Foucault's Subject

8/8/2019 Foucault's Subject

1/21

Foucault's Subject: An Ontological ReadingAuthor(s): Neve GordonSource: Polity, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Spring, 1999), pp. 395-414Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235247Accessed: 28/10/2010 04:31

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pal.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Palgrave Macmillan Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Polity.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=palhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3235247?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=palhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=palhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3235247?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pal


2/21

Foucault'sSubject:An OntologicalReading*Neve GordonUniversityof NotreDame

From the mid-1970s until his death,MichelFoucaultsought to developanaccount of the subjectthat would avoid bothregarding he subjectas merelythepassive productof power relationsand regarding t as entirelyself-creating. Following Foucault's inal cuesfocused on his discussionof theethics of the self and rootedin a conceptionoffreedom as an ontologicalconditionof possibilityrather thanas humanwill drawnmainly romHeidegger,I argue that Foucault sought to developan accountof humansasbeings-in-the-world ituatedwithinan existingweb of relationsoccurringwithin a contextof backgroundpractices, all the whilepossessing anontologicalfreedom that is not moldedbypower relations but is instead theconditionof possibilityof power itself In this way,Foucaultsought toachieve a balance betweenactivityandpassivity, agency and structure nhis accountof the subject.Neve Gordon s a Ph.D. Candidate n theDepartmentof Government,Universityof NotreDame, NotreDame, IN.

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault reformulatesthe Kantian question"What s man?,"to give it a historical slant. "Who are we?" Foucaultasks;"What are we in our actuality?"'These questions are intimatelyrelated toFoucault'spoignantcritiqueof the "humanist"raditionof "Man"2 nd to hisrefusal to privilege an a priori conceptionof the subject.Foucault does not

*I would like to thankFredDallmayr,JohnReiger,andPolity's anonymousreviewersfortheircommentsand suggestions. In addition,I wish to acknowledgethe financialsupportpro-videdduring he summerof 1997 by theUniversityof Notre Dame'sDepartment f Governmentand International tudies.1. Michel Foucault,"The Subject and Power,"appearedas an Afterword in HubertL.

DreyfusandPaulRabinow,MichelFoucaultBeyondStructuralism nd Hermeneutics Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1983), 212 (emphasisadded).2. ParticularlyMichel Foucault,The Order to Things,(New York:Vintage, 1994). Alsointeresting s JamesBerauer's interpretation f Foucaulton this issue, Michel Foucault'sForceof Flight (London:HumanitiesPressInternational,1990).

Polity Volume XXXI, Number 3 Spring 1999Polity Volume XXXI, Number 3 Spring 1999


3/21

396 Foucault'sSubject

subscribe o an ideal humannatureandintroduces he idea that the subject sproducedby power.WhendiscussingtheFoucauldian ubjectmost commen-tatorsrecountthis idea and thus accentuate he subject'spassivity.

AlthoughFoucaultnever developeda general theoryof the subject(sucha theorywould be antithetical o his project),in what follows I arguethatinhis later work Foucault strove to resituate the subject, seeking a balancebetween agency andstructure,activityandpassivity.3While scholars tend todiscuss his philosophy via the concepts of power and truth,I follow Fou-cault's final cue andproceed throughan analysisof the subjectand freedom.4I adoptArnold Davidson's differentiationbetween threeperiodsin Foucault'sthought5-archaeology, genealogy and ethics-to suggest that an ontologicalreading clarifies a number of claims Foucault advancedduringhis ethicalperiodand to a certainextent even his genealogicalperiod.I begin by highlightingthe structuralmotif in Foucault'swork and theubiquitousnatureof power,both of which underlie he conceptionof the pas-sive subject. I then discuss Foucault's notion of freedom, first, by outliningsome of the scholarly nterpretationsf Foucault'sunderstanding f freedom,andsecond, by presentingan alternativereadingwhich emphasizesthe onto-logical elements in his laterworkand accentuates he idea that freedom s thecondition of possibilityof power.It is in this context thatI attempt o unravelthe idea of care of one's self whichFoucaultdiscussedin considerable engthduringthe last years of his life. I arguethatHeidegger's ontologicalconcep-tion of freedom is compatiblewith Foucault's notion of care of the self andenables us to articulatea cogent idea of agency.I concludeby suggestingthatit is untenable o conceive of the Foucauldian ubjectas an artifactproducedby power,and that an ontological readingof Foucaultcan sustain a constanttension betweenagency andpower.Thus,the analysisindicates how the sub-ject can maintainagency withina structure hat not only restricts,constrainsand delimits action, but also producesmodes of behavior,fabricatesobjects

3. ThomasMcCarthyalso claims thatFoucault'sconceptionof thesubjectchanged,yet heconcludes that Foucaultends witha self-constituting ubject,rather han a middlenotion balanc-ing agency and structure."TheCritiqueof ImpureReason,Foucaultand the Frankfurt chool,"Political Theory18 (August 1990):437-69.4. Michel Foucault,"The Ethicof Carefor theSelf as a Practiceof Freedom"n TheFinalFoucault,ed. James Berauer andDavid Rasmussen(Cambridge,MA:MITPress, 1988).5. ArnoldI. Davidson,"Archaeology,Genealogy,Ethics," n Foucault,A CriticalReader,ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1986), 221-34. As I understandt, the firstperiod-archaeology-ends with TheArchaeology of Knowledge,around1969, and the secondperiod-genealogy-ends following the publicationof the first volume of TheHistoryof Sexu-ality, in the late 1970s. Davidson's differentiation etween theperiodscorrespondswith the threeaxes Foucaultmentions n the introduction o the Second Volumeof theHistoryof Sexuality: heformationof sciences (savoirs), systems of power,and formswith which individualsrecognizethemselves as subjects.TheHistoryof Sexuality,Vol.2 (New York:Vintage,1990), 5.


4/21

Neve Gordon 397

of knowledge,and constructsreality.It shows how the tension betweenstruc-ture andagency can be preservedwithoutone undermining he other.I. The Passive Subject

Most scholarsemphasizethe contrastbetween Foucault'srelationalcon-ception of power and the moreprevalentunderstanding f power as a prop-ertywhich can be possessed.They stresshis sensitivityto the fluctuatingnet-work of power relations,his developmentof the "capillary" onception ofpower-a micro-powerwhich permeatesall social strataproducingand thusconstrainingsubjectivity-and his notion of bio-power,which he consideredto be an indispensable lementin thedevelopmentof capitalism.Some under-score his constantendeavor o problematize he "normal," raisingFoucault'ssuccess in showing that phenomena which society deems permanent,inevitable, and universal, are but a specific period's fabrication.Moreover,commentators end to agree thatFoucaulthas opened a new pathof criticalinquiry.DebatesconcerningFoucault's workemerge,not as a consequenceof hisdisclosure that social practices pertaining o the insane or criminals are his-toricallycontingentand arbitrary, or as a direct result of his critiqueof thehumansciences' on-going productionof "normalcy."Rather,nearly all dis-agreementsrevolve aroundhis analysis of backgroundpracticesand, moreparticularly, ddresshis conceptionof both truthandpower,and the difficul-ties arising from the relationshipbetween the two. Despite the plethoraofdiverseviews advancedon both sides of these debates,6hemajorityof schol-arsagreethat,accordingto Foucault,subjectsareproducedby power.7

