FPRC-6

FPRC Journal No.6

Focus : India-Iran relations Responses

1. Prakash Shah Former Ambassador of India

2. Siavash Z. Yaghoubi Former Iranian Ambassador to India

3. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh Editor,Iranreview.org

4. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer Chairman, Centre for Study of Society and Secularism,Mumbai

5. Prof. Hooshang Amirahmadi Rutgers University, USA

Articles

1.H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari Consul General of Islamic Rep.of Iran, Hyderabad

2. Dr. David J. Karl President, Asia Strategy Initiative, Los Angeles

3. Amb. Karamatullah Ghori Former Pakistan Ambassador

4. Dr. Harsh V. Pant Reader,King's College, London

5. Brig (Retd) Dr.Muhammad A. Khan Pakistan,memberWSN Foundation Int. Advisory Board

6 Dr.Vijay Prashad Prof.of Int.Studies,Trinity College , Hartford (CT)

7. Dr.Anjali Sahay Gannon University,Erie, Pennsylvania

8. Dr.Uddipan Mukherjee BPPIMT (Kolkata, India)

9. Dr.Farah Naaz JMI, New Delhi

10. Dr. Mahnaz Zahirinejad A leading researcher on Iran

11. Dr. Rushda Siddiqui Res. Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi

12. Dr.Venkateshwaran Lokanathan Manipal University,Manipal ,(Karnataka) India

13. Gauri Jain beinformedjournal.org

(Ed.) Prof. Mahendra Gaur

Foreign Policy Research Centre

NEW DELHI (India)

FPRC Journal No. 6 India-Iran relations

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CONTENTS PREFACE

Responses (pp. 5-22)

1. Prakash Shah

2. Siavash Z. Yaghoubi

3. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh

4. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer

5. Prof. Hooshang Amirahmadi

Articles

1.H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari

The Contribution of Iranian Scholars in the Advancement of Sciences during the Qutb Shahi

Period in Dakan (Southern India) (pp.24-50)

2. Dr. David J. Karl

The Fading Iran Factor (pp.51-58)

3. Amb. Karamatullah Ghori

India-Iran Relations: Not Quite Ideal, Yet (pp. 59-70)

4. Dr. Harsh V. Pant

The Israel Factor in India-Iran Relations (pp.71-72)

5. Brig (Retd) Dr.Muhammad Aslam Khan

Triangulating India-Iran-Pakistan’s Balance of Equation (pp.73-85)

6. Dr.Vijay Prashad

Quid Pro Quo: India’s Quest for the American Narrative (pp. 86-93)

7. Dr.Anjali Sahay

At the Crossroads: The Future of India-Iran Relations (pp. 94-103) 8. Dr.Uddipan Mukherjee

India and Iran: Can SCO serve as the common platform? (pp.104-117)

9. Dr.Farah Naaz

India-Iran Relations : Testing Time? (pp.118-125)

10. Dr. Mahnaz Zahirinejad

The Impact of Islamic Revolution on the Indian Muslims Clerics (pp.126-130)

11. Dr. Rushda Siddiqui

India- Iran Relations:Need for formulation of a Foreign Policy (pp.131-140)

12. Dr.Venkateshwaran Lokanathan India-Iran Relations: Varying Challenges and Perspectives (pp.141-145) 13. Gauri Jain India's Shifting Loyalties: Does India Need US More Than It Needs Iran? (pp.146-149)


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PREFACE

Is it testing time for the age old relationship between two great nations- India and

Islamic Republic of Iran ? Are they at the Crossroads? Do they present varying

Challenges and Perspective? These questions have engaged the attention of all

of us. The public leaders, diplomats, strategic affairs experts, journalists and

academics from both countries, have ,time and again,emphasized that on many

issues they need each other. Both have a responsibility to make greater

diplomatic efforts to reduce misunderstanding between the two countries and to

get them to come closer. There should be greater efforts to meet each other’s

concerns.

The 6th issue of the FPRC JOURNAL focuses on - India-Iran relations- political,economic,strategic,cultural,educational, and seeks to analyse the subject from international perspective also (The US factor, The Israel Factor, The Arab Factor and The Pakistan Factor)

We are thankful to our contributors who have enriched the contents of the Journal,even at the cost of personal inconvenience. They are our source of strength.

Mahendra Gaur Indira Gaur

Director Mg. Editor

Foreign Policy Research Centre

New Delhi


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1. Prakash Shah

2. Siavash Z. Yaghoubi

3. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh

4. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer

5. Prof. Hooshang Amirahmadi

RESPONSES


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(1) Ambassador Prakash Shah

Prakash Shah is an independent consultant on both domestic

and international policies and is Chairman of PRS Consultants,

headquartered in India. He is currently Senior Advisor to

Dodsal Group, Dubai. He is a Member of the Board of Falcon

Corporate Advisory Services and the Hinduja Group India.

Ambassador Shah is Emeritus Board Member of Pathfinder

International, Boston, an NGO with an annual budget of $100 million with projects on family planning, ant-

HIV Aids and adolescent health care in 23 developing countries, and Indo-American Arts Society, New

York. He is currently a Member of the Board, on Policy and Development, of the Symbiosis International

University, Pune, and a Member of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations,

New Delhi.

Ambassador Shah has served as India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, both in New York

and Geneva, India’s Ambassador to Japan and Venezuela and India’s High Commissioner to Malaysia.

During 1998-2000, Ambassador Shah was the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General for

Iraq in his capacity as Under-Secretary General, U.N. He has also served as India’s Petroleum Advisor for

Gulf countries with headquarters in Tehran, Iran and has worked as Director in the Ministries of Petroleum,

and of Economic Affairs in New Delhi.

Ambassador Shah has led a number of Indian delegations to UNCTAD, ECAFE, OPEC, UN Disarmament

Conference, Non-Aligned and Commonwealth Summits, among other international conferences.

Ambassador Shah has contributed articles frequently to newspapers and magazines on foreign political

and economic policies and on multi-lateral issues. He has been a member of the visiting faculty in a

number of academic institutions such as Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis and United Services

Institute, as well as lectured at foreign institutes such as the Foreign Services Institutes of Mexico and

Peru, University of Santa Maria at Caracas and National Defence College, Canberra.


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Response to Questionnaire

1. Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years?

1) Over the decades, India-Iran relations have not been uniformly smooth even though

both countries have always recognized the benefits of cordial and active relations.

During the early years of the rule of the Shah of Iran, and particularly during 1965 and

1971 wars between India and Pakistan, Iran was transparently pro-Pakistan in its

attitude. The collapse of the much publicized Pakistani military might and the surrender

of the Pakistan Armed Forces in Bangladesh within 16 days of the 1971 war

dramatically changed both the approach and the policy of the Shah’s regime towards

India. Some deft diplomacy by India in the post-Bangladesh era resulted in India-Iran

relationship reaching a high point, with political, economic and energy co-operation

blossoming to a higher stage. Since the departure of the Shah and the emergence of an

Islamic Republic in Iran, the religious ideology of Iran’s ruling elite became a factor in

Iran’s foreign policy and it inevitably impinged on relations with India. Indian policy was

mature enough not to let relations with Iran deteriorate either by Iran’s support for

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy or Iran’s support of South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

If there has been another hiccup in India-Iran relations as a result of India’s vote in the

IAEA on Iran’s nuclear programme, then the blame needs to be share by both countries.

2. Is IPI gas pipeline a dead issue so far as India is concerned?

2) The IPI gas pipeline was a sensible proposition which would have benefited both Iran

and India. India needs to ensure its energy security for future growth and Iran needs an

assured stable market for its surplus natural gas. In pure economic terms, sale of Iran’s

natural gas via the IPI pipeline through Pakistan would make a lot of sense. But the

proposal was doomed from its inception due to the nature of Pakistan’s hostile relations

with India, a lack of credibility in its desire or ability to provide security along the route of

the pipeline in Pakistan and the progressive deterioration in Pakistan’s internal security.

Indian policy makers wisely decided not to make its industrial and power sector growth,

based on Iranian natural gas, hostage to Pakistan’s uncertain policies. However, a

bilateral arrangement for India to buy Iranian gas on a long-term basis through the LNG

route remains a mutually beneficial idea to pursue.

3. Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to

draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern?

3) India-US relations have improved exponentially over the last decade for bilateral,

regional, global and strategic reasons. India does not need to play the Iran card to

enhance India-US relations.

4. Is India‟s enhanced engagement with Israel one of the constraints on

India‟s flourishing relations with Iran?

4) It is well-known in diplomacy that a country’s relations with another country are never at

the expense of its other bilateral relations. Iran-India relations would flourish if both

countries recognize that they have several long-term common interests in a region that

has increasingly shown signs of volatility. Independent foreign policy pursued by each

country should not blind either India or Iran to the benefits of closer bilateral relations.


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5. Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on

US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned?

5) There is a persisting perception, since India’s positive vote in IAEA on the Western

Resolution on Iran’s nuclear programme, that India’s Iran policy is dependent on the US

factor. The government of India has not been able to dispel this perception, as US

sanctions against Iran have progressively become more stringent. While US sanctions

are not mandatory on India, unlike the UN sanctions, their impact on India’s

international, economic and trade interests have undoubtedly become a factor in India’s

Iran policy.

6. Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran

rapproachement?

7. Is India‟s inability to deal with the US and Iran simultaneously,without „upsetting‟ one or

the other , a failure of Indian diplomacy?

6) & 7) Hostility in Iran-US relations poses a special challenge to India. It is in India’s

interest, as it is in the interest of the West Asian region, that this hostility is reduced and

understanding prevails. To the extent that miscommunication between US and Iran is

responsible for this hostility, India has an important role to play. As an emerging power

and a good friend of both Iran and USA, I believe India has a responsibility to make

greater diplomatic efforts to reduce misunderstanding between the two countries and to

get them to come closer.

8. Do you believe that a shift in India‟s Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obama‟s Af-Pak policy? 9. Can India-Iran work together to stablise disorder in Afganistan? Could India be a part of a regional initiative on Afghanistan with Iran?

8) & 9) Both India and Iran have a major stake in Afghanistan’s future, considering that they

are neighbours of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Any take-over of Kabul by Pakistan supported

Taliban will impose great burden on both countries, who have reason to be apprehensive of

a Taliban dominated Afghan policy. With President Obama announcing the beginning of

withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, India will need to consult with Iran more closely

on developments in AF-PAK region. For India to play a role along with Iran in a regional

initiative on Afghanistan is a difficult proposition for two main reasons. In the first place,

Pakistan remains unalterably opposed to any such role. The second reason is the present

state of non-relations between USA and Iran with little prospect of change in the immediate

future.

10. Is India‟s Iran policy designed for “domestic consumption”, mostly to

please the „domestic Muslim audience' ?

10) India’s policy towards Iran cannot be sensitive to US concerns and at the same time,

meet the demands of Indian Muslims. Despite the powerful Shia affinity towards Iran, the

coalition government of India believes that for the Indian Muslim diaspora, Pakistan is far

more important than Iran. If anything, the mistaken belief in the coalition government that a

strong Indian policy against Paksitan will alienate Indian Muslims votes, continues to prevail.


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(2) Siavash Z. Yaghoubi Former Iranian Ambassador to India Email : [email protected]

Education: B.S. in Civil Engineering at Evansville

University ,Indiana, USA , High school Diploma from

Rahnama High School , Tehran .Iran

Current Position :Planning and Development Director as well as member of the Board of Directors at

IFIC( Iran Foreign Investment Co.)

Member of the Board of Directors in Iran/Oman Joint Investment Company

Work Experience: Secretary to President’s Special Committee for IPI(Iran Pakistan India) Pipeline

Iranian Ambassador to India

Iranian Ambassador to Oman

Iranian Ambassador to Algeria

General Director for West Asia, Ministry of External Affairs

General Director for East Asia, Ministry of External Affairs

General Director for Cultural Affairs Ministry of External Affairs

General Director for Foreign Aids, Ministry of External Affairs

Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Iran Representative for Colombo Economic plan

Charge D,Affair of Iranian Embassy in Srilanks

Charge D,Affairs of Iranian Embassy in Pakistan

Member of the Economic and Development Committee of Reconstruction Ministry , In charge of Fars

,Khusestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr, Buyer Ahmad and Kohkilouyeh

Other Achievements : Chosen as the best National Management Director

: Received the highest honorary award from the Sultanate of Oman

Presently doing studies and research in the issues related to Regional issues in the Gulf Region as well as

neighboring countries. The idea of putting up a center as a think tank is on the agenda.

mailto:[email protected]


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1.Why India-Iran relations have soured in recent years?

- Several reasons could be addressed such as change of priorities, International environment and regional crisis, development in Afghanistan, US- Pakistan relation..etc

2.India says it is keen to expand relations with Iran. What could be the specific areas of cooperation?

That could be a logical approach from both sides. However it is a general statement, and should be supported by deed and action to be delivered. To start with both sides should take necessary step to uplift the current declining qualities of their relations. Of course, historically relations have been cordial and friendly, but not with much ingredients. However, both countries are main players of the region and there are many common and sheared interests .There are many area of immediate corporations which are vital to the sustainable development of the two nations and do not have any substitute, such as energy.Our region is rather backwards and poor.This situation will help to create social unrest and extremists . Peace and stability of our region would be in the interest of whole world, as well. However, Strategically we are lacking behind.

3.Is India’s slight disagreement with Iran’s nuclear programme one of the stumbling blocs in India-Iran ties?

- Even though several differences are there, this issue is not the main concern of both sides.

4.Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so

far as policy towards Iran is concerned?

- India is following her own interest, regionally and internationally. Sometimes it is not in conformity with traditional and classical policy of independent of India. One can say in today,s vibrant world these changes are inevitable. It is true ,but perhaps following a strong and proactive rule in the region will not be only in the interest of security and prosperity of our nations but also could be much more helpful and beneficial to the outsiders as well.

Like what we did together in Afghanistan when Taliban and Alqaede were in power. They were recognised by Arab Countries which are still in the Western Countries camp. Not only that,some of the Western Countries even recognised them indirectly. Likewise now! they are rushing to recognise Taliban again, who will suffer the most again? Isn't it time to ring the bell again? They will leave the region but the mess is there for us to clear.


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5.Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw

concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern?

-I think I have already answered this question.

6.Why many Americans have serious misgivings about Iran-India ties?

It is not only about Iran-India it the same where ever they wish. It is about misinformation and lack of communication.

7.Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran rapproachement?

- US- Iran relation has suffered a lot for decades. It is not an essay task. After all ,every body feels the pain of the problem which we are facing in our Region. They might be also responsible for it, but there are many other common platforms which could be used to have a secure and stable region which is in the interest of everybody.

8.Do you believe that the shift in India’s Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obama’s Af-Pak policy?

- We have gone through similar question already.


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(3) Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh Executive Editor of Iran Review

Mahmoudreza Golshanpazhooh

(Ph.D)

Executive Editor, Iranreview.org

Director of Democracy and Human Rights

Research Group, Center for

Strategic Research (CSR)

Vice Chairman, Tehran International

Studies and Research Institute (TISRI)


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1.Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years?

Let me first say that there are many reasons for the positive attitude of

Iranians toward India, including background of historical relations,

positive mutual sentiment between the two nations, presence of Zoroastrian

minority (Parsi) in India and Indian minorities (such as Sikhs) in Iran,

absence of any colonialistic precedence between the two countries, Iran’s

positive attitude toward India’s struggles to get rid of the British

colonialism….

Developments in recent years (regardless of how correct subsequent

judgments have been) have caused some Iranians to think that India is not

as independent as they thought. Iranians assumed that India is too

powerful to be brought to its knees by the United States through pressure

or other means. The progress on Iran-India gas pipeline had strengthened

those assumptions. Of course, Iran and Pakistan have had different views

on some issues, but we, Iranians, love to see that countries are able to

withstand global pressures.

2.India says it is keen to expand relations with Iran. What could be the

specific areas of cooperation?

I think that countries which are not suspicious of one another can expand

relations in many areas from such soft areas as culture, exchange of

students, tourism, arts and handicrafts, as well as civilizational and

religious dialogue to harder areas like economic exchanges and even

security matters. Iran and India do not see each other as threats and,

therefore, they are not involved in a zero-sum game.

3.Is India’s slight disagreement with Iran’s nuclear programme one of the

stumbling blocs in India-Iran ties?

To a great extent, the answer is yes. The Iranian public opinion was

shocked by India’s positive vote for the anti-Iranian resolution at the

Security Council. Although India’s stances in the past few years may be

justified on the basis of the Indian government’s policies, they are not

understandable to Iranians which still see India as a powerful member of

the Non-Aligned Movement. As a result of those stances, we expect nothing

from India, neither with regard to the nuclear energy, nor in such areas

as human rights and security. This is because we presume that India is not

with us anymore. However, no presumptions are permanent.

4.Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US

so far as policy towards Iran is concerned?

I know that every country makes decisions according to its own national


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interests to promote or demote relations with others. However, when I see

that there is no special problem between Iran and India, yet relations are

not as cordial as they should be, the only reason which occurs to me is

the effect and influence of foreign factors. We believe that presence of

the United States in the Middle East and South Asia has been followed by

more negative than positive developments and we are, therefore, surprised

why India is repeating that experience. In reality, Iran’s relations are

much friendlier with China and Pakistan which are India’s rivals, but Iran

has never tried to pressure India. Iran prefers to have three friends on

its side. It is very pleasant to imagine friendly India, China and

Pakistan around Iran. This does not necessarily mean that we are going to

form an anti-American block, but we seek peaceful conditions which will

make way for stability as well as economic prosperity and security.

5.Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to


As I said before, this is a general feeling in Iran and it is not limited

to India, but we feel the same toward Russia, China and many other

countries. Let me tell you something. When the Peace Pipeline project

failed after many years of negotiations and although Iranians experienced

frustration due to India’s position, there was also a good feeling among

the Iranian experts. They noted that we were giving our most precious

commodity at a low price to another country just because we needed friends

in the region to dispel this sense of isolation. I don’t mean that this

was the dominant view or the official viewpoint of the government, but

some Iranian experts really thought along those lines. They sometimes feel

the same toward China and Russia. Although the result of that process was

not economically or politically in our favor, we have come to the

conclusion in the past few years that we should stand on our own feet and

do not reckon on other countries. In general, it has had good results for

us.

6.Why many Americans have serious misgivings about Iran-India ties?

The United States (I mean the American government, not the American

nation) fears anything that many make Iran more powerful and they think

that it would not be to their benefit if powerful countries took sides

with Iran. This is a wrong presumption in the minds of the American

statesmen that isolating Iran and putting pressure on it will finally make

Iranians give up their policies and back down. Thirty years of

post-revolution experience has proven otherwise. I personally support a

solution for problems between Iran and the United States, but I also think

that this could only happen if the Americans cared for Iran’s mentality

and concerns and gave up their condescending attitude.

7.Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India

facilitate US-Iran rapproachement?


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Not necessarily, but India will be among the best choices. Finding a

solution to Iran-US problem is difficult and time-consuming due to

accumulation of negative attitudes on both sides. During the past few

months, the US government has attributed all negative developments, such

as developments in Syria or behavior of Hamas, to Iran and I think that

this is at odds with good politics. We are almost sure that the United

States is trying to use all means, even irrational ones, to increase

pressures on Iran in order to make Iran genuflect. The United States is

mistaken in that under false analyses, Washington thinks that there is a

wide divide between the Iranian nation and government and is trying to

deepen that gap by asserting that it supports the Iranian nation. In

reality, however, the US behavior, examples of which we recently witnessed

in the Middle East’s developments, have been so closely associated with

profiteering and hypocrisy in Iran that most Iranians cannot be optimistic

toward the United States. If a country intends to mediate between Tehran

and Washington, even if it is a reputable country like India, it should

first analyze the reasons behind the existing distrust between Iran and

the United States. It should also firmly believe that improved relations

between Iran and the United States will be ultimately to the benefit of

other regional countries, including India.

8.Do you believe that the shift in India’s Iran policy has been brought

about in response to President Obama’s Af-Pak policy?

I am not sure, but I know something. Regardless of how different Iran,

India, Pakistan and Afghanistan may approach various issues, they are

situated in the same region and any kind of insecurity will hit them all.

Years of conflict between India and Pakistan as well as chronic border

clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have made transregional powers

think that regional states really need them for a balance. Many countries

in South Asia and the Persian Gulf have apparently reached the conclusion

that there would be no security for them in the absence of transregional

powers. I think that the first step should be for us to get rid of such

ideas. The United States’ policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has led to no

positive development in the region to make us believe that India has

decided to revise its ties to Iran in the light of such development. If

India is distancing from Iran because the United States is getting close

to Pakistan and New Delhi does not want to make Washington upset, then

India cannot be rightfully called an emerging superpower. This would mean

that India is so scared of Pakistan or the United States that it cannot

manage this situation. I know that problems between India and Pakistan or

between India and Afghanistan are deep-rooted, but building positive

relationship with Iran will not worsen the existing problems in India’s

foreign relations. On the opposite, Iran’s influence on Pakistan can work

to establish a general atmosphere of friendship, peace, and tranquility in

the whole region.


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(4) Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer

Chairman Centre for Study of Society and Secularism Mumbai E-mail: [email protected]

Website: www.csss-isla.com

He has been named as one of the 500 most

influential Muslims in the World (2009). This study

has been done by the Royal Islamic Strategic

Studies Centre (Jordan) and the Prince Al-

Waleedbin-Talal Centre for Muslim Christian

Understanding of Georgetown University,

Washington.

Special Awards:

Honorarydegree of D.Litt. by Jamia Millia Islamia University,New Delhi,2008.

Prof. Shah Sahib Award (2006) by Institute of Mappila Studies, Thrissur, Kerala.

Muhammed Abdul Rahiman Sahib Foundation, Kodungallur, Thrissur, KeralaNational

Award ? 2006.

Honorary degree of D. Litt. (Causa) by Jamia Hamdard, Islamic University, New

Delhi, 2005. Right Livelihood Honorary Award (aka: Alternate Nobel Award) for Vision andWork,

Stockholm, Sweden, December 2004.

C.N.Ahamed Moulavi M.S.S. Award 2004 (Muslim Service Society, Kozhikode,Kerala).

Association for Communal Harmony in Asia (ACHA), USA Award 2003

Inter-faith Award, 1999 ((Khwaja Gharib-Un-Nawaz Welfare Centre, Bangalore)

Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Award, 1998 (Haryana Urdu Academy)

New Leader Award , New Leaders Award Committee, Madras ,1998

National Communal Harmony Award, 1997, Government of India Fourth South - Asian Youth Summit ?94 Award at Punjab University, Patiala, 1994

Honorary degree of D. Litt. by the University of Calcutta, 1993

Hakim Khan Sur Award by Maharana Mewar Foundation, Udaipur for national

integration. Dalmia Award on Communal Harmony, 1990

Distinguished Service Award by USA International Student Assembly and USAIndian Student Association, 1987.

Publications:

Dr Engineer has published 63 books on Islam, Problems of Muslims, Muslim Women?s Rights,

Communal and Ethnic Problem in India, South Asia and Islamic State. He also publishes Secular


http://www.csss-isla.com/


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Perspective (fortnightly) and Islam and Modern Age (monthly)

Offices held in Organisations/Institutions:

(a) Nominated by ICSSR as a representative on the Governing Board of A.N. Sinha Institute of

Social Studies, Patna for 3-years (2009-12) (b) Nominated as member of National Integration Council in the year 2005 by Prime Minister of

India/Re-nominated in the year 2009 for the further period of 3-yars. (c) Nominated by the Central Government as a member of Society of the Indian Institute of

Advanced Study (IIAS), Shimla for the term of 3-years (2009-2011) (d) Chairman, Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai

(e) Director, Institute of Islamic Studies. Mumbai (f) Chairman, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN), Mumbai

(g) Member, National Foundation for Communal Harmony (h) Former Vice-President, People’s Union for Civil Libertise (PUCL), Mumbai

(i) Ex-Member, Executive Council, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi (j) Ex-Member, University Court, Aligharh Muslim University, U.P.

(k) General Secretary, Central Board of Dawoodi Bohara Community, Mumbai (l) Chairman,Vikas Adhyan Kendra, Malad (W), Mumbai

(m) Member, Presidium Indian National Social Action Forum (INSAF), Mumbai (n) Chairman, Ekta Samiti, Mumbai


1.Why Iran needs India and vice versa? 1)Both India and Iran are Asian and developing countries. On many issues they need each other. Iran has oipl and gas and India needs both. Iran needs India's help on several issues in international fora. Also Iran is a gateway to Asia. 2.Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years? 2) the main cause of India-Iran relations souring is India not supporting Iran on the issue of nuclear issue. Even Turkey was ready to mediate but India supported anti-Iranian line on this voital issue. 3.Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned?

3) Yes, Ibdia depends a lot on US for its policy towards Iran. It is under pressure from America not to support Iran. America has no principled foreign policy except its own selfish interests as against India which, under Nehru, had principled stand on foreign policy issues. However, after Nehru except Indira Gandhi no one followed policy of non-alignment.

4.Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to


4) Yes, I fully agree that India has not hesitated to play Iran Card to draw concessions from USA. It is very unfortunate. 5.Do you believe that the shift in India‟s Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obama‟s Af-Pak policy?


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5) No0, it is not so. India's Iran policy had undergone change during Bush's time. Obama became President later. It is so unfortunate that Iran had supported India on Kashmir issue and yet we supported Americaan stand on nuclear issue and alienated Iran. Since then our relations cooled off. 6.Is India‟s enhanced engagement with Israel one of the constraints on India‟s flourishing relations with Iran? 6) There is no doubt India is far too c;loser to Israel these days which makes Iranian authorities uncomfortable but it is not fundamental cause. Fundamental cause is India's unhesitant pro-US stance. 7.Is India‟s Iran policy designed for “domestic consumption”, mostly to please the „domestic Muslim audience?

7) No I do not agree. India's Iran policy is not designed for domestic consumption. Indian Muslims would welcome warm relations between two countries. But of course Hindutva lobby would like warm relations between India and Iasrael. And a section of bureaucracy works for bringing India and Israel closer. 8.How should India meet Iran‟s concerns? 8) India and Iran should come together on mutual interests. Iran is very sensitive on the issue of nuclear power. India, along with few other neutral countries should help Iran dispell doubts about not enriching euranium for weaponisation but for power..


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(5)Interview with

Professor Hooshang Amirahmadi Rutgers University, USA

HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI holds a Ph.D. in planning and international development from

Cornell University and is a professor at Rutgers University. He is also a Senior Associate Member

at Oxford University in the U.K. and was director of Rutgers’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies

for many years. He is the founder and president of the American Iranian Council and was a

candidate for President in the ninth presidential elections in Iran in June 2005. Dr. Amirahmadi’s

most recent book on The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars is forthcoming (fall 2011)

from I.B. Taurus in London. He is the author of Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian

Experience and three other books in Persian on civil society, industrial policy, and geopolitics of

energy. Dr. Amirahmadi is also editor of 10 books on Iran and the Middle East, and 16

conference proceedings on US-Iran relations. He has authored numerous scholarly journal

articles and book chapters. A frequent contributor to lots of conferences in Europe, North

America, Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, Dr. Amirahmadi’s writings have been

translated and published in Europe, Iran and the Arab world. Dr. Amirahmadi is also often

interviewed on national and international TV and radio, and is quoted in newspapers

throughout the world. Email: [email protected]: www.amirahmadi.com



19

1. Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years? India’s policy toward Iran is influenced by a multitude of motivations and forces, some principled and others opportunistic. India wishes to become a global power and to achieve that status, it must first enhance its regional pre-imminence. This requires a careful identification of strategic allies and rivals. In the Persian Gulf region, where India wants to be reckonedas a great power, it has chosen Arab states of the Persian Gulf over Iran. The reasons for this choice arestraight forward: Arab states are weaker than Iran, they are less ambitious, and they are friends of the west. The Arab states also need India as a source of cheap labor supply and of huge demand for oil and commerce. For India, too, these are the key reasons to favor Arab states over Iran. Besides, India-Iran history is marked with certain past conflicts while Arabs have had little problem with Indians. Currently, Iran claims leadership of Islam, making India nervous as it has the largest Muslim population of any non-Muslim states. US-Iran tension is another source of India’s unwillingness to get closer to Iran. Sanctions increase the cost of Iranian business for India, and the constant pressure from the US and Europe to help isolate Iran cannot be always and easily resisted. However, the western pressure does not just constrain India but provides it with opportunity as well. By cooperating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment dispute, e.g., India has learned that it can extract real and valuable concessions. Thus, when India learned that it can get what it needed for its nuclear programs from the US, it did not hesitate to vote against Iran in the IAEA and in the UN Security Concil. From India’s perspective, loosing Iran and gaining the US did not involve an equal trade off; that the gain was much larger than the loss given also that doing business with the Islamic Iran is not easy to begin with. Iran’s close cooperation with China and Pakistan, India’s rivals, and India’s close relations with Israel,Iran’s arch enemy, are other sources of tightnessin Iran-India relations. Kashmir is another but lesser obstacle. Has India made its strategic calculations right? Are Arab states more reliable strategic partners than Iran? Will the US honor its strategic openings to India after it normalizes relations with Iran? Can India afford to close its pathways to the Central Asia by making Iran into an adversary? Can India afford to lose Afghanistan to Iran and or Pakistan when the US leaves that country? Only the time can tell. Indian strategists must have pondered responses to these questions but their choices show that they have not looked far into the future. Just consider one possible scenario: normal US-Iran relations in a few years – a real possibility! Under such a condition, India can end up being a big looser because resumption of relations between Iran and the US will radically change the regional political environment in favor of Iran, leading to shifting alliances and counter-alliances among the Middle Eastern states. Regardless of how powerful India become by then, it will find it hard to compete with a resurgent Iran that will have not just the west on its side but also China, Russia and many other regional states. 2. India says it is keen to expand relations with Iran. What could be the specific areas of cooperation? Iran and India are doomed by geography and resource complementarity to coexist and cooperate. Broadly speaking, they may cooperate in two areas: strategic and economic. Of course, they can and should also cooperate in cultural, scientific and educational areas as well. Strategic cooperation can include coordinated efforts to create a more stable Afghanistan free from terrorism and Pakistan’s influence. They can also work together in creating corridors of


20

transport, trade and development to the nations in the Central Asia. Pipelines are a sure source of binding cooperation between the two states for decades to come, and one example that comes to mind is the famous Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Unfortunately, India, under pressure from the US and also because of shortsighted strategic calculations, has only given lip service to this potentially historic project. This brings me to the economic area for cooperation. India has already been involved in a few major infrastructural and energy-related projects in Iran, including those in Chahbahar on the Persian Gulf coast and in the South Pars gas field in the heart of Persian Gulf. Energy is certainly a top commercial item in Iran-India relations and was at one point in not so distance past the defining economic tie between the two nations. India gets 16 per cent of its oil supply from Iran as against 45 per cent coming from the Persian Gulf countries that include Saudi Arabia. This clearly indicates that oil import alone is not the compelling reason for India to warm its ties with Iran and antagonize its other trading partners. Yet, when oil, gas and geopolitics are put together, India will have better reason to expand economic ties with Iran than with any other regional states. Unfortunately these and other projects and economic relations, which were originally well planned and operated, have run into deep difficulties following India’s votes against Iran. Tehran is particularly dismayed at New Delhi because India is not even a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty and has built its bombs by defying the international community. Incidentally, Iran is not on record to have made many noises against India when it was developing its military nuclear programs. Besides, Iran sees India’s objection to its civilian nuclear project as self-defeating because it could free Iranian oil and gas for trade with India, a nation with a 8 percent growth in its energy consumption. This opportunity is being increasingly lost to both sides as India develops more dependency on Arab oil and uncertain US promises. 3. Is India’s slight disagreement with Iran’s nuclear programme one of the stumbling blocks in India-Iran ties? It sure is! The disagreement is not “slight.” India has consistently voted against Iran and is now working with the US to isolate Iran. India has also accepted the western premise that Iran’s nuclear programs are not peaceful. This is not even consistent with the views of IAEA or the UN Security Council. India’s turn against Iran was a shocking incidence for Iran, which had counted on a non-aligned leader for support. Iran was caught off guardedalso because it counted India among its friends and had even supported it in the Kashmir case outside the Organization of Islamic Countries.The India turn has been devastating for Iran as it became the source of Iran’s troubles with Europe and the US, and then with IAEA and the UNSC. India’s votes legitimized the anti-Iran moves that followed. Compared to China and Russia, who also voted against Iran, India has been more vocal and consistent in its opposition to Iran’s nuclear programs, largely because of deals it made with the US. 4. Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned? Yes, I sure do. Unfortunately, India let itself to be played by the US over the Iranian nuclear programs. India was a leader of non-aligned nations, a hope for the developing world, and one of the most independent-minded Asian states. It betrayed that position. India accepted US’


21

support for its nuclear adventure as a prize to cooperate with it against Iran.Of course India is not doing these entirely to please the US. Wishing to become a global power, India feels that it must work closely with the US and Europe. India also needs American support for its rivalry with China and Pakistan. For example, from India’s perspective, cooperation with the US will lessen Pakistan’s influence over Afghanistan – a rather false assumption! 5. Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern? Yes, I agree! The irony is that India did not need to sell Iran out for such concessions. The United States had no choice but to work closely with the emerging India at a time of American military and economic troubles.India also did not need the US support for its nuclear programs and the slight gains it made for its national interest in this respect was not worth the principles it undermined. By turning against Iran, in favor of the US, India turned its back against developing nations and lost their trust and leadership. I may be exaggerating the negative impact on India’s image among the oppressed nations, but given India’s past stands, the proposition does not seem too farfetched. 6. Why many Americans have serious misgivings about Iran-India ties? India in the past used to be very vocal about its independence and defense of the oppressed nations. It was an initiator and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and for decades did not have a good relationship with the US. Iran is currently in that mode as India moves closer to the west. Americans who have misgivings about India-Iran tie know this past history and mindset. They are concerned that the India-Iran unity is a possibility and that their partnership can create a powerful and rival bloc, economically and strategically. After all, India and Iran are the two most important countries in Southwest Asia – large in population, geography, economic means, and human resources. American Southwest Asia strategy also makes them to divide the two nations and rule. Americans particularly want India on their side as China becomes economically more powerful and Russia becomes more nationalistic. The American need for Indian friendship is also borne by the fact that the Arab-Israeli lobby in the US has successfully blocked the US-Iran rapprochement. 7. Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran rapprochement? India is an important nation, an emerging economy, a strategic country at a very important region for the US. If India was to seriously mediate and put asset behind such mediation and act as a really honest broker and sustain that brokerage for a while, it can help change the direction of the relations. After all, India is a nuclear power as well as a neighbor of Iran. Now that India has taken side with the US in this conflict, it has more credibility from the US side to mediate. However, for India to be successful it must also earn Iran’s trust and that can be achieved by India seeing Iran in more realistic and pragmatic terms than in the last few years. India can also use better information and analysis about Iran’s nuclear project. One place India may get some help is in using a joint opinion piece that the former ambassadors of UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Sweden to Iran have written regarding Iran’s nuclear dispute. In a nutshell, their article exposes the hollowness and hypocrisy of the western policy


22

toward the Iranian nuclear program. Theybelieve that Iran as a sovereign nation has the right to pursue its nuclear enrichment program, and that the western states must accept it in principle and encourage Iran to work with the IAEAas it develops credible means of inspection. Indeed, they argue that the UNSC resolutions are indefensible under international law; the IAEAor western intelligence estimates have never determined that Iran’s program is for weapon, andIran has painstakingly abided by IAEA safeguards. 8. Do you believe that the shift in India’s Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan policy? Only partly! The Indian strategists believe that sanctions could lead to pre-emptive military action against Iran. This they see as a threat to Indian interest particularly because the Strait of Hormuz could be negatively affected. It was this war fear that made India to originally vote against Iran and then support the Brazil-Turkey-Iranenriched-uranium swap deal. India is also driven by the obsession to be seen as the regional superpower.India has other national interests and concerns,including the Afghan-Pakistan problem. Any relieve in that front helps India. Thus, the main reason for the Indian policy change regarding Iran is not the shift in Obama policy. India changed its Iran direction under Georg W. Bush when he gave India the promise of access to US nuclear technology!

While India was ready to expand on its nuclear technology and military arsenal, it voted against Iran’s peaceful nuclear enrichment just because it thought its interest is better served by working with the US! Obama has called for "a close strategic partnership" with India, but that call has not been put in practice. Obama’s Afghan policy of early withdrawal and negotiation with Taliban may indeed create trouble for India. The US is also increasingly more willing to accommodate Pakistan in regards to Afghan future. I can see that without cooperation with Iran, India will not have success in relation to its Afghan-Pakistan dilemma. For example, India’s involvement in Chabahar’s project was a major aspect of its Afghan and the Central Asia access policy. India’s vote against Iran has put that cooperation in jeopardy.


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1.H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari

2. Dr. David J. Karl

3. Amb. Karamatullah Ghori

4. Dr. Harsh V. Pant

5. Brig (Retd) Dr.Muhammad A. Khan

6. Dr.Vijay Prashad

7. Dr.Anjali Sahay

8. Dr.Uddipan Mukherjee

9. Dr.Farah Naaz

10. Dr. Mahnaz Zahirinejad

11. Dr. Rushda Siddiqui

13. Dr.Venkateshwaran Lokanathan

13. Gauri Jain


24

"The Contribution of Iranian Scholars in the Advancement of

Sciences during the Qutb Shahi Period in Dakan (Southern India)”

H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari Farkhud

Consul General of Islamic Republic of Iran – Hyderabad

Literary work: Wrote a Number of articles on Foreign Policy of India in Journals of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamic Republic of Iran, Articles on Relations of India with Central Asian countries etc.

Occupation : 1993 – 1996 Political Expert. 1996 -1999 : Expert on foreign Relations, Liaison officer for the Asian - Africa Legal Consultative Organization. (AALCO) in India . 1999-2001: Deputy Director in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Islamic Republic of Iran . 2001 – 2004: Deputy Ambassador of Islamic Republic of Iran at Tbilisi - Georgia 2004- 20th August 2009: Director General Department of Economic Affairs – Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21st August 2009: Consul General of Islamic Republic of Iran Hyderabad .


25

India – Iran Relations

A lot has been said and done pertaining to the age old relationship between two great nations

India and Islamic Republic of Iran.

Relations between India and Iran date back to the Neolithic period. The existence of several empires spanning both Persia and northern India ensured the constant migration of people between the two regions and the spread and evolution of the Indo-Iranian language groups. As a consequence, the people of India and Iran share significant cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics.

During much of the early Cold War period, relations between contemporary Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Iran were frosty. However, following the 1979 revolution, relations between Iran and India strengthened after Iran withdrew from CENTO and dissociated itself from strategic cooperation with Pakistan (an arch-rival of India). The two nations further cemented bilateral strategic cooperation when India collaborated with Iran to support the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban in late 1990s.

Even though the two countries share some common strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues. India has expressed strong opposition against Iran's nuclear program and while both the nations continue to oppose the Taliban, India supports the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan unlike Iran.

Despite the decline in strategic and military links, the two nations continue to maintain strong cultural and economic ties. Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh India, continues to be a major center of Shiite culture and Persian study in South Asia. Iran is the second largest supplier of crude oil to India, supplying more than 425,000 barrels of oil per day and India is one of the largest foreign investors in Iran's oil and gas industry. December 2010, the $14 billion worth annual oil trade between India and Iran and inspite of the Reserve Bank of India‟s refusal to process transactions with Iran using the Asian Clearing Union the trade and Commerce between Iran and India are continuing with out any hurdle.

The first Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and said about India and Iran

Relationship:

“Few People have been more closely related in origin and throughout history than the people of

India and the people of Iran”

“Among the many peoples and races who have come in contact with and influenced India‟s life

and culture the oldest and most persistent have been the Iranians”

Taking into account the above fact as being stationed in Hyderabad the cradle of Culture and

Civilization I would like to high light the Role of Migrant Scholars in Deccan.

Unlike many other countries who invaded India with their army and swords to loot its riches.

