Forestry vs Munoz

7/27/2019 Forestry vs Munoz

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DISTRICT 13, BUREAU OFFORESTRY, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGEAUTHORITY 1 and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,vs.HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I,the SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE of BULACAN, and PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRODEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.,respondents.

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G.R. No. L-25459 June 28, 1968

PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of National Defense;HON. ENETERIO DE JESUS, in his capacity as Undersecretary of National Defense;GENERAL RIGOBERTO ATIENZA, in his capacity as the Chief of Staff; 2 Armed Forces of thePhilippines,COLONEL MANUEL V. REYES, in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General, Armed Forcesof the Philippines;and the TASK FORCES COMMANDER, Task Force Preserve (Tabak Division), 1st InfantryDivision, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner Director of Forestry, et al.Gualberto Cruz for respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation.

SANCHEZ, J .:

Two original actions involving divers legal questions are now before this Court.

In the first, L-24796, the corresponding government officials seek on certiorariand prohibitionto annul the order and writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its CivilCase 3035-M allowing Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco, forshort) to haul its logs in the area hereinafter to be mentioned.

In the second, L-25459, it was Piadeco's turn to ask on prohibition and injunction for a rulingthat respondent government officials are "without authority and jurisdiction to stop loggingoperations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forestproducts" from said corporation's private woodland area.

Because of their interrelation, the two case are here jointly considered.

The following undisputed facts control:


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Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities ofAngat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban,province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists ofTitulo de PropiedadNo. 4136, dated

April 25, 1894,4 and a deed of absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied forregistration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, onDecember 4, 1963, issued in Piadeco's name Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR

2065-New, covering but a portion of the land an aggregate area of 4,400 hectares and an averagestand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose delMonte, all of the province of Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on December 31,1964. By virtue of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging operations..

The controversy in the these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of ForestryApolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco tosurrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violatedforestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina WatershedReservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.5

On April 14, 1964, Forest Station Warden Reinaldo B. Marquez, District 13, Bureau of Forestry,wrote Piadeco requesting the latter to desist, effective the same day, April 14, 1964, from conductingits logging operation inside or outside the area covered by PWR 2065-New, and to refrain fromremoving logs already cut unless they have been scaled and properly invoiced by forestry officers.

Previously, on April 10, 1964, Nawasa's board of directors advised Piadeco, by letter, of therevocation of the 1964 grant to Piadeco, of a right of way from a barrio in Bosoboso, Antipolo, toMontalban, Rizal, as an access road to its logging concession under PWR 2061.

Offshot of the foregoing is Piadeco's petition forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction,lodged on April 17, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.6 This petition was directedagainst the Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon theaverment that their acts heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical andcapricious." On the same day, April 17, 1964, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the Bulacan court

directed the government authorities to show cause why preliminary injunction should not issue.

On May 4, 1964, over the Director of Forestry's opposition, the judge ordered the issuance upon aP10,000-bond of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Director of Forestry, the ForestStation Warden and Nawasa from carrying out and executing the April 10, 1964 revocation byNawasa of Piadeco's right of way, the April 11, 1964 order of the Director of Forestry, and the April14, 1964 directive of the Forest Station Warden, heretofore mentioned.

On May 5, 1964, Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure to answer itspetition on time.

On May 6, 1964, unaware of Piadeco's May 5 motion, the forestry officials, upon a motion dated

April 29, 1964, asked the Bulacan court to dismiss Piadeco's petition upon the averments that saidcourt had no jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter of the petition, and thatadministrative remedies have not yet been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in aseparate motion, said forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's order grantingpreliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by Piadeco insidethe Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations which are the main source of water supply of theCity of Manila and its surrounding towns and cities poses a grave danger of causing them to dryup to the prejudice and irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. Piadeco file written opposition onMay 13, 1964.


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On May 14, 1964, acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and opposition thereto, thejudge below ruled that although Piadeco is entitled to injunction, the continuance thereof wouldcause great damage to the government, while Piadeco can be fully compensated for any damagesPiadeco may suffer because of the dissolution thereof. That bond, however, was not filed by theforestry officials.

On July 13, 1964, upon Piadeco's May 5 motion earlier adverted to, the forestry officials weredeclared in default.

On July 24, 1964, said forestry officials filed a verified motion to set aside the default order and toadmit their answer thereto attached. They pleaded excusable neglect and/or oversight of the clerk ofthe records of the Records section of the Bureau of Forestry.

On July 29, 1964, the court shunted aside the foregoing motion for the reason that their six days'delay was not excusable and their answer was prepared only after three days from their receipt ofthe order of default. A motion for reconsideration registered by the forestry officials on August 12,1964 was unavailing. The court below struck down that motion on September 4, 1964.

Thus it is, that Piadeco submitted evidence ex parte to the court below against the Director ofForestry and the Forest Station Warden.

Piadeco had, in the meantime, entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco'scase against Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco remainingrevoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also withdrawn inconsideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's liabilities to thelatter.

