Foul play the crisis of football management in kenya

The crisis of football management in Kenya

foul play!

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The crisis of football management in Kenya

foul play!

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword

1 Introduction

2 FootballinKenya:thebackground,policyandglobalcontext

3 TheriseandfallofKenyanfootball

4 Kenyanfootballmanagementincrisis

5 TheproblemwithfootballmanagementinKenya:keyissues

6 Conclusionandthewayforward

7 Transformingfootballmanagementfornationaldevelopment

8 Recommendations

Annex:Comparingfootballmanagementacrossnations- experiencesfromelsewhere

References

4

6

9

13

19

32

37

40

43

47

50

PAGECHAPTER

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFC AbaluhyaFootballClubAfriCOG AfricaCentreforOpenGovernanceAGM AnnualGeneralMeetingAIDS AcquiredImmuneDeficiencySyndromeCAF ConfederationofAfricanFootballCAS CourtforArbitrationinSportsFA FootballAssociationFAP FinancialAssistanceProgrammeFC FootballClubFIFA FederationInternationaledeFootballAssociationFKL FootballKenyaLimitedGEMA GikuyuEmbuMeruAssociationGTZ GermanTechnicalCooperationHIV HumanImmune-deficiencyVirusICCG Inter-ClubsConsultativeGroupIDPs InternallyDisplacedPersonsIFAB InternationalFootballArbitrationBoardISL InternationalSports&LeisureKANU KenyaAfricanNationalUnionKEFOCA KenyaFootballCoachesAssociationKEFORA KenyaFootballRefereesAssociationKENFA KenyaFootballAssociationKFF KenyaFootballFederationKFFPL KFFPremiershipLeagueLtdKLTA KenyaLawnTennisAssociationKNC KFFNormalisationCommitteeKNSC KenyaNationalSportsCouncilKPA KenyaPortsAuthorityKPFG KenyaPremiershipFootballGroupKPL KenyaPremierLeagueKRFU KenyaRugbyFootballUnionMYSA MathareYouthSportsAssociationNARC NationalAllianceRainbowCoalitionNIC NormalisationInterimCommitteeNOC–K NationalOlympicCommitteeofKenyaODM OrangeDemocraticMovementPNU PartyofNationalUnitySGM SpecialGeneralMeetingSTC Stakeholders’TransitionCommitteeUEFA UnionofEuropeanFootballAssociationUN UnitedNationsUNHCR UnitedHighCommissionforRefugees

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Sports iswidelyrecognisedasasectorwith immenseeconomicvalue.Overandabovetheeconomicpotentialarethesocio-politicalbenefitsofsportsforreconciliationandasacarrierforpositivemessagesonissuessuchascorruptionandHIV/Aidsfortheyouthandsocietyasawhole.

WhileKenyaiswellknownasasportingnation,thissuccessisnotreflectedinthefootballsector,whichhasbeenparticularlypronetosquabblingandcorruption.

Corruptioninsportsisnotnew.Thereareconcernstheworldoveraboutthelackoftransparencyandaccountabilityinsportsandtheresultantsocialandeconomicimpact.Theriskofcorruptionhasincreaseddramaticallyascommercialinfluencesgrow1.

The vast sums of money the industry attracts and the high and public profile of keyparticipantsinsportsmakesitparticularlypronetofinancialmisappropriationandothergovernanceissues.

MegasportingeventssuchastheWorldCup2010bringtolightendemiccorruptionin theglobalmanagement structuresof football.A2010publicationby the InstituteforSecurityStudiesaccusesFIFA2leadersof“creatinganorganisationthatgoesoutofitswaytoavoidfinancialscrutiny”andgoesontoillustratehowFIFAactivelyresiststransparency,making football a fertile ground for corruption. The level of estimatedprofitsthatFIFAcanexpectfromthefirstWorldCuponAfricansoilhavebeenestimatedatbetweenUS$3.2and4billion, thisdoesnot include theexpectedrevenues fromtelevision,marketing,hospitalityandlicensingwhichgotoFIFAanditslocalorganisingcommittee3.

In the lastdecade,Kenya’s footballadministrationhasdrawnsignificantnegativeglobalinterestasaresultofpoorgovernanceandcorruption.Publicwranglesforpower,widespreadmismanagement,ethnicantagonismandpoliticalintriguehavetypifiedfootballinKenya,leavingmanyindustryplayersandthepublicdisillusioned.

Moreimportantly,corruptionandnegligenceinthemanagementoffootballrobsKenya’syouthofvaluableandsorelyneededopportunitiesandhamperssocio-economicgrowth.ThemediationagreementthatbroughtanendtoKenya’spost-electionviolenceidentifiedlack

1Schaefer,L.(2006).BlowingtheWhistleonCorruptioninSport.DeutscheWelle.Onlinearticleonhttp://www.dw-world.de2FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(InternationalFederationofFootballAssociations)3Herzenberg,C.(2010).PlayerandReferee:conflictinginterestsandthe2010FIFAWorldCup.Pretoria:theInstituteforSecurityStudies

FOREWORD

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ofopportunitiesforyouth,whoconstitutesome60percentofourpopulation,asaparticulartriggerof thecrisis.Government responses to theyouthdilemma,suchas theKaziKwaVijanainitiative,haveprovedinadequate.EnsuringgoodgovernanceinthemanagementoffootballwouldbeacriticalelementinaddressingtheyouthissueshighlightedinAgenda4oftheagreement.

“Foul Play!” is a study of governance in football in Kenya. With this report, AfriCOGexploresfootballmanagementinKenyaoverthelast30yearswiththeobjectiveofanalysingpastmanagementchallengesandreformeffortsandlearninglessonsfromtheoutcomesofthoseinitiatives.

“Foul Play!”documentsthedecades-longstruggletoreformfootballinKenyaandanalysesthechallengesofintroducingtransparencyandaccountabilityinfootballadministrationinKenyawhileworkinginacomplex,oftenunpredictableglobalframework.

WededicatethisreporttothefutureofKenya’syouth.

GladwellOtienoExecutive DirectorAfriCOG

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfriCOG AfricaCentreforOpenGovernance

FIFA FederationInternationaledeFootballAssociation

KFF KenyaFootballFederation

KPL KenyaPremierLeague

NIC NormalisationInterimCommittee

STC Stakeholders’TransitionCommittee

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“My Government also plans to take sports more seriously. Not only is it an important pastime but Kenyans are good at it. Success in sports changes the lives of many Kenyans every year. It gives us something to be proud of as a nation. It promotes healthy lifestyles. My Government plans to deal with corruption and mismanagement in this sector. These trends negatively affect our athletes. They have undermined the standards of key sports like soccer.”

PresidentMwaiKibaki,2003

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Kenyaiswellknownasasportingnationacrossthe world, especially due to its achievementsin athletics. However, as is the case with manydeveloping countries, football is the foremostparticipation and spectator sport. Rich andpooralikecanplay thegameas it requires littleequipmentandcanbeplayedanywhere.

Sadly, football in Kenya has suffered throughthe years from corruption, mismanagementand political intrigue, resulting in the country’sfailuretomakeanysignificantimpactinregional,continentalorglobalcompetitions.

The objective of this report is to explore thegenesisandcharacterofgovernancechallengesinfootball inKenyaandtosuggestwaystoresolvethesechallengesforthebenefitofouryouthwhoconstituteover60percentofKenya’spopulation.

Kenya’s youth, though often educated, areunemployed and disillusioned. Indeed, it iswidely held that Kenya’s 2007 post-electionviolence, inwhichmanyof theyouth tookpart,wasamanifestationoftheirfrustrationatthelackofopportunitiesfortheminthecountryaswellasthebadgovernanceandendemiccorruptiontheyseeallaroundthem.

Youthunemploymentisthemostimmediatethreattopoliticalandsocialstability.Disillusionedyoungpeople are one of the most disruptive forces insociety,andunemploymentisarguablyoneoftheprincipal sourcesofalienation.Figuresvary,butstatisticsindicatethatovertwomillionyouthsinthecountryareoutofwork.Another750,000jointhemeveryyearfromeducationalinstitutions,of

whombarely125,000areabsorbedannuallyintoformalemployment.Theinformalsectorabsorbsthemostofthem,orabout8million4.

Giventhelackofattentiontosportsdevelopment,Kenyanyouthacquiresportingskillsintheirlocalneighbourhoodsratherthaninformalinstitutions.Consequently,sportisapartofthelocalculture,linkingyoungandoldandcreatingopportunitiesforyoungpeopletorealiseapotentialthatisnon-academic. Despite these potential benefits, anddespiteitbeingKenya’smostpopularsport,bothtowatchand toplay, football isoneofKenya’smost mismanaged sports. This has partly beenresponsiblefordivertinglocalspectatorinteresttotelevisedforeignfootball.

Governments today understand that sports isnot only big business, but a source of youthemploymentandenjoyment,oftenkeepingthemaway from negative influences and activities.Further, employment in sports can bring highrewards for the very best, and a living for themany people involved in sports management,andintheindustrieswithforwardandbackwardlinkagestosport.However,sportsadministrationinKenyasuffersfrommultipleproblemsincludingweak financial management and leadership,poor governance, and a failure to invest inyouth programmes. Currently, there seems tobe no coherent policy governing sports; theYouth Ministry’s website refers to an outdated2002 sports policy document and a 2008/2009government assessment of performance acrossits40-oddministries listed theSports andYouthAffairsministryasthefifthworst5.AlthoughthereisaNationalYouthPolicy,sportsdevelopmentis

INTRODUCTION

4“Highunemploymentratecouldevolveintorevolution,expertswarn”DailyNation,May12009.5“QuestionsasAG’steamtopstheclass:Bestperformerstoberewardedandlaggardspunished,sayKibakiandRaila”DailyNation,

April272010

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6 http://www.guardian.co.uk, July 12 2010

notapriority.Asaresult,interventionstoaddressproblemsinthesportssectorhavehistoricallybeenadhoc,lackingfocusandthereforeineffective.

A popular version of Kenya’s long-termdevelopment strategy, Kenya Vision 2030,declares that the country “aims to capitaliseon her international reputation as an ‘athleticsuperpower’ by opening up the country for topglobal sports events, encouraged by corporatesponsorship(p.21)”.Oneofitsflagshipprojects,tobedeliveredby2012,isto“establishasportslottery fund and an international academy ofsports”.Theideaistoexploitthepotentialofsportsforemploymentcreationandsocialcohesion.

Foul Play! istheproductofareviewoffootballadministration in Kenya over the last 30 years,commissionedbyAfriCOGwiththeobjectiveofanalysingpastmanagementchallengesandreformeffortsandlearninglessonsfromtheoutcomesofthoseinitiatives.

This report attempts to analyse Kenya’s footballmanagementframeworkintheoverallcontextofsportsmanagementinKenyawhileexpoundingontheeventsthathavebroughtittonearcollapse.

The following section of this report reviews thebackground,policyandglobalcontextoffootballin Kenya. The report goes further to discussthe rise and fall of Kenyan football describingthechainof events thathave led to thecurrentfootballmanagementcrisis.TheendofChapter4providesatimelineofeventsinKenyanfootballfrom2000to2010,whileChapter5outlinesthekeychallenges in footballadministration -chiefofwhichispoorleadership.

Foul Play! also discusses transformationalfootball management, which uses the gameto create programmes that generate spin-offs, while promoting national cohesion anddevelopment, and the importance of womenand youth football for a robust, all-inclusivesector.Thereportconcludesbymakinga fewrecommendationsforabetter-governedfootballsectorinKenya.

Someconstraintsencounteredduringproductionof this report relate to thedifficultyofobtainingdocumentarysources:thereisnocentraldepositoryofdocumentation.ThisstudytriedtoaccessKFFfilesattheRegistrarofSocieties,butthepending100-odd football cases before the courts meantthefileswerewiththeAttorneyGeneral.

This report therefore relies extensively onsecondary sources such as the Stakeholders‘TransitionCommittee(STC)whosemethodologywas found to be the most comprehensive.Indeed, the Normalisation Interim Committee(NIC) eventually took on board severalrecommendations from the STC report, suchas the establishment of the Kenya PremiershipLimited(KPL).

The just-ended World Cup 2010, which onceagain saw African teams falling out at an earlystage,underlinestheneedforthoroughreformofthegovernanceofAfricanfootball.

As an indicator of the rewards that beckon forbetter-governedsport,theKenyaPremierLeague(KPL)signedanimprovedtelevisionrightsdealwiththe satellite broadcaster SuperSport immediatelyaftertheWorldCup6.

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FKL FootballKenyaLimited

IFAB InternationalFootballArbitrationBoard

KNSC KenyaNationalSportsCouncil

NOC-K NationalOlympicCommissionofKenya


CHAPTER 2: FOOTBALL IN KENYA: THE BACKGROUND, POLICY AND GLOBAL CONTEXT

To maintain fair practices and orderliness in procedures and to provide protection from malpractices against established sporting norms, a comprehensive legal framework is necessary for the smooth running of sports. It will also provide for registration, dispute resolution and a code of conduct.

TheKenyaNationalSportsPolicy,2002

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Footballwas introducedtoKenyaby theBritish,who administered the country as a colony from1925 to 1963. While football is the country’sgreatest player and spectator sport, Kenya ismore famous for its middle and long-distancerunners. Lesser-known sports, in which Kenyahas experienced significant success at one timeor another, include motor car rallying, seven-a-side rugby,amateurboxing,hockey,cricketandwomen’s volley-ball. The discussion of effectivefootballmanagementmustbeplacedinthewidercontextofKenyansportsmanagementaswellasthatoftheglobalmanagementoffootball.

Who runs the game?

BeforeaddressingfootballgovernanceinKenya,itis useful to examine the situation at FIFA, as theumbrella body and standard setter for nationalfootball associations. The global framework forfootball management is provided by the FIFAStatutesandtheFIFAwebsitelistsnumerousotherlaws governing the game. The original intentionwasthatnationalfootballmanagementframeworksbe ideally fashionedafter theFIFA rules; thishasnowbecomeamandatoryrequirement,accordingtotheFKLsecretariat.

FIFA is managed through a Congress whichbrings together delegates from the 208 membercountries7. Besides providing for the Congress,Article 21 of FIFA Statutes also provides for anExecutive Committee, the general secretariatandstandingandadhoccommittees.Article31providesthattheExecutiveCommitteebeheadedbythePresidentelectedforafour-yearterm.Thearticle also provides that the committee meet atleast twice a year, appoint a Secretary General

FOOTBALL IN KENYA: THE BACKGROUND, POLICYAND GLOBAL CONTEXT

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7InformationonFIFAcanbeaccessedathttp://www.FIFA.com.FIFA’sgreatercountrymembershipcomparedtotheUNisbecausetheformerrecognisessub-nations,suchasBritain’sfour‘HomeCounties’.

8FIFAStatutescanbefoundathttp://www.fifa.com9Seehttp://www.fifa.com

proposedbythePresidentandappointdelegatesto the International Football Arbitration Board[IFAB].Article32designatesthePresidentasthelegal embodiment of FIFA, mandates the officeholdertoimplementthedecisionsoftheCongressand Executive Committee through the generalsecretariat,andberesponsibleforrelationsbetweenFIFAandtheaffiliatedcontinentalconfederationsand national associations, political bodies andother international agencies. The SecretaryGeneralrunsthegeneralsecretariatassistedbyastaffcomplementof280whoservethe22Standing

FIFA’s objectives

TheFederation InternationaledeFootballAssociation

(FIFA)wasfoundedinParisinMay1904withtheinitial

sevenfoundingmembersaffiliatinganother14national

associations by 1912. Over the decades, football’s

popularitycontinuedtoattractnewdevoteesandatthe

endofthe2007FIFACongress,FIFAhad208members

spreadacrosstheglobe.