6. Foucault'scriticsinclude CharlesTaylor,"Foucaulton FreedomandTruth,"n CouzensHoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; EdwardSaid, "Foucaultand the ImaginationofPower," n CouzensHoy,ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader:149-156;NancyFraser,"FoucaultonModem Power:EmpiricalInsightsand NormativeConfusion,"Praxis International 1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justiceof Genealogy: ChomskyandSaidvs. FoucaultandBove,"Philosophy Today, Spring1989):73-94. ForFoucault'sdefenders,consult William Connolly, "Taylor,Foucault, and Otheress," Political Theory 13 (August(1985): 365-76; PaulPatton,"TaylorandFoucaulton Power andFreedom,"Political Studies,37(1989): 260-76; ThomasDumm,Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom(ThousandOaks,CA: Sage, 1996);AndrewLamb,"Freedom, he Self, and Ethical PracticeAccordingto MichelFoucault,"InternationalPhilosophical Quarterly35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L.Picket,"Foucaultandthe Politics of Resistance,"Polity, 27 (Summer 1996):445-66.7. CharlesTaylor, or example, says that "Foucaultwantsto explainthemodem notion ofindividualityas one of [technology's] products,"in "Foucault on Freedom and Truth,"75.WilliamConnollystates thatFoucault's"Powerproduces hesubject hatbecomes nota merefic-tion of theory and law, but a real artifact," n "Taylor,Foucault,and Otherness,"371. LeslieThiele states that in Foucault'sopinion "powertraversesandproduces subjects" n "Foucault's


5/21


The scholarly consensus that Foucaultregards subjects as an effect ofpowercan be traced o his rejectionof the constituting ubject.In the Archae-ology of Knowledge,he tells his readers hat"theauthorityof the creativesub-ject, as the raison d'etre of an ceuvreand the principleof its unity, is quitealien to [archaeology]."A few years later, n a moreemphatictone, he statesthat "one has to dispense with the constitutingsubject,to get rid of the sub-ject itself, that's to say,to arriveat an analysiswhich can account for the con-stitution of the subjectwithin a historical framework."8HubertDreyfus andPaul Rabinowpoint out that Foucault'scriticism of the constitutingsubjectwas triggeredby what he believed to be an unworkableKantian dea whichattributeso mansovereigntyin spiteof his being enslaved.9Foucault's disavowal of the constitutingsubjectis also at the core of thecriticismhe directsagainstphenomenologyand existentialism.Claimingthathumanbeings arealwaysthrown nto anexistingweb of constraints,Foucaultdenounces both the idea that the subject is the sovereign of power and thenotion that one is nothingbut what one makes of oneself. This standpointhasbeen noticed by practicallyall critics and has frequentlybeen linked to theinfluence of structuralism.When mentioningthe Foucauldian ubject,'0 om-mentatorsoften evoke passages in which Foucaultsuggests that "theindivid-ual, with his identityandcharacteristics,s the productof a relationof powerexercised over bodies, multiplicities,movements,desires, forces";or "Disci-pline 'makes' individuals; t is the specific techniqueof a power thatregardsindividualsboth as objectsandinstruments f its exercise.""The Foucauldian

TripleMurderandthe Modem Developmentof Power" CanadianJournalof Political Science19 (June,1986)257. HaroldWeisspointsout that"Foucaultviews the subjector 'humannature'as constituted,whetherdiscursively, nstitutionally, r autonomically,"n "TheGenealogyof Jus-tice and the Justice of Genealogy,"77. PaulPattonclaims that"ithas beenone of Foucault'scon-stanttheses sinceDisciplineandPunish,thatpowercreatessubjects,"n "Taylor nd FoucaultonPowerandFreedom,"264. InMichel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom,Thomas DummsaysthatFoucaultexposes the"techniques hroughwhich individualsareproduced," 1, see also 101.8. MichelFoucault,TheArchaeologyof Knowledge(New York:BarnesandNoble, 1993),139. Michel Foucault,Power/Knowledge,ed. Colin Gordon(New York:Vintage,1980), 117.9. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,Michel Foucault Beyond StructuralismandHermeneutics,31, suggest that,accordingto Foucault,the Kantianunderstanding f the humansubjectcreates threemajor paradoxes:Man is considered"1) as a fact amongother facts to bestudiedempirically,andyet as the transcendental onditionof thepossibilityof all knowledge;2)as surroundedby what he cannotget clear about(the unthought)and yet as a potentiallylucidcogito, sourceof all intelligibility;and3) as theproductof a long historywhosebeginninghe cannever reach andyet, paradoxically, s the sourceof thatvery history."10. One should note that often Foucault does not distinguishclearly between the conceptsindividualandsubject,and uses themalternately.Unless I amquotingFoucaultor one of hiscom-mentators will restrictmyself to the term"subject."11. Foucault,PowerlKnowledge,74; Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish (New York:Vintage,1979), 170.


6/21

Neve Gordon 399

subject has no inherent characteristics,and seems to gain meaning onlythrough ts relationshipswith otherunitsin the structure. notherwords,sub-jects acquire identity as a result of the interplayof power relations takingplace within the system.A paradigmatic xampleof this idea is Foucault'streatment f the panop-ticon "architectural igure" designed by Jeremy Bentham.'2The perpetual"gaze" of an unverifiable observer situated inside the panoptic tower actsdirectlyon prisonerswithout the necessity of physical instruments.The con-straintsand norms which this "gaze"projectsupontheperson sittingin a cell,permanentlyvisible, rendera prisonerdocile.'3Moreover,the prisoner nter-nalizes the disciplinaryrequirements.This becomes even clearerthrough heanalysisof the confession practice, n which Foucault llustrates hat not onlyexteriorrelationships mposeanobjectivemolduponthe subject; t is as if the"gaze"penetrates he subject, ensuringthatthe "soul" conforms to the exist-ing rules, codes, and mores, which are considered to correspondwith thesoul's "essence."In "TheSubjectand Power"Foucaultstates that he has studiedthe differ-ent dimensions of power in order to understandhow the subject is objec-tivized. We read that the "formof power appliesitself to immediateeverydaylife which categorizes the individual,markshim by his own individuality,attacheshim to his own identity, mposesa law of truthon himwhichhe mustrecognize and which others have to recognize in him."'4This idea is discussedin greatdetailin Discipline andPunish,where Fou-caultanalyzesnot only surveillancebutothertechniquesby which the subjectis constituted-e.g., "normalization" nd "examination."The power of nor-malizationdetermines he "acceptable"imits of behaviorby demarcating henormaland"respectable."Normalization"imposes homogeneity"on the sub-ject both in thoughtandcomportment;but at the same time it individualizesthe subject "by making t possible to measuregaps, to determine evels, to fixspecialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one toanother."Examination"establishesover individualsa visibilitythroughwhichone differentiates hemandjudges them."It enables the teacher, orexample,to transmit pecific informationand"to transformhis pupilsinto a whole fieldof knowledge,"while each individual"receivesas his statushis own individ-uality"thus markinghim as a case. Foucaultconcludes that a new modality

12. Foucault,Discipline and Punish,200ff.13. C. Colwell pointsout thatthe flaw of the panopticonmodel is that the gaze is central-ized, while in the ideal structure he gaze is fragmented.Power,accordingto Foucault,is notlocated in one identifiablesite. "The Retreat of the Subject in the Late Foucault,"PhilosophyToday Spring 1994): 56-69.14. Foucault,"TheSubjectandPower,"212.