On December 29, 1964, the court below rendered judgment. It approved Piadeco's compromiseagreement with Nawasa. It held that Piadeco was the ownerof the land in question; that itsoperation was not in violation of forestry rules and regulations; that aside from its regulationcertificate, Piadeco was permitted by Nawasa thru the latter's Resolution 1050, Section of 1963, toconduct selective logging within the Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment of P2.00 for everycubic meter of timber classified in the first group and P1.75 belonging to the second group; thatsimilar permits were issued to other individuals by the Director of Forestry with the acquiescence ofNawasa; that Piadeco's logging under Resolution 1050 aforesaid could not be contrary to forestryrules and regulations; and that, upon the doctrine laid down in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31, 1963, even if Piadeco's private woodland was unregistered, it still retains itsinherent "rights of ownership, among which are (its) rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude anypersons from the enjoyment and disposal thereof", its only liability being the payment of surchargeson the timber severed from the land. Thereupon, the court reinstated the writ of preliminaryinjunction earlier issued and made it permanent, with costs..

Meanwhile, on December 28, 1964, one day before the rendition of the judgment just mentioned,

Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration PWR 2065-New,which would expire on the last day of that month. On January 12, 1965, in reply thereto, AssistantDirector of Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal requested. He informed Piadeco that its Titulo dePropiedad4136 was not registerable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2 which took effecton January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration certificate and the non-renewal thereofnotwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that illegal logging wasdenounced by some members of Congress thereby attracting national attention. This led to adirective by the President of the Philippines on March 8, 1965 to stop all illegal logging operations.Complying therewith, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources wrote the Secretary of


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National Defense with the request that units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines be detailed at theareas involved, deputizing them agents of the Bureau of Forestry to assist in the enforcement offorest laws, rules and regulations, and the protection of the forests. The Secretary of NationalDefense, in turn, direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, theChief of Staff dispatched at ask force of the army into the Angat area, which impounded and seizedall logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedly conducting illegal operations.

On May 11, 1965, Piadeco sought from the Bulacan court an ex parte writ of execution of theDecember 29, 1964 decision. That decision had by then become final for failure of the forestryofficials to appeal therefrom. Piadeco prayed that it be not molested in its logging operationsincluding the hauling of about 600 pieces (unscaled) and 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled andunscaled) timber from the log ponds.

On May 12, 1965, the Bulacan court presided over temporarily by Judge Ricardo C. Puno setPiadeco's motion for execution for hearing on May 27, 1965. Before the day of the hearing arrived,however, Piadeco withdrew its ex parte motion for execution with the manifestation that it would lookfor a more expeditious way or a more appropriate remedy to enable it to haul the logs before therains set in. But on May 27, 1965, Piadeco refiled its motion for execution with Judge Muoz, whohad meanwhile resumed his duties.

On June 1, 1965, Judge Muoz granted Piadeco's motion. In line therewith, on June 3, 1965, thecorresponding writ of execution was issued, directing a special sheriff to make effective and executethe aforesaid lower court's decision of December 29, 1964.

Execution notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to haul its logs.Because of this, on June 11, 1965, Piadeco asked the court below to declare the forestry officialsand those acting under them in contempt. On June 30, 1965, the forestry officials opposed. Theyaverred that Piadeco's registration certificate already expired on December 31, 1964; that despitethis expiration, Piadeco continued illegal logging operations, which resulted in the seizure of its logs:that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court below became functusofficio and could no longer be executed. Piadeco's rejoinder of July 1, 1965 was that its registration

certificate is not expirable and that it is not a license.

On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration ofpetitioner's [Piadeco's] license (?) on December 31, 1964, their said property remains registered withthe Bureau of Forestry subject only to renewal, in which case it can still pursue its loggingoperations, conditioned upon the payment by it of forest charges." The judge took into considerationa certificate issued on May 4, 1965 by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg, as officer-in-charge,that "all the timber cut ... during the lifetime" of the registration certificate "may be transported by"Piadeco "provided they are properly documented." Finding that Piadeco "complied with all therequirements of the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Internal Revenue as regards the properdocumentation of the logs in question," the judge thereupon directed the forestry officials "and allmembers of the Armed Forces stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul its logs which have

already been properly documented."

This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden,the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition with this Court (L-24796, now at bar)forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the June 1,1965 order of execution,the June 3, 1965 writ of execution and the July 8, 1965 order allowing Piadeco to haul its logs.Named respondents were Piacedo, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the Bulacan court, and theProvincial Sheriff of Bulacan..


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On July 30, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, as prayed for by the aforenamedgovernment officials. On August 3, 1965, Piadeco sought the dissolution thereof for the reason,amongst others, that Mr. J. L. Utleg, Assistant Director of Forestry and Officer-in-Charge of theBureau of Forestry, was already agreeable mentioned, as per his letter of June 7, 1965 to Piadecoinforming the latter that the writ of execution was being referred to the Forest Station Warden forcompliance. On August 9, 1965, the Solicitor General blocked Piadeco's motion to dissolve, with an

allegation, amongst others, that the June 7, 1965 letter just mentioned was deemed recalled whenthe Director Forestry realizing that the said writ would allow Piadeco to continue logging after theexpiration and non-renewal of its certificate in a public forest area or in an area excluded from theexpired permit did not give effect to the said letter.