Iranian‟s were the people who came to India especially to Deccan were the Poets, epistolarians,

Historiographers, Ulema, Muftis, physicians and enriched this region with Knowledge and

Culture.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neolithic

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_India

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Iranian_languages

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_India

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Republic_of_Iran

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CENTO

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_relations

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Alliance



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucknow

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserve_Bank_of_India

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Clearing_Union


26

"The Contribution of Iranian Scholars in the Advancement of Sciences during the

Qutb Shahi Period in Dakan (Southern India)”

The founder of the Qutb Shahi dynasty Sultan-Quli Qutbul Mulk (ruled from 918 A.H./1512

A.D.-950 A.H./1543 A.D.) belonged to the cultured and noble family of Qara Quyunulu, in Iran as

such he brought with him a good literary savior.(1)The Qutb Shahi rulers invited great scholars,

poets , historians ,religious Divines and the Sufis from Iran to settle down in the kingdom. The

learned Iranian migrants to the Qutb Shahi dominions made the kingdom seat of learning and

extensive literary activities. The Qutb Shahi rulers and the nobility, who were mostly Iranians,

were genuine patron of arts and sciences. The kingdom made an invaluable contribution to the

cause of letters and bequeathed to posterity a vast treasure of knowledge which can never sink

into oblivion. All the Qutb Shahi rulers were highly educated and were great patrons of art and

learning .Much as they exulted in a selfless discharge of their duties as rulers, they inculcated in

them deep love of arts and sciences. Poets and litterateurs were equally at home with them. They

even composed poetry and penned volumes in prose, with the result that literary pursuits had a

fresh of life during their regime.

Most of the elite and nobility of Golkonda was drawn from it developed a great degree of cultured

exchange from the two countries. Most of the Iranian poets, epistolarians, historiographers,

Ulema, Muftis, physicians and other visited Golkonda and some of them settled there. The

Persian epistolography developed by Iranian migrants is the best artistic prose in Golkonda

.Migration of great Ulama from Golkonda created a great volume of religious literature which

surpassed the size of any other branch of Persian literature in Golkunda. This Shi‟ite Ulama

religious literature relates to the interpretation of the Holy Quran, theology, eschatology,

jurisprudence and prayers.

Iranian scholars in Golkonda showed profound interest in philosophy, ethics and mysticism. They

introduced almost all important Greek, Arab and Iranian thinkers in Golkonda society through

Persian literature.

Iranian scientists and physicians in Golkonda contributed vastly to the study of medicine, physics,

meteorology and mathematics.

The Iranian scholars produced considerable amount of historiography work in Golkonda. They

highlighted the political and cultural aspects in their works and also paid attention to the civil and

military administration and economic life of the people .The Iranian scholars created specialized

work in various disciplines. The encyclopedias written during the Qutb Shahi period by them is no

way inferior to modern encyclopedias.

They also compiled dictionaries of specialized nature. They also prepared comprehensive

gazetteers of in Golkonda. Official documents, bonds and deeds and a huge number of Persian

epigraphs are also the ever-lasting contribution of Iranian scholars in Golkonda. The seals and

coins produced in Golkonda is also the valuable contribution of the Iranian scholars and

technicians settled in the kingdom. Extensive Persian literature written by Iranian scholars in

Golkonda is the part of golden cultural heritage of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

Sultan-Quli (ruled from 918 A.H./1512 A.D.-950 A.H./1543 A.D.)

The Golkonda during the reign of Sultan-Quli Qutbul Mulk boomed with scholars and literary

magnates. He formed a literary club known as (Aash Khana) where all men of letters used to

assemble.


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Jamsheed Quli (950 A.H./1543 A.D.- 957 A.H./ 1550A.D.)

Sultan Quli‟s successor, Jamsheed Quli (950 A.H./1543 A.D.- 957 A.H./ 1550A.D.) showed a keen

aptitude for poetic compositions. He was poet of merits wrote verses under the pseudonym of

“Jamsheed”. At times, he delved into extempore recitation of poetry. We have quite a few poetic

compositions from the facile pen of Jamshid in the Tarikh-i-Muhammad Qutb Shah, full of

romantic ideas.

Mulla Waqui Nishapuri

Jamshid-Quli, second ruler of the dynasty appointed Mulla Muhammad Sharif Waqui Nishapuri,

from Nishapur (eastern Iran, in the Khurasan province) as poet-laureate at his court. Mulla

Nishapuri played an important part in the evolution of Persian poetry in the Qutb Shahi

Kingdom. He wrote the famous book on history by name Majma-ul-Akhbar or Najm-ul-Akhbar.

Professor Devare writes about Majma-ul-Akhbar that “it is a comprehensive general history of the

Muslim world written at the behest of Ibrahim Quli Qutub Shah.

Mulla Qasim Tabassi

A great poet from Tabas (north-eastern who came to Golkonda during Jamsheed-Quli‟s reign was

rewarded with gifts and property by sultan. The famous book written by him is Insha-i Qasim

Tabassi.(9) This book was completed during Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah‟s period. It comprises

official letters from Ibrahim-Quli to the rulers of Bijapur and the Safawid monarch.

He held the same position in the court of Ibrahim Quli which the Munshi-ul-Mamalik or Dabir-

ul-Mulk held during the times of his successors.

His language is supported by fundamental tenets of Islamic faith. The Waqf Nama drafted by him

is an instance, how even in official writings he cites all necessary verses of the Holy Quran which

enlightened the legal, religious and the moral justification of an act of endowment. He makes use

of rhyme words but at pleasant distances. Most of the devices adopted by him are connotative.

His style manifests an intellectual and spiritual emancipation which is not tamed and intimidated

by the formalities of court. Freedom of his mind has made his writings lucid, crisp and lively.

Mulla Qasim Tabassi is the first prose artist of Golkonda, who was capable of being natural in his

writing of all occasions.The period subsequent to Mulla Qasim Tabassi, seems to have been

encouraging rhetorical artifice.

Mulla Husain Tabassi

Mulla Husain Tabassi, an Iranian migrant from Tabas(north-eastern),was patronized by

Sultan-Quli Qutbul Mulk. He wrote the book Marqub-ul-Qulub.(10)The author of Tarikh-i-

Muhammad Qutb Shah had quoted extensively in his book from Marqub-ul-Qulub. Fursi, the

great Iranian poet, lauded Mulla Husain Tabassi in his Nasb Nameh. Mulla Husain Tabassi was

also Chief Justice of Sultan Quli‟s reign. His book, the Marghul-ul-Qulub, has already been

referred to in connection with the reign of Ibrahim-Quli‟s father,Sultan-Quli. He lived on and

wrote another book, the Saidiyah‟the Book of the Game‟ at the instance of Ibrahim Qutb in

983A.H/1575-76A.D.The book consists of an introduction ,ten chapters and an Epilogue, and

deals with all aspects of the game and its limits set for it by Islamic jurisprudence. Its manuscript

copies are preserved in Mulla Firaz Library, and the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,

Munshi Khushdil


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There is another and a shorter work called Tawarikh Qutb Shahi reputed to be the work Munshi

Khushdil, private secretary of Prince Haidar-Quli. This is a much small composition and only an

abridgement of Fursi‟s work. This book is also divided into four parts: part-1 deals with the birth

of the founder of the dynasty up to his accession to power, part-2 with his rule, part-3 with the

reign of Ibrahim Qutb Shah and part-4 with the reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah .This

history of the Qutb Shahi dynasty was written on the model of the Bahman Nama of Azari .A

unique manuscript of this history is preserved in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,

Calcutta.

Ibrahim-Quli Qutb Shah(957 A.H./1550 A.D.-988 A.H./1580 A.D.)

The reign of Ibrahim Quli, when the foundation of the kingdom had been firmly laid, ushered in

an era of patronage of arts and sciences .Ibrahim was a man of polite learning and liberal

education and also bore a love of knowledge. He made scores of school where the children were

imparted basic primary education. He rallied round him a galaxy of learned and scholars and

made the best of time in their company .The learned conferred with the king even when the latter

was on his tour of the dominions and enlivened his company by their palatable discussions. These

scholars were the receipt of royal honors and some of those who illumined the court of Ibrahim

Quli were prominent Iranian scholars like: Amir Shah ,Muhammad Anju, Amir Imaduddin,

Mahmood Shirazi, Qasim Beg Shirazi and Husain Quli Mirza. They were all profound scholars

and masters in logic. (13) He was one who is known for his lavish patronization of Telugu poets.

He was so popular among them that he was compared with the Hindu gods by some of the Telugu

poets. In spite of this his period saw the compilation of three Persian books, two on the subject of

history by Khurshah and Sharif and one over the games and sports by an Iranian scholar Husain

Tabassi.(14) In, 1512A.D. Sultan Quli Qutubul Mulk declared Shi‟ite faith as the state religion

which resulted in the opening of a new chapter in the Iran-Haidarabad relations. The Qutb Shahi

sultans encouraged scholarly, educated and qualified Iranian to migrate to Qutb Shahi Kingdom

in waves. Thus large number of Iranian religious scholars, poets, calligraphers, architects,

artisans, scholars, builders, engineers came down to Golkonda in large numbers. This migration

of Iranian to Golkonda continued right up to the end of the Qutb Shahi rule. The Qutb Shahi

sultans not only patronized these immigrants but appointed them to higher posts of

administration. There was tremendous migration of learned Iranians to Qutb Shahi kingdom

during the reign of Ibrahim Quli. With their migration, Dakkan became the cradle of Iranian

poets, writers, religious scholars, calligraphers, painters and artisans, who richly contributed to

the progress of culture, literature, architecture, poetry, medicine, theology and jurisprudence in

Dakkan.

Little research had been carried out on the most valuable manuscripts covering the fields of

religious literature like tafseer, hadith, jurisprudence, theology, ethics, philosophy etc. present in

various libraries of India especially in Haidarabad.

Khurshah Husaini

One of the famous books dedicated to Ibrahim-Quli Qutb Shah was Khurshah bin Qubad al-

Husaini‟s voluminous „History of the World‟ stressing the history of pre-Islamic and post-Islamic

Iran, the dynasties which ruled the lands of the Muslims, the Sultans who held sway in north

India, Bengal, Malwa, Gujrat, and finally the history of the Bahmanis of the Dakkan down to the

death of Mahmud Shah Bahmani in 1518A.D. This book was written in the reign of Ibrahim-Quli

and was completed in 972A.H/1564-65A.D. It preceded by twenty five years, Mulla Waqui

Nishapuri‟s Majma-al-Akhbar another chronicle produced at Golkonda during the same period.


29

The author, Khurshah Husaini, does not specifically mention the name of his work anywhere in

the text, but it is commonly known as Tarikh-i Elchi Nizam Shah.

Haji Abarkhuhi

Haji Abarkhuhi was born at Abarkhuh near yazd City (Central Iran). His father died when Haji

was only a small child. He took to trade and traveled for this purpose to ShirazCity and Kirman.

After sometime he migrated to India and secured a position in the court of Ibrahim Quli Qutb

Shah at Golkonda .He was later patronized by Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah in whose praise he

wrote a number of poems . The poet compiled his poetic works at the instance of a prominent

noble of the Qutb Shahi dynasty Mustafa Khan Ardestani. An incomplete manuscript of the poets‟

„Diwan‟ preserved in the Majlis Library at Tehran comprising 2400 lines contains the following:

(1) Qasidas , including religious poems (2) A small romantic Mathnawi called „Nazir-wa-Manzur‟,

(3) „Ghazals‟ arranged alphabetically covering more than half of the Diwan, (4) Ruba‟iayat. The

manuscript abruptly finished at page 217.The most attractive feature of his ghazals is that they

seem to have been composed on the model of Sa‟di and Hafiz and he fairly succeeded in imitating

his masters.

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah (988 A.H./1580 A.D.-1020 A.H./1612 A.D.)

Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah was a devoted Shi‟ite and practiced his faith openly. He greatly

strengthened the relations with Safawid Iran. He himself was an artist by nature. The advent of

Allama Mir Mumin Astarabadi as the Peshwa-e Sultanat of the Qutb Shahi kingdom during his

reign spurred the vast influx of Iranian poets, physicians and scholars into the kingdom. He

composed a „Diwan‟ in Persian, which is written in nastaliq style. It is reserved in the Salar Jung

Museum Library, Haidarabad. It contains more than three thousand couplets.

Meer Shah Meer Isfahani

Meer Taqiuddin Meer Shah Isfahani came to Haidarabad during Ibrahim Quli‟s reign and

attained the position of Peshwa-e-Saltanat. He was also a famous poet, scholar and warrior of his

period.

Kami Shirazi

Kami Shirazi was a famous poet during the Qutb Shahi period. He lived during the period of

Muhammad–Quli Qutb Shah and was the associate of Muhammad Amin Shahristani famous as

Ruh-al-Ameen.

Mirza Kashani

Mirza Muhammad Shareef Kashani, the famous Persian poet of the Qutb Shahi period was the

pupil of famous Iranian poet Muhtasham Kashani. He was affiliated to the court of Muhammad-

Quli Qutb Shah. The copies of his „Diwan‟ is preserved in India Office Library, London City.

Hakeem Arif-i-Egi

Hakeem Arif-i Egi arrived Haidarabad in 1014 A.H/1605-6 A.D. and entered the Qutb Shahi

service in Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah‟s reign. He wrote laudatory verses and was magnificently

rewarded for it. Arif was a distinguished poet. He was the author of „Andarz Nameh‟ or „the Book


30

of Admonitions‟, which is modeled on the „Shahnamah‟ and comprises 2300 couplets. He also

composed „Saqi Namah‟ which deserves a very high place in the Persian literature.

Adai Yazdi

Mir Muhammad Mumin Adai Yazdi belonged to the Sada‟at family of YazdCity (Iran).He was a

famous poet, physician and philosopher who came to Haidarabad in 1030 A.H. He was more

inclined towards „Rubai‟ form.

Mir Mumin Astarabadi

Mir Mumin Astarabadi was a statesman, a litterateur, a divine and a polished courtier, and he

exercised a great influence on the person of the Sultan. He was without doubt one of the chief

advisors of the Sultan in planning the new city of Haidarabad. He caused the rapid introduction

and universalization of Shia‟ism in the kingdom. Shia‟ism had a hold on the court of Haidarabad

to such an extent that the court circles of the capital appeared like a replica of Safawid Iran. Mir

Mumin attempted to make Haidarabad a new City eIsfahan City and thus he planned the city on

the architectural style and pattern of Isfahan City, the capital of Safawid Iran. Thus, he called

Haidarabad as „Isfahan-e-Nau‟(New Isfahan).His political ,cultural, social and literary

achievements have to be discussed in a separate section. His poetical works were collected and

compiled in the form of a “diwan” a copy of which covering 175 folios, is preserved in the India

Office Library, LondonCity. This diwan comprises Ghazals in an alphabetical order in honor of

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah.

Mir Mumin excelled both in the panegyric and lyric forms. In his gazals, the poet depicts the true

sentiments of lovers and as such he succeeds in widening the scope of popular appeal to his lyrics.

It was the patronage of learning on the part of the court at Haidarabad which made poets of Iran

throng into the city, and Haidarabad became a place of refuge for reputed Iranian poets because

of royal patronage offered to them by the Qutb Shahi sultans. There were a number of minor

poets of Iran who came and settled down in Haidarabad and ended their life there. Apart from

this a kind of fashion had set in for travelers of note coming from Iran to an addressIndian Court

addressStreet to come and pass a few years at Haidarabad as well, for they were sure of being

accorded a warm welcome with the prospect of leaving Haidarabad much richer than when they

arrived there.

Mirza Muhammad Amin Shahristani ‘Ruh al-Amin’

One of the leading Iranian poets who also became an outstanding personality of QutbShahi

Kingdom was Mirza Muhammad Amin Shahristani „Ruh al-Amin‟. He came to Haidarabad and

was forthwith appointed Mir Jumla by the Sultan on Mir Mumin‟s recommendation in

1011A.H/1602-3A.D.He proved to be the “strong man” of QutbShahi Kingdom and Muhammad-

Quli Qutb Shah relegated practically all governmental powers to him both on the civil side and in

the military field. He remained at the helm of affairs till the death of Sultan ten years later. In

spite of his obvious preoccupations as a statesman and a soldier, Mirza Muhammad Amin

Shahristani „Ruh al-Amin‟ found time to compose some fine poetry. He belonged to renowned

noble family of Musavi Sayyid in Shahristan near Isfahan City. Members of his family

commanded great respect at the Safawid court. Mirza Amin Shahristani had a fine literary taste

and was poet of great order. He was so confident of his own capacity that he in a way challenged

such a masterly work as the Khamsa Nizamiya of the great poet Nizami Ganjawi, and while at

Haidarabad began to compose his own khamsa, or five-Mathnawis, four books of which he was

able to complete.


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(1) „Shirin wa Khusro‟ was the first mathnawi in the “Khamsa-i-Ruhul Amin” was composed in

1018A.H, in imitation of Nizami‟s poem of the same name. One of its manuscript is preserved in

the Majlis Library, Tehran and the other in the India Office Library, London.)

(2) „Matmahul Anzar‟ being an imitation of Nizami‟s „Makhzanul Asrar‟ was Amin‟s second

Mathnawi. It comprises an epilogue in mixed prose and verse, praise of Allah, supplications,

praise of the Holy Prophet of Islam (S.A.W.) and the Ahlul-Bayt (A.S.) and eulogy of Sultan.

(3) “Laila Majnun”being the third Mathnawi of Amin‟s Khamsa. Its two manuscripts are

preserved one in the British Museum Londonty and the other in the India Office Library, London.

(4)“Asman-i-Hashtum” being the forth Mathnawi of Amin‟s Khamsa was written in imitation of

Nizam‟s “Haft- Paikar”. It was started in the time of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah but could be

finished only after his death. It was therefore dedicated to the Sultan‟s successor Muhammad

Qutb Shah. One of its manuscripts is preserved in the BritishMuseumLondon

(5)We have no exact information about his fifth Mathnawi. Besides these Mathnawis, Mirza Amin

composed a large number of lyrical poems and those written in the early period of his poetic

career were compiled into a “diwan” which exists in three manuscripts. One in the British

Museum, London City, the other in the India Office Library, London:City and the third in the

Majlis Library, Tehran. His “diwan” is named Gulistan-i-Naz..

Mulla Muin Mirak Sabazwari

Another great Iranian poet who was honored at Haidarabad was Mulla Muin Mirak

Sabzwari, who began acting as envoy of Ahmadnagar sent to Haidarabad to felicitate

Muhammad-Quli‟s accession to the throne and then represented the Nizam Shahi Kingdom on

being sent on the occasion of the marriage of the King‟s daughter, Hayat Baksh Begum in

1016A.H/1607A.D.

It was probably after he had settled down at Haidarabad that the Sultan constructed his famous

palace Khudadad Mahal.

Muin Sabzwari belonged to a distinguished family of Sabzwar in the Khurasan province, Iran

country-region. He entered the services of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah and attained honorable

positions in the royal court. He was a poet of great repute during Muhammad-Quli‟s reign.

Sabzwari was a humorist and proved great fun and laughter in the jovial assemblies.

Husain bin Ali Fursi Shaidani

The tradition of compiling a metrical chronicle of the Qutb Shahi dynasty which had begun in the

reign of Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah was continued during the reign of his successor. .Husain bin Ali

Fursi compiled Nasab Namah Qutb Shahi or Nisbat Namah Shahryari during the reign of

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah in 1019 A.H.

It is the metrical history of the Qutb Shahi dynasty from the beginning of the dynasty to the early

period of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. This history is expressed in poetical form and comprises

18600 couplets. The work is divided into four parts: the first part is a kind of introduction and

takes the reader up to the end of the Bahmani dynasty: the second takes him right up to the

accession of Ibrahim: the third deals with the reign of Ibrahim, while the forth brings the history

up to the compilation of the work. He based his Nasab Namah on the Shahnamah-i-Firdausi and

it is heroic _expression of poet. .


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Sultan Muhammad Qutb (1020 A.H./1612 A.D.-1034 A.H./1626 A.D.)

Muhammad Quli‟s successor Sultan Muhammad Qutb was taught and brought up by Allama Mir

Mumin Astarabadi, Peshwa-e-Sultanat. He therefore is known as Mujtahid and Faqih Sultan of

the Qutb Shahi dynasty. Besides being a peace loving Sultan, he was a great lover of the books. He

employed a large number of calligraphers to make copies of the books. His court companions

were religious divines. It was he who stopped all the practices and customs contrary to religion.

Allama Mir Muhammad Mumin Astarabadi, Vakil and Peshwa-e- Sultanat during Muhammad

Quli and Muhammad Qutb‟s reigns played very crucial role in the development and furtherance of

Persian literature in the Qutb Shahi kingdom.

He was also an outstanding Persian poet. His ghazal is full of allusions to the land of his birth,

Iran, and is reminiscent of some of the famous cities of that country like Isfahan and Shiraz. The

ode he composed after the accession of Sultan Muhammad was presented to him immediately

after his enthronement. There is again the ode composed on the festival of Idd-al- Azha,

1020A.H/1613A.D., another on the birth of the Prince Muhammad Ali Mirza and few lines in

praise of the Sultan in the preface to the Risala-i- Miqdariyah. It deals with all the weights,

distances and measures prevalent in the kingdom.

Mir Mumin was also the author of Kitab-i-Raj‟at and wrote the preface to the Persian translation

of the Arabic work Kathirul-Miamin,which was ascribed to the eighth Shi‟ite Imam, Ali ibn Musa

ar- Reza(A.S.).

Tarikh-i-Muhammad Qutb Shah

The famous book of the Qutb Shahi history was written by an anonymous writer. This book

contains the history of the Qutb Shahi dynasty up to 1026A.H./ 1617A.D. six years after

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah‟s death. This book was compiled at the behest of Muhammad Qutb

in 1025A.H.or 1026.

The special literary significance of this work consists in this, that it has preserved a selection of

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah‟s poetry in its concluding portion. (46)As a complement to Tarikh

Muhammad Qutb Shah

the history of the dynasty is brought right up to the end of the reign in Ma‟athir-i Qutb Shahi

compiled by Muhammad bin Abdullah Nishapuri.

Hakeem Rukna Kashi

Hakeem Ruknuddin Masud Kashi alias Hakeem Rukna-i-Masih was a famous physician and poet

during Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah‟s period.

The author of Khazana-i-Amera writes that Hakeem Rukna Kashi was the author of one hundred

couplets. Professor Devare writes that „‟Hakeem Rukna Kashi is the author of Mathnawi,

Majmua-e-Khayal comprising two thousand couplets.

Rukhna Kashi in youth was personal friend and favorite of Shah Abbas Safawi-I. He was an

outstanding physician and calligrapher. He is the author of ten diwans. His mathnawi Majmua-i-

Khayal is available in the British Museum London


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. The mathnawi was written by Rukna Kashi based on the model of Nizami‟s “Khusro-wa-

Shireen”. He is also the author of Saqi Namah. Rukna Kashi closely imitated the odes of Baba

Fighani . He died in Mashhad in 1066A.H 1655-56A.D

Mulla Fazlullah Semnani

Mulla Fazlullah Husaini Semnani rendered “Rauzat-ur-Riyaheen” into Persian and named it

“Nuzhat-ul-Uyun”. It is a book on the lives of Sufi saints and divines. Rauzat-ur-Riyaheen was

translated into Persian by Mulla Semnani in 1026A.H./ 1626-27A.D. at the request of Sultan

Muhammad Qutb (490

Mulla Husain Amuli

Mulla Husain Amuli was a great scholar who migrated to Haidarabad from the Mazandaran

province (Iran) during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He penned the Sharh-e-Nahjul Balagha

in Haidarabad.

Zainuddin Ali Badakshi

Zainddin Ali Badakshi translated into Persian Shaikh Nasiruddin Tusi‟s Arabic treatise Tajrid. It

was completed in the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. The translator also wrote a commentary

on Tajrid and gave it the title of Tuhfa-i-Shahi.

Shah Qazi Astarabadi

Shah Qazi, a famous Iranian poet from Astarabad near Isfahan:City, wrote Qasidah in praise of

Sultan Muhammad Qutb in the book known as Kaseer-ul-Mayameen.

Wisali Ardistani

Wisali Ardistani migrated from Ardistan near Isfahan City to Haidarabad during the reign of

Sultan Muhammad Qutb. He was an author of Diwan in Persian.

Ali Gul Astarabadi

Ali Gul Astarabadi, a distinguished Persian poet from Astarabad near Isfahan City came to

Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb and was partonised by Sultan and

Allamma Mir Mumin, Peshwa-e-sultanat who also hailed from Astarabad.

Mulla Abdul Baqi Damavandi

Mulla Abdul Baqi hailed from Damavand (Iran). He came to Haidarabad during the last days of

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. As a Persian poet, he earned a great reputation in Haidarabad.

Amir Taqi Isfahani

Amir Taqi Isfahani also famous as Durkani visited Golkonda during the reign of Ibrahim

Qutb Shah. He was an outstanding Persian poet.

Tajalli Kashani


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Muhammad Husain Kashani‟s poetic name was Tajalli. He had been to Haidarabad during the

reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah.

Askari Kashani

Mir Hasan Askari hailed from Kashan. He visited Haidarabad during the reign of Muhammad-

Quli Qutb Shah. His Saqi Namah best represent his poetry and it consists of 223 couplets in the

praise of Imam Ali (A.S.).

Qasim Arsalan Mashhadi

His name was Qasim and poetic name Arsalan. He hailed from Mashhad He joined the court

of Adbullah Qutb Shah and enjoyed royal favors.

Jalaluddin Nishapuri

He hailed from Nishapur and had been to Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad

Qutb.

Sali Ardestani

Mirza Sali Ardestani came to Haiderabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb .He was

one of the famous Persian poet of Haidarabad during that reign.

Ishrati Yazdi

Ishrati of Yazd died in Haidarabad in 1037A.H/1627A.D. He was an outstanding poet and

contributed richly to Persian literature.

Shams Dah Dah Isfahani

He was a poet and came to Golkonda during the second half of the sixteenth century and stayed

there for considerable time.

Syed Murad Isfahani

Syed Murad Isfahani had written short mathnawi on the city of Haidarabad.

There are many other works compiled in Persian during Muhammad Qutb‟s reign on tasawwuf,

ethics, and literature interspersed in the libraries of London, Calcutta, Bankipur and Haidarabad,

which throw light on the avidity of the Court for gems of literature.

Abdullah Qutb Shah (1034 A.H./1626A.D-1083 A.H./1672A.D.)

Muhammad Qutb and his renowned wife Hayat Baksh Begum appointed some of the best

teachers available to train prince Abdullah. His teachers were Iranians and Persian was the

official language of the state as well as the language of communication among the learned. Thus,

Abdullah‟s court became rendezvous of scholars and writers from Iran. Great scholars from Iran

hovered round him. A few of them are as follows: Allama Mir Majduddin, Allama Rounaqi, Qazi

Ahsan, Mir Miran ,Hakim Abdul Jabbar Gilani ,Shaikh Abdul Lateef Nurullah, Mirza Muhammad

Jowhar Tabrizi, Mirza Hamza Astarabadi, Mir Fazlullah Shirazi, Shaikh Harun, Mulla Taphtai

Shirazi and Mulla Arab.


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Abdullah Qutb Shah(1626A.D-1672A.D) kept the traditions of his father alive and lavishly

patronized the men of letters ,who came down to Haidarabad from Iran. Beside Allama

Muhammad Ibn-e-Khatun Ameli, who was the Vakil and Peshwa-e-Sultanat and Riaz Astarabadi,

who held a prominent post in administration ,there were other Iranians too whose list is very

long. But the other most important Iranian scholars of his period are: Mulla Jamaluddin, Mulla

Hussain Amuli, Nizamuddin Ahmed Shirazi, Syed Ali Masoom Shirazi, Muhammad Hussain

Burhan Tabrizi, Muhammad Quli Jami, Razi Danish, Reza Quli Beg „Neknam Khan‟, Hakeem

Abdul Jabbar Gilani, Hakeem Nizamuddin Ahmed, Zulfiqar Sasani, Khalqi Shustari etc .Beside

the literary work, Abdullah‟s reign is marked for a large number of books in religious literature.

The Iranian scholars and divines like Shah Qazi Yazi, Nizamuddin Gilani, Ali Bin Taifoor Bustami,

etc. wrote a number of books covering all aspects of religion..

Allama Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli

One of the foremost among such scholars was Allama Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli, who

became the Peshwa-e-Sultanat. He rose to such an eminence in the realm of knowledge that he

came to be known as Hadrat Allama Fahami or “the most learned and full of wisdom”. He wrote

four books Sharh-e-Irshad-ul-Azhan, Sharh-e-Arba‟een. Jameh Abbasi, Kitab-al-Imamat. He held

regular classes twice a day and delivered lectures on the commentaries of the Holy Quran, logic,

philosophy and mathematics.

Mulla Muhammad Husain Burhan Tabrizi

He is the author of the well known Persian dictionary Burhan-i-Qatey and was an erudite and

learned Persian scholar. He migrated from Tabriz Iran and settled in Haidarabad during the

Abdullah Qutb Shah‟s reign. He complied this famous Persian dictionary Burhan-i-Qatey at the

behest of Abdullah Qutb Shah. Allamah Ibn Khatun Amuli, had great respect for Mulla

Muhammad Husain Burhan Tabrizi. This monumental dictionary was completed in 1656A.D.in

Haidarabad. This is one of the most standard works on Persian in lexicography compiled under

the patronage of Abdullah Qutb Shah. This book has enjoyed wide reputation both in India and

Iran. This dictionary had been printed in Calcutta, Bombay and Lucknow and the copy of it is at

hand in every distinguished and reputed library in the world. In the body of the books, words

have been enumerated under each orthographical heading, the total number of words dealt with

being 19,177. Burhan-i-Qatey is still one of the basic dictionaries of the Persian language.

Mirza Nizamuddin Ahmed Saidi

Another Persian work of a permanent value complied during Abdullah Qutb Shah‟s reign is Mirza

Nizamuddin Ahmad Saidi‟s, Hadiqat-us-Salatin. It is a detailed history of the first nineteen years

of the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and was written at the instance of the Peshwa-e-Saltanat,

Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli. It purports to be a day to day chronicle of the kingdom

from Abdullah‟s birth on 21-10-1023A.H/21-11-1614A.D to 26-12-1053A.H/25-2-1644A.D. It gives

a correct picture of social life of the people and the administrative and the international set-up.

Mirza Nizamuddin Ahmed al-Saidi Shirazi was leading religious scholar and poet during the reign

of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was also a leading professor at the Hawzah-i-Ilmia(Islamic Seminary)

of Allama Shaikh Muhammad ibn Khatun in Haidarabad. He also occupied a respectable post in

the court of Abdullah Qutb Shah.


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He was also well versed in applied sciences like mathematics and astronomy. He wrote a book

“Shajr-e-Danish” which includes 108 articles in various branches of sciences like mathematics

and astronomy.

Kaukab Qazwini

Qubbad Beg Kaukab Qazwini came to Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb

and died in 1033A.H/1623A.D. and is buried in Dairah Mir Mumin cemetery in Haidarabad. He

was a famous poet of his period and composed a “diwan” which is at present extinct. His poetry

has a deep under-current of pessimism and a fatalistic pathos.

Abdul Ali Taliqani

Haji Abdul Ali Talighani, a famous Iranian scholar hailed from the city of Talighan (Iran). He

migrated to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and attained the distinguished

position of “Nazir-ul-Mamalik” which contains royal letters written by him during the service of

Abdullah Qutb Shah. This book is great work in the art of letter-writing and correspondence in

Persian. This book also gives an insight into the political, social and international conditions of

the kingdom. The copies of the book are present in the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad

and British Museum Library, London. He drafted letters of political and administrative nature on

behalf of Abdullah Qutb Shah and Hayat Baksh Begum addressed to the Emperor Shah Jahan,

Shah Abbas Safawi-II of Iran, Adil Shahs of Bijapur and the Mughul princes, Dara Shikoh,

Aurangzeb, Muhammad Sultan as well as the grand-daughter of Shah Jahan and wife of

Muhammad Adil Shah. Among the types of documents drafted by him, there are Farman, Kabin

Nama,Wakalat Nama,Waqf Nama,diplomatic correspondence and belles letters.

Above all the historical „Inqiyad Nama‟ or the Deed of Submission executed by Abdullah Qutb

Shah to the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan was drafted by him. In his writings, though he has dealt

with a variety of subjects relating to politics, diplomacy, administration and culture, his individual

style prevails in all these directions. His style manifests his two fold capacity of writing the most

artificial prose on one hand and the practical on the other hand.

Abdul Azeem Taliqani

Abdul Azeem Taliqani succeeded his father Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani and was appointed as Dabir-

ul-Mulk during the reign of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah. He too drafted all important foreign and

international correspondence. His drafts include letters addressed to the Mughal Emperor

Aurangzeb, Shah Sulaiman Safavi of Iran, Sikander Adil Shah of Bijapur and the Prince

Muhammad Moazzam and others.

His style was plain and ornate. He made a better room for Persian glosses than his father. He

maintained a uniform style throughout by thinning the ceremonial baroque in the beginning or

end. The contention expressed in his Insha prevails over the heaviness of diction and makes his

writings more palatable than his father‟s. His style keeps up freshness in every letter and does not

become thick with any traditional or individual stereotype. Thus Abdul Azeem Taliqani‟s style is

more effective and artistic.

Ali bin Taifoor Bustami

He was a famous historian of the Qutb Shahi period. He was patronized by Neknam Khan and

wrote many books on history, biographies, ethics and mysticism. His famous works are:


37

1) Tuhfe-e-Mulki, Persian rendering of Ibn-i-Babwaih Qummi‟s Uyun-ul-Akhbar ar-Reza(A.S.).

2) Anwar-ul-Tahqiq, which contains extracts from the writing of the Sufi saint Khwaja Abdullah

Ansari.

3) The translation of Makarem-ul-Akhlaq.

4) Risalah-i-Masoomah.

5) Tuhfa-tul-Gharaib, containing the traditions of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.), verdicts of the

saints, acrimonious sermons of certain preachers and the advice of the learned.

6) Ganj Nameh, the monumental work which explains the difficult words in the Shahnamah-i-

Firdausi. It was compiled at the behest of Neknam Khan in 1079 Hijrah. It contains 174 folios.

7) Sharah-i-Awamil.

8) Tuhfa-i-Qutb Shahi, written on the style of Gulistan which includes eight chapters and

conclusion.

9) Hadaiq-us-Salatin: It is a very important treatise on the historical events during the reigns of

Abdullah Qutb Shah and Abul Hasan Qutb Shah. It can be considered as magnum opus of Ali bin

Taifoor Bustami. The copy of it in fine nastaliq script is preserved in Salar Jung Museum Library,

Haidarabad. Its literary value is unique since it preserves poetical extracts of the Bahmanis and

the Qutb Shahi sultans as well of other eminent poets of Iran and India. The notices of Mir

Mumin Astarabadi and Mir Muhammad Amin Shahristani in this work are of great value.

Mir Majduddin Astarabadi

Mir Muhammad Majduddin was the son of Allama Mir Muhammad Mumin Astarabadi. He was

renowned scholar and poet during the Qutb Shahi period. According to the author of Hadaiq-us-

Salatin, he was the author of Diwan, copy of it is at present extinct.

Ulfati Yazdi

Maulana Ulfati Yazdi wrote about the events of Abdullah Qutb Shah in the form of a book known

as “Rawa‟eh-i-Gulshan Qutb Shahi”, which contains seven chapters. The copy of it is present in

the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad.

Ulfati Yazdi is one of the distinguished writers during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He wrote

a Risalah on Ilm-ul-Arus in1048A.H, known as “Riyaz-ul-Za‟eh Qutb Shah”i. The copies of the

book are present in Bankipur Library, Patna; Asafia Library, Haidarabad, and Cambridge

University Library, U.K.

Meer Razi

Meer Razi bin Meer Turab Razavi belonged to the Razavi Sadaat family of Mashhad Iran. He

came to Haidarabad during Abdullah Qutb Shah‟s period and settled in the city. He was a Persian

poet of great standard and merit. His father Meer Turab died in Haidarabad in 1060A.H. and was

buried in the Dairah Mir Mumin Astarabadi cemetery, the exclusive graveyard for the Iranian

during the Qutb Shahi period.


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In 1073A.H.,Abdullah Qutb Shah deputed Meer Razi as Nayeb-us-Ziarah, for the pilgrimage to

the mausoleum of Imam Reza (A.S.), the eighth Shi‟ite Imam. Meer Razi composed a Diwan

which the author of Aatish Kade states that Diwan of Meer Razi consisted of one thousand

couplets. But unfortunately the copy of it is extinct now.

Shah Jami

Muhammad Shah Jami was born in Haidarabad in an Iranian family. He was a great scholar of

Persian and Sanskrit during Abdullah Qutb Shah‟s reign. He had translated “Koka Shastra”

attributed to Pundit Koka of Kashmir form Sanskrit to Persian in1036A.H., during Abdullah‟s

reign..

Kismet Mashhadi

Muhammad Qasim Kismet Mashhadi migrated form Iran to Haidarabad during Abdullah Qutb

Shah‟s period. He was a great artisan as well as distinguished Persian poet .

Salik Yazdi

Salik Yazdi was a famous Persian poet who migrated to Haidarabad from Yazd (Iran) during the

reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He composed a Diwan, a copy of which is preserved in Salar Jung

Museum Library, Haidarabad. A selection of his lyrical poetry is housed in the Bombay University

Library. Azad Bilgrami and the author of Makhzan-ul-Gharaib had praised the poetical genius of

Salik Yazdi. He composed about six thousand couplets.

Farajullah Shushtari

Farajullah Shushtari belonged to a distinguished Sada‟at family of Shushtar (Iran) and was author

of a Diwan. Authors of Ma‟asir al Kala‟am, Riyaz-al-Shu‟ara and Natayej-al-Afkar had applauded

the outstanding lyrical merit of Farajullah Shushtaril He came to Haidarabad during the reign of

Abdullah Qutb Shah and attained a respectable position in his court. His Diwan contains about

three to four thousand couplets. Gulam Ali Masoom, author of the famous “Salafat-ul-Asr” writes

that Farajullah Shushtari was also an Arabic poet of great repute. The copies of his Diwan are

present in the Bankipur Library, Patna and Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta

Hamza Astarabadi

Hamza Astarabadi came to Haidarabad from Iran during Muhammad Qutb‟s reign. He attained

the dignified position of Sarkhail during Abdullah Qutab Shah‟s reign. He was a writer and poet of

good repute but unfortunately his works are at present extinct.

Khalqi Shushtari

Shaikh Abdul Lateef Khalqi Shushtari was a distinguished religious scholar from Iran who

reached Haidarabad in 997A.H. and attained high positions in the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah.

He was an outstanding Persian poet and also lectured at the Darul Shifa Medical College in

Haidarabad.

Husaini Kareem


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Meer Muhammad Kazem Husaini Kareem, was a distinguished and famous Persian poet who

migrated to Haidarabad form <st1:Iran during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He had written a

lengthy Qasidah, ode, in praise of Abdullah Qutb Shah which is famous as “Ganj Namah”. A copy

of the Kulliyat of Hussaini Kareem is present in the British Museum Library.

Bayan Isfahani

Mahdi Bayan Isfahani came to Haidarabad from Isfahan during the reign of Abdullah Qutb shah

and was distinguished Persian poet.

Neknam Khan

Mirza Reza Quli Beg Neknam Khan, an Iranian who held a honorable position in the

administration of Shah Abbas Safavi‟s court, migrated to Haidarabad and occupied distinguished

administrative and military posts in the Qutb Shahi Kingdom

Neknam Khan was a strange combination of a man of sword and a man of pen. He patronized the

men of letters, religious scholars and poets lavishly. Ali Bin Taifoor Bustami, one of the leading

scholar of Abdullah Qutb Shah‟s reign came to Haidarabad on the invitation of Neknam Khan and

flourished under his patronization.

Akhtari Yazdi

Akhtari Yazdi was a great Persian poet who was also well versed in astronomy. He came to

Haidarabad during Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah‟s period and was associated with services of Mir

Muhammad Amin Shahristani, Mir Jumla. He died in 1026A.H. and is buried in Langar Houz,

Haidarabad.

Abdullah Amani

Abdullah Amani came from Mazandaran province Iran to Haidarabad during reign of Abdullah

Qutb Shah and wrote a Diwan in Persian and also a book on medicine. The copy of his Diwan is

still present in Indian Office Library, London.(98)

Muhammad Ali Jabalarudi

Muhammad Ali Jabalarudi was born in a village Jabalarud near Isfahan. He migrated to

Haidarabad in 1054A.H. during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and entered the services of

Allama Ibn Khatun Ameli. At behest of Allamah Ibn Khatun, he collected the “amsal” in Persian in

128 chapters famous as “Majma-al-Amsal” or Jameh-ul- Tamseel”. It was compiled in 1054A.H.

While explaining amsal, the author had described the historical events and anecdotes pertaining

to the amsal. Professor Ethe calls this book as “Jameh-ul-Tamseel”. The original manuscripts of

the book are present in Rampur Library, Berlin Library and Asafia Library, Haidarabad. It was

printed in Tehran 1278A.H. and inBombay in 1291A.H. It is a voluminous work containing 205

folios.