FIFA is responsible for worldwide football

regulationssummarisedinFIFAStatutes,updatedas

necessaryaftereveryannualcongress8.Article2of

FIFA’sStatutesspecifyFIFA’sobjectives to include

improvement of the game, its control through

appropriatemeasures,andpreventionofallmethods

andpracticesthatmightjeopardiseintegrity,leading

totheabuseofAssociationFootball.

FIFAPresident Joseph “Sepp”Blatterwrites: “only

with the unwavering dedication of every FIFA

team member, every member association, and

everybusinesspartnercan football inall its forms

contributetoachievingFIFA’sgoalsatahighlevel

by protecting standards, encouraging competition

andpromotingsolidarityintheworldgame9.”

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CommitteesprovidedforbyArticle34.Intheory,theFIFAgovernancestructurechecksthepowersofthePresidentthroughtheCongress.However,the President exerts considerable influence overtheAssociation’sdecisionsgiventheconcentrationofpowersdescribedhere.

ConcernsthatFIFA’smanagementframeworkseemstoleaveloopholesforabuseofpoweraresharedbymany.For instance,AndrewJennings’ report,“Foul! The Secret World of FIFA”, is filled withillustrationsofexcessesat theFederationwhich,iftrue,wouldseemtonegateitsstatedmissionto“developthegame,touchtheworld,buildabetterfuture…fosterunitywithinthefootballworld,beamodeloffairplay,tolerance,sportsmanshipandtransparency.”JenningsincisiveinvestigationintoFIFA mismanagement alleges that by December1998,itsPresident,Joseph“Sepp”BlattertriedtocreateanExecutivePresidencybyproposingthatthe responsibilities of the Secretary General besharedbetween incumbentMichelZen-Ruffinenand Michel Platini who was to be ‘Advisor tothe President’10. While the Executive Committeeinitiallyblockedthechange,thishadlargelybeeneffectedbyMarch1999whenJeromeChampagnealsocameonboardasa‘personaladvisor’11.Zen-RuffinenandBlatterpartedcompanyacrimoniouslyin 2002, after the former presented a report toFIFA’s executive committee accusing his bossof mismanagement, financial improprieties, andmanipulatingtheFIFAnetwork“tothebenefitofthirdpartiesandhispersonalinterests12.”

The local policy and administrative framework

Sincebeforeindependence,sportsinKenyahavebeen recognised in government structures andassociations are formalised through registration

withtheRegistrarofSocieties.TheKenyaFootballAssociation was registered comparatively early,in1946,(hockeyandathleticswereregisteredin1950and1951respectively).Registrationof theNationalOlympicCommitteeofKenyafollowedin1954.Whileinearlierdecades,sportwaspartoftheSocialServicesDepartment,itacquiredfullministerialstatusin2003.

Sincethen,thesportsdockethasmovedbetweenministries, and is currently under the Ministryof Youth and Sports. Within the ministry is theDepartmentofSports,createdbya1986presidentialdirective. A Secretary for Sports, who supervisestheCommissionerofSports,headsthedepartment.According to the Kenya National Sports Policydating back to 2002, the Department is chargedwith the responsibility of developing, promoting

10SeeJennings,A.(2006:113-4),Foul!TheSecretWorldofFIFA:bribes,voteriggingandticketscandals.London:HarperCollins.FIFA’scourtactiontostopthepublicationofthisbookfailed.

11Champagne’sarrivalissignificantfortheKenyanstorybecausehemademanyvisitstoKenyathatproducedthereports,whichledtoFIFA’sexclusiverecognitionofHatimy’sadministration.(SeetimelineattheendofChapter4thatsummarisestheeventsinKenya’sfootball,2000–2010)

12cf.Time,Sunday19May2002,“LastManStanding”.Forexample,hereportedlyallegedthatBlatterconsistentlytookorinfluenceddecisionsfavourabletoFIFAVicePresidentJackWarner,whocontrolstheblocvoteoftheCONCACAF,theNorthandCentralAmericanandCaribbeanfootballfederation,suchasthegrantingoftelevisionrightsintheCaribbeanfortheWorldCupfrom1990/1994and1998forasymboliconedollar.RuffinenwassubsequentlysackedbyBlatter,Jennings,2006,p364.

Blatter threatens to suspend Brazil

“In 2000, the Brazilian Congress and Senate

had demanded an investigation into the alleged

mismanagementofthecountry’sfootballfederation

by its top officials, including ex-FIFA president

Havelange’sson-in-lawTeixeiraandanuncle.

Blatter denounced this as interference in the

management of football and ranted: “Brazil will be

suspendedfromall internationalactivities.Brazilwill

nottakepartinthe2002WorldCup,theWorldYouth

Cup, theUnder-17WorldCup, theWomen’sWorld

CupandtheFutsalindoortournamentinGuatemala.”

The 2001 investigation report concluded the

Brazilianfederationwas“adenofcrime,anarchy,

incompetenceanddishonesty.”

Oneofthe‘topofficials’investigatedwouldlatersit

onFIFA’s2003InternalAuditCommittee.”

Source: Jennings (2006) p. 240

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and providing technical advice on all mattersrelatingtosportsandrecreationalactivities.

Through the Kenya National Sports Council(KNSC), established in 1966, the Departmentoverseesthewelfareofsportsmenandwomenandthefinancialandothermoveableandimmovableassetsofsportsassociations.Throughitsnetworks,the Department is required to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic, encourage professionalism foremploymentcreationandpovertyreduction,andinculcatepatriotismandnationalpride.

The Kenya National Sports Policy, 2002

The National Sports Policy requires sportsorganisationstoenhanceinvestmentandfundingespecially for grassroots programmes, based oncomprehensive,integratedmediumandlong-termdevelopment plans with accompanying annualwork plans. It distinguishes differing categoriesof sports: traditional from modern; mass fromcompetitive and sports for the aged, disabled,youth and women. Besides central and local

government,italsorecognisespotentialfinancingsources, such as individual and corporatesponsorship. It requires the financial affairs ofthe 50 organisations affiliated to the KNSC tobemanagedbyprofessionals, subject to regularaudits and KNSC scrutiny. Thus, prospectiveofficials should have a demonstrated interest inthesport,andhavenocriminalrecord.

While emphasising adequate formal educationfor sportsmen and women, it also calls for theestablishment of a National Sports Institute,whichwouldsetstandards,carryouttraininganddocumentationandarchiverecords.

TheKenyaNationalSportsPolicyrecognisesthedestructive potential of disputes, requiring thedevelopment of an “ultimate, authoritative andneutral dispute resolution mechanism and/ordisputeresolutionfora…”

ThePolicymandatesKNSCtoestablishanarbitrationpanel based on the Arbitration Act (1995) for allsports organisations, and whose decisions shall befinal.Thus,thereshouldbenoresorttojudicialcourtsunlessthematterathandiscriminal.

FIFA Governance Structure

TheCongressisthesupremeandlegislativebodyofFIFA,whichismadeupofallthememberassociations,witheach

gettingonevote.ACongressmaybeanOrdinaryoranExtraordinaryCongress.TheCongressrulesonmodifications

totheStatutes,addressespropositionsfromExecutiveCommitteemembersandelectstheFIFAPresident.

TheExecutiveCommitteeconsistsofaPresident,electedbytheCongressintheyearfollowingaFIFAWorldCup,

eightvice-presidentsand15members,appointedbytheconfederationsandassociations.Itmeetsatleasttwiceayear,

withthemandateforeachmemberlastingfouryears,anditsroleincludesdeterminingthedates,locationsandformat

oftournaments,appointingFIFAdelegatestotheIFAB(thebodythatdeterminestheLawsoftheGameofassociation

football)andelectinganddismissingtheGeneralSecretaryontheproposaloftheFIFAPresident.

FIFA’sGeneralSecretaryisassistedinhisorherworkbymorethan25standingcommitteesandbytwojudicial

bodies,theFIFADisciplinaryCommitteeandtheFIFAAppealCommittee.Thecommitteesserveacrucialfunction,

astheytakedecisionsconcerningtheorganisationofcompetitionsandthedevelopmentoffootballingeneral.The

decisionsmadebythecommitteesareratifiedbytheExecutiveCommittee.

Source: http://www.fifa.com

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AFC AbaluhyaFootballClub

FC FootballClub


GEMA GikuyuEmbuMeruAssociation

KANU KenyaAfricanNationalUnion



CHAPTER 3: THE RISE AND FALL OF KENYAN FOOTBALL

Among the many KFF failures, the saddest is the failure to invest in youth and women’s football. The funds largely disappeared from the KFF youth and women’s football levies at every KFF match as well as the funds sent by FIFA. The KFF officials stole the future of our youth.

Stakeholders’TransitionCommitteeFinalReport,June2004

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Ports Authority-sponsored Bandari FC. However,thislaterperiodcontributedwell-knownplayersatthenationallevel,suchasBinziMwakolo,AbbasMagongo, Ibrahim Magogo, Mohammed AbbasandGeorgeOnyango.

Politics of tribe and

post-independence football

After independence, football managementbecame embroiled in politics. The AbaluhyaclubscametogethertoformAbaluhyaFC(1965)while Luo Union and the newly-formed LuoSports, supported by founding Vice-PresidentJaramogi Odinga and political rival TomMboyarespectively,pittedrivalpoliticalgroupsagainsteachother.WhentheupstartLuoSportssupplantedLuoUnionintheLeague,thecreamofNairobi-basedLuoplayersprotestedatwhattheysawasaMboyaconspiracybymoving tothe lakeside club, Kisumu All Stars. In 1968,however, leadersof theLuocommunity struckacompromisebybringingallLuoplayersunderthe Gor Mahia FC umbrella. The ethnicallyexclusive Abaluhya and Gor Mahia clubsdominatedKenyanfootballuntil thecorporate-sponsoredKenyaBreweriesFCwasfoundedin1970,thesuccessfulKenyaBreweriescompanyusing its financial might to poach key playersfromtheformerclubs.

Influential in the early Kenyan football scenewas Isaac Lugonzo who went on to becomeMayorofNairobi.Thepostindependencepoliticalrivalry set the stage for footballadministration tobeusedasa stepping stone topoliticalofficeas

THE RISE AND FALL OF KENYAN FOOTBALL�

The birth of the KFF

The Kenya Football Federation (KFF) replacedtheKenyaFootballAssociationin1960,theyearKenya became affiliated to FIFA. The KFF wasconstitutedin1963whentenclubsjoinedfromNairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa. It should benoted thatmostof theNairobiclubsdrew theirplayersandsupportersfromspecificethnicbases,a logical outcome of the way colonialism hadsegregated thehigh-densityresidentialestatesofthecity.BesidesLuoUnionandthecosmopolitanNairobi Strikers, the other founding clubs weredrawn from the various ethnic sub-groups thatwerelaterconvenientlydubbedtheAbaluhya13.

The rise of the football club

Kenyan football players of the colonial andearlyindependenceeramostlycamefromruralcommunities,areflectionoftheruralbaseofmostyouth.Increasingly,however,asthecountryhasbecomeurbanised,Kenya’sstarfootballershavegrown up in urban high density, low-incomeneighbourhoods. (This is not limited to Kenya;highdensity,poorcommunitieshaveproducedmanygiftedplayers, includingPele,MaradonaandLionelMessi.)

During the colonial and post-colonial era,Kenya’scoastalregion–notablyMombasaIsland–providedmanykeyplayerstothenationalteamwho at various points played for the dominantMombasa clubs Feisal and Mwenge (Liverpool),whichwereamongtheinauguralKFFleagueclubs.By the1990s, thecoastal region’s influencehadwaned,includingthatofitsflagshipclub,theKenya

13Luhyaclubs,includingBunyore,Kakamega,Marama,Bunyatso,SamiaUnionandBukusuBrotherhoodmergedtoformAbaluhya

United.http://www.kff.co.ke

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the prospective administrators aligned themselvesalong the emerging political blocs. For instancetheOdinga/Mboyapolitical camps, competing forsuccessiontoKenyatta,influencedwhowouldmakeitnotonlyinthenationalbutalsoinclubfootballadministration14. Local authority politics has alsoseenitsfairshareoffootballadministrators.

Weeding out tribalism?

For the politically repressive Moi presidency(1978-2002), this growth of strong parochialallegianceswasthreatening.Footballwonthekindof loyalty that could carry politically ambitiousofficials into parliamentary and local authoritypolitics,whetherMoiandthesolepoliticalparty,theKenyaAfricanNationalUnion (KANU) likedthemornot.Moresignificantly,thiscloutmadeitpossiblefordissentingcommunitiestoblockMoi/KANU preferred candidates from being electedintoleadership.

These are the circumstances under which theMoi regimebeganacampaignostensiblyaimedatstoppingtribalism,whichmanyobserverssawas cynical15. In sports, Moi’s decree transformedAbaluhyaFootballClub(AFC)intoAFCLeopards,while Gor Mahia wittily proposing to renameitselfGreat/GulfOlympicRangers (GOR).Whilethe Leopards name change stuck, Gor Mahiaretaineditsoriginalnamethroughtheintercessionofprominentminister,thelateRobertOuko16.TheAbaluhya/LeopardsnamechangewasaMoi-erastrategyostensiblydesignedtoweedethnicityout of social activities, by requiring associations,societies and other organisations to drop ethnicnames. This also saw various members-only

clubs change their names. Within Kenya’s Asiancommunity, for example, Goan and GymkhanaInstitutes became Nairobi and Premier Institutesrespectively17.

Fierce club rivalry

The regional backbone of Kenyan football hasalways been the western part of the country,hometotheAbaluhyaandLuoethnicgroups.TheneighbouringLuhyaandLuo,withdifferentethnicbackgrounds, became great football rivals overthe years. This translated into clashes that wereoftenviolent,especiallybetween1970and1990,which fed the Leopards/Gor Mahia dominanceof Kenyan football. Indeed, many of the othercompetitiveclubsactedasnurturinggrounds forplayersdestinedforAFCLeopardsandGorMahia,oralternatively,asavent for thesurplusplayersejected by the ‘big two’. Consequently, formerplayers from these two communities dominateKenyanfootball’sHallofFame.

The rivalry was such, that in the 1970s and1980sitwasunthinkablethataLuhyafootballercould turn out for Gor Mahia, or a Luo playerfor Abaluhya. Indeed, football lovers all overKenya increasingly found themselves aligningwith either Leopards or Gor Mahia, becomingin consequence, nominally Luhya or Luorespectively. Even supporters of other leagueclubs consciously or unconsciously identifiedwithoneortheotherofthesetwoclubs.

Thedivisionofseatingatthemainfootballvenues,NairobiCityStadiumandNyayoStadiumdidnothelp:Leopardssupportersoccupiedtheleftofthemainstand,whileGorMahiatooktheright.Football

14http://www.kff.co.ke15Moi’sextensionofKenyattaeraparochialismwasevidentinhisappointmentofunqualified,ininstancesbarelyliterateindi-

vidualstokeypublicoffices.AgooddiscussionofsuchparochialismistobefoundinWidner,J.(1992),TheRiseofaOne-PartyStateinKenya:From“Harambee!”to“Nyayo!”UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

16InpursuitofhisownsoundfootinginLuopolitics,retentionoftheGorMahianamewasthefirstofthreeissuesOukosuccess-fullychampionedfortheLuoin1987.TheothertwowerevictoryinacontinentalcupandthereturntoNyakach(Kisumu)ofOmieri,alargepythonbroughtforrecuperationattheNationalMuseumafterbeingburntinabushfire.