On August 18, 1965, manifestation was made by the Solicitor General to this Court thru a motiondated August 17, 1965, that the logs seized and imposed by the armed forces were being exposedto the elements; that the rainy season having set in, there was grave danger that the said logs mightdeteriorate and become useless. He thus prayed that the forestry officials be authorized to turn thelogs over to the engineer corps of the Armed Forces for the construction of prefabricatedschoolhouses pursuant to General Circular V-337, series of 1961, of the Bureau of InternalRevenue. On August 31, 1965, Piadeco objected upon the ground that the said logs are still itsprivate property; and that there is no law empowering the State to seize, confiscate and turn over thecut logs to the Armed Forces.

On September 29, 1965, Piadeco, in turn, petitioned for preliminary injunction and moved again todissolve this Court's writ of preliminary injunction of July 30, 1965. It called attention to the fact thatthe writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court below on May 4, 1964 in Civil Case 3035-M isstill enforceable and has not yet been dissolved because the forestry officials have not filed theirP10,000.00-bond as required by the trial court in its order of May 14, 1964.

On October 8, 1965, this Court denied the two motions of Piadeco, declared that the writ ofpreliminary injunction it issued stands enforced and is effective until otherwise lifted, and authorizedthe Solicitor General to effect the removal of all the logs subject of his motion of August 17, 1965from the log ponds but only for the purpose of turning them over to the Armed Forces for

safekeeping and custody pending final resolution of the case.

On October 14, 1965, Piadeco traversed the averments of the forestry officials' petition before thisCourt, thru an answer dated October 12, admission of which was however denied for being late. Thecase was submitted without further memoranda.

Meanwhile, a companion case (L-25459, also at bar)emerged from subsequent events hereunderrelated.

On October 20, 1965, pending this Court's resolution of the foregoing petition of the forestry officials(L-24796), Piadeco wrote the Director of Forestry with a request to grant it "AUTHORITYto cut,gather and remove timber" from its alleged private woodland. At the same time, it advised the

Director of Forestry that "in the absence of such authority or permit", it "shall cut, gather and removetimber from the said area subject to the payment of regular forest charge and 300% surcharge forunlawful cutting in accordance with the penal provisions" of Section 266 of the Tax Code.

On November 4, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg replied. He told Piadeco that "pending meticulousstudy" of its application for renewal of PWR 2065-New, his "[o]ffice is not now in a position to grant"the desired authority and "will consider any cutting, gathering and removal of timber" from the land"to be illegal, hence, subject to the provisions of Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code."


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Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as amended byForestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It reads:

7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering lands containing timber,firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to Section1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;

(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent, freepatent, and sales patent; and

(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act 496, asamended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).

The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2consisted in theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the titlesregistrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by theSpanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid titles under the existing laws."

Piadeco's position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829, which does not specifythe titles that are registrable thereunder; and that it is diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the

Attorney General of October 15, 1919, which ruled that a royal title "issued in September, 1896, andinscribed in the Registry of Property within a year after its issuance is valid, and therefore its owneris entitled to the benefits" of Section 1829 aforesaid. Also cited are the Opinion of the Secretary ofthe Interior of November 7, 1916, stating that registration under Section 1829 is not subject tochange and revocation unless title is established in a different person by judicial declaration; theOpinion of the Director of Forestry of January 8, 1925, which recognized as registrable, titles "suchaninformacion posesoria ..., composicion con el estado and purchase under the Spanishsovereignty" amongst others; and the Opinion of the Collector of Internal Revenue of February 6,1926, declaring imperfect titles within the purview of Section 45(a) of Act 2874, as also registrable.

True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registeredwith the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly, too, administrative authorities in the past considered asregistrable, titles issued during the Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry AdministrativeOrder 12-1 was still in force, authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But when Forestry

Administrative Order 12-2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order should be deemed to haverepealed all such previous administrative determinations.

There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect oflaw. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers theBureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations "deemedexpedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in suchmanner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future,and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end." Forestry

Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrativeregulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence isthat when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations toimplement a given legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to theobjects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to thestandards that the law prescribes."8 In Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712, we pronounced thatthe necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations forvarious and varying details of management has been recognized and upheld by the courts.


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And we are certainly totally unprepared to jettison Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 as illegal andunreasonable.

Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the present system.Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru prescription. They are,therefore, neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. The law in this jurisdiction, both under the present

sovereignty and the previous Spanish regime is that ordinary prescription of ten years may takeplace against a title recorded in the Registry of Property "in virtue of another title alsorecorded,"9 and extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years will run, even "without need of title or ofgood faith."10 For possession for along period fixed by law, the "unquestionable foundation of theprescription of ownership ... weakens and destroys the force and value of the best possible title tothe thing possessed by one who is not the owner thereof." 11 The exception, of course, is the Torrenstitle, expressly recognized to be indefeasible and impresciptible.12

And more. If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land,is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated.13 Before private interests have intervened,the government may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside andreserved as forest land.14 Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into privateownership.15

In this case, it is undisputed that Picadeco's title which it sought to register was issued by theSpanish sovereigntyTitulo de PropiedadNo. 4136, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is unmistakablynot one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been allowed registration inthe first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be renewed.

2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather, and remove timber from itsalleged private woodland, upon payment of forest charges and surcharges.

The purposes of registration, as succinctly stated in Section 6, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1dated July 1, 1941, are:

6. Objects of registration (a) to exempt the owners of private woodlands from the paymentof forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes.

(b) To regulate the transportation of forest products gathered or collected therefrom and toavoid fraud which may be committed in connection with utilization of such forest productswith respect to their origin.

(c) To determine the legality of private claims for the protection of the interest of the ownersas well as of the Government, and to exclude all land claimed under valid titles from themass of the public forest in order to facilitate the protection, administration, and supervisionof the latter.

The foregoing has in part gained judicial approval in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, L-15532, October 31, 1963, where we pronounced: "Obviously, the purpose of the registration requiredin Section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to exempt the titled ownerof the land from thepayment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal RevenueCode."16 And Section 266 of the Tax Code, therein mentioned, provides in full:

SEC. 266. Charges collectible on forest products cut, gathered and removed fromunregistered private lands. The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forestproducts cut, gathered and removedfrom any private landthe title to which is not registered


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with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law: Provided, however, That in theabsence of such registration, the ownerwho desires to cut, gather and remove timber andother forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry inaccordance with the Forest Law and regulations. The cutting, and the removing of timber andother forest products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawfulcutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forest and shall be subject to

the charges prescribed in such cases in this Chapter. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 173,approved June 20, 1947.)17

Following this provision in the Tax Code is Section 267, which in part provides:

SEC. 267. Surcharges for illegal cutting and removal of forest products or for delinquency.Where forest products are unlawfully cut or gathered in any public forest without license or, ifunder license, in violation of the terms thereof, the charges on such products shall beincreased by three hundred per centum....

To recapitulate, registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestryresults in an exemption "from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or

industrial purposes." If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, asprescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code, because "he still retain(s) his rights ofownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from theenjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)."18 However, as provided in Section 266above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and remove timberand other forest products from his land, he may "secure a license from the Director of Forestry inaccordance with the Forest Law and regulations." If he does not, under the same Section 266, hiscutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products "shall be considered as unlawfulcutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to thecharges prescribed in such cases." And this would bring into play Section 267, where, as heretoforequoted, the charges on forest products "unlawfully cut and gathered in any public forest withoutlicense, or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof ... shall be increased by threehundred per centum."

But it should be stressed that all of the situations herein mentioned refer specifically to owners ofprivate woodlands. The position Piadeco has taken is a jump ahead of where it should be. We arenot ready to grant the assumption that Piadeco owns the forest land it seeks to register. Suchunwillingness can come from even a superficial assessment of Piadeco's pretensions of ownershipbased on the Titulo de Propiedadin question.

Neither said Titulo, nor a copy thereof, was presented in the two proceedings before us. What wehave is merely a description thereof, viz:

TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136DATED APRIL 25, 1894, ISSUED BY

GOBIERNO CIVIL DE LA PROVINCIADE BULACAN

Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, in the name of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, datedApril 25, 1894, being a gratuitous composicion title, grated to Dn. Mariano San PedroyEsteban, by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, pursuant to Resolution dated April14, 1894, of the Board of Land Adjustment of the (Spanish) Administration Civil de Filipinas,as authorized under Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, and signed by Dn.

Alejandro Garcia, El Jefede la Provincia de Bulacan and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado El


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Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines attachedthereto and to said Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, is affixed a "Sello 10aA*s 1894 y 95de Peso" documentary stamp bearing Serial Number NO. 292-404 inscribed in the Office ofthe Registry of Property of Bulacan, on pages 127 and 129 of Book I, for Norzagaray, as TaxDeclaration (Fincas) Nos. 57 and 58, Inscripcion No. 1, on July 16, 1894 (or within one (1)year from April 25, 1894, pursuant to Royal Decree of January 12, 1863), the inscription of

the said TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136 of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,having been accomplished by the Office of the Land Registry of Bulacan, on the said date ofJuly 16, 1894, by the then Registrar of Bulacan, Dn. Miguel de Lizan, as follows:

Ynscrito el titulo que precede, a los folios ciento veinti-sietey ciento veintinueve del Tomoprimero de Norzagaray, fincas numeros cincuenta y siete y cincuenta y ocho inscripcionnumero uno, Bulacan, diez y seis de julio de mil ocho cientos noventa y cuatro (Fdo.)MIGUEL DE LIZAN.