Abdullah Nishapuri

Muhammad bin Abdullah Nishapuri came to Haidarabad during the reign of Muhammad-Quli

Qutb Shah. He was a distinguished historian of the Qutb Shahi period and wrote a famous book

on the events during the Qutb Shahi period known as “Ma‟athir Qutb Shahi”.Professor Devare


40

writes „This work is supplement to Tarikh-e-Muhammad Qutb Shah recording in details the

history of Muhammad Qutb Shah‟s reign till his death in 1035 Hijrah‟. .

Shaikh Ahmed Jabel Ameli

Shaikh Ahmed Jabel Ameli came from Iran to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb

Shah. He translated the monumental work of Bahauddin Ameli‟s „Kashkul‟ into Persian in seven

volumes in Haidarabad in 1101A.H. According to Professor Ethe, the copy of this book is present

in the Indian Office Library, London.

Rounaqi Hamadani

Rounaqi Hamadani came from Iran to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He

was also an author of Diwan running into 3,500 couplets.

Munsif Isfahani

Ghiyasuddin Ali Munsif Isfahani was a didactic poet, writing plain and chaste poetry. He joined

the Qutb Shahi services. His diwan was compiled posthumously by a friend of his. His Saqi

Namah is highly ethical and reflective in tone and comprises five thousand verses.

Reza Danish Mashhadi

Reza Danish was Razavi Sayyid of the holy city of Mashhad and son of a great poet Abu Turab

Fitrat. He composed a mathnavi in praise of the holy cities and the mausoleum of Imam Reza

(A.S) in Mashhad.(104) He arrived in Haidarabad in 1068A.H./1657-58A.D. As a Mashhadi

Sayyid, he naturally commands the reverence of the Qutb Shahi ruler and he was exalted to high

rank.

Jung-i-Qutb Shahi

It is a treatise on ethics and theology by an anonymous author who flourished in the reign of

Abdullah Qutb Shah. The manuscript of this book is preserved in the Andhra Pradesh Oriental

Manuscript Library, Haidarabad. The work comprises 178 folios.

Lama’at–e-Qutb Shahi

It is work on meteorology compiled by an Iranian named Ibn Husain bin Jamaluddin in the reign

of Abdullah Qutb Shah. The manuscript contains 61 folios..

Muizuddin Wafa Khan

Muizuddin Wafa Khan was an eminent Persian poet who migrated to Golkonda during Ibrahim-

Quli‟s reign. He is the author of “Parwane-i-Shikar”.

Haji Hamadani

Haji Hamadani, a distinguished poet in Persian migrated from Hamadan (Iran) to Haidarabad

during Sultan Muhammad Qutb‟s reign and contributed to the advancement of Persian literature

in the kingdom.


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Fikri Isfahani

Muhamman Reza Fikri Isfahani was a great scholar and poet in Persian. He was a minister under

Muhammad Amin Shahristani and died in Haidarabad in 1002A.H/1593-94A.D..

Zulfiqar Sasani

Zulfiqar Azar Sasani famous as Mobed is author of “Dabistan” a book written on various religions,

creeds and sects. He arrived in Haidarabad from Iran Abdullah Qutb Shah‟s reign and was

patronized by Allama Ibn Khatun Ameli, Peshwa-e-Sultanat.

Ulfati Savehji

Ulfati bin Husain Savehji wrote a book on prosody called Riyaz-us-Sana‟I Qutb Shahi at the

instance of Abdullah Qutb Shah in 1046A.H/1636A.D. this work covers 32 folios..

Mir Fazlullah Shirazi

He was great religious scholar and traditionalist „Muhaddith‟. He was well versed in all the

branches of knowledge and collected one thousand Apostolic Traditions in support of the Shi‟ite

faith. He translated „Al-Misbah‟ into Persian.(113)

Safi Shirazi

Shaikh Muhammad Safi Shirazi came from Shiraz to Haidarabad during the reign of Muhammad

Quli Qutb Shah where he was appointed as “Mir Munshi”. He was a famous Persian poet. He died

in Haidarabad in 974A.H/1566-67A.D, and was buried in the Dairah-i-Mir Mumin cemetery.(114)

Fitrat Mashhadi

Mirza Abu Turb Fitrat Mashhadi came to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and

was favoured with a “mansab”. He was a Persian poet of great repute.He died in 1060A.H./

1650A.D. and was buried in the Dairah-i-Mir Mumin cemetery.(115)

Wahshi Jaushqani

He was born in Kashan and was student of Maulana Muhtashim Kashi. He died in Haidarabad in

1013A.H/1604-5A.D. He wrote more than two thousand couplets of ghazal.

Hukmi Shirazi

Mulla Hukmi Shirazi was the nephew of Urfi Shirazi. He had been to Haidarabad during Sultan

Muhammad Qutb‟s reign. He died in Haidarabad. (117)

Famous Iranian scholars in the court of Abdullah Qutb Shah who contributed beautiful

chronogramatic verses on different occasions were Shaik Ahmed Jabal,(118) Mulla Arab Shirazi,

Mulla Burhan Tabrizi,(119) Mulla Qutb-e-Adai,(120) Mir Khalilullah Husaini,(121) Mulla Mina-e-

Gilani,(122) Mirza Ghiyas Khwish,(123) Qaiser Maddah(124) and Mulla Majlisi.(125)

Shaikh Harun Jazairi

He was a famous mujtahid (jurisprudent) and theologian during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah.

He taught fiqh for thirty years and died in 1047A.H/1638A.D. (126)


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Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (1083 A.H./1672A.D-1098 A.H./1687A.D.)

The last ruler of the Qutb Shahi dynasty Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (1672A.D-1687A.D) was

interested in many branches of knowledge and encouraged poets and writers but unfortunately he

fell before the expanding might of the Mughal empire.The extinction of the Dakkani kingdoms at

the hands of Aurangzeb closed the chapter of Persian art and learning in the Dakkan as a separate

entity.

Ali bin Taifoor Bustami completed the compilation of Hadaiq-us-Salatin or the „Gardens of Kings‟

in 1092 A.H/ 1681A.D , i.e. nine years after Abul Hasan Qutb Shah‟s accession.He also wrote

Tuhfa-e-Qutb Shahi) (127) relating to ethics during his reign.

Abul Hasan never lagged behind in the field of art and letters.His reign had reached the golden

prime in the advancement of learning, especially Islamic theology. „Risalah Dar Akhlaq‟, a treatise

on ethics was written at the instance of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah.(128)

Ibne Imad

Ibne Imad the great scholar from Iran and wrote „Kirkha-tul-Ulema‟ which is considered as

master-piece in the Persian literature.This book embodies various arts and sciences.The book

makes a comprehensive survey of all sciences and is a perpetual glory of the Qutb Shahi age.

This work consists of six volumes: the first is on Tafsir, the second on Hadith, the third on Fiqh,

and was entitle Majma-ud-Daqaiq, the fourth was on „Causes of things‟ and was entitled „Kashf al-

Asrar‟, the fifth was on Hikmat and the sixth on „Miscellaneous Arts and Sciences‟. A copy of this

work is available in the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad. He completed this work in

Haidarabad in 1046A.H/1635A.D and consists of 263 folios. (129)

Mulla Muhazabbuddin Ahmed

During the reign of Abul Qutb Shah, the famous Iranian scholar in Haidarabad, Mulla

Muhazabbuddin Ahmed wrote a commentary on the Quran entitled „Tafsir-ul-Quran‟ in

1089A.H.He also wrote sixteen more treatises on various topics such as Islamic law,

jurisprudence, traditions. (130)

Ali Husain Alkoh Khailavi

At the instance of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, Ali Husain Alkoh Khailavi wrote „Hilyat-ul-Qari‟, a

book on the science of Quran elocution.Abul Hasan Qutb Shah himself was well versed in Quranic

elocution and recited the Quran in the seven manners of pronunciation.

Tafsir-ul-Quran and Hilayat-ul-Qari (131) are regarded as magnum opus with regard to both their

academic and bulk which redound to the memory of the scholar-king Abul Hasan Qutb Shah as

also to the religious zeal of the age.

Insha (Epistolography)

Insha or epistolography is the foundation of all literary prose in Persian language.The art of prose

writing termed as Insha pardazi was supposed to be a natural gift and an admirable faculty

possessed by a writer.The art of prose writing was intrinsic as well as extrinsic.Every syllable of a

writing was tied up with some principle and well-knitted with a larger fugal scheme. Every word

had a careful usage. The meanings were extended, decorated and made full of imagery with the


43

help of several figures. If the imagery involved in Qutb Shahi prose is distilled, it shall afford a

more picturesque glimpse of the contemporary cultural traits than a painting or an architectural

baroque. The asset of literary prose of Golkonda which is now extant is also coloured with

individual stylistics.

The art of prose writing was called Insha and every stylistic pattern of Insha went after the name

of its writer as “Insha-e-Tabasi” and “Insha-e-Taliqani” etc. Some of the prominent stylists are

Mulla Qasim Tabasi, Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani, Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun, Nizamuddin

Ahmed Shirazi, Muhammad Kazim Karim, Ali bin Taifoor-al-Bustami and Abdul Azeem Taliqani.

In Qutb Shahi administration, there had been eminent epistolarians known as “Dabir-ul-Mulk” or

“Mushi-ul-Mamalik. Several authors who held prominent position in the Qutb Shahi court are

Mulla Qasim Tabassi, Abdul Jabbar, Muzaffar Ali, Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani, Shaikh Muhammad

Ibn Khatun Ameli, Muhammad Reza Astarabadi and Abdul Azeem Taliqani. The rare collections

of Insha of three prose writers, namely Mulla Qasim Tabassi, Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani and Abdul

Azeem Taliqani are preserved. Some of the letters of Mir Muhammad Kazim Karim are also

preserved.

Insha has been one of the strongest channels of Arabicising the Persian language during the 14th

and 15th centuries A.D. It is with this retrospects, Persian Insha developed in the Qutb Shahi

kingdom during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, all the epistolographers during

that reign were the Iranians who contributed immensely in this literary field.

Qissa Khawn (Fictionists)

The Iranian fictionists of the Qutb Shahi kingdom produced only romances and no novels.

Eminent and skilled “Qissa Khawn” or story tellars are seen in the kingdoms who were Iranian

migrants. (132)

Mulla Khalil “Qissa Khwan”(133) came from Iran to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah

Qutb Shah in 1047A.H.

Mullah Hamza Isfahani, (134) was another famous Iranian “Qissa Khawn” in Haidarabad during

the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was employed in the royal library. His picturesque narration

of lighting has been categorized as “Dastan” or “Romance” by Nizammudin Shirazi.

The famous Iranian “Qissa Khawn” during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb was Haji Qissa

Khawn Hamadani. He brought with him several versions of the famous romance entitled “Dastan-

e-Amir Hamza”. This romance has been lithographed in seven volumes in Tehran in 1274A.H

Tafsir (Exegesis)

There are instances of Tafsir in fragmentary forms written during the Qutb Shahi period.

The Tafsir-e-Surah-e-Hal Ata by Muizuddin Ardistani who wrote in the year 1044A.H/ 1634A.D,

at the suggestion of Ibne Khatun Ameli and dedicated to Abdullah Qutb Shah.

The tafsir of selective verses, is found in different forms.It is in the form of an independent work

compiled in an anthology as Sawame-ul-Malakut of Shah Qazi Yazdi compiled in 1017A.H/

1608A.D,during the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah,or Ayat-ul-Ahkam (136) a Persian

rendition of Shah Qazi Yazdi‟s work which he prepared in 1021A.H/ 1612A.D. for Sultan

Muhammad Qutb Shah. Ibn Imad Rozbihan has classified Tafsir as one of the branches of


44

Ma‟arifat and has dealt with it in his scholarly work Khirqa-e-Ulama. Shah Qazi Yazdi‟s

translation of Ayat-ul-Ahkam in eight volumes each having several chapters in which there is

Tafsir of each Ayat referred to therein.

Fiqh (Jurisprudence)

Shah Qazi Yazdi‟s another important work is Fiqh-ul-Razavi. This work is an explanation of an

original Arabic work on Fiqh ascribed to the eighth Shi‟ite Imam Ali bin Musa Reza (A.S.).This

translation with notes and explanation, has been prepared by Shah Qazi Yazdi at the instance of

Sultan Muhammad Qutb and was completed in 1029A.H/1620A.D.This was done under the

supervision of Allama Mir Mumin Astarabadi, the Peshwa-e-Sultanat.

Aqaid (Ideology)

The earliest work on Islamic doctrine Aqaid during the Qutb Shahi period is Sirat-al-Mustaqeem

wa Deen-e-Qawim, written during the reign of Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah.The other work on this

subject is Usul-e-Khamsa-e-Imamiya.

The reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah is the richest period regarding the production of Aqaid

literature.During his reign not only several important works of Aqaid were translated but many

original works were also recorded in Persian.There are at least seven works of this period which

have survived through the ravages of time and which exclusively deal with the subjects of Aqaid

(ideology).

Muizuddin Muhammad, an eminent Iranian scholar in Haidarabad wrote Fauz-ul-Najat. This

voluminous work runs over 402 folios and has been divided into one Muqaddama, one main part

and an epilogue.It mainly attempts at justifying Imam Ali‟s (A.S.) claim to the Imamat and

elaborately describes the significance of the eleven Shi‟ite Imams succeeding Imam Ali(A.S).

Nikat-e-Duwan-o-Dudman-e-Qutb Shahi written by Husain-al-Yazdi, who wrote it in the year

1054A.H/ 1634A.D with this chronographic title.This small treatise of 24 folios contains

information on various aspects of the religious mind and practice of the Qutb Shahi rulers.It

commences with the prophecies of Shah Nimatullah Kirmani and comes down to the period of

Abdullah Qutb Shah.The author has described the interest of the Qutb Shahi rulers in the

development of both Shi‟ite and Sunni religious institutions.

Adiya (Prayer Manuals)

Iranian scholars of Golkonda prepared many manuals of prayers. Prayers are normally in Arabic

language.But the compilers of the prayer manuals of the Qutb Shahi kingdom have compiled

Arabic prayers with Presian translation and commentary on the significance of these prayers has

been offered.There are four manuscript manuals on Adiya or prayers compiled during the Qutb

Shahi reign.

The first manual entitled Sawame-ul-Malakut was compiled by Shah Qazi Yazdi in 1017A.H/

1607A.D.The second important work in the translation of the famous Arabic manual of prayers is

entitled Misbah-e-Kafami.The work with translation runs over 826 folios.This translation was

prepared by Qazi Jamaluddin Fathullah bin Sadruddin Shirazi at the instance of Sultan

Muhammad Qutb.

The third work is Riyaz-ul-Salikin Fi Sharh Sayyid al Abideen, a commentary on Imam

Zainulabedin‟s famous work on prayers called as Sahifah-e-Kamilah.


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The fourth work is a translation of Bahauddin Ameli‟s Miftah-ul-Falah made by Ali bin Taifoor al

Bustami with the title Minhaj-ul-Najah.The codex runs over 127 folios and has been divided into

one introduction and six chapters.Ali bin Taifoor al Bustami has added his own notes and

comments to this translation.

Hikmah (Philosophy)

The intellectual elite in the Qutb Shahi kingdom who were mostly Iranian were conscious and

responsive to the ideological developments in the contemporary Muslim world.The philosophic,

the ethical and the mystic literature of Golkonda bears a testimony of this effect.These disciplines

in Golkonda were mainly of oriental Islamic character.

Danish Name-e-Shahi, which is the exclusive book on philosophy produced in the Qutb Shahi

kingdom was written by Muhammad Amin bin Muhammad Sherif Astarabadi (d.1036A.H.)at the

instance of Sultan Muhammad Qutb.The philosophy dealt with in this codex is theological.The

author has derived information from authorities like Naseeruddin Tusi(d.1067A.H.),Jalaluddin

Dawwani (d.908A.H./1502-3A.D), Razi(d.311A.H.) Syed Sharif Jurjani, Fareeduddin Taftazani

(d.1510 A.D.)and several Muslim thinkers attached to scholastic group. He claims to have styled

his work after the Arba‟in of Fakhr-al-Razi and has divided the book in forty sections entiltled

Faida or the benefit.

Another important work which exclusively relates to philosophy is the “Tadhkirat-ul-Hukama.

This is a small Who‟s Who of philosophers with a brief and useful introduction, written during the

reign of Abdul Hasan Qutb Shah. The work introduces about forty-seven thinkers of Greece Rome

Iran and Arabia. This biographical dictionary of the philosophers was written by Ismail bin

Ibrahim Tabrizi.

Encyclopaedia

In 1035(A.H/ 1625A.D., a magnificent Persian encyclopaedia entitled “Nafa‟is-ul-Funun Fi Ara‟is-

ul-Uyun(144) of Muhammad bin Mahmud al Amuli was copied and placed in the royal library.

This work comprises a very scholary “muqaddama” and two parts. These parts have been divided

in eighty-five chapters, each grouped under several “maqalas”. Every chapter deals with a special

branch of knowledge.

Anthology

One of the great personal anthologies of the Qutb Shahi era is the “Shajar-e-Danish written by

Hakim Nizammuddin Ahmed Gilani, who was the court physician of Abdullah Qutb Shah and was

famous as “Hakeem-ul-Mulk. The codex runs over 439 folios and comprises one hundred and

eight items, which are of varied nature and cover a good variety of disciplines.

The famous personal anthology written by Shaik Bahauddin Ameli known as “Kashkul” was

translated by Ahmed al Shahidi al Amuli at the instance of Abdulah Qutb Shah. The royal codex

runs over 173 folios.

Physics

During the Qutb Shahi period, the science of physics attained great progress.The properties, the

causes and effects of material and metaphysical were dealt with by the author of „Nafa‟is-ul-

Funun‟. Hakim Nizamuddin Gilani‟s treatise No.14 and 22 also relate to physics.


46

Mathematics

In view of grand architectural constructions and Nizamuddin Shirazi‟s report of Massaahan (the

Surveyors), “Zamin Paimayan” (the land measurers), mathematics was fairly in advanced stages

in the Qutb Shahi period. The only available work on mathematics is the translation of Bahauddin

Ameli‟s(d., 1621-22A.D.) “Khulasat-ul-Hisab”.

Indexes

The tradition of indexing and referencing was in vogue in the Qutb Shahi kingdom. “Hadiya-e-

Qutb Shahi” is one of the best examples of indexes. This is an index of the selective words of the

Holy Quran alphabetically arranged together with reference to the Quranic chapter in which such

words have occurred.

Other famous literary works accomplished by Iranian scholars are “Tarikh-e-Ganjina”. It is a

comprehensive world history written in Haidarabad by an anonymous author. It was completed

somewhere during the fourth decade of the eleventh century, during the reign of Abdullah Qutb

Shah. “Tarikh-e-Ganjina” is divided into an introduction and twelve books termed “Khizanahs,”

the sub-division of which are called “Ganjinas”.“Jame-e-Mufidi” is an important work written by

Mulla Muhammad Mufid Yazdi al-Mustaufi. He was in Haidarabad during the reign of Abul

Hasan Qutb Shah but left for Delhi in 1088A.H/1677A.D.). He is the author of “Majalis-ul-Muluk,

“Mukhtisar Mufid” and “Jame-e-Mufidi”, in three monumental volumes. He started the

compilation of Jame-e-Mufidi in Haidarabad. The first volume deals with the history of Yazd. The

second volume deals with the history of Safawid dynasty in Iran. The third volume is of an

encyclopedic character which has been nicely edited by Iraj Afshar and published from Tehran in

1340A.H. He also wrote the famous gazetteer “Ausaf-ul-Amsar” in Haidarabad in the year

1091A.H/1680A.D.

Primary Education

Ibrahim-Quli Qutb Shah started a kingdom wide campaign to rout out and eradicate illiteracy and

universalize primary education.He established a network of schools in the kingdom where the

students irrespective of caste, creed and religion were imparted basic and primary education.

Haidarabad’s Hawzah-Ilmea (Islamic Seminary)

By the sixteenth century, education system in Iran had developed at a large scale. The Safawids

set it in a new direction of training Shi‟ite divines and jurisprudents or “Mujtahids”.

The Islamic Seminaries or „Hawzah-i-Ilmea were instituted in Haidarabad and Qutb Shahi

kingdom which served as an important agency for the diffusion of ideas and knowledge which had

developed in Iranian environment.

There had been some notable Islamic seminaries or “Hawzah-i-Ilmea” in Haidarabad as

“Madrasah-i-Ibn Khatun and Madrasah-i-Hayat Baksh Begum”. The curriculum taught at these

Islamic seminaries included detailed courses of reflective „maqulat‟ and narrative „manqulat‟

branches of knowledge. The curriculum comprised “Tafasir”, the commentaries of Holy Quran,

“Ahadith” the traditions of the Holy Prophet of Islam (S.A.W.). “Fiqh”, Islamic Jurisprudence,

Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, Arabic and Persian Literature.

In 1595A.D, Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah established „Madrasah-Darul Shifa‟ or the Medical

College in Haidarabad.


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The colleges in Haidarabad produced great scholars like Mir-i-Miran son of Qazi Zahiruddin

Muhammad, who rose to the position of royal epistolarian (Dabir-i-Huzur). He was first

appointed as qazi of cantonment and later as „Dabir‟ and the member of the “Majlis” in

1047A.H/1637A.D.

The curricula for the education of princes was somewhat different and comprised the following

subjects obviously in addition to curricula meant for common people.

1. Qawaid-i-Jahandari‟ the art of governance.

2. Administration of justice.

3. Adab-i-Giti‟ Comity of nations.

4. Qanun-i-Majlis‟ the laws of Majlis.

5. Diwan Dar court procedure.

6. Marasim-i-Padshahi‟Royal customs.

7. Ihtimam-i-Asakir military organization.

8. Tarbiyat-i-Nizami military training.

The language of education was Persian and the books of the syllabi were those written in Iran and

most of the teachers in the schools and colleges of the Qutb Shahi kingdom were Iranians. Among

the tutors of Abdullah Qutb Shah there were men like Mir Qutbuddin Nimatullah Shirazi, Syed

Sharif Shahristani, Khwajah Muzaffer Ali and Maulana Syed Husain Shirazi.

A close observation of the situation reveals that <st1:country-region Iran was the source of

intellectual light. It was a model and an ideal in education and administration or fairly well in all

walks of life of the nobility and aristocracy. The educational set up organized for the nobility in

the Qutb Shahi kingdom smoothened ways for the new generation competently to receive the

changing ideas imported from Iran and in turn to make their own contribution.

Akhlaq (Ethics)

The best of the works relating to ethics produced in Qutb Shahi kingdom is perhaps “Tuhfa-i-

Qutb Shahi” written by Ali Bin Taifoor Bustami. Among the other ethical works produced in the

Qutb Shahi kingdom reference may be made to “Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Salatin”(154), “Risalah Dar

Akhlaq and “Resalah Shajar”.

During the Safawid era all the Islamic sciences were revised from Shi‟ite point of view.

Haidarabad followed Iran as a sincere disciple in all disciplines.

Eschatology

The Iranian scholars of Qutb Shahi kingdom like Muhammad Muqim bin Kamaluddin Husayn

wrote a treatise Dar Tahqiq-i-Maad Wa Hashr-i-Ajsad, Ali bin Taifoor Bustami wrote “Risalah-i-

Msdumiysh” and the author of “Usul-i-Kamsah” paid special attention to the propagation of

Islamic eschatology and contributed considerable literature projecting it as a very important

issue.


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There had been hardly any Iranian scholar of Qutb Shahi kingdom who contributed to the

religious and ethical literature and should have over looked a discussion on justice(Adl).

There is a sizeable volume of literature relating to the interpretation of the Holy Quran, the

traditions (Hadith) and jurisprudence (Fiqh) produced in Haidarabad or imported from Safawid

Iran which reveals many more specialized aspects of Islamic thoughts and values diffused in

Haidarabad. That had been done both by the Sufis through their mystic mission as well as by the

Iranian elites through their control of administrative, judicial and educational institutions in their

own ways.

Education in the Qutb Shahi kingdom was common for everybody. The Hindus in the kingdom

learned craft pertaining to their hereditary caste. The practice of Sati was prohibited and women

were prevented from burning themselves on the funeral pyres of their husband.

Tibb (Medicine)

The Qutb Shahi rulers patronized “Unani” (Greek) medicine by inviting eminent physicians from

Iran, encouraging medicinal researches by establishing medical institutions. The “Unani”

medicine found its way in the kingdom through the efforts of Iranian physicians „Hakims‟ who

were all the experts of Greco-Arab medicines. Almost all the “Unani” medicinal system had come

from Iran. Many of them were officially invited by the Qutb Shahi sultans. The Unani system

made great stride in Haidarabad. There had been constant inflow of eminent physicians from Iran

and so Iranian medicine became an important import commodity of the foreign trade of

Haidarabad. The Qutb Shahi kingdom had been one of the Greco-Persian „Unani‟ medicine during

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Hakim Ismail

He was attached to the court of Abdullah Qutb Shah and attended the aristocracy. Other famous

Iranian physicians in the Qutb Shahi kingdom were Hakim Shamsuddin Ali al-Husaini, Hakim

Saifuddin Muhammad, Hakim Jabbar, Mirza Abdul Qasim, Kareem Yazdi, and Khulqi Shushtari.

Hakim Nizamuddin Gilani

He was perhaps the greatest of the medical scholars of Haidarabad. He hailed form Gilan and was

student of Baha‟uddin Ameli (d1031A.H/1621A.D) and Shamsuddin Muhammad Baquer Damad

(d. 1040A.H/1630A.D). In the year 1044A.H/1634A.D), he was invited by Abdullah Qutb Shah

and appointed as the Royal Physician. He was considered as “Hakim-ul-Mulk” of the kingdom.

“Hakim-ul-Mulk” contributed to the promotion of „Unani‟ medicine in Haidarabad in many ways.

He was a versatile person. He served Haidarabad as a physician, a scholar, and as an ambassador.

He died in Haidarabad.

“Makhzan-e-Tibb-e-Qutb Shahi” discovered by Dr. Syed Muhammad Quadri Zore, who

contended that it belonged to the Qutb Shahi period. It is an excellent work of pathology and

therapeutics. Its author was a student of Maulana Ataullah Kurdistani. The work has been divided

into chapters relating to various categories of diseases.

“Ikhtiyarat-e-Qutb Shahi‟ of Mir Muhammd Mumin Astarabadi and Mizan-ul-Tabai Qutb Shahi‟

of Taqiuddin Muhammad bin Sadruddin Ali were written at the instance of Sultan Muhammad

Qutb are two books on medical sciences complied during the Qutb Shahi period.


49

“Tadhkirah-al-Kahhalin” ( a note for occultists) was translated in Hiadarabad at the instance of

Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah. The translator of this book is Shamsuddin Ali al-Husaini al-Jurjani.

Hygiene

A unique manual of hygiene was compiled by Hakim Shamsuddin bin Nuruddin during the reign

of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. This manual is entitled “Zubdat-al-Hukam”(164) Another

hygienic manual is entitled „Farid‟. It was written by Hakim Abdullah at the instance of

Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah.

Medicinal Research

Studies in different branches of medicinal science were encouraged in Haidarabad. Such studies

were carried out either by directly indulging into a research project or by translating authoritative

Arabic works into Persian. It imported the traditional system of Iran and introduced it at a large

scale in the Sultanate. The scientific interest shown by the physicians of Haidarabad appears to

have been centered round pharmacology.

In this discipline of pharmacology attention has been paid to introduce the Greco-Arab methods

of assaying both simple and compound drugs. In that effort many such drug ingredients were

introduced which were found in Iran

The standard forms of „Unani‟ compound drugs introduced in Haidarabad were: a) Electuaries

„Maajin, b) Liquids „Araq‟, c) Powder „Sufuf, d) Tablets „Qurs‟ e) pills „Hubub‟ f) Ointments

„Marham‟

An enormous fund of recipes suggesting all sorts of compound medicine to cure various diseases

was imported from Iran and assayed in Haidarabad

The Iranian physicians in Haidarabad laid much emphasis on observing the principles of sound

habits and hygiene. Hygienic slogans for the upkeep of health were formulated and manuals for

maintaining health were written.

Major medical institution founded during the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah was the Darul

Shifa which was run by the government. Darul Shifa had been a hospital with medical college and

several other ancillary institutions like hostels ,mosques ,caravanserai and hamman(bath).It was

constructed in 1004A.H/1595A.D.

Even administrators and monarch like Abdullah Qutb Shah had their own laboratories. Various

„Hakims‟ maintained private medical institutions.

In Darul Shifa general hospital which was established in 1595A.D in Haidarabad, nearly three

hundred and fifty patients were lodged and fed at the expense of the government. Apart from the

great state hospitals like Darul Shifa,at Haidarabad ,the state kept salaried „Hakims‟ and „vaids‟

„Ayurvedic physicians‟ in different towns at its expense, and they were commanded not to charge

the patients for treatment.

Thus the Iranian physician in the Qutb Shahi kingdom dominated the medical research and

treatment in the kingdom. They were greatly respected in the kingdom by the rulers, nobility and

the people. They even occupied key administrative positions. Thus the Iranian physicians and

pharmacologists outstanding contribution to the system of health and hygiene in the kingdom is


50

immense. The efforts of the Iranian physicians in Haidarabad paved the way for the further

advancement of „Unani‟ medicine in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

Conclusion

Thus due to the Qutb Shahi Sultans patronage, the Iranian scholars in the kingdom compiled vast

volumes of books on every aspect and fields of science and knowledge. Due to there incessant

endeavors Haidarabad became one of the greatest seats of learning during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries A.D. The Iranian scholars in Golkonda strengthened their cultural,

ideological, commercial, political and religious ties with Safawid Iran, which also helped in the

rapid progress and evolution of Persian literature and Islamic-Iranian culture in Haidarabad and

Dakkan.

Today we come across thousands of manuscripts at Andhra Pradesh oriental Manuscrip Library

and Research Centre in Persian, Urdu and Arabic Languages and Noor Micro Film Centre one of

the Organizations in India under the Auspicius of Iran Culture House – New Delhi have taken up

the work of Repair, Binding, digitalization and Cataloguing of them. The Department of Persian at

Osmania University is in existence ever since its inception and

Thus the Indo-Iran relationship even today is very strong and will continue to be so.


51

The Fading Iran Factor Dr.David J. Karl

President

Asia Strategy Initiative, Los Angeles

David J. Karl is president of the Asia

Strategy Initiative, a consultancy

based in Los Angeles that provides

policy-relevant analysis of

geopolitical, diplomatic and macro-

economic developments in Asia, with particular focus on South Asia. He also is an adjunct

professor of diplomacy & world affairs at Occidental College, where he teaches on South Asia

and globalization.

Dr. Karl previously served as director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy,

in charge of the Council’s think tank focused on foreign policy issues of particular resonance

to the U.S West Coast, and was project director of the Joint Task Force on Enhancing India-U.S.

Cooperation in the Global Innovation Economy that was jointly organized by the Pacific

Council and the Federation of Indian Chambers & Industry. He wrote his doctoral dissertation

on the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry. He currently serves on the executive committee of TiE’s

Southern California chapter, and is an active contributor to the India blogs run by the Foreign

Policy Association (http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/) and the U.S-India Political Action

Committee. (http://www.usinpac.com/component/lyftenbloggie/authors/272.html).


52

The Fading Iran Factor

With Iran moving closer to producing weapons-grade uranium1&2 Tehran‟s

atomic ambitions will be an item of discussion at the upcoming U.S.-India

Strategic Dialogue. The issue has been a prominent bilateral irritant in the past

and some fear3 that continued friction might well endanger New Delhi‟s

candidacy for a permanent seat the United Nations Security Council. In truth,

though, the issue is losing its potency to bedevil U.S.-India ties. This is not

because Washington will cease regarding the Iranian nuclear program as a matter

of concern. Nor will South Block finally figure out how to painlessly balance its

simultaneous quest for constructive relations with Iran and its American

nemesis. Rather, now that Tehran has largely accumulated the requisite

materials and technology for a nuclear weapon4 U.S. policymakers are

increasingly coming to the grudging realization that there are real limits as to

what can be done to elicit Iranian compliance with the global nonproliferation

regime.

One of the ironies of the diplomatic process that eventuated in the U.S.-India civil

nuclear accord is that as concerns about Indian proliferation activities ceased

being a hindrance to closer bilateral ties, the Iranian nuclear issue surfaced as a

new point of discord. Indeed, in some quarters in both Washington and New

Delhi, the two developments were inextricably linked. In the months following

the path-breaking July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulford

continuously sounded the alarm that a failure to back a series of International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) motions censuring Iran risked jeopardizing

Congressional support of the agreement. In September 2005, in the run-up to

the first IAEA motion, Mulford delivered a tough message to Foreign Secretary

Shyam Saran, warning that “it is time for India to make some hard decisions. We

are approaching the moment when fence sitting will not be an option.” And as

the IAEA wrestled with a second motion in early 2006, Mulford took to the media 5&6 to warn that the lack of Indian support would have a “devastating” effect on

Congressional opinion, causing the nuclear accord to “die” on Capitol Hill.

Influential Congressional voices underscored the admonishments. The late Tom

Lantos, a leading player in the House International Relations Committee, was

especially vocal. He publicly stated7 in September 2005 that “There is quid pro

quo in international relations. And if our Indian friends are interested in

receiving all of the benefits of U.S. support, we have every right to expect that

India will reciprocate in taking into account our concerns.” He subsequently


53

warned that New Delhi “will pay a heavy price for a disregard of U.S. concerns

vis-à-vis Iran.”

The U.S. Congress gave preliminary assent to the nuclear initiative when it

passed the so-called Hyde Act in late 2006 in a strong show of bipartisan support.

But it also attached provisions to encourage Indian backing of the U.S. approach

on Iran, thus ensuring that the issue would continue hanging in the air

throughout the negotiations over the enabling “123 Agreement.” With Lantos

once more leading the charge, Congressional leaders sent a toughly-worded letter 8 to Prime Minister Singh in May 2007 warning of “grave concern” that India‟s

ties with Iran “have the potential to significantly harm prospects” for the accord‟s

final passage.

Although President Bush took the position that the Hyde Act‟s provisions on Iran

were “advisory” in nature, an odd alliance of the Indian Left and Right regarded

them as an affront to the country‟s sovereignty. Pointing to New Delhi‟s support

of the IAEA censures, they accused Mr. Singh of purchasing Washington‟s

concessions on the civil nuclear initiative by mortgaging India‟s hard-won

strategic autonomy. These passions came to a head in the parliamentary vote of

confidence that occurred in July 2008, an unprecedented act for a foreign policy

matter. Although Mr. Singh emerged victorious from the fray, the prolonged

melodrama led some in Washington to question New Delhi‟s reliability as a

strategic partner. As the Washington Post commented 9, “if New Delhi‟s

politicians cannot find a way to say yes to such a clearly advantageous agreement

with a natural ally, the next U.S. administration no doubt will think twice before

trying anything like it.”

Given what was at stake in the U.S.-India nuclear negotiations – not only

critically-need access to reactor technology and fuel but also the prospect of

converting a strategic rapprochement with the world‟s premier power into a full-

fledged partnership – it is not surprising that New Delhi sought to mollify

Washington‟s concerns on Iran. Still, the charges leveled against the Singh

government were off the mark. The IAEA votes in 2005 and 2006 represented a

tactical adjustment rather than a wholesale shift occasioned by excessive

deference to U.S. policy preferences.

This is not to say that India would otherwise have been supportive of Iran‟s

nuclear weapons program. New Delhi has been consistent that Tehran must live

up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that was

reaffirmed in November 2009 when it backed another IAEA rebuke of Iran.


54

Yet the Indian government also has done little to surrender the pursuit of what it

considers important national interests vis-à-vis Tehran. This is vividly

demonstrated by the recent acrobatics in finding a stable mechanism to pay for

crucial energy imports from Iran. Acceding to U.S. pressure, New Delhi barred

Indian oil and gas companies last December from settling payments through the

Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union. Iran had advertised the ACU as a means of

sidestepping U.S. economic sanctions and Indian enterprises made extensive use

of the facility. Though American officials hailed the move as a“significant step”10,

New Delhi quickly arranged an alternative conduit, using an Iranian-owned bank

in Germany to funnel euro-denominated payments. When this connection was

shut down in April, again due to Washington‟s insistence, India and Iran soon

enough settled on a new arrangement, this time to pay for oil imports in rupees.

And even as New Delhi was going through these maneuvers, a consortium of

firms, led by the overseas arm of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas

Corporation, was moving forward with plans to invest $5 billion in developing

the Farsi gas field in Iran. 11

Energy security is a substantial reason for New Delhi‟s desire to continue its

engagement with Tehran. Possessing the world‟s second largest oil and natural

gas reserves, Iran ranks just behind Saudi Arabia as India‟s most important crude

oil supplier. And with the country‟s power requirements burgeoning12, India will

be increasingly dependent upon foreign energy sources, including Iran, which

currently provides over ten percent of the country‟s oil imports.

Besides the petroleum connection, geopolitics will also drive New Delhi into a

closer relationship with Tehran. India has traditionally relied upon Iran to help

blunt Pakistan‟s influence in Central Asia and to serve as a bridge to trade and

energy opportunities there. And with the political endgame of the Afghan conflict

beginning to unfold, this reliance will only deepen.

Indeed, this process has already started. A year ago, just after the Obama

administration unilaterally enacted fresh sanctions against Tehran, Foreign

Secretary Nirupama Rao (now slated as India‟s new ambassador in Washington)

highlighted13 the “unique” civilizational ties and “the instinctive feeling of

goodwill” between India and Iran. She spoke of how links with Tehran are a

“fundamental component” of New Delhi‟s foreign policy and how there has been

a recent “convergence of views” on important policy issues. Regarding bilateral

cooperation in Afghanistan, she argued that the two countries “are of the region

and will belong here forever, even as outsiders [read the Americans] come and

go.” A senior Indian official 14 described the outreach to Iran as a policy


55

“recalibration” necessitated by the “scenario unfolding in Afghanistan and India‟s

determination to secure its national interests.”

Earlier this year, India‟s national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, visited

Tehran seeking to shore up strategic ties15. In early June, the deputy secretary of

Iran‟s National Security Council was in New Delhi to continue the talks. New

Delhi now has even less incentive to go along with any new exertions of U.S.

sanctions, and both countries may go so far as to revive their cooperation during

the 1990s that provided critical support to the non-Pashtun militias battling the

Taliban regime. The Americans will surely grumble about the cozying up with

Iran, but the strategic logic of the gradual U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan

leaves New Delhi little choice.

But as New Delhi adjusts policy, an even more significant change is underway in

Washington. It is true that the U.S. government has prepared a new National

IntelligenceEstimate16 concluding that Iran has resumed work on key nuclear

weapon components. It is also the case that President Obama signed into law last

summer a new round of anti-Iran penalties and that his administration has been

fairly energetic in enforcing them. This implementation has affected some Indian

companies and prompted complaints from New Delhi about the extra-territorial

reach of U.S. laws.

But over the last year, U.S. options in dealing with Iran have narrowed in

important ways. Critics urge the Obama administration to be more forthcoming

in diplomatic talks17, though with the current disarray in the Iranian government

it is difficult to see how even the most sincere of efforts could gain meaningful

traction. The administration has also pointedly stressed that “all options are on

the table,” implying that it is willing to pick up the cudgel of military action in the

event Tehran fails to engage diplomatically. Yet this threat always had an air of

unreality, given how armed hostilities in the Persian Gulf region – the epicenter

of the world‟s petroleum lifeline – would have such calamitous economic

consequences.

And now the saber-rattling option is ringing more and more hollow by the

month, in view of the bipartisan political consensus that is quickly growing in

Washington in favor of reducing the country‟s strategic commitments. President

Obama‟s announcement of a fairly large and rapid drawdown of U.S. forces in

Afghanistan is illustrative of this consensus, as is the likelihood that the Pentagon

will face sharp budget cuts for years into the future. Confessing that the U.S.

military establishment is “exhausted,” outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates

has pointedly cautioned against launching any new conflicts in the Middle East.


56

With Mr. Obama declaring that “America, it‟s time to focus on nation building

here at home18,” a new geopolitical era is dawning.

Hawks in the United States hold out hope that even if the Obama administration

lacks the stomach to deal sternly with the Iranian nuclear program, the

assignment can always be outsourced to Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have staked out hard-line positions

on the issue. But even in Tel Aviv, salient changes in elite opinion may be afoot.

Meir Dagan, the newly retired chief of the Mossad intelligence agency, for

instance, has been outspoken in warning 19 that an attack on Iran would be a

“stupid idea” and a “dangerous adventure.”

