foreknowledge

Politicisation ofintelligence analysis

Walking a tight rope …ethics for

intelligence analysts

Essential Resources for Intelligence Analystswww.foreknowledge.info

ISSN 2225-5613October 2012Issue Five

Intelligencia,secreto y política

Analyticrigour

Ethical dilemmasfor the

intelligence analyst

LEIU awards

Finding Nemo:discovering the value

of open sourceintelligence in

social media

Evaluating effectivenessof analysis incriminal investigations

2 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

Contents Editor:Dalene Duvenage

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From the editor 3

Walking a tight rope: ethics for the 4

Intelligence analystThe ethical implications of the politicisation ofintelligence analysis

Intelligence & ethics: uncomfortable companions

Intelligencia, secreto y politíca

Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations

Some advice on ethics for intelligence analysts?

Categories of ethical dilemmas

Resources on ethics for intelligence analysts

Toolbox: Analytic rigour 13

Upcoming events 14

LEIU Awards 2012 14

Finding Nemo: discovering the value of 15open source intelligence in Social Media

Evaluating effectiveness of analysis in 16criminal investigations

The effective analyst: attributes 17

The all-discipline intelligence process: 18wanted - a simplified construct with realexplanatory power

Psychology of intelligence analysis # 5 20

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October 2012 • Foreknowledge 3

Dalene

Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa

A lot has been written the last few years on the ethical aspects of intelligence, including politicization, in-terrogation, drones and various war and intelligence doctrines. Ethics is a fuzzy concept and dependenton individuals, organisations, ethnic groups, religious groups, cultures and countries’ interpretation andinterests. These debates, mostly US-centric, usually take place on a policy-making or academic level.

There is silence on how other countries and intelligence sectors deal with ethical issues while we as intelligence an-alysts struggle to find the relevancy to our day-to-day work. More often than not, we find ourselves walking atight rope between what we feel is the right thing to do and what our clients or managers want from us. It’s easy tosay “Talk truth to power” when work, management and political realities and pressures makes it difficult. Howev-er, if we are serious about improving intelligence analysis and professionalisation, we need to operationalise thisand talk about what is best practice and acceptable and what is not. I doubt that we will ever agree on a“Hippocratic Oath” for analysts, but at least we should put our problems out there so that we can assist each otherto deal with it more effectively. This issue of Foreknowledge reflects on what intelligence ethics means to our dailytasks. I hope that it will stimulate debate wherever you are.

Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts:

Richards Heuer is a veteran intelli-gence scholar and analyst. He haswritten numerous books and residesin Monterey, California, USA. He gaveus permission to summarise his book,

Mario Eybers is a mortgagefraud analyst at First NationalBank, Johannesburg, South Africa

from the editor

Janet Evans is AssociateInvestigator, Centre of Excellence inPolicing and Security, Australia

Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid,Spain where he is a strategic and com-petitive intelligence  specialist .

Amongst others, Jan Goldman is theeditor of the Scarecrow ProfessionalIntelligence Education Series and is afounding member of the InternationalIntelligence Ethics Association. Heteaches as NDIC and Georgetown Uni-versity in Washinton, US.

Don McDowell (SCCA) received awards forhis book Strategic Intelligence: a handbookfor practitioners, managers and users,teaches intelligence analysis throughout theworld, has a private intelligence distancelearning college and is a founding member ofAIPIO. He is from Pambula, NSW, Australia.

4 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

Before we can discuss theethical implications of thepoliticisation of intelli-

gence analysis, we must first de-fine what is meant as“politicisation of intelligenceanalysis.” Then, after we canagree on a definition of this term,can we better understand its im-pact on how it both assists andhinders intelligence analysis.So, what is the politicisation ofintelligence analysis? Simply put,“politicised intelligence” is anyintelligence or analysis that is de-veloped to meet the conclusion ofkey judgements that have al-ready been predetermined tosupport policy.Other definitions include the ma-nipulation of intelligence to re-flect policy preferences. Ofcourse, the policymaker is notinterested in objective intelli-gence analysis because of policybias that may already exist by theperson responsible for receivingthe intelligence.Consequently, the intelligenceanalyst is not being asked to beobjective (that is, letting the factsspeak for themselves) but rather,the consumer is asking the ana-lyst to be subjective (that is, deliv-ering assessments that speak forthemselves IN SPITE of the facts).Having your boss come over toyour desk and telling you to