7/21


of power is introduced hroughdiscipline whose proceduresand techniques"constitute he individualas an effect andobjectof power,as effect andobjectof knowledge."'5So it seems thatpower makes humanbeings into objects by giving themidentitiesto which a set of categoriesare attached:woman/passive/lack, rim-inal/illicit/dangerous, nd sane/reason/normal. hecategoriesorattributes reconcatenatedto the subjectand are conceived of as natural,normal and/oressential;theybecome the standards f theexistingsocial practices.The "nor-malization"of attributespermeatessocial practicesvia a complex networkofpowerrelations,which in his lateryearsFoucaultalso describedvia the term"gamesof truth."Scientific models, medical and legal discourses,economicinstitutions,etc. are constitutedby games of truth.It is precisely the vivid images which depict the subjectas an effect thathave led many scholars to recite Foucault's claim that power producesthesubject.This claim postulates a passive subject and accentuates the struc-turalistmotif in Foucault's hought.'6Yet it raisesa seriousquestion.If poweris the conditionof possibilityof thesubject, f it precedesand createstheexis-tence of subjects,how can we explain the escape of a subjectfrom a givensystemof powerrelations,not in the sense of meredifference-being a delin-quentor insane-but ratheropeninga new directionthatis not within the setbinariesand definitionsintegralto that system?ThomasFlynn recounts theoccasion on which Sartrereminded he Marxisteconomiststhat Flaubertmaybe apetit bourgeois,but not allpetit bourgeoisare Flauberts.'7II. Foucault's Notion of Freedom?The questionwe need to addressis whether Foucaultactuallyconceives thesubjectas an objectwhichpowerhasengendered.WilliamConnollyseems tobelieve thathe does. He says: "Powerproducesthe subjectthat becomes not

15. Foucault,DisciplineandPunish, 184, 186, 192.16. One commentator uggests that,accordingto The Orderof Things,"the class of sen-tencesthat can be uttered n a specifiedtime andplace is not determinedby the conscious wishesof the speakers.Thepossibilityof beingtrue-or-falsedoes not residein a person'sdesireto com-municate.Hence the authorhimself is irrelevant o the analysisof theconditions of possibility."IanHacking,"TheArchaeologyof Foucault,"n CouzensHoy,Foucault,A CriticalReader,32.17. ThomasFlynn,"Foucaultas Parrhesiast,"n Bemauer et al., The Final Foucault, 114.JohnRajchman,Michel Foucault: The Freedomof Philosophy(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1985), 10, points out that Flaubert"perhaps irst exemplifies the 'antibourgeois'aims ofmodernist iteraryculture,for he envisageda new aristocracyof lettersopposedto the 'revolt ofthe masses' and to the idea of progress,to the journalism,sentimentalmagazines,and middlebrow culturewhich was ruiningthe languageandkeepingthe greatwriter from his sovereigntyover it."


8/21

Neve Gordon401

a mere ictionof theoryand aw,buta realartifact." y imposing"anartifi-cialreality n materialotdesignedo receive t,"power reates rtifacts,.e.,criminals,omosexuals,cademics,tc.Thismaterial, ccordingoConnolly,is theselfandpower ransformsheself intoasubject.Theself isnotdesignedto receive he artificialealitybecause t is recalcitrant,hichexplainswhypower s oftenan act of imposition.'8 onnolly ersuasivelyrgueshatFou-caultunderstandshesubjecto beembodied,nd hat"bodies ndpleasures"canresistpower.'9 onetheless,Connolly's uggestionhat he self is arecal-citrantmaterial eemsto be foreign o Foucault'shought nd, urthermore,creates problematicubject/self inary.More mportantly,onnolly's nalysisdoes not seemto concurwith thethoughts oucault dvanced uringhis "ethical"eriod, nddoes not enableustorelate othe issuesaddresseduringhoseyears,particularlyhe ideaof"care ftheself."20yleavinghenotionof recalcitrantaterialpaque,Con-nolly'sdescriptionoesnothelpanswerhebasicguidingquestion osedear-lier:howdoesFoucault'snalysisof thesubjectdiffer roma rigidformofstructuralismhereone can account nlyfor differenceswithin heexistingsystem?na late nterview, oucault sserts: Inmybooks havereally riedtoanalyze hanges, ot norder o find he materialausesbut o showall thefactors hat nteractednd hereactions f people. believe n thefreedom fpeople.To the samesituation, eoplereact nverydifferentways."2'Foucault's uvre s notonlyananalysisof historicalhange,as he statesin theinterview,or it has alsohelped reate heconditions eeded ortrans-formationndalteration.nthiswayhe is a followerof theearlyMarxwhopointed utthatpovertys notnaturalitis notaresultof scarcity utof vio-lenceandviolation) ndsuggestedhat he mechanisms hichproducet canandshouldbe resisted.Foucault as alsoattemptedo undermineotionsofnecessityand naturalness hich havepermeatedur socialpractices.Hisunderlyingssumption,s thepassage bove ndicates,s thatpeopleare ree.This pointhas been discussedby severalcommentators,he majority fwhom, believe,misconstruehatFoucaultmeanswhenhesaysthat hesub-jectis free.ThomasDumm,orexample, iscussesFoucault'sdeaof freedom xten-sively.HeusesIsaiahBerlin'sTwoConcepts f Libertys apointofreference,

18. Connolly, "Taylor,Foucault,andOtherness,"371.19. Michel Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.1 (New York:Vintage,1990), 157.20. In his recent book The Ethos of Pluralization (Minnesota:University of MinnesotaPress, 1995), Connolly promotesan ontological readingof Foucaultwhichstressesthe notion ofcare . I takeup this treatment ater.21. Michel Foucault, "Truth,Power, Self: An Interviewwith Michel Foucault," n Tech-

nologies of the Self, ed. LutherH. Martin,HuckGutman,and PatrickH. Hutton(Amherst:TheUniversityof MassachusettsPress, 1988), 14.


