First-past-the-post: undermining democracy in United Kingdom general

elections

A dissertation undertaken as part of the BSc (Hons) in Politics & History at Brunel University

Student number: 1109484

24th April 2014

11,628 words

Contents

Acknowledgments

Abstract

Introduction

Chapter 1: Electoral systems: party system shapers?

Chapter 2: The functions of an electoral system

Representation

Accountability/legitimacy

Participation

Voter choice

Chapter 3: The elements of Democracy

Liberty

Participation

Equality

Chapter 4: FPTP: a functionally democratic system?

Functions of an electoral system

Representation

Accountability/legitimacy

Participation

Voter choice

Summary

Elements of democracy

Liberty

2

Participation

Equality

Summary

Conclusion

Bilbiography

3

Acknowledgments

Writing this dissertation has been the hardest academic endeavor I have yet

had to face, and I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to those who have helped

make this possible.

Firstly, I would like to extend my warmest thanks to my dissertation

supervisor Martin Hansen, for helping guide my research, allowing this thesis to grow

organically. Your advice helped narrow my research, culminating in something more

focused than I could have imagined at the start of my research.

I would also like to my flat mates for their support in this process. Especially,

Matt Thomas for being my work partner, helping to convince me to spend those long

days and nights in the library, honing in on this thesis. Additionally, Ryan Allister, for

his help in formatting as well as being my go-to proofreader.

Lastly, none of this would have been possible without the support of my family,

who have motivated me to finish this, giving me the moral support I needed at some of

the more frustrating moments of my research.

4

First-past-the-post: undermining democracy in United Kingdom

general elections

The changing political climate in the United Kingdom has led many to

criticise its first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections through a variety of

frameworks. Political scientists have too often assessed electoral systems

mathematically, providing an objective answer based on a criterion that

allows a voting system to either pass or fail. Electoral systems should be

assessed for functionality, so as to provide practical relevance. This

dissertation will employ a functional analysis of FPTP based upon what it

is designed to achieve as an electoral system, and how well it achieves the

elements of democracy. This dissertation seeks to understand whether the

FPTP system for UK general elections is hampering democracy.

Introduction

The party system in the United Kingdom (UK) has changed dramatically since

the end of the Second World War. There has been a considerable fall in the electoral

support of the two main parties (Labour and Conservative). This has coincided with a

scholarly recognised fall in class voting (see Franklin 1984, Evans & Tilley 2012), as

the electorate has increasingly not been restricted to a binary choice between the two

predominant parties. This fall in voting for Labour and the Conservative Party has

coincided with the rise of smaller parties, beginning largely in the 1980s, and has

resulted in the fixation of the Liberal Democrats as the third party of British politics.

These circumstances have been met with a voter turnout that has been following a

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general pattern of decline, which has rapidly dropped off further over the last 20

years. These changes in the party system have led many to focus on whether the

electoral system was responsible for any of these phenomena.

Electoral systems are the manifestation of a vital link between the preferences

of the people and their democratic representation. Michael Gallagher and Paul

Mitchell define an electoral system as the ‘set of rules that structure how votes are

cast at elections for representative assembly and how these votes are then converted

into seats in that assembly’ (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005, p. 3). It is important now to

draw attention to the distinct difference between electoral systems, and electoral laws.

Electoral laws are the rules that govern the process of elections; including when the

election is called, who can vote, campaigning regulations, all up until counting the

votes. Electoral systems are the means by which votes are translated into seats, that

is, how voting preference becomes political power.

Electoral systems are the means by which individual preferences (social

choice) are amalgamated into a legitimate cohesive whole (democracy). André Blais

(1999) stated that the evaluation of an electoral system hinges on two sets of

judgments: Empirical judgments, concerning the consequences of alternative systems,

and normative judgments about whether these consequences are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This

first dimension, empirical judgments, has been extensively studied by mathematically

minded political scientists, with various attempts to assess electoral systems using

mathematical apparatus, such that any voting system either passes or fails. This has

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been common procedure in discussing social choice and democracy, turning the

scholarship into a technical, mathematical exercise.

The Marquis de Condorcet used a mathematic framework as far back as the

late 18th century, creating the Condorcet criterion, which states that for a social choice

to be legitimate, it must beat or tie all other alternatives. From this stemmed his

paradox: the fundamental difficulty in making sure that social decisions are

consistent, as a collective choice should be mostly representative of the distribution of

opinions among the electorate (Giansanti, 2007, p. 308). Let it be noted that a

Condorcet winner will not always be present from a set of votes, which is part of the

paradox.

Douglas Rae (1971) furthered the academic endeavor, giving the first

systematic comparative analysis of electoral systems, applying mathematical social

science tools to elections to determine the effects of electoral laws upon electoral

results. Also, Kenneth Arrow (1950) demonstrated through an economic framework

that when voters have three or more options, no rank order voting system can

amalgamate individual preferences into a cohesive, legitimate whole. This is known as

Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Arrow accomplished this by creating six conditions of

fairness that need to be met to have a fair, logical result. He stated that so long as

society preserves democratic institutions, its members can expect that some of their

social choices will be unordered or inconsistent (Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of

Social Welfare, 1950). Gibbard–Satterthwaite (Gibbard 1973, 1977 and Satterthwaite

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1975) developed Arrow’s discoveries by explicitly applying it to elections, thus

providing an electoral winner, over just an order.

These mathematical, empirical theories give perfectly objective results, but

lack in practical relevance. When empirical political scientists want to answer the

question of how well a political system meets democratic norms, they need a

democratic theory that will clarify those norms in ways that make it easier to

determine when real-world situations conform to, or violate, them (Mansbridge, 2003,

p. 11).

The second dimension, normative judgments, has also been studied

extensively. Many observers see electoral fairness as a central democratic concern.

Notwithstanding, they often fail to provide a precise meaning of fairness,

subsequently obscuring the language of democracy, and thus hampering the

evaluation of political institutions. For example, Michael Pinto- Duschinsky argues in

favour of FPTP, deriding alternatives as ‘unfair’ (Pinto Duschinsky, 1999, p. 114)‐ ,

whereas Austin Mitchell denounced first-past-the-post (FPTP) as unfair and

undemocratic (Mitchell, 1993, p. 88). These different conclusions are derived from the

same vague notion of ‘fairness’. Adrian Blau (2004) attempted to correct this problem

by explicitly defining fairness, suggesting that there are five different conceptions of

fairness (equality, populist, winner-takes-all, majority, and plurality). An equality

conception of fairness is usually invoked by scholars, although not effectively, delving

into a philosophical stratosphere rather than grounding it on pragmatic research.

Even when fairness is defined explicitly, it poses problems, as it is not a distinct

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property of an electoral system, but rather a judgment based on other principles of

the system.

FPTP has already met considerable scholarly review using these different

frameworks. Institutions have attempted to define what an electoral system should

do, and aim to achieve. The Independent Commission on the Voting System,

colloquially known as the ‘Jenkins Commission’, established by Tony Blair’s Labour

government, concluded that there are four key functions that an electoral system used

for elections to Westminster should achieve (The Independent Commission on the

Voting System, 1998);

1. Broad proportionality

2. The need for stable government

3. Extension of voter choice

4. The maintenance of the constituency linking an MP to a geographical

area.

This is a form of assessing functionality. However rather than specifically

stating ideal democratic functions of an electoral system, the Jenkins Commission

instead mentions vague notions without a precise means of measuring them.