Jan Goldman

Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics

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The ethical implications of thepoliticisation of intelligence

analysis

change your conclusions is themost blatant and obvious form ofpoliticisation of intelligence; how-ever, there are many other formsof politicisation of intelligence,that are more subtle and yet, justas deadly for the intelligence ana-lyst to lose theircredibility…because, if you arewilling to fix your intelligenceassessment to please your boss,then why should you ever betrusted to provide accurate intel-ligence in the future?The danger of the politicisation ofintelligence community is real.Moreover, the danger can neverbe eliminated but the challenge isto develop reasonable safeguards.There is a need to protect intelli-gence from any kind of pressure.The intelligence community candefend itself by strengthening itsprofessional ethos from politicalpressure, by both establishing un-biased analytical approaches andstrong leadership that is notafraid to speak truth to power.Additionally, when intelligenceanalysts see intelligence not beinghandled or prepared in an objec-tive manner, they need to speakout and make these concernsavailable to their chain-of-com-mand.When intelligence is misused,everyone loses.

ethics

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October 2012 • Foreknowledge 5

1Indirect manipulation ofintelligence analysisThis is when the boss usessubtle efforts to shapeintelligence. These actionsoccur in how your boss“suggests” better ways towrite a report leading to adifferent conclusion, orproviding incentives toassessments that “prove apoint” rather than seeking tofind out what the point is.

2 Direct manipulation ofintelligence analysisThis action occurs when thepolicymakers points out thatthese are the specific findingsthat will be accepted andnothing else. This is probablythe easiest and most obviousform of politicization ofintelligence.

3 Subtle assumptions of factWhen analysts are expectedto use certain basic

ethics

assumptions that are agreedupon by their bosses andcolleagues. Analysts are notallowed to wander off anddevelop their ownassumptions.

4 Career interestsWhen analysts are driven byhow the intelligence willadvance their careers in theorganization. By becomingthe intelligence expert – thatprovides the requiredanswers to the intelligencequestions, your status will beenhanced. Of course, you arenot allowed to accept otheropinions or facts that mightcontradict your assessments.

5 Partisan intelligenceWhen political motivesinfluence the decision of theanalyst and their assessment.Clearly, when two or morepolitical parties are vying forpower in a country, there is a

carryover to how it mayprove or disprove a politicalparty’s platform.

6 Bureaucratic intelligenceBureaucracies useintelligence to gain powerand favour from those inpolitical power. Goodsupportive intelligence forone party over anotherpolitical party will result inhow it will affect theorganization’s budget,resources and organizationalgoals.

7 Intelligence as a scapegoatPoliticians will often blameintelligence for failed policies,or when governmentoperations go wrong.Intelligence analysts can beeasy prey for politicians -especially when the elementof secrecy is involved.Consequently, intelligenceanalysts can rarely speak outin their own defense. •

Here are 7 additional and different forms of politicisation that exists. The list includes the obvious andless obvious but is important that analysts be aware of such frameworks.

6 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

Uncomfortablecompanions

Though this topic keeps occa-sionally appearing in printand in discussions about in-

telligence activity in all its forms,most of the hub-bub simply tendsto die away. Ethics seems not to bea topic that we in the global intelli-gence community want to embraceor treat seriously.1 This article, thefirst in a series, looks at ethics inthe enforcement and corporate in-telligence context, although draw-ing parallels with other forms andapplications of the intelligencecraft.A non-issue or unpopular subject

Having for several years taught,lectured and given presentationson ethics a nd morality in variousdomestic and international settings,I still find it difficult to engage in-telligence officers in any seriousdiscussion about this topic. Clearlyone could be forgiven for thinkingthat the “ethics and intelligence”nexus is either a non-issue, or atleast an unpopular one that per-haps should neither be mentionednor explored.It is all too easy for intelligencestaff to ignore the issue of ethicaland moral challenge, relying in-stead on our presumed knowledgeof “right and wrong.” Moreover,the conviction that we do what wedo for a good and proper purposesustains belief in self. We are notalone in this either; operationalagents and investigators face exact-ly the same choices and are drivenby the same convictions.Insufficient rules and regulations

Reliance on rules and regulationsto guide – as well as to constrainactions and behaviour - allows in-telligence officers to expect that act-ing according to rule will overcomeany ethical or moral considerationsand challenges.