17Tribalorganisations,likeGEMAandLuoUnion,representinglargetribes,werealsotargetedbythesenamechanges.Manycommentators,pointingtoMoi’smembershipofaminoritytribe,didnotseealtruisminMoi’sattackontheethnicnamesofsocialinstitutions.Instead,theysawtheinitiativeasaMoistrategytoreininpowerfulorganisationsthatcouldfosteroppositiontohisheavy-handedregime.

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matches involving either club, and especiallybetweenthem,wereprecededandsucceededbyextensivefeastingandmuchdrinkingofalcoholatwell-knownvenuessuchasBurmaMarket,ShauriMoyo, Kaloleni and Nairobi West, transformingmatch-dayintoavolatilecarnival.

Managing football:

benefiting from ‘volunteerism’?

AswithmostKenyansports,footballmanagementatclubandnationallevelshastraditionallybeenvoluntary. Indeed, football executives oftenfind themselves using their private resourcesto keep their clubs’ activities afloat. To manypolitical aspirants, investing money in a highlypoliticisedfootball fraternity isgoodmarketing.However,thismodeofoperationalsoencouragesfootball executives to misuse meagre club andnational team resources, such as gate fees andsponsorship income. This vicious cycle of lowresourcesandmismanagement further fuels thedesire forpoliticalofficewhich is seen toofferopportunitiesforself-enrichment.

Vested interests

Despite their joint domestic dominance sincetheir formation, AFC Leopards and Gor MahiaFC went into decline following the mid-1980semergence of numerous corporate-sponsoredclubs, including those attached to statecorporations.Motivesforcorporatesponsorshipwerevaried:‘marketinginvestment’,wasthetermoftenusedasacoverbypolitical‘wannabes’incorporationswhoused(andmisused)theirofficetomarketthemselves18.

Country and club successes

In their heydays, Gor Mahia and AFC Leopardsalsodominated theEastandCentralAfricaClubChampionship, winning all competitions exceptonebetween1977and1987.Duringthisperiod,thenationalteam,HarambeeStars(underCoachMarshallMulwa), faredwell intheregion.Localclubs also did fairly well; Gor Mahia reachedthefinaloftheWinnersCupin1979,whileAFCLeopardsreachedthesemi-finalsoftheAfricaCupWinnersCupin1985.

On the continental scene, Kenya Breweriesreached the semi-finals of the 1973 Africa CupofChampionshipsClub;GorMahia reached thefinal of Cup Winners Cup in 1979; the semi-

KenyaBreweriesFCwas foundedduringKenneth

Matiba’s chairmanship of the brewing monopoly.

Matibaeventuallybecameamemberofparliament

(1983–1990 and 1992-1997), Cabinet Minister

(1985–1988) and presidential candidate (1992).

Meanwhile, he had been the KFF Chairman

(1974–1978)duringwhichperiodhefoughtmany

battleswithpoliticalhopefulDanOwino,aformer

diplomatandcareerpublicadministratorwhowas

also a key patron of Luo Union FC. Other KFF

chairswhoenteredpoliticsincludeMartinShikuku

(1970–1972), Job Omino (1984-1988), Clement

Gachanja(early1980s),PeterKenneth(1998-2000)

and Alfred Sambu (2005-2006). At club level,

the patrons and chairs of the big clubs contested

parliamentarypoliticswithvariedsuccess19.Local

authority politics has also seen its fair share of

footballadministrators.

Kenya Breweries FC and the political connection

18Forexample,KenyaPostsandTelecommunicationsCorporationsponsoredtheverysuccessfulKisumu-basedPostaFCamongstmanyothersportingteamsaspartofitscorporatesocialresponsibility.However,itsmotiveforsponsoringthesonofformerpresidentMoiinmotorrallyingcannothavebeenasnoble.

19Forexample,forAbaluhyaFC,thelistincludesprominentKenyanslikerallydriverPeterShiyukah,WalterMasiga,PeterOnalo,MPFredGumo,andformerMinisterMudambaMudavadiandlatersonMusalia,currentDeputyPrimeMinister.AtGorMahiaFCwereZackRamogo,PeterAnyumba,amongothers.

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finalsin1989;thesemi-finalsofthe1984AfricaCup of Championships Club, and became 1987champions of Africa Cup Winners Cup. AFCLeopards reached the semi-finals of Africa CupWinnersCupin1985andthesemi-finalsofAfricaCupofChampionshipsClubin1968.

HarambeeStarshaveonlyqualifiedforthebiennialAfrica Cup of Nations five times (1972, 1988,1990,1992and2004)however,theyhaveneverprogressedbeyondthefirstround.HarambeeStars’greatestmomentcameintheKenya-hosted1987AllAfricaGamesfootballfinal,inwhichtheylostnarrowlytocontinentalgiantsEgypt.

Faded glory

1987wasthesummitofKenyanfootballattainment:Gor Mahia won a continental club cup whileHarambeeStarsnarrowlylostthefinaloftheAllAfricaGames football tournament,whichKenyahosted, to Egypt. Then began the decline of thecommunity-backedclubsthroughthetappingandtransferofprimeplayersbycorporate-sponsored,institutionalandforeignclubs.Forinstance,bothAFCLeopardsandGorMahialostacestrikerstoEgyptianclubs.

Kenyan football in decline

As companies and institutions began theirsponsorshipsof community clubs, the conceptof ‘professional’ came into play. In the mid-1980s Volcano United became Kenya’s firstprofessional (but short-lived) football club.While AFC Leopards received sponsorshipfrom Crown Paints and for a short time weretwinnedwithasmallEnglishpremiershipclub,Gor Mahia and other community-based clubs

struggled with financing, especially when gaterevenuesdeclinedwithkeyplayersdefectingtopayingclubs,andamidstgrossmisappropriationof resources by administrators20. The growingcommercialisation of player acquisition meantthatstarplayersbreachedtheethnicdivide.

Inthe1990s,corporateandinstitution-sponsoredclubs shifted power away from community-basedclubs.Thenewprofessionalismmeantthatplayersfeltsecurewhiletheywerebeingpaidandknewthat,aslongastheyplayedwell,theywereattractive tootherclubs.Themain supportersofKenyancommunity-basedfootballclubsremainsKenyans living in informal settlements such asMathareandKibera.

Apartfromthelossofcommunity-basedclubs,otherfactorsunderminedthequalityofKenyanfootballduring the 1990s: the deterioration of voluntarymanagement; a declining standard of managersandofficials21;andtheriseoftelevisedfootball.

Meanwhile, a shift occurred as the new clubmanagers were employees in the respectivesponsoring corporations22. Indeed, whereasprevious national football executives had beenlargelyself-madebusinessmen,theyear2000sawthetopKFFjobgotoanexecutivefromCocaCola,Maina Kariuki. This change did not, however,bring about a reduction in mismanagement andcorruptionasthefollowingchapterdemonstrates.

Apart from deteriorating standards in thegame (including the issue of safety of fans),globalisation,manifestedinthetransferofAfricanplayers to Europe and the increasing access tosatellite television and the internet, are amongthe reasons why Kenyan football fans began tosupportforeignteams.

20Community-basedclubsinvariablydependedgreatlyontheprivatefinancialresourcesoftheirofficialswhoconsequentlyfrequentlydippedtheirfingersintotheclubkittyasameansofrefundingpreviouslyinvestedprivateresources.

21Poorofficiatingwasperceivedaspossiblematchfixing,leadingtoriots,injuriesanddamage.Dissatisfactionwiththeofficiatingdur-ingthe1997seasonledMathareUnitedtovideotapematchproceedingstobeusedasevidenceinpost-matchappeals.SeeMunro,B.(2005),“GreedversusGoodGovernance:thefightforcorruption-freefootballinKenya”.ApaperpresentedtotheFourthWorldCommunicationConferenceonSportand

Society.November6-10,2005,Copenhagen,Denmark.22Thus,forexample,amongtheseniorBandariFCmanagerswastheKenyaPortsAuthority’sHumanResourcesManager.

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KFF CHAIRPERSONS SINCE 1963 AND THEIR PUBLIC ROLES

Comments

Theofficewasdisbandedbythegovernmentonallegationsofcorruption

AschairmanofKenyaBreweriesFootballClub(nowTuskerFC),MatibawalkedoutontheKenyaFootballAssociation(KFA)toformtheKFFafterbeinglockedoutoftheKFAelectionsthatyear.

TheofficewasdisbandedbytheGovernment

TheofficewasdisbandedbythegovernmentoncorruptionallegationsbutFIFAintervenedThrownoutofofficebyrebelgroup

Office Status ElectedElectedElected

CaretakerCommitteeElectedElectedElected

ElectedElected

CaretakerCommittee

Elected

Elected

Elected

Elected

Elected

Tenure1963Mid60s*-19701970-1972

1972

197219741974-1978

1978-19841984-1988

*

Early90s*-1996

1996-2000

2001-2004

2004-2007

2007todate

NameIsaacLugonzoJohnKasyokaMartinShikuku

BillMartins

WilliamsNgaahDanOwinoKennethMatiba

ClementGachanjaJobOmino

MathewA.Karauri

JobOmino

PeterKenneth

MainaKariuki

AlfredSambu

MohammedHatimy

Public Life Mayor,Nairobi

MP,Buteresince1963withshortbreaksuntilhewasoustedin1988.Herecapturedtheseatin1992.

MP,Kiharu(1983–1990;1992-1997),CabinetMinister(1985–1988)andpresidentialcandidate(1992GeneralElections).

MP,Dagoretti1983-1988MP,KisumuTownFirstattemptatparliamentarypolitics,1988.HeranagainstthelateDrRobertOukofortheKisumuTownseat.MP,TiganiaEast1979-1992ChiefExecutive,KenyaLiteratureBureau.MP,KisumuTown.ServedasDeputySpeaker,NationalAssemblyandAssistantMinisterforForeignAffairs.

MP,Gatangasince2002formerManagingDirectorKenyaReinsuranceCompany.AssistantMinistersince2003.TopexecutiveatCoca-Cola.

MP,Webuyesince2007formerchairmanofAFCLeopardsfootballclub.NominatedCouncillor,Mombasa.

*Exactdatesforthesewerenotreadilyavailable

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CAF ConfederationofAfricanFootballCAS CourtforArbitrationinSportsFAP FinancialAssistanceProgrammeFIFA FederationInternationaledeFootballAssociationFKL FootballKenyaLimitedICCG Inter-ClubsConsultativeGroupKEFOCA KenyaFootballCoachesAssociationKEFORA KenyaFootballRefereesAssociationKENFA KenyaFootballAssociationKFF KenyaFootballFederationKLTA KenyaLawnTennisAssociationKNC KFFNormalisationCommitteeKNSC KenyaNationalSportsCouncilKPFG KenyaPremiershipFootballGroupKRFU KenyaRugbyFootballUnionMYSA MathareYouthSportsAssociationNIC NormalisationInterimCommitteeSGM SpecialGeneralMeetingSTC Stakeholders’TransitionCommitteeUEFA UnionofEuropeanFootballAssociation


CHAPTER 4: KENYAN FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS

“That Kenyans are passionate lovers of football is not in doubt, but Kenyans doubt whether football administrators are capable of rising above petty federation politics for the sake of the national squad.”

T.Ngare,“ANaggingConcern”,TheStandard,April3,2009

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Despite (or perhaps because of) the tribalism ofpost-independencefootball,gamesstillmanagedtoattract growing crowds, raising standards towardsthe1980sdominanceoftheEastandCentralAfricanregion.However,inthemid-1990s,KenyalosttheopportunitytohosttheAfricaCupofNationsfinalsduetomanagementpoliticsandthefailuretoassureCAFthatasufficientnumberofqualitystadiawouldbereadyintime23.ItisdifficulttoestimatetheadverseeffectofthislostopportunityforglobalexposureonKenyanfootball.

Poor leadership, poor governance and lack of accountability

Kenyan football plodded on, even though thedeteriorating international results repeatedlyraised questions about how to reclaim pastglories.WhereWestandCentralAfricanplayersweremakingtheirmarkintopEuropeanleagues,Kenyan stars found only inauspicious short-termcontracts,notablyintheMiddleEast.Thesefactorscoincidedwithahighturnover inoffice-bearers,whoconsequentlyhadlittleopportunitytomakealong-termimpactonthegame24.

However, the current football crisis inKenyanfootball grows largely from the failings of the2000-2004 administration of Maina Kariuki,Hussein Swaleh and Mohamed Hatimy as theKFFChairman,SecretaryGeneralandTreasurerrespectively.

Dissatisfaction with this regime led the eighttop football clubs to form the Inter-ClubsConsultative Group (ICCG) in December 2000.ICCGdeveloped50reformproposalstoimprovefootball management, which the KFF Chairmanrefusedtoconsider25.

The ICCG, with the help of TransparencyInternational, demanded KPMG/FIFA-appointedauditors to auditKFFaccounts, causing theKFFto threaten the signatory clubs with disciplinaryaction, even though the KFF had persistentlyviolatedKenyan lawby failing tofile its returnswiththeRegistrarofSocietiessinceMay2002.

In September 2003, 11 top premiership clubsresignedfromtheKFFtoformtheKenyaPremierFootballGroup(KPFG),whichco-optedofficialsof the Kenya Football Referees Association(KEFORA) and the Kenya Football CoachesAssociation(KEFOCA).

KFF’s constitution:

the bane of Kenyan football?

The KFF constitution had seen little change inthe years leading to the 2004 crisis. Apart fromunscrupulousofficials,manyoftheKFF’sfailureswereattributedtoaweakconstitution.Atthetime,thegreatestchallengefacingtheKFFwasabuseoftheelectoralprocess.Thereviewoftheconstitution

KENYAN FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS

23In1993,Kenyawaschosentohostthe1996AfricaNationsCup.ThegovernmentcommittedtobuildinganewstadiuminMombasa,oneoftheconditionssettoqualifytohostthetournament.CAFsentdelegationafterdelegationtoinquireonKenya’sprogressindevelopingthenewfacility.Eachtime,theyreceivedpromisesthatworkonthenewstadiumwouldsoonbegin.Finally,CAFrevokedthehostingrightsandawardedthemtoSouthAfrica.Atthetime,theKFFwasledbyJobOmino,anoppositionleader.

24ContrastthistotheexperienceoftheformativeEnglishFAyearswhenameresixpresidentspresidedoverthesevendecadesbetween1863and1939,includinga33-yeartenurefrom1890to1923.OneFAsecretariatheadpresidedfrom1934to1962.

25SeeMunro,B.(2005),‘GreedvsGoodGovernance:thefightforcorruptionfreefootballinKenya.’AreportpresentedtotheFourthWorldCommunicationConferenceonSportandSociety.November6-10,2005,Copenhagen,Denmark.