This dissertation will evaluate FPTP through a third, and unique, judgment:

democratic functionality. This will be done by analysing the functions of an electoral

system, and, subsequently, the elements of democracy that an electoral system (as the

means by which we vote) is meant to achieve. This link between the theory of social

choice and the theory of democracy is not unique, however, this dissertation’s

9

approach of assessing an electoral system’s worth by judging democratic functionality

helps to fill a gap in the otherwise extensive scholarly literature. This dissertation

seeks to understand whether or not FPTP for UK general elections hampers

democracy.

Before defining the functions of an electoral system, as well as the elements of

democracy that it is supposed to achieve, this dissertation must demonstrate that

electoral systems influence the party system, as opposed to being influenced by it. As,

if the party system is not a function, at least in part, of the electoral system, it is

difficult to establish the significance of the effects of the electoral system in

determining the quality of democracy present. Once this influence is proved, precise

definitions of each of the functions of an electoral system, as well as the elements of

democracy, will be provided along with an appropriate means of measuring them.

Whilst this dissertation will not offer insights into or preferences for

alternative electoral systems, as it is largely concerned with democratic normative

judgments, its stress of democratic functionality seeks to bridge a gap between

empirical and normative political science theories. This will allow future empirically

minded political scientists to understand the relevance of the normative claims of

political philosophy in regard to social choice analysis, thereby making it easier for

them to determine when real-world situations conform to, or violate, them.

Considering both the changes in the composition of the UK party system, and the

relationship between the theory of social choice and democracy, an alternative

10

method of evaluating FPTP is important, as ‘what is at stake is not mathematical

'fairness' but democracy itself’ (Pinto Duschinsky, 1999, p. 126)‐ .

Chapter 1 will reveal the scholarly divide concerning whether electoral

systems are a product of the party system, or vice versa. This will be carried forward

in Chapter 2, where key authors and literature will be evaluated to define the

functions of an electoral system. Once these functions have been defined and

understood, a methodology of measuring and assessing them will be provided.

Chapter 3 will use a similar framework of consulting key authors and literature to

understand the principal elements of democracy. A method for measuring these

principles will then be provided. Chapter 4 will then apply these methods of

assessment upon the FPTP system for Westminster elections, analysing, and then

discussing the implications.

11

Chapter 1: Electoral systems, party system shapers?

Maurice Duverger (1964), more than any other, demonstrated the influence of

electoral systems on the party system, and provided the building block for this area of

political science, with many subsequent authors basing their works on his scholarship.

Duverger’s eponymous law states that single-member district, simple plurality

electoral systems, like FPTP, inhibit the formation of more than two parties, even if

social cleavages call for a larger number. Duverger states that single-member district,

simple plurality electoral systems inhibit the formation of more than two parties, due

to the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems (Duverger, 1964).

Mechanical effects are concerned with the translation of votes to seats. For instance,

single member, simple plurality system rules have made it difficult for smaller parties

to gain representation because such rules favour larger parties. This mapping is a

zero-sum process, meaning that the over-representation of large parties must create

an under-representation of the smaller parties. Sartori (1976) gives an example of this

claim, stating that electoral systems can be ‘feeble’ or ‘strong’, meaning that they can

be permissive or inhospitable to small parties. Other scholars have corroborated this

claim that the tendency of FPTP is to advantage big parties at the disadvantage of

small ones (see Taagapera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994, Benoit 2002).

These mechanical effects are reinforced by psychological effects, which

concern voting behaviour: voters anticipate electoral outcomes provided by the

mechanical distortion in the translation of votes to seats and, thus, adapt their voting

behaviour. This alludes to strategic or tactical voting, as voters who consider their

12

vote to not be of any electoral weight are less likely to vote, or to vote tactically and

not to their true preference.

Duverger’s Law has been examined with increasing sophistication, and even

contradicted in certain cases. Duverger’s Law was most famously contradicted by the

party system in Malta, where the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, which is

designed to achieve proportional representation, is present, yet Malta has a two-party

system. However, this apparent contradiction is derived from a misconception that

Duverger’s Law is absolute. Duverger himself states that it is not unconditional;

however, plurality could act to delay the emergence of a new political force and would

accelerate the elimination of a weakening force (Duverger, 1972, pp. 23-32). In

layman’s terms, plurality systems such as FPTP make it more difficult for smaller

parties to be politically significant.

The Cube Law has also been used to explain Duverger’s Law. At its simplest,

the Cube Law means that in a two-party election, a party with a one percentage point

lead in votes would have a three point lead in seats, and a party with a two point lead

in votes would have a six point lead in seats. David Butler, the Cube Law’s principal

author, concluded that FPTP exaggerates narrow majorities in votes into sizeable

majorities in seats (Butler, 1963). However, the Cube Law’s effectiveness at explaining

FPTP’s mechanical distortion of electoral outcomes is believed to have diminished

(see Blau, 2004).

Attempts have also been made to reverse Duverger’s Law by stating that

electoral systems are an effect of party systems rather than a cause. Josep Colomer

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(2005) argues this view by stating that Duverger’s Law is ‘upside down’, and that it is

the party system that chooses the electoral institutions. However, Colomer does not

deny that existing electoral systems offer positive and negative incentives for the

creation and endurance of political parties, although he argues that ‘because electoral

systems may have important consequences on shaping the party system, it can be

supposed that they are chosen by already existing political actors in their own

interest’ (Colomer, 2005, p. 1). This statement has direct implications for our ability to

make statements about the political consequences of electoral systems through

comparative observation, since electoral systems may be driven by, rather than drive,

the polarising pressures described by Duverger. However, the fact that it does not

attempt to discredit electoral systems effects on the party system, it can be contested.

This dissertation is not attempting to claim contrary to Colomer concerning whether

parties are helping to maintain the current system if it is working in their favour, that

is considered a separate issue.

Even those who accept Duverger’s Law argue that it is not completely

understood. William Clark and Matt Golder (2006) argue that even though Duverger’s

Law is widely accepted, its implications are not completely understood. They suggest

that whilst Duverger is often labelled as the founder of the institutionalist approach to

party systems, his theories in fact state that social heterogeneity is the primary

driving force behind the number of parties in a party system. They continue by stating

that once this point is recognised, Duverger’s Law can be seen as a mere implication,

rather than a theory itself, and that it is social heterogeneity that increases the

number of parties, once the electoral system is sufficiently permissive (Clark & Golder,

14

2006, p. 704).

Duverger's formulation of his law provided a far more comprehensive and

extensive analysis of the relationship of electoral institutions and party systems than

any prior attempts. It offered a detailed explanation, not just of the consequences that

electoral institutions produced, but also of the procedure by which they influenced

political parties in bringing about these outcomes. Duverger’s implications were self-

prescribed as law-like, but should not be considered so. The institutional

characteristics of electoral systems should be treated as producing tendencies in party

systems that are probabilistic, not deterministic, in nature (Benoit, 2006, p. 76).

Duverger’s implications that the influence of electoral systems on the party system are

probabilistic, not deterministic, is still adequate for lines of analysis, as conclusions

regarding the likelihood that an electoral system will mechanically and

psychologically alter electoral outcomes is still important.

This dissertation will be based upon the norm that electoral systems shape the

party system, as they influence the range of choice available to the electorate, and

affect the stability of governments. Also, they structure the relationship between the

executive and the assembly, establishing a bias in favour of either conflict or

consensus, shaping the general character of the political culture. Even if the

relationship can be deemed probabilistic and not deterministic, it should not distract

us from the fact that where there is a system of single-member, simple plurality

system, it is more likely to be a two party system.