Don McDowellPambula, Australia

In being employed and legitimizedby governments or corporations,there is a virtual umbrella of pro-tection.Within military circles as well asenforcement paramilitary organiza-tions, publication of ROE (rules offengagement) satisfies two require-ments: firstly, that a set of rules hasbeen developed to ensure behav-iour is authorised and legitimized;and secondly, that everyone in-volved knows what they can doand what they cannot.However, ROE are produced forspecific operational purposes gov-erning the behaviour of all con-cerned (including intelligenceoperatives) and defining the pa-

rameters of action and contact withopposing offenders or combatants.No such procedural mechanismexists for day-to-day activities ofintelligence staff. Instead, and eventhen not always universally ap-plied, government departmentsand corporate organizations maypublish a code of ethics as part oftheir standard operating procedur-al instructions (SOPs).When it comes to intelligence units(particularly in enforcement), weface the obvious dilemma of beinginvolved in what is often typifiedas secretive behaviour, trying togather information and interpret itin a sensitive environment, alwaysto protect the safety and security of

Intelligence & ethics

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ethics

October 2012 • Foreknowledge 7

government and the people. Thesame can be said of corporate intel-ligence activities.Ethical challenges almost neverseem to loom large in our tradition-al thinking as intelligence officers.Yet there are recorded cases inwhich scandals erupt when datacollection activities – overt and cov-ert - go “wrong,” raising questionsabout whether our actions were jus-tifiable in all the circumstances. Theeasy solutions always seem to be tofocus on those who conducted thedata gathering, whether authorisedor not, and rarely focus on the intel-ligence thinking behind the direc-tion to collectors.If we direct collection, we shareresponsibility

This brings us to the real challengefacing intelligence staff. We see our-selves as absolutely important tothe role of guiding and directingdata gathering for an intelligencecase, even though we might not,ourselves, be physically involved inthat activity. Hence the responsibil-ity for improper action, were it tooccur, can easily be seen to rest onthe collectors.But the questions remain unan-swered: if we in intelligence directdata collection, do we not alsoshare responsibility for ensuringthat the targets are properly cho-sen? For the hypothetical rationale?For directing the collection effort?For the specifically focused direc-tions given by our intelligencestaff? All must be rational and logi-cal, and beyond reproach in termsof ethical and moral considerations.We can always rationalise that wecarry out our functions with thebest of intentions and thus perhaps“the end justifies the means.” Yet

there are quite stringent legal re-quirements for enforcement andintelligence action, and merelyquoting that well-known aphorismwould be little useful defenceagainst potential prosecution.Self-interested justification

In the intelligence world, analysisenjoys seemingly the greatest levelof protection and self-interested jus-tification. After all, analysts merelyanalyse and give advice and we donot get involved in any real physi-cal activity that needs be consideredagainst ethical or moral issues andbenchmarks. This is a truly mistak-en belief at the most fundamentallevel, unto the point of self-delu-sion.In giving advice, analysts mustmake decisions to share their con-victions with their clients and com-manders. How do we decide whatto tell and what to keep out of thebriefing or report? It is human na-ture to want to satisfy ourselvesthat we have done somethingworthwhile; to admit to mistakes orerrors, threatens our well-being.Yet to withhold from a client orcommander information that mightbe essential – that we have missedout on some element of research,that some data is unreliable, or eventhat there are conflicting supposi-tions and possibilities – all these de-prive the client of an ability to makea completely informed decision.Telling what we know and don’tknow

Are we right to focus only on thepositives? Most analysts and com-

manders might be tempted to an-swer “Yes” on the basis of urgencyand time and critical decisionsneeding to me made. But if deci-sion-making is so critical, thensurely we, the analysts, need to re-spond holistically, stating what weknow and admitting what wedon’t.Only in that way do we provide afully disclosing, balanced intelli-gence report to our client. Only byacting this way are we approachingthe briefing challenge with our eth-ical values intact.Making sure that this can happen isa matter of training and develop-ment, conditioning, monitoringand regulation. More about theseissues, problems, challenges andsolutions will come in planned fu-ture articles. •

Don McDowell has been an intelligence officerfor nearly 50 years across a wide variety ofworking environments. He is a respected au-thor, consultant, advisor and lecturer. Don wasthe co-founder and Charter President of AIPIOfrom 1990 to 1994, is co-Vice Chair of the Inter-national Association for Intelligence Education(IAFIE).

1 The exception is the focal point that the InternationalIntelligence Ethics Association provides through itsconferences and publications. The IIEA body, however,tends to focus primarily on ethical issues as theyrelate to national security, defense and espionage,rather than on enforcement.

Thinking only operational staff and not analysts are boundby ethical considerations? This is a truly mistaken belief atthe most fundamental level, unto the point of self-delusion.