Two (2) vast parcels of land (agricultural and mountainous lands), together with theimprovements thereon, including all the trees in the mountains, all mineral deposits orresources ( pertenecia minera), including lime, gravel and lumber for ship building, located inthe Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon and Quezon City, and bounded, on the North, bySierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi,Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by Susong Dalagaand Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and Sapang-Alat(Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauan to Laog).

The various types of titles granted by the Spanish crown, it will be remembered, were: (1) the "tituloreal" or royal grant; (2) the "concession especial" or special grant; (3) the "composicion con elestado" title or adjustment title; (4) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (5) the"informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or agratuitous title.19

Piadeco's Titulo appears to be an adjustment title. Piadeco asserts in its answer in L-2479620 that it

is a "titulo de composicion con el estado"21 or a "composicion" with the State.22 The given descriptionofTitulo de PropiedadNo. 4136 above-quoted calls it a "gratuitous composition title."

Title by "composicion con el estado" was granted by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil,pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, or by the Chief of the Province by delegation,pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, or under the Royal Decree of February 13,1894,otherwise known as the Maura Law. The theory behind this title is that all lands belong to the State.

Applicants to be entitled to adjustment must possess the lands sought to be acquired for a numberof years.23 These titles, as the "titulo real", altho evidences of ownership, may be lost byprescription.24

Piadeco's Titulo de Propiedad4136, as heretofore described, was signed, pursuant to the Royal

Decrees of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, el Jefe de la Provincial deBulacan, and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, el Secretario de la Junta, purportedly with the Seal of theSpanish Government in the Philippines.

The main difficulty here lies with the requirements, then obtaining, for the issuance of Spanishadjustment titles.

The Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 under which Piadeco's title was issued classified publiclands subject to adjustment into two groups:


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First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands belonging to the State, and those which,though entirely encircled by private lands, had a total area of more than 30 hectares.

Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares and entirely bounded by private lands.

By this royal decree, adjustment of the lands of the first group just mentioned continued to be heard

and determined by the general directorate of civil administration with the intervention of the InspectorGeneral of Forests; adjustment of lands of the second group were heard and determined by "aprovincial board for the adjustment of lands "headed by a Civil or Military-Civil Governor aspresident. When the provincial board approves the adjustment, "the chief of the province, in hiscapacity as deputy of the General Directorate of Civil Administration, shall issue the correspondingtitle."25

The property here involved unquestionably belongs to the first group. That is because the areathereof is more than 30 hectares (72,000 or 74,000 hectares); and, going by the descripcion of itsboundaries, the property is bounded by public land. In particular, the description is that it is"bounded, on the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on theEast, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by Susong

Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and Sapang-Alat(Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauanto Laog)."26

As stated, the title were was "signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefe de la Provincia de Bulacan,and by Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the SpanishGovernment in the Philippines attached thereto."

Piadeco now claims before this Court that its title "appears to be issued by (on its face) theDIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADMINISTRACION DE FILIPINAS"; that the title is in printed form, withthe dry seal in the form of a mountain, bearing the inscription, "Office of the Inspector General ofForests in the Philippine Islands Adjustment of Lands" and the rubric of the said InspectorGeneral of Forests and is serially numbered, pursuant to the Circular dated February 14, 1894 of theGeneral Directorate of Civil Administration. In the same breath, however, Piadeco avers that the title

was approved by the Chief of the Province of Bulacan as Deputy of the General Directorate of CivilAdministration and the said Chief issued Titulo 4136 pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31,1888.27These averments, we must say, merely emphasize the necessity of adducing evidence toprove the validity of Piadeco's title, which should be done in appropriate land registrationproceedings. Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, 123, struck down a similar title coveringland which it thereupon declared public forest land, upon grounds, amongst others, that the title wasnot issued by the proper authority. On this ground, this Court there specifically declared

Judging from the area of the land28 in question and that of the two-third portions from which ithas been segregated, upon the supposition that the three-third portions above-mentionedconstitute the whole tract of land which had originally passed from Tomas Ilao, it is obviousthat the same belonged to the first group, as defined in the aforesaid Royal Decree, on the

ground that the area thereof greatly exceeded thirty hectares and was not entirely boundedby private lands. Notwithstanding such facts, the title Exhibit D-2 was not issued by theGeneral Directorate of Civil Administration with the intervention of the Inspector General ofForests, but merely by the provincial board, in open violation of the laws and regulationsrelative thereto.29

But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. Thetitle embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second.


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The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the LandRegistry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.

To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land mustbe proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the landclaimed.30 This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land

must be concretely measured per hectare or perquion, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos),31

That factthat the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands stronglysuggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.

Here, no definite are seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder toOpposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified the area covered by its Titulode Propiedadas 74,000 hectares.32In its "Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it describedthe land as containing 72,000 hectares.33 Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identityof Piadeco's land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least inthese proceedings.

Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title,

acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree ofJune 25, 1880,34 the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applicationsfor adjustment showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for were to be filedwith the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification andsurveyof the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative.35

The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at oneyear from the date of the publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880,extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881. 36 If Don Mariano sought adjustmentwithin the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the RoyalOrders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectaresof arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands.37 And, at the risk ofrepetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000

hectares of lands.