In the final analysis, the Iranian issue will likely be to Mr. Obama and his

successor what the North Korean nuclear program was to Presidents Bill Clinton

and George W. Bush. Despite tough rhetoric directed at Pyongyang, the

horrendous consequences of any major resort to arms on the Korean peninsula

ultimately forced Washington to come to terms with the strategic reality of a

nuclear-armed North Korea. And notwithstanding ample evidence that Chinese

assistance was underpinning Kim Jung-il‟s regime, the U.S. government

reluctantly came to the conclusion that it had bigger fish to fry in its bilateral

relations with Beijing.

To be sure, the parallels with the Iranian case are not fully complete. Few

countries would welcome a nuclear-armed Tehran, but it does remain far from

Pyongyang‟s international pariahtude. Nor is India‟s rather limited engagement

with Iran the equivalent of China‟s sustenance of North Korea. Still, at the end of

the day, the lack of viable alternative options will compel Washington‟s

acquiescence were Iran to develop a strategic arsenal, affecting in turn the

demands that it places on allies and partners.

A harbinger of what is likely to take place over the next few years occurred during

the recent visit to Washington by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose

country – to America‟s chagrin – continues to maintain a huge trading

relationship with Iran. At a joint press conference, Mr. Obama once more issued

a warning about Tehran‟s nuclear program, threatening “additional steps,

including potentially additional sanctions.” Yet his words were half-hearted and

Mrs. Merkel‟s presence at his side only underscored U.S. difficulties in securing

the enthusiastic support of its even long-time allies.

Of course, American focus on a nuclear Iran will not flag entirely. New

unilaterally formulated and enforced sanctions are certainly possible and these

could come to ensnare Indian firms. But the real challenge for Indian


57

policymakers these days seems to lie more in Riyadh than in Washington. The

simmering rivalry between the Shiite theocracy in Iran and the Sunni monarchy

in Saudi Arabia is once again coming to a boil. Last week, a senior member of the

Saudi royal family reportedly warned 20 that Riyadh is preparing to employ all of

its economic, diplomatic and security assets to blunt Tehran‟s regional ambitions.

India may well get caught in the crossfire. If it does, satisfying the demands of its

principal suppliers of crude oil will be South Block‟s next balancing act.

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58

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http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-ambassadors-iran-20110609





59

India-Iran Relations: Not Quite Ideal, Yet

Karamatullah K. Ghori

Former Pakistani ambassador

His area of specialization includes

the Arab world and ME, in

particular.

He’s currently working on a book—

Partition Revisited on his

recollections, as a child, of the great

divide and the two-way migration it

spawned, and how the two main communities of India and Pakistan—

Hindus and Muslims—have since fared as independent peoples. The book’s

publication is intended to coincide with the 65th anniversary of the Partition,

next year.


60

India-Iran relations have a history, a long one, going back to millennia. The two countries had

been neighbours to each other and shared a land border until the birth of Pakistan, in 1947,

created a physical wedge between them.

In the course of their millennial interaction the two enriched each other at the level of

civilizations. India of antiquity was the font of Buddhism and Buddhist ideology that seeped

across the historic Khyber Pass into Afghanistan—then ruled by Persia. Buddhism flourished in

Afghanistan but couldn’t penetrate across the formidable barrier of Hindukush Mountains into

the heartland of Persia.

However, in the modern context, the genesis of relations between India and Iran should, in all

fairness, be traced to India’s birth as a sovereign state as a result of the historic partition of the

South Asian sub-continent into India and Pakistan in August 1947.

Independent India was launched on an idealistic, socialistic, course under Pundit Nehru. He had

expounded his creed of socialism long before he became India’s first Prime Minister. Iran, on the

other hand was a monarchy, and an exploitative elitist order prevailed there because of the

over-bearing influence of the west that was in full control of Iran’s rich mineral resources,

particularly oil and gas. India and Iran, in that early phase, found themselves orbiting in

diametrically opposite orbits as the Cold War enveloped the world and sought to divide it into

conflicting spheres. India, because of its socialistic moorings, got rooted in the so-called Eastern

bloc, led by the then Soviet Union. Iran, in contrast, was saddled with a key role in the Western

camp in the context of the geo-strategically important Gulf region; the Shah of Iran took on the

mantle of the head policeman of western imperialistic interests in the Gulf and ME region.

The early phase of India-Iran relations, which stretched right up to the end of monarchy in

Iran—under its 1979 Islamic Revolution— could well be described as cordial and correct but

lacking in warmth that many may have considered not only desirable but ineluctable given the

centuries-old bonds of history between them.

Pakistan’s extraordinarily close entente with Iran, and the two neighbours’ camaraderie induced

by their common membership of the Anglo-American-led CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)

was also a major factor in keeping India and Iran mired into a relationship that was correct but

cool. Pakistan, a neighbour to both India and Iran has persistently played a role—wittingly or

unwittingly—in influencing the course of India-Iran relations. No discussion of the whole gamut

of Indo-Iranian can be complete, or even fully understood, without Pakistan butting into it. In

this narrative, therefore, Pakistan would be appearing intermittently into the discourse. It has

always had an obvious or unobtrusive place in the India-Iranian equation and cannot be left out

of any analysis or prognosis of this equation.

So the first quarter century of India-Iran relations visibly lacked any dynamics that could inspire

confidence about the two getting out of the rut, while Pakistan and Iran went on adding all the

substance of close co-operation in their bilateral sphere. The Shah of Iran was so committed to


61

Pakistan that he didn’t even mind breaching “U.S. law by transferring American weapons to

Pakistan during its war with India in 1971.”*1+

That calculated defiance of U.S. laws governing the weapons supplied to close allies by the Shah

underlined the regard he had for Pakistan. He took the risk of annoying the power that had

restored him, in 1953, to his Peacock Throne (carted away from India, no doubt, in the 18th

century by the Persian invader, Nadir Shah after he had sacked Delhi in 1739) when the then

socialist Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadaq, had forced him to flee to Rome for his life.

That the Shah had elected to take sides with Pakistan in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, anchored

in the conflict in East Pakistan that eventually spawned the independent state of Bangladesh,

was also indicative of his low esteem for relations with India. Even in an earlier conflict between

India and Pakistan—the so-called 1965 War—the Shah had provided parking space to the

civilian aircraft of Pakistan, transported there for safe-keeping.

The Islamic revolution of Iran, in early 1979, impacted a sea-change in the global perception of

Iran and the world’s of Iran, too.

The revolutionary regime, determined to put the monarchic era of the loathed Shah firmly

behind it, disentangled Iran from all those alliances that the Shah had saddled it with. Even the

next door Pakistan that had been a bosom ally in the days of the Shah couldn’t escape the

revolutionary backlash as the new regime cut off all strategic ties with Pakistan.

But Iran’s distancing itself from Pakistan—at least in the sense that had defined Pakistan-Iran

relations during the Shah’s rule—didn’t, necessarily, lead to India taking advantage of it, or Iran

taking a big step to cultivate India. There was hardly any change perceptible in the status quo of

Indo-Iran bilateral relations, in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution.

India, in that period, was still preoccupied with its experimentation with socialism; Indo-Soviet

alliance was still intact; it had, in fact, gathered more mass and substance with Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi at the helm in India. Iran, too, was soon consumed with the war that had been

inflicted on it from Iraq. That ‘cold’ phase in India-Iran relations—with business as usual but

lacking in any sense a new direction or dynamic—prevailed well up to the end of the 80s.

Another contributing factor in keeping India-Iran relations on a slow burner was the Soviet

invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which happened within a year of Iran’s Islamic

revolution. There was ample evidence to suggest that the Iranian revolution had impacted the

Soviets nervously and given them a creeping fear of the Islamic revolutionary ardour seeping

into Afghanistan, a land the Soviets had always regarded with suspicion but also coveted it as a

vital piece of the jigsaw puzzle they had been working so hard to fashion as their answer to the

western bloc.


62

The new Iranian leadership, deeply embroiled in fighting off the Iraqi invaders, had ample

reason to distrust India, which was allied to the Soviet Union and didn’t condemn its invasion of

Afghanistan. By the same token, India elected to sit on the fence in the wasteful war of attrition

between Iran and Iraq. But India was not alone in that fence sitting; Pakistan, too, for a variety

of reasons—the most powerful being its relations with the Arabs—also kept itself firmly

insulated from any partisan role in the Iran-Iraq war.

The end of the 1980s and the dawn of 1990s heralded the commencement of the current phase

of India-Iran relations.

By then, Iran had seen the end of the nightmare that its 8-year-long war with Iraq—1980 to

1988—had kept it onerously wrapped in. The 10-year-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had

also come to an end with the ignominious withdrawal of the invader from there in 1989. It soon

triggered the collapse of the ersatz union that the Russians had clobbered together under the

weight of their military might. That, in a sense, freed India from its entanglement with an

imperialist power, which in any case was an oxymoron for a country like India that had been

founded under an anti-imperialistic creed and had expounded a middle-course—non-

alignment—between the two rival ideological super-power camps in international relations.

Two other more tangible developments in India and Iran further helped pave the way for the

two countries to discover a more pro-active phase in their bilateral relations, which, more or

less, had stayed fairly moribund for decades.

One of these was India at last casting off its strait-jacket of a rigidly-controlled—Soviet-style—

economic orientation and opting for an open-door, market-driven, economy. That inaugurated

the ongoing leap into an unshackled economic enterprise ruling the roost in the post-Nehru and

post-Indira Gandhi India.

It also meant, in another sense, that an India eager to take-off, in real economic sense, needed a

vast amount of energy-input. With India itself short of fossil fuels, that meant tapping outside

sources of available energy: oil and gas. Iran, just across the Pakistani land-mass, possessed both

in abundance. It was also anxious to tap new markets for its burgeoning gas deposits, in

particular. India’s drive to an economic miracle required both oil and gas to fuel its new

industries and motors of economic boom. These were ideal ingredients and incentives for India

and Iran to embark on active economic and commercial co-operation.

The other development that factored itself like a bolt from the blue into the budding equation

between India and Iran was the emergence of the Taliban as a new political force in Afghanistan.

To the Shiite-ruled Iran, the Wahabi-brainwashed Taliban, with their dogmatic interpretation of

Islam, were anathema. The Iranians were already fighting a proxy-war-of-ideas –and-creeds

against Saudi Arabia in the ideologically-fertile Pakistan, next door. Now with a Taliban-

controlled Afghanistan, also next door, the Iranian leadership found itself being forced to

contend with the Saudi-inspired Wahabi antagonism on two fronts.


63

For India, on the other hand, the fact that the Taliban were a product of the religious

seminaries—madrassas—of Pakistan was reason enough to be wary of their intent and agenda.

The traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan came into a sharp focus on the issue. India

didn’t, however, allow itself to be bothered by another fact that these religious seminaries had

often been funded by the Americans who saw the zealous religious brigade among the Afghans

exiled in Pakistan as a potent force against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. It was the same

U.S. that India was making visible efforts to curry favour with, especially in regard to the ban

that Washington had slapped against both India and Pakistan for the transfer of nuclear know-

how and technology.

What clinched the issue against the Taliban, as far as India was concerned, was evidence, in

spades, that they had the moral and material support of Pakistan’s much-maligned intelligence

services—which were backing the Taliban to gain power in Afghanistan for their own reasons.

One of these, no doubt, was to ensure that Pakistan’s strategic ‘back’ was secure and tactical

‘depth’ in military terms was on side in its confrontation with India.

There couldn’t be a more welcoming backdrop to usher in a phase of close tactical and

pragmatic co-operation for India and Iran. The two found a proxy in the Northern Alliance of

Afghanistan, a largely non-Pushtoon ethnic group from northern Afghanistan, which was

ideologically opposed to the Taliban. The stage was set for the Taliban-opposed Northern

Alliance (NA) to become a recipient of assistance from both Iran and India—in more ways than

one—to maintain a credible resistance against the Taliban’s goal to over-run the NA-held

northern strip of Afghanistan the way they had over-powered the rest of the country.

The Taliban proved the worst-case fears of the Iranians when soon after wresting control of the

city of Mazar-e-Sharif—with a heavy presence of the Afghan Shiite—they carried out a brutal

massacre of the local Shiites and didn’t even spare the Iranian consular personnel stationed

there.

Pragmatism was, obviously, the name of the new game kicked off between India and Iran,

distant, otherwise, in ideology or creed. For instance, India helped Iran gain the status of an

‘observer’ at the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Iran returned the

compliment when, in 1994, it stopped a Pakistani effort at the UN Human Rights Council to bring

in a collective resolution, in the name of OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) on Kashmir

condemning Indian human rights violations [2].

That Iran, a formidable ally to Pakistan on Kashmir during the monarchical era, had chosen to

subvert an ostensibly altruistic Pakistani initiative on behalf of the Kashmiris, under Indian

control of the Kashmir Valley, was a shock to Pakistan. But it was no less befuddling to Pakistan’s

friends and ‘brothers’ in the Arab world. This scribe, then Ambassador of Pakistan in Kuwait, was

briefed by the Kuwaitis of their ‘concern’ over the Iranian ‘brazen’ volte face.

The Kuwaitis, no doubt, had their own axe to grind with Iran, whose influence in the oil-rich

Sheikhdom within hailing distance of Iran, has been on an upswing since Kuwait’s liberation


64

from the brief Iraqi occupation of 1990-91. The Kuwaiti Shiites are not only close to being

equal—in numbers—with the Wahabi segment of the Kuwaiti population but are also rich and

powerful. That may sit well with the Kuwaitis—whose innate business instinct tells them that

being on good relations with Iran is in their best interest, but it nags the Saudis, next door,

whose influence over the Kuwaitis is far more powerful than whatever clout Iran wields over

them.

Common interest and mutual benefit is, obviously, the key element in Indian-Iranian commercial

exchanges. The two sides seem to have settled on fostering a purely business-like ambience

between them.

That Iran has become the second largest supplier of crude oil to India, over the years, with close

to half-a-million barrels per day of it being poured into the Indian market, is ample proof of

hard-nosed business deals dominating the India-Iran agenda of co-operation.

On its part, India has steadily become one of the largest foreign investors in Iran’s oil & gas

industry, giving it a huge stake in the stability of Iran as a major exporter of oil, both regionally

and internationally.

Direct bilateral trade between India and Iran notched up an impressive figure of $ 14 billion in

2009—the last year for which full figures were available. However, there is much more to India-

Iran trade quantum taking place indirectly through third parties, overwhelmingly located in the

thriving regional hub of Dubai. With that indirect trade thrown into direct trade, the total

volume, in dollar terms, is estimated to be close to a hefty almost $ 30 billion, annually [3]

India tapping into the Iranian market in an era when Iran was, and still is, being corralled with

myriad economic sanctions and boycotts by the western economies, spear-headed by U.S.,

should be seen as nothing less than a big and welcome helping hand extended to Iran in its

trying days.

India has also been helpful to Iran and quite munificent in lending its technical expertise and

financial assistance to the building of vital infrastructure projects in Iran, such as Zaranj-Delaram

highway and the Chahbahar Port, jointly financed by India and Iran.

And yet India has balked at becoming part of an ambitious gas pipeline project, which would

have included—had India not wriggled out after showing early enthusiasm for it—India, Iran and

Pakistan in a trilateral co-operation to bring Iran’s natural gas to both India and Pakistan.

The trilateral gas pipeline project has been on the anvil for nearly two decades. It started,

primarily, as a brain-wave of some Pakistani oil & gas engineers and experts who came to the

conclusion that Pakistan’s rapidly depleting gas deposits were quite insufficient for its growing

needs and the best alternative to relying only on whatever it had was to import gas from the

next-door neighbour and old friend Iran.


65

India was invited to get on board the Iranian-Pakistani initiative because it made all the

economic sense for Iran, sitting over some of the largest natural gas deposits in the world, to tap

not just the Pakistani market for its gas but also rope in the much larger consumer market of

India. Pakistan, after some initial reluctance, which was entirely an off-shoot of its congenital

suspicion of India, also signed on the Iranian thrust. The Pakistanis agreed to extend the pipeline

to India for two reasons: the lure of several hundred million dollars in transit fees to fill their

empty coffers and, two, getting a sort of political and economic noose in their hands to clamp

on India for leverage whenever needed.

There is, of course, no riddle in why India back-tracked on its commitment to both Iran and

Pakistan in the pipeline deal. It did so under American pressure.

It was common knowledge among international observers of India, Pakistan and Iran that the

Americans were not happy at all with India and Pakistan throwing what American pundits of the

region regarded as a ‘lifeline’ to Iran in circumstances where U.S. has been, constantly, on a

campaign to tighten the ring around Iran’s neck and isolate it—in both economic and political

senses—in the region.

Washington used its nuclear deal with India as a lever to put pressure on Delhi to forget about

buying gas from Iran. It was, again, widely known that Washington made it a condition of its

lucrative nuclear co-operation with Delhi (lucrative to both sides) that any deal with Iran must

be off the table.

While Washington deployed soft and nuanced persuasion vis-à-vis Delhi to force a rethinking on

its part on the gas pipeline deal, it was blatant arm-twisting that went on with Islamabad

because of its client status in American eyes. It’s, however, interesting, if not intriguing, that

despite its obvious handicaps and constraints with Washington, Pakistan has not only signed a

bilateral deal with Iran to bring the Iranian gas to its starved consumers and industries but

seems intent on building the pipeline as quickly as possible.

U.S. initially tried to convince both India and Pakistan of a deal with Qatar—a redoubtable

American ally and geo-political launching pad in the region—for a gas pipeline under the sea.

But that involved exorbitant capital that Pakistan, in particular, couldn’t afford.

For a second-best option, Washington has blessed a gas pipeline to bring gas from

Turkmenistan to India and Pakistan, via Afghanistan. These four countries have been prevailed

upon, if not bamboozled, by Washington to sign the deal for what’s known in the oil and gas

circles as TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) project. Heads of state from the

first three, and a cabinet minister from India, met in Ashkabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, in

December, 2010, and actually signed the deal to the delight of the project’s god-father. But the

project is, at this stage, is no more than a pie- in- the- sky, given the war in Afghanistan which—

to say the very least—gives no hope of the project getting off the ground any time soon. The

proposed pipeline involves hundreds of kilometers of transit through the war-torn Afghanistan,

a daunting factor.


66

However, in the India-Iranian context, the biggest blow to any hope of an abiding friendship

between the two was dealt by India’s susceptibility to arm-twisting from Washington on Iran’s

nuclear status.

The Nuclear Factor:

Washington’s Iran-phobia on the nuclear issue is no secret. That its nuclear co-operation with

India—and the transfer of technology it promises to India from U.S—gives it a stout stick to

discipline India with and keep it in line behind it is no brain-teaser.

Delhi’s vulnerability to persuasion or arm-twisting—or a combination of both, depending on the

exigencies of a situation—has triggered an obvious down-ward slide in India-Iran relations over

the years since Delhi and Washington kicked off their nuclear co-operation. For instance, India,

which had been supportive to Iran’s nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, without

attaching any caveats to it, apparently succumbed to U.S. pressure when the then India Foreign

Minister, Parnab Mukerjee intoned that the Iranian enrichment programme should proceed “in

accordance with its own international commitments and obligations [and must] satisfy the

international community that its programme is indeed peaceful.”*4+

However, despite being egged on by Washington to lean more in favour of its campaign to

openly blackmail Iran over its suspected intentions to make nuclear weapons, Delhi still

maintained a nuanced position, vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear intent. It didn’t lend any support to the

jingoistic drums beaten in Washington and Tel Aviv on the issue and insisted on a peaceful

approach to resolving the crisis. Indian categorically refused to be a party to twist Tehran’s arm

on the issue [5] as quoted by Ariel Farrar- Wellman in his Iran Tracker of June 25, 2010

But apparently India’s nuanced and calibrated stance of playing safe on both sides of the Iran-

U.S. divide was not to the liking of Tehran. They regarded India’s equivocation as being a ploy to

curry favour with the Americans and resented it. This contributed to Iran’s sense of isolation and

reflected negatively on its relations with India.

The downward slide in relations appeared to have reached its nadir toward the close of 2010.

But the low point had been years in the making, with Iran becoming increasingly chary and

suspicious of India’s budding co-operation with U.S., in the nuclear field, among others.

Washington’s rambunctious diplomacy—which for years has been geared to block any effort on

Iran’s part to acquire nuclear know-how or weapon capability—seemed all the more focused on

creating a gulf between India and Iran.

Iran had a bone to pick with India on the nuclear issue since the time, in 2005, when India—a

member of the 35-nation board of governors of IAEA—had voted against Iran. To Tehran that

was only symptomatic of India signing on the U.S. agenda to deny Iran whatever it was

legitimately entitled to do—by way of peaceful use of nuclear energy and know-how—as a

signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tehran regarded it as nothing short of


67

being ironic that U.S. was using a non-NPT-signatory state, such as India, to block the legitimate

rights of an NPT-signatory like Iran.

To the Iranian leadership, increasingly under scrutiny in an orchestrated campaign led by U.S.

and its western allies, what India was doing was akin to betrayal of the principles it had

espoused with such exuberance and élan when it was a leading light of the non-aligned

movement. A frustrated Iranian leadership, cornered from the west, seemed to have decided to

let loose its pent-up frustration on India for what they regarded as unbecoming behaviour of a

neighbour that Iran had been trying hard to cultivate.

The charge was led, from the Iranian side by no lesser a person than Syed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s

supreme leader and guide. Availing himself of the address marking the solemn occasion of the

day of Hajj, 2010, Khamenei took a swipe at India, without naming it as such, for its suppression

of the rights of the people of Kashmir under its control.

Painting the country he led as an ideological and principled defender of the oppressed

everywhere, Khamenei exhorted the collective Muslim Ummah to rescue oppressed “nations

from the demonic clutches of hegemonic powers.” The oppressed nations on his list included,

among others, Kshmir and he prodded the world Islamic leaders to make their contribution to

the emancipation of their oppressed brethren. He said: “The major duty of the elite of the

Islamic Ummah is to provide help to the Palestinian nation and the besieged people of Gaza, to

sympathize and provide assistance to the nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Kashmir.”

[6]

The Indian response and retribution to what was clearly seen in Delhi as a calculated snub was

swift and telling. On the heels of Khamenei’s salvo, India abstained on a UN resolution critical of

Iran’s human rights. It was a calibrated climb-down from the position India had hitherto taken

on the issue by consistently voting against such resolutions and, in a way, shielding Iran. It was a

loud and categorical tit-for-tat to remind Iran of its vulnerability.

Understandably, Khamenei’s gambit didn’t pay any dividends to Iran, as far as its bilateral

relations with India were concerned. But in Iran’s western-enforced isolation, it was a desperate

bid by its supreme leader to seek friends among the community of Muslim states to off-set

some of the enormous damage done to Iran under the American-led propaganda and economic

blockade of Iran. But India’s backlash obviously amounted to calling Iran’s bluff.

2011 thus seems to have commenced with India-Iran relations declined perceptibly in trust and

mutual respect from preceding years. With nearly half the year gone, there is no evidence of

either country making a deliberate and calculated effort to repair the damage done to the

bilateral equation.

India, apparently, doesn’t feel any urgency or obligation to revert the relationship to where it

was before Iran dealt it a blow. India has the upper hand in an equation where the other entity

is an international pariah. India, on the other hand, is now a major player in a big league; its


68

membership of the elite G-20, has lent it an international stature that seems far removed from

Iran. Why should Delhi compromise its position by being seen as making an extra effort to repair

the damage done to its relationship with a regional and international out-cast?

The Arab Factor:

The Indian pragmatism on the issue is also heavily influenced by the Arab factor, i.e.

consideration that there are millions of Indian expatriate workers gainfully engaged in earning

their living in the oil rich Arab countries of the Gulf. These expatriates—skilled, semi-skilled and

un-skilled—are also a lucrative source of foreign exchange remittances to India, making up 40 %

of the total remittances from the Indian diaspora from across the globe. [7] The number of

Indian workers in the Arab world is expected to increase 5 to 10 % in the coming decade [8].

It’s a question of simple arithmetic. There are 22 member-states of the Arab League. Of course,

these Arab states don’t always unite on the same platform on an issue much of the time; the

Arab proclivity to nit-pick and unravel on even the most trifle of issues, much of the time, is

legendary. However, on the issue of Iranian nuclear ambitions, there is an over-whelming

concert of Arab voices that sings in chorus against Iran. India, sheer pragmatism dictates, cannot

afford to ignore these Arab concerns or consensus.

Sudha Ramachandran, writing in the Asia Times on the nadir reached between India and Iran,

quoted an academic teaching West Asian Studies at Delhi’s Jawaharlal University as saying with

unusual candour that “India can override US-Israeli concerns vis-a-vis Iran, but it cannot ignore

Arab pressure.” He was hitting the nail on the head.

Equally weighted is, again, the matter of arithmetic on the quantum of trade between India and

Iran, on the one hand, and between India and the Arab states, on the other. With Iran, as

already cited above, the two-way direct trade figure is $ 14 billion, whereas with the Arab world

it’s $ 114 billion, which is expected to double by 2014 *9+.

For its oil imports, too, India is more dependent on the Arab countries than on Iran, from which

it fulfills only 14 % of its requirements. Compared to this, oil from Saudi Arabia makes up 18 % of

Indian imports, from Kuwait 10 %, from Iraq 9 % and from U.A.E. 8 % [10]. So the total Arab

share of 45 % of Indian imports outweighs the one from Iran more than 3 to 1; the balance is

overwhelmingly in favour of the Arabs.

It was quite understandable, for instance, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, visiting

Saudi Arabia in March 2010, agreed fully with King Abdullah that Iran must co-operate with the

world to help remove the “doubts” about its nuclear programme *11+

The Wiki Leaks, through recent revelations, have left no iota of doubt about the unvarnished

sentiments of the Arab leaders on the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambition. Some Arab leaders,

including King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, have been quoted of telling their American interlocutors

to ‘chop off the head of the serpent.’ India, if it had any doubts before, should know well


69

enough, now, how the Arabs feel about Iran. Circumspection is the bottom line for the Indians in

their dealings with Iran.

Conclusion:

India’s circumspection or expediency doesn’t help Iran in coping with the dragnet U.S. has been

conducting against it. Iran is being surrounded from all sides; the noose is being tightened with

relentless efficiency. India, even if it doesn’t relish the idea much, is becoming part of the U.S.

inspired and led forced isolation in the region. It’s a grand design to tighten the screws on Iran

to the point where a regime change—one of the principal aims of the new ‘Great Game’—in Iran

becomes achievable.

Vast resources of oil and gas are Iran’s strength. But the U.S. strategy is to use this strength as a

weapon in the task of weakening the clerical regime of Iran. The way India’s arm has been

twisted by Washington to forget about joining hands with Pakistan to bring Iranian gas to India

is one example of it; Pakistan—with a weak and wretchedly corrupt ruling elite—is being

worked upon to go slow—dead-slow—on its touted intent to implement its deal for a gas

pipeline from Iran to Pakistan.

But in the latest instance, Iran is also being hobbled with problems regarding its oil sales to

India. Up until now the two countries had been using an Asian ‘clearing house’ to facilitate

payments to Iran against its oil exports to India. That facility is being closed because of India’s

obligations under the sanctions on Iran. The visit to Delhi—as these lines are being written—of

Iran’s National Security Chief, Saeed Jalili is believed to be related to this problem. Iran has

ample reason to feel deeply worried over this latest U.S. thrust into its export earning from oil.

On top of it, American sources are talking of a Saudi offer—without explaining as to whom this

offer has been made, India or U.S.—to make up for the loss of Iranian oil supplies to India

because of payment wrangles. [12]

The Saudis have long been part of the Iranian problem. Their aversion to the Iranian regime,

based largely on the sectarian differences between the two countries, has been exploited by

Washington as the cutting edge of the wedge in the region. The trust deficit between Riyadh

and Tehran needs hardly any elaboration, notwithstanding occasional attempts—no more than

window-dressing—by them to work out some modus Vivendi.

Saudi Arabia, in the prevailing scheme of things, is to Washington what Iran was under the Shah.

It’s the new ‘policeman’ in the region to stand in the vanguard of protecting American interests,

which match so much with Saudi Arabia’s own. The Saudis are, obviously, putting this status to

full use in Bahrain and Yemen. India is already on excellent terms with Saudi Arabia. However, if

it becomes a party to depriving Iran of its Indian market—and if that market is picked up by

Saudi Arabia—it would add a huge element of complication in the tangled relationship between

India and Iran.


70

India and Iran could ideally exploit the rich potential for co-operation between them if Pakistan

could also be party to it. That would revive the bonds that had existed between the two

historically. However, for this ideal to materialize the kinks and strains in relations between

India and Pakistan will first have to be ironed out, the prospects of which are not much exciting

to talk about. In fact, there are indications to the contrary, given the likelihood of U.S. pulling

out of its messy entanglement in Afghanistan. U.S. would withdraw from Afghanistan only after

some face-saving deal with its adversary, the Taliban. Such a deal will not happen without

Pakistan being in the thick of it. That, implicitly, would spell complications for both India and

Iran. The bottom line is that the odds don’t seem to augur well for a full flowering of India-Iran

relations in the near future. The road to mend these odds will be long and tortuous.

Footnotes:

1. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America; Kenneth M. Pollack, Random House, NY. P. 105

2. Author’s own archives. 3. Fars news agency, June 24, 2010 4. IRNA ( Iranian news agency), May 13, 2008 5. India Seeks Velvet Divorce from Iran, Asia Sentinel, November 5, 2008 6. India –Iran relations at nadir, Sudha Ramachandran, Asia Times Online, December 4,

2010 7. S. Ramachandran, op. cit 8. ibid 9. ibid 10. ibid 11. PTI News, March 2, 2010 12. STRATFOR, Global Intelligence Dispatch: Increasing Complications in India-Iran Relations,

June 14, 2011


71

The Israel Factor in India-Iran Relations

A Short Intervention

Dr. Harsh V. Pant

Reader in International Relations,

Department of Defence Studies,

King's College London,

United Kingdom

HARSH V. PANT is a Reader in International Relations

at King’s College London in the Department of

Defense Studies. He is also an Associate with the

King’s Centre for Science and Security Studies and an

Affiliate with the King’s India Institute. His current

research is focused on Asian security issues.

His recent books includeContemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy (Palgrave

Macmillan), Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World (Routledge), The China

Syndrome(HarperCollins), and The US-India Nuclear Deal: Policy, Process, and Great Power

Politics (Oxford University Press, 2011).


72

Despite the hype surrounding India‟s ties with Iran, India‟s relations with the Arab Gulf

states and Israel have been on an upswing, something that will continue to circumscribe

India-Iran relations in the coming years. Since establishing full diplomatic relations with

Israel in 1992, India has moved considerably closer to Israel, so much so that India and

Israel now share a growing defense partnership. It will be difficult for India to maintain

strategic partnerships with both Israel and Iran for a long time, given the peculiar nature

of relations among the West Asian countries. Iran‟s policy toward the Palestine issue can

become a major stumbling block in Indo-Iranian relations, because Iran supports not

only the Palestine cause and the right of its people to reclaim occupied lands as their

homeland but also non-recognition of Israel. As has been pointed out by many, this

basically means the elimination of the Israeli state. And this hostility toward Israel shows

no signs of abating, with the present Iranian president Ahmadinejad adopting a

particularly hard-line approach vis-à-vis Israel by openly questioning the Holocaust and

calling for Israel‟s removal from the face of the earth.

Israel has a deeply antagonistic relationship with Iran. Israel sees Iran as the main supporter of the anti-Israeli Hezbollah in Lebanon. It also blames Iran for actively supporting extremist Palestinian groups that use terrorism against the Israeli civilians. Israel, along with the United States, has also been putting pressure on Iran to stop its suspected nuclear weapons program, with some reports even suggesting that Israel could consider taking military action against the Iranian nuclear facilities. With Iran openly calling for its elimination, Israel clearly sees a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. While the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein may have removed one of Israel‟s enemies, it also seems to have created new opportunities for Iran to increase its influence in Israel‟s immediate neighborhood. In this respect, Israel is concerned about India‟s growing ties with Iran. It is especially worried about India sharing with Iran some of the military technology it is receiving from Israel. Israel has officially raised its concerns in its interactions with Indian officials, because Israel would like India to acknowledge the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran and would like India to make efforts to help in the stabilization of the volatile security situation in West Asia. While India and Israel need not make their bilateral relationship a function of each other‟s relationship with any third country, both will have to manage it carefully in light of India‟s relations with other countries in Middle East, and with Iran in particular. Israel will remain concerned about the direction of Indian foreign policy in the Middle East even though India might try its best to keep its relationship with Israel insulated from its bilateral dealings with other countries of the Middle East. Indian interests in the Arab Gulf and Israel are significant and evolving, and India is carefully nurturing these ties. This will clearly have an impact on India-Iran relations.


73

Triangulating India-Iran-Pakistan’s Balance of Equation

- Brig (Retd) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan

(Pakistan)

Brig (Retd) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan

Dr. Makni (his acronym) has military experience of about 32

years and is from the Regiment of Artillery. Recipient of

"sitara-e-imtiaz", he served on various command, staff,

instructional, administration, operational, research and evaluation appointments during his

career. As a young officer, he saw actions in 1971 Indo-Pak War on the Eastern border.

Holds first class Master‟s degree in International Relations and acquired doctorate in 2002-2007,

from University of Peshawar, Pakistan. He has attended national and international

seminars/conferences and appeared selectively as an analyst on Pakistani as well as foreign media

channels. Also a member of WSN Foundation International Advisory Board, his book, "The New

Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia" was published by Raider Publishing

International, simultaneously from New York, London and Swansea in February 2008.

([email protected])


74

I was right to be wrong

While you and your kind were wrong to be right.

---Pierre Courtade1

Hypothesis of narrative of power of the three countries is manifestly simple in the regional

setting but more one ponders about the complexities, more frustration grips once any side

endeavors to relegate its conflict vulnerabilities to workable equation with the neighbors. Like

Pierre Courtade’s dialogue, Pakistani ‘right’ sounds Indian ‘wrong’, Iranian ‘wrong’ may be

Indian ‘right’ and Indian ‘wrong’ may be Pakistani ‘right’ as one moves along and around the

pivots of the triangle. Discussing Iran-India in isolation would be a parochial approach. Their

foreign policy undercurrents and strategic objectives invariably crisscross, of necessity, to India,

Pakistan, Iran, China and beyond.

India is relatively huge land mass. Its geo-strategic significance is established not only as a South

Asian country but also as a power with massive expanding ability to influence sea-lanes in Indian

Ocean and thus South East Asia and Middle Eastern countries by implications. Approaches to the

Pacific, land operations in Himalayan Range, southern plains and the desert with China and

Pakistan are also located within its prowess. India has a firm foot in Iran, Afghanistan and

Central Asia, notably Kazakhstan for energy proxy, Tajikistan and Mongolia where it now

maintains military facilities that afford her better strategic orientation against the adjoining

countries, Pakistan and China from the North West. Its economy leapt forward in mid 90s era

and speculations abound that the center of gravity of the ‘riches’ would shift to BRICS2 from the

West, some placing it exclusively between China and India. However, geo-political environments

which, would remain a major threat to its expansive ambitions and adoption of the global role

that some world powers would like it to embrace, not necessarily to India’s advantage, acutely

eclipse India’s future prosperity.

The simmering Kashmir dispute with Pakistan and its corollaries like Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek

and now Rivers Water Distribution can catapult the prevailing ‘no war no peace’ scenario,

should any side lose patience. Impending war among the two would perhaps be unprecedented

by the (de)merit of its horrific mutual destruction because both sides have counted each other’s

teeth very accurately. Indian military might is impressive while Pakistan, a much smaller

country, maintains an efficient system of forces with credible nuclear deterrence. Despite being

riveted by internal turmoil, it has shown remarkable astuteness to keep ready its ‘steeds of war’

to deter any of the perceived threats. It has remained laced with crises since inception but at

the same time, it has fine-finished its ability to survive the crises as well. Whenever Pakistan was

found ignorant of internal and external build up of storms, and its leadership failed to rise to the

occasion, it paid an exorbitant price. India imposed such ‘price’ on it, at least once before during

1 . Tony Judt, “ Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945”, (Vintage Books London, 2010) p. 197

2 . BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.


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the final phases of cutting Pakistan to size. Obviously, the reference is to the debacle of

erstwhile East Pakistan.

India’s territorial dispute with China could develop into a formal conflict if it fits the design of

capturing geo-political space by either power. Sujit Dutta comments euphemistically but with

visible concern, downplaying the stand off as ‘competition’ only, “China and India straddle a

common geopolitical space across the Himalayas and South and Southeast Asia. This makes for

strategic and geopolitical competition.”3 The remarks, from the point of view of International

Relations are simply in the domain of liberalism, but the followers of ‘Realist’ approaches would

side line such comments in the light of ground realities. The ensuing dilemma from these

realities has forced a compulsion on the Indian hierarchy to maintain a potent military system to

react to or eliminate these threats, which the war evaluations prove, it cannot. It sounds like

war mongering. However, it is very heartening that powers to the disputes have come to

recognize the base line wisdom and that is, wars alone cannot resolve the conflicts4 though the

‘guns’ have been branded as the final argument of the kings historically. David Scott concludes in

his essay, ―Finally… some competition between India and China is likely to continue within

regional organizations, in the diplomatic arena, within their military and economic strategies;

and with it their elements of mutual balancing, and above all hedging. However, neither state

will want to antagonize the other too much, both will want to maintain their own long term

grand strategies of peaceful rise and economic modernization...”.5 Nevertheless, Indian forces

have to maintain a superb state of readiness to cater for the worst contingencies but that

unfortunately means sinking billions of taxpayers’ dollars every year that could be well spent

productively elsewhere instead of rattling the sabers. Any attempt to lower the guards by sliding

back from the build up of war arsenals may be even more risky within the riddle of maintaining

a ‘balance of power’, and the resultant encroachment upon India’s luster as a huge customer of

the modern weaponry with its ability to pay in dollars instantly.

3 . Sujit Dutta, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia’, in Jonathan Pollack

and Richard Yang, eds., “In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military

Development”, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), p. 92.

4. Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Shri P. Chidambaram appears inclined however, to support ‘war’ option

to resolve issues with Pakistan as he hurled an open threat on June 8, 2011. Being an optimist, I still see lesser graveside of his thunder that aimed possibly at an opposition BJP leader who had expressed shock a day earlier over the scale of Indian forces atrocities committed in Kashmir.

5 . David Scott 'Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century', ‘Asian Security’ (Journal),

2008, 4:3, p.265


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The sound and burgeoning economy tends to intensify the territorial lust of any state, if also

cajoled by its civil society, to adopt a role that transcends the geographical borders. In other

words, the virus of lebensraum, catching up with the appetite for seeking expansion or

recognition of their influence among the comity of nations can afflict any prosperous nation.

India, in a bid to survive the crunch of fading oil and gas reserves is likely to be vulnerable to

committing military adventurism by mid 21st Century, what Japan did against Pearl Harbor, to

sustain its military as well as economic might. This is particularly worrisome and the possibilities,

if not probabilities, heighten when some leading powers are already showing the symptom of

morality collapse under such desire and have come to deal with certain theaters in Eurasia in a

manner that is not finding due legitimacy despite their ardent desire to paint them as such.

India now is a regional power but its markers on the world map reach far and wide. The role it

yearns as a world power, particularly on the high seas and in the space does not find adequate

means but even the pipe dreams can materialize if the leadership perseveres in attaining the

objectives. Knowing the ambitious sides of Indian build up, other than its traditional rivals, China

and Pakistan, two powers, Australia and Indonesia can throw their tentacles up as a preemption

strategy. Gary Smith visibly circumvents Australia’s Indian fears through the entire length of his

essay but he puts across indirectly, which some times sounds more valid than direct. He

comments, “The uranium trade plays directly into two of the major regional and global

problems: the traditional concern of military security/insecurity...”6. About Australia, it is not

only the war of caricatures now. Australia has Herculean tasks ahead to keep engaged not only

China and India simultaneously but also China and America as well when the ‘national interests’

pull is divergent between them. Some of their taught syllabi advocate, “Australia’s strategic

relationship with America has always been fundamentally different from the old strategic

relationship with Britain, in that the British relationship was a matter of identity, and the US

relationship was based on interests.”7 More the Australian relationship would deepen with US

and India, more ominous strain it would cast on China and other subsystems that are well

poised to meet the challenge, thus making it a complex tangle.