9/21


to which he contrasts and opposes Foucault's notion of freedom.22Dummbegins by underscoring he differences between Berlin and Foucaultregard-ing theirconceptionof space, and its relationto freedom.Dumm points outthat Berlin starts rom the liberalnotion of neutral pacewhich can be dividedinto public andprivate,and from the idea that humanbeings embodya "nat-ural 'status."Berlin then cultivates a notion of normalcy vis-d-vis "neutralspace"and the "natural tatus of humanity."Foucault,Dumm says, exposesthe contingentandopen characterof both agents andthe space they inhabit,while showinghow the"qualityof imagination n a given society is intimatelyrelated to the externalorganizationof that society's space."23 agree withDumm'scritiqueof Berlin andappreciatehis attempt o highlightFoucault'snotion of space. Nonetheless, I find his interpretation f Foucault'sfreedommisleadingandultimatelyflawed.Dummtells his readers hat"DisciplineandPunish is atroota book aboutthe practicesof freedom andthe conditions that bearuponthose practices nthe moder era ... a book that sets an agendafor uncoveringnot only theterms of our imprisonmentbut the conditions of our freedom" (emphasisadded).QuotingFoucault,he claims thatmechanismsof power create "nor-malization,"24 ut suggests that disciplinary order is, nonetheless, alwaysincomplete.Preciselybecausedisciplineis always incompletethe existence offreedom is not in question (an idea reminiscent of Berlin's negative free-dom).25 orDumm,then,freedom is dependenton the incompletenessof dis-cipline, and identified with the lack of discipline.26Paul Patton, who also analyzes Foucault vis-a-vis Berlin, provides thereaderwith a muchmore nuancedargument.He avers that it is insufficient orepresent"Foucault'swork as concerned with expandingthe sphereof nega-tive freedomopento individuals"; ather t is directedatenlarginga sphereofpositivefreedom.Positive freedom attainsa differentmeaning n thiscontext,for Pattonequates positive freedom with "the existence of a humancapacity

22. "TwoConceptsof Liberty," n IsaiahBerlin,Four Essays on Liberty(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1969), 118-72.23. Dumm,MichelFoucault and the Politics of Freedom,41.24. Dumm,Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom,78, 101-02.25. Dumm,MichelFoucault and the Politics of Freedom,108.26. For example,Dumm suggests thataccording o society the delinquent"comesclose tobeingtheemblematic igureof freedom"which"puts hemost elementalaspectof freedomon themarginsof a socialorder hatclaims freedomas its mostimportantalue."This,he says,contributesto an "impoverished olitical imagination oncerning reedom" or it marginalizes ndsegregatesthe most free elements n society (MichelFoucault and thePolitics of Freedom,111-112).Rajch-man,who alsowroteon thisissue,disagrees.He says:"Foucault dvancesa newethic:not the ethicof transgression, ut theethicof constantdisengagementromconstituted orms of experience,offreeingoneself for the inventionsof new forms of life"(MichelFoucault: TheFreedomof Philos-ophy,37). The subtledifferencebetween the two commentatorss, of course,crucial.


10/21

Neve Gordon 403

for active self transformation"ndgives it the name"powerto." Contrary oDumm,Pattonbelieves that"powerto" is the condition of possibilityof dis-cipline, which he regardsas a specific form of "powerover,"the power thatconfines and produceshumanbeings. "Power to" is laterrenamed"force,"meaning the "capacityto act and be acted upon."While I willingly followPatton'sinterpretationhis far,his notion that"force,""powerto," or "posi-tive freedom"can be increased eads me to suspectthathe too conceives free-dom as a humanproperty.27Both commentatorsmakeinterestingobservations,yet fail to disclose thefundamentaldifferencebetweenFoucaultandBerlin. UnlikeFoucault,Berlintreatsfreedomas a subject'swill, thatis, a propertywhich can eitherbe con-strained negativefreedom)or amplified (positive freedom).28 o makesenseof Foucault's aterwritings,the periodDavidson calls "ethics," t is advanta-geous to read Foucaultthrougha Heideggerian,29nd to a lesser extent Sar-

27. Patton,"Taylorand Foucaulton Power andFreedom,"266, 276.28. Foucault would have probablysaid thatby using the word"liberty"n the title of boththe chapterand the book, Berlin assumessome kind of essential naturewhich needs to be liber-ated.Foucault,"The Ethicsof the Care of the Self as a Practiceof Freedom," n Berauer et al.,Final Foucault, 2-3.29. I do not claim thatFoucaultbecame a Heideggerian n his final years;he had his ownagenda, nsightsand innovations.However,I do thinkthatreadingFoucault's aterworkthroughHeideggerhelps make his claims morecoherent.One shouldnote that in his last interview Fou-cault claimed:"For me Heideggerhas always been the essentialphilosopher."A numberof sen-tences laterhe adds: "My entirephilosophical developmentwas determinedby my readingofHeidegger.I neverthelessrecognizedthatNietzsche outweighedhim"(interviewwith Foucaultconductedby Gilles Barbedetteand Andre Scala in Michel Foucault,Michel Foucault:Politics,Philosophy,Culture,ed. LawrenceD. Kritzman New York:Routledge, 1990], 250). There is aconsiderableliteraturediscussing the relation between Foucault's and Heidegger's work. NeilLevy points out that most of this literature ocuses on Foucault'scritiqueof Heideggerin TheOrderof Things,andhis relationship o the early Heideggerin "ThePrehistoryof Archaeology:Heideggerand the EarlyFoucault,"Journalof the BritishSociety or Phenomenology,27, (May1996), 158. Some claim that the relationshipbetween Foucault and Heidegger is lax, mostnotablyJacquesDerrida,who accuses Foucaultof having"neverconfronted[Heidegger]and, ifone may say so, neverexplainedhimselfon his relation o him," n "Desistence,"whichappearedin P.Lacoue-Labarthe, ypography:Mimesis,Philosophy,Politics (Cambridge:HarvardUniver-sity Press, 1989), 17; quotedfrom Levy, "The Prehistoryof Archaeology:Heideggerand theEarlyFoucault."Paul Rabinowasserts thatHeideggeris concernedwith truthas being and truthas destiny,while Foucaultis concernedwith truthas techne and truthas presence, in "Moderand countermoder: Ethosandepoch in HeideggerandFoucault,"n TheCambridgeCompanionto Foucault,ed. GaryGutting Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994).Onthe other sideof this debatearescholars like Rajchmanwho claims thatHeidegger"is surelythecentralphilo-sophical influence"on Foucault,in Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, 18. In theaforementionedarticleNeil Levy illustrates hat Foucault'scriticismof objectificationand sub-jectificationis rootedin his readingof Heidegger,and HubertDreyfusdiscussesthe relationshipbetween Heidegger's Being and Foucault'spower, in "Being and Power: Heideggerand Fou-cault,"InternationalJournalof PhilosophicalStudies,4 (1996): 1-16.


11/21

404 Foucault's ubject

trian,ens.Foucault,believe,particularlynhislaterwritings, oesnotcon-ceivefreedom sapropertyhatcanbeexpropriatedromhuman eings,butrather s thecondition f possibility f human eings.III. Foucault'sFreedom:An OntologicalReadingExamininghe similarities etween he Foucauldianubjectanda few ofSartre'sntologicalnsightsproveshelpful. nhisfamous ectureExistential-ismandHumanism,artrepointsoutthatunlikeotherbeings-in-the-worldwhoseessenceprecedesheirexistence, he existenceof humanbeingspre-cedes heir ssence.Theexistence fatables preceded ytheformandqual-itywhichmade tsproductionnddefinition ossible.Theessenceof humanbeings,on the otherhand, s dependentn theirexistence:"man irstof allexists,encountersimself, urgesupintheworld-and defineshimselfafter-wards."30ince existenceprecedes ssence,onecannot xplainone'sactionby referringo some deaof human ature.Man,accordingo Sartre,s free-dom. Sartregoes on to explain hat becausehumanbeingsdo not haveanature achpersons whathemakesof him/herself.artres aware f exter-nalandinternal onstraints n thesubject, et he thinks hatultimatelyhesubject asthecapacityoovercomehemand iveauthentically,.e.,torelatetohim/herselfsfree.