But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published inthe Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894.38 That decree required a second petition for adjustmentwithin six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of thepublication of the law.39 Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of landsestablished by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31,1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established byDecree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which theymay hold in their possession.40

Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that that title was either dated

April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.

Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rightsunder the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.From Piadeco's explanationnot its evidence41 we cull the following: On December 3,1894, DonMariano mortgaged the land underpacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to oneDon Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December4, 1894. Don Mariano failed to redeem within the stipulated period. When Don Ignacio died, hisdaughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only her, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same


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time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities andExchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became ashareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator,Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B.Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearingas sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of

adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Considerationtherefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.

The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo madeto depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of thevalidity ofTitulo de Propiedad4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds ofdoubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title.

The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the State, and any personseeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner. 42 And hispresumption clings with greater force here where "a portion" of the land Piadeco claims is, asPiadeco itself admits, directly affected by Proclamation No. 71 dated March 10, 1927 of the thenGovernor-General Leonard Wood of the Philippines, which reserved for watershed purposes an areaof 62,309.0952 hectares of land located in Montalban, Province of Rizal, in San Jose del Monte,Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, in Pearanda, Province ofNueva Ecija, and in Infanta, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon),subject to "private rights if any therebe." Private rights must then have to be proved. It will be remembered that, by Article VIII of theTreaty of Paris of December 10,1898, property of the public domain was relinquished and ceded bythe Kingdom of Spain to the United States of America, which, of course, transferred the same to thepresent Republic.

Assertion has likewise been made that Piadeco's title has already been judicially recognized in thejudgment rendered in Civil Case 3035-M, the case below, at least insofar as the portion of the landthat lies in Bulacan is concerned. This is less than persuasive. Piadeco's title was not directly inissue in the court below. A reading of the decision thereof suggests that said title was not submitted

therein. The judge did not even examine that title. According to the decision, Piadeco's ownershipwas gleaned merely from the registration certificate which stated that a copy of Piadeco's land title,including the corresponding plan, was submitted to the Director of Forestry. A mere statement by the

judge below that Piadeco appears to be the owner of the land cannot wipe out the objectionablefeatures of its title.

From all the foregoing, our conclusion is that we cannot give prima facie value to Piadeco's title. Wecannot thus truly state that Piadeco is a private woodland owner for purpose of these proceedings.This all the more strengthens our view that Piadeco needs to acquire an indefeasible title to beentitled to registration under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code.

3. Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said corporation cannot

complain against the cancellation thereof by the Director of Forestry on April 11, 1964. Why?

When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's registration certificate, he only performed his dutyas he saw fit. By Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "[t]he Director of Forestry may cancel acertificate of registration for any violation of the provision of this Order or of the forest and internalrevenue laws and regulations or of the terms and conditions embodied in the certificate, or whenfound that the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or ofhis representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said Director of Forestry."43 Tohim, a condition expressly written into the registration certificate was being violated. Piadeco was


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found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations in directcontravention of a specific prohibition in the certificate. And this, upon the basis of positive andactual findings of qualified and competent forestry officers.

Quite revealing is Piadeco's admission44 before the court below that "it made cuttings on that portionof its own private land within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation where it was

constructing its access road to the area covered by P.W.P. No. 2065to the construction of which noobjection was interposed by ... Nawasa as per its resolution No. 126, Series of 1964."45 Deduciblefrom the foregoing is that Piadeco was cutting within the watershed reservations outside the areacovered by its registration certificate, altho within the land it claims in private ownership, which isnow disputed.

Piadeco's registration certificate should remain cancelled. It could be stricken down anytime. It is anullity. And, notwithstanding the fact that said registration certificate had expired and was notrenewed, Piadeco had the temerity to continue operations. Correctly, there was necessity forfreezing forthwith Piadeco's illegal acts.46

4. True it is that the judgment below virtually reinstated Piadeco's registration certificate. However,

as shall be discussed later on in this opinion, that judgment has now no legal effect. For, saidcertificate, by its very terms, expired on December 31, 1964. Piadeco cannot be heard to protestfurther.

But Piadeco still insists that it objected to the expiry date of the registration certificate, when it wasissued that certificate. Granting the truth of this averment, Piadeco nonetheless accepted thecertificate, did not follow up its objection to its logical conclusion, sat supinely until the certificate wascancelled; only then did it renew the bid that its registration certificate is non-expirable.

At all events, Piadeco's submission is inaccurate. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, promulgatedpursuant to law, amended Section 11 of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1, the pertinent part ofwhich reads:

(b) Duration of the certificate. The certificate of registration issued under this Order shallbe made to expire on the last day of the 12th month from the date of its issuance.