From the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), however, India has managed an effective image profile,

obfuscating that she focuses on the development of trade relations and fostering peace though

it also implicates power game as well as its power projection. Staging a counter deception

perhaps, Australia and Indonesia particularly, have pretended to look the other way but not

remaining lax about her naval and nuclear expansion. Should India be stuck across the

waterways by drawing their disapproval if not full-blown rivalry, it would make Indian tasks

insurmountable. In other words, India would be a victim of backlash of its own build up. Seeing

Europe somewhat critical of US ‘go alone’ ventures and cis-trans-Atlantic alliance’s ride

6 . Gary Smith 'Australia and the rise of India', Australian Journal of International Affairs,2010, 64: 5, p.570

7 . ‘Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence’ (a Course Guide-2011), School of International, Political and

Strategic Studies, ANU College, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre of Asia & the Pacific, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sdsc/gssd, (accessed on 10 May 2011).

http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sdsc/gssd


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becoming bumpy, certain quarters are already advocating a new axis between India, America,

Israel and Australia (IAIA).8 Japan and New Zealand could be fifth and sixth candidates but it

would be hard to keep Japan in America’s fold if at any stage its relations smoothen out with

China or Russia over the disputed ocean spaces. New Zealand would be better advised by its

friends to stay away from the conundrum. Briefly said, India has the wherewithal to emerge as a

power with global role but not without heavy baggage of severe frustrations. Conversely, Indian

diplomacy, an important instrument of foreign policy, in regional setting, more so about

Pakistan and Iran, is vibrant from Indian perspective but within the globalize environments, it

has some severe critics, even at home who rate it a victim of sheer ambivalence. Harsh V. Pant

(not as harsh as Sikri is towards Pakistan) and Rajiv Sikri belong to realists and traditionalists

school of thought respectively. The former laments India’s ambivalence towards US, advocating

to take bold leaps in foreign policy conduct, the latter bitterly criticizes such mode of falling in

the lap of US, perhaps at the expense of not clearing mine fields for its diplomacy in ‘near

abroad’. Ian Hall comments about Sikri, “The region, he thinks, displays remarkable

commonality of cultural practices; its divisions, in other words, stem not so much from cultural

distinction but political decision.”9 Here the hint appears to division of the Subcontinent in

August 1947 that became the bedrock of disputes and hostilities. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had

observed over six decades ago (1946), “The factors that laid the foundation of Islam in Indian

society and created a powerful following have become victim of politics of partition.”10 Thus,

according to such generalizations, territorial disputes between India and Pakistan and to a

certain extent include China as well; are of lesser consequences than the psychological barriers

of hearts and minds among them, gaining height with the lapse of each year. Muslims have

endured a level of genocide at the time of partition and its horror still lurks on the horizon.

Concluding a chapter on ‘Black Death’ that devastated Europe in mid fourteenth century, Cathie

Carmichael comments, “Every Jew, Muslim, atheist or Christian who died at this time as a result

of being targeted for his or her faith or ethnicity was an individual with his or her own unique

martyrdom”11. One would expect from the leaders who steer the destinies of the masses to

obviate such tragedies, occurring to the minorities in the Subcontinent, though history is witness

8 . The alphabets (IAIA), if pronounced one by one, sound Urdu, meaning incidentally as, ‘welcome, welcome’. 9. Ian Hall, “The other exception? India as a rising power”, Australian Journal of International Affairs,

2010, 64: 5, p. 606

10

. Shorish Kashmiri, ‘Richness and Depth of Vision’, an interview with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in “Chattan”, (Matbooaat-e Chattan Lahore n.d. April 1946). 11. Cathie Carmichael, “Genocide before the Holocaust”, (New Haven & London: Yale University

Press, 2009) p.160


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that states seldom learn from past determinants of genocide. In fact, the most enduring bond, a

sage said, among the brothers has been the ‘sword’.

Iran with its potent hydrocarbon reserves has significant weight in the domain of geopolitics. It

maintains a long coastal line on Arabian Sea as well as Persian Gulf that act as trade lanes for

huge stocks of oil and gas and thus gain geo-strategic significance. It is essentially a Middle

Eastern country, but at the same time, a Caspian littoral and also contiguous to Central as well

as South Asia. Before Soviets ‘phantasmagoria’, it shared borders with the Soviet Union.12 India

and Iran have had the history of looking in opposite directions. During the royal era when Iran

was embedded deep in the Western, read American, alliance, it leaned more towards Pakistan

because of similarities in their geo-strategic priorities. India, on the other hand, inclined towards

Soviet Union and pursuing course of non-aligned bloc at the same time, was not Iran’s choice

obviously, when India’s energy thirst had also not exacerbated yet.

On the fall of Shah of Iran, the succeeding theocracy attempted to grasp the ‘leadership’ role

among Muslim ‘Ummah’ and hence India-Iran relations remained cool. Iranian support for

Kashmir cause was an impediment. The growth of US-Iran polarization and ensuing sanctions

through ‘Iran, Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA 1996)’ forced Iran to break American cordon by looking

towards China, India and Russia for its strategic assets safeguards and to parry off Israeli and

Western wrath that she feared by implications. Neutral observers blame Iran for some self-

inflicted wounds in the international arena. “While right to tap nuclear energy as a source and

shrewd option to explore alternatives for her enormous but fast dwindling oil and gas reserves

can not be denied, it is also encumbered as a responsible member to allay international fears

and move along the wind rather than flexing muscles in confrontational manner.”13 For Iran,

India was yet another lucrative window for breaking the US noose, which now imports 14% of its

energy needs from Iran. In return, India-Iran sounded comfortable with each other when Iran

ebbed down its Kashmir rhetoric. Their relations could plummet on conclusion of US-India and

Indo-Israel dialogues of strategic collusion but the mutual fears were downplayed by Iran as a

geopolitical expediency. However, Indian reluctance to render her support on nuclear issue at

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to Iran and by abstaining from the November 2010

UN vote that condemned Iran on question of Human Rights, have made the job of diplomats of

both the countries too perplexing to mend the fences.

As if, it was not enough. Indian ambivalence to join in contemplated Iran-Pakistan-India gas

pipeline project has also exposed vulnerabilities of their souring relations. The Iranian leadership

has come to see India clearly fixated by US and Israel, an assumption perhaps not very valid to

12 . If one sees Iranian northern boundaries and its claim over the Caspian Sea status as unresolved, Iran is well within its right to claim sharing Caspian borders with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, as well as Azerbaijan. 13

. Brig (Retired) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi (Makni), “The New Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia”, (Raider Publishing International, New York. London and Swansea, 2008), p.192.


79

stand the test of expert scrutiny. Indian rejection of US tenders worth $11 Billions equipment

deal14 last April proves that India generally could not be spoon fed by her allies and would

jealously guard its ability to steer foreign policy course without strings, compatible to its

national interests. Here, the likes of Rajiv Sikri have won. The decision must have taken wind out

of US incentives of the times while granting India concessions on acquiring advanced nuclear

technology and fuel from the nuclear club. US might have been relishing ever since the scenario

of launching India as a counterweight to China in the Indian Ocean as well as Pacific and the

potentials of India being a huge modern weaponry market that US would love to secure. The

shock’s apparent casualty was the US ambassador to New Delhi; Mr. Timothy Roemer who

resigned for ‘personal’ as well as ‘professional’ reasons. Yet another surprise is that India is

turning to Europe and not even to its traditional supplier, Russia though Russia protested

discreetly, as some reports suggest, by withdrawing its bid for supply of weapons to India. The

shift aspect, relevant to the topic, would have far-reaching consequences by lending India an

added maneuver space to keep Iran engaged successfully and perhaps Pakistan also, including

on Kashmir issue. Iran and Pakistan are glued together by the sort that dries up in a day and

revitalizes the next day when Indo-centric concerns are always dominant factors to count. The

two countries interact frankly and informally. Iran has some grievances against Pakistan; the

main perhaps its tilt to Middle Eastern actors and US with whom Iran has direct or indirect

territorial or ideological stand off but finds hard to ditch Pakistan at the same time. Iranian

President, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s recent claim (08 June 2011) to have known a US plot that aims at

denuclearization of Pakistan is a sincere revelation that validates such a predominant conviction,

already prevailing among the entire Muslim ‘Ummah’. In the regional context, US mean now a

full team, comprising US, India, Israel, Russia and NATO collaborators versus Pakistan as their

thrust lines converge in strategic dimension, a paradigm hard to admit by them but a reality

nevertheless. India has the ability to nourish its Middle Eastern diplomacy by driving a wedge

among Iran and others further deep to conduct chicanery of its exterior maneuvers.

There may be another twist in the Indian perception that Iran is failing to register and that is its

impending demographic explosion and corresponding aggravating energy thirst. Robert Kaplan

comments, “India -- soon to become the world's fourth-largest energy consumer, after the

United States, China, and Japan -- is dependent on oil for roughly 33 percent of its energy needs,

65 percent of which it imports. And 90 percent of its oil imports could soon come from the

Persian Gulf. India must satisfy a population that will, by 2030, be the largest of any country in

the world.”15 Indian energy imports from other Middle East countries, measure up to about 45%

of its total needs as compared to 14% from Iran (some sources figures vary). When Iran’s

nuclear venture is suspected among the Middle East countries and its role seen clearly as a force

trying to unhinge the ruling hierarchies of its neighbors in the wake of recent uprising in North

Africa and Middle East, India has the option to weigh gains and losses. By playing cool, India

14

. “India rejects U.S. tender”, ‘The News International’, Pakistan, 28 April 2011. 15

. Robert Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the 21st

Century: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, ‘Foreign Affairs’, April 2009(accessed at RealClearPolitics website on 22 April 2011.


80

reaps the advantage of ensuring that its energy lifeline remains green and large numbers of its

expatriates’ remittances from the Middle East fill her coffers.

For Sudha Ramachandran, however, India needs to focus still at Iran when she writes, “With

Pakistan refusing India overland access to Afghanistan, Iran is key to India’s land access to there

and beyond to Central Asia…. Besides, at times Delhi is concerned over the resurgence of

Taliban; can India afford to lose an important ally in Iran on Afghan issue?”16 The statement

clearly affords an insight to possible magnitude of ‘cooperation’ between India and some

Taliban faction(s) through Iranian influence in Afghanistan. It also reveals the level of advocacy

to accord, alternative access route through Iran to Afghanistan and Central Asia, a high priority

tag as compared to remaining warmed up with Middle East for the sake of energy and

expatriates’ remittances even though they are sizeable. However, Sudha Ramachandran

prescription has limited scope as he envisions the immediate crucial spaces and ignores the

global obligations India has to meet. Indian’s Iran embrace could resist US as well as Israel with

whom it collaborates strategically, but for the Middle Eastern countries and Europe combined,

she would find dent to her image unmanageable because of Iran once its own nuclear posturing

and refusal to sign Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is yet not out of the woods. His arguments

would have been even weightier, had he not, wittingly or unwittingly, downplayed Indo-Iranian

forces operational collusion. “Some experts see this as part of broad strategic cooperation

between two powers in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea…India had reportedly hoped the

Declaration (Indo-Iran of January 2003) would pave the way for Indian sales to Iran of upgrades

of Iran’s Russian-made conventional weapons systems”. The same report further dilates at

another place, “It is perhaps because of Indo-Iranian cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan that

Tajikistan—a Persian speaking Central Asian state bordering Afghanistan — allows Indian

combat aircrafts to use its Farkhor air base. There are reports that India will soon also be

allowed to use Tajikistan’s Aini air base as well.”17 Iranian influence made the difference for

India.

Pakistan and perhaps China as well as Central Asians view Indo-Iranian collaboration in

Afghanistan as unnatural or rather too lavish in full view of their antagonists, if not hostile

neighbors. Iran has to understand that India needs Iran and it would gravitate on its energy bait

relentlessly, giving Iran an impression at the same time that she stands by it despite US

disapproval. IAIA axis, when allies would maintain forces preponderance for the Gulf energy

16 . Sudha Ramachandran, “India-Iran relations at nadir”, Asia Times ( www.atimes.com) , December 4, 2010.

17 . K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzma, “India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests”, ‘CRS Report for

Congress’, Order Code RS 22486, August 2, 2006,

(http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf, accessed on 18 May 2011) p. 6

http://www.atimes.com/

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf


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security against Iranian wish in the Gulf by force if necessary, shall rupture Indo-Iranian ‘close’

relationship mirage in a nasty way. “But for a non-Jew to challenge that American and Israeli

interests are identical is to invite the charge of anti-Semitism, which has been the kiss of death

politically since the holocaust.”18 India is safely in the same bracket now. Iran would not gulp

down Israeli threat behind Indian smoke screen on its borders with Afghanistan. Under these

circumstances when US-Israel-India draw more closer because of their wider convergence of

global priorities, Iran would have no option but to restrict Indian access to its seaport of Chah

Bahar that India is helping it to develop, cutting at the same time Indian roots in Tajikistan as

well as Afghanistan. Pakistan would remain comfortable anyway, because of its loyal ‘Pathan’

belt on its western borders with Afghanistan that could not be subverted ever since partition.

However, some powers with heavy stakes are keen to ignite this strategic asset called ethnic

‘pukhtoons’ against Pakistan by bribing and equipping an odd tribal segment in adjoining Afghan

border areas through moles that portray perfect ‘turban and beard’ combination. Such a degree

of ‘loyalty’ consolation for Pakistan through historic incidence however, has to be nurtured and

sustained laboriously for which Pakistan is putting little effort and eroding its own reservoir of

strength under aliens’ pressure.

It is an interesting paradox, when India did incessant finger pointing to Pakistan for indulging in

illegal nuclear proliferation (Dr. A Q Khan episode), Indian scientists were helping Iran on

possible enrichment techniques. According to Wall Street Journal, in September 2004

determination, two Indian nuclear scientists were sanctioned against under the INA (Iran Non-

proliferation Act), Dr.Chaudhary Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad. The two formerly headed the

Nuclear Power Corp of India and allegedly passed to Iran heavy-water nuclear technology.19 At

least four or five other Indian chemical and engineering companies faced sanctions or threat of

sanctions in 2005 by US on similar transfer violations to Iran in nuclear and missile technology

field under INA. Grant Pakistan that when it faced an avalanche of Indian propaganda, hardly

any one in Pakistan blew trumpet of Indian complicity with Iran, out of sheer laziness of its

diplomatic corps or its urge to build bridges of understanding with India!

It remains clear that Pakistani leadership, embroiled in survival war with opposing political

parties has not been able to cash on such/similar profitable themes to gain a diplomacy edge

internationally as does India, whenever situation presents her an opportunity. Killing of Osama

bin Laden was still wrapped in a mystery but India clinched Pakistan by throat to label it as the

harbinger of global terrorism on the same day, 02 May 2011. The allegation came like a bolt

from India and even US who are very weak in simple arithmetic and are not impressed by five

times more Pakistani forces personnel and civilians falling martyrs than theirs all combined,

spilling blood for US war on terror. Such an ill timed and possibly, a deliberate barrage, if spared

18 . Theodore P. Wright, “ Indo-Israel Relations and the Concept of National Interest in Multi Ethnic/Religious States” in ‘FPRC Journal-5’, (accessed at Foreign Policy Research Centre, New Delhi website on 20 April, 2011) 19

. John Larkin and Jay Solomon, “India’s Ties With Iran Pose Challenge for U.S.,” ‘Wall Street Journal’, March 28, 2005


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for a while, could permit the two countries moving closer for chalking out an agenda of

reconciliation. The cool of cricket diplomacy, which Indian Prime Minister achieved so

assiduously, vanished overnight. Demolishing the bridges among the states has been the easiest

narrative historically than building ones. Ephemeral gestures of reconciliation India makes

occasionally have fast become the fuel for added fury, which, India and Pakistan can ill afford to

suffer for a long time. Recent inconclusive talks on Sir Creek and Siachen issues in May 2011

were least followed by the Pakistani public, with foregone assumption that it was a mere

gimmickry, aimed at securing credibility reservoir from ‘peace-seeking-Western world’ and a

ploy to further isolate Pakistan.

On Pakistan domestic front, mega corruption scandal breaks cover almost every fortnight,

forcing its top leadership to go out of breath to defend it. Within weeks when judiciary comes in

to play its role, instead of recovering from the shame, they embark on the monstrous campaign

to defy the highest courts because the corruption tales in Pakistan explored by the media are

more or less always true. It is not the bad governance only but some opposition parties are also

corrupt to the roots and ‘cooperate’ with the Government after securing big share in the deals.

In all probability, while Pakistan Army, Judiciary and Media are reassuring icons, the country has

the potentials to wriggle out of the crises.

Indo-Iranian collaboration on trade and military cooperation in the presence of serious Indo-Pak

territorial irritants and perceptional gulf would remain a concern, not only for Pakistan but for

China as well. Coupled with it, Indian image as a factor for inducing instability in Pakistan from

its Eastern as well as Western borders, perhaps as counter stroke to ‘Jihadis’ operations in

Kashmir is extremely disturbing, when the pointers also prove US nod to India if not active

support from Afghan territory. Tiff between US-Pakistan on the magnitude of war on terror and

‘do more’ syndrome haunts every Pakistani because it is unrealistic as well as impracticable.

Intelligentsia in Pakistan clearly perceives that prolongation of the war on terror in Afghanistan

is a mere farce to defile it or at least force Pakistan to give up its nuclear arsenals that it

possesses as a solitary Muslim power. The scenario is horrible to conceive but there is graceful

diplomatic maneuver space available if both the countries heed to the reason rather than

making recourse to the ruses contrived by some war mongering think-tank, known for their

prejudice and bias.

For India, to assume the status of 21st Century economic giant, its energy thirst would not

satiate unless it resolves its dispute with Pakistan. Its strategic significance far exceeds than that

of Iran when it would need every drop of oil and gas, possibly from Iran as well as Central Asia.

Until Pakistan acts as an energy bridge and Damocles sword of internal and external threats are

not taken off Pakistan, Indian economic boom would face severe eclipse. India may well argue

that Pakistan’s internal problems are of its own making or their resolution at least its own

prerogative but the fact remains that there is so much of arms twisting and intrusion in its

internal affairs that even US officials had the tongue in cheeks to openly admit, yes, our

operators are there in Pakistan. Raymond Davis saga renders all speculations on the contrary to

rest. Within the wider game, India needs to reassess its ambitions by recalling that as a poor but


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relatively ethics based country, it enjoyed far more respect even in bipolar world of Cold War

era. With economic boom and lager stocks of guns, missiles and munitions, logically, its reach

and recognition would have taken longer strides but it has not. All its direct neighbors except

Bhutan, a protectorate, maintain uneasy relationship with India, is a coincidence worth

reckoning. Is it the lack of will to mend fences with the neighbors or too much of a flare for

courting distant actors who would see India supplementing their own designs at the cost of

wreaking miseries to Indian masses?

The technology that is pushing globalization to the zenith, is also making the inter states

relations transparent. Cloak and dagger policies, no matter who the executioners are, would

seldom remain covert in the coming years; wikileaks may be a small demonstration only. The

dichotomy in acts and facts, when the big powers in 21st Century were to be more benign

towards the planet if not the humanity, is exaggerating. The irony is that the most powerful

states that have grown beyond measures in annihilating capabilities are showing strong

tendencies of eliminating the reconciliatory approaches, whatever the pretexts, in reverse ratio

that bodes catastrophic for breathing space of the developing countries. China, Iran, India and

Pakistan are high on the graph periphery that could be sucked in by the centripetal character of

the tornado of violence in pursuit of ‘narrow or aliens’ objectives. While India and China have

history of recovering from the brink, Pakistan and Iran are more vulnerable and would need to

stand guard to preempt such follies.

Some conclusions are pertinent to draw:

India as a power in military spectrum has immense emerging influence not only in the Subcontinent but also as far as China and Australia to the East and to Gulf of Aden to the West. While India would welcome seamless cooperation from the countries within this space, they would need equal, if not more, Indian cooperation as well in the process of its improved power potentials from regional to extra regional capability. Iran, Indonesia, Australia, China and Pakistan, if not on board with India, can inflict severe dent to the perceived Indian hegemony.

India-Iran relations figure out prominently in the sphere of trade and at forces operational levels. Conceiving any military alliance with Iran as of today, does not fit in the Indian wider considerations. However, its cordial relations with Iran might prevent Iran to be studded on, as some Pentagon officials call it, the ‘string of pearls’ or ‘pearls necklace’ but ‘noose for India’, engineered by China. In other words, the Iranian seaports in Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, being vital for energy security, shall emerge as a subject from covert to overt diplomacy when China and India would bid for their naval use or lien in the event of any collapse of energy security environments. Iran in this context would not oblige India but China instead, not because India does not mean any importance to her but in energy security setting, Iran would see India more as a US ally and China, its all weathers choice. To woo Iranian favor for energy supplies, India has to walk on the tight rope and maintain balance with US, Israel and other Middle Eastern countries that would turn it as suspect if diplomacy cards were not played judiciously.


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Kashmir is the mother of all disputes and mistrust between India and Pakistan. After having fought three short wars and Kargil misadventure, Pakistan has to remain committed to its viable resolution, according to the wishes of People of Kashmir. Lingering Kashmir dispute is dangerous more for India than for Pakistan, particularly when the Subcontinent, Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Russia and at some stage China as well, can integrate on European Union (EU) pattern that would herald tremendous peace, tranquility and hence prosperity. After India-Pakistan possible patch up, no reason remains in the fold why Pakistan should not become Energy Bridge for India as well as South East Asia. Iran, Caspian littorals and other Central Asians would be in the line by choice.

Indian Government needs to ensure effective public awareness so that the ruling as well as opposition parties support India-Pakistan reconciliatory overtures and ditching the dialogue does not become electioneering agenda. It fuels anti Pakistan sentiments and India has it in abundance. Too much of vitriol is pumped into masses to demonize Pakistan that is usually resorted to hype the war phobia before launching full-fledged offensives. India has the prerogative to do so if she foresees hostilities in short term. If not, she should commit herself to douse the flames.

Tension with Iran developed because of extra regional considerations and Indian obligation to support its allies. The alliances surfaced because India was not comfortable with neighbors including China. Chinese conduct in the international arena has remained pragmatic, fostering peace. Indo-China disputes are there but not so complicated that these cannot be resolved. After all they have been, ‘Hindi-Cheanee bhai bhai’ that translates ‘people of India and China are brothers to each other’. It only needs a stock of pragmatism from Indian side and well-intentioned diplomacy away from the distant alliances specter while on Chinese side India would find it in plenty. Friendly dance together is possible. Any side that makes the first move would enjoy moral ascendancy. It thus becomes imperative that India takes wind out of international meddling in this part of the world that is thriving on Indo-China ‘competition’. Inward coalescing of Russia, China, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, further on to Australia makes a fantastic dream for free trading space. History has it that some grand accomplishments were perceived as dreams to start with. All actors need to take cue from EU, which has amongst them, not only brute memories but some lingered on as well.

Iran has to adopt a flexible approach toward the regional as well as world issues. Its anti US and anti Israel jargons hit no one else but Iran. Obliteration of Israel is her fantasy, far removed from reality. She must reconcile with impracticable ideal by sponsoring peace and harmony. Reconciled Iran would not only be more prosperous and ardently sought for power but also the one that makes its friends’ task much easier in give and take deals. “Discreet pragmatism would enable her to prove an assumption wrong, what Fred Halliday said about Iran, ‘condemned to react, unable to influence’.”20 Conversely,

20 . Dr. Makni, op cit, p. 193


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Israel has emerged as a trusted ally of the US and now of India as well. Instead of setting up snares for the surrounding as well as distant countries including Iran and Pakistan, Israel is best advised to knock out two issues. It must grant Palestine a statehood that is ultimately to the benefit of Israel and return the 1967-captured territories to its neighbors. Instead of taking pleasure in demeaning US President, Barak Obama on Palestinians issue, it must regret its obstinacy for not picking up the advice of its most trusted benefactor, America. On the other hand, one sees a remarkable change that Muslims are prepared to work with Israel if these two obstacles were removed. India, as an allied country should exert its influence on Israel for helping Palestinians whose supporter, India remained for long time during Cold War era. Any success in this direction would render its standing tall with Arabs.

Pakistan has tremendous heap of homework to accomplish and there is light/hope on the long end side. It needs to reassess the circumstances that have pushed it to the precipice of internal turmoil and portrayed it as the subject of international conspiracies despite its rich dossier of decades’ long loyalties against the utopian ideology. It must pursue a policy within the ambit of recognized international relations, free of the gridlocks clamped by the powers that embrace it today and kick it out the next day. Resolution of imminent conflict scenarios by applying soft power while maintaining impeccable military deterrence would be the best option. Spare no effort that fosters honorable peace with the immediate neighbors, cordial relations with Muslim countries and equitable ties with all major powers.


86

Quid Pro Quo: India’s Quest for the American Narrative

Dr.Vijay Prashad

Trinity College (Hartford,CT)

Vijay Prashad is the George and Martha Kellner

Chair of South Asian History and Professor in and

Director of the International Studies Program at

Trinity College (Hartford, CT). He is the author of

eleven books, most recently The Darker Nations: A

People's History of the Third World: New Press and

LeftWord, 2008) which was chosen as the best nonfiction book of 2008 by the Asian

American Writers' Workshop and which won the 2009 Muzaffar Ahmad Book Prize.

He will soon release The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South

(Verso and LeftWord) and Uncle Swami (The New Press). He is a columnist for

Frontline (Chennai) and Counterpunch (Petrolia, CA).


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“Traditional ties with West Asia will be given a fresh thrust.”

National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India, May 2004.

“Pragmatism trumps moral clarity in Delhi’s Middle East policy.”

U. S. Ambassador to India, David Mulford, March 31, 2006.

On April 21, 2011, journalist Sadanand Dhume published a commentary essay in the Wall

Street Journal entitled “It’s Time to Re-Align India.” The context for Dhume’s essay was the

consolidation of a view of the world among the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and

South Africa. Meeting in Hainan, China, the BRICS countries called for a multipolar world (i.

e. no longer dominated by the Atlantic powers, led by the U. S.) and for a less militaristic

approach to common problems (i. e. with special reference to the imbroglio in Libya, fast

becoming the 21st century’s Yugoslavia). For Dhume, “like a monster in a B-grade horror

film, India’s love affair with non-alignment refuses to die…. The end of the Cold War should

have ended this approach to foreign policy. Unfortunately, it hasn’t.”

What Dhume does not realize is that the BRICS dynamic is precisely a post-Cold War

phenomenon. The major powers within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) recognized in

the 1990s that the U. S. had come to dominate world affairs, and that their main instrument,

the UN General Assembly, had been set aside. NAM had few institutional forums through

which to try and exert the power of the planet’s majority. The demographic minority

through the UN Security Council, the Group of Seven (G7), NATO and the GATT exerted their

domination: this is what George H. W. Bush called the “new world order,” one that emerged

out of the detritus of the Iraq war of 1990-91. It was in the 1990s that the large states of the

South began to consider a new approach to protect ideas of multipolarity and development

against NATO’s Kosovo model of political relations and the G7’s neoliberal economic

policies. Various platforms were tried out, such as the NAM’s G-15, the IBSA (India-Brazil-

South Africa) group and eventually with the addition of Russia and China, the BRICS. These

are robust forums to provide an alternative to what many see as the failed polices of the G7

– both in political and economic terms.

India was not only central to the Third World Project (from Bandung to the formation of the

NAM in 1961), but it was also crucial to the rethinking of the post-Cold War landscape –

being a member of the G-15, the IBSA and the BRICS.

In the early years after the Cold War ended, India positioned itself in a way to exert its

power on the world stage and yet, contradictorily, not to do so in an antagonistic manner to

the Atlantic powers, whose own appetite for sharing the stage remains modest. The

Liberalization policy inaugurated in 1991 came with much fanfare, and with considerable

nudging from the IMF and IMF-oriented economists within India (such as the current Prime

Minister, Manmohan Singh). With Liberalization came a reorientation of the foreign policy:

there was an assessment in the early 1990s that the shift from a dirigiste economy must be


88

met with a friendlier attitude toward the West. It was hoped by the emergent consensus

among the New Delhi elite that normal relations with Israel would send a signal to

Washington of Delhi’s seriousness toward the established power equation. NAM was to be

squandered on behalf of a new alliance policy with the U. S., a kind of alliance that might

mimic the “special relationship” between Israel and the United States.

It was toward this alliance that the Congress (led by Narasimha Rao, 1991-1996) and the

BJP (led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 1996, 1998-2004) pushed, with a brief interregnum that

tried to return the country to both the planned economy and the non-aligned foreign policy

(led by Dewe Gowda and Inder Gujral, 1996-1998). These governments ran roughshod over

a recalcitrant Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), where the habits of Nehruvian statecraft

remained (when Natwar Singh returned to the office in 2004-2005, an MEA bureaucrat told

me that they hoped for a revitalization of the NAM dynamic; it was not to be). The principle

mode of the Congress and BJP governments has been to engineer a “strategic partnership”

with the United States.

Other currents remained, however, such as the recognition amongst sections of the elite and

in the MEA that the United States was a fickle friend, in need of its alliance with Pakistan

(particularly after 2001) and unwilling to fully commit to making India a partner in the first

circle of world affairs (the U. S. promised Japan and Germany that it would campaign for

them to become permanent members of the Security Council – on June 10, 1993 – and it has

still not done more than offer anemic public statements of support). This latter recognition

reinforced the long-standing ideological commitment to non-alignment amongst sections of

the Congress, whereas the former problem (fealty to Pakistan) reproduced distrust amongst

sections of the hardened BJP. It was never going to be an easy sell, to disrupt India’s own

various international entanglements and the various theories of its national interest in

order to become the subordinate partner in an alliance with the U. S. (all those who partner

with it are subordinate; there are no equals, at this time).

On the plane of Indian politics, it was only the Communist Left that was ideologically

opposed to an alliance with what they saw as the central political spear of imperialism.

Others had various pragmatic disagreements with the alliance, or else had ideological

misgivings that could otherwisebe set aside once in a while (such as the socialists). That is

precisely why it was the Communist Left that provided the parliamentary backbone to

resist sending Indian troops to join the U. S. adventure in Iraq (one forgets that even Natwar

Singh, the standard bearer for the NAM in the lonely halls of the MEA, had indicated in a July

11, 2004 press conference with U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that India was

“delighted” with the UN Resolution on Iraq [1546] and it might reconsider the issue of

troops to Iraq). It was the Communist Left that persisted with its warnings on various

aspects of Indian foreign policy, in particular the assertions by the U. S. Embassy that India

adopts three pillars, essential to Washington:


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.Close relations with Israel.

.Intensified Military and Commercial ties with the U. S. armed forces and firms.

.Isolation of Iran.

The Indian government recognized the state of Israel in January 1992, and over the course

of the decade developed close ties for the import of military hardware and intelligence

software. As well, India tempered its previously resolute backing for the Palestinian

struggle. This was an important signal to Washington. It meant that India was willing to

sacrifice its own ideological and institutional commitments for a narrative of the world

favorable to Washington. If India could become close to Israel, the door to the special

relationship that really mattered (with Washington) opened wider.

By the late 1990s, the Indian government turned toward increased arms purchases from the

U. S. and welcomed U. S. military personnel to train with the Indian arms forces. This close

relationship (inter-operatability) sent the next hint. Since much of the military relationship

is also commercial, it is fitting that these two elements (the military and the commercial)

remain side-by-side. In the Clinton years, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen repeatedly said

of India that its middle class is the “size of France,” and so is capable of buying much that U.

S. firms produce (even as the production sites might be in China!). It was to this end that the

“special relationship” had a very prominent commercial angle, with agricultural businesses

interested in drastically changing Indian agriculture (to a more agro-business model) and

energy firms invested in the privatization of the energy boom that was forecast. Cargill and

Enron, General Electric and ADM – they lined up with as much enthusiasm as the major

banks, who wanted to open up the money markets to predatory “hot money.”

The Left was unable to prevent the rapid, and much of it secret, alliance with Israel (Efraim

Inbar, director of Israel’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, who is actively involved

in the Indo-Israeli contacts, recognizes the political problem, “this kind of cooperation needs

to be secret if it can be,” he told Newsweek). The commercial and military ties also came

upon the country like a Tsunami, but here the Left in alliance with sections of the Congress

and the BJP was able to stave off the elimination of protections against finance capital,

having been unable to hold back the energy and the agricultural transformations. The

protection against financial “openness” saved India during the credit crunch of 2007

onwards, and the recession that followed.

The battlefield that turned out to be the most contentious was over the question of Iran. It

was the test case of India’s subordination to the U. S. narrative of world affairs. The Bush

administration was adamant that Iran be isolated, despite Washington’s appalling

adventure in Iraq and its own isolation from the world community of the UN General

Assembly. The problem of Iran is not so much about the Iranian government and the Iranian

people. U. S. foreign policy is rarely grounded in the aspirations of the peoples of far-off

lands: if it were so, then it might not have removed popularly elected leaders via coups and

military conquests, from the removal of Arbenz from Guatemala (1954) to Aristide from

Haiti (1991, 2004). Iran poses a threat to the establishment’s order of things in the Middle


90

East and North Africa (MENA). By the establishment, I mean the United States, Saudi Arabia

(and its satellite emirates), Israel and the European players. For the establishment, Iran has

been a threat since 1979, and this is precisely the reason why they encouraged the Carter

Doctrine -- that the defense of the Persian Gulf region was a vital national interest for the U.

S. (1980); they pushed Iraq to go to war with Iran (1980-1988); and they formed the Gulf

Coordination Council, the Arab NATO (1981). Iran poses a political threat to the

establishment’s order of things, and it has long been its policy to defang Iran by military and

political means. Corralling India into this policy was a policy since the early 1990s, and it

has come close to fruition over the past decade.

In January 2004, the Bush administration sent a man of the banks (head of Credit Suisse and

previously senior advisor to the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency), David Mulford, to be the

Ambassador to India. Mulford remained at this post till 2009. It was a crucial period. When

Mulford came to India, relations between Teheran and New Delhi were on a reasonably

good footing: congruence on Afghanistan was the most recent foreign policy linkage, but so

too was the question of energy (India had long been in talks with Teheran and Islamabad to

allow a natural gas pipeline to run from Iran to India). Mulford’s brash style mimicked that

of his president (Bush), demonstrated in his unwillingness to bend to the niceties of

diplomatic aide-mémoires.

The deal from Washington was simple. India would soft-pedal the natural gas pipeline, and

it would be given more than assurances to build up its nuclear sector (to be built, largely, by

U. S. firms). Any disentanglement from Iran would allow India freedom of maneuver toward

the U. S. narrative of world affairs. When next the U. S. needed a vote to sanction Iran (in the

International Atomic Energy Agency or in the U. N.) it might have to call upon India, and

thereby confuse the NAM bloc, which was often led by India on some of these matters. To

make the case, Bush sent his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to India in 2005: she got

what the U. S. wanted from India, but gave very little. India did not get a commitment to a

permanent seat at the U. N. Security Council, and the U. S. would not go back on its

commitment to sell Pakistan a new batch of F-16s. Rice lobbied hard for India to abjure the

peace pipeline and to adopt the nuclear road. It was clear by 2005 that the nuclear deal was

a quid pro quo for scuttling the peace pipeline and for giving the U. S. political cover in the

NAM-type forums in its policy to isolate Iran. When External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh

said at a press conference that India has “good relations with Iran,” Rice grimaced.

The best case scenario for nuclear power, according to energy analyst Prabir Purkayastha,

was that it would provide no more than 5% of India’s primary energy needs by 2015 – this

is hardly a solution to India’s energy problem. It is, rather, a political matter: India is now

anointed as a nuclear power, and feels emboldened to seek its proper place in the Security

Council, and to earn that role it must act “maturely,” namely work with the “international

community” (viz. the Atlantic powers) to isolate revisionist powers, such as Iran. That was

the bottom line. The aggravations of David Mulford come out clearly in the cables he sent off

to the U. S. State Department (and revealed by Wikileaks). In early September 2005, prior to

India’s vote against Iran in the IAEA on September 24, Mulford met Foreign Secretary


91

Shyam Saran. In Mulford’s rendering, he “delivered the mail (wrapped in a brick)”

(September 6, 2005, 05NEWDELHI6840, Wikileaks). This is the kind of aggressive language

that he often used. Mulford “took Saran to task” for Natwar Singh’s statements during a visit

to Teheran and told Saran that “the time was drawing near for fence-sitters to make hard

decisions.” Then comes the clear quid pro quo: “Many in Congress and throughout

Washington, [Mulford] reminded Saran, were watching India’s treatment of Iran prior to

Congressional debate on the U. S.-India civilian nuclear initiative.” One could only come if

the other was demonstrated. Why was India’s vote so important? “India had a key voice in

the NAM and could swing opinion in the [IAEA Board of Governors]; it was time, [Mulford]

said, for us to know where India stood.” From the U. S. side, the “nuclear deal” was about

nuclear energy (and $60 billion promised in purchases for nuclear hardware), but more so

it was about cementing India’s shift from its non-aligned foreign policy to being a

subordinate ally of the U. S. narrative.

The irritant to Mulford was not the BJP, nor the Congress. On December 28, 2005, BJP

National Executive Member Seshadiri Chari told the U. S. embassy that they should not

“read too much into the foreign policy resolution [of the BJP national council meeting],

especially the part relating to the U. S.” (December 28, 2005, 05NEWDELHI9761,

Wikileaks). This was just “standard practice,” the BJP leader told the Embassy, rhetoric for

the elections. On October 21, 2005, BJP leader Jaswant Singh met with Nicholas Burns, no. 3

at the U. S. State Department, and the point person for the nuclear deal. Singh complained

about U. S. support of Pakistan and other such points. But the main message that Singh

delivered was that the Congress “does not have the intellectual commitment to improve U.

S./India relations” (October 24, 2005, 05NEWDELHI8231, Wikileaks). The Congress is

hampered by the Communists, who are bent on “hollowing out” the Congress Party by

“disapproving anything and everything.” The BJP would govern without any Communist

influence, and was therefore a better partner.

The U. S. was not convinced that the Congress was the problem. It was the Communist bloc

that was obdurate. Jaswant Singh told Burns, “The Communists will obstruct the policy and

the PM should deal with this problem. Singh emphasized that the U. S. should not have

frontloaded the relationship with nuclear issues but should have waited to construct a large

political base first.” The Communist bloc in the parliament had to be cut down to size. This

meant that the bastions in West Bengal and Kerala needed to be pruned. It helped that at

this opportune moment, the Left Front government in Bengal ran into trouble with its

attempt to create the Tata factory in Singur. The slide downhill for the Left Front’s

popularity could be gauged to the events in Singur of 2006, just when the nuclear deal/Iran

began to heat up. The Left Front suffered in the panchayat elections (2008), the Lok Sabha

elections (2009), the municipal elections (2010) and the Assembly elections (2011). The

four parties that comprise the Left bloc in the parliament (the two Communist Parties, the

Forward Bloc and the Revolutionary Socialist Party) saw their membership in the Lok

Sabha drop from 58 (in the 14th Lok Sabha, 2004-2009) to 24 (in the 15th Lok Sabha, 2009-)

– out of a total of 543. A weaker Left presence in the parliament has strengthened the ability

of the Congress to more fully adopt the U. S. narrative of world events.


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The other decisive problem for those who wished to consolidate the U. S.-India relationship

was the inherited people and ideas inside the bureaucracy, both in the MEA and in the

ambassadorial personnel. Prior to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to India

in late September 2008, the MEA went into turmoil. It released an official statement that the

U. S. embassy in Delhi characterized as “an anodyne draft statement that reiterated

standard Indian talking points on Iran.” MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar had

showed the draft to the Political Counselor at the Embassy, and told him, “India’s growing

relationship with the U. S. had split MEA into two camps” (April 24, 2008,

08NEWDELHI1134, Wikileaks). A member of the MEA who was against the strong

relationship wrote the draft, which enraged Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, who was

in Beijing on a visit. The Embassy registered “its protest against the MEA’s offensive

statement on Iran,” and pushed on with its attempt to strengthen its allies in the MEA and

weaken its adversaries.

One example of how the U. S. government influenced the Indian MEA bureaucracy is in its

attempt to undermine the Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Nirupam

Sen. Sen had come to the UN from his post as Indian Ambassador to Sri Lanka. An

intellectual with a seasoned understanding of world affairs, Sen threw in his energy to push

for more democracy in the UN and less fealty by the NAM bloc and India to the tantrums

from Washington (the Bush administration sent as its Representative John Bolton, whose

views on the UN can be captured in his view that, “the Secretariat building in New York has

38 stories. If it lost ten stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference”). Sen was well-liked

among the representatives from the South, and earned the respect of the UN establishment

(upon his departure from the ambassadorship, Sen was the Special Senior Advisor to the

President of the UN General Assembly). But he was despised by Washington. A cable from

Bolton offered the full view of why they disliked Sen: “Sen’s arguments consistently attack

the Charter-based rights of the Security Council and the P-5 [the five permanent members]

in particular. He routinely characterizes the P-5 as an exclusive club attempting to

perpetuate an historical dominance within the international community that no longer

reflects reality and does not acknowledge rising powers. (His statements along these lines,

particularly as they coincide with the [U. S.] Administration’s efforts to achieve an historic

nuclear deal with India, strike us as terribly anachronistic.).” (June 21, 2006,

06USUNNEWYORK1254, Wikileaks). Bolton suggested that Sen was an “unreformed

Communist.”