Foucault, believe,wouldsubscribeo the"existence recedes ssence"formulawithtwomajorqualifications.irst,FoucaultwouldrejectSartre'sclaim hathumans reresponsibleorwhat heyare.3' hesecond,andsurelymoremportantualification,elates o the status rnotionof "existence."WehaveseenthatFoucault elieves hathuman eingsare ree.YetFoucault,nmyopinion,wouldattribute different enseto freedom.WhileSartre aysthat humanexistence s freedom,Foucault, s I will explainmomentarily,seemsto considerreedom o be thecondition f possibility f human xis-tence.The majordisagreementetweenFoucault ndSartre s ultimatelyrelated o theirdifferent onceptionsf Being,a topicwhich s beyond hescopeof thispaper.32ere t is sufficientosaythatFoucault'sdeasappearocorrelatemorewithHeidegger'sositionhanwithSartre's.Heideggeruggestshathuman eingsare hrownntotheworldand hat

30. Jean-PaulSartre,Existentialism& Humanism London:EyreMethuenLtd., 1973), 28.31. Sartre,Existentialism&Humanism,2932. Inhis critiqueof Sartre,Heideggerclaims thata reversalof therelationbetweenessenceandexistence still conceives being in its traditional ense, as presence.Heideggerwants to dis-tinguishbetweenbeings as presenceandBeing. See MartinHeidegger,"Letteron Humanism,"in MartinHeidegger,Basic Writings,ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco:HarperCollins,1993), 213-66.


12/21

Neve Gordon 405

their conditionof possibilityis freedom.Freedom s used herein the ontolog-ical sense and not as free will. In TheQuestionConcerningTechnology,Hei-degger says that the "essenceof freedomis originallynot connectedwith thewill or even withthecausalityof humanwilling."33Heideggerarguesthat"theessence of the being-in-itselfof all beings is freedom,"34nd that freedomisactualizedthrough he engagementin the disclosureof beings; "manshouldbe understood,within the questionof being, as the site which being requiresin order to disclose itself."' In his discussion on Schelling's Treatiseon theEssence of HumanFreedom,Heideggerwrites:

Schellingfinds it remarkablehatKant realizedin his practicalphiloso-phy that the essence of the "ego"is freedomand thus determined heessence of thisbeing in itself in its own being, butthen declaredon topof this in the Critiqueof Pure Reason thatthe essence of the thing-in-itself is unknowable.Only one step was necessary,to carry over theinsightaboutman'sbeing-in-itselfto the being-in-itselfof all beings ingeneraland thus to make freedominto a positive and completely uni-versaldetermination f the "in-itself' in general.36Elsewhere Heidegger explains that "Freedom s the comprehensiveandpervasivedimension of being in whose ambianceman becomes man in thefirstplace. This means: the essence of manis grounded n freedom;freedomitself, however, is a categorytranscendinghumanDasein, thatis, a categoryof authenticbeing as such." In Schelling's TreatiseHeidegger stresses that

ontological freedom is not "freedomas a propertyof man; but the reverse:man as the possibility of freedom. Human freedom is a freedom whichinvadesandsustainsman,therebyrenderingmanpossible."3Heidegger,FredDallmayrexplains,conceives freedomof will to be "basedon humanDaseinconstruedas freedomor a mode of 'being free', andnot vice versa.Viewed asDasein's ontological core, 'being free' is neitherimposed on as an externalfate or destiny,norcan it arbitrarily e chosen or discarded."38As is all too evident, the Foucauldian ubject s a being-in-the-world, nd

33. Martin eidegger,TheQuestion oncerningechnology,"nKrell,BasicWritings,30.34. MartinHeidegger,Schelling'sTreatiseon the Essence of HumanFreedom,trans. JoanStambaughAthens:Universityf OhioPress,1985),93.35. MartinHeidegger,nIntroductionoMetaphysics,rans.RalphManheimNewHaven:YaleUniversity ress,1987),205.36. Heidegger,Schelling'sTreatiseon theEssenceof HumanFreedom,93.37. MartinHeidegger, Wesender menschlichenFreiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie,(Gesamtausgabeol.31), ed. Hartmut ietjenFrankfurt-Main:lostermann,982),303.Thispassages quotedn FredDallmayr,olisandPraxis Cambridge, A:MITPress,1984),121.Heidegger,Schelling'sTreatiseon theEssenceof HumanFreedom,9, translation lightlyaltered.38. Dallmayr,Polis and Praxis, 114.


13/21

406 Foucault'subject

notan autonomousational eingsetagainsthe worldasBerlinwouldhaveus think.Moreover, oucault'saterworkrevealsanunderstandingf free-domsimilar oHeidegger's. woconditionsf possibility renecessary,ou-caultsays,for a powerrelationshipo exist:"That he 'other' theoneoverwhompower s exercised)be thoroughlyecognized nd maintainedo theveryend as apersonwhoacts;and hat, acedwitharelationshipf power,whole field of responses, eactions, esults,andpossible nventionsmaybeopened." ower s characterizeds an actionwhichmodifies he actionsofothers, nd"is exercised nlyover reesubjects, ndonlyinsofar stheyarefree."A few pages ater,he adds:"For,f it is true hatattheheartof powerrelations ndas a permanentondition f theirexistence here s aninsubor-dination nda certain ssential bstinacynthepartof theprinciplesf free-dom, hen here s nopossibility fpowerwithout hemeansofescapeorpos-sibleflight."39hus, t seemsthat reedoms thecondition f possibility fpower.Powerdoes not act onobjectsikechairs,butonlyonhuman eings,andonlyinsofar s theircondition f possibilitys freedom.In the finalyearsof his life, Foucault eiteratedhat thepossibilityofescapefromthe constraints f power s power'scondition orexistence. none of his lastinterviews, e says:"Onemustobservealso that herecannotbe relations fpowerunless hesubjects free.... [I]n herelations f power,there s necessarilyhepossibility f resistance,or if therewerenopossibil-ity of resistance-of violentresistance, f escape,of ruse,of strategieshatreverse hesituation-therewouldbe no relations f power."40o onecouldsaythat hesubject, onstrueds thatwhosecondition f possibilitys free-dom, s thecondition f possibility f power.Thisamountso a newreadingof theearlier ssumptionhatpowerproducesubjects.Following uch a lineof thinking few scholarshave claimed hatthelaterFoucault eversedhis conception f thesubject, ransformingt, as itwere, romabsolute assivityoabsolute ctivity.4'foneacceptshatarever-

39. Foucault,"TheSubjectandPower,"220, 221, 225. Already n TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.1, he suggeststhat"wherethere is power,there is resistance."See 95.40. Foucault,"The Ethicsof the Care of the Self as a Practiceof Freedom," n Bernauer tal., Final Foucault, 12.41. JiirgenHabermasmakes a similar claim in his essay "TakingAim at the Heart of thePresent," n Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault a Critical Reader, 103-08. A numberof years laterThomasMcCarthy eaches the same conclusion. He says:"Viewed from the perspectiveof criti-cal social theory,Foucault'slaterframeworkof interpretationies in the oppositeextreme fromhis earliersocial ontology of power.Then everythingwas a function of context, of impersonalforces andfields, fromwhich therewas no escape-the end of man.Now, the focus is on those'intentionalandvoluntaryactionsby which men notonly set themselves rules of conductbutalsoseek to transform hemselves .. . and to make their life into an oeuvre"-with scant regardforsocial, political and economic context. In "The Critiqueof ImpureReason, Foucault and theFrankfurt chool,"463.