We share responsibility …

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8 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

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INTELIGENCIA,SECRETO YPOLÍTICA

La obtención y el análi-sis de información parasu posterior transforma-ción en conocimiento al

servicio de ciertos intereses partic-ulares o generales no es una reali-dad nueva, sino que es casi tanvieja como el hombre mismo ynació con las primeras civiliza-ciones. Es una actividad que yaaparece documentada en la Biblia,como bien ha estudiado Rose MarySheldon.Desde sus orígenes mismos, hayuna relación crucial entre informa-ción, inteligencia y poder. Uno delos riesgos de cualquier institución,en el aspecto funcional, como seña-la Peter Jackson, es su politización.De hecho, la historia está sembradade casos en los que determinadasinstituciones cedieron ante las pre-siones del poder político. Por ejem-plo, la antigua inquisición fue,muchas veces, un instrumento uti-lizado por las monarquías de me-dia Europa para logrardeterminados fines políticos.Los servicios de inteligencia no sonajenos a este riesgo y pueden llegara acomodar su información a losintereses políticos predominantes.Pero también se ha dado el revésde la moneda, es decir, el poderpúblico y político es manejado pordeterminados servicios de in-teligencia o de información parasatisfacer intereses privados o indi-viduales. Es el caso de Edgar Hoo-ver. El que fuera director del

Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) desde 1924, controló a lossucesivos presidentes y fiscalesgenerales, a quienes, en ocasiones,amenazó con desvelar escándalosen caso de ser destituido, lo que lepermitió, a pesar de las críticas,permanecer en su cargo hasta sumuerte en 1972. Se le atribuye alpresidente norteamericano John-son una curiosa analogía relacion-ando política y servicios deinteligencia:“La política es como ordeñar unavaca. Ves la leche salir, aprietasmás y la leche burbujea y sale; yjusto cuando el cubo está lleno, lavaca con su rabo empuja el cubo ytodo se derrama. Esto es lo que laCIA hace a la política”.Otro de los riesgos añadidos enesta relación obligada entre in-teligencia y política tiene que vercon la dirección política de losservicios de inteligencia. La experi-encia demuestra que cuando noexiste una adecuada dirección oexisten vacíos de poder y decisión,normalmente son siempre ocupa-dos por alguien.Lo que, en algunas ocasiones, hafavorecido que, quien verdadera-mente tenía la responsabilidad dehaber tomado determinadas deci-siones acuse a quien las tomó en sudefecto cuando las cosas no salier-on tal y como estaban planeadas.Por otro lado, cuando hablamos degobiernos democráticos, la altern-ancia política no debiera implicar

cambios drásticos en cuanto a laplanificación y las directrices, puesla continuidad implica estabilidady esta última generalmente redun-da en eficacia de los servicios deinteligencia.Pero es el secreto el que cierra estatriada circular. El secreto se hallaen la médula misma del poder.Buena parte de la fuerza de lasdictaduras de todo tipo y signopolítico reside en la capacidad deconcentrar el secreto, que en las de-mocracias se comparte y se diluyeentre muchos.Pero todos los secretos guardadosen una sola mano o círculo re-stringido, acaban siendo fatales, nosolo para sus depositarios, sinopara todos los afectados. El ejemp-lo de la Stasi en el antiguo Berlínoriental quedará siempre como unrecuerdo imperecedero del ladomás peligroso del secreto. •

Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spainwhere he is strategic  and competitiveintelligence  specialist. He runs a Spanish blog,Intel Times here

Juan Pablo SomiedoMadrid, Spain

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October 2012 • Foreknowledge 9

Pathologies of intelligence-policyrelationsJoshua Rovner

From Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelli-gence. Cornell University Press (2011). Book available here

PoliticizationDirect manipulationPolicymakers and staff pressure intelligence to produce specificfindings. Alternately, they appoint malleable analysts.

Policymakers send tacit signals about acceptable and unacceptableconclusions. Implicit threats and promises accompany these signals.

Indirect manipulation

Widely held strategic assumptions and social norms restrict thebounds of acceptable analysis.

Embedded assumptions

Intelligence estimates publicly undermine policy decisions. Policy-makers may ignore intelligence because they fear this kind of sub-version.

Intelligence subverts policy

Analysts tailor findings for personal or professional gain. De-pending on the analyst’s goals, this can lead to “intelligence toplease” or subversion.

Intelligence parochialism

Intelligence agencies tailor findings to support their organization-al interests.

Bureaucratic parochialism

Political parties use intelligence issues for partisan gain, often byaccusing rivals of mismanaging intelligence.