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Chapter 2: The functions of an electoral system

In the previous chapter, Duverger’s Law was considered. From this discussion

it was observed that electoral systems can have both mechanical and psychological

effects on the party system, although these implications are probabilistic, rather than

deterministic.

Douglas Rae’s seminal work (1967) on electoral systems showed us that they

are made of three key characteristics: electoral formula (translating votes to seats),

district magnitude (number of members to be elected per constituency), and ballot

structure (how electoral choices are presented on the ballot). Long accepted, this

work has now been under much intensified scrutiny. Arend Lijphart (1994) argues

that electoral systems embody seven attributes, not three: electoral formula, district

magnitude, electoral threshold, total membership of the body to be elected, the

influence of presidential elections on legislative elections, malapportionment, and

interparty electoral links (Lijphart, 1994, pp. 145-146). An electoral system’s

functionality can be derived from the design of an electoral system, based on these

criteria. However, when considering democratic functionality, an electoral system

needs to be assessed on more than its internal composition, with more being done to

determine its outward effects on the quality of democracy.

When considering the democratic functionality of an electoral system, its

functionality could be seen as dependent on the perceived notions of what voting is

and what it is actually supposed to achieve, as an electoral system is the means by

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which one actuates their preference. Voting as an instrument of social choice has the

principal function of serving democracy, as voting is the central act of democracy.

Historically, there is a fundamental divide in understanding why people do or

do not vote, comprising two main schools of interpretation: liberal and populist. The

liberal voter votes only to control officials, and no more. This is because the electorate

is riddled with the fear of the tyranny of the majority. On the other hand, populists are

more Rousseauist, believing in a social contract between elected and electors.

Populists argue that liberty and self-determination through participation are obtained

by embodying the will of the people in the actions of officials (Riker, 1988, pp. 11-12).

The principal difference between the two schools is that in the populist interpretation,

the opinions of the majority must be respected as they are the general will, while the

liberal view simply states that the outcome of voting is just a decision.

More recently, rational choice theorists have attempted to understand voting

by concerning themselves with individuals and the criteria they use to make a social

choice, rather than looking at the profiles of voters and their social backgrounds. This

approach does not attempt to diminish the findings of political sociologists, accepting

that they may affect the final decision. However, it attempts to study the actual

mechanisms that take place in a voter’s mind as they make a decision. Anthony

Downs, perhaps the founder of modern rational choice theory, demonstrates this in

his book An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) by stating that the axiom that

citizens act rationally in politics implies that each citizen casts their vote for the party

that will maximise their utility (Downs, 1957, p. 36). However, rational choice

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explanations of why people vote are deductive, relying on theoretical models to

explain real world policy outcomes and often oversimplifying human motivation and

interaction.

As in most divides between scholarly thought, the optimum solution is

somewhere in between. Clark and Golder (2006) aptly suggest that there need not be

a tension between the explanations for why one votes, as both sociological and

institutional explanations are important as electoral institutions translate social

choices into political parties, i.e., sociological factors into political institutions (Clark &

Golder, 2006, pp. 679-680). For this reason, one needs not to be overly concerned

with why people vote, as it would be better to focus on the democratic implications of

this vote.

The functions of an electoral system need not be derived from its design, or the

perceived purpose of voting. They can be understood at their simplest levels by

examining the purpose of an election. The UK, as a parliamentary democracy, holds

the government accountable, as its legitimacy comes from representatives who

embody the people. From this, one can derive some of the functions of elections in the

UK. Firstly, an election must provide representation, which is evident for a

representative democracy. A second function, therefore, is legitimacy, as elections

make government legitimate by representing us. Thirdly, elections must allow for

participation, as they are the means by which we vote. This is perhaps the most

obvious variable, but it must be provided at the same time as voter choice, as offering

participation, but not amenable choice, would not be democratic. For these reasons,

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and considering the onset analysis of democratic functionality, this dissertation will

show that electoral systems have four main functions: representation,

accountability/legitimacy, participation, and voter choice.

Representation

Representation has been at the centre of the democratic debate for hundreds of

years. John Stuart Mill (1861), in his book Considerations on Representative

Government, understood political representation to be when politicians mirror or

reproduce the composition of an electorate (Manin, Przeworksi, & Stokes, 1999, p.

32). Edmund Burke had a different viewpoint, stating that a representative owes you

(the constituent), not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of

helps you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion (Burke, 1854, pp. 446-448). As early as the

18th century, it was clear that representation had multiple methods of being achieved.

Mill had advocated what at the time was considered an agency conception of

representation: the government’s interests should coincide with that of the

community as a whole. Burke, however, argued in favour of a trustee conception of

representation: the community relies on the expertise of the representative to make

informed decisions. Representation cannot be merely understood as a substantive

acting for others. There is more to representation than simply reflecting the

represented preferences, there is a normative judgment over what constitutes good

representation.

Hannah Pitkin (1967) attempted to stay clear of normative judgments by

defining representation as a word firstly, before being concerned with how a

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representative should act, what their obligations are, and how their role is defined.

She identifies four main strands of understanding the concept of representation,

formalistic, symbolic, descriptive and substantive. She concludes by stating that a

representative electoral system is one that gives us a parliament that is inherently

torn between ideal and achievement, attempting to construct institutions and pursue

the public interest, whilst remaining critical of said institutions and staying open to

further reform (Pitkin, 1967, p. 240).

Jane Mansbridge (2003) attempted to narrow the gap between the empirical

findings of the last 20 years and the normative theories of what constitutes ‘good’

representation, building upon the trustee and agency conceptions of representation

outlined by Mill and Burke. She notes that empirical work in the last 20 years has

identified at least three other forms of representation, which she calls, ‘anticipatory,’

‘gyroscopic,’ and ‘surrogate’, on top of the contemporary traditional model of

representation, the ‘principal-agent’, which she refers to as ‘promissory’

representation. Anticipatory representation is where the representative tries to

please future voters. Gyroscopic representation is where voters select representatives

who can be expected to act in ways the voter approves without external incentives:

representatives act like gyroscopes, maintaining a certain direction, pursuing certain

built-in goals with their deeper accountability to the political party of which they

identify. Surrogate representation is representation by a representative with whom

one has no electoral relationship: a normatively critical role of providing

representation to voters who lose in their own districts. These concepts of

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representation are concerned largely with the MPs themselves, rather than the

broader implications of the electoral system (Mansbridge, 2003).

Contemporarily, considerable scholarly debate has arisen over what political

representation is supposed to be, with the distinction being largely over a ‘microcosm’

and a ‘principal-agent’ concept of representation. The key difference between the two

being that the ‘microcosm’ form of representation entails that parliament is

proportionally representative of voters: a sociological mirroring of society, whereas a

‘principal-agent’ method of representation does not see this as necessary, as

parliament is there to represent people’s interests, not their characteristics. As long as

they are representing the people’s interests, it is just (Farrell, 2001, p. 11). Of course, a

parliamentary system that helped to promote proportionality of features such as

ethnicity or sex would be desirable to most, if not all. However, it opens room for

problems concerning what traits should be recognised. For instance, should

something as small as eye colour be recognised?

Measuring representation has often depended on empirical studies that

examine correlations, which lack theoretical insight, as well as having the potential to

cause mischief by conflating correlation with cause. Christopher Achen (1978)

demonstrated an alternate means to determine representativeness by measuring key

features that make one representative. Achen measured proximity (nearness of

legislator to citizen), centrism (index of performance to represent), and

responsiveness (legislators willingness to adapt to his/her constituents). By splitting

representation into key variables, it simplifies their analysis, it also demonstrates how

21

alternative systems can be considered representative in different manners. Despite

Achen’s contributions, a systematic analysis of representation to this extent is due its

own specific research question. Thus, this dissertation will measure electoral systems’

influence on representation by analysing its mechanical effects. This entails looking at

how people and parties are affected by the translation of votes to seats.