14/21

Neve Gordon 407

sal actuallyoccurred,one must conclude thatan irreconcilable issure existsbetween the first two periodsin Foucault'soeuvreandthe last. To reveal theshortcomingof such an interpretation,while striving o attaina bettergraspofFoucault'spositionconcerningfreedom and the subject,I turnto other workshe producedduringhis last period.In The Use of Pleasure, the Second Volumeof TheHistory of Sexuality,Foucault discloses similarities between antiquityand Christianityregardingwhich sexual activity was sanctioned and prohibited,while arguingthat theGreeks recognized and organized sexuality differently.Already in classicalGreek thought sexual practices were considered to be part of an ethicaldomain.This ethicaldomain, however,was not governed by rules or univer-sal interdictionsregardingthe use of pleasureas it subsequentlydid in theChristianmoralityof sexual behavior.Nor did the Greeks think thatdesireslay "hiddenin the mysteries of the heart"waiting to be deciphered.Antiq-uity's ethical domain of pleasure was not determinedby codes and/or ahermeneuticalapproachwhich assumes a well defined yet concealed mean-ing, essence, or nature,thatneeds to be revealed.Rather,sexual moderationwas consideredto be an exercise of freedom andindividualswereexpectedtomaster themselves accordingto need, time, and status, so as to create andrecreatethe rule of the self over self. When Foucault tells us thatmasteringthe use of pleasurewas characterized s an "activefreedom,a freedom whichwas indissociablefrom a structural, nstrumental, nd ontologicalrelation totruth,"we notice that his assumptionsare beginning to change-the struc-ture/agencyrelationship s brought o the fore andrenegotiated.42This change, however, does not constitute a reversal of his earlierposi-tion;it is an elaboration. n a seminargiven attheUniversityof Vermont,Fou-cault begins to develop whathe called the technologyof the self, suggestingthat in his earlierworks he had over-emphasized he technology of domina-tion and power. In his analysis of technologies of the self, he finds thatthenotion of care of the self, which had been prominent n antiquity,had beenobscured by the Delphic principle "know thyself." Foucault claims that"know thyself' became dominant for two majorreasons. On the one hand,"ourmorality,a moralityof asceticism, insists that the self is thatwhich onecan reject,"while on the otherhand,since Descartes,philosophershave con-sideredthe thinking subjectto be the cornerstoneof epistemology,andcon-sequently emphasizedthe scrutinyof the self. Both observationsare firmlylinked to his priorwork. As I have already suggested, Foucaultargues thathuman beings do not have a nature that can be rejected, liberated, orrenounced(as some Christianteachings would have us think).At the same

42. Foucault,TheHistoryof Sexuality,Vol.2, 93.


15/21

408 Foucault's ubject

time,asmentioned t theoutset,he claims hat he self cannotbe simultane-ouslythe transcendentalondition f possibility f knowledge ndanobjectof empirical nquiry.The dominance f "knowhyself'is aninversion f thehierarchyf thetwoprinciplesf antiquity,esays,andsetsout o disclose he ancient nder-standingof takingcare of the self. He turns to Plato'sAlcibiadesandSocrates'sApologyandfinds he notion hat o takecareof theself,onehasto takecareof one'sactivities, ndnotoverthesoul-as-substance.oucaulttakesgreatpains o emphasizehatcareof the self is not a turn nsideone'sself,it is bynomeansa call forquietism,or if it is a call foranythingt is acall foraction.Takingareofone'sself,asopposedo "knowhyself," ccen-tuatesanontological otionof freedom,where reedoms nota propertyfthe self.Onlybecause areof one'sself assumes hat reedoms theconditionof possibility f beinghuman, ndnothumanwill,can tcoherentlytress heideaof improvingne'sselfand ranscendingne'sown limits.43This is themajorheme n thethirdvolumeof TheHistory f Sexuality,which s titledTheCareoftheSelf.Foucault ointsoutthatnHellenistic ndRoman hought ttentivenesso one'sself wasproblematizedven further.WhilefortheGreeks he careof the selfwasanethics hatpertainedo freemenandwasfirmlyinked o their tatusnsociety,nthese ater ras hecareof the self couldnolongeraccordwithone's status.Foucault uotesSeneca44saying hatmanneeds o seekhisownsoul,a soul that s upright,ood,andgreat."What lse,"Senecasays,"shouldyou call sucha soul thana goddwellingas a guestin a humanbody.A soul like thismaydescend nto aRoman night ustaswellas intoafreedman'sonora slave."45oucault on-

43. Foucault,Technologiesf theSelf," n Martintal.,TechnologiesftheSelf,22,25.44. It is interestingo notethatHeideggermentions eneca n hisdiscussion f the onto-logicalhistory f care.HequotesSeneca aying hat hegoodof human eings s fulfilledbycare.YetHeideggerlso asserts hat f "onewere o constructheexpressioncare or oneself'... thiswouldbe a tautology."are, esays,"cannottand orsomespecial ttitudeowardsheSelf."Unfortunately,cannot,n thiscontext,discuss hedifference etweenHeidegger'sndFoucault's otions f care.MartinHeidegger, eingandTimeOxford: asilBlackwell, 988),243and237,respectively.45. Foucault's iscussion f Seneca s problematic.eneca sksusto seekoursoul,a soulthat s upright, oodandgreat.Yet,we haveseen hatFoucaultejectshenotion hat aking areof theself amountsotakingareofone'ssoul,particularlysoul-as-substance.nother,erhapsgreater, roblems that n hisdiscussiononcerninghecareof the selfFoucault sestheStoicsashismajoreference.Hannah rendt aspointed utthatStoicism epresentsanescape romtheworld nto heselfwhich,t is hoped,will beable o sustaintself nsovereignndependenceof theoutsideworld"nMen nDarkTimesSanDiego:Harcourtrace, 993),9. WhileArendt'sassessment f Stoicisms probablyver-conclusive,t wouldhavebeenbeneficialf Foucault,whorejects uietism rany ormof escapism, adaddressedhisdisturbingspect f Stoicism.Oneshould, owever,ememberhatTheCareof theSelfwaspartof aworknprogressutoffbyFoucault'srematureeath.