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Massive misappropriation revealed

EightPremierLeagueClubscametogetherinDecember2000tocreatetheInter-ClubConsultativeGroup(ICCG)

topetitiontheKFFovernegativetrends.InspiteofKFFresistance,theICCGprotestsubsequentlyunravelleda

complexweboffinancialintrigue.AcopyoftheKFFauditfor2000wasleaked,revealingmajorirregularities

intheFederation’sbook-keeping;onlyKshs2.1million(US$26,023)wasrecordedforgatecollectionsduring

2000,althoughtheyearwitnessedover300league,cupandcontinentalmatches.Meanwhile,stadiumexpenses

tripledfromKshs785,225(US$10,066)in1999tooverKshs2.3million(US$29,487)in2000,although150

fewermatcheswereplayed thatyear.Officialallowancesandyouthexpensessimilarly rosemassively,but

inexplicably,duringthesameperiod.Inresponsetothesealarmingfindings,theICCGsentalettertotheKFF

SecretaryGeneralinMay2001askingtheKFFtocallameetingofallclubstodiscusstheauditissueandthe

generalissuesofaccountability.Theletterwasreturnedunopenedwithanannotationstating:“Mailback.We

donotknowthisgroupsincetheyarenotourmembers”26

ISSUES RAISED BY THE KPFG AGAINST MAINA KARIUKI’S OFFICE (2000-2004)

Article Management issueI MovingtheSecretariat,includingfiles,topremisesotherthanthosedulyrecognisedbytheRegistrar

ofSocieties’office.III InMay2001,HusseinSwaleh,theKFFSecretaryGeneral,admittedrepeatedfailurestoadhereto

theConstitution,includingfailingtoactonrelegatedclubs“duetopoliticalinterference.Theofficefurtheradmittedthatrigorousapplicationofrules,includingcollectionoffines,wouldmeanclubsnotplayingatall.TheFederationalsofailedtoincludetheKEFORAinitscoachingandtrainingactivities.

V Continued violation of the constitutional requirement that its top office holders be ordinarilyresidentinorownorrentpropertyinNairobi.

VI ContinuedviolationoftheKshs1,000pettycashceiling.VIII Habitualdelaysinresolutionofappealsbeyondtheprescribedthreeweeks.IX Failure to hold the constitutionally mandated quarterly meetings of the National Governing

Council.XII PersistentdisregardoftherequirementthatpaymentsaboveKshs1,000authorisedbythetopofficials

(theChairman,SecretaryGeneralandTreasurer)beratifiedbytheimmediatesucceedingFinanceCommittee meeting. KEFORA was further excluded from the National League & CompetitionscommitteeandtheTechnical&Trainingcommittee.Finally,theconstitutionandprocessesoftheDisciplinaryandAppealsCommitteewererepeatedlymismanaged.

XIII Failuretosupplyauditedannualstatementofaccounts.XIV Failuretoallowmemberinspectionofbooksofaccountwithinathreeworkingdaystimeframeas

providedbytheConstitution.Indeed,theaccountshadremainedinaccessibletomemberssinceFebruary2001.

XV Failuretoconspicuouslydisplayitsaccountsatitsregisteredoffice,ortoproduceadequatecopiesofitsaccountsfordistributiontoallmembersincludingbranchesandsub-branchoffices.

XIX Failuretofacilitatearbitrationofdisputesbyindividualsmutuallyacceptabletodisputants.XXI FailuretosubmittotheauthorityoftheKNSC,suchasitsNovember2001orderforthereplayofa

disputedmatch.

26TransparencyInternational,2001.GlobalCorruptionReport2001,p.76,Berlin,TransparencyInternational

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wasaimedatpreparingforfreeandfairelections,and for it to serve as thebasis for improving themanagementoffootballinthecountry.

For instance, after the decision of the High CourtconfirmedthatthetermofofficeoftheformerKFFofficialshadexpiredonMarch24,2004,therewasno provision in the KFF Constitution that wouldallow for an amendment that would facilitate an

election27. This necessitated the government’sandFIFA’Sinterventionsasdiscussedbelow.TheKFFConstitutionmandatestheoutgoingofficetoconductelections foranewoffice.However, inthiscase,theirtermhadexpired.

Thecourt’sdecisionmadeit imperative thatFIFA,CAFandthegovernmentrapidlyintervenetoaddressthevacuuminfootballadministrationinKenya.

27ThiswasfollowingtheMombasaHighCourtdeclarationthattheMainaKariukiofficecouldnot“doanythingvalidand lawfulasregardsrunningtheaffairsoftheKFF”afterthe24March(2004)expiryofitstenure”,meaningthateffectively therewerenobona fideKFFofficials.

Laws governing sports

ThereisnosinglelawthatgovernssportsinKenya.Sportsrulesencompassamultitudeofareasoflawbroughttogetherinspecificwaysaccordingtothesporttobeparticipatedin.Thecommonlyapplicablelawsinsportsareinareassuchascontracts,tortsandantitrust,agency,constitutional,labour,criminal,taxissuesetc.Theapplicationsofsportslawsisdependentonthestatusoftheathlete/player,whethertheplayerinquestionisparticipatingasanamateur,professional,andininternationalsports.

Amateur Sports: Inthiscategory,activitiesareoftenorganisedandmanagedbyindividualgroupsthatestablishrulesforeligibilityandcompetition.Therangeofactivitiesincludesinter-estatefootball,officecompetitions,casualweekendathletics,schoolscompetitions,etc.Whetheranathleteiseligibletocompeteinamateureventsdependsontherulesofthegoverningassociation.

Manyeventsformerlyreservedforamateurs,suchastheOlympics,wereopenedtoprofessionalsinthe1980sand1990s.Ofnoteinthiscategoryisthatcourtsareoftenunwillingtointerferewithactionsinthiscategoryofsportsaslongastherespectiverulesarereasonablyapplied.

Professional Sports: The most important aspect under this category is the relationship between theindividualplayerandtheteamowner/sbecausetheplayer/athleteispaidforhisservice.Thisisacontractualrelationshipgovernedbythelawofcontract.

Today,mostsportsdisciplinesunderthiscategorynowhaveaStandardPlayer’sContractwhichservesasamodelemploymentcontractbetweentheplayersandteamowners.Manytimes,thiscontractismodifiedtoaccommodate thespecialneedsand talentsof individualplayers.Theparties involved include teamowners,promoters,agents,advertisersandthegoverningbodyoftheparticularsport.

International Sports: The twomajor international sports competitions are theOlympics, sponsoredby theInternational Olympic Committee, and the World Cup, sponsored by FIFA. Continents/regions also organisetheirownmajorcompetitions;inAfrica,themajorcompetitionsaretheAfricanNationsCup-football,organisedbyConfederationofAfrican Football (CAF), and theAllAfricanGameswhichbrings together various sportsdisciplines

ThereareseventeenlawsintheofficialLawsoftheGame.Thesamelawsaredesignedtoapplytoalllevelsof football,althoughcertainmodifications forgroupssuchas juniors, seniors,womenandpeoplewithphysicaldisabilitiesarepermitted.Thelawsareoftenframedinbroadterms,whichallowflexibilityintheirapplicationdependingonthenatureofthegame.TheLawsoftheGamearepublishedbyFIFA.

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Contradictory FIFA intervention

AsKenyanfootballmanagementwasdegenerating,FIFAsentenvoysinApril2004,includingJeromeChampagne (FIFA Deputy General Secretary)and Dr Joseph Mifsud (Malta, UEFA ExecutiveCommittee),toinvestigateandmediatethecrisis.

Theirinterventionwasofquestionablevalue;forexample,incontradictionofFIFA’sadvocacyofexclusive arbitration over disputes (rather thanlitigationthroughthecourts),MifsudadvisedtheFederationto“waitforthedecisionoftheHighCourtinNairobithatstillhastodecidewhethertheorderof theHighCourt inMombasa…willbeoverruled.”

Mifsudwaseithermisinformedormisunderstoodthe situation, since the Nairobi and MombasaHighCourtsareatpar,andonecannotoverturnthedecisionoftheother.

In July 2004, after Hatimy (and others) werechargedwiththetheftofKshs55millionofFIFA/KFFfunds,theyweresubsequentlybarredbyFIFAfrom managing the sport in October 2005. Yet,withthetheftcaseunresolved,HatimyregisteredFKL in June 2008, with FIFA support, in grossviolationoftheKenyanlawsunderwhichfootballmanagementwasregistered28.

Enter Football Kenya Ltd.

Fast forward to June 2008: following persistentmanagement wrangles that saw parallel SpecialGeneralMeetings(SGMs)forelectionstakeplaceinMay2007,andamidstacourtcase institutedinJuly2004againstMohammedHatimy(theKFFChair)forallegedtheft,theHatimygroupregisteredFootballKenyaLimited(FKL)withtheRegistrarofCompanies,aninitiativethatFIFAhadapparentlyalreadyacknowledged29.(Thetimelineattheendof this chapter highlights the complex chain of

events in football management from September2003toApril2010.)

As the FIFA-recognised football managementbody, the FKL developed its own 84-articleconstitution based on FIFA Statutes, togetherwithaMemorandumandArticlesofAssociationspecifyingobjectivesandagovernancestructure.

FKL confirmed as Kenya’s

football governing body

By May 2008, FKL had acquired exclusiverecognitionbyFIFAwhichthreatenedtobanKenya

28KEFOCA,KEFOPA,KEFRApetitionFIFAontheFKL.Seehttp://www.kenyafootball.com29However,MunrocreditsFIFA,andparticularlyChampagne,withfinallyhaving,afteryearsofignoringKenyanclubs’appeals

forhelp,insistedthatKFFofficialsrespecttherightsofclubsandtheFIFAandKFFstatutes,andtherebypreventedarenewed“implosion”ofKenyanfootball,Munro,2005,p.11.

Resolving disputes through FIFA

Article4(2)obligestheAssociationtoprovideameansfordisputeresolutionbetweenaffiliatedmembers. Indeed, Article 64 (2) categoricallyprohibits recourse to ordinary courts of lawover disputes, unless specifically provided forinFIFAStatutes.FIFAhas itsowndisciplinaryframeworks concerning infringement of theLaws of Football, provided for under Article57. However, for disputes between FIFA andmembers, Article 62 (1) and (2) recognise aCourt of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) and itsCodeofSports-relatedArbitration,inthecontextof Swiss law and other FIFA statutes. Article63 (2) provides for recourse to CAS when allotherchannelsofdisputeresolutionhavebeenexhausted. In delineating CAS’ jurisdiction,Article 63 (1) allows it to handle all appealsagainstanyfinaldecisionsbyFIFA’slegalbodies,aswellasdecisionsbyconfederations,aslongassuchappealsarefiledwithin21daysofthenotificationofthedecision.Article64(1)obligesconfederations and associations to recogniseCASandagree toabideby itsdecisions.Thismust be reflected in the constitutions of suchconfederationsandassociations.

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from football should the government enforcethe KFF’s status as the country’s only legitimatefootballmanagementauthority.

In June thatyear, theNairobiHighCourt ruledagainst Sam Nyamweya, the KFF Chairman’spleatobarHatimylestFIFAexcludeKenyafromitscompetitionstothedetrimentoftheinterestsof the youth. This decision was upheld by anOctober Court of Appeal judgement which,however, conditioned this on the impendingDecember elections at which all stakeholderscouldcontestoffice.

HatimyconductedtheKFFSGMinNovember2008withFIFAandCAFrepresentatives inattendance.The meeting purportedly wound up the KFF andanointedtheFKLasitssuccessor;yet,amongstotherirregularities,theKFF’sconstitutionalprovisionthata resolution to dissolve be ratified by a secondGeneralMeetingafter30dayswasignored.

Further, on 22 December, the Registrar ofSocieties’ confirmed Nyamweya’s as the bonafide KFF office, which meant Hatimy had nolegalstatusunderwhichtoconveneafederationGeneralMeeting.

Nonetheless,theFKLSecretaryGeneralreportsthecompanytohaveassumedalltheKFF’sassetsandliabilitiesunderFIFA’sGoalProject.ThebonafideKFF’s SGM in December re-elected Nyamweya,an outcome that FIFA ignored to the extent ofeven dismissing the KFF’s request for recoursetoarbitration throughCAS30. InApril2010,CASruledinfavouroftheFKL.

FIFA double standards?

FIFA’s intervention in the Kenyan crisis since2004raisesconcern;inwhatseemstobeacase

of double standards, Dr Joseph Mifsud (Malta,UEFA Executive Committee) accused the SportsMinister of being “very inconsistent since oneday he supports the leaders of the KFF and thenextdayhedoes somethingagainst them.”Yet,FIFAitselfisguiltyofsuch‘flip-flopping’:withtheHatimytheftcaseyetunresolved,andaFIFAbanfromfootballmanagement,HatimyregisteredFKLand consequently hijacked KFF functions withFIFAsupport31ingrossviolationofKenyan–andindeed,FIFA–laws.

Inbacking theFKL,FIFAignores the failureof theKFF top officials (Kariuki, Swaleh and Hatimy) toabidebytherelevantKenyanstatutesandtheKFFconstitutiontoconductelectionsbeforetheexpiryoftheirtermon24March2004,leadingtheMombasaHighCourttodeclarethatgrantingcontroltoHatimy“maydoirreparabledamagetotheKFF.”

Limited legitimacy, lots of cash

Meanwhile, Kenyan football suffers as FKLmonopolises FIFA’s Financial AssistanceProgramme (FAP) resources (US$ 250,000 peryear–roughlyKshs18.75million)andiswithoutany real structures outside Nairobi. While theFKLclaimslegitimacy,totheextentthatanysub-nationalstructuresexist,theyarebasedonthe21-article KFF constitution, which has few parallelswiththeFKL’s83-articleconstitution32.Yet,FKLisreluctanttoseekanimmediategrassrootsmandatebasedon itsownconstitution,with theSecretaryGeneral emphasising thatKenya is part of FIFA’sSpecialGovernanceImprovementProjectforwhicharoadmapwastobeprovidedinlate200933.

Notwithstanding the deeper mess into whichFKLhassunkKenyanfootball,thereseemslittlescope for getting FIFA to awake to the rot itcontinuestofinanceinKenyanfootball.

30KFFfiledproceedingsatCASinMarch2009.InApril2010,CASrendereditsfinaldecisioninthearbitrationprocedurebetweenKFFandFIFA,dismissingtheKFF’srequestthatitberecognisedasthebodygoverningfootballinKenyaanddeclaringFKLthesolelegitimatefootballadministrationbodyinKenyarecognisedbyKenyanlawinlinewithFIFAstatutes.http://www.tas-cas.orgCAS2008/O/1808KenyaFootballFederationvs.FIFA

31Thissupportwasintheformofendorsement,correspondenceandthepresenceofFIFArepresentativesatFKLmeetings.SeeCASjudgementibidparagraphs14,19and20.

32TheFKLisessentiallyusingtheKFF’ssub-nationalstructures–apositionreinforcedbyparagraph23and24ofCASwhichcitescorrespondencebetweenFIFA,theFKLandtheGovernmentofKenya.

33http://www.kenyafootball.com.NospecificinformationcouldbefoundontheSpecialGovernanceImprovementProjectontheFIFAwebsite.

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Attempts towards constitutional reform: the Stakeholders’ Transitional Committee and the Normalisation Interim Committee

Following the Mombasa High Court declarationthattheMainaKariukiofficecouldnot“doanythingvalidandlawfulasregardsrunningtheaffairsoftheKFF”afterthe24March(2004)expiryofitstenure”,meaningeffectively therewerenobonafideKFFofficials,focusonreviewoftheconstitutionbecameimperative to streamline football management inthepost-Kariukiperiod(after2004).