Partisan intelligence

Policymakers deride intelligence when it does not support policydecisions. In addition, intelligence is blamed for failure to predictevents like surprise attacks.

Intelligence as scapegoat

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Mutual satisfaction leads to shared tunnelvision. Intelligence and policy fail to chal-lenge each others’ assumptions and be-liefs, potentially leading to disaster.

Excessive harmony

1

Policymakers ignore intelligence that underminestheir objectives. Instead, they cherry-pick support-ing information or ignore intelligence altogether.

NeglectIgnore the messenger

Intelligence self-consciously avoids contactwith policymakers.

Self-isolation

2

3

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10 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

�

Sources of information

MA: Sources may be reliable, unre-liable, or they may be spies servingother agendas. Even when sincereand well placed, sources can besimply wrong. So assessing thequality of sources is important foraccuracy of your conclusions. Lessdiscussed, but equally important inmy view, is protecting your sourc-es from bureaucracies that mayabuse them without any trace ofconscience. In fact, it is commonfor intelligence bureaucracies to

squeeze as much as possible fromsources, indifferent to their welfareand obsessed with short termgoals. Analysts may not be direct-ly involved in collection or han-dling sources, but analyticproducts have consequences too.So remembering the humanity ofthose you use, and even those youmay target, is important to pre-serving some moral foundation forthe whole endeavor.

(MA): Prof Michael Andregg:University of St Thomas, StPaul, Minnesota, US.mmandregg@stthomas.edu

MA: Another issue is the illusion of im-punity and hubris or extreme arro-gance. Hubris can destroy you in manyways. Countless analysts have dis-tanced themselves from the conse-quences of their work on the theorythey are tiny cogs in big machines, andthat moral judgments are reserved forpolicy people. Bureaucracies encour-age that view, but they are fundamen-tally amoral, having neither consciencenor soul. If you make errors in target-ing and a house full of children is de-stroyed instead of a house full ofterrorists, the soldier who pulled thetrigger is no more responsible than themen or women who told him what todestroy.

Do not be deceived by those who saythe moral way is for sissies and preach-ers. The prime missions of intelligenceprofessionals are protecting your peo-ple from the dangers of our troubledworld, and protecting innocence as aconcept. Be professional and protectthem.

Some advice on ethics tointelligence analysts?

Professional integrity and best practice

(DD): Dalene Duvenage:Trainer, consultant, scholar,Foreknowledge editorPretoria, South Africa

(TN): Tony Nolan, Risk,Intelligence and AnalyticsOfficer, AustralianGovernment

DD: We often forget about work ethic when we debate intelligence ethics.As analysts, we at least have some control over our attitude towards ourwork, in contrast to politicisation and other ethical dilemmas. Analystsshould be mindful and reflective: improve the application for methods, learnnew approaches, be mindful of the biases that clouds my perspective, active-ly looking for counter arguments that might make my analysis better. As ananalyst, I can make sure that I have done my best in terms of methods, opin-ions, showing what I know and what not, and be ready to answer any ques-tion or critique from my client. But if he does not want to listen to mebecause of his own biases and political reasons, my hands are tied. I’ll getfrustrated, but being an analyst, my raison d’être is to make sense and advise,and that should be enough. If it is not, I should get another job!

MA: Cognitive biases are a problem for analysts because they affect percep-tions, conclusions, and the questions one selects for research. Leaders havebiases too, so a delicate balance must be struck between sup-pressing yours and catering to theirs without violating yourcommitment to objective truths. Failure can have huge con-sequences.

TN: The challenge facing any intelligence analyst is that notonly will they be judged by the ethics of thepresent, but also the ethics of the future. Thismakes the framework that dictates how we gather,build, complete, and pretty up our work critical.For the intelligence analyst to forget ethics alto-gether, rather than making an informed decisionof where to apply them, could lead to a careerdisaster not only now, but also in the future.

Impunity and arrogance

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October 2012 • Foreknowledge 11

ethics

A political protest erupts in cities around the country. Theprotestors are dedicated to non-violence and, despite attractinglarge numbers of supporters, engage in little serious criminalactivity. Yet, the movement attracts the attention of law en-forcement and counter-terrorism officials who demand a steadystream of products linking the protest to other, violent move-ments despite little to no evidence of any such connection. Asintelligence resources are focused on the movement, other crimi-nal and terrorist threats are given lower priority and attention.