16/21

Neve Gordon409

cludesthatduring hisperiod he exerciseof powerwasrelativizedn twoways.First,whilepoliticalactivitywas considered life commitment,twasnolongerobvioushatonehad oaccept hisresponsibilitysfollowingromtheparticulartatus neheldat birth-one'splace n the socialstructure asno longerconsideredo be a causal orce eavingno room or recourse.Wenoticethat,accordingo Foucault'seading,he subjects not an effectofexternal onstraints,uthastheopportunityo act and f needbe defytheseconstraints.econd,andmore mportantn thiscontext, he Hellenistic ndRomanhinkersecognizedhatone exercisespoweralreadywithinan exist-ingfieldofcomplex elations,whichentailshatone s simultaneouslylwaysrulerandruled.Artistides, oucaultays,seestheprinciple f goodgovern-ment"in hefactthata man s oneand heotheratthe same ime, hroughninterplayf directionsent andreceived,of checks,of appeals, f decisionstaken."46his,I think,s exactly he balanceFoucaultwaslooking orin thelastyearsof hislife,andI will discuss tsimplicationsn the finalsection.Ina late nterview, oucaultharacterizeshe careof theselfas thedelib-eratepractice f freedom.Careof the selfmeans irstand oremostelatingoone'sselfas anon-slave, sfree,which,nturn,s acare ortheother.To us-tifythe atter laim,FoucaultmentionsheGreeks'onceptionf thetyrant sapersonwho s evil towards issubjects ecause e is a slave ohisappetites;his immoralomportmentowards therss a consequencef neglectingelfcare.47n anothernterviewromthe sameperiod,Foucault sserts hatthecareof theself is the"elaborationf one's ife as apersonalworkof art."'4Sartre,owardsheendof ExistentialismndHumanism,triveso answertheaccusationhatexistentialismmountso nihilismandvoluntarism.Themoral hoice,"he says,"iscomparableo the constructionf a workof art."There s no a prioricode orrulewhichhumanbeingsmust ollow,"theresno pre-definedictureor [humans]o make."49artrehas oneguidelineooffer basedon his conception f humanontology:humans houldrelate othemselvesand othersas free. Thisadvice, ncludinghe metaphorf theworkof art, esembles oucault'snderstandingf theethicof thecareof theselfas apractice f freedom.Thisconclusion oesnot ndicatehatn his lateryearsFoucaultspousedaconstitutingubject, sovereign.Consideror amomenthe ntroductionfthe secondvolumeof theHistory f Sexuality,whereFoucaultxplainswhythepublicationf thebookwasdelayed.The initialplanwasto publish ix

46. MichelFoucault, heHistory fSexuality, ol. (NewYork:Vintage, 990),86,87-88.47. Foucault,TheEthics f theCareof theSelf as a Practice f Freedom,"nBernauertal., Final Foucault, 10-14. See also Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.2, 80-81.48. Foucault,AnAestheticsf Existence,"nKritzman,olitics,Philosophy, ulture,9.49. Sartre,Existentialism& Humanism,48-49.


17/21


volumes which dealt with the historyof the experienceof sexuality,"whereexperience is understoodas the correlationbetween fields of knowledge,types of normativity,and forms of subjectivity n a particular ulture."Aftercompletingthefirstvolume,Foucaultrealizedthat n order o accomplishthisobjective,he had to analyze the interrelationsalong the three axes that con-stituteit: "1) the formationsof sciences (savoirs) that referto it, 2) the sys-tems of powerthatregulateits practice,3) the forms withinwhich individu-als areable,areobliged,to recognizethemselvesas subjectsof thissexuality."Foucault ells the reader hathe hadmastered he tools to analyzethe firsttwoaxes in his earlierwork,and that the delay occurredbecausehe had to under-take a "shift"so he could understand he third."I felt obliged,"he says, "tostudythe games of truth n the relationshipof self with self and the formingof oneself as a subject, takingas my domainof referenceandfield of investi-gationwhatmightbe called 'the historyof desiringman."'50Along the same lines, Foucault answers an interviewer who asks himwhetherin the second and thirdvolumes of the History of Sexualityhe hadchangeddirection.

Yes, I have changeddirection.When I was dealing with madnessI setout fromthe "problem"hat it may have constituted n a certainsocial,political,andepistemologicalcontext: the problemthat madnessposesfor others.[IntheHistory of Sexuality,volumes two andthree]I set outfrom theproblem hat sexualbehaviormight pose for individuals hem-selves (orat least to meninAntiquity).In thefirstcase, I hadto find outhow madmenwere"controlled";n the second,how one "controls" ne-self ... Here I would like to show how self control is integrated ntothe practiceof controllingothers.They are,in short,two oppositewaysof approaching he same question:how is an "experience" ormed inwhich the relationshipto oneself and the relationshipto others arelinkedtogether.Foucaultconceived his laterworknot as a reversalor rejectionof an ear-lierposition,butas anattempt o approach he sameproblematicn a new andrefreshingmanner.To be sure, it was a change in direction,a shift whichinevitablybecame a self-critiqueof precedingwork.Yet he did not abandonthe notion of power, the idea that humansare always within a web of con-straints,butrather troveto enrich andgo beyondhis earlierworkin ordertosolve some of the problemsarisingfromit. Foucault ells us thataccentuatingthe care of the self complementshis previousendeavors. His late work is, Ibelieve, an attempt o rethinkandconsequentlyresituate he subjectvis-d-vis50. Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.2, 5-6.


18/21

Neve Gordon 411

powerrelations,which, in turn, s a rethinkingof thecapacityof poweritself.So while I disagreewith the so-called reversalclaim, I also think that it iserroneousto suggest that Foucaultconsiders the subjectto be an artifactofpower. Already in Discipline and Punish he insinuates that discipline isdependenton indiscipline,while in TheHistory of SexualityVolumeOne hesuggests that power is dependenton resistance.5Consideringthat the twosubsequentvolumes of TheHistoryof Sexualityand otherlate writingscom-plementFoucault'searlierwork,andtakinginto account thatduringthe laterperiodthere is a strongaccenton agency and thathe statesclearlythatpoweris dependenton freedom,it does not make sense to continuereadingFoucaultas if he considers the subjectas a mere effect.A coherentaccount of Foucaultmust thereforemake room for both the notion of power and a certaindegreeof agency. The ontological readingpresentedhere can reveal, I believe, themannerby which some kind of balance between the two may be attained.IV. Power and AgencyThe late Foucault'semphasisof care alongsidehis effort to resituateagencyvis-a-vis power, point to a tangible, and to my mind worthy,ethical stancewhich strives to identify a pathbetween the passivity characteristicof rigidstructuralismand the self-creating subject. By accentuatingcare, Foucaultenables the subject to assume responsibilitywithout violating the other'sintegrity.Interestingly,William Connolly reaches a similar conclusion. Hesays that the ethic of care"acknowledges he need to limit its own self-asser-tion so that otherfaithscancountfor something oo."While I appreciateCon-nolly's endeavorto articulatean ethics thatpromotes respect for the other,Ibelieve that he bases Foucault'sethics of careon a mistakenontologicalread-ing. Connollyclaims thataccording o Foucault"Nothing s fundamental....Thereforealmosteverythingcounts for something.""This reading, as I understand t, is based on Foucault's insistence thatpoweris not merelya negative,but a constitutive orce. "Wemustcease onceand for all,"he tells us, "todescribethe effects of powerin negativeterms: t'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', t 'masks', it 'conceals'.In fact, power produces;it producesreality;it producesdomains of objectsand ritualsof truth.The individual andthe knowledge thatmay be gained ofhim belong to this production.""3While this conception of power indeed

51. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 290; Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.1, 95.52. Connolly, TheEthos of Pluralization,40. The claim that "nothing s fundamental"stakendirectlyfromFoucault,who in an interviewcalled "Space,Knowledge,andPower,"states:"Nothingis fundamental.That is whatis interesting n the analysisof society ..." In The Fou-cault Reader,ed, Paul Rabinow(New York:Pantheon,1984), 247.53. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 194.