The sports minister moved quickly to form theStakeholdersTransitionalCommittee (STC) tofillthegapleftbytheKFFoffice.

The Stakeholders’ Transitional Committee (STC)TheSTC’stermsofreferenceforthethreemonthsendingJune2004wereto:• runtheaffairsoftheKFF,• reviewfootballmanagementandrecommend

suitablechanges,• reviewtheKFFconstitution,and• organisetheelectionofanewoffice

The STC chair was Mike Boit, a formerCommissioner of Sports, and an athlete. Othermembers were former footballers, retired andcurrentfootballmanagers,Kenya’sCommissionerof Police, and representatives of KEFORA andKEFOCA. To ensure non-interfering governmentoversight,thesittingCommissionerofSportswasanon-votingmember.

One of the conclusions of the STC report wasthat a new direction in football managementrequiredacleanbreakwith thepast.The reportalsorecommendedtheestablishmentofthenewlynamedKenyaFootballAssociation(KENFA)withanewconstitution.

The Normalisation Interim Committee (NIC)However, KENFA’s June 2004 registration atthe Registrar of Societies was blocked by a

court injunction filed by the KFF. This led tothe establishment of the Normalisation InterimCommittee (NIC), following a meeting betweendelegationsfromKenyaandrepresentativesfromFIFA thatwasheldon July9, 2004, at the FIFAheadquarters in Zurich. The aim of the meetingwastotrytoresolvethecurrentchallengesfacingfootball inKenyaand tochartaway forward infootballmanagement.

The Normalisation Interim Committee (NIC) satfromJunetoDecember2004,andwasheadedbyKipchoge Keino. The NIC was expected to workwiththehelpandunderthesupervisionofFIFAto:

• reviewtheKFFrulesandregulationstofacilitateanelection

• ensure that regulation of the election wastransparentandacceptabletoallparties

• source commitment from the clubs in theofficial KFF Premier League and the rebelleaguetomergeintoonePremierLeague

• organise the league expected to begin inSeptember2004

TheNICalsoproducedadraftconstitution,basedextensively on FIFA Statutes, but which FIFArejected.

The football representation dilemma

WhiletheSTCandtheNICclaimtheirrespectivereviewprocessestohavebeenobjective,itshouldbenotedthatamajorproblemofKenyanfootballhas been the difficulty of ascertaining the bonafide representatives of football. This observationcanbemadefollowingthe impasseexperiencedin 2004 when KFF elections were not held asscheduled. Thereafter, anybody could lay claimto the KFF office as all it took was finances tofacilitate ‘delegates’ to assemble for a GeneralMeeting and purport to elect the financiers asKFF officials. The ability to finance ‘delegates’hasalwaysbeenasignificantfactoringrassrootsconsultative processes. Consequently, aspiring

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and incumbent leaders are able to pre-selectfavourable delegates, undermining objectivityin processes such as the search for opinionsonreformstotheconstitution.

The STC and the NIC proposals for reform

In constituting the STC and the NIC, consciouseffortsweremadetoensurewiderepresentationoffootballstakeholders.Duringthelong-standingwranglesinthefootballfraternity,bothcommitteeswerechairedby‘outsiders’(BoitandKeino)whohad nonetheless distinguished themselves asglobalathletesandlocalsportsadministrators.

While both committees’ constitutions drewvery heavily on FIFA Statutes, the STC processcreating the 57-article KENFA constitution was

arguablymoreconsultativethantheNICprocessand its 62-article constitution. Although bothdraftsprovidedforarbitrationbyaseven-memberboard and barred resort to normal courts, theydifferedinsmallbutsignificantwaysasshowninthetablebelow.

FKL’s constitution

FKL’s constitution has ten football-specificobjectives,very similar to theSTC’s fiveandthe NIC’s 16, which include “being the soleorganisation in charge of the administration,management and/or running of associationfootball or soccer in Kenya…”. The tablebelow summarises key articles in the FKLconstitutionagainstproposalsintheSTCandNICdrafts.

STC proposals

OptedforEnglishastheexclusiveofficiallanguage

Electionofnationalofficebearerseverytwoyears

10standingcommittees

Todissolvethefootballmanagementbody,theSTCdraftrequiredatwo-thirdsmajorityofmembersattendinganAnnualorExtraordinaryGeneralMeeting,afterwhichassetswouldbedividedbetweentheorganisationsresponsibleforprimaryandsecondaryschoolfootball.

NIC proposals

RecognisedbothEnglishandKiswahili

Afour-yeartenurefornationalofficebearers

13standingcommittees

Todissolvethefootballmanagementbody,theNICdraftrequiredatwo-thirdsGeneralMeetingmajoritydecisiontobeconfirmedbyafurtherGeneralMeetingafterwhichassetswouldbehandedovertotheKNSCwhichwouldbankthefinancesuntilanewfootballmanagementbodyhadbeeninstituted.

FKL constitution

Afour-yeartenurefornationalofficebearers.Candidatesshouldbebetween40and58yearsofageandwithoutacriminalrecord“saveforpettyoffences”andmusthave“aCertificateinAdministrationandManagementofFootballwhichisrecognisedbyFIFAandCAF

ProvidesforanappointedGeneralSecretarywhopresidesover16standingcommittees.

Todissolvethefootballmanagementbody,theconstitutionrequiresatwo-thirdsmajoritytodecideondissolutionwithassetsgoingtothe“PublicTrustee…untilFKLisre-established(eventhough)thefinalAnnualGeneralMeetingmay…chooseanotherrecipientfortheassets…”

AllowsforarbitrationindisputesbetweenFKLandmembers

SUMMARY OF KEY ARTICLES IN THE FKL CONSTITUTION AGAINST PROPOSALS IN THE STC AND NIC DRAFTS

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TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN KENYAN FOOTBALL (2000 – 2010)

Date Event

March2000 Maina Kariuki wins election as the 13th KFF Chairman, Hussein SwalehSecretaryGeneralandMohammedHatimyastheNationalTreasurer

July2000 ThefirstinaseriesofcorruptionallegationsaremadeagainsttheKariuki-runKFFasanestimatedKsh1millionwasreportedlystolenfromthegatereceiptsoftheKenyavsSwazilandmatch.

Thirdquarterof2000 An audit is ordered and exposes further major irregularities in KFFbookkeeping.

December2000 EightPremierleagueclubsunitetocreatetheInter-ClubConsultativeGroup(ICCG)andpetitiontheKFFovermismanagementandcorruption.TheICCGprotestsubsequentlyunravelsacomplexweboffinancialintrigueinspiteofKFFresistance.

May2001 ICCGclubs’ letter toKFFSecretaryGeneral toholdmeetingof all clubs todiscuss issuesoffinancial accountability rejectedbyKFF.Direct appeals toGoK,CAFandFIFAarealsounsuccessful.

May2002 Sports Minister Francis Nyenze dissolves the KFF citing corruption andmismanagementandappointsacaretakercommittee. Nyenze’sdecision isreversedbythehighcourt.

June2002 ParliamentdemandsthatpeopleimplicatedincorruptionandfraudintheKFFadministrationbeprosecuted.

September2003 11toppremiershipclubsresignfromtheKFFtoformtheKenyaPremierFootballGroup(KPFG),whichco-optsofficialsoftheKenyaFootballRefereesAssociation(KEFORA)andtheKenyaFootballCoachesAssociation(KEFOCA).

October2003 TheKenyanPremierLeagueLtd(KPL)isincorporatedasaprivatecompany.

November2003 The Kenya National Sports Council (KNSC) hosts a reconciliation meetingbetweentheKenyaPremiershipFootballGroup(KPFG)andtheKFFatwhichthe KFF chairman promises remedial measures. These included involvingfootballclubsintheKFFconstitutionreview,allowingclubsaccesstoauditedaccountsforthe2000-2002period,andpayingitsdebtstoclubsandreferees.However,hedidnotdeliveronthesepromises.

Over the last few decades poor leadership,poor governance and lack of accountability,coupled with inadequate policy and legislativeframeworks, led to the deterioration of footballin Kenya to alarming levels that required

governmentandjudicialinterventionbothlocallyandinternationally.

ThetablebelowprovidesasnapshotofeventsinKenyanfootballoverthelastdecade.

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November2003 KPLlaunchestheworld’sfirstTransparencyCupwiththethemeof“Kickingcorruptionoutoffootball”.

March2004 In response to an applicationby theMombasaKFFbranch, theMombasaHigh Court declares that the Maina Kariuki office could not “do anythingvalidandlawfulasregardsrunningtheaffairsoftheKFF”afterthe24March(2004)expiryofitstenure.Consequently,thesportsministermovesquicklytoformtheStakeholders’TransitionalCommittee(STC)tofillthegapleftbytheKFFoffice.

March2004 Internal KFF wrangles escalate and the KFF fixtures become increasinglychaotic.KFFleaguescollapse.

April2004 TheKenyaRevenueAuthority(KRA)suestheKFFoverfailuretoremitKShs1.7million in taxes, and imposes afineofKShs500,000or sixmonths inprison.Meanwhile,theKPFGorganisestheTransparencyCup.

June2004 TheKPFGestablishestheHarambeeStarsmanagementboardtopreparethenational teamforqualifyingmatchesfor theAfricaCupofNationand2010WorldCup.However,withallarrangementsalreadyinplacefortheinternationalencounterinJune,FIFAcancelsandsuspendsKenya’smembershipforallegedgovernmentinterferenceintherunningoffootball.

June2004 The STC, in partnership with Transparency International-Kenya, holds aconferenceinLimurutodebateanewconstitutionforKenyanFootball.ThemeetingapprovesthedraftconstitutionforanewKenyanFootballAssociation(KENFA). It also concludes that the KFF is bankrupt and recommends thatformerofficialsbeinvestigatedwithaviewtoprosecutionandexclusionfromholdingofficeinfuture,amongotherrecommendations34.

June2004 TheSTCissues“FortheGoodoftheGame”,acomprehensivediscussionpaperonfootballinKenyawithproposalsforthewayforward35.

July2004 NegotiationsbetweenthegovernmentandFIFAleadtotheestablishmentoftheKFFNormalisationCommittee(KNC)headedbyKipchogeKeino,aprominentKenyanOlympianandchairof theNationalOlympicCommitteeofKenya.TheKNCismandatedtodevelopanewKFFconstitution,holdfreshelectionsbytheendof2004,andunifytheKFFandKPFGleagues.

34Thedocument’sfulltitleis“FortheGoodoftheGame:AchievingGoodGovernance,FinancialTransparencyandStakeholderAccountabilityforSavingandImprovingKenyanFootball.”

35Themeetingalsorecommendedthat:theRegistrarofSocietiesreviewtheKFF’slegalstatuswithaviewtodeterminingitsabilitytomeetitsoutstandingfinancialobligations;theKFFconstitutionbereplacedwiththedraftKENFAconstitution(whoseregistrationwassubsequentlyblockedbyacourtorderinstitutedbytheKFF);thePremierLeagueberestructuredtoincludeonly16teamswhilethenationwideleagueshouldbedividedintothreegroupsofamaximum16teamseachandthatthegovernmentdrawitsagendafordiscussionswithFIFAfromtheconsultativereportbytheSTC(“FortheGoodoftheGame”)andconsiderresortingtotheUNintheeventofFIFAintransigence.

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July2004 Hatimy,KariukiandSwalehchargedwiththetheftofKShs55millionofFIFA/KFFfunds

September2004 The KNC accepts an invitation to join the board of the Kenya PremiershipLimited(KPL).

October2004 The KNC is registered as the Normalisation Interim Committee (NIC). Itshurriedly-draftedversionoftheKFFconstitution,modelledonFIFA’sStatutes,isrejectedbyFIFAasitwasnotdevelopedconsultatively.

November2004 KPL’sstatusisformalisedbytheRegistrarofCompanies,anditbecomestheKFFPremiershipLeagueLimitedinlinewithFIFA’srequirements.

December2004 The NIC conducts elections using the existing KFF constitutional provisionforaSpecialGeneralMeeting(SGM).AlfredSambuiselectedchair(beatingimmediatepastKFFsecretarygeneralandtreasurerMohamedHatimy).

May2005 TheKFFNationalChairmanwritestotheRegistrarofCompaniesauthorisingtheKPLtochangeitsnametotheKFFPremierLeague.TheKPFGchangesitsnametotheKenyaPremiershipLeague(KPL)Limited

August2005 WhileSambuisrecoveringfromamotorvehicleaccident,anSGMreplaceshimwiththegovernment-supportedseniorVice-Chair,Hatimy.

October2005 FIFAbarsHatimyfromfootballmanagementandgivestheKFFthreemonthstoput itshouse inorder.Meanwhile, thesportsminister removesabanonfootball activities sponsoredbyparastatals, and theuseofpublic stadia forfootball.

January2006 An SGM reinstates Sambu, and Prof. Moni Wekesa takes up his contractas Secretary General. The KFF institutes a two-month probe into suspectedfinancialimproprietiesbypreviousofficeholders.

June2006 ThereportresultingfromtheprobeinstitutedinJanuary2006isadoptedbytheKFF.

October2006 Theadoptionof thefinancialgovernancereport leads toaFIFAbanontheKFFandonKenyaasa footballnation, forallegedgovernment interferencein football management. The recently-banned Hatimy replaces Sambu andWekesa.

February2007 AmeetingbetweentheSportsMinisterandtheKFFcaretakerofficeisheldinAddisAbabaasoneoftheinitiativestogetKenyanfootballbackontrack.FIFAnamesHatimyastheactingnationalchairpendingelectionstobeheldby31May.

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36 ItisworthnotingthatHatimyisanominatedMombasacouncillorofthePrimeMinister’sOrangeDemocraticParty[ODM]towhichFKLVice-ChairErastusOkulalsobelongs.Meanwhile,Nyamweya(oftheKFF)isapoliticalactivistofthePartyofNationalUnity(PNU)whichKenya’sPresidentchairs

37 SeeCivilAppealNumber154of2004.

May2007 ParallelSGMsforelectionstakeplace;onehostedbytheKFFofficerecognisedby theRegistrarofSocieties inNairobiand theotherbyHatimy inMalindi,with FIFA and Confederation of African Football (CAF) representatives inattendance.The93KasaranidelegateselectSamNyamweyaaschair.Inturn,the Malindi meeting (with 126 delegates) alleges that US$115,000 (roughlyKShs8.6million)isunaccountedforbytheSambu/Ominooffice,promptingFIFAtothreatencourtaction.

August2007 A further 103-delegate SGM confirms the KFF office of Sam Nyamweya. AlettertothiseffectissenttotheRegistrarofSocieties.

May2008 TheKFF (underNyamweya)obtainsacourt injunctionbarringHatimy frominterfering in its affairs. FIFA protests the involvement of ordinary courts infootballmattersandthreatenstoexcludeKenyafromtheMay/Junequalifiersfor theAfricanCupofNationsunless theKFFvacates itsheadquarters,builtusingFIFA’sGoalProjectfunds.

June2008 TheHatimygroupregistersFootballKenyaLimited(FKL)withtheRegistrarofCompanies,aninitiativethatFIFAhadapparentlyalreadyacknowledged.

The Nyamweya faction requests FIFA to start an arbitration procedure for,amongother issues, the recognitionof thedulyelected&bonafideofficialsof theKFFas regards themeetingofAugust2007.FIFAdeclines tostart thearbitrationprocedure.