Accountability/legitimacy

The scholarship of legitimacy (or accountability) has existed since Hobbes,

Locke and Rousseau attempted to explain how the social contract was instigated and

upheld. John Locke (1690) stated that men are naturally free, and governments exist

by the consent of the people to protect the rights of the people and promote the public

good. Locke used this claim to understand political accountability, as the governing

bodies are answerable to the governed as a result of the social contract in which the

governed have transferred some of their rights to the government in exchange for

their lives, liberty and property. Locke contends that since governments are a function

of the consent of the will of the people, a government that fails to protect the rights of

the people and promote the public good can be replaced (Locke, 1690).

Edmund Burke (1774) was also at the forefront of attempting to decide what

makes a representative accountable, or legitimate, in a representative democracy. He

stated two different types of accountability; mandate and trustee. Mandate

accountability is where a representative promises to follow the constituents’

instructions or expressed desires. This is in contrast to trustee accountability, in

which the representative promises to further the constituency’s long-term interests

22

and the interests of the nation as a whole (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 2). Much like in the

debate on representation, legitimacy is normative to whether the representative is

deemed to reflect the wishes of their constituents, or to pursue the public good, even if

that means going against public wishes.

This dissertation will demonstrate that in a democracy, government legitimacy

derives from the popular perception that the elected government abides by

democratic principles. Legitimacy, which is provided through winning elections, is

subservient to the other functions of electoral systems. An electoral system that

allows participation, represents properly, and satisfies voter choice is providing

legitimate and accountable government. Thus, measuring legitimacy is a question of

how well other functions are met. This can be understood by looking into the nature

of winner that a system provides; from this one can understand the likelihood that an

electoral system will be able to function well.

Participation

Participation is a crucial function of elections, as well as an attribute of

democracy. The original meaning of the Greek word democracy was participation.

Archon Fung (2006) posed three key questions to help understand how participation

is being achieved; who is allowed to participate, and are they representative of the

population? What is the method of communication or decision-making? And how

much influence or authority is granted to the participation? (Fung, 2006, p. 66).

Understanding an electoral system’s influence on participation must be

understood by looking at why one would turn out to vote, rather than how one would

23

participate, as Fung (2006) does. This could superficially be assessed by looking at

voter turnout at UK general elections, however this would only determine the

mechanical effects of a voting system, doing little to help us understand why people

participate in politics. Assessing participation should be mainly concerned with

Duverger’s implication that electoral systems psychologically influence voters’

behaviour. Looking at safe seats can be helpful to understand the presence of any

psychological constraints on participation.

Voter choice

Providing sufficient voter choice is often seen as the most important function

of an electoral system, and is frequently referred to as the principal failure of FPTP.

Duverger’s Law helped to demonstrate that single-member, district simple plurality

elections, such as FPTP, inhibit the formation of more than two parties, even if social

cleavages call for a larger number. This is because electoral systems have mechanical

and psychological effects.

It would be easy to assess voter choice mechanically, by how many parties are

represented at parliament. However, the system makes some minor seat holders

almost worthless. A better measure would be an effective number of parties index.

The Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) and the Effective Number of

Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) are two measures that can provide an indication of the

number of relevant parties at electoral and parliamentary levels.

Psychologically, this could be assessed by analysing election survey data to see

whether there is a discrepancy between people’s actual stated preference and how

24

they voted in general elections. Of course, this method assumes that respondents

answer truthfully. By creating a preference order, sympathy for party can be used to

suggest how they would vote. These statistics, when juxtaposed to actual voting

patterns, will show whether there is a discrepancy between actual preference and

vote. Using survey results, something that the Michigan Model championed (see,

Campbell et al. 1960), conclusions can be drawn regarding how people would have

voted if the psychological implications of the electoral system were taken out of the

equation. Rather than explain voting behaviour by looking at the psychological

attachment to a political party, it would state the preferred vote.

This would allow us to understand the extent to which voters have to choose

their candidate tactically. An electoral system can either be hospitable or permissive

to smaller parties, and this is reflected in tactical voting. If an electoral system is likely

to mechanically inhibit a party, a rational voter is likely to vote for an alternative that

has a chance of victory.

The functions of an electoral system are to enable representation, make

government accountable or legitimate, promote participation, and give the voter a

proper choice. Now that we understand the functions of an electoral system, the

theories of social choice and democracy can be linked.

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Chapter 3: The elements of democracy

In the previous chapter, it was concluded that electoral systems have four main

functions. They should facilitate representation, accountability/legitimacy,

participation and voter choice.

Democracy, which has been apparent from the ancient world to that of the

modern, has resulted in a plethora of different goals and methods. There is no unique

authoritative definition of democracy. However, Riker extensively studied scholars’

attempts to define democracy, and what it’s principle properties are, which

culminated in three common elements; liberty, participation and equality (Riker,

1988, p. 5). It should be made clear that there is bound to be some overlap of the

elements of democracy and the functions of an electoral system, as voting is the

central act of democracy. Arend Lijphart (1994) believed that there are different types

of democracy, principally majoritarian or consensus. She notes that the UK has a

majoritarian democracy. However, the type of democracy is not important when one

considers its fundamental elements.

Geraldo Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002) demonstrate the difficulty in

conceptualising and measuring democracy as ‘the methodological issues that are

relevant to the generation of data and that have a direct bearing on the quality of data

on democracy are only partially addressed in the methodological literature’ (Munck &

Verkuilen, 2002, p. 7). This results in democratic indices that provide an answer, but

one that is not of good quality. This dissertation will conceptualise liberty,

participation and equality in a manner that is neither maximalist (the inclusion of

26

theoretically irrelevant attributes) nor minimalist (the exclusion of theoretically

relevant attributes), making sure that less weight is placed on the precise nature of

the term, rather its implications (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002, p. 8).

Liberty

Liberty as a concept has always been at the forefront of democratic politics.

Historically, liberty can be understood as an instrument of democracy, rather than an

element of democracy. This is because democratic liberty is necessary to organise

participation in government. In the times before universal suffrage, liberty was more

of a means of achieving democratic participation, as opposed to now, when it is

enshrined in the very meaning of the word democracy (Riker, 1988, p.7).

Liberty is a vague notion that is difficult to measure. Attempts to explain what

liberty is have been explained through the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke,

and Rousseau, who attempted to define the active exercise of freedom and rights.

However, it would be easy to get wound up in political philosophy attempting to

define and measure liberty. This dissertation will simply regard liberty as the state of

being free within society from oppressive restrictions imposed by authority on one's

behaviour or political views. However they are expressed, liberty and democracy are

closely linked, as the association is instrumental because liberty is necessary to

organise participation in government. A good indicator of having the liberty to exhibit

one’s political views is the level of strategic (or tactical) voting present. Does the

electoral system psychologically limit voters, or are they free to vote as they wish?

27

Participation

As both a function of electoral systems and an element of democracy,

participation’s importance is unrivalled. Democratic participation differs from

participation as a function of an electoral system because voting is a necessary, but

not sufficient, condition of democracy, and needs to be surrounded with other access

points to positions of power. To make them equal, voting must be a part of a political

system with political parties and free speech, which help to organise voting into

genuine choice (Riker, 1988, p. 5).

Participation and voter turnout are terms that are used almost synonymously.