This regulation is not without rational basis. This Court had occasion to say once 47 that: "Land maybe classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral,be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timberor the discovery of valuable minerals, land classified as agricultural today may be differentlyclassified tomorrow." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 verily declares that certificates "arerenewable for as long as there are substantial amounts of forestry in the area, upon filing of thenecessary application therefor" and that those "cancelled for causes may be renewed uponsubmission of application for registration by the owner and if the cause of cancellation is explainedsatisfactorily."48 If only for purposes of effective regulation, annual registration of private woodlands

cannot be successfully assailed.

5. We cannot place our stamp of approval on Piadeco's claim that it should be permitted to removefrom the premises those logs that have already been cut before December 31, 1964, the expiry dateof its registration certificate. We have already said that its registration certificate is a nullity. Even if itis not, the facts and the law will not support its plea.

It is not altogether clear whether the 600 pieces of unscaled and the 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaledand unscaled)timber sought to be hauled by Piadeco, were cut before December 31, 1964. Piadeco


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could present only one auxiliary invoice thereon, which but covers 256 logs and that very invoicestated that those logs were "cut or ordered cut" in the area covered by P.W.R. No. 2065-New,"afterits expiration on Dec. 31, 1964."49

Worse, a factual assumption that the logs were cut before that date, is meaningless in law. Acontrary view would easily lend itself to misuse and mischief. For, loopholes could then be bored

through which an unscrupulous logger may crawl. Such that a holder of a registration certificatecould be at complete liberty to just cut and cut during the lifetime of that certificate and leave thehauling for later, as he pleases, even long after expiry thereof. This, we must say, should not beallowed to pass.

6. Absent a valid registration certificate under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, or alicense to cut, gather and remove timber, and more important, credible evidence of privateownership over the forestry land in question, Piadeco's logging operations logically descend to thelevel of unlawful cutting from public forests.

Seizure made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be branded as illegal. Itwas but in obedience to Bureau of Internal Revenue General Circular No. V-337 of May 24, 1961,

which prescribed rules on the disposition of illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the Officeof the President to the Secretary of Finance on March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337 declaresas follows:

3. Logs illegally cut from public forests, such as timberlands, forest reserves other thannational parks, 50communal forests and communal pastures shall be subject to seizure anddelivered to the nearest Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer who in turn shall deliver them tothe duly authorized representative of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for use in themanufacture of prefabricated school houses. The illegal cutter shall not be allowed to pay theforest charges and surcharges and other fees on the logs cut. However, if such forestcharges and fees have already been paid, the same shall be retained by the Bureau ofInternal Revenue Officer concerned as part of the collection for forest charges, but shall notbe the basis for the release of such logs. On the other hand, such payment shall be used as

evidence should the illegal cutter be prosecuted in court for the violation of the correspondingforest laws.51

Could this Court then justifiably order the delivery to Piadeco of the logs impounded right there onthe land? The answer must certainly have to be in the negative; a contrary posture is tantamount toabetting a wrong. The logs belong to the State. They are not Piadeco's. Piadeco cannot later oncome back to claim them by curing defects in the proof of its ownership over the land. It hassubmitted the controversy over the logs for decision to this Court. Any ruling thereon should bindPiadeco. It cannot be overturned by fresh convincing proof of ownership, which it should haveoffered in the first place.

We hold that government seizure of Piadeco's logs here complained of is valid.

7. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should befollowed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, andquite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, developmentand reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country'snatural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover onour lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,watersheds try up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fishdisappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric


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plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosioncome the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, housesand highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should bewritten down in a lumberman's decalogue.

Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to

regulate the use and occupancy of forests and forest reserves.

To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the general welfare cannot beseriously attacked. Our Government has definite instructions from the Constitution's preamble to"promote the general welfare." Jurisprudence has time and again upheld the police power overindividual rights, because of the general welfare. Five decades ago, Mr. Justice Malcolm made itclear that the "right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law forthe common good" and that the "liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of publichealth, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the policepower."52 Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed the precept when he declared that"the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,and with business and occupations" and that"[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all kinds ofrestraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of thestate."53 Recently, we quoted from a leading American case,54 which pronounced that "neitherproperty rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at willuse his property to the detriment of his fellow, or exercise his freedom of contract to work themharm," and that, therefore, "[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public toregulate in the common interest.55

These precepts more than suffice to sustain the validity of the government's action with respect toPiadeco's logging operations.

8. We come to consider the effects of the judgment in Civil Case 3035-M, where the Court of FirstInstance of Bulacan adjudged Piadeco's operation not to be in violation of forestry rules andregulations and made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defaulting

forestry authorities, upon Piadeco's ex-parteevidence. That judgment, it should be remembered, issought to be executed by Piadeco and the execution proceedings in that case are not before thisCourt on review.

Said judgment enjoined the forestry officials from carrying out and executing the order of April 11,1964 and the implementing letter of April 14, 1964, cancelling Piadeco's registration certificate, PWR2065-New. But when execution was ordered on June 1, 1965, and the writ of execution issued onJune 3, 1965, and when the court ordered on July 8, 1965 that Piadeco be allowed to haul its logs,the registration certificate had already expiredon December 31, 1964. It is, therefore, notinappropriate for us to say that judgment had already become functus officio56 and can no longer beexecuted.