August2008 AgroupofprominentformerfootballplayersandadministratorsseeksaudiencewiththePrimeMinistertorequesthisinterventionoverthestand-offinfootballmanagement.Themeetingdoesnottakeplace36.

October2008 TheCourtofAppeal(afteranappealbytheKFF)decidesinfavourofHatimy“asNyamweyahadneverbeenincontroldespitebeingthelegalKFF37.”However,thecourtemphasisesthisstatusquowillonlybemaintaineduntiltheassociation’selectionsinDecember2008.

November2008 Hatimy hosts an SGM attended by 105 delegates, including CAF and FIFArepresentatives.Amongstotherthings, themeetingperusesauditedFinancialAssistanceProgramme(FAP)accountsupto2007-thefirstauditin10years.

TheformationofFKLandthedissolutionofKFFisalsoagreedatthismeeting.

November2008 The KPL and SuperSport International sign a 4-year partnership agreement.Under the agreement, SuperSport secures theTVbroadcast andnewmediarights for theKenyanPremierLeague fora totalofUS$5.5million (Ksh360million)forthe4-yearperiod.

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December2008 TheNyamweyagroupholdsa150-delegateSGM.TheRegistrarofSocietiesconfirmsNyamweya’svictoryatthatSGM.

February2009 FIFAsendalettertoHatimyinforminghimthatKFFisnolongerregisteredbyFIFAandCAFandthesameshouldbetransmittedtotheRegistrarofSocietiesinKenya.

March2009 ThePrimeMinisterofKenyawritestoFIFAPresidentBlatterinforminghimthat the government recognises FKL as the only body managing footballin the country and that the FKL Headquarters will be returned to FKLimmediately.

May2009 Hatimy’s factioncontinues to runKenyan footballdespitependingcriminalcourtcasesandgovernmentrecognitionofNyamweya’sfaction.Thelatter,inturn,filesforCASarbitration.

August2009 HatimysuspendsFKLExecutiveSecretaryObingoforfailingtoconsultoverthe arrangement of friendly matches for Harambee Stars. In turn, Obingocomplainsofinterferencebyoffice-bearers.

August2009 The Sports Minister appoints the Vimal Shah Committee to “attempt toreconcile theKFFandFKL.”TheVimalShahReport largelyfindsagainstHatimy’s FKL noting that: The KFF constitution had been prepared incollaboration with FIFA to ensure compatibility with FIFA Statutes;dissolutionoftheKFFrequiredanAGMresolutionpassedwithatwo-thirdmajority of members present and voting, which Hatimy’s 15 Novembermeetinghadnotcompliedwith;Hatimyhadneitherheldaconfirmatorymeeting amonth laternor sought theRegistrarof Societies’ certificationof the KFF dissolution, as provided by the KFF’s constitution; there arenostatutoryprovisionsforthetransformationofasociety(theKFF)intoaprivatecompany(FKL),nottomentionthefactthatFKLwasincorporatedinJune,afullfivemonthsbeforethemeetingthatpurportedlytransformedtheKFFintotheFKL.

2009 Correspondence between the FIFA and KFF-Nyamweya faction continuesthroughouttheyearonthefiledarbitrationmatter.

January2010 ThehearingofthearbitrationmatterbeginsinLausanne,Switzerland.

April2010 CAS delivers a ruling stating that FKL is the body recognised to carry outfootball-relatedactivitiesinthecountry.

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CAF ConfederationofAfricanFootballFIFA FederationInternationaledeFootballAssociationFKL FootballKenyaLimitedICCG Inter-ClubsConsultativeGroupKFF KenyaFootballFederationKLTA KenyaLawnTennisAssociationKPFG KenyaPremiershipFootballGroupKRFU KenyaRugbyFootballUnionMYSA MathareYouthSportsAssociationSTC Stakeholders’TransitionCommittee


CHAPTER 5: THE PROBLEM WITH FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT IN KENYA: KEY ISSUES

“The wrong people for the wrong reasons win elections”.

Stakeholders’TransitionCommittee,FinalReportJune2004

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The STC’s findings

TheSTC’sreport,“FortheGoodoftheGame”,didnotdwellonthechallengesfacingKenyanfootball,choosinginsteadtofocusonimprovementofthegame.However,thereportidentifiedthefollowingkeyissues:

•A flawed KFF constitution allows “thewrongpeopleforthewrongreasonstooftenseek and win (KFF) elections (after which)they often ignore the real stakeholders.”Most recently, this resulted in 20 repeatedviolationsof12ofthe21articlesoftheKFFconstitution.

•Talented players, mostly from poor families,get little opportunity to exploit their fullpotential and escape poverty because ofmismanagement and corruption at the KFFwhich undermines investment in youth andwomen’s football. In effect, “KFF officials(steal)thefutureoftheyouth”.

•Corrupt and incompetentKFFofficials lackingin leadership abilities, transparency andaccountability cause multiple organisationalandfinancialcrisesandscandals,violatingtheirconstitutioninfailingtocirculateannualauditreports, allow members’ access to accountbooks,actonthefindingsofthe2001KFFProbeReport, fulfil financial obligations to membersandacton reform recommendationsmadebystakeholders.

•Consequent to these factors, key sponsorswithdrew, resulting in some clubs collapsingwhile the existence of others is threatened.Effectively, the KFF became “bankrupt and soindebted (and)widelydiscredited (that itwas)nolongerapubliclycredible,financiallyviableormarketableentity.”

WhileviolationoftheKFFrulesandregulationsis unacceptable, the then-Secretary General’sexplanation in 2005 that strict adherenceto these rules would kill some clubs simplyunderscoredtheneedtoreviewtheconstitutionin the context of developments inside andoutsidefootball.Inwhatseemstobeaviciouscircle, mismanagement has turned awaysponsorsand(paying)spectators,meaningmanyfootballclubs’revenueshavediminished.Thisincreases such clubs’ dependence on patronswithoutfundamentalinterestsinfootball,whoexpectareturnontheir(financial)investment.This fuels misappropriation of revenues, suchasgatetakingsandFIFAgrants.Otherpatronsexpect electoral favour, failing which theywithdrawsupport.

Theft of stocks and club victimisation

Themismanagementof football resources is notlimited to finances: the Commissioner of Sportscitesthedisappearanceof2,000donatedfootballsatthehandsoftheKFF.

THE PROBLEM WITH FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT IN KENYA: KEY ISSUES5

38MathareUnitedisaKenyanfootballclubbasedinMathareslumsofNairobi.ItisamemberofthetopdivisioninKenyanfootball.Theclubwasformedin1994asaprofessionaloutfitoftheMathareYouthSportsAssociation(MYSA-whichwasfoundedin1987).TheclubhasbeenintheKenyaPremierLeaguesince1999.MathareUnitedhasproducedmanyKenyantopplayers,includingDennisOliech.

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39SeeMunro,B.(2005),“GreedvsGoodGovernance:thefightforcorruptionfreefootballinKenya.”ApaperpresentedtotheFourthWorldCommunicationConferenceonSportandSociety.November6-10,2005,Copenhagen,Denmark.

40http://www.kenyafootball.com41StakeholdersTransitionalCommittee,(2004).

“FortheGoodoftheGame:AchievingGoodGovernance,FinancialTransparencyandStakeholderAccountabilityForSavingandImprovingKenyanFootball”.Nairobi:StakeholdersTransitionalCommittee

TheviolationsoftheconstitutionhavealsomeantthatvariousKFFofficeshaveignoredimpartiality:MathareUnitedFootballClub38 hascomplainedof victimisation through interference with matchschedulesandbiasedofficiatingduringmatches,designed to penalise clubs that question poorgovernanceinKenyanfootball39.

These factorsundermine thedevelopmentof thenationalteamandthedevelopmentofyouthandwomen’sfootball,asnotedbytheSTCreport.

The price of football mismanagement in Kenya

Telling improvements in football during the reform periods

One way of gauging the KFF’s impotence isto examine trends in football during the shortinterludes of the interim committees. In theSTC’s three-month tenure, various reforms wereinstituted, some of them from among KenyaPremiershipFootballGroup(KPFG)andInter-ClubsConsultativeGroup(ICCG)proposalspresentedtotheKFFovertheyears.

While the KFF’s league was collapsing – partlyasaresultofthewithdrawalofkeyleagueclubs– the KPFG organised a Champions Leaguethat also involved participating clubs in somecommunityresponsibilities,suchascleaningtheenvironment. At matches, home teams retained100 percent of gate takings, a motivation forimproved management of ticket sales. The

Women’s football

Women’sfootballinKenyaisfaringverypoorly.The

KFF,withtheassistanceofMYSAleadersestablished

thefirstandonlyleagueforwomenin2002.Aside

from this, theonly significant tournaments for girls

have been organised by MYSA. In Mathare area,

2,500 girls on over 200 teams in different age

groupsparticipateintheMYSAself-helpsportsand

community serviceprogrammes. Somegirls’ teams

are already highly competitive, internationally

winninggold,silverandbronzemedalsattheworld’s

largestyouthtournamentinthelastfiveyears40.

TheKFFhasfailedtosupportandenternationalgirls’

andwomen’steamsinCAFandFIFAcompetitions.

This neglect is despite allocations from FIFA for

this activity. For instance, in July 2006, FIFA’s

head of development management team, Pascal

Torres, wrote to Alfred Sambu, chair of the KFF,

informinghim thatFIFAwouldmakea transferof

USD113,000onthe19thofJuly.Themonieswere

to be assigned as follows: US$25,000 for youth

footballactivities;US$25,000forwomen’sfootball;

US$10,000fortechnicaldevelopment;US$10,000

for refereeing activities; US$5,000 for planning

and administration; US$33,000 for planning and

administration. In spite of these provisions, there

havebeencomplaintsoverdelayedallowancesfor

womenplayers,anindicationthat,atbest,women’s

footballispoorlymanaged41.Atworst,thesefunds

maynotreachtheintendedrecipients.

The 2004 Stakeholders’ Transitional Committee

(STC)Reportmadeanumberofrecommendations

forthewayforwardinwomen’sfootballincluding

the need to start professional women’s football

leagues in other provinces and to organise local,

provincialandnationalcompetitionsforgirl’steams

fromprimaryandsecondaryschools.

The STC proposed that girls be given far higher

priority and support in local to national youth

footballprogrammes.

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42DonationscamefromtheembassiesofBritain,Canada,Germany,Netherlands,NorwayandfromTransparencyInternational-Kenya.CorporatesponsorsincludedtheExpoCameraCentre,Kandanda,KapaOils,K.D.Wire,KenyaCommercialBank,MintoTrade,3miceInteractiveMedia,Safaricom,SherAgencies,SportsStation,SportswiseManagement,TequilaKenya,TextbookCentreSportsandXXCELAfrica.43http://ndn.nigeriadailynews.com

http://roadto2010final.blogspot.com/2009/06/kenya-coach-boycotts-nigeria-trip.html44KRFUhastodateacquiredprimecorporatesponsorships,suchasKenyaAirways,KenyaBreweries,SafaricomandVirgin

Atlantic,amongmanyothers.

KPFG further organised the Transparency Cup,originally for the ‘rebel’ clubs, but eventuallyincorporatingotherclubsfromthecollapsedKFFleague.Corporate,civilsocietyanddonorsupportenabledthepaymentofatotalKshs2.5milliontothetopfourteamsofthetournament,prizesofasizeneverwitnessedinKenyabefore42.Underitsmanagementboard,HarambeeStars’matchesagainstSwazilandandMoroccoenabledKenyatorise toanunprecedentedposition58inFIFArankings before FIFA abruptly cancelled theteam’smatchagainstGuinea.

Theinterimcommitteesof2004showedthelevelofpotentialforimprovementinmanagingfootballinKenya.

Lost opportunities for investment

WhiletheFKLconstitutionismorecomprehensivethantheKFFconstitution,theFKLdoesnothavea grassroots presence to enable its effectivemanagement of the sport. Consequently, theelaborategovernancestructuresproposedbySTCremainjustthat:proposals.

Thus,FIFA’sUS$250,000(approximatelyKshs18.75 million) ‘seed money’ plus whateverthe Kenya government provides, continues todisappear, seen in the disputes over coaches’salaries and players’ allowances ahead of theHarambee Stars June 2009 trip to Nigeria, aswell as thedeclaration in September that yearthat the Sports Ministry could not afford thecoach’ssalary43.

While the FKL’s Secretary General laments theKenyagovernment’sweakfinancialcommitmenttofootball compared to theTanzaniagovernment’s,theFKLmustappreciate thatgoodgovernanceinTanzaniaattractsa furtherKshs600million fromcorporatesponsors,suchasCastleBreweries.

In the Kenyan scenario, the 2004 TransparencyCup showed the potential for non-governmentsponsorship.

We also know that other Kenyan sportscommittees attract varied resources: the KenyaLawn Tennis Association (KLTA) receives anInternational Tennis Federation grant for itsSchool Tennis Initiative focusing on the under-12 primary school children, initially in Nairobiwhile the Kenya Rugby Football Union (KRFU)received a total of UK£ 200,000 (roughly Kshs28 million) to implement its first Strategic Plan(2005/2008). Both bodies also approach thecorporatesectorfortournamentsponsorship.Forinstance,therugbyfederationreceivedoverKshs25millionforthethree-daySafari7stournamentinJune201044.

Management lessons from other sports associations

The Kenya Lawn Tennis Association (KLTA)attributesthesuccessfulmanagementofitsmoreelitist sport to the strong spirit of volunteerism,whichitsaysislackinginthefootballarena.The

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spiritofvoluntarismminimisesconflictsofinterestandcompetitionforleadership.TheKenyaRugbyFootball Union (KRFU) also attributes footballmismanagement to the lack of professionalcapacityofmanyofthepeopleinvolved.

In these and other sports, there is limited scopefor revenue generation, such as through gate

45TransparencyInternational(2001).GlobalCorruptionReport2001.Berlin:TransparencyInternational46http://www.playthegame.org47http://www.kenyafootball.com

Youth development

AmongthekeyissuesinyouthdevelopmentinthearenaoffootballistheKFF’sfailuretoproduceanational youthdevelopmentplan as repeatedlypromised. Further, there is nonational systemfor identifying and providing special training for talented young players. The KFF officials alsomisappropriatedtheyouthlevyfromthegatereceiptsofallmatchesandaFIFAYouthDevelopmentProgrammegrantofUS$250,000intheyear200145.Observersagreethatthereisnothingtoshowforthisgrantanditiswidelythoughtthatthemoneyendedupinfederationofficials’pocketsratherthangoingtowardsdevelopingyouthsoccerinKenya46.Withproperuseofsuchalargegrant,Kenya’snationalunder-20teamneednothavetravelledthe862kmfromNairobitoBujumburabyroadtoplayinthe2009regionalyouthtournament,forinstance47.

EventhoughKenyafieldsyouthteams,footballadministratorsdonotconsideritapriority,failingtoinvestadequatelyinthissector.Itistellingthatthenationalunder-17teamlost3-1toSomaliainanAfricaYouthChampionshipsqualifiermatchinApril2010.