19/21


entails thatnothingis fundamental, t deemphasizesthe ontological perspec-tive which highlights the subject's agency and the idea that freedom is theconditionof possibilityof power.

By contrast,I have argued hatFoucault'snotion of care of the self meansrelatingto oneself as free, andit is preciselythis way of relatingto one's self- not merely a notion thatnothingis fundamental-which spursa care forthe other.Foucault'sexampleof the tyrantwho is a slave to his appetitesandthereforedoes not care for others is persuasive.This readingtakes into con-siderationFoucault'swritingfrom the late 1970s, first,by pointingto the con-ditionof possibilityof power:

there is no face to face confrontationof power and freedomwhich ismutually exclusive (freedom disappearseverywhere power is exer-cised), but a much more complicatedinterplay.In this game freedommay well appearas the conditionfor the exerciseof power(at the sametime its precondition, ince freedommust exist forpowerto be exerted,and also its permanent upport, ince withoutthe possibilityforrecalci-trance,powerwould be equivalentto a physicaldetermination).54

Second, through he analysisof the care of the self, this readingstresses Fou-cault's claim that each person has the possibility "to make his life into aneuvre."55Yet, to be tenable, this readingwould have to indicatehow agency cancoexist with Foucault'snotionof power.Once moreHeidegger's insightsare

helpful.InBeing and Time,he suggeststhatDasein is "constantly more'thanit factuallyis." Heidegger,as is well known,distinguishesbetweenfactualityandfacticity,where the formeris some kind of inventory,a "listof contentsof its Being."Dasein can neverbe fully defined orcapturedby factuality.Fac-ticity,on the otherhand,has to do with Heidegger'sdepictionof Dasein as a"thrownprojection,"a depiction which seems to reverberate n Foucault'slaterunderstanding f the subject."As thrown,"Heidegger explains, "Dasein is thrown into the kind ofBeing we call 'projecting'."By "projecting"Heideggerdoes not mean thatDasein is an autonomousbeing, totallyfree to choose or makeplans into thefuturein the sense of "arrangingts Being." Not only is Dasein invariablymore than it factuallyis, but "Daseinalwayshas understoodtself andalwayswill understand tself in terms of possibilities." The emphasis here is onunderstanding,where understanding,as potentiality-for-Being,"has itself

54. Foucault,"The Subject and Power,"221. As noted earlier,Foucaultmakes a similarclaim in theHistoryof Sexuality,Vol.1, 95-97.55. Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.2, 139.


20/21

Neve Gordon 413

possibilities, which are sketchedout beforehandwithin the rangeof what isessentially disclosable in it."56We see thatDasein is thrown into the world,into an existing situation which alreadyhas concretepossibilities.These arenot logical possibilities as one might thinkof when discussingchoices in anabstractmanner;rather,as David Couzens Hoy points out, the possibilitiesthat Heidegger is referringto "come with limitations."7Heidegger definesthese concretepossibilitiesand limitationsas Dasein's facticity.Dasein, as athrownprojection, s always already"determinedby facticity,"he says. Yet,even thoughDasein is throwninto the world, into its facticity, it is thrownconcerfully, as care.When asked, in January1984, about his conception of human agency,Foucaultattempted o depictsome kind of balancedrelationship:"Iwouldsaythatif now I aminterested, n fact, in the way in which the subjectconstituteshimself in an active fashion,by the practicesof self, these practicesare nev-erthelessnot somethingthat the individual nventsby himself. They arepat-terns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested andimposedon him by his culture,his society andhis social group."58he Fou-cauldiansubjecthas gained agency, yet at the same time it is always situatedwithin a web of constraints,and thereforecannot be conceived as an entityautonomousof power relations and backgroundpractices.As seen from hisstatementsconcerningfreedom, the subject is no longer considered to be aproductof power relationsin the sense that it is identicalwith what powerproduces,an artifact.The subject always maintainsa difference. Not only inthe structural ense where the difference is a consequenceof its relation andpositionvis-a-vis the otherunits withinthe structure,butalso in an ontologi-cal sense where the subject, whose condition of possibility is freedom, isnever fully determined.Similar to the depiction of Dasein as that which isconstantlymore thanit factuallyis, Foucaultno longerportrays he subjectasa mere effect of power, nor does he attributean essence to it, but ratherimplies a repositioningof the subjectwithin a never settledlocation situatedbetweenpassivityandactivity.

Using Heidegger's ontology to read Foucault's aterwork enables us tomake room for agency withoutrelinquishingFoucault'snotionof power.Theidea that the subjectcan never be fully determinedundermines he belief that

56. ElsewhereHeidegger says that "In its projection[Dasein] reveals itself as somethingwhich has been thrown.It has been thrownlyabandoned o the 'world,'and falls into it concern-fully." Being and Time,185 and 458 respectively.57. David Couzens Hoy, "Heideggerand the HermeneuticTurn," n Guigon, The Cam-bridgeCompanion o Heidegger, 179.58. Foucault,"The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practiceof Freedom," n Berauer etal., Final Foucault, 11.


21/21


power,as both a constrainingandconstituting orce, is antitheticalo agency.Examiningthe two philosophers ogetheralso contributes, believe, to ourunderstandingf Heidegger.While it is beyondthe scopeof thispaper o showtheadvantages f readingHeidegger rom Foucault'svantagepoint, t seems tome thatseveralof Heidegger'sphilosophical nsightsgain politicalconcretenesswhen linked to Foucault'sempiricalanalysis.Foucault'sdepictionand investi-gationof mechanismsof power-whether they be linguisticor physical-areconcretemanifestations f whatHeideggercalls Dasein's facticity.

By way of conclusion it is important o note that this reading inevitablychangesourconceptionof the relationbetweenubiquitouspowerand the sub-ject, and calls for a reexamination f the contestedpower-truth elationship. talso brings into relief statements that appeared to be contradictory.Forinstance,in the History of SexualityVolumeOne, Foucault states: one is not"inside"power,while, within a few sentences he asserts that resistance canexist only in the strategic ield of powerrelations.59 n the basis of ouronto-logical discussion such ostensible contradictions an be resolved. Humansarebeings-in-the-world,beings that are always within an existing web of rela-tions, within a context of backgroundpractices.Resistanceto a given set ofconstraintsor modes of productioncan occuronly in the ambianceof powerand in this sense there is no exit from power. "Power is alreadythere,"hesays, "one is never outsideit, ... thereare no 'margins' or those who breakfrom the system to gambol in."60 rom an ontological perspective,however,humansare free, and this ontologicalfreedomwhich can be construedas thecondition of possibility of the subject cannot be taken away by means ofpower-it is not a property hatcan be limited,constrainedor moldedby theweb of power relations. Rather, t is the condition of possibility of poweritself. Foucault,I believe, is referring o this ontological level when he saysthat one shouldpracticefreedom.

59. Foucault,TheHistoryof Sexuality,Vol.1, 95-96.60. Foucault,Power/Knowledge,141.

Foucault's Subject

Documents

Transcript of Foucault's Subject