Whilst there is a strong relationship between the two variables, it is short sighted to

measure participation solely by voter turnout. Democracy is not something that only

happens on the day of an election. Thus, democratic participation cannot just be

assessed off of voter turnout. Party membership is an indicator of participation,

however, it is difficult to conclusively link the electoral systems’ effects to that of party

membership, as there are many variables that influence party membership. For

instance, electoral salience and leadership popularity are popular reasons for

fluctuations in membership. Nevertheless, looking at levels of membership still

provides an indicator of the electoral system’s effect on the party system.

28

Equality

The ability of an electoral system to provide equality is referring explicitly to

the concept of ‘one man, one vote’ (or ‘one person, one vote’). Equality is the state of

being provided with the same status, rights or opportunities as others. Considering

the electoral systems, it is their ability to give equal weight and importance to each

vote. Robert Dahl illustrated the difficulties in measuring political equality, as;

‘Unlike income or wealth, or even health, longevity, and other possible ends,

to estimate gains and losses in political equality we lack cardinal measures

that would allow us to say, for example, that ‘political equality is twice as

great in country X as in country Y. At best we must rely on ordinal measures

based on judgments about ‘more,’ ‘less,’ ‘about the same,’ and the like.’ (Dahl,

On Political Equality, 2006, p. 78).

Dahl’s view notwithstanding, measuring equality concerning the mechanical

and psychological effects of an electoral system can be derived from the weight of a

vote. This can be done at multiple levels. Firstly, is every vote electorally worth the

same amount? Secondly, are parties valuing each vote to the same extent? This can be

assessed by looking at campaigning efforts of parties in different constituencies,

whether marginal or safe. Then one can consider the phenomenon of wasted votes. A

wasted vote is one that is not for an elected candidate, or is not needed in electing a

candidate (i.e., it is in excess of the support they need). Looking at wasted votes can be

helpful in assessing whether our votes are in equal mechanical importance in forming

government.

29

William Riker (1988) states that however the goals of democracy are defined,

and which sort of party system is adopted (majoritarian or consensus), its method

involves some kind of popular participation in government, thus linking the theories

of social choice and democracy, and making voting the central act of democracy. This

dissertation will use a viewpoint similar to Riker’s in the sense that to provide

coherence, it will hold that all the elements of the democratic method are means to

render voting practically effective and politically significant, as voting is the central

act of democracy (Riker, 1988).

30

Chapter 4: FPTP: a functionally democratic system?

In the previous chapters, the scholarly debates concerning the function of an

electoral system have been evaluated, concluding that they are designed to achieve;

representation, accountability, participation, and voter choice. On top of this, the

elements of democracy were seen as; liberty, participation, and equality. Now that we

understand the functions of an election, the elements of democracy, as well as voting

being the crucial link between the theories of social choice and democracy, we can

begin to use these tools to assess FPTP.

At UK general elections, FPTP works by employing single-member

constituencies, where the electorate votes for candidates rather than for a party. The

winning candidate need only get a plurality of the votes (more than anybody else), not

an overall majority. It has been hailed as simple system that provides the UK with

strong, stable single-party government, with an inbuilt working majority, all whilst

maintaining the constituency link between MP and the electorate: a cornerstone of

British representative democracy. FPTP in its current form, with single-member

constituencies, has been used to elect MPs to Westminster since 1950, when the last

multi-member constituencies were abolished. Historically, before 1885 the

predominant pattern had been two-member seats. On top of this, other electoral

systems have been used during two phases of parliamentary history – the Limited

Vote in some boroughs from 1867 to 1885, and the Single Transferable Vote in the

university seats from 1918 to 1950 (Electoral Reform Society, 2007, p. 28). FPTP in its

31

current form has not long been a central part of British electoral democracy, devaluing

a historical sentimentalist defence of it.

The party system in the UK, post-World War Two, has undergone a process of

drastic change. The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a process of political

dealignment based upon class. Class-based voting is judged to have dropped from

around 60% in the 1960s to around 40% in 2005 (Denver, et al., 2012). This

weakening class cleavage opened the door for other political conflicts, which were

given a new platform to be expressed through new political parties and devolved

institutions (Clark, 2012, pp. 10-16).

Functions of an electoral system

FPTP has been seen as a very functional system, often cited as providing a

strong, stable, single-party government. Consider the claims that FPTP is strong and

stable. On at least four occasions post-World War Two, FPTP has failed to provide a

single-party government. In the general election of February 1974, there was a hung

parliament, resulting in Labour having to call a re-election for October 1974. The

Labour party won, albeit securing a tiny majority of just 3 votes. More recently, the

1992 Conservative election victory under John Major left them with a minuscule

majority that would dwindle away over the parliament through defections and by-

election defeats, resulting in a Conservative minority government. Perhaps most

substantially, in 2010 the UK was led to another hung parliament with the

Conservatives 20 seats short of an overall majority, resulting in a coalition deal

between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. This provides ample

32

ground to question FPTP’s functionality. It will now be evaluated to see if it is

functioning adequately, beginning with how well it represents.

Representation

An electoral system has the function of representation, as it is the means by

which our preferences are put into government. FPTP exhibits a principal agent

concept of representation, as constituents elect their MP, and they represent them at

Westminster. This entails that FPTP concerns itself with parliament’s decisions, rather

than its composition. This means that the make-up of the House of Commons is not a

microcosm of British society, nor does it have to be to represent. FPTP’s ability to be

functionally representative must be evaluated at two levels; people, and parties.

For the individual voter, FPTP’s winner-takes-all elections means that those

whose preferred policies attract a minority of votes could theoretically end up with no

representation in the legislature (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 9). Principal agent

representation, whilst providing a representative, does not account for the inbuilt

mechanical discrimination to smaller parties. For instance, the UK Independence

Party (UKIP) do not have a single seat in the House of Commons, despite taking 3.1%

of the nationwide vote in 2010: not far fewer than 1 million votes (BBC, 2010).

Mechanically, FPTP distorts electoral results in its translation of votes to seats,

this is undeniable. In the process it strengthens larger parties, in an attempt to ensure

strong, stable, single-party government. From Table 1 you can see the mechanical bias

in the translation of votes to seats, demonstrating a sizeable deviation between the

two variables. For instance, the Labour party, getting just 6% more of the votes than

33

the Liberal Democrats, gained over 4 times as many seats; whereas Labour received

7.1% less than the Conservative vote, but roughly 80% of their amount of seats.

Table 1: Parties’ share of the vote in the UK general election 2010

Share of Vote (%) Number of seats

Conservative 36.1 306

Labour 29 258

Liberal Democrat 23 57

Others 11.9 28

Source: (BBC, 2010)

FPTP still punishes third parties in terms of seats won relative to their share of

the vote. In 2010 it took: 33,468 votes to elect a Labour MP, 35,028 votes to elect a

Conservative MP, and 119,780 votes to elect a Liberal Democrat MP (Lodge &

Gottfried, 2011, p. 14).

These sorts of discrepancies between votes and seats occur because the

geographical distribution of a party’s support is almost as important as its level: the

system rewards parties with concentrations of electoral support and penalises those

whose support is more evenly spread. On two occasions this has led to the party

winning the most votes, not winning the election: In 1951, the Conservatives won

more seats than Labour on a lower percentage of the popular vote, and in February

1974, Labour formed a government on a lower proportion of the popular vote than

the Conservatives. (Denver, Carman, & Johns, 2012, p. 208).