Remarkably, at a lunch meeting between Sen’s Deputy, Ajai Malhotra and Bolton’s Deputy,

Alejandro Wolff, the Indian said that he “had been sent to New York with instructions from

Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran to cooperate with the USG on the broad range of

issues,” and, as Wolff put it, “to check his boss’s antiquated instincts.” Malhotra criticized

Sen’s “confrontational attitude to the USG,” which led Wolff to his own assessment (May 19,

2006, 06USUNNEWYORK1033, Wikileaks). In May 2009, the Indian government ended

Sen’s tenure, and sent as his replacement Hardeep Singh Puri, whose appointment pleased

the U. S. Government. In a meeting on May 1 with Political Counselor Ted Osius in New

Delhi, Malhotra indicated that he wanted to increase U. S. –India engagement “to a higher


93

degree of convergence” (May 1, 2009, 09NEWDELHI877, Wikileaks). Head of the India-U. S.

Forum of Parliamentarians, Ramesh Chandran put it plainly, “Noting Puri’s Moscow-

educated, UN predecessor Nirupam Sen’s proclivity to cling to a leftist non-aligned

mentality, Chandran favorably compared Puri whom he contended has a much more

modern and 21st century way of thinking,” in other words, much more prone to the U. S.

narrative of world affairs.

Pressure from Washington and from sections of the Indian political and commercial elite

upon the MEA and the Left had the desired result: the Left is weakened inside the

parliament, and the MEA has largely been sequestered to the U. S. narrative. In Dhume’s

essay, he asks two questions that have been largely answered by the events detailed above:

“Will New Delhi back tougher sanctions, and possibly military action, against Iran should

the Islamic Republic refuse to abandon its rogue nuclear program? Will it publicly stand by

Israel, a stalwart friend and close defense partner?” The answer to both questions should be

yes, but events are not so easy to define. Despite the house-cleaning in the MEA, there are

few who would allow the U. S. interests to trump common sense, international law and

morality. Iran, unlike India, is a member of the NPT; it is not clear at all that its nuclear

program should be categorized as rogue (India and Israel both have nuclear programs and

both are outside the treaty obligations of the NPT). Israel’s asymmetric warfare against the

Palestinians, and its own increasing isolation among the nations of the world for its wars

and occupation make it hard for India to “publicly stand” with Israel in the same way as the

U. S. does so (it is worth pointing out that Israel’s politicians are not above humiliating U. S.

politicians, with no retribution – Netanyahu did this to Joe Biden during his March 2011 trip

to Israel, and to Obama during Netanyahu’s May visit to the United States). Despite the

craven wish to adopt the U. S. narrative, the behavior of the U. S. and Israel make it very

hard for India to go along their grain.

It is much easier to align India’s own foreign policy ambitions to those of the BRICS project,

which has the ear of the majority of countries in the UN General Assembly and has the

respect of many. Unwilling to be antagonistic to states like Iran, or to the revisionist current

in MENA that emerge out of the Arab Spring, the BRICS favor a less militaristic view of the

world than the U. S. and Israel, and NATO. There will always be quid pro quo deals in the

world of international relations, but these will not necessary be premised upon

subordination or of the creation of cliques to bully those who refuse to be cowered. The

Indian political class, and scribes like Dhume (who is at the right-wing American Enterprise

Institute) might wish that India become the new Israel; but the interests of the planet (and

of India) lean in a different direction, toward the strengthening of a multipolar world that is

defined less by conflict and more by cooperation. That is a more modern and 21st century

way of thinking.


94

At the Crossroads: The Future of India-Iran Relations

Dr. Anjali Sahay

Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania, USA

Currently working in a tenured position as

Assistant Professor of International

Relations and Political Science at Gannon

University, Erie, Pennsylvania, USA since

2008 and has been appointed as Program

Director of the International Studies

Program (undergraduate) as well as

Director of the Model UN Program.

Prior to her current work she was appointed as Visiting Assistant Professor of

International Relations at East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA from

2006 - 2008. She received her doctoral degree in International Studies from Old

Dominion University, Virginia, USA. Additionally, she received her bachelors and

Masters degree in History from Delhi University, New Delhi, India. Her recent

publications include her book titled: Indian Diaspora in the United States: Brain Drain or

Gain? in 2009. She also published an article titled: The Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas

Pipeline: Implications and Challenges for Regional Security in Strategic Analysis, 2010

published by Routledge.


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At the Crossroads: The Future of India-Iran Relations

Introduction:

Much has been written about the strategic relations between India and Iran in the

twenty first century. Yet this relationship is not as predictable today as it has been in the

past. The nuclear, economic, diplomatic, trade and other ties that these two countries

share can in no way be an indication to its future. This article explores the current

problems and hurdles in the Indo-Iranian relations to predict the future course of the

relations between them. First and most important, the role of the United States as a factor

in this relationship will be explored. Both India and Iran have an important place in US

foreign policy-making, although dissimilar in US foreign policy towards each of these

countries. Second, Iran‘s nuclear ambitions and India‘s continued support for this will be

critical in any future relations shared by these two countries. Third, India‘s growing

population and its ever growing energy requirements as the demand country and Iran as

the energy (natural gas and oil) supplier country will be critical in any discussion on the

future of this relationship. And last, the diplomatic chord between the two countries

needs to resonate together to continue the goodwill that the two countries have shared

over the decades. At the crossroads, in which direction are the two countries headed?

The United States in the Middle

The ‗I‘ factor in US foreign policy looms pretty large. Not only is this a reference

to US national interests in its foreign policy but also countries such as Iraq, Iran, and now

India. United States is a very big factor in the relationship between India and Iran. This

is triangular relationship where one is affected when the other two interact. The three

dyadic relationships being, (a) India – United States; (b) United States – Iran, and (c) Iran

– India. Of these three, it‘s the last one that concerns the US the most.

On the Indian side, New Delhi‘s relationship and ties to the United States restrains

it from embracing Iran in all of its range of connections. Yet India and Iran are important

trading partners and ―in the last few years, India‘s policy toward the Middle East has

often been viewed through the prism of Indian—Iranian relations.‖1

Two other ‗key factors‘ behind India‘s interest in maintaining a positive relationship with

Iran, are ―its energy needs and its desire to play well with others in the region, especially

at times when India‘s relationship with Pakistan (which Iran also shares a border with) is

increasingly contentious.‖2 As the Ministry of External Affairs in India notes:

“Political engagement with Iran, while of great importance, may not be sufficient to

ensure that our interests are protected. Economic engagement with Iran is also necessary

and would help us in promoting our energy security, connectivity and opening of new

markets, and to underpin our political objectives.”

―Several commentators have written recently about the strengthening of relations

between India and Iran. Despite negative overtures over the Iranian national interests,

India and Iran relationship harps on shared geopolitical interests and the security issues

that are centered on the conflict in Afghanistan. ― Since the American announcement of

rounding up the Afghan mission by 2014, India is working overtime with Iran to ensure

that its interests post US withdrawal from Afghanistan remain secured therein with the

crucial help of Iran. Iran has a justifiable interest in Afghanistan being its neighbor. It

has been a great supporter of Northern Alliance. India also supports the Northern

Alliance heavily and relies on it as panache for implementing its agenda in

Afghanistan.‖3

The intersection of Iran‘s controversial nuclear program, the West‘s persistent

efforts to slow it and India‘s interests in maintaining economic ties with Iran have made

for complicated relationships between the three.‖4 Politically India supports the sanctions

on Iran, but remains a firm supporter or states‘ rights and Iran‘s right to develop peaceful

nuclear energy. While India continues its balancing act with both United States and Iran,

it remains to be seen how long India will support Iran against United States‘ wishes.

―Developments in relations between New Delhi and Tehran, however, may expose limits

in the U.S.-India partnership as the standoff between the U.S. and Iran continues.‖5 In

the long run, if India had to choose one strategic relationship, would it be the United

States as the world leader and global player or Iran, which is increasingly seen as the key

to India‘s future in energy security. Much will depend on how India perceives its own

role as a global player in twenty first century.


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Nuclear Ambitions:

India and Iran as part of the ‗have-nots‘ club are two of the most nuclear

ambitious countries today. Not only do they pose proliferation problems in their

respective regions but also huge security threats for the world with non-state actors such

as terrorist organizations looming large in these regions. The United States however

views these two countries as completely different insofar as the treatment each of these

countries gets from the world and the United States. While there is continued tensions

between Iran and the US over Iran‘s nuclear program, United States recognizes and even

rewards India for its nuclear ambitions. As US officials have put it, India today falls into

the ‗trusted‘ category of countries which can be allowed to handle nuclear weapons on a

strategic scale, which means that the transfer of nuclear-weapons facilitating technology

can be allowed with some degree of confidence and comfort. Among others, the US

National Security Adviser, Mr. Stephen Hadley, has been quoted as saying that India ―has

a good record, as a practical matter, in terms of proliferation to third countries. They have

been a very responsible party.‖6 The US – India Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2006,

although taking three years to come to fruition, confirms United States commitment to

help India in its nuclear program.

While it is clear that the United States and the West oppose Iran‘s insistence on

continuing to enrich uranium to low levels despite three UN Security Council resolutions

ordering it to desist, India has publicly supported Iran‘s right to peaceful nuclear

technology. Many Indian diplomats have openly expressed their opinion supporting

Iran‘s right to pursue a nuclear enrichment program. However recently, Iranian

leadership has expressed disappointment over India‘s decision to vote in favor of a recent

resolution by the IAEA regarding Tehran‘s nuclear program. India now maintains (since

2010) that the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs are dissimilar and that India‘s non-

proliferation record is free from blemishes. Iran–India relations remain hostage to Indian

diplomatic chivalry as the former seeks not to lose Iranian friendship while supporting

the Western acts of cornering Iran. India voted in 2005 for taking the issue of Iran‘s

enrichment program to the UN Security Council and in 2010, India voted against Iran yet

again and supported the IAEA resolutions cornering Iran on nuclear issue.


98

Although India is trying to resolve the controversy over Iran‘s nuclear program

through dialogue with other partners such as South Arabia, India continues to vacillate

over its government‘s opposition to any sanctions that would negatively affect the Iranian

people and its desire to not support Iran‘s violations of IAEA rules.

Trade and Energy Security:

India, as one of the largest growing economies in the world has diversified its

trade with many countries. Its exports to the United States remain at second position

after China at 12.59% of all exports and 7.16% of all imports.7 However, its trade with

Iran is seen as crucial to India‘s energy security. India, while playing the double game,

has benefited across the board tremendously on the trade with Iran. In 2011 trade with

Iran has soared up to plus US $14 billion. A huge part of this trade is spread over Iranian

hydrocarbon exports to India.

The year 2010 notes an increase in India-Iran economic and commercial ties

which has been buoyed by Indian import of Iranian crude oil. India imported about 22

million tons of crude oil valued at about $ 10 billion in 2009-10, which makes it the third

largest market for Iranian crude. India-Iran trade in 2009-10 was US$ 13.4 billion (Indian

exports US$ 1.9 billion and imports US$ 11.5 billion). India‘s exports to Iran include

petroleum products, rice, machinery & instruments, manufactures of metals, primary and

semi finished iron & steel, drugs, pharmaceuticals & fine chemicals, processed minerals,

manmade yarn & fabrics, tea, organic/inorganic/agro chemicals, rubber manufactured

products, etc. Figure 1 below depicts current trends in India-Iran bilateral trade from

2005 – 2010.8


99

As noted by the Department of Energy in the United States, India is still

dependent on coal, oil, and gas to meet its energy needs. Nuclear energy constitutes less

than 5% of its energy requirements.

India‘s large and growing energy demand and Iran‘s pool of energy resources

make the two nations natural economic partners. India‘s search for energy security in a

rather volatile energy market makes Iran, with the world‘s fourth-largest reserve of oil

and second-largest reserves of natural gas, highly attractive. It is the energy relationship

between India and Iran that remains at the heart of a long-term partnership between the

two countries, even as Indo-Iranian relations have significantly diversified across various

sectors in recent years. It is in this context that the building of a natural gas pipeline

between India and Iran through Pakistan had assumed great importance. Popularly

known as the IPI Peace pipeline, various options, such as offshore and overland routes,

have been under consideration for quite some time now. However, the proposal has been

stuck because of differences between India and Iran on pricing and on methods to supply

the gas and in February 2010 news report it has been proposed that, ―China replace India

in the proposed IPI gas pipeline project as New Delhi has been dithering over the deal.‖9

In addition to the viability of India remaining in this project, the United States has been

vehemently opposed to the IPI gas pipeline project.


100

Although energy security is vital to India‘s long term growth, Iran is not vital to

India in supplying oil. For all the hype, Iran is responsible merely for about 8% of Indian

oil imports. Amid the growing global isolation of Iran, sectors of the Indian government

have suggested that India‘s participation in the gas pipeline deal might not give any

strategic advantage to India. Again it remains to be seen whether India will pursue

strategic trade relations with Iran, or diversify its oil and gas imports from other countries

such as Russia if it sees Iran as an unreliable trading partner.

Leadership and Domestic Politics:

India-Iran relations have gone from strength to strength ever since the then Indian

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao took fresh initiatives on Iran and further underscored

the significance of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Sharing

cultural and historical ties, these two mammoth civilizations span centuries in their

meaningful interactions. The table below gives us a quick chronology of the deepening

ties that the two countries have shared since India‘s independence in 1947. What is

notable is the frequency and depth of the relations since the turn of the century. Most

recent diplomatic exchanges have enhanced their cooperation in economic, energy,

political and security arenas. ― The most recent and important one being the high-level

visit by President Ahmadinjad to New Delhi in April 2008 and External Affairs Minister

Pranab Mukherjee‘s visit to Tehran in November 2008. During these visit, several

documents were signed to strengthen and cement existing ties.‖10

India –Iran Key Developments11

Until 1947

The two countries shared a border till 1947 and share several common

features in their language, culture and traditions

15 March 1950

Independent India and Iran established diplomatic links

February/March 1956

The Shah visited India

September 1959

Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru visited Iran

April 1974

P M Smt. Indira Gandhi visited Iran followed by Morarji Desai in 1977

February 1978

Shah visited India


101

1979

Iranian Revolution introducing a new phase of engagement between India

and Iran marked by exchange of high level visits

September 1993

Indian Prime Minister Shri Narasimha Rao visits Iran

April 1995

Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visits India

October 1996

Indian Vice President Shri K. R. Narayanan visits Iran

2001

Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee visits Iran

2003

return visit by President Mohammad Khatami of Iran and also the Chief Guest at the Republic Day function

29 April 2008

The Iranian President Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited India

16-17 November 2009

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki led a high-level delegation to

India

2-3 February 2010

The Foreign Secretary of India, Smt. Nirupama Rao visited Tehran

15-18 May 2010

External Affairs Minister Shri S.M. Krishna visited Tehran to attend the 14th

G-15 Summit.

8-9 November 2010

Minister of State for Human Resource Development Dr. D. Purandeswari

visited Tehran to attend the 9th Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)

Ministerial meeting

7-8 March 2011

Shri Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser visited Tehran for

discussion with his counterpart Dr. Saeed Jalili, Secretary, Supreme National Security Council

13-14 March 2011

Shri Jayant Prasad, Special Secretary (PD) visited Tehran. He met Deputy

Foreign Minister for Education and Director General, Institute for Political &

International Studies (IPIS), Dr. Mostafa Dolatyar.

26-27 March 2011

Shri Gulam Nabi Azad, Hon‘ble Union Minister of Health & Family Welfare

visited Iran to represent India at the Second World Nowruz Festival held in

Tehran

The visit by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the present Indian Prime Minister in April

2001 as also President Khatami‘s visit to India in January 2003 signal the good health of

bilateral relations and underline the promise to work consistently towards consolidation

of friendship between the two countries. ―In January 2003, then Iranian president

Mohammed Khatami visited New Delhi as a chief guest at India‘s Republic Day parade.

During his visit, important energy deals were signed and a strategic partnership was

established between both countries. However, just over three years later, India has twice

voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The second of


102

these votes, which had the support of nearly all the IAEA board, recommended that Iran‘s

nuclear program be referred to the UN Security Council for violating international

obligations.‖12

This shift in the Indian policy not only deepened the cracks in the Indo-

Iranian relationship but also drew a sharp criticism amongst India‘s Communists and

other Leftist parties who accused India of dancing to US tunes. David Mulford, the U.S.

ambassador to India at the time, also publicly noted that if India voted against referring

Iran to the UN, the nuclear deal with the United States would not materialize. Since the

election of Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran, India has avoided any sharp

critique of his government and has urged the international community to handle Iran

nuclear program with diplomacy rather than confrontation.

At the Crossroads:

The future of India-Iran relations is critically dependent on the changing

dynamics of Indian relations with the US and is own positioning in the international

community. Over the years India-Iran relations were perceived as something inspired by

mutual interests such as energy, economy and trade, strategic interests vis-à-vis

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and historical ties. The future holds two obvious directions in

this relationship. Either India will give in to the U.S. obsession with Iran during the last

few years, where it has been asked to prove its loyalty to the United States by lining up

behind Washington at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the question

of Iran‘s nuclear program. Or it will maintain its own independent foreign policy and

pursue its strategic trade and energy relations with Iran. Of the two, the latter seems to be

more probable direction based on the following observations.

There is growing evidence of a deepening of Iran-China relations and India‘s own

marginalization in Iranian politics. Where Beijing‘s economic engagement with Iran is

growing, India‘s presence is shrinking, as firms such as Reliance Industries have,

partially under Western pressure, withdrawn from Iran, and others have shelved their

plans to make investments. The IPI gas pipeline project has for the most part been

shelved or China might be replacing India in the project. Even if it does not the

unreliability of Iran as a trading partner leaves it as a pipedream. With respect to imports


103

in oil, Iran accounts for only 8% of all oil imports. India seeks better relations with the

United States than it does with Iran and wants a US endorsement on a permanent member

seat at the UN Security Council. Although India respects Iran‘s sovereign right to a

peaceful nuclear program and maintains that sanctions will hurt Iranian civilians, it has

voted twice against Iran at the IAEA. All these do indicate a growing drift in the Indo-

Iranian relations.

In a changing world with ever-changing alliances and interests, it remains to be

seen whether India and Iran will resume their strategic relations in the future. At the

crossroads, maybe India can pick a third direction and balance its relations with both

United States and Iran in a sophisticated manner.

------------------------------------------------

1http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Pant.pdf

2 http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1539453.ece

3 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=24905&Cat=2&dt=1/10/2011

4http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations

5 http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations

6http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2006/03/13/stories/2006031300260800.htm

7All data compiled from http://www.iptu.co.uk/content/india_economy.asp#6

8Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

9 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_china-may-replace-india-in-ipi-gas-pipeline-

project-report_1344669

10http://www.idsa.in/event/india-iranrelations_meenasinghroy_051208

11 Information compiled from http://meaindia.nic.in/meaxpsite/foreignrelation/iran.pdf

12http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam92.pdf

http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Pant.pdf

http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1539453.ece

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=24905&Cat=2&dt=1/10/2011

http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations

http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations

http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2006/03/13/stories/2006031300260800.htm

http://www.iptu.co.uk/content/india_economy.asp#6

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_china-may-replace-india-in-ipi-gas-pipeline-project-report_1344669

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_china-may-replace-india-in-ipi-gas-pipeline-project-report_1344669

http://www.idsa.in/event/india-iranrelations_meenasinghroy_051208

http://meaindia.nic.in/meaxpsite/foreignrelation/iran.pdf

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam92.pdf


104

India and Iran: Can SCO

serve as the common

platform?

Dr Uddipan Mukherjee

BPPIMT (Kolkata, India).

Dr Uddipan Mukherjee is a

strategic analyst for ITS

(Landshut, Germany and

Gais, Italy). He is an Assistant Professor at BPPIMT (Kolkata, India).


105

Abstract :

SCO seems a potent multilateral framework which could be put to effective implementation by

both India and Iran so as to settle their bilateral hick-ups. However, the geopolitical calculus is

not easily integrable. This paper explores the potholes in the path to camaraderie, if any, between

India and Iran.

____________________

Introduction

When Shinichi Nishimiya said: "I do not think so"[1], he was sternly expressing the

common agenda propped up by White House so as to vilify the ‗Axis of Evil‘. And

Tehran was included as a coordinate in that axis in 2002 by none other than George

Bush.

Foreign policy is shaped mostly by national interest. But not always is national interest

the only defining parameter. Supporting a cause or buttressing an agenda may have a

different raison d‘etre: for instance, value and ethics. For Japan and countries

strategically inclined to the US, the former rationale mostly holds true. These nations

simply do not want to lose out in the race of acquiring a top spot in the global strategic

architecture; whether that has a direct bearing on their national interest or not.

Inasmuch as Japan is concerned, a passively obdurate stance as expressed through

Nishimiya, its deputy foreign minister, bespeaks the desire of a permanent seat in the

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). And in the process, Japan does not feel

necessary to align with ‗rising‘ stars like India. This was clearly indicative when Tokyo

disallowed India to use Japanese banks in providing a clearing house mechanism to pay

for Iranian oil imports.

When asked whether Japan would allow its banks to process the payments, Nishimaya

said his country would follow global sanctions against Iran, which stands accused by

western powers of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme [2]. The message from the

Japanese was loud and clear. They are going to follow a discernible foreign policy

regime insofar as Iran or for that matter; any other ‗pariah‘ state is concerned. For Japan,

the foreign policy priorities are aptly set.

Germany, another contender for a permanent seat at the UNSC, has also exhibited a

lucid and pro-active foreign policy stance vis-à-vis Iran. Berlin is in fact, a part of the 5+1

group (5 permanent UNSC members and Germany) in deliberations with Iran with

regard to the latter‘s allegedly ‗clandestine‘ nuclear programme. An economically

resilient Germany (amidst the Euro Crisis) has catapulted itself to the league of global

crises solvers: and that‘s no mean achievement.


106

What is India’s policy?

India, on the other hand, has time and again, projected itself as a peace-loving, law-

abiding, ethically correct player in the world rostrum. However, as two noted analysts

of Indian foreign policy have opined in a recent paper that ―a subversive pragmatic

vision is increasingly challenging some of the key foundations of India‘s traditional

nationalist and left-of-center foreign policy, diluting the consensus that shaped the

policy, and raising new possibilities especially for India‘s relations with the United

States and global nuclear arms control.‖ [3] A most recent instance which further

declaims India‘s sixty-year old Nehruvian legacy in foreign policy was its abstention

from voting in the contentious UNSC resolution against Libya. [4]

In simultaneity, if India‘s actions of referring Iran to the UNSC in February 2006 is

placed [5], then it might engender slight confusion. However, as corroborated according

to the taxonomy put forward by Ollapally & Rajagopalan, it needs to be understood that

the dominant centrist foreign policy perspective prevalent in India is the nationalist

school. And they, that is the nationalists, according to the authors, ―prefer foreign policy

cooperation on a case-by-case basis‖ [6]

Thus, India may go ahead with a civilian nuclear deal with Washington and in spite of

such a move (which may force analysts to ponder about New Delhi‘s new found

strategic proximity with the US and accordingly let them surmise about a fresh

alignment in Asia); India has the capabilities to bludgeon the argumentative

theoreticians and empiricists by refraining to meddle in Libya (by vociferously talking

about ‗sovereignty‘) and keeping mum about positioning its troops in the Global War on

Terror (GWOT) in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Furthermore, India‘s overtures toward Myanmar and at times its ‗soft‘ approach toward

Iran bothers the Americans but as of yet have not botched up the Indo-US strategic

partnership; which, does not merely hinge on India‘s diplomatic position with respect to

the ‗pariah‘ states, viz. Iran, North Korea, Myanmar or for that matter Libya.

India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has asserted, though somewhat imperfectly,

―diplomacy has changed and today it is about economics, trade and petroleum‖. [7]

America keeps the trade factor in mind in any sensitive dealing with India. In fact, post-

Pokhran-II sanctions got diluted to some extent because of this. Naturally, India too

keeps in mind the trade and petroleum aspects when nurturing an already fragile

relationship with Iran. New Delhi‘s major challenge in a post-1991 ‗American‘ world is

to balance an apparently antediluvian foreign policy framework with the increasingly

pragmatic demand for a ‗paradigm‘ shift in policy, both from within as well as without.


107

The SCO-Iran dynamics

At the just concluded 11th Summit meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation

(SCO) at Astana, Kazakhstan, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, predictably,

roared thus: ―Which one of our countries (has played a role) in the black era of slavery,

or in the destruction of hundreds of millions of human beings?‖ [8] In the same venue,

he called for a post-Soviet security alliance against America-backed West. He has made

it a habit, in tune with Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, to lambast the US (specific

leaders in particular) at important platforms. His personal traits notwithstanding,

domestic pressures and internal discontent could be assumed to provide the necessary

fillip for such explosive demagogy.

In 2009 at Yekaterinberg, Russia, the Iranian President had echoed similar sentiments,

with special emphasis on a single currency for intra-SCO trade and an exclusive ‗energy

club‘. [9] If STRATFOR‘s analysis is to be relied upon, ―Iran spent the better part of the

past decade using its nuclear program (or the threat of one) to try to get a primo spot at

the world's geopolitical table.‖ In case of Iran, STRATFOR further contends:

‖ Highly publicize your progress on a nuclear program, stir in a reputation for irrational

behavior — you've got a brilliant strategy for getting concessions from major

powers.‖[10]

Nevertheless, it is clear that Iran strongly aspires to be SCO‘s 7th full member: a desire

the cocooned SCO doesn‘t really seem to relish. Iran currently holds an observer status

in the group and had applied for full membership in a request filed on March 24, 2008.

From a geopolitical perspective though, a bonding between Iran and the SCO could only

benefit the regional cartel. Iran is world‘s 2nd largest natural gas producer and if clubbed

with SCO, would enhance the energy capabilities of the group and hence uplift its

negotiating powers with the rest of the world.

Moreover, an expansion of SCO is overdue and with Iran expressing an earnest desire, it

seems logical that the glue must be searched. More so, since the primary (unstated)

objective of SCO was to erect a security alliance vis-à-vis NATO, which was apparently

stated through the aim of addressing religious extremism and border security in Central

Asia.

In the post-1979 era, after the Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution in Iran, and furthermore

with the ascension of Ahmadi-Nejad, it seems somewhat certain that it would be

difficult for Iran to forge a ‗workable‘ relationship with USA, at least in the foreseeable

future. And in the unholy backdrop created by Washington‘s maneuvers to the extent of

browbeating a defiant Iran, the bilateral equation of the two countries does not appear to

be analytically solvable. In such a scenario, Iran as a full member could only provide


108

fillip to SCO since the latter‘s primary motive was to construct a multipolar world,

challenging US dominance.

Additionally, since Russia may act as a viable mediator in the 5+1 party talks with Iran

with regard to its allegedly ‗clandestine‘ nuclear programme [11], inclusion of Iran in

SCO can only provide negotiating leverage to Russia and by group extension, to China.

Such a measure, due to its natural fallout, would also strengthen the strategic objectives

of these two countries in the UNSC.

Hence, it was no wonder that the Deputy Head of Tajikistan's Center for Strategic

Research, Seifollah Safarov underlined the positive outcomes of Iran's membership in

the SCO. To quote him: "Changing Iran's membership status in the Shanghai

Organization will provide further grounds for cooperation among the organization's

members in confronting security threats that have targeted the region.‖[12]

According to Wan Chengcai, a Chinese expert on Russian foreign policy, SCO is

constantly growing in stature which is understood from its appeal to countries like

Mongolia, Iran, India, Pakistan and of late, Afghanistan. [13]

Despite the apparently favourable bonding parameters, all is not well between Iran and

SCO. Russia and China do not want a rhetorically violent Iran with its ‗pariah‘ tag. That

is why Russia has ‗urged‘ Ahmadi-Nejad to conform to the IAEA guidelines and get on

with the 5+1 party talks. It is veritably clear that the SCO doesn‘t prefer to openly

antagonize the US, at least at the present juncture. The elasticity of the SCO is being

challenged.

India’s equation with the SCO

The new-brand of pragmatists, as defined by Ollapally and Rajagopalan, emphasize

exclusively on national interest rather than global justice and ethics. However, they are

still on the fringe, at least as far as devising foreign policy is concerned. The so-called

‗nationalists‘, who are at the helm of foreign policy making, prefer moderating events on

a case-by-case basis [14] without basically compromising the overarching tenet of the

Nehruvian dogma.

While putting into effect Indian foreign policy, there has been an incessant conflict between idealism and realism, with the former winning on the majority of occasions. An obvious criticism has been that India led too much focus on idealism at the cost of national interest. It is also a fact that power projection has never been the adopted methodology for New Delhi. Dasgupta and Cohen are correct to assert that ‗strategic restraint‘ has been India‘s doctrine [15] and they conclude with the expected: ―Linear projections of current trends do not predict India abandoning its strategic restraint; for that, it will require a major and unforeseeable disruption at home or abroad.‖[16]


109

On bilateral terms, India‘s relations with Russia have been more than cordial. Even after the fall of communism, and post 9/11 dominance of America in the world order, Indo-Russia ties, especially in defence has leapfrogged. With Central Asia, (after 1991) India has remained tentative; mainly because of the ‗territorial disconnect‘ due to the presence of Pakistan and also because the former being a land-locked region. Nevertheless, as and when opportunities existed, like during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89) and after 9/11, India has skillfully projected its ‗soft power‘ in Afghanistan and tried to use the ‗land of Abdali‘ as the launching pad for Central Asia. However, New Delhi has been diffident to even accept the making of an Air Base at Ayni near Dushanbe, Tajikistan [17]. However, as far as joining SCO is concerned, India never expressed its desire earnestly. Like Iran, India is an SCO-observer, but has never been overly ambitious to claim a permanent membership, unlike Iran. In the Summit-meetings of SCO, India‘s Prime Minister had been hardly visible, except that in Yekaterinberg in 2009. Finally, after sufficient dilly-dallying, India at last expressed its intent of being a permanent member in 2010. [18] India-Iran Ties: A Critical Look There is no gainsaying that Indo-US bonhomie has been on the rise since the era of Bush-

junior. Whatever speculations existed in the scholarly discourses regarding the Obama

administration, have probably been assuaged to a significant degree by the recent

overtures of the American President.

In this context, it is pertinent to explore India‘s relationships with the so-called pariah

states like Iran since India‘s foreign policy regime vis-a-vis these countries may define

the future trajectory of its bilateral relationship with USA. It is not at all unlikely for one

to discover on a frequent basis anything similar to the following:

―While India and the United States have embarked on a campaign to strengthen their

bilateral relations, as symbolized by the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal, it

appears as though New Delhi has similarly begun to pursue a more robust relationship

with another major power: Iran. The two states have recently expanded cooperation in a

number of key areas, including counterterrorism, regional stability, and energy security.

What are the implications of this ―New Delhi-Tehran Axis‖ for the United States, and

how should Washington respond to growing ties between India and Iran?‖[19]

Now, it is quite natural for foreign analysts, especially Americans, to believe in the

above manner as far as India-Iran relations are concerned. For instance, in a CRS report

prepared for the Congress in August 2006, Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman echo


110

somewhat similar concerns.[20] Nevertheless, they sound positive as far as future Indo-

US bilateral ties matter.

However, the doubts regarding the ―New Delhi-Tehran Axis‖ may be somewhat

unfounded as Indo-Iran ties can hardly be interpreted as ‗strategic‘. In fact, that is what

Indian analyst Harsh V Pant argues in his recent paper [21].

He says that ―ever since India and the United States began to transform their ties by

changing the global nuclear order to accommodate India with the 2005 framework for

the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, Iran has become a litmus test that India has

occasionally been asked to pass to satisfy U.S. policymakers‖.

He further states: ―Nascent Indian-Iranian ties have been categorized by some analysts

as an ‗‗axis,‘‘ a ‗‗strategic partnership,‘‘ or even an ‗‗alliance,‘‘ which some in the U.S.

strategic community have suggested could have a potentially damaging impact on U.S.

interests in Southwest Asia and the Middle East‖.

Such dialectics notwithstanding, it remains a reality that the US views India‘s moves vis-

à-vis Iran quite cautiously and on the other hand, India keeps the Iran card up its sleeve

in a post-US Afghanistan scenario where its ‗childhood enemy‘ Pakistan may become a

potent player. A Sunni-radicalized Afghanistan may not be a lively picture for either a

secular India or a Shi-ite Iran.

India has some valid interests in Iran and chief among those is energy. Moreover,

Pakistan has signed a pipeline deal with Tehran. Also India‘s Asian competitor China is

venturing into Iran to grab the energy field left open after the Western companies

vacated the area.

Already in 2005, India had signed a long term (25 year), $22 billion agreement with Iran

for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, India also initiated another

energy project; and that too with much fanfare. It was the construction of a 1,700 mile, $7

billion pipeline to carry natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan. However both these

projects have been stalled.[22]

The Indian government says it would pay for the gas only after it will be received at the

Pakistan-India border. Also, New Delhi does not agree to Tehran‘s demand to revise the

gas prices every three years.

On the other hand, the LNG project is yet to proceed as the proposed plant would need

American components, which might violate the US-Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).

Plainly speaking, behind the garb of commercial losses that India is citing, it is the

American-factor which is telling its tale. And this is no mere presumption, which may be

corroborated from the following facts.


111

Of late, India has voted in favour of the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) resolutions against Iran on grounds that a nuclear Iran needs to comply with such directives as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, New Delhi also stresses that it favors dialogue and diplomacy as means of resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis; in tune with its Nehruvian legacy. On the issue of energy relations, India proclaims that Iran is an important partner as

well as a significant source for hydrocarbon resources. Iran is also one of India‘s largest

suppliers of crude oil, and India in turn is a major supplier of refined petroleum

products for Iran. While the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution does

not directly affect India‘s oil trade with Iran, the US monitoring surely must have had an

impact. Moreover, the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, along with its caveat ―The Hyde

Act‖, categorically mentions that India ought to toe the US line with regard to pariah

states like Iran.

However, such a weird Indian behavior with respect to Iran may not be blamed fully on

US hegemony in a post Cold War era. It probably has some specific diplomatic basis

pertaining to Indo-Iran ties.

It will be worthwhile to reminisce that Iran was not supportive of the Indian nuclear

tests in 1998. Moreover, it also backed the UNSC Resolution asking India and Pakistan

to cap their nuclear capabilities by signing the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Iran has repeatedly urged India for accepting the NPT regime.

Furthermore, with the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Iran warned that the pact

had endangered the NPT and would trigger new ‗crises‘ for the international

community.

Although Iran has claimed that such an assertion was basically directed at Israel (which

is also not an NPT signatory), the implications of that move could be seen in the recent

diplomatic counter-attacks launched by India as far as Iran‘s nuclear programme is

concerned.

Furthermore, Tehran has been critical of the Indian government's way of handling

protests in Kashmir. This made India to issue a demarche, expressing reservations

against Iranian interference in India‘s domestic issues.

In these circumstances, it may appear prudent for India to follow the recommendation

of the Harvard-Kennedy School. They postulate that ―India should distinguish sharply

between Iran‘s nuclear position and other areas of cooperation. That is, while India

needs to continue cooperation with Iran in pursuit of its own national interests, New

Delhi should make it clear that it will continue to strongly support American efforts to

bring Iran into legal compliance over its nuclear program‖.


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Nonetheless, though such a recommendation appears to be fine on paper, it might be

diplomatically unfeasible for India to pursue a dualistic foreign policy vis-à-vis the

pariah states. For instance, standing by the US in order to sternly monitor Iran‘s nuclear

programme would make it quite difficult to go ahead with the gas deals; since such a

move would evoke apprehensions in both the US as well as in the Iranian camps.

Actually, India‘s position regarding the contentious issue of the Iranian nuclear

programme is logical. India believes that since Iran is an NPT signatory, it needs to

conform to NPT guidelines and clarify the doubts, if any, of the IAEA. India never

denies the fact that Iran has the right to pursue nuclear energy program for civilian

purposes. However, the existence of a stubborn political dispensation in Tehran will not

make matters smooth in this regard and Indo-Iran mutual camaraderie would be on

tenterhooks. In addition to that, American and Israeli misgivings regarding Iran‘s

motive will not create any salubrious diplomatic ambience for India either.

In sum, India needs to perform the ‗balancing act‘ to a level of precision. For that, it shall

be natural for New Delhi to maintain the status quo regarding the gas deals with

Tehran, at least in the foreseeable future. That is, New Delhi is most likely to

procrastinate the gas deals by citing commercial problems and likely terrorist

infringements. However, it is unexpected that it would outrightly scrap the deals

altogether. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that USA or no USA, Pakistan and its

homegrown terrorist network shall remain a perennial problem in the path of

fructification of the gas deals.

Anyhow, future sanctions against Iran would entangle India, at least tangentially

because India is at present a non-permanent member of the UNSC. And if it seeks for a

permanent position in the influential body, it needs to quickly solve the foreign policy

conundrum toward the pariah states.

The Oil Angle

A fresh spin was provided to the already turbulent India-Iran bilateral relations when

India‘s Central Bank issued a directive on 27 December 2010, regarding the payment

mechanism concerning trade with Iran. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) announced that:

―In view of the difficulties being experienced by importers and exporters in payments to

and receipts from Iran, the extant provisions have been reviewed and it has been

decided that all eligible current account transactions including trade transactions with

Iran should be settled in any permitted currency outside the Asian Clearing Union

(ACU) mechanism until further notice.‖[23]

ACU is the simplest form of payment arrangements whereby the participants settle

payments for intra-regional transactions with the central banks as their representatives.


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As an initial reaction, Iran refused to sell crude oil to the Indian companies if the

payment was done outside the ACU route. Nevertheless, Iran later agreed to ensure

shipments at least for January 2011.

In fact, to make matters worse, on 07 January 2011, the State Bank of India (SBI) refused

to issue fresh Letters of Credit (LCs) to public and private sector refiners. This particular

stance by major public sector Indian banks forced the private sector firm Reliance to

abandon its plans of investing in an oil refinery in Iran.

Though there is no direct evidence that American pressure is operating on Indian

companies, however, there are indications that it is quite likely that firms like Reliance

were coerced to withdraw from Iran if they wanted to keep their prospects alive in the

Shale Gas sector in USA.

To partially corroborate such a hypothesis; according to WikiLeaks, the officials of the

US government had warned executives of France's Total and Italy's Eni SPA that

investments in Iran ―could possibly impact their Shale gas investments in the US‖.

Moreover, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that US officials had made a similar

warning to the Indian companies.

Presently, India will try to ensure that political underpinnings do not jeopardize its own

economic interests. Hence, the RBI directive may be interpreted as a temporary muscle-

flexing so as to serve two purposes simultaneously: one, an indication of allegiance to

US interests and two, censuring Iran for Ayatollah's Kashmir comments made in

November, 2010.

To resolve the ongoing impasse, India and Iran are looking at various options and

payment through other currencies like the euro, yen and dirham since settlement

through US dollars has become difficult due to sanctions imposed against Iran.

Unfortunately, as discussed above, Japan has turned down India‘s proposal of routing

the payments through Japanese banks.

SCO as the common platform: An examination

Richard Weitz posits a viable reason ―why the SCO has not designated new members

since its founding, or new formal observers since Iran‘s accession in 2005, is that, despite

numerous attempts, the SCO governments have been unable to define the legal basis for

such expansion.‖ [24] Moreover, SCO for obvious reasons is keen to pull in the energy-

rich Turkmenistan into its fold, whereas the latter has always exhibited diplomatic

coyness. Ashgabat is part of the Central Asian geopolitical framework, both in terms of

topography as well as history. So, if the SCO has to expand, its first preference must be

Turkmenistan and not Iran. India, on the other hand, might not be a distant proposition,


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till Russian persuasion exists. But the obvious impediment to include India would come

from three quarters.

First, India itself, as New Delhi‘s strategic restraint doctrine would hardly enable it to

free the holy gyves of Nehruvian dogma and openly adhere to Realpolitik. Furthermore,

it might not be prudent for India to displease the US by joining a security framework

which is basically antithetical to US interests.