A more common and subtle ethical issue for intelligenceanalysts falls into this category. Intelligence personnelmay be directed to focus their energies towards a particu-lar conclusion for any number of biases or interests. Theend result, however, remains the same. Analytical judg-ments are influenced and manipulated based upon the pa-rameters under which intelligence personnel directed.

As in the case of the search for WMDs in Iraq, repeatedrequests to find evidence of a particular threat, along withincreasing amounts of resources devoted to the question,inevitably leads to increased reporting. Often this report-ing involves information of decreasing quality or repeti-tive reporting but its quantity can lead to superficialassessments that threats exist where they really don't.

An agency is in competition with another over scarce resources.In furtherance of that end a supervisor approaches a junior ana-lyst and asks for a product with a specific conclusion. When theanalyst tells her supervisor that she's not sure the data supportsthat conclusion, the supervisor replies: “C'mon, you can makestatistics say anything.”

Sins of commission, where someone in power attempts tostrong arm an analyst to deliver a particular judgment,are rare among those agencies that have a strong traditionof professionalism and where analysts are able toprogress beyond the lowest levels of the organization.

Yet, in the United States, the past decade has seen an ex-plosion of domestic intelligence personnel in law enforce-ment and 'homeland security' agencies. Most of theseagencies have little or no orientation or traditions in intel-ligence analysis, are fragmented with few analytical per-sonnel and rarely afford analysts the opportunity to risewithin the organization to positions with decision makingauthority.

It is under these conditions where analysts are most likelyto be directed to produce politicized analysis and alsowhere they will have the fewest opportunities for redress.

Difficult ethical decisionsimpact on our career

paths…

R aising questions about practiceslike those discussed above, can be

problematic - even for experienced in-telligence personnel. While in the fed-eral intelligence community, raisingsuch questions may result in a transferto a less desirable post or delayed careeradvancement, in the law enforcement orcounter-terrorism communities the con-sequences can be much longer lasting.

Many analysts in those communitieswork for small agencies and have fewcareer opportunities other than movingto other agencies. Acquiring a reputa-

tion as not being a'team player' can effec-tively destroy a career viainformal channels.

Expecting analysts to both beaware of ways in which their workcan be manipulated (consciously ornot) and expecting them to act aswarning system to prevent that occur-ring without training or support mayjust be too much for them to bear.New intelligence analysts frequentlycome into their agency wanting to both

make a good impressionand a difference in their community.The important nature of the work, cul-ture of hierarchy and presence of peo-ple of great experience, even if in anon-intelligence field, can make thepressures against raising concerns for-midable at best. •

Categories of ethical dilemmas

Sins of Commission

Travels with Shiloh

Sins of Omission

12 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

The realist approach: National security is an end whichjustifies all means and therefore intelligence officials maypotentially pursue any course of action in the defence ofnational security.

The consequentialist approach: Intelligence activitieshave to be judged in view of their manifest consequences.In this view, no activities (including torture or extrajudicialkillings) are intrinsically wrong, the ethical evaluation de-pends on the consequences. The “just intelligence” theoryfits here. They argue that in making judgements on selec-tion of targets and methods of obtaining the informationwe must ask: is this a last resort, is there just cause, whatare the prospects for success, are the means deployedproportional to the ends sought, what is the possibility ofdamage to innocent people and the need for oversight ofthe actions.

The deontological approach which contends thatsome activities are intrinsically wrong and can never bejustified.

The 3 approaches to ethics in intelligence

1

From Hans Born and Aidan Wills, (2010) Beyond the oxymoron: exploring ethics through the intelligence cyclein Jan Goldman (ed) Ethics of spying: a reader for the intelligence professional vol 2 available here

2

3

Renseigner, c’est aussi influencercelui ui attend une réponse. Comptetenu de l’influence potentielle deséléments fournis, il est important

que l’information soit présentée demanière neutre et non à travers unprisme politique déformant. Les

prismes déformants dans l’analyseet la présentation des renseigne-

ments sont de graves fautes profes-sionnelles qui peuvent avoir des

conséquences funestes, tant pour lapolitique qu’elle croit servir que

pour la crédibilité du service.

Éric Denécé, 2011, L'éthique dans les activités de Renseignement in. Pdf Here

International Journal of IntelligenceEthics (IJIE) is the primary source for

multidisciplinary information andresearch on the role of ethics in itsapplication to intelligence activities.

Go their website here

get a free copy here

Email the editor here

Resources on ethics for intelligence analysts

Kindle here Kindle here

Click on the book cover to access the books in our Amazon bookstore. Click on the Kindle link below to get the e-book.