RecognisingtheseissuesintheadministrationofyouthfootballinKenya,the2004Stakeholders’TransitionalCommittee(STC)Reportmadeanumberofrecommendationsforthewayforwardinyouthfootballincluding:theneedtofocusonyouthdevelopmentprogrammesforplayers16yearsandyounger;theneedtoimproveschoolfacilities,trainingandcompetitionsatallgeographicandagelevels.ThereportalsoproposedthatallPremierLeagueclubsberequiredtoestablishajuniorteamofplayersaged18yearsorbelow,withamaximumofthreeplayersover18yearsold.

fees, because of low player and spectatorinvolvement.Thismaycontributetotransparencyin management in order to attract corporatesponsorsandinternationalgrants.Further,becauseof thecomparativelysmallandelitistplayerandspectator populations, tennis and rugby do notofferanattractivehuntinggroundforopportunistsseekingaplatformintonationalorlocalpolitics.

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FAP FinancialAssistanceProgramme



ICCG Inter-ClubsConsultativeGroup


KPFG KenyaPremiershipFootballGroup

NIC NormalisationInterimCommittee



CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

Until brought to a level where they can compete in international tournaments beyond Africa, women’s soccer teams will continue to struggle. And, considering the rampant corruption that plagues our continent, it might take a century to see male soccer teams managed and funded sufficiently…”

JulietTorome,‘WorldCupwon’tboostAfricaWomenSoccer’,

TheStar,July7,2010

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CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD�

Plans for the future

FKLhasaStrategicPlanforthe2009/2012periodwith desirable interventions, such as trainingcoaches, and introducing contracts, medicaltesting and insurance for players. However, thePlan is a collection of generalities rather thancosted,time-boundspecificsthatcouldconvinceprospectivesponsors.

Indeed, every year’s budget merely breaksdowntheFAPUS$250,000(roughlyKshs18.75million) into regular allocations to ten areasover the four years of the plan as if previousyears’ investments make no change to thecurrentstatus,andthereforehavenoinfluenceon future budgetary needs. While the FAPis seed money, the Strategic Plan appears tohave no scope for generating supplementaryfinancingfromFKL’sownactivitiesorfromthegoodwill of corporations and donors. Alongsuchlines,FKLwoulddowelltoreviewKRFU’sdetailed and costed Strategic Plan which setstime-bound targets foractivitiesand revenues.Meanwhile, the FKL Strategic Plan also showsscant awareness of the exhaustive work donebytheSTCandtheNICinidentifyingthewayforwardforKenyanfootball.

The STC reform proposals

DuringMainaKariuki’stenureattheKFF,variousstakeholders had made reform proposals that

were largely ignored, such as the product of a2001 audit and 2001 ICCG recommendations.The STC report of June 2004 contained 130reform recommendations that arguably build ontheconcernsofpreviousstakeholders,suchastheKPFGandtheICCGtotheextentthatsomeofthelatter’scommitteemembershadbeeninvolvedintheearlierinitiatives.Indeed,amajorcriticismoftheoldKFFconstitutionhadbeenitsexclusionoffootballplayers,refereesandcoachesfromdeliberationsonfootballmanagement;theSTCsecuredamendmentsbyincludingthechairsofthecoachesandrefereesassociations, as well as numerous former playersandofficialsindiscussions.

Schools,womenandyouthfootballrepresentativeswere also brought into the process. The NICendorsed some of the STC’s initiatives, such asthecommercialisationofthepremierleague,butwas not always decisive in implementing suchmeasurestransparently.

In light of the foregoing, this report reiteratesits view that the STC’s reform proposals weregenerated in a participatory way and thereforehavethemostauthority.Assuch,theyshouldformthebasisofanycomprehensivereformstofootballmanagementinKenya.

Further, the KPFG/ICCG initiatives of the early2000scontainedtheseedsofamoretransformativeapproachtofootballmanagement.Thisiscoveredinthefollowingchapter.

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Summary of recommendations by the STC

BelowisanoverviewofsomeoftherecommendationsmadeinAnnex2oftheSTC’sFinalReport:

1. Formation of a new football management body TheSTCreportrecommendedacleanbreakfromtheKFFtoformanewfootballmanagement

body based on FIFA Statutes, which recognises the rights of players, coaches and refereesas “producers of football” while active and into retirement. The new body would addressmanagement corruption by installing a professional secretariat that incorporates professionalfinancialmanagement,thelatteridealbeingbasedontheinvestigationandpunishment(wherenecessary)ofpastindiscretionsorabuse.

2. Professionally-managed clubs Thereformscalledforprofessionally-managedclubswithplayersandcertifiedcoachesunder

contract, meaning, among other things, the prompt payment of dues. Besides active welfareorganisations,playerswouldbenefitfrommedicaltestsandinsurance.

3. Investment in youth and women’s football Under-16talentswouldbedocumentedandclubswouldbeencouragedtorecruitthemwhile

effortswouldbemadetoimprovewomen’sfootballwithscholarshipsawardedtothetalented.

4. Capacity building Improvementoftechnicalcoachingcapacitieswouldbesoughtthroughsub-nationalcoaching

networks.

5. Development of a strategic plan for the national team Astrategicplanforthenationalteamwouldseeshort-termforeigncoachesgivingwaytonational

coachingteams.

6. Commercial management of leagues Ontheplayingfront,theSTCreportadvocatedthecommercialmanagementofleaguesalongthe

linesoftheEnglishpremiership,throughtheestablishmentofamanagementcompanyownedbycompetingclubsandthenationalfootballoversightbody.

7. Establishment of a top-tier league Keeping in mind the need to avoid player burnout, the STC proposed a top-tier league of a

maximum14clubsbythe2005/2006season.Atthesub-nationallevel,threeinitialsub-groupswouldeventuallybemergedintoasinglenationalleagueofbetween10and16clubs.

8. Link football to other socio-economic activities Oneimportantreformproposalwouldbetolinkfootballtoothersocio-economicactivities,

including health concerns (drugs and AIDS), environmentalism and community service.The MYSA experience is also an example of football’s potential for peace-building andreconcilliationefforts.

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CECAFA CouncilofEastandCentralAfricanFootballAssociationsGTZ GermanTechnicalCooperationIDPs InternallyDisplacedPersonsMYSA MathareYouthSportsAssociationNARC NationalAllianceRainbowCoalitionODM OrangeDemocraticMovementPNU PartyofNationalUnityUN UnitedNationsUNHCR UnitedHighCommissionforRefugees


CHAPTER 7: TRANSFORMING FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

“Too many national associations are failing African football. We cannot have strong national teams without strong leagues but we do not have strong leagues because too often the associations are run by the wrong people, people who get involved for politics or money, not for football. Until we sort ourselves out, we will have the same old circus.”NicholasMusonye,GeneralSecretary,CECAFATheGuardian,July112010

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The 2008 violence witnessed in Kenya in thewake of the disputed 2007 General Elections hasbeenwidelyattributedtoangerovertheperceivedbetrayalbypoliticalleadersinthefourdecadessinceindependence.

ThatKibaki’s2003accessionchangedlittlebywayofensuringgoodgovernancewasmanifestinfesteringgrievancesbroughttotheforeinthe2008violencethatlargelypittedyouthsfromdifferentethnicgroupsagainsteachother.TheresolutionoftheseconflictswouldforceKibakitoconfrontthenumerousreformproposalsoftheNationalRainbowCoalition(NARC)manifestothathehadrenegedonfrom2003,intheformofAgendaFour,issuesnegotiatedbetweenthepre-eminent2007electionsprotagonists,theOrangeDemocratic Movement (ODM) and the Party ofNational Unity (PNU). The key agenda items arehighlightedintheboxbelow.

TheattainmentofAgendaFourreformswouldgoalongwaytowardsreducingpovertyandinequality,whichcontributedsignificantlytothe2008violence.Yet,suchattainmentswilltaketime.Meanwhile,itisnecessarytodeviseapproachesthatcanpre-emptorresolvetheperennialtensionsthatariseamongKenyan communities. In other contexts in Kenyaandothercountries,footballandsportsingeneralhasbeenemployedinsuchinitiatives.Therestofthischapterreviewsthecharacter,implementationandoutcomesofsomesuchinitiativeswithaviewtoassessinghow theycouldbepartofa footballandsportsfornationaldevelopmentinitiative.

A positive example of sports management

In Kenya, the Mathare Youth Sports Association(MYSA) initiative has been used for the pursuit

TRANSFORMING FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT�

of varied ends48. Founded in 1987 in Nairobi’sMathareslums,andbestknownforfootball,MYSAother activities include drama, music, dance,photography, library and social hall services.Within the community, MYSA pays attention tochild prisoners, HIV/AIDS awareness, garbagecollection and environmentalism. MYSA is runbyamembers’ExecutiveCouncildemocraticallyelected from the grassroots, whose ages rangebetween 17 and 21 years, an entirely youth-empoweringprocess.MYSA’sfootballprogrammecoverssome21,000girlsandboysinmulti-ethnicteamsin120leaguesin16zones.

Agenda items in Kenya’s 2008 Coalition Agreement

OnFebruary28,2008,followingthepoliticalviolenceensuing from the disputed December 2007 GeneralElections, the twomainpartiessigned the ‘Agreementon the Principles of Partnership of the CoalitionGovernment’, following which the National AccordandReconciliationActof2008wasenacted.Undertheagreement,thepartiescommittedtoundertakeasetofactionsunderfourmainagendaitems.Thesewere:

• Agenda Item 1: Immediateactiontostopviolenceandrestorefundamentalrightsandliberties;

• Agenda Item 2: Immediate measures to addressthehumanitariancrisis,andpromotehealingandreconciliation;

• Agenda Item 3: How to overcome the politicalcrisis;and

• Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues,including constitutional and institutionalreforms, land reforms, poverty and inequalities,youth unemployment, national cohesion, andtransparencyandaccountability.

48SeeMunro,B.(2009),“SportforPeaceandReconciliation:YoungPeacemakersintheKakumaRefugeeCampandMathareSlumsinKenya.”Paperpresentedtothe6thPlaytheGameWorldCommunicationsConferenceonSportandSociety,Coventry,UK,June8-12,2009

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MYSA has been an agency of defusing tensionovertheyears,keepingmanyyoungpeopleoutoftheethnicallycentredvigilantegroupsoftheslum,notably theMungikiof theKikuyuandTalibanoftheLuo.MYSAinitiativeswereunabletopromptlydefusethetensionsthatarosefroma2005standoffoverrentpaymentsintheslum,partiallybecausethisconflictwasnotentirelyindigenoustotheslumareagiven thatmany tenantswereoutsiders.However,MYSAwasabletodoalotmoreagainsttheviolenceinthewakeofthe2007elections(seeboxbelow).

Earlier, MYSA’s example had been instrumentalindefusingtensionsandinstillingharmonyinthemultinationalKakumaRefugeeCampinTurkana.In1999Kakumahad70,000refugees,70percentofwhomwerefrommulti-ethnicSouthernSudan,andtherestfromsevenothercountries.Two-thirdsofthecampinmateswereunder25yearsold,withone-thirdof thosebeingunaccompaniedminors. Theoriginalfootballinitiativedeveloped200ethnicallyexclusive teams, which excluded the 20,000 girlpopulationfromtheiractivities.However,a1999initiativeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugees,WorldLutheranFoundationandtheNetherlandsgovernmentusedtheMYSAmodeltoaddressgenderandethnicbarriersinparticipation,excessivedependencyamongrefugees,communityself-helpandemergingsocialandhealththreats.

By mid-2000, 12,000 youths, including 1,800girls and 400 disabled people, were involvedin mandatory multi-ethnic football, basketball,netball and volleyball teams in the camps andschools.Girls’ representationonyouth-managedsports committees was mandatory, with MYSAcomplementinglocalinitiativesratherthandoingthings for the community. Twenty workshops,eachlastingtwoweeks,trained600youthleadersin sports administration. Successful completionof the GTZ-sponsored Youth for Environment Programmeaddedpointstosportsteams.

Eventually,independentevaluationsoftheseinitiativesconcludedthattheyeradicatedidlenessandboredom,

diminishedtensions,raisedself-esteemandthescopefor non-violent conflict resolution, and producedincomegeneratingactivities.Importantly,thismodelwas exported to Rumbek, Southern Sudan duringthe2001ChildSoldiersDemobilisationProgrammeinvolvingsome3,000youths.

Thisyear,MYSAwonatrophyatthe2010FootballforHopeFestival,heldinJohannesburgparelleltotheWorldCup.Youngpeoplein32teamsfromover40countriesparticipatedinafestivalofeducation,cultureandfootball.

The example cited in this section, and others,show the potential for football specifically, butsports in general, to provide opportunities forpovertyandinequalityreduction,socialcohesionand towards the attainment of such MillenniumDevelopmentGoals as the enrolmentof girls inschools,HIV/AIDSandasustainableenvironment.Thisandsimilarinitiativesarecurrentlyconfinedto certain regions, but as with MYSA’s forayoutsideMathare, in the rightcontext theycouldbe rolledout countrywide. Such amove wouldbenefitgreatlyfromaproperlymanagedfootballsectorinthecountry.

Using sports to reconcile antagonists

Buildingon itspreviousachievements,MYSAwasable to successfully intervene to assist internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) after the outbreak ofviolenceinthewakeofthedisputed2007generalelections.WhiletheUNandotherdonoragenciesditheredovertheirappropriateroleintheunfoldingtragedy, MYSA diverted resources marked for itsanniversary celebrations to tending to deprivedpeople’sneeds.Soon,MYSAwasattendingto8,000IDPs including6,700children, supplyingmaterialneedswhilealsoprovidingsportspastimestoallowmotherstoundertakehouseholdchores.ThefootballmatcheswereamongethnicallydiverseteamswhileMYSAalsouseditsresourcestopurchaseuniformsandshoestoenable200boysandgirlstoreturntoschoolaftertheviolencesubsided.

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KNSC KenyaNationalSportsCouncil

NOC-K NationalOlympicCommitteeofKenya



CHAPTER 8: RECOMMENDATIONS

“We should start developing soccer at the grassroots level. It is high time we start spotting talent at an early age and develop it. If we do this, Kenya will surely go to the World Cup in 2014. We can surely make it to Brazil.”

PrimeMinisterRailaOdinga

“PMcallsfororderinfootballmanagement”,DailyNation,July4,2010

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Six years down the road, none of the STC’s,or indeed other, reform proposals have beenimplemented substantially due to persistentwrangles in Kenyan football management.Implementationofthesereformswouldpositivelytransform football management in Kenya andpotentially contribute to national cohesion anddevelopment.

Kenyan football criesout for reform. However,givenFIFA’spowerandreadinesstointerveneinlocal attempts to clean up the sport, which thisreporthasdetailed,itisdifficulttoseehowsuchreformscouldbesuccessfulwithoutrealchangeattheinternationallevel.Inthisrespect,Kenyaisinasingularlydifficultposition,beingafootballminnow which happens to have caught thenegativeattentionofFIFA.ConsideringthatKenyahasverylittle leverageagainstaFIFAthatcouldcontemplate banning Brazil, an internationalfootball heavyweight, thepush for such reformswouldhavetobecarriedoutverystrategically.

ThissectionpresentssomeproposalsonthewayforwardforKenyanfootballmanagement49.

1. FIFA should serve the global interest in football management.

For FIFA to serve global rather than parochialinterests,itisnecessarytoreviewitsframeworksto secure the Federation against a manipulativeadministration. How this could be done is notimmediatelycleargiventhatsuchchangeswouldhave tocome through theFIFACongresswhichis alleged to be firmly under the thumb of the

current FIFA President, despite a few dissentingvoices. Introducinga limitationof tenurecouldgoalongwaytowardsdiscouragingincumbentsfromdevelopingfiefdoms.