Second is the China-Pakistan factor. SCO has made it almost clear that if India has to be

co-opted, then Pakistan would come as part of the ‗package‘. China insists on such a

configuration as it would not allow the rising Asian power to challenge its authority in

the SCO; in conjunction with Russia. Moscow, on the other hand, would like a scenario

in which India joins the SCO without Pakistan. But, it has to be kept in consideration

that any extension of SCO to integrate South Asia naturally must go through

Afghanistan and Pakistan. India may not appreciate such a formation, but it is to a large

extent, inevitable.

And third, the SCO members must be wary of the inherent discord between India and

Pakistan. Interestingly, at the 11th Summit of SCO in the second week of June 2011,

India‘s External Affairs Minister had to face verbal bombardments from the Kazakh

president regarding the Kashmir dispute. [25] These are ominous signs for India. India

has nonetheless fought bilateral issues with its ‗childhood enemy‘ Pakistan in

multilateral forums; viz. in South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation

(SAARC), but that is a platform where India reigns supreme, both politically as well as

economically. However, in an ‗expanded‘ SCO, India might not get such an advantage

and to what extent the present Indian political dispensation is ready to take up

challenges of such genre is perhaps not difficult to fathom.

On the other hand, a RAND study [26] alleges that Iran continues to provide ‗measured‘

support to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and also maintains close relations with the

same Afghan central government that is battling Taliban forces. The research rules out

any abatement in confrontation between Iran and the US. In such an atmosphere, it

seems highly unlikely that the US would welcome any moves by the SCO to

accommodate Iran.

Interestingly, Iran and India have shown similar modus operandi in Afghanistan. Both

the countries provided support, (military aid by Iran and logistical help by India), to the

Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, as a counterweight to the Taliban. Moreover, both

the countries have pumped in major investment projects in infrastructure and education

for Kabul. It won‘t be preposterous to assume that these two states would harbour


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roughly similar mode of operation in Central Asia through the SCO. In that sense, SCO

provides a decent platform for interaction to both these nations.

However, there are other impediments. Inclusion of Iran, India and Pakistan into SCO

can further complicate matters for the regional block. Iran suspects that Pakistan abets

the Sunni-insurgent group Jundallah, which wreaks havoc at times within Iran. And the

plethora of bilateral matters plaguing India-Pakistan ties may come to the fore in an

extended SCO. Such factors can easily dissuade the region-specific issues of Central Asia

and make SCO an unnecessary bickering ground for ‗outsiders‘, as far as the original

members are concerned. At the same time, however, an enlargement of SCO can

broaden its scope and widen its reach in the global geopolitical chessboard; with a

resurgent Russia and intimidating China gaining most of the fruits.

Conclusion

Since independence, India has hardly deviated from its non-committal position in

aligning with power blocks. Perhaps that is the perpetual backdrop which adumbrates

India‘s incumbent Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‘s articulation: ―India is too large a

country to be boxed into any alliance‖. [27] Iran, on the other hand, presently is a

Mullah-dominated theocracy, the rudders of which are with a vociferous President.

Till Iran is under the umbrella of Shi-ite Mulla-ism and India holds the banner of its age-

old foreign policy paradigm, a ‗strategic bonhomie‘ between the two nations is an

unlikely outcome; prevalent may be in the writings of academicians and in the domain

of wishful thinking.

Even if India and Iran share the same dais through the SCO, it is a definite possibility

that India would keep a safe distance from Tehran and not antagonize White house to

any significant degree. Both nations want to be a part of the SCO for reasons specific to

each. But a bilateral strategic partnership is not seen to be evolving out of the SCO.

Before that occurs however, Iran‘s asymmetric military doctrine (allegations of aiding

Hezbollah and other Shi-ite insurgent groups in Middle East) and India-Pakistan

outstanding bilateral problems would continue to ensnare the SCO-veterans to allow a

smooth direct entry for these two nations.

References and Notes

1: Japan banks unlikely to settle India-Iran oil payments, Reuters Jun 7, 2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-07/news/29629839_1_iranian-oil-imports-india-iran-japan-banks 2: ibid 3: Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, ―The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy‖, The Washington Quarterly, 34:2, pp. 145 - 162

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-07/news/29629839_1_iranian-oil-imports-india-iran-japan-banks

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-07/news/29629839_1_iranian-oil-imports-india-iran-japan-banks


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4: Uddipan Mukherjee, ―India ducks UNSC bouncer‖, Uday India, 09 April 2011, http://www.udayindia.org/content_09april2011/spotlight.html 5: John Cherian, ―Indian Betrayal‖, Frontline, Volume 23 - Issue 03, Feb. 11 - 24, 2006, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2303/stories/20060224005912800.htm 6: see 3 7: VP Dutt, "India's Foreign Policy", National Book Trust, India, p 238, ISBN 978-81-237-4955-6, p 238 8: ―Iran’s president calls for post-Soviet security alliance to unite in alliance against West”, Associated Press, Wednesday, June 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/irans-president-calls-for-post-soviet-security-alliance-to-unite-in-alliance-against-west/2011/06/15/AGr0wnVH_story.html 9: Richard Weitz, ―The SCO‘s Iran Problem‖, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 11, No. 15, 19 Aug 2009 10: ―Iran's World: Breaking Out of the Mountain Fortress‖, STRATFOR 11: ―Russia urges Iran to cooperate with UN on nuclear program”, Reuters, June 15, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/russia-urges-iran-to-cooperate-with-un-on-nuclear-program-1.367908 12: “Tajik Analyst Stresses Importance of Iran's Membership in SCO‖, FARS News Agency, June 14, 2011, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9003240965 13: ―SCO demonstrates growing vitality, appeal, says Chinese expert “, Xinhua, June 15, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-6/16/c_13933870.htm 14: see 3 (p 3) 15: Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, ―Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?‖ The Washington Quarterly , 34:2, pp. 163 – 177 (p 3) 16: p 13, ibid 17: Uddipan Mukherjee, ―Presidential Visit to Tajikistan: India among the Pamirs?‖, Artice No. 2972, 22 September 2009, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2972 18: ―India's agenda at the SCO‖, The Hindu, Opinion-Editorials, June 17, 2011, http://www.hindu.com/2011/06/17/stories/2011061755141000.htm 19: ―India-Iranian Relations: Key Security Implications”, Harvard-Kennedy School, March 26, 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/India%20Iran%20Brief-%20Final%204.pdf 20: ―India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests‖, CRS report for the Congress, August 02, 2006, K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf 21: Harsh V Pant, ―India‘s Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing‖, The Washington Quarterly, 34:1, pp. 61-74 22: India and Iran are in discussions for the setting up of a number of projects such as the IPI gas pipeline project, a long term annual supply of 5 million tons of LNG, development of the Farsi oil and gas blocks, South Pars gas field and LNG project, Chabahar container terminal project and Chabahar-Faraj-Bam railway project, etc. Both countries have set up joint ventures such as the Irano-Hind Shipping Company, the Madras Fertilizer Company and the Chennai Refinery. Indian companies such as TATA, ESSAR, OVL, etc have a presence in Iran. The State Bank of India (SBI) has a representative office in Tehran. India is also a member of the International North-South Corridor project. The two countries are in the process of finalizing a Bilateral Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement (BIPPA) and a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044479 23: RBI Notification, ACU Mechanism – Indo-Iran Trade, http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6172&Mode=0 24: see 9 25: Iftikhar Gilani, ―At SCO summit Krishna faces Kashmir jigsaw‖, June 17, 2011, The Kashmir Monitor, http://kashmirmonitor.org/06172011-ND-at-sco-summit-krishna-faces-kashmir-jigsaw-7190.aspx

http://www.udayindia.org/content_09april2011/spotlight.html

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2303/stories/20060224005912800.htm

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/irans-president-calls-for-post-soviet-security-alliance-to-unite-in-alliance-against-west/2011/06/15/AGr0wnVH_story.html



http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/russia-urges-iran-to-cooperate-with-un-on-nuclear-program-1.367908

http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/russia-urges-iran-to-cooperate-with-un-on-nuclear-program-1.367908

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9003240965

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-6/16/c_13933870.htm

http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2972


http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/India%20Iran%20Brief-%20Final%204.pdf

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf

http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044479

http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6172&Mode=0

http://kashmirmonitor.org/06172011-ND-at-sco-summit-krishna-faces-kashmir-jigsaw-7190.aspx

http://kashmirmonitor.org/06172011-ND-at-sco-summit-krishna-faces-kashmir-jigsaw-7190.aspx


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26: Alireza Nader and Joya Laha, ―Iran‘s Balancing Act in Afghanistan‖, RAND, May 31, 2011, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/may/31/rand-irans-balancing-act-afghanistan 27: see 3 Note : India-Iran economic and commercial ties have traditionally been buoyed by Indian import of Iranian crude oil. India imported about 22 million tons of crude oil valued at about $ 10 billion in 2009-10, which makes it the third largest market for Iranian crude. India-Iran trade in 2009-10 was US$ 13.4 billion (Indian exports US$ 1.9 billion and imports US$ 11.5 billion). India‘s exports to Iran include petroleum products, rice, machinery & instruments, manufactures of metals, primary and semi finished iron & steel, drugs/pharmaceuticals & fine chemicals, processed minerals, manmade yarn & fabrics, tea, organic/inorganic/agro chemicals, rubber manufactured products, etc. http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044479

http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/may/31/rand-irans-balancing-act-afghanistan

http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044479


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India-Iran Relations : Testing Time?

Dr. Farah Naaz

Jamia Millia Islamia

New Delhi

Farah Naaz is an Assitant Professor in the

Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia

Islamia, New Delhi. She did her MA from Aligarh

Muslim University,Aligarh and Ph.D from

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She

worked with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi from 1998 to 2002, as an

Associate Fellow.

She has written extensively on West Asia, particularly India’s relations with the countries of

the region. She has published one book (West Asia and India: Changing Perspectives), two

monographs (Israel Palestinian Relations and India- Israel Cooperation) and twelve articles.


119

The interaction between India and Iran were present since time immemorial. Both the countries

were well disposed towards each other even before India’s independence. In the post World

War II period, the changed international system compelled them to formulate their foreign

policies according to their national interests. During the cold war years, Iran aligned with the

west while India did not join any power bloc. India’s policy of non alignment and Iran’s policy of

alignment with the west determined their relations to a great extent. As there was very little in

common between them at that time their relations during the 1950s were confined to non-

political spheres like trade and commerce. Over the decades these relations improved but in

1980s during Khomeini’s time, there was a downward trend in India- Iran relations due to Iran’s

inclination towards Islamic causes and its preoccupation in the Iran Iraq war. 1

The end of the cold war heralded a new era characterised by the unipolar world. Iran was facing

an adversarial situation in the region as the Arab Gulf states consolidated their ties with the US.

Iran also lost its strategic leverage. India too was troubled by the regional rivalries and

international pressures and was set to expand its economic and political relations with the

countries of the world including the Islamic world. During the 1990s, security threat perceptions

and common interests of India and Iran brought them closer. The decade saw an upswing in

their relations and their cooperation expanded in all possible areas. The main areas where the

relations were expanded were energy partnership, bringing stability in Afghanistan and building

linkages to Central Asia for economic interaction. 2

The last decade, however, put their relations to different tests. India’s close relations with the

US, Iran’s nuclear program and its confrontational stance with the US presented different

problems for the Indian policy makers. India’s stand on Iranian nuclear issue had the potential to

strain their relations with Iran and also slowed down negotiations on the pipeline project. The

pressures on India posed considerable problems where it was left with very less option but to

balance its relations between US and Iran.

Nuclear issue

Iran has been under serious observation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as

well as UN Security Council over its nuclear energy program during most of the last decade.

Although Iran’s nuclear program began in 1960s under the Shah, it could not make much

progress and was abandoned. In the mid 1990s, it made new efforts but raised suspicion among

the world community about its clandestine nuclear program. To avoid possible international

sanctions, in 2003, it agreed “to suspend work on uranium enrichment and allow a stepped-up

level of inspection by the International Atomic Energy Association.”3 In August 2005,

Ahmadinejad, a hardline conservative became the President of Iran. In the same month, Iran

decided “to restart uranium conversion against the commitment to suspend all enrichment

related activities under the Paris Agreement of 14 November2004 with the EU-3 (France

Germany and Britain)”. In January 2006, Iran made it clear to the IAEA that it would resume

nuclear research which led to the current confrontation between Iran and the US. 4


120

India had always regarded Iran as an important regional player and had never supported the US

policy of isolating Iran. At the same time it did not want another nuclear weapons power in the

region. Consequently, it aligned itself with international efforts to bring Iran’s controversial

nuclear program into conformity with Non Proliferation Treaty and IAEA provisions. However,

India consistently supported Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology but it also insisted that it

must satisfy the international community of its peaceful program. Because of its association

with the Non Aligned Movement, close relations with the US under world’s changing power

equation and Indo-US nuclear deal, the Indian policy makers faced difficulties and were also

criticised by the leftist and opposition parties in the country who have been critical of Indo US

civil nuclear cooperation. They argued that “India’s closer relations with the United states

should not come at the expense of positive ties with Iran.” 5

Given the US hostility with Iran, India had been asked to prove its loyalty to the US. In this case,

Iran became a litmus test that India had been asked to pass to satisfy US policy makers.

Consequently, India was expected to support the US at the IAEA on the question of Iran’s

nuclear program.6 In September 2005, the IAEA board approved a resolution that found Iran in

non compliance with its international obligations. It set up Iran for future referral to the UN

Security Council. “The resolution seeks to refer Iran to the Security Council at an unspecified

date…” 7 India voted in favour of the resolution. Only 22 of the 35 board nations voted for the

US backed European Union motion. India’s External Affairs Ministry spokeman defended the

vote by saying, “Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the Security Council

and has agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This is in

line with our position and therefore, we have extended our support to it.”8 It justified it being in

its national interests saying that “its vote in favour of the EU resolution on Iran’s nuclear

program in the IAEA addressed some of the major concerns and did not reflect any change in its

stand on Iran”. 9 Tehran however did not show any signs of downgrading its relations with India

and interpreted India’s vote as an example of “realpolitik and national interests transcending

long-standing traditions and principles.” 10

In Jan 2006, the US ambassador to India linked progress on proposed US India civil nuclear

cooperation with India’s upcoming vote indicating, that India must side with the US otherwise

US-India initiative would fail in the congress. “On February 4, 2006, India again voted with the

majority in referring Iran to the Security Council”, but emphasised that it was not detracting

from its close ties with Iran.11 Some independent observers felt that India’s IAEA votes

demonstrated its strategic choice to strengthen partnership with US even at the cost of

friendship with Iran.12

In March 2006, the United Nations (UN) Security Council discussed Iran’s nuclear issue and

called for a report by the IAEA to check if Iran complied with the NPT. In its view, IAEA was

unable to provide assurances. It gave a strong message to Iran to suspend enrichment and

reprocessing and find a diplomatic solution. Finally, in July 2006 it adopted resolution 1696

demanding, “Iran suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research

and development”, failing which it would face economic and diplomatic sanctions.13


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Following this Iran has been subjected to four rounds of UN Security Council sanctions in

relations to the nuclear programme. The first round was in December 2006 when Security

Council adopted resolution 1737. “This called on states to block Iran’s import and export of

sensitive nuclear material and equipment and to freeze the financial assets of those involved in

Iran’s nuclear activities.” In the second round, in March 2007, Security Council passed resolution

1747 to toughen sanctions and banned all of Iran’s arms exports, “froze the assets and restricted

the travel of people it deemed involved in the nuclear program”. In the third round, by

resolution 1803 in March 2008, more restrictions were imposed. In the fourth round of

sanctions, Resolution 1929 was passed in June 2010. The Council approved fresh sanctions

against Iran. “The measures prohibit Iran from buying heavy weapons such as attack helicopters

and missiles. They also toughen rules on financial transaction with Iranian banks and increased

the number of Iranian individuals and companies that are targeted with asset freezes and travel

bans.”14

In compliance with the UN Security council Resolutions, India imposed a ban on the direct or

indirect export of all items that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear fuel enrichment related,

reprocessing or heavy water related activities as well as development of nuclear weapons

delivery systems. India made changes in country’s foreign trade policy (2004-2009) to conform

to the UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran.15

In November 2009, India again voted against Iran (the third time in four years) in a resolution

passed by IAEA censuring Iran over its nuclear program and demanding that it stop uranium

enrichment. The resolution demanded that “Iran immediately suspend construction of its newly

revealed uranium enrichment plant at Qom – a site kept secret until recently”.16

India however, was strongly against the additional fourth round of sanctions on Iran and

considered them as counterproductive.17 Opposing the sanctions India regarded them as “extra

territorial” and which would lead to restrictions on the third countries to investing in Iran’s

energy sector. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said “India has always supported dialogue

and avoidance of confrontation” and that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues

to provide the best framework for addressing technical issues related to the Iranian nuclear

programme. Indicating that it would have an adverse impact on India’s energy security she said,

“We are justifiably concerned that the extra-territorial nature of certain unilateral sanctions

recently imposed by individual countries, with their restrictions on investment by third countries

in Iran’s energy sector, can have a direct and adverse impact on Indian companies and more

importantly, on our energy security and our attempts to meet the development needs of our

people.”18 By this India not only made it clear to the US that sanctions would directly affect

Indian companies and India’s energy security but also showed its intentions to retune its

relations with Iran.19 To further underline its inclination to strengthen its relations with Iran,

India hosted the Iranian Minister of economic affairs and finance just prior to the arrival of

James Jones, US National Security Adviser in July 2010. The Iranian official came with 30

member business delegation and signed agreements on energy, transportation and counter

terrorism cooperation. Both sides also discussed building of an undersea natural gas pipeline.20


122

Few months later again, India repeated its support for Iran. Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at a

conference at Indian Council of World Affairs said that “India supports Iran’s right to the

peaceful use of nuclear energy….India’s stand on the Iran nuclear issue has been consistent. We

support the right of all states, including Iran, to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with

their international obligations.” She also added that India desired to have an enhanced

partnership with Iran. 21

India has constantly maintained peaceful resolution to the conflict. Its refusal to support any

threats of violence against Iran could be seen in its opposition to impose additional sanctions on

Iran. Even though India’s stand at the IAEA is seen to have been influenced by the US, it

maintained its stand on nuclear issue keeping in view its cordial relations with Iran as well as its

national interests.

Energy:

The pressures generated by the US and India’s stand against Iran on IAEA votes affected the

India Iran energy cooperation particularly the pipeline project. It should not be ignored that

India’s energy requirement is growing with years and consequently its imports are expected to

grow as consumption rises. With plenty of coal reserves and modest oil and gas reserves, India’s

policy makers are trying to meet their ever growing energy demands. “India’s energy

consumption will rise to 27.1 quadrillion BTUs by 2025, up from 12.7 in 2000.”22 India’s demand

for natural gas would also increase despite the increase in the share of nuclear power. As cited,

“nuclear power at this point accounts for some 2.6 percent of India’s electricity; the most

ambitious plan now under discussion would increase this share to some 12 percent by 2020.

Much of the estimated 8 percent annual increase in demand will therefore have to come from

oil and gas, with gas demand growing more rapidly than any other part of India’s energy

market.” 23

Iran which holds the largest gas reserves after Russia and is a large reservoir of oil, is one of

India’s leading supplier. While it is keen to find export markets, India has also emerged as one of

the world’s biggest consumers and importers of petroleum products. Energy cooperation has

thus inevitably emerged as the top agenda between India and Iran. In May 2003, both the

countries agreed that Tehran will supply India with 5 million tonnes of liquefied gas annually for

twenty five years. They also agreed to provide for “exchange of experience in the field of

compressed natural gas production and reconstruction of refineries.” There were also new

opportunities for Indian companies to invest in Iranian energy.” 24 In June 2005, the two

countries signed a 25 year deal, under which “India would import five million tons of liquefied

natural gas (LNG) from Iran every year. In connection with this deal, Iran granted development

rights to India in two Iranian oil fields that are potentially capable of generating 60,000 barrels

per day in production.”25 In another deal Iran gave development rights to a block in the North

Pars gas field to India. Both the countries have also pledged to explore joint investment projects

in petrochemicals.26


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Currently, both India and Iran are engaged in negotiating an Iranian project for an IPI (Iran-

Pakistan-India) gas pipeline to India. Initially, Pakistan was opposed to the idea of allowing the

gas pipeline to India using Pakistani territory. Later, however, it agreed and even assured the

Iranians of its full support to the pipeline going across its territory to India.27 But there are

many obstacles. For India, running a pipeline through Pakistan has its own security

considerations. The Indian policy makers fear that Pakistan might cut off the supplies during any

military or diplomatic tension. There is also the risk of threat of terrorists damaging the pipeline.

Another issue that needs to be resolved is agreeing on a gas price acceptable to all the three

countries. Indian observers also wonder if India’s IAEA votes and its new partnership with the US

will undermine its energy relations with Iran including the prospects of the pipeline.28

India has been staying away from the talks since 2008 and withdrew from the project in

September 2009. Many reasons have been attributed to this stalled talks like, India’s concerns

over safe delivery of gas from Iran to India through Pakistan was not addressed by the Pakistan

government. The post 26/11 diplomatic chill too cast a shadow over the talks. Also, New Delhi

wanted Iran to be responsible for safe passage of natural gas through Pakistan.29 Other factors

that disrupted the talks included anti- Iranian pressure from the US, price dispute with Pakistan

and the possibility of less expensive domestic alternatives.30

As a result, Iran and Pakistan proceeded and “signed a deal to begin construction without India’s

participation.” Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki also informed of China’s keenness

to join the Pakistan Iran project.31 They however remained open for the future participation of

India. Iranian Foreign Minister was quoted as saying, “we have a bilateral arrangement with

Pakistan and the door is open for our Indian friends. That (IPI) will be a reality …” 32

India finally gave indications of reviving the talks on pipeline. The Additional Secretary of India

Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Sudhir Bhatnagar told his Iranian counterparts that India

was willing to rejoin the IPI pipeline project. Bhatnagar discussed mutual oil and natural gas

concerns and also showed India’s interest in boosting oil and gas ties with Iran.33 Another

positive development in this direction was, in a commerce secretary level dialogue, both the

sides agreed to increase trade relations. Among important decisions were examining the

feasibility of cross border trade in petroleum products.34 The pipeline project may have stalled

for some time but both India and Iran seem to be keen on completion of the project.

Conclusions

India -Iran relations were built up over the years. India’s vote against Iran at the IAEA has to an

extent negatively affected these relations. US Iran conflict has posed considerable problems for

the Indian policy makers. It is not in the interest of either US or Iran to confront each other. The

US must be conscious of the fact that most of “the world energy passes through the straits of

Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.” It is unlikely that both the US and Iran would like to escalate

military tension in the region. Also, Iran should not loose the sympathies of China and Russia


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who have often resisted the attempts of US, Britain and France to adopt tougher measures

against Iran. 35

To the Indian policy makers, Iran’s nuclear program would not be favourable to peace in the

region. It is because of this that India did not support Iran’s pursuits of nuclear weapons but

supported peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, India is fully conscious of its relations with

Iran and keeps consolidated them. The negotiations on pipeline are also showing signs of picking

up again. India should not let it get affected by its relations with US and must strengthen its

energy partnership with Iran. Iran too does not want to downgrade its relations with India. If

India cannot disregard the US, it must also protect its close ties with Iran which are based on

common interests in energy, Afghanistan and Central Asia and balance the two. For that it is

important to diffuse the confrontational stance between US and Iran. Imposing sanctions is not

the solution to the problem. Peaceful dialogue is the need of the hour and is in everybody’s

interest for which India should also persist.

_________________________

End Notes

1 Farah Naaz, West Asia and India: Changing Perspectives,(New Delhi, Shipra Publications, 2005),pp. 36-

43. 2.Ibid., pp. 52-63. 3.Iran‘s Nuclear Program, New York Times, June 17, 2011. Available at,

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html. 4. Rajesh Kumar Mishra, Iran‘s Nuclear Defiance, in S. D. Muni, ed., IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2007,

(New Delhi, Academic Foundation, 2008), p. 255; See also, ibid. 5. K. Alan Kronstadt, and Kenneth Katzman, India Iran Relations and US Interests, CRS(Congressional

Research Service), Report for Congress, Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RS22486, August 2,

2006, p. 3, (available at, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/70294.pdf); Biswaranjan Mohanty,

International Relations: New Horizons and Changing Equations, (New Delhi, Atlantic publishers, 2010),

pp. 293-294. 6Harsh V. Pant, India‘s Relations with Iran : Much Ado about Nothing, The Washington Quarterly, vol.34,

no. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 61-62. 7. John Cherian, India and Iran: The Indian Volte-face, Frontline, vol. 22, no. 21, October 8-21, 2005.

Available at, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2221/stories/20051021007113000.htm. 8.Statement by External Affairs Ministry spokesman, in, Amit Baruah, India‘s IAEA Vote was decided in

Advance, The Hindu, online edition of India‘s National Newspaper, Sept 26, 2005. 9.India votes to refer Iran to UN Security Council, September 25, 2005,

http://specials.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/25iran.htm.

10. John Cherian, op. cit. 11.K. Alan Kronstadt, and Kenneth Katzman, op. cit. 12. Ibid., pp 3-4. 13. UN Sanctions against Iran, BBC News Middle East, 26 July 2010,

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10768146, See also, Mishra, op. cit. , pp. 255-256. 14.BBC News Middle East, 26 July 2010, ibid. 15. India Imposes ban on nuclear trade with Iran, The Hindu, February 22, 2007, accessed at

www.hindu.com/2007/02/22/stories/2007022206300100htm, See also, India bans Iran nuclear related

trade, Al Arabia news, 17 May 2011, english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/02/143895.html?PHPSESSID=

http://specials.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/25iran.htm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10768146

http://www.hindu.com/2007/02/22/stories/2007022206300100htm


125

16.India votes against Iran in IAEA resolution, The Hindu, November, 27, 2009. 17. ―Sanctions on Iran Counterproductive, says India‖, The Hindu, March 9, 2010. Accessed at

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article223516.ece. 18. Iran sanctions may hit our energy security: India, The Hindu, July 5, 2010 ,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article501500.ece, See also, Indrani Bagchi, India to US: Iran

curbs will hurt us, Times of India, July 6, 2010. 19. As reported in The Hindu, (July 5, 2010) earlier in April, the U.S. Government Accountability Office

(GAO) urged the countries to sever business ties with Iran in view of its nuclear dispute with the nation.

For that it identified several Indian oil and gas companies that were doing business with Iran, including

Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Oil India Limited (OIL), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), ONGC

Videsh and Petronet LNG. 20. David J. Karl, ―James Jones Comes A-Calling but Storm Clouds Gather‖,

http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/07/22/james-jones-comes-a-calling-but-storm-clouds-gather/, p.3. 21. India supports Iran‘s peaceful use of n-power: Nirupama Rao, Times of India, November 21, 2010. 22.Pramit Mitra and Vibhuti Hate, ―India Iran relations : Changing the Tone‖, South Asia Monitor

(Washington D.C.), no. 92, March 8, 2006, p. 2. (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam92.pdf. 23.

Ibid. 24. Donald L. Berlin, India Iran Relations : A Deepening Entente, Special Assessment, October 2004, pp 4-

5. http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/India-IranRelationsBerlin.pdf 25. H. P. Chattopadhyay and Surya Narain Yadav, India and the Contemporary World, (New Delhi, Global

Vision publishing house, 2010), p. 575 26. Ibid. 27. Farah Naaz, op. cit., pp 55-56. 28.Pramit Mitra and Vibhuti Hate, op. cit., pp 2-3. 29.It wants to pay for the gas only when it reaches Pak- India border. But Iran and Pakistan are in favour of

a trilateral mechanism that provides for all the three countries being involved in ensuring safe

transportation of gas. India will have to pay for the gas even if supply is disrupted in Pakistan, if the

mechanism is accepted. 30.

India Worried over Iran Pipeline, Deccan Herald, march 18, 2010,

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/58830/india-worried-over-iran-pipeline.html ; Iran Tracker,

http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/india-iran-foreign-relations. The US pressure affected the

cooperation between India and Iran. Like India‘s Reliance Industries Ltd. halted gasoline exports to

Iran to avoid possible restriction on sales in the United States,( which has increased pressure on

companies selling gasoline to Iran). On its part Iran reduced its share of a project that was signed with

India in December 2009 due to concerns over slow progress and US pressure on India. 31. Iran Tracker, ibid. 32. Door open for India to join IPI gas pipeline: Mottaki,

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/Door+open+for+india+to+join+IPI+gas+pipeline+Mottaki/1/71286.h

tml, (IPI – Iran-Pakistan-India) ; See also ―Iran Pakistan India Gas Pipeline Deal Still Open‖,

http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2009/11/19/iran-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-deal-still-open-3071.html 33. India and Iran Boost Energy Ties, Jan 3, 2011, http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-

Wars/2011/01/03/India-and-Iran-boost-energy-ties/UPI-41221294076253/. 34. India Pak to explore preferential trade deal, Times of India, April 29, 2011,

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-29/india/29487104_1_trade-talks-bilateral-trade-

commerce-secretary-level . 35. Mishra, op. Cit., p 260.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article223516.ece

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article501500.ece

http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/07/22/james-jones-comes-a-calling-but-storm-clouds-gather/

http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/India-IranRelationsBerlin.pdf

http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/india-iran-foreign-relations

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/Door+open+for+india+to+join+IPI+gas+pipeline+Mottaki/1/71286.html

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/Door+open+for+india+to+join+IPI+gas+pipeline+Mottaki/1/71286.html

http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2009/11/19/iran-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-deal-still-open-3071.html

http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2011/01/03/India-and-Iran-boost-energy-ties/UPI-41221294076253/

http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2011/01/03/India-and-Iran-boost-energy-ties/UPI-41221294076253/

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-29/india/29487104_1_trade-talks-bilateral-trade-commerce-secretary-level

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-29/india/29487104_1_trade-talks-bilateral-trade-commerce-secretary-level


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The Impact of Islamic Revolution on the Indian Muslim Clerics

Dr.Mahnaz Zahirinejad

I am an Iranian national and was recently awarded Ph.D

from Centre for West Asian Studies (Middle East Studies),

International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New

Delhi, India. I have conducted many research works on the

Middle Eastern and Asian foreign and energy policies for

more than 6 years . The area of my research concentrates on

critical study of the Middle Eastern Countries particularly Iran and Iraq foreign and energy policies in

relations with the East and South Asian Countries.

Publications : 1. Foreign Policy of Iraq: The Role of Iraq’s Geopolitics in Relations with Neighbors, Tehran

(2005). book

2. Ayatollah Khomeini’s Relation with the Islamic Movements in the World, Islamic Revolution Documents Center

(2003) book

3. The Role of Political Structure in Iran’s Energy Decision Making Policy”, Journal of Third World Studies

(JTWS), spring 2012.

4"Iran’s Energy Policy and India’s International Orientation”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,

Volume XXXIV. No 1, 2010.

5. "Energy Factor in China-Iran Relations", Journal of Peace Studies, Volum17, Issue 2- 3, April-September.2010.

6. “Culture and Identity of Iranian Kurds”, International Journal of National Studies, Tehran, (2000).

7.“Iran’s Energy Policy towards China and India”, International Conference: IAEE Istanbul conference 18th

to 20th

June, Turkey (2008).

8. “Iran and India Foreign Policies under Complex Interdependence”, International Seminar Centre for West Asian

Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, 4th

to 5th

December, India (2009).

9.“Iran’s Foreign Policy towards New Afghanistan”, Indian Social Science Congress, New Delhi, 27th

to 30th

December (2007).

10.“Foreign Policies of Iran and India in the New World”, International Seminar at Gauhati University, 4th

to 6th

February, India (2010).

11.“Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy Impacts on Energy”, Indian Social Science Congress, New Delhi, 17th to 22

th December(2008).


127

The Impact of Islamic Revolution on the Indian Muslim Clerics

Following the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini,

the leader of the revolution, did his best to renovate Iran’s diplomacy in

accordance with Islamic principles and values. He announced, “… the foreign

policy of the Islamic Republic will give priority to freedom, independence, as well

as interests of Islam and Muslims and this principle will not be sacrificed for

anything else.” 1 Based on this opinion he emphasized “…the Islamic Republic of

Iran will do what it can to restore the Islamic identity of Muslims all through the

world. We declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain a haven for

Muslims of the world for good and ever, and Iran, as an invincible fortress, will

supply the needs of soldiers of Islam and make them familiar with ideological and

educational bases of Islam as well as principles and values of fighting infidels

and unreligious governments.” 2

Therefore, the Islamic government of Iran, based on the Ayatollah

Khomeini’s opinion in supporting Muslims in the world, paid special attention to

Shiite groups and took steps to help co-religious groups in other countries such

as India.

The Islamic revolution had a strong emotion on the Indian Muslims due to

the fact that India's Muslim population is the world's third largest and also the

world's largest Muslim-minority population. The influence came directly by the

Iranian missions to India and also through Pakistan. The reason is that the

revolution gave Pakistani Shiite a new visibility and a renewed impetus for

identity assertion. The Iranian regime helped Pakistan's Shiite to organize Shiite

groups.3 The new situation of the Pakistani Shiites affected Indian Shiites.

Although, the impact of Islamic revolution was on the Shiite groups more

than Sunni in Pakistan, it covered both Sunni and Shiite in India. As a matter of

fact Iran and India have a historical relation which is a result of Moguls Empire in

India. This is an important factor in contemporary relation between Indian

Muslims and the Iranian and can be seen as a reason behind the relation

between Iranian Shiites and Indian Sunnis.

For instance the Islamic revolution, as a theocratic regime, ruled by the

religious leaders, called Mullahs, started to give the new role to clerics. As a

result the Shiite and Sunni clergies re-emerged as an assertive group in India.4

As the result, the Sunni clerics in India became active in politics, social life

and also became leaders of Muslims groups. It might not be the only reason for

increasing the role of clerics leaders in India but it helped the clerics and gave

them more legitimacy to be on power. It can be seen that, Muslim clerics


128

negotiate on behalf of the Muslim community with some senior leaders of political

parties.5 In addition, almost all organizations that claim to represent the Indian

Muslims are mullah-led.6 Meanwhile, even a majority of non-religious issues of

the Muslim community are being addressed mostly by clerics. 7

Therefore, leading Muslim groups and organizations by clerics has

become common on Sunni and Shiaa groups. For instance, Syed Jalaluddin

Umri, president of Jammat-e-Islami Hind, Sayyid Hyderali Shihab Thangal , the

Kerala State president of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and current

supreme leader of the E. K. Sunni of Kerala, Maulana Syed Mahmood Madni

General Secretary Jamiat Ulama-I Hind and, ...

This is important to know that Khana-e-Farhang (Iranian cultural centres)

offered scholarships to Indian Muslims who are interested in pursuing religious

studies in Qom and other religious centres in Iran. Moreover, Iranian government

has supported Indian clerics financially.8

Moreover, the result of relation between Iranian government and Indian

Muslims clerics in the first decade after Islamic revolution, Indian Muslims

followed the Iranian policies regarding many national and International issues. As

an example, religious symbolism was increasingly used to legitimize political

action, and Iranian slogans against the United States and Israel were adopted

verbatim and chanted after Friday prayers in many. In addition, due to the

influence of Iran on the Indian Muslims clerics, it can be seen that the

government of India which was ruled by the Congress party, made India the first

country to ban the book “The Satanic Verses” by Salman Rushdie. This was

following the call of some clerics particularly Ayatollah Khomeini who felt that the

book offended Islam. In addition, when the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini

died, India declared a three-day official period of mourning.

However, the pragmatic policy that was followed by the Iranian

government changed its situation among Indian Muslims. In fact promoting

relations with the Indian state, instead of Muslim groups of the country that had

been following since 1990 by the Iranian government, reduced Iranian influence

among the Indian Muslims. For instance, Iran adopted a very moderate position

after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Also in 1991, during discussions between

the leaders of the two countries, Iran agreed that Kashmir was an integral part of

India. These policies changed the Indian Muslims first view towards the Iranian

government.

However, three decades after the Islamic revolution, Iran still has the

belief that it can play with the Muslims card in its relation with India. This issue


129

could be observed at the time when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appealed to the

Muslim elite worldwide to support the "struggle" in Jammu and Kashmir, equating

the northern Indian state with the "nations" of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s speech was a week after Barak Obama visit to India.

But, it seems that, Indian Muslims have been steadily falling behind other

countrymen. The one reason is the leading Indian Muslims by the clerics. The

Indian Muslims clerics are in relations with many non- Muslims political parties

and they follow them in the politics.

However, relations between political parties and Muslim clerics in India

are more sentimental than rational. Instead of a healthy relation, one sees a

relationship based on mutual exploitation, mistrust and blackmail. On one hand,

“…political parties just want to use the Muslims for their immediate interests and

on the other hand Muslims are content to be playing the role of pawns in political

games.” 9

Therefore , the relation has not changed the Indian Muslims situation

.This is because , at the first, “…most clerics do not have adequate background

in subjects like economics, law, sociology and technology that is needed to

understand and debate today academics complex issues .In addition because of

their background, most clerics typically look at even non-religious issues from a

religious perspective.” 10 Moreover, they mainly focus on problems affecting the

socio-cultural freedom of Muslims and strongly safeguard encroachment by

communal elements in the government on the personal laws and the freedom of

Muslims as envisaged by the time-honoured and time-tested laws of the Islamic

Shari’ah. 11

It appears that, the Indian Muslims after trying all such versions, they are

now getting disillusioned with the political process itself.12 This can be seen in the

Indian Muslims leader’s policies. For instance, Ejaz Ahmed Aslam, national

secretary of the Jammat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) who is responsible for Public

Relations, fort forming a separate political organization, emphasizes that: “...the

JIH considered all the relevant dimensions related to the creation of a separate

political party but it reached the conclusion that it is not willing to relinquish the

core work that it has carried out every day without fail here in India for the past

70 years”.13

Thus, thought, Iran is trying to recover its position among Indian Muslim,

it seems that they are influenced by some internal centres and are connected to

Indian political parties. This can be the main obstacle to keeping Indian Muslim

clerics far from Iranian influence.


130

----------------------

1 Shahroud, Amir Entekhabi, ―Role of Religious Texts in Shaping the Foregin Policy of Islamic Republic of

Iran‖, June 20, 2010, Centre for Scientific Research and Middle East strategic Studies.

2 Ibid. 3Hassan , Abbas, ―Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‖, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 22, 2010 . p28.

4Ibid.P8

5 Kaleem,Kawaja , ―Who Shrunk The Muslim Intelligentsia?‖, August 17, 2008 ,

http://indianmuslims.in/who-shrunk-the-muslim-intelligentsia/

6Yoginder, Sikand, ―Indian Muslim Middle-Class Must Play A More Active Leadership Role: Asghar Ali

Engineer‖, 18 March, 2011, Newageislam.com, http://www.countercurrents.org/sikand180311.htm 7The role of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the Muslim world‖ , Hawzah net ,

http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/Magazines/MagArt.aspx?MagazineNumberID=6696&id=79427 8 The role of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the Muslim world‖ , Hawzah net ,

http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/Magazines/MagArt.aspx?MagazineNumberID=6696&id=79427 9Kaleem, Kawaja, ―Is India Really A Secular State?‖, Indian Muslims, February 1, 2009.

http://indianmuslims.in/is-india-really-a-secular-state

10 Religion and Politics , September 21, 2010. http://niro-nirosha.blogspot.com/2010_09_01_archive.html 11 The Situation of Muslims in India, http://www2.irib.ir/worldservice/englishradio/ISLAM/muslindia.htm.

12http://www.samarthbharat.com/muslim.htm

13

Shahroud, Amir Entekhabi, ―Role of Religious Texts in Shaping the Foregin Policy of Islamic Republic

of Iran‖, June 20, 2010, Centre for Scientific Research and Middle East strategic Studies.


131

India- Iran Relations:

Need for formulation of a Foreign Policy

Dr. Rushda Siddiqui

Research Fellow

Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi

Rushda Siddiqui is a Research Fellow with the

Indian Council of World Affairs. Her area of

expertise is in the field of religion-based

movements in West Asia and North Africa.

She has worked exclusively on the ‘religion based states of Israel and Iran’, and has been

writing extensively on the dynamics of change in the Gulf. A Ph.D from the Centre for West

Asian and African Studies, JNU on ‘ State and Political Islam in North Africa: Comparative

Perspectives from Algeria and Egypt (1988-1995), Rushda has also worked as an Associate

Fellow on the West Asia Desk at the National Maritime Foundation and the Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses.