The over-all position we have here taken should dispose of all other issues raised by the parties;hence, unnecessary is a discussion thereof.

For the reasons given

The petition forcertiorariand prohibition in L-24796 is hereby granted; the June 1, 1965 order ofexecution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, and the July 8, 1965 order,allowing respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. to haul its logs, all ofthe Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case 3035-M, are hereby declared null and void; the


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writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby made permanent; and the Chief of the EngineerCorps, Armed Forces of the Philippines, who was permitted by this Court on October 8, 1965 toretain for safekeeping and custody the logs previously seized by the State from the log ponds ofrespondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., is now given authority to usethe same for the manufacture of prefabricated school houses; and

The petition of Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. for injunction andprohibition in L-25459 is hereby denied.

Costs in both cases against Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1Hereinafter referred to merely as Nawasa. Nawasa should be deemed excluded as apetitioner inasmuch as it did not make any appearance before this Court as such, because of

its amicable settlement with respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro DevelopmentCorporation, Inc.

2On March 14, 1966, this Court noted petitioner's motion for substitution of party respondentsand for leave of court to include incumbents of the positions of Secretary and Undersecretaryof National Defense, and the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines.

3Rollo of L-24796, p. 48. According to Piadeco also in another pleading, the area is 74,000hectares. Id., p. 36. Piadeco's pleadings are attached to the record as annexes of theGovernment's petition.

4Some portions of the record place the date as April 29, 1894.

5One condition of the certificate is that it "does not permit the holder to cut trees within thestrip of one (1) kilometer wide from the boundary of the Angat and Marikina WatershedReservation."

6Civil Case 3035-M, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entitled "Pinagcamaligan Indo-AgroDevelopment Corporation, Inc., Petitioner, vs. The Director of Forestry, et al., Respondents."

7On August 3, 1965, Piadeco moved that this Court delete Nawasa as one of the petitionersin view of its compromise agreement with Piadeco, to which the Solicitor General signified noobjection.

8

People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, 1129-1130, citing Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 727;Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs.Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660.

9Article 1126, Civil Code; Article 1949, Spanish Code. Ordinary prescription as betweenabsentees is twenty years under Article 1957, Spanish Civil Code.

10Article 1137, Civil Code; Article 1959, Spanish Civil Code.


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11Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383, 395, where the title of ownership lost by prescriptionwas previously acquired from the Spanish government.

12Section 46, Act 496.

13See: Ankron vs. Government, 40 Phil. 10, 14; Li Seng Giap y Cia vs. Director of Lands, 55

Phil. 693; 695; Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 929, 936; Alfafara vs.Mapa, 95 Phil. 125, 128.

14Ankron vs. Government, supra, at p. 16, citing Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175;Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil. 560.

15Adorable vs. Director, L-13663, March 25, 1960. See also: Vao vs. Government, 41 Phil.161, 162.

16Emphasis supplied.


18Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, supra.

19For a discussion of these titles, see Ventura, Land Titles and Deeds, 1955 ed., pp. 17-32;Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, 1965 ed., pp. 4-9; Pea, Registration of Land Titles andDeeds, 1961 ed., pp. 2634; Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, 1964 ed., pp. 11-31.

20To be noted here is this Court's resolution of October 20,1965 (Rollo, pp. 139, 227) denyingthe first to the eighth extensions of time sought by respondent Piadeco within which toanswer. In the interest of substantial justice, as Piadeco's answer is attached to the recordand the Solicitor General not having moved to expunge the same therefrom, said answer ishere considered in the disposition of L-24796.

21Rollo, p. 486.

22Rollo, p. 187.

23Law 19, Title 12, Book IV, Laws of the Indies. See: Valenton vs. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 540,548, 553; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615, 628-629.

24Noblejas, op. cit., pp. 5, 6.

25Article 10, Royal Decree of August 31, 1888.


27Rollo of L-24796, pp. 184-185.

28The area in the Ramirezcase was 203 hectares, 85 ares and 44 centares (at p.115). Compare this with the alleged area herein involved 72,000 or 74,000 hectares.

29Emphasis supplied. The Royal Decree referred to is the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888.


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50Logs cut from national parks are governed by the preceding section, Section 2, which alsodirects prosecution and seizure of the logs under Republic Act 122, for use in themanufacture of prefabricated school houses.

51The Philippine Tax Journal, December, 1961, pp. 769-771.

52Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 706. See also: Ermita-Malate Hotel andHotel Operators Ass'n. Inc. vs. City of Manila, 20 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 849, 864;Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968.

53Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733, cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel OperatorsAss'n, Inc. vs. City of Manila, supra, at p. 865.

54Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940,948-949.

55Philippine American Life Insurance Company vs. Auditor General, L-19255, January 18,1968.

56Manila Railroad Company vs. Yatco, L-23056, May 27,1968, citing Villasenor vs. Albano,1967C Phild. 882, 885, and cases cited.

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Forestry vs Munoz

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