34

Table 2: proportional map of electoral seats at the 2005 UK general election

Source: (The Guardian, 2010)

A look at the constituency proportional map of the UK in Table 2 demonstrates

the geographical monopoly of the major parties’ concentration of votes in the 2005 UK

general election. From this one can really identify the electoral geography that

dominates FPTP’s mechanical conversion of votes to seats. The United Kingdom is

politically defined largely by two parties, Labour or Conservative, red or blue.

35

Accountability/legitimacy

In a representative democracy, a legitimate and accountable government is one

that holds a mandate to govern. This mandate comes from winning a free, fair, regular

elections. The principal challenge to FPTP’s ability to provide accountability is the

nature of winner it provides.

FPTP has on many occasions elected MPs to parliament with low levels of

public support, often resulting in more votes for alternative candidates than for them.

In the constituency of Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber, Sir Russell Johnston won his

seat in the 1992 general election with just 26% of the vote. The actual figure is worse

than this when those who did not vote are factored in, culminating in just 19%. Whilst

this may be an extreme example, it is common for MPs to win on figures far short of

50%: this demonstrates the weakness of plurality winners (Farrell, 2001, p. 23). It is

difficult to convincingly argue that FPTP is providing an accountable, legitimate

government, when its winning candidates harbour such low public support.

FPTP also fails to provide legitimacy because of its mechanical likelihood to

harbour safe seats, which are antithetical to accountable and legitimate

representatives. There is a fundamental problem when less than 10% of the seats up

for contest at election times are considered key for deciding the victor. FPTP has led

to many seats becoming ‘ossified’. Mark Pack demonstrated that since 1945, one third

of seats have consistently been held by the same party, a figure that rises to half of all

seats since 1970 (Lodge & Gottfried, 2011, p. 13). The phenomenon of the safe seat is

underpinned by the remarkably static electoral geography that FPTP exhibits. At the

36

2001 UK General Election, 506 of the 641 MPs (79%) were returned with majorities of

10% or more. The pattern was very similar in 2005, when 461 of the 628

constituencies (73%) returned MPs with majorities on this scale. More than this, the

UK has a sizeable proportion of constituencies that can be described as ‘ultra-safe’,

with MPs securing majorities of 20% or above. A total of 281 constituencies (45% of

all seats) were in this category after the 2005 General Election (Wilks-Heeg, 2010, p.

3).

FPTP’s inherent support of plurality winners makes it difficult for it to be

functionally accountable. Plurality winners give you a victor, when in reality, there is

not one. It is not democratically functional to amalgamate a constituency’s

preferences into a ‘winning’ candidate with a small percentage of popular support,

and claim they are representatively accountable to them. On top of this it mechanically

harbours safe seats, creating ‘ossified’ constituencies.

Participation

Elections are principal way that the electorate participates in national politics

and, hence, why it is an important function of an electoral system. Despite an increase

in voter turnout in the last general election (61.3% to 65.3%), this is still a great deal

lower than any general election between 1950 and 1997. Voter turnout in general has

been on a downward spiral since the end of The Second World War, albeit with some

small peaks.

37

Table 3; turnout % in UK general elections, 1959-2010.

19591964

19661970

1974 (Feb

)

1974 (Oct)

19791983

19871992

19972001

20052010

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

General election turnout % (1959-2010)

Source: (Electoral Reform Society, 2010)

From Table 3 one can see the general decline in voter turnout over the last 50

years. Academic analyses of turnout at general elections tend to centre around two

sorts of explanation: perceived competitiveness of the election, and perceived

differences between the parties. If the result of the election is perceived as uncertain

or close, this attracts voters to the polls, while a foregone conclusion turns people off.

Supporters of the likely winner may assume that their vote is not necessary, and their

opponents may become demoralised (Electoral Reform Society, 2007, p. 31).

If it were indeed influenced by political competitiveness, one would expect

voter turnout to be lower in safe seats, and higher in marginal seats. The three safest

seats by majority percentage in 2010 were Liverpool Walton, Knowsley and East Ham,

38

and the three most marginal seats were Fermanagh and South Tyrone, Hampstead

and Kilburn, and North Warwickshire. Table 4 demonstrates the levels of voter

turnout in the 2010 UK general election, showing that voter turnout was higher on

average in the safest seats, over the most marginal. This relationship is not a new

study, as commentators have discovered that there is a strong correlation between

marginality and voter turnout: the more marginal the seat, the higher the turnout

(see, Franklin 2004). This once again demonstrates the damaging nature of safe seats

upon both the ability of an electoral system to function properly, and to be democratic

(Lodge & Gottfried, 2011, p. 10).

Table 4: voter turnout percentage, marginal vs. safe.

Liverp

ool Walt

on

Knowsley

East H

am

Ferman

agh an

d South Ty

rone

Hampste

ad an

d Kilburn

North W

arwick

shire0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Marginal seatsSafe seats

Source: (Cracknell, 2010)

39

At the 2010 UK general election, about 31% of voters (approximately 9 million

people) lived in marginal seats, defined as seats with a majority of less than 10%.

Conversely, 69% of the electorate (approximately 20.5 million people) lived in safe

seats, and cast votes which had little chance of making a difference (Lodge & Gottfried,

2011, p. 11). From Table 4, you can see that voter turnout was indeed higher in

marginal seats, compared to safer seats. Franklin’s study (2004) discovered that

turnout is higher under certain conditions, some of which can directly be related to

the nature of the electoral system. Firstly, Franklin suggest that the higher the

proportionality of the electoral system, the higher the possibility that there will be an

increase in voter turnout. On top of this, he suggests that voters’ perception of election

salience, both nationally and locally, affects turnout (Franklin M. N., 2004). This is a

direct attack against safe seats, as without a contest being competitive, turnout is

doomed to be lower.

This mechanical disparity has also been reinforced psychologically, as the

electorate is becoming increasingly aware that seats are not electorally worth the

same amount. More voters (32.39%) living in marginal seats believed that their vote

would make a difference than in safe seats (21.45%). More than 50% of voters in safe

seats believed that their vote would not make a difference to the election outcome

(Lodge & Gottfried, 2011, p. 11).

FPTP mechanically makes elections at constituency level uncompetitive. This

psychologically impacts voter’s choice to turn up to vote, as more often than not, their

40

vote will not make a difference. This has been made evident by contrasting turnout in

safe seats against marginal seats.

Voter choice

The electoral system should allow for individual preferences to be properly

amalgamated, democratically that could theoretically be in a two party system;

however, the decline of class politics has led to an electorate that is not divided largely

upon class basis. The electorate is instead divided upon social and economic issues

which leave larger ideological gaps to be taken up by alternative parties. For instance,

before the Green Party, no British party adequately covered the social issue of the

environment, therefore creating a policy niche.

The Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) and the Effective Number of

Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) are two measures that can provide an indication of the

number of relevant parties at electoral and parliamentary levels. Alistair Clark (2012)

notes that whilst there has not been less than three relevant parties in electoral

competition since 1983, relevant parliamentary parties are not as high. Three or more

parties are effectively competing nationally; however, this increased competition is

not being reflected in parliamentary relevance. For instance, the ENPP at the 2010 UK

general election was 3.71, whereas the ENPP was just 2.57 (Clark A., 2012, p. 12).

Table 5 upon first glance would demonstrate that the claim that FPTP is

discouraging people from voting for third parties is weakening, as the Liberal

41

Democrats and other parties now account for over a quarter of votes over the last four

general elections. However, FPTP is deterministic with its effects upon the party

system, rather, that it is probabilistic. That does not mean that a voter will not choose

third parties; it means that they are less likely to do so.