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(As the world awaits for the outcome of the Jasmine Revolution that is sweeping West Asia and

North Africa, policy makers are busy with scenario building exercises about the possible state

and social formations that will emerge. Most consider the beginning of the change taking place

today, as a continuation of the revolution that toppled the stable and established government of

the Shah. This paper seeks to argue that since the time of independence, the biggest challenge

that was faced by foreign policy makers in India, apart domestic political changes has been the

dynamics of West Asia, and most importantly the dynamic of Iran. This was a challenge that

began with the creation of Israel, but peaked with the revolution of Iran. India’s inability to grasp

the magnitude of the revolution and the dynamics of change that it unleashed is responsible for

India’s apparently contradictory stands in international forums with regard to Iran India needs to

consciously identify its national interests and project its aims and objectives. Once it is able to

project a definite image about its identity, would it be able to have a foreign policy that is

proactively effective. At the outset, it will need to understand the dynamics of change within

Iran, its foreign policy objectives and the process it uses to achieve its goals.)

It is said that one of the disadvantages of a democracy is inconsistency in policy. For a country

like India, the challenge of formulating a stable foreign policy is more daunting than can be

imagined. To begin with, like any Western country, India does not have a commitment to a

specific ideological cause, like capitalism or communism. As a result, the guiding ideology for

defining foreign policy has been extremely varied for India. From being the founding member of

the non-aligned movement to adapting to the ‘Realist School’ in international relations in the

post-cold war era, India’s foreign policy has shifted priorities with time. If we look at the period

prior to WWII, Western interest in the region was limited to seeing it as a trade route between

Europe and Asia. Theorists dealing with the concept of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ would rather see

the developing dynamics as a continuity of conflict from the time Christianity shifted out of Asia

to Greece and Rome. Till the time India gained independence and was able to find her identity,

relations between the region and India had been independent of developments in the region.

One of the residual impacts of European colonialism has been the change in bi-lateral relations

between countries, not just colonizer and colony but between colony and any other country.

Analysts and policy makers largely tend to overlook the impact that European colonialism has

had on the policy making process in the former colonies. If we take the case of India alone, as

the experience of independence and partition was not pleasant for her, the ideological and

psychological impacts of the independence movement left a deep mark on the way the initial

foreign policy was shaped. From 1947 until the late 1980s, or foreign policy goals enabled us to

achieve some successes in carving out an independent international role. Regionally, India was

the predominant power because of its size, its population (the world's second-largest after

China), and its growing military strength.

Our first Prime Minister, Pt. Nehru, who gave the world the first vision of future India’s foreign

policy, was heavily influenced by the Gandhian thought of occupying a moral high ground to put

the adversary at a disadvantage, he wanted to follow a similar policy in external affairs. Since

the model brought us independence, Nehru visualized that this concept could be applied to


133

foreign policy as well. As a result, India’s foreign policy has largely been reactive rather than

proactive. As Prime Minister, Pt. Nehru achieved a domestic consensus on the definition of

Indian national interests and foreign policy goals--building a unified and integrated nation-state

based on secular, democratic principles; defending Indian territory; declaring India's non-

partisan approach internationally through nonalignment. Non alignment meant not depending

on a single or a group of countries for economic, military and political leadership.

However, India's nonaligned stance was not a viable substitute for the political and economic

role it wished to play. The biggest disadvantage with the Nehruvian model of non-intervention

and non-alignment was that it was centered around the personality of the Prime Minister. After

his death, there was no anticipation of challenges and a need design a mechanism to respond to

the challenges. Though the principal of non-alignment remains a utopian concept, its inability to

resolve international disputes did not allow it grow as a foreign policy directive. The end of the

Cold War gutted the core meaning of nonalignment, and India's economic problems in the

changed global economic, military and political scenario forced her to reassess foreign policy

objectives and goals. It led India to re-assess its relation with West Asia and redefine its anti-

Israeli policy.

I have used the background of the evolution of India’s foreign policy to point out that by not

actively studying the dynamics of global change, India found it difficult and will continue to find

it difficult to respond to the change that WANA is continually going to throw up. We will need to

learn from the changing scenarios in the same manner as our founding fathers. Mahatma

Gandhi, took up the concept of non-violence and satyagrah and re-defined it in the context of

combating colonialism. Pandit Nehru too, took the concepts of independence, non-violence and

decolonization to formulate a policy of panchsheel that continues to be the guiding principle of

the Chinese foreign policy makers. His concept of non-aligment, though difficult to follow in the

changing economic and political scenario, has given India a foundation on which its bi-lateral

relations with various countries find stability.

Iran, by far, has posed the biggest foreign policy challenge that the world has ever faced. By

having a revolution, establishing an Islamic state Iran has emerged as a sole state that like non-

state actors defy conventionalism. Iran went from being an ideal oil-rent economy that could

easily gel with the global economy to becoming a stand-alone economy. The country has huge

reserves of oil and gas, is the country with the world's fifth largest Islamic population1 and is the

only predominantly Shiite movement that has formed a state. It is a country that chose to be a

religion-based state, and established a political and administrative system that can find parallels

in the rest of the world yet can remain distinct.

When it came to dealing with Iran, the United States and Europe followed a blanket policy,

keeping their interests and needs in mind. Their interventions as a result have been systematic,

calculated and decisive. From the beginning of the 1900s itself, both Britain and Russia wanted

to divide Iran within their spheres of influence, and the British succeeded in influencing the

polity in Iran to the extent that it could potentially become a protectorate. This was largely due


134

to the potential oil resources of Iran that could be exploited. As early as the 1870s, there was a

fierce battle among the Europeans over the rights of to the Iranian oil. It was the Iranian oil that

fueled the British ships. The French, the British, the Dutch, the Russian and even the Australian

businessmen were interested in financing the oil exploration and processing of Iranian oil, as it

would result in large profits. Britain took the lead in politically and militarily dominating Iranian

polity, as Iran lay en-route to India. The American interests in the region increased with the First

World War. Once the American realized that they were not getting enough in the spoils of the

war, and the Sykes-Picot agreement, they actively started taking an interest in the

developments in Iran. Post WWII the importance of Iran as being an oil-producing country and

being strategically located south of the Soviet Union, were two factors that saw an increased US

interest in the country. The US was guided by three factors: money, Israel and the needs to have

a military foothold in the region.

Iran remained a playground for power play, till the 1978, when the revolution turned the tide

for everyone. The Shah was ousted, and the government that came into existence was made of

people who were not very known in the world. Ayatollah Khomeini was one of the many

ayatollahs who were part of the clerical order. The revolution destroyed everything that the rest

of the world was familiar with. It redefined democracy and government. Most importantly, the

national interests and priorities of the new Iran got defined. It was no longer successfully

enmeshing with the global economic order. The revolution had separated Iran from the rest of

the world. The elite that emerged was new, the leadership was different, and the systems that

were being setup were unconventional Suddenly, the world had to deal with the second largest

oil producer attempting to establish a new socio-political-economic order. Iran was no longer

content with being a nation-state, rather it consciously chose to redefine its identity in terms of

Islamic and Shiite. It was fearless and ready to take on the world on its own terms.

The brashness with which the revolutionaries took US nationals as hostages and for 444 days did

not bow down to international pressure to release them, were the first indications that the new

Iran was going to be looking at every country, every person and every detail from a new

perspective. It was no longer going to be an issue of historical, emotional, civilizational ties. In

brief, Iran started re-structuring its foreign policy framework, and aligning it with its own

national demands and needs. The clearest example of this was the relations it developed with

neighbouring Iraq and the other states in the Gulf. Soon after the revolution, the Iranian

leadership realized that it has unwittingly taken over the leadership of the section of the world

that was unhappy with the power play between the two superpowers. Most importantly, with

the success of the revolution, Iran was able to tell Muslims across the world that an alternative

model of governance and state formation was possible. Shias across the world were a section of

a larger population in various parts of the world. The revolution gave them a newer and

stronger identity, and a hope that the revolution would expand and create a new Shiite world.

If we look at statistics: Iran’s population is more than that of Iraq and all six GCC countries put

together.


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---- Though the Shias constitute less than 15% of the global Muslim population, the Shia

population of the Gulf region, which includes the 6 GCC countries, Iraq and Iran, is 63.35 % of

the region’s total population. For the first time, an Arab country, Iraq, has emerged as a Shia

ruled state. Bahrain has a Shia majority. Almost one third of Kuwait’s population is Shia. Saudi

Arabia’s Shia population is concentrated in its eastern oil producing region. The Shia populations

in other GCC countries, although small, have a disproportionately large role in the economies of

these countries. In February 2008 the Iranian Ambassador to the UAE disclosed that 4,00, 000

Iranians live in the UAE and that almost 15% of Dubai’s indigenous population is of Iranian

origin. 2

---- According to a Feb 27, 2008, article entitled ‘US efforts to scuttle Iran-UAE ties fail’ by Kimia

Sanati in Asia Times,3

UAE is Iran's top non-oil trade partner with bilateral trade reaching US$14

billion in 2008 and Iranian investment in Dubai is around $300 billion. This is despite the

territorial dispute about the Tumbs islands, between the two countries. There is no unified GCC

political stance towards Iran, with Oman having had a close relationship for decades and Qatar

playing a particularly proactive role in seeking to bring Iran and the GCC closer in more recent

years.

----Iran’s military is numerically larger than that of Iraq (still being reconstituted) and the GCC

countries put together. Arguably, its indigenous military capabilities are very likely much more

potent than of the GCC countries whose armed forces have never fought a real war.

Yet the same Iran worked overtime to curb its revolution within its own borders. Though it

could have exported the revolution and redefined the demographic geography of the Persian

Gulf region, Iran chose to limit the image it projected. The eight years of war had given it a

legitimacy and identity that were unique. Like Israel and Pakistan, post-revolutionary Iran,

became part of the group of states that are culminations of a socio-political movements, and are

not based on identities of simple geography or cultural or ethnic affinities. The basis for Iran’s

strength comes from its ownership of resources and its ability re-define its working styles for its

national priorities.

It is on the basis of the identification of its national priorities that Iran has defined its foreign

policy within the realms– projecting power and influence, containing rivals, and deterring attack

by enemies. What we see in Iran is the constant conflict between the social and the state

powers. As the functions of the state include representing the society, the state authorities have

to work overtime to balance the image and practice of the state within the state and outside the

state. The state has be Islamic, revolutionary, modern and ideal at the same time. It has to

represent itself as the alternative to both the capitalist and communist state systems, yet at the

same time it has to distinguish itself from the other concepts of the Islamic state. It has to

demonstrate its compatibility with the rest of the world, yet it has to distinguish itself from the

rest of the world. And it is in this paradox that the role of the power struggle between the

governing political forces and the clerical orders come to the fore.


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Once Iran gave up its rhetoric about exporting the Islamic revolution, its foreign and regional

policies, have been driven primarily by pragmatic national interests rather than by ideology,

rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding. The Islamic Republic has not initiated any conflict or

aggression in the region. It was neutral in the first Gulf War, it was helpful in the US action

against Afghanistan, in the initial period after US attacks on Saddam’s Iraq it cooperated with

the US in Iraq also. In the ultimate analysis, more than anything else, Iran ardently desires

international acceptance of the legitimacy of its regime, full integration into the international

economic and political order and recognition of the reality that it is the region’s preeminent

power.

The record of Iranian foreign policy since the eruption of the revolution in 1979 reveals that

policymakers have seldom disregarded the pragmatic interest of the Iranian state. Perhaps the

most striking example of dominance of pragmatic factors over ideological influences in Iran’s

foreign policy during Khomeini’s lifetime was the secret purchase of arms from “the Great

Satan” US and Israel, “the lesser Satan.”4

The process of reintegration of Iran into the

international community intensified after Khomeini. President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in

his eight years in office in effect turned on its head the doctrine of “Neither East, nor West” by

expanding Iran’s relations with both and by reaching out to the pro-Western Persian Gulf

monarchies to an unprecedented extent. With respect to the United States, he observed a strict

policy of neutrality in the first Persian Gulf War and upheld UN resolutions. He also helped in the

release of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon.5

Efforts to reintegrate Iran into the international system have reached an unprecedented height

since the presidency of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. It came as a surprise to most observers

that his first major foreign policy statement addressed the American people. In keeping with the

essentially conciliatory thrust of his foreign policy, Khatami took the initiative of pressing for

dialogue among civilizations in the United Nations. The General Assembly took up his initiative

in a resolution calling for the designation of 2001 as the year of dialogue among civilizations.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for international conferences, seminars, and other forums

and the dissemination of scholarly studies worldwide for enhancing dialogue among

civilizations.6

Of the factors impacting change in Iranian polity, there is a need to focus on three. The first is

the changing stands of Imam Khomaini, which resulted in giving the state of Iran a very flexible

kind of character. From being theocratic state, his vacillations did not allow for the creation of a

singular body that would allow for the theocratic state to come in into existence.

The second factor, is the fluctuation of the foreign policy of the US in WANA as a region. The US

foreign policy towards Iran, and its opposition towards the revolution and the ideology of the

revolution has been responsible for the changes in the stands of the various governments of the

country. They have either adopted a hostile stand, like Khomaini and Ahmednijad, or they have

sought to accommodate changes and thaw relations with the US, like Khatami and Rafsanjani.

Their standoffs between the two countries has been responsible for the siege mentality of the


137

Iranians, the regional instability of West Asia, the growth and sustenance of the non-state actors

like the Hizballah, and the fluctuating oil politics on the region.

The third variable for change is the role of the coercive apparatus, particularly of the

revolutionary guards. Their significance in the Iranian polity cannot be ignored, as they

represent the core of the value systems that the Iranian revolution stood for. Also, they

represent the strength of the revolution, and its ability to organize and defend itself. It is on the

basis of the revolutionary guards that the Iranian clerical order is able to assert its strength and

challenge or support the political system.

Iran has also managed to make itself an indispensable factor in the processes of arriving at any

solution of the Israeli Palestinian imbroglio. It has a place on the high table on all Israeli

Palestinian issues for all practical purposes through Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. Distance would

enable it to play spoiler with relative impunity should it choose to do so. Features of the region’s

demography and the manner in which it has spread its influence help fortify Iran’s perception of

itself as the preeminent power of the region.

The initial confusion of defining the character of the Islamic revolution, combined with the

problems of the Iran-Iraq war, all led to the changes in the nature of the factors governing the

foreign policy in Iran. According to Ramazani, during Khomeini’s era, Iran’s foreign policy was

guided more by ideology as embodied in his interpretation of Islamic governance (vilayat-i

faqih), than Iran’s interest in the nation-state.7 The issue of survival and security is a question

that besieges Iran. The need to protect their identity in a hostile world, safeguard their

uniqueness and to ensure that they are not swallowed up in the new secular world, has shaped

the focus of the primary role of the government in Iran. The support that Iraq received during

the Iran-Iraq war was an indicator of the isolation that Iran would face in the international arena

in times to come. The hostility and organized campaign that Israel mounted on Iran back in 1979

and the continued rhetorical warfare between the two, the labeling of being part of ‘axis of evil’

despite being one of the first countries to condemn 9/11, have all played a part in the insecurity

and hostility with which Iran treats the rest of the world. Relations between the United States

and Iran have remained difficult even as Khatami improved Iran's international profile and

significantly improved relations with many U.S. allies, particularly European nations.

The aggressive push towards developing indigenous war heads and pursuing a possible nuclear

weapons program comes partly from the hostility it faces from Israel and partly from the

constant confrontation that successive US governments force on it. The Israelis recognise the

difference between Iran’s rhetoric and its policy, and initially treated the post-revolutionary Iran

as a potential regional ally – regardless of the nature of its regime and its rhetoric. Shimon

Peres, successively Israel’s prime minister and foreign minister (1984-88) – was at the forefront

lobbying with the US to boost Iran’s defenses and bring Tehran “back into the western fold.” In

October 1992, Israeli went cold on Iran. This was partially motivated by the fear that its strategic

importance would diminish significantly in the post-cold war middle east if the then president

(1989-97) Hashemi Rafsanjani’s outreach to the Bush Sr. administration was successful. Also, the


138

geopolitical map of the Middle East had changed. Israel no longer needed Iran to balance Iraq

and the Arabs – rather, Iran was now a potentially powerful regional player who could become a

threat. And according to Israel’s military doctrine, potential threats are to be treated as existing

threats. 8

During President Ahmadinejad’s first term, Iranian foreign policy had two main challenges. First

was the new security dilemma brought about by the U.S. presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan

after 2003. Iran responded with an ‘‘accommodating policy,’’ which consisted of expanding

cooperation after Saddam’s fall with the main Arab world actors, principally Egypt and Saudi

Arabia, and seeking direct talks with the United States. This included Iran’s engagement in direct

talks with Coalition Forces regarding the prevailing security situations in both Iraq and

Afghanistan. The second challenge was to seek an ‘‘alliance policy’’ while regionalizing the

nuclear issue, in which Iran sought to tie and interweave the nuclear issue with broader regional

dynamics such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and the Arab-Israeli conflict. By building

relationships with friendly states (e.g., Syria) and political movements (e.g., Hezbollah or Shiite

factions in Iraq), Iran tried to deter the U.S. or Israeli military threat in the short term and to

prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. role in its backyard in the long term.

Given the North Korean precedent and India’s example (the Indo-US civil nuclear deal), Iran may

at some point of time it may be possible to resolve the nuclear standoff. However, for this to

happen, Iran will have to compromise on certain aspects of its nuclear programme in a manner

acceptable to the international community as well as give up its precondition that US forces

must be withdrawn from the region. Iran has been buying time to allow the regional geopolitical

situation continuing to change to its advantage and to increase its strategic bargaining leverage.

In all its confusion and stabilizing post-revolution, Iran has not been able to determine a foreign

policy vis a vis India. It is aware of the deep civilizational ties and the fact that numerically India

has the one of the world’s most sizeable population of Shiias, the fact that India and Iran have

many common shared strategic and regional interests. India is strategically located, as Pandit

Jawaharlal Nehru had pointed out, at the pivot of change in Asia. If we take West Asia as a geo-

political unit, India is the largest country near its Eastern borders that has the capability to

impact and influence socio-economic and political change in the region. India is a big enough

neighboring power for the Iran not to completely eschew engaging it over the long run. The

nervousness of Iran due to the nuclear threat from Sunni Pakistan, the fear of being rivaled by a

Hindu India, and the need to remove opposition to the establishment of a state for the Jews has

been a very strong influence in shaping the strategic alliances in the region. India, as one of the

largest country, located at the center of West, East, South and South East Asia, has been

repeatedly drawn into the shifting strategic partnerships in the region. Also the two most

important developments that shape every country’s policy towards Iran are: the Iranian nuclear

ambition and the politics of sanctions.

Prior to 9/11, Iran and India shared strong strategic commonalities in supporting the Northern

Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and later in providing a corridor for economic and


139

transport linkages between India and Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran. Plans for

substantive and innovative defence cooperation and a very strong energy and transport

infrastructure development relationship were agreed to. Post 9/11 too, President Khatami of

Iran was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day in 2003. This was the high water mark of the

bilateral relationship when the two countries signed a strategic partnership. However, both

sides moved very tardily in implementing the various bilateral agreements that had been signed,

and thus missed the opportunity to securely lock in this extremely promising turnaround in the

bilateral relationship. The fact is that India does not rank high in Iranian priorities and Iran has

not made up its mind as to the kind of relationship it wants with India. Moreover, the vacillating

attitude of the US and Europe towards the nuclear policy of North Korea and India and Pakistan,

has proven to be a stumbling block for Iran for negotiating with India. Critics say that India’s

vote at the IAEA against Iran was the price that India has to pay for the development of a

strategic partnership with United States, thereby jeopardising an ostensibly burgeoning

relationship with Iran. The reality remains, that as India tries to grow as an economic and

military power, it is difficult for India not to continue its nuclear program. The Indo-US nuclear

deal is not a step towards a nuclear weaponization programme of India, rather it is a civil

nuclear deal.

However, the point remains, that like Israel, that has had a consistent policy of aligning with the

stronger forces, or the US that seeks to ally with forces that it would benefit most from, or

Europe that prioritizes its own economic and ideological interests over those of other countries,

or even China that seeks to first engage and later increase its sphere of influence, India has no

defined foreign policy. It has been engaging or disengaging with Iran on an issue based

approach. As a result, it would oppose Iran on the issue of nuclear ambitions, while at the same

time, it would support Iran on the subject of economic sanctions as punitive punishment. It

would be offended by Iran equating Kashmir with Palestine, but it would appreciate the Iranian

opposition to the violation of human right in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

India is not an ally to any superpower not does it have a dogmatic power driven hegemonistic

world view of power. It has advocated non-alignment, peace and de-colonization in its earlier

approaches. After the cold war, it switched to economic growth and the ‘pragmatic realist’

approach to foreign policy. Though the approaches have not led to many problems, India will

need to define a foreign policy. Iran is one of the first countries to have destabilized the stable

nation-state, secular world, cart. It re-defined the identity of the state. Admittedly the Iranian

revolution and the dynamics that the new state presented was difficult to assess and respond

to. However, India will need to consciously spell out its responses to hypothetical situations of

change. The need to understand the dynamics of Iran and frame a foreign policy is most urgent

now than ever before. This is not due to the new set of sanctions that targeted Indian imports

from Iran or due to the possible anticipated domestic changes within Iran. Rather, it an

understanding of how the revolution worked and settled down, would go a long way to help

India cope with the new challenges that West Asia and North Africa as a region are bound to

throw up in a few years time. As the US presence in the domestic politics of Iraq, Libya and


140

Afghanistan fades, the new governments are likely to demand more than banal responses to

their foreign policies. The impact of the Jasmine Revolution and the changes that it has set in

motion are likely to become clearer by the beginning of next year. The possibilities of the new

governments being as religion driven as Iran are very strong. Also, once the revolution settles

down, Iran may emerge as one of the bigger political, strategic economic players in the region. It

has led a revolution earlier, and may be able to understand the new elite in the region better.

India does not need to go out of its way to woo the Iranian leadership, but it will definitely need

to understand the psyche of the leadership. It will have formulate a foreign policy, beginning

with Iran, where it does not see the country in question through the prisms of analysis that the

other countries view it with. An understanding of the change that is responsible for today’s Iran

would go a long way for India in formulating a successful foreign policy. Though the new polities

that will come into existence now in WANA will not repeat the pattern that Iran set, they will

definitely be as unconventional if not more. Most importantly for India, it is time to realize that

despite its handicaps and limitations, Iran is actively preparing a regional engagement policy and

has already started working on how to tackle its neighbours as the US and allied presence in the

region decreases. India does not need to compete with Iran, but it would help to understand the

variables and factors that Iran is taking into consideration while formulating their regional

policies.

_____________________

1 After Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh 2 However, official statistics do not confirm these figures as there has always been a deliberate official

ambiguity about statistics relating to Iranian involvement with and in Dubai.

3 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB27Ak02.html accessed on 15 May 2011 4 See Ramazani, R. K.: Ideology and pragmatism in Iran's foreign policy. Middle East Journal Vol. 58,

No.4; Autumn 2004: p 555-6 5 See See Ramazani, R.K., Iran‘s Hostage Crisis: International Legitimacy Matters, Comparative Studies

of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, A Duke University Press Vol. 25, No. 2, 2005 6bid 7 See Esposito, John L. (ed.) & Ramazani, R. K. (ed.): Iran at the crossroads. New York. Palgrave, 2001,

Chapter 10. 8 Parsi, Trita, The Iran-Israel cold war, 28 October 2005, www.openDemocracy.net, cited: 4/18/06.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB27Ak02.html

http://www.opendemocracy.net/


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India-Iran Relations: Varying Challenges and Perspectives

Dr. Venkat Lokanathan

Manipal University, Manipal, India

The writer is currently Senior Lecturer in the

Department of Geopolitics and International

Relations at Manipal University, Manipal,

India. He has also worked as a Research

Officer at the Institute of Peace and Conflict

Studies, New Delhi.

His areas of interest include the broader contours of International Security Affairs

with specific focus on US foreign policy towards China and South Asia.


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India-Iran Relations: Varying Challenges and Perspectives

A policy of non-alignment and the presence of a significant domestic Muslim population

ensured that India’s foreign policy towards Iran, in its formative years, was largely

ideological rather than one based on national interests. On March 15, 1950, New Delhi

and Tehran signed a friendship treaty. In principle, this document committed them to

amicable relations; yet, in practice, both countries were mired—albeit to differing

extents at different times—in opposing Cold War alliances that precluded the

development of robust bilateral ties. However, post-Cold War, keeping substantial

regional interests in mind, India sought to forge a robust and comprehensive

relationship inclusive of energy, commercial cooperation, infrastructure development,

military and intelligence ties. Narasimha Rao’s 1993 state visit was significant in

improving relations as it was the first by an Indian Prime Minister. Iranian President

Rafsanjani made a reciprocal visit in 1995. While high-level visits continued after 1995

solidifying mutual economic interests in key technological sectors, the next state visit

did not occur until 2001, when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Tehran. This visit

culminated in the Tehran Declaration which laid the foundation for cooperation on a

wide array of strategic issues including defense. In January 2003, during President

Khatami’s visit as the “Chief Guest” at India’s 2003 Republic Day celebrations, the New

Delhi Agreement was signed further committing both countries to deeper levels of

engagement including military cooperation.

The US factor

Significantly, despite extensive regional press coverage, the Indian-Iranian

rapprochement drew the attention of the United States only episodically and never as

intensely as in 2006. Arguably, increased scrutiny arose due to the convergence of two

unrelated developments. The first was the nuclear crisis which directly put Iran in

confrontation with the United States. The second was the 2005 framework for a civilian

nuclear agreement that began transforming ties between India and the United States.

Critics of the nuclear deal argued that it would weaken the non-proliferation regime at a

time when it had to be adequately robust to counter Iranian intransigence towards its

nuclear program. Both opponents and proponents of some variant questioned the

relationship between New Delhi and Tehran. Hence, India was put under immense

pressure to back the United States at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on

the question of Iran’s nuclear program. India voted for the resolutions finding Iran to be

in non-compliance in September 2005. It, then again, voted to refer Iran to the UN

Security Council as the Bush administration voiced its concerns that if India voted


143

against the February 2006 U.S. motion on Iran at the IAEA, Congress would likely not

approve the nuclear agreement. Nevertheless, many Congressional members, citing the

second Indian-Iranian naval exercise in March 2006, continued to demand that the

United States make the nuclear deal conditional on India’s ending all military relations

with Iran. When New Delhi raised its concerns, the Bush administration assured that it

would oppose any amendment to the nuclear pact which would condition U.S.

cooperation with India on its policies toward Iran. Interestingly, throughout Congress’

deliberation on the civilian nuclear deal, the Bush administration consistently

downplayed New Delhi’s ties with Tehran by reducing them to India’s growing energy

needs. Officials argued that the civilian nuclear engagement would diminish India’s

reliance upon Iran, or at least provide the opportunity for the United States to shape

India’s relationship with Iran. Given the various apprehensions about the Indo-Iranian

relationship in the context of the nuclear deal, the Congressional Research Service

authored a report in August 2006 examining the extent of the relationship, ostensibly to

put to rest some of these concerns. While acknowledging that some differences in

preferred policy towards Iran could emerge, that report too concluded that India’s

motivations to pursue relations with Iran were primarily rooted in its growing energy

needs and therefore were relatively benign to U.S. interests. Yet, the U.S.—India

Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (also known as the Hyde Act), signed by

President Bush in December 2006, contained a ‘‘Statement of Policy’’ including riders

designed to ensure India’s support for U.S. policies regarding the Iranian nuclear issue.

In particular, India was ‘‘to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran

for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons

capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means

to deliver weapons of mass destruction.’’ Although this generated considerable

domestic opposition in India, President Bush, while signing the Act, emphasized that his

administration would interpret this provision as merely ‘‘advisory.’’

The nuclear issue is complex as India and Iran have long held significantly different

perceptions of the global nuclear order. Iran was not supportive of the Indian nuclear

tests in 1998 and backed the UN Security Council Resolution asking India and Pakistan to

cap their nuclear capabilities by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Additionally, Tehran has repeatedly

called for universal acceptance of the NPT, much to New Delhi’s chagrin. Although Iran

has claimed that this was directed at Israel, the implications of such a move are far

reaching for India. With the conclusion of the U.S.—India nuclear deal, Iran has warned

that the pact had endangered the NPT and would trigger new ‘‘crises’’ for the

international community. Meanwhile, India’s position on the Iranian nuclear question is

relatively straightforward. Although India believes that Iran has the right to pursue


144

civilian nuclear energy, it has insisted that Tehran should clarify the doubts raised by the

IAEA regarding its compliance with the NPT. India has continued to affirm its

commitment to enforce all sanctions against Iran as mandated since 2006 by the UN

Security Council. However, much like China and Russia, it has argued that such this

should not hurt the Iranian population, and has expressed its disapproval of sanctions by

individual countries that restrict investments by third countries in Iran’s energy sector.

India’s presence in Iran has shrunk, as firms such as Reliance Industries have, partially

under American pressure, withdrawn from Iran, and others have shelved their plans to

make investments. To date, Iran accounts for only about 8 percent of Indian oil imports.

Moreover, both of the major energy deals recently signed with great fanfare, and raising

American concerns, are now in limbo. The 25-year, $22 billion agreement with Iran for

the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has not produced anything since it was signed

in 2005, as it requires India to build an LNG plant in Iran. The plant would need

American components, which might violate the U.S. Iran—Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).

The other project involving the construction of a 1,700-mile, $7 billion pipeline (IPI) to

carry natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan is also stuck. Pakistan has already signed

the pipeline deal with Tehran, while China, now Iran’s largest trading partner, has

undertaken massive investments in an effort to rapidly occupy the space vacated by

Western firms. Iran’s position on several other crucial issues has also run counter to

Indian interests. Tehran was critical of the way India handled protests in Kashmir in early

2011. The Indian government was forced to issue a demarche, protesting against Iranian

interference in Indian domestic issues.

The need for momentum

India has ambitions to be recognized as the preeminent power within the Indian Ocean

basin and also be a global player in due course. For this, it will have to be proactive to

prevent developments that are fundamentally negative to its interests by relying upon

two instruments of “soft” power: its economic and political sources of influence. Central

Asia, which includes Afghanistan along with Iran, comprises an important theatre for

this power projection as India sees enormous energy potential in the region. With 2.7

percent of the world’s confirmed oil deposits and seven percent of the world’s natural

gas deposits, Central Asia has long figured imminently in India’s efforts to diversify its

energy sources.

However, the crucial regional issue where India and Iran need each other is the evolving

security situation in Afghanistan. There is a fundamental disconnect that has emerged

between U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States has

actively discouraged New Delhi from assuming a higher profile in Afghanistan, for fear of


145

offending Islamabad. However it has failed to persuade Pakistan into taking Indian

concerns regarding cross border terrorism more seriously. So long as Afghan territory is

not being used to launch attacks onto American soil, the United States may have no vital

interest in determining who actually governs in Afghanistan, however, it is important to

India. If the United States were to abandon the goals of establishing a functioning

Afghan state and seeing a moderate Pakistan emerge, that would put greater pressure

on Indian security. To preserve its interests in case such a strategic milieu evolves, India

has reason to coordinate more closely with states such as Russia and Iran as a

contingency. In recent months, India has infact reached out to Iran about Afghanistan,

and the two sides are now involved in ‘‘structured and regular consultations’’ on the

issue. Both New Delhi and Tehran are unlikely to accept a political regime in Kabul which

serves as a springboard to project Pakistan’s military interests. Militarily and

strategically, Central Asia is an important area for Indian presence, at least in part to

deny Pakistan the “strategic depth” it craves. Although Iran has joined the Indian navy’s

annual initiative, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which provides a forum for the

navies of the Indian Ocean littoral states to engage each other, the defense relationship,

however, remains not only sporadic and tentative, but also circumscribed by India’s

growing defense linkages with Israel.


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India's Shifting Loyalties:

Does India Need US More Than It Needs Iran?

Gauri Jain (beinformedjournal.org)

Born and brought up in Mumbai, India I have immigrated to the US.

I have lived here in the US since 1996. I am a Psychiatrist by

training. I work as the Medical Director of a local Mental Health

Center in the US. I am an avid reader and a long time political observer.

I write and publish the 'beinformedjournal' (beinformedjouran:org). In the short time that the journal has been online (since December 2009) it has become quite popular. People from all

over the world read the journal daily. My articles have been used as a reference by a number of other writers, bloggers, online publications including Wikipedia and Forbes.

http://www.beinformedjournal.org/


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India's Shifting Loyalties: Does India Need US More Than It Needs Iran?

India has tried to skirt around the issue of its historically warm relations with Iran for the longest time now, despite growing US pressure to cut ties with Iran. With the announcement from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), in December 2010 which indicated tightening of financial transactions for trade with Iran, it appeared that New Delhi has finally decided to jump off the fence and had landed on Washington's side. The RBI had announced that it would no longer allow financial transactions to Iranian crude imports through the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism. The RBI's statement did not specifically single out Iran as the target of this regulation, but it was obviously so. India is Iran's biggest trade partner within the ACU. The ACU - headquartered in Tehran - is a financial clearing house system set up by the UN in 1974 to facilitate trade and economic growth among Asian countries. Its members are the central banks of nine Asian countries: India, Iran, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar (Burma). The ACU allows companies which trade with each other within these nine countries, to transact via their respective central banks rather than deal directly with each other. The benefit of this is that the central banks can process these financial transactions in such a manner that it can be very difficult for third parties to track the payments. Thus the details about the transaction remain obscure, which benefits both the payee and the payer. Full disclosure of the details can create problems for some Indian companies because the current sanctions against Iran mandate that companies that engage in trade with Iran in excess of $20 million, be not allowed to do business with American companies. These companies would then essentially set themselves up for getting sanctioned by the US. For huge multinationals with lucrative business interests all around the world, getting officially sanctioned by the US can spell a kiss of death. The sanctions imposed by the UN on Iran do not forbid countries from buying oil from Iran. But transacting with Iran becomes complicated due to severe restrictions and sanctions placed on Iranian banks by the US and the EU. As the sanctions against Iran have become more severe, Iran has increasingly relied upon the ACU over the last few years to do business with its regional trade partners. The fact that Iran can do business with others via the ACU makes the sanctions imposed by the international community toothless and ineffective. Washington has therefore long pressured New Delhi to shut down this loophole of the ACU and to take a firmer stand against the Tehran's nuclear program. Following the decision by the RBI, by the end of December 2010, Tehran retaliated by saying that it will not accept any transactions by Indian companies for Iranian crude, outside of the ACU. This essentially put India into a bind. Iran is the second biggest exporter of oil to India, after Saudi Arabia. India cannot afford to entirely displease Iran. India's increasing energy demand to fuel its growth is a major factor in this dynamic. In January 2011, Iran suggested that the Indian companies use the Hamburg based bank - EIH Bank (aka European-Iranian Trade Bank or Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG) - to process payments for Iranian crude. This proposal required Indian companies to open accounts with the SBI (State Bank of India), which in turn would open an account on behalf of its Indian clients with the EIH and thus process their payments to Tehran.


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However back in September 2010, the EHI was already blacklisted by the US Treasury for allowing Iran to trade with other states, despite the sanctions. This means that any bank that works with the EHI is subject to an US investigation. In May 2011, the EHI was blacklisted by the EU as well. Tehran had also suggested using two banks in the UAE, both of which turned down the request to process the payments. India reportedly used the EHI to process some overdue payments to Tehran in early 2011. However that option quickly fizzled out, as Germany put an end to these transactions. Fierce negotiations have continued on both sides for months, as New Delhi currently owes close to $2 billion to Tehran for imported crude. In early May 2011, it was reported by Indian media that the Indian government is considering paying for the Iranian crude in Indian Rupees, by allowing the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to open rupee accounts with Indian banks. However by the end of May 2011 when the Indian delegation from the finance ministry led by R. Gopalan met with Iranian delegation led by deputy governor of Iranian central bank, Hamid Bohrani, this issue was (and it still is) - unsettled. Thus for India it has not been easy to take sides and appease the US. India has vested interests in Iran, most important being - crude. India is estimated to import $13 billion of crude annually from Iran annually. India also has a long history of cultural ties with Iran. Indian‟s relationship with Tehran runs deeper than its new found friendship with Washington. India is in Iran's neighborhood, so to speak, more so than the US. This means India also has geopolitical interests at stake in this partnership. In a program (1) aired in July 2010, by the highly respectable American public radio station - National Public Radio (NPR) - journalist Corey Flintoff explained this nuanced issue rather well. Here is an excerpt: "India and Iran have had a relationship that dates back not just for years but millennia. Iran also figures into India's geopolitical interests in the region, including its relations with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. Rajiv Sikri (a retired Indian diplomatic and foreign policy strategist) says that India wants to stay engaged with Afghanistan partly to counter terrorism and partly to balance the influence of its main rival, Pakistan. Pakistan has been blocking India's land access to Afghanistan, so the Indians built a road through Iran. India supported the U.S. drive for sanctions against Iran in 2005 and 2006, when it was negotiating for a nuclear technology deal with the Bush administration. Sikri says many Indian leaders feel the U.S. never appreciated what a difficult decision that was for India and never properly reciprocated. U.S. officials have said that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is as important for India's security as it is for the United States. But Sikri says Indians are less anxious about the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran because they already live with a rival who has the bomb - Pakistan." At least for now it appears that New Delhi has finally ceded to Washington's pressure. There are multiple factors that may have driven India‟s decision to side with Washington. First and foremost there is the overshadowing presence of the proverbial elephant in the region – China! China is the key reason why Washington is warming up to India. For instance, President Obama‟s vocal support to India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, during his recent trip to India, had less to do with India itself and more to do with China. First of all, the logistics of adding a new permanent member to the UN Security Council are so complicated that it is not even a theoretical option in the foreseeable future. Since it is not ever likely to happen during Obama‟s term as the President he has nothing to lose and much to gain by doing lip service. The message he was trying to send by this announcement was twofold: primarily


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to Beijing that Washington is willing to put its full diplomatic weight behind Beijing‟s rival, to prop India up against China and second he wanted to dangle a carrot in front of New Delhi of what could possibly be achieved (albeit in some distant future, if ever), if it chooses its friends wisely. Ever since former President Bush signed the civilian nuclear energy deal with India in 2008, China has been fuming. In an effort to get back at the US, China has been increasingly getting more involved with Pakistan. China‟s recently announced nuclear deals with Pakistan are a cause for concern for both the US and India. Last summer China announced that it wants to sell two more civilian nuclear reactors to Pakistan. China, which officially became a member of the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 46-country group of nuclear supplier countries), in 2004 has said that this sale is grandfathered, as Beijing had supposedly made commitment to Islamabad to build nuclear reactors at Chasma in Punjab (in Pakistan) prior to becoming a NSG member, and as such it had to fulfill its obligation. Washington refuses to accept that argument and is vehemently opposed to the idea. An article published in London‟s Economist last June (2) explains this further: “AT FIRST sight, China‟s proposed sale of two civilian nuclear-power reactors to Pakistan hardly seems a danger sign. Yet the sale (really a gift, as Pakistan is broke) has caused shudders at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal cartel of countries who want to stop their advanced nuclear technology getting into the wrong hands. By any measure, Pakistan is a shocker. Its proliferation record would make the serial nuclear mischief-makers of North Korea blush. If the Chinese reactor deal goes ahead, the damage will be huge: beyond just stoking the already alarming nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India. That does not deter China, which still seethes about the way in which the Bush administration in 2008 browbeat other NSG members into exempting America‟s friend India from the group‟s rules. China is trying a legalistic defense (the 'grandfather clause') of the sale of the third and fourth reactors at Chasma. But its real point is this: if America can bend the rules for India, then China can break them for Pakistan.” Indeed reports circulated last October, that when an American official questioned China about its ongoing support to Pakistan, the Chinese official sarcastically retorted, “Pakistan is our Israel”. In March 2010, Pakistan and Iran finalized the long pending natural gas pipeline (also called the 'peace pipeline') deal, worth $7.6 billion. The deal first conceptualized in 1989, had been in the making for several years and was initially supposed to include India as well. New Delhi withdrew from the talks in 2009 due to its chronic distrust of Pakistan and also because it was able to reach a deal for civilian nuclear energy development with Washington in 2008. The new deal between Iran-Pakistan, allows Islamabad to charge New Delhi a 'transit fee', if in future India changed its mind and the pipeline is ever actually extended into India (via Pakistan). The reason why all of this matters with regards to India‟s relations with Iran is because there is now a new three-way alliance being formed in the region between China, Pakistan and Iran, which not only creates an increasing isolation but also poses new threats for India in the region. New Delhi seems to have reached the conclusion that it needs Washington now more than ever and definitely more than it needs Tehran and that explains the ACU decision.

References : 1.http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128685206

2.http://www.economist.com/node/16426072?story_id=16426072

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128685206

http://www.economist.com/node/16426072?story_id=16426072

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