2. The many football-management related cases before the Kenyan judiciary should be quickly resolved and punitive action taken to deter future misconduct.

For example, ifHatimywere tobe foundguiltyand convicted in either of the criminal casesbeforethecourts,thenhewouldbeineligibleforelectiontofootballmanagementunderbothFIFAStatutesandtheFKLconstitution.

FIFA could then take the unlikely decision ofbanningKenya,oracceptthatfootballcanprosperwithoutHatimy.Nonetheless,itisimportantthatthecasesinvolvingmisuseoffootballmanagementoffice – such as the Kariuki regime’s failure tobankrevenuesfromticketsales–bedecided,andpunitiveactiontakentodeterfutureadministratorsfromsuchmisconduct.

3. A good governance framework for football management in Kenya should be established.

Seeming government support for Hatimy andfor the termination of the coaching tenure ofthe comparatively successful Kimanzi, hasproved a stumbling block to improved footballmanagement in Kenya. The exorbitant salariespaid to foreigncoachesshould insteadbeusedasincentivesforplayersandlocalcoachesandwould go a long way in making the national

RECOMMENDATIONS�

49Some of these proposals lean on recommendations made by an All Party Parliamentary Football Group in the UKParliament,whichconductedaninquiryintothegovernanceofEnglishfootball.See“EnglishFootballanditsGovernance,AllPartyParliamentaryFootballGroup,London,April2009.

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teammorecompetitive.Further,thegovernmentshould takes a more objective view and allowfootball to find its own equilibrium, such asthroughgenuinelyfreeandfairelections.

Thegovernmentandtheentirefootballfraternitywould do well to espouse a good governanceframework forKenyan football incorporating themanyvaluableproposalsmadein“FortheGoodoftheGame”andothersimilarinitiatives.

4. The STC’s findings and recommendations should be appropriately updated and implemented.

Withregardtotheforegoingrecommendation,theSTC’s findings and recommendations should beappropriatelyupdatedandimplemented. TheSTCwasworkingunderaseveretimeconstraint.Inalessstrenuouscontext,itwouldbepossibletoimproveonSTC’srecommendationsfortheexploitationoffootball’ssocio-economicpotential.

5. Capacity building should be provided for ‘producers of football’ and other key stakeholders.

Capacitybuildingforthe‘producersoffootball’49and other key stakeholders,50 is imperative.The proposed areas of intervention wouldinclude capacity building on the national sportsmanagementframeworkandfootballmanagementrules/regulations. This would include capacitybuildingonFIFA,othercountrycasestudies,theFKL,andclubconstitutions.

6. Access to information on various important aspects should be ensured.

Allkeyclubdocumentssuchasconstitutionsshouldbe available on the internet. Returns of all clubsshould be publicly available and annual reports

shouldbepublished,includingfinancialinformation.Thereshouldbetransparencyondirectors’andclubofficials’backgroundandinterests.

7. A Fit and Proper Persons Test should be adopted.

AFitandProperPersonsTestshouldbeadoptedandstringentlycarriedouttoensurethatclubsare owned and/or run by people who wantto see theclubs succeedandespousevaluesaimedatpromotingthegreaterinterestsofthegame.

Persons with a history of corruption andmismanagement or with related or criminalcasespendingincourtshouldnotbeallowedto hold leading positions in football clubs.Theeventualestablishmentofanindependentregulatoryauthorityforsportswouldfacilitatethiskindofoversight.ItsestablishmentshouldbecoordinatedwithallstakeholdersincludingFIFA.

8. Participation by and accountability to supporters in sports structures should be encouraged and facilitated.

Supporters contribute to the development offootballby supporting itandpaying towatch it.Theestablishmentof supporters’ trustswouldbeone avenue for consolidating and representingsupporters’interestsascorporatebodiestowhomclubsoweaccountability.

9. The 2002 Kenya National Youth Policy should be updated and implemented.

The current National Youth Policy does notprioritise sports development. As a result,interventions to address problems in the sportssectorhavehistoricallybeenadhoc,lackingfocusandthereforeineffective.

49Theseincludeplayers,referees,coaches,clubofficialsandfootballofficials50These include supporters’ clubs, the media, and the Kenya Police (because they are in charge of security in the

stadiums)

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10. Modern sports facilities should be established in each of the country’s provincial headquarters to help in identifying and nurturing talent.

Existingsportsfacilitiesshouldbegazettedasnationalheritagesites(tohelppreservethemfromlandgrabbers)andtheiraccessibilitytotheyouthguaranteed.

11. Opportunities for all, especially the youth, to participate in football should be provided.

Incentives should be offered to local footballclubs which have fully-fledged youth teams ofvariousagecategories.

12. More government investments should be directed towards the hosting, organisation and follow up programmes of both the Primary and Secondary Schools Sports to enhance the positive exploitation of identified talents in those games.

This would in effect make sure that the country isrepresented in all age categories of CAF and FIFAtournamentsaswellasprovidingasourceofemploymenttothosewhoareunabletofurthertheirstudies.

13. Youth football should be linked with other national socio-economic development programmes.

Thegovernment should linkand facilitateyouthteams to national development programmes onissuessuchastheenvironment,andHIV/AIDS.

14. An independent annual audit of the Sports Development Fund should be undertaken.

An independent audit should be undertaken toasses whether the Kshs. 10 million constituencySports Development Fund is an effective toolin tapping and nurturing football talent in theconstituencies.

15. The recommendations of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry should be implemented.

In dealing with corruption, the governmentshould implement therecommendationsof thereport of the commission of inquiry into theillegal/irregular Allocation of public land torecoverpublicutilitylandmeantfordevelopmentofsportsfacilities.

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ANNEX: COMPARING FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT ACROSS NATIONS EXPERIENCES FROM ELSEWHERE

England England’s pioneering national footballadministration,theFAwasfoundedin1871andhasoperatedcontinuallyeversince.Its foundingcoincided with the split in football activity thatdistinguished Association Football – or ‘soccer’– from rugby football. After initial years ofmanagementbytrial-and-error,theFAbecamealimitedliabilitycompanyin1903.BesidesowningEngland’s famous Wembley Stadium, the FA isalsoresponsiblefortheEnglishnationalteam,theFACup,theFootballLeagueandallotheryouth,womenandmen’sfootball.

The FA administers regional football activitiesthrough 43 affiliated county associations; buttheFootballLeague–thatis,theChampionship,LeagueOneandLeagueTwo–isself-governing.WhiletheFAhasnodirectcontroloverEngland’sworld-renownedPremierLeague, it retainsvetopower over the choice of its chair and chiefexecutive. All professional English footballclubs are affiliated to the FA, but are entirelyindependent, illustrated in their increasingforeignownership.Besides theaboveactivities,theFAalsorunsotherfootballcompetitionsandactivitiesacrossthecountry.

FA-managed activities and related sponsors

The FA’s largest asset is the Wembley Stadium,contracted to generate UK£ 570 million fromlocal and overseas TV rights between 2008 and2012. England international matches and FACup games had a turnover of UK£ 240 millionbyDecember2007.ThesignificanceofrevenuesfrominternationalmatchesisreflectedintheFA’sestimatedlossofUK£5millionduetothefailure

toqualify forEuro2008;but therevenueloss tothe whole country would obviously have beenmuchbigger.Besidesthesesources,FAactivitiesalso receive extensive corporate sponsorship.Effectively, the FA does not rely on gate-fees atleaguematches,as theserevenuesremaininthehandsoftheclubs,whichownandmaintaintheirownstadia.

Inadministrationterms,theFAhadsixpresidentsinthesevendecadesbetween1863and1939,thelongesttenurebeingthe33-yearonebetween1890and1923,withtheaveragetenurebeingnearly13years.Sincethe1939onsetoftheSecondWorldWar,thepresidencyhasbeenceremonial,goingtoamemberoftheroyalfamily,withtwotenuresbeing distinguished by their longevity (1939 to1955,and1971to2000).

Meanwhile, theAssociationhadonechairmanbetween1890and1937,buttheturn-overhasbeen greater since the advent of the nominalpresidency. For the secretariat, the late 1800sand the entire 1900s saw some long tenure,such as 1870-95, 1895-1934 and 1934-62.Since replacing the secretary with a chiefexecutive, tenures have been rather brief, apossible reflection of growing disenchantmentwith England’s failure to stamp its mark oninternationalfootballevenasitremainsamajorfocusofglobalclubfootball.

TwoanecdotesdrawnfromtheEnglishhistoryoffootballmanagementprobablypointtothebasisofthesuccessfulmanagementofthesportinthatcountry,notwithstandingthelackofinternationaltrophies. On Middlesbrough’s relegation at theendof the1854/55season–somesixteenyearsbeforetheinceptionoftheFA,oneplayerturned

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downanirregularUK£3,000-offertoswitchclubs,but resigned from playing rather than name theoffendingclub.Onrefusingtonametheclubafterreturningtofootballafewyearslater, theplayerwasbannedforlife.Inanotherinstance,1905sawManchester City’s manager fined UK£ 250 andbanned for life for irregularly paying players anin-kindpremiumofUK£4.

Croatia

Similarly, in Croatia, Brazilian player AmauriVicentedeJesusJuniorrefusedbribestorighisteamNKMedjimurje’smatchesbyplayingabadgame,unlikesomeofhislessethicalteammembers.Anti-corruption officers said that although receivinganofferofseveralthousandEurosherefusedandforcedotherteammateswhohadalreadyacceptedthebribetoreturnthemoney.

Inanoperationdubbed“Offside”USKOKagentsarrested20CroatianandtwoSloveniansforgivingand receiving bribes, with profits of between150,000to300,000Eurosperfootballgame.Amongst those arrested are well-known publicfigures, including soccer players, coaches andorganizers.TheyaresuspectedprimarilyoffixingthedomesticgamesofPrvaHNL(CroatianFootballLeague),althoughthereisapossibilitythatsomeinternationalmatcheswerealsorigged.

South Africa

Organised football inSouthAfricadatesback to1892. South Africa joined FIFA in 1908, beingthe first continental African country to do so.The official name of football administration inSouthAfricahasassumedvariouspermutationsof‘football’, ‘soccer’ ‘association’ and ‘federation’,

partiallyreflectingthedivisionsbroughtuponthesportbyapartheid-eraexperiences.

Eventually, a 1998 revision of one constitutiondevelopedan“indissolublesingleorganisationundertheSouthAfricaFootballAssociation(SAFA).”SAFA’soperationsareguidedby its25-articleconstitutionwhose preamble reflects a great awareness of theneed to address and remedy the problems thatgrewoutofapartheid, includingthefragmentationinto independent footballorganisationsagainst thewishesofthemajorityoffootballers…”

SAFA’sconstitutionpreambleacknowledgestheroleofnon-racialorganisationsintryingtounifyfootballfor“aunited,democratic,indivisibleandnon-racialSouthAfrica.”Thepreamble’snon-racialsocietyhasallpeopleequalbeforethelawwithnooppressionorgratuitousinterferencewithindividualrights,andwith access to compulsory and equal education,andadequateresidentialandrecreationalfacilities.While upholding democracy, accountability andconsultation, there would be universal freedomsofassociation,movement,domicile,ownershipoflandandparticipationineconomicactivitywhilelivinginpeace,harmonyandcomfort.Thesesocialconditions are considered fundamental for thecountry’ssustainableparticipationininternationalsport, including football, and to the sustainabilityofSAFA.

Article 8 of SAFA’s constitution obliges it to“promote, advance, administer, co-ordinate andgenerally encourage the game of football… inaccordance with the principles as laid downin the statutes of FIFA.” It further obliges theAssociation to “settle disputes arising betweenmembersorbodiesorpersonsconnecteddirectlyor indirectlywith footballwithin the jurisdictionoftheAssociation.”

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A framework for better

football management

The above limited review of global experiencesin football management has shed light on somefundamentalsforsuccessfulinitiatives.TheEnglishexperiencesofthemid-1800semphasisetheneedforappropriatelegalandinstitutionalframeworksformanagingthegame.Theexperienceshighlightthefactthatthedevelopmentofsuchframeworksshouldnotbetakenforgranted;thattheprocesscan instead lead to a parting of ways shouldidealsdiverge.

The FA’s experience further highlights the needfor good governance based on adherence toestablishedframeworks.SinceFIFAStatutesprovide

the framework for football management in 208countries,itisimperativethatFIFAitselfpracticesgoodgovernance for it todemandaccountabilityfromaffiliatedconfederationsandassociations.

Good governance at the global and nationallevels secures resources: it facilitates prudentmanagement of often scarce local resources,such as gate takings; attracts local corporatesponsorship; and also attracts internationalsponsorship, such as those from FIFA. In turn,adequateresourcesprovideimpetusforsustainedgoodgovernance.Thesecircumstancescreatetheenvironment to fully exploit football’s capacityfor leisure and employment, and offer avenuestoenhancenationalcohesionanddevelopment,suchasenvisagedbySAFA’sconstitution.

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REFERENCES

Herzenberg,C.(2010).PlayerandReferee:conflictinginterestsandthe2010FIFAWorldCup.Pretoria,TheInstituteforSecurityStudies

Jennings,A. (2006).Foul!TheSecretWorldofFIFA:bribes,voteriggingandticketscandals,p.113-4.London,HarperCollins

TransparencyInternational.(2001),GlobalCorruptionReport,2001,p.76,Berlin,TransparencyInternational

Widner, J. (1992),TheRiseof aOne-PartyState inKenya:FromHarambee!ToNyayo!,UniversityofCaliforniaPress

Munro,B.(2005),“GreedvsGoodGovernance:thefightforcorruptionfreefootballinKenya”.AreportpresentedtotheFourthWorldCommunicationConferenceonSportandSociety.November6-10,2005,Copenhagen,Denmark

StakeholdersTransitionalCommittee.(2004).“FortheGoodoftheGame:AchievingGoodGovernance,Financial Transparency and Stakeholder Accountability For Saving and Improving Kenyan Football”,Nairobi,StakeholdersTransitionalCommittee

“Highunemploymentratecouldevolveintorevolutions,expertswarn”,DailyNation,May12009

“QuestionsasAG’steamtopstheclass:Bestperformerstoberewardedandlaggardspunished,sayKibakiandRaila”DailyNation,April272010

Schaefer,L.(2006).BlowingtheWhistleonCorruptioninSport.DeutscheWelle,http://www.dw-world.de

http://ndn.nigeriadailynews.com

http://roadto2010final.blogspot.com

http://www.playthegame.org

http://www.kenyafootball.com/index

http://www.kff.co.ke

http://www.fifa.com

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This report was authored by Prof. Othieno Nyanjom with editorial direction from Gladwell Otieno (Executive Director, AfriCOG) and input from James Wamugo (Programmes Officer, AfriCOG).

Production and editorial guidance was provided by Sylvia Maina (Advocacy and Communications, AfriCOG) with contributions from Hilary Atkins. The report was peer reviewed by Waciira Maina and Migai Akech, external resource persons.

Who we areAfriCOG is a civil society organisation dedicated to addressing the structural causes of corruption in Kenya. Its anti-corruption initiatives seek to address issues of bad governance in the public and private sectors.

AfriCOG would like to thank the following for their support:• Department for International Development (DFID)• Open Society Initiative for East Africa (OSIEA)• The Royal Finnish Embassy in Kenya• The Royal Netherlands Embassy• Donor partners in the National Response Initiative (URAIA)• German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

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Foul play the crisis of football management in kenya

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