Table 5: The rise and fall of the two-party vote, 1959–2010, percentage

Year Conservative and

Labour

Liberal/Alliance/

Liberal Democrat

Other parties

1959 93.2 5.9 0.9

1964 87.5 11.2 1.3

1966 89.9 8.5 1.5

1970 89.5 7.5 3.0

1974 (February) 75.1 19.3 5.6

1974 (October) 75.1 18.3 6.7

1979 80.8 13.8 5.4

1983 70.0 25.4 4.6

1987 73.1 22.6 4.4

1992 76.3 17.8 5.8

1997 73.9 16.8 9.3

2001 72.4 18.3 9.4

2005 67.6 22.0 10.4

2010 65.1 23.0 11.9

Source: (Curtice, 2010, p. 626)

42

Table 6 also demonstrates an increasing presence of smaller parties, not just

the Liberal Democrats. The last four elections have seen at least 45 Liberal Democrat

MPs as well as at least 25 other representing other parties, in the UK. This once again,

seems to point to FPTP no longer inhibiting third parties from entering the political

fray.

Table 6: Seats won by third parties in UK general elections 1959–2010

Year Liberal/Alliance/Liberal

Democrat

Others (GB) Others (NI)

1959 6 1 0

1964 9 0 0

1966 12 0 1

1970 6 2 4

1974 (February) 14 11 12

1974 (October) 13 14 12

1979 11 4 12

1983 23 4 17

1987 22 6 17

1992 20 7 17

1997 46 11 18

2001 52 10 18

2005 62 12 18

2010 57 10 18

43

Source: (Curtice, 2010, p. 628)

However, Table 5 and 6 do not show the extent to which voters are still not

voting for their true preference, and being forced to vote strategically. By examining

British Election Survey data, it is possible to create a rank ordering, or a ‘feeling

thermometer’ of individual preferences. By contrasting people’s preferred parties, to

that of how they actually voted, it is possible to draw conclusions about the

psychological affects of FPTP upon voter choice. Hix et al. (2010) demonstrated this

by examining the British Election Survey data. They discovered that 15% of electors

voted for a party other than their most preferred choice in the 2005 general election.

More than this, they demonstrated that of those whose first choice was neither

Conservative nor Labour, 45% voted for a party other than their most preferred; and

of those whose first choice was other than Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat,

only 21% voted for their most preferred party (Hix, Johnston, & McLean, 2010, p. 45).

In an electoral system based on plurality voting, it is notorious that an individual who

really favours a minor party candidate will frequently vote for the less undesirable of

the major party candidates, rather than throw away his vote (Arrow, 1963, p. 7).

FPTP seems to be becoming increasingly permissive at providing a higher level

of effective electoral parties, however this has not translated into parliamentary

power for smaller parties. FPTP is still psychologically hampering a significant

proportion of the electorate from voting to their true preference.

Summary

44

FPTP is not deterministic in its mechanical and psychological effects on the

party system, however, it is probabilistic. Under a system of single-member simple

plurality, it is likely that you will have safe seats, a lower electoral turnout, and

comparatively high levels of tactical voting. FPTP psychologically reduces the

likelihood that the electorate participates, and turns out to vote. This can be seen in

part due to the high level of safe seats which are a result of its mechanical distortion of

electoral outcomes, resulting in a restricted voter choice. Low voter turnout means

less representation, which all in all equates to a less functionally legitimate system.

Elements of democracy

We have now discussed the extent to which FPTP is functioning well. Now we

will examine how this functionality is influencing democracy in the UK. Riker (1988)

notes that FPTP is consistent with the democratic purposes of voting. However, there

is no fair way of ensuring the proper choice of two alternatives, as the political world

offers many options, for which simple majority decision must be reduced to two. FPTP

cannot be fair in a democratic sense because the imposition of binary alternatives is

itself unfair. (Riker, 1988, p. 64). This examination of the elements of democracy will

begin with assessing FPTP’s ability to achieve liberty.

Liberty

Liberty is the freedom to not be oppressed by one’s political convictions, and

being able to vote according to one’s true preference: to be free to vote how you want,

and not have a system or institution psychologically or mechanically alter this. This is

very similar to voter choice. Duverger’s Law tells us that single-member district

45

simple plurality electoral systems inhibit the formation of more than two parties, even

if social cleavages call for a larger number. With a declining level of partisanship and

class politics in Britain, the electorate has no longer been confined to a binary choice

between Labour and the Conservatives; thus, smaller parties have gained larger

support. This could be demonstrated by the Effective Number of Parties Index, which

stood at just 2.1 in 1951, and has since reached 3.6 in 2005 (Kiewiet, 2013, p. 87).

However, are voters truly free to vote to their true preference, or is the electoral

system psychologically limiting voters?

At the 2010 UK general election Johnston and Pattie (2011) analysed British

Election Study Internet survey data, concluding that of the 13,356 respondents,

12,016 said that they voted, as well as indicating which party they voted for. Of the

latter, 8% indicated that they preferred an alternative party, but it did not have a

chance of winning. A further 8% claimed they voted tactically. A sum of these two

findings would suggest that 16% of respondents were tactical voters in 2010

(Johnston & Pattie, 2011, p. 1326). That equates to roughly a sixth of voters.

Tactical voting is a hallmark of British democracy. Traditionally the UK has

exhibited a form of anti-Conservative tactical voting, after the Liberal Democrats and

Labour moved ideologically closer in the 1980s. This made it easier for their

supporters to transfer their preferences to the lesser of two evils, when it was

politically viable. However, this has since evolved into anti-government tactical voting,

as Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters began to vote tactically against

Tony Blair’s (and later Gordon Brown’s) incumbent Labour government. The onset

46

2015 UK general election poses an interesting question of how, and to what extent the

electorate will vote tactically against the government, when it consist of two of the

main three parties. This will be elucidated following the electoral result.

In the UK, smaller parties, which often have larger, thinner spreads of national

support suffer, as they cannot mobilise enough support regionally to effectively

challenge electoral contests. The declining level of class-based politics, has led to a

broadening of the electorate’s political sphere, and therefore an increased wish to

vote alternatively. However, FPTP often psychologically restricts voters to vote

strategically for a challenger rather than for their true ideological preference, as the

electorate is increasingly aware that FPTP will mechanically inhibit smaller parties.

Participation

Democratic participation differs from participation as a function of an electoral

system because voting is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of democracy, and

needs to be surrounded with other access points to positions of power. Thus, the

democratic element of participation cannot just be assessed off of voter turnout.

Democratic representation is not something that occurs solely at elections, it is

something that occurs every day. Party membership is an indicator of participation,

however it is difficult to conclusively link the electoral system’s effects to that of party

membership, as there are many variables that influence party membership. For

instance, electoral salience and leadership popularity. However, FPTP increases the

likelihood of the current format of the party system, thus indirectly it effects the

parliamentary parties, and therefore their membership.

47

Under FPTP only the Conservatives or Labour will form a single party

government (at least for the immediate future). They have been in control of the UK

politically for a long time, which may have been acceptable when they were

representing a large part of the electorate: as members of the party, as well as voters

turning out in the masses to vote for them. However, today, a shrinking amount of

people still feel that they reflect their views.

The big three parties are currently in a crisis regarding membership. Less than

1% of the electorate was a member of the three main political parties in December,

2012, according to the House of Commons Library (McGuinness, 2012). Membership

figures for the big parties has dramatically decline since the 1990s, coinciding with a

rise for the traditional smaller parties in the 2000s. People have shifted their attention

from caring about the big parties ‘catch all’ philosophies and their drifting toward the

electorally successful middle-ground, to supporting smaller, more nuanced parties.