Books:Andregg, Michael (ed) 2007. Ethics: the definitive work of 2007. PDF hereGoldman, Jan (ed) 2005. Ethics of spying: a reader for the intelligence professional. Book hereGoldman, Jan. (Ed) 2009. Ethics of Spying: A reader for the Intelligence Professional, 2nd edition. Book here.Rovner, Joshua. 2011. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Book available hereArticlesArmstrong, Fulton. 2002. Ways to make analysis relevant but not prescriptive. Studies in Intelligence 46. Web hereBar-Joseph, Uri. 2010. The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 24(1) $ hereDavis, Jack. 2006. Intelligence analysts and policymakers: Benefits and dangers of tensions in the relationship. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6). $ hereDavis, Jack. 2003. Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence. Kent Centre Occasional Papers, 2(2). Web hereDenécé, Éric. 2011. L'éthique dans les activités de Renseignement in Revue Française D'administration Publique. Pdf hereGentry, John A. 1995. Intelligence analyst/manager relations at the CIA. Intelligence and National Security,10(4), $ hereODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203. 2007. Analytic standards. Web herePatterson, Eric & Casale, Teresa. 2005. Targeting terror: The ethical and practical implications of targeted killing. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelli-gence, 18(4). $ hereLunstroh, John. 2007. A proposed analysts’ code of ethics. Defence Intelligence Journal 16(1)Selim, George. 2011. Talking terrorism: can we ethically communicate the threat? International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 2(2)Shelton, Allison. 2011. Framing the oxymoron: e new paradigm for intelligence ethics. Intelligence and National Security, 26(1). $ hereWesterfield, H. Bradford. 1996. Inside Ivory bunkers: CIA analysts resist managers' “pandering” — Part I. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence,9(4), $ here

There are hundreds of articles and books on intelligence ethics in general and intelligence oversight, but only a few on the analysis function specifically:

Kindle here Kindle here

ethics

October 2012 • Foreknowledge 13

Analytic rigourThe previous pages stressed how important it is that we as analysts are honest in our thinking, analysis and communicating thethreat to our clients. A few scholars and practitioners are now developing methods and tools to enhance mindfulness and rigour inour quest to provide insight and foresight to clients. In this issue we look at Daniel Zelik et al’s rigour model which tries to answer

the question: “How can intelligence analysts ensure that they have been rigorous in the analytical process?”

toolbox

Dalene Duvenage

1. Hyp

othe

sis ex

plora

tion

3. Information validation

8. Explanation critiquing

5. Sensitivity analysis

6. Speciali

st colla

boratio

n

2. Info

rmatio

n sear

ch

4, Stance analysis

7. Information synthesis

Were multiple hypotheses considered

in explaining data?

Low: minimum weighing of alterna-

tives High: Multiple perspectives to

identify the best & most probable

explanations

The depth and breadth of the search processused in collecting data.

Low: Routine and readily available data sources

High: Exhaustively explore all data

The levels at which information sources are corroboratedand cross-validated.

Low: No effort to verify source accuracy

High: Systematic approach to verify information and where possible use

source closest to issue

Identify the stance or per-

spective of the source and

placing it into a broader

context for understanding

Does the analyst consider andunderstand the assumptions

and limitations of their analy-sis?Low: Explanation seems valid onsurface

Were the perspectives of domain expertsincluded into the assessments?

Low: No effort to seek out expertise

High: Experts have been consulted

How far beyond simply collecting andlisting data did analyst go?

Low: Compiled a unified form

High: Integrated with thorough consider-ation of diverse interpretations

How many different perspectives were incorporat-

ed in examining the primary hypotheses?

Low: Little use of other analysts

High: Peer & expert review on

chain of reasoning with strong

and weak inferences clearly indi-

cated

Low: Analyst notice bias in source

High: Research into source background to un-

derstand how their perspective might influence

their stance

High: Analyst has strategy to consider

strengths of explanations if supporting

sources were to prove invalid

Based on Zelik, Daniel et al 2007. Understanding Rigor in Information Analysis papers here, here and here

14 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

Rick Morton: Orange Country (CA) District Attorney’s Office

The LEIU Distinguished Service Award

This award is presented to the person who has shown a sustained contribution to the Association ofLaw Enforcement Intelligence Units and a continuous effort to enhance the professionalization of thecriminal intelligence profession. Rick began his law enforcement career in 1968 with the Los AngelesPolice Department (LAPD) and he retired in 1994 as a Lieutenant Commander. Rick began working asa supervising investigator with the Orange County District Attorney’s Bureau of Investigation. Duringthe past 18 years he has been assigned to the Intelligence/Organized Crime Unit, the Anti-TerrorismUnit, and the Gang Target Unit. During his 44 year law enforcement career Rick Morton has shown asustained contribution to the mission of LEIU and has demonstrated a sustained effort of professionalism to the criminal intelligence profession.