A democratic climate where people are being more alienated with the political

process inevitably will inevitably result in less democratic participation. Whether that

entails casting your ballot, or joining a political party.

Equality

The purpose of universal suffrage is to reflect each person’s preferences

equally, making one vote equal to another: one person, one vote. For a vote to be truly

equal, it should have the same weight in influencing the results of an election, as well

being valued equally by political parties.

48

FPTP employs constituencies in national elections, effectively making general

elections a series of mini-elections. This is where the discrepancy in voter value is

born. In 12 of the last 17 elections, 90% or more seats stayed with the party defending

them. Even in Labour's 1997 ‘landslide’ victory more than 70% of seats remained with

the incumbent party. It is evident that in national elections, FPTP does not make one

vote equal to another, as for instance, a vote in Thurrock or Ashfield is far more

valuable than one in Shropshire North, which has been under Conservative control

since 1835: before Queen Victoria’s accession to the throne. The New Economics

Foundation (2005) attempted to demonstrate this inconsistency, by creating a ‘voter

power index’, basing it on the probability of the seat changing hands and its size. For

example, a voter in the constituency of Uxbridge & Ruislip South, Brunel University’s

location, had only 0.144 votes in the 2005 UK general election. The national average

was 0.253 votes. Is FPTP advocating one man, a quarter of a vote? Liverpool Walton,

and Knowsley, two of the safest seats in the 2010 general election were considered

some of the least powerful constituencies in the 2005 general election, with a voter

power index of 0.002 and 0.003 respectively (New Economics Foundation, 2005).

FPTP also encourages electoral parties to not treat individual votes equally.

This is evident when evaluating the spending discrepancies between constituencies.

This inequality is demonstrated when judging the cash value of each individual’s vote.

Voters in safe seats are increasingly less likely to be campaigned to vote. In the

constituency of Bootle, which has been a Labour seat since 1945, the spend-per-vote

in the 2010 UK general election was just £0.14: Labour paid £3,944 to secure the seat,

with the Conservatives putting nothing into the race (Terry, 2013, p. 7). Concerning

49

the 2010 UK general election overall, the spending per vote was 162% higher in the

50 most marginal seats, than the 50 safest seats: £1.62 per vote compared to £0.50

(Terry, 2013, p. 9). Whilst it may seem like some parties are ignoring sections of the

electorate if they are not spending anything at all in some constituencies, it is an

entirely rational response to the electoral system. The financial constraints and

political uncertainties afflicting political parties means that they have to target their

resources to make the maximum electoral difference from the smallest contribution

possible. It is the ultimate postcode lottery. Those voters with the bad luck of living in

a safe seat are not truly involved in elections; for them, it becomes solely a national

conversation, diminishing any local role. This goes against the democratic ideal

outlined by Robert Dahl, who assumed that ‘a key characteristic of a democracy is the

continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens,

considered as political equals.’ (Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, 1971,

p. 1).

The phenomenon of the wasted vote is a good measure of equality. In 2010, the

majority of votes (52.8%) went to losing candidates, and therefore did not contribute

to electing a representative. When added to the votes that were in surplus of what the

winners needed, this figure rises to 71%. This result was not an anomaly, as the votes

cast for losing candidates has consistently been above 50% since February 1974,

however, notably the 2010 result is higher than in recent years (Electoral Reform

Society, 2010, p. 35).

50

FPTP’s tendency to waste votes, and create safe seats both diminishes its

effectiveness of functioning well, as well as proving that it does not live up to the name

of being a democratic representative system. Riker (1988) aptly suggests that

however fair FPTP may seem in the abstract, it is unfair in practice because ‘the

institutions to generate binary alternatives are unfair, mainly because they are not

neutral. The institutions give some alternatives advantages over others’ (Riker, 1988,

p. 59.).

FPTP does not treat voters equally. It is equal in providing everyone with the right

to vote, however it does not weight these votes equally. The high level of safe seats

under FPTP elections means that voters in seats that have a low possibility of

changing hands, have but a fraction of a whole vote. This reflects upon the actions of

the parties, who consequently target their finite resources rationally, to where it will

make the most difference. Voters who live in safe seats are not given an equal vote, or

treated equally by political parties. As George Orwell alluded to in his political allegory

Animal Farm: all voters are equal, but some are more equal than others (Orwell,

1945).

Summary

If the purpose of democracy is to render voting practically effective and

politically significant, FPTP is ominously failing its inherent elements. Voters do not

have the liberty to vote as they please, due to psychological restrictions that attempt

to inflict a binary choice. Votes are not worth the same in deciding an electoral

outcome, as well as being not being valued equally by parliamentary parties. With

51

those in marginal seats far more likely to be canvased and as a result of this,

participate, whether that means voting, or joining a political party.

Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation has been to determine whether or not FPTP for UK

general elections is hampering democracy in the UK.

Chapter 1 demonstrated the causality debate between whether the electoral

system shapes the party system, or the reverse. From studying Duverger’s

implications, it was seen that the relationship can be deemed as probabilistic, and not

deterministic. Despite this, we should not be distracted from the fact that where there

is a system of single-member simple plurality, it is more likely to be a two party

system. From considering the relevant literature, it was unearthed that electoral

systems shape the wider political society through mechanical and psychological

means.

Chapter 2 considered the different concepts of voting, and the functions of an

electoral system. It concluded that whether voting was liberal or populist, the

functions of an electoral system could be derived from the functions of an election. It

concluded that the functions of an electoral system are to enable representation, make

government accountable or legitimate, promote participation, and give the voter a

proper choice. Chapter 3 then considered key literatures concerning voting and

democracy, culminating in three elements of democracy: Liberty, participation, and

52

equality. It was also noted that all the elements of the democratic method are means

to render voting practically effective and politically significant, as voting is the central

act of democracy.

Chapter 4 then applied these findings to the assessment of FPTP. Whilst there

is no deterministic relationship between FPTP and electoral outcomes, there is a

significant probabilistic association.

FPTP does not function well. It fails to adequately represent people and parties,

with its inbuilt mechanical distortion. This favours larger parties, whilst diminishing

smaller parties. It is a zero sum game. This effectively means that those who have

minority preferences may technically be unrepresented. The nature of winners that

FPTP promotes damages its claim to providing legitimate representatives. Plurality

winners under FPTP allow parties to geographically dominate regions, creating safe

seats that rarely change hands. This has a negative knock-on effect to participation.

This relationship was demonstrated when the voter turnout in marginal seats was

contrasted to that of safe seats. All together, this renders FPTP a dysfunctional system.

If the purpose of the elements of democracy is to render voting practically

effective and politically significant, FPTP is significantly failing to meet these

standards. Tactical voting at UK general elections signifies FPTP as a system that does

not promote voter liberty. At the 2010 UK general election, 1/6 of all voters were

shown as voting tactically. Participation is also not fully achieved, as the big three

parties are all suffering a crisis in party membership. Most crucially, FPTP does not

meet the democratic element of equality. FPTP elections for Westminster do not treat

53

the individual’s vote equally, as more often than not, its power is either hampered by a

seat that is likely to not change hands, or it is a wasted vote. More than this, FPTP’s

implications on the party system mean that each vote is not treated equally by the

parties, as they have to use their finite resources to target winnable seats.

Moving forward, this functional democratic analysis could be used to better

apply empirical findings to the normative discussions of political science. A theoretical

mathematical model could be used to test these functions and elements. This could

then be used to compare alternative systems, to see if they fare better functionally,

and providing the elements of democracy.

Let it not be forgotten that ‘democracy implies voting but voting does not imply

democracy’ (Riker, 1988, p. 5).

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