(From Left to Right) Dale Ferranto, representing Lexis Nex-is, Rick Morton and Van Godsey, LEIU General Chairman

Association of Law EnforcementIntelligence Units

2012 AwardsLEIU Special Recognition

Award

Gary WilliamsGary has had a long and distinguished 40 yearcareer with the Los Angeles Police Department(LAPD) retiring at the rank of Captain in chargeof the Major Crimes Division where he super-vised several investigative units as well as the

Intelligence Unit. He also served as a LEIUBoard member from February 2004 until his

retirement in 2007. Gary volunteered to comeout of retirement to further the cause of theLEIU mission, and has taken on the role of a

LEIU Foundation Board member.

New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC)LEIU General Chairman’s Award

This center has not only been a leader in the national network of Fusion Centers—it has signifi-cantly assisted all levels of law enforcement with solving and preventing criminal activity

throughout the state--through the fusion of information and intelligence.

L-R: Col Rick Fuentes (Superintendent of the New JerseyState Police), Major Chris Schulz (Commander of the NewJersey State Police Regional Operations and IntelligenceCenter - ROIC), Assistant Director James McDermond,(U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,Firearms, and Explosives, Office of Strategic Intelligence

and Information), Lt KevinFoley (Union County Prosecutor'sOffice, New Jersey, Commander of the Intelligence Unit)

collaboratesharediscuss

December 2012

Australian Securityand Intelligence

Conference

3-5 December 2012

Perth, AustraliaInformation here

International Crimeand Intelligence

Analysis Conference

13-14 December 2012

Manchester, UKInformation here

2013● April 2-6 2013: International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, US. info● April 8-12 2013: IALEIA/LEIU Annual Training Conference, Chicago, US. info● May 20-23 2013: International Association for Intelligence Education, El Paso, Texas, US. info● July 24-26 2013: AIPIO annual conference, Canberra, Australia. info

November 2012

3rd InternationalCongress ofIntelligence

14 November 2012

Barcelona, SpainInformation here

events

October 2012 • Foreknowledge 15

Discovering the value of open sourceintelligence in Social Media

by RJGtech@foreknowledge.info

Using open source intelligence toflush out the antihero may be as oldas the hills, but Social Media is arelative new kid on the block. Muchhype has been created around therole of SNSs (social networking serv-ices) in various circumstances of po-litical protests, unrests anddemonstrations throughout theworld.

As a leading microblogging service,Twitter has been the darling of inter-action and news dissemination inseveral prominent hotspots of unrestsince 2009 (Moldova, Tunisia, Iran,Egypt). By posting user-generatedcontent to mass audiences, the rapidorganizing of protests and mobiliz-ing of bulk participation is executedin a flash across a borderless societyonly bound by common interest.

To the intelligence analyst, SNS plat-forms present a treasure trove ofdata to explore for patterns andclues towards understanding behav-ioral patterns. The unstructured con-tent of messaging within enormoussets of records may seem dauntingto some, but to an analyticallytrained eye with an appetite for nod-al investigation, the rewards can besubstantial.

The examination of networks is notnew, but tracking and mapping themessaging relative to its impact onnetwork change has only recentlybecome a possibility due to the visu-alization tools which can rendersuch complexities. The structuredcontent around the messenger isfairly simple to cognize for profiling,

but scrutinizing the semantics of thequalitative content (the actual text ofthe message) is more delicate.Through tailored lexicons, senti-ment tracking, keyword- and entityextraction; clusters can be generatedto be explored for its influence onnetworks and more specifically, ex-plicit nodes in such networks.

A good example would be a recentcase analysis done on Twitter totrace poachers of protected marineresources in a small fishing village.HUMINT indicated that poachersused the term “goldfish” as an eu-phemism for a specific protectedmarine resource. The keyword wasinserted into a Twitter extractionscript linked to its API (openprogramming interface to Twitter)which then trawled the network fora prescribed period.

The harvested data posed a richarray of classes for evaluation whichenabled the analyst to first generatea topic view to identify clusters ofexpression and filter residual clutter.Specific clusters identified actorswithin the network. Categories ofusers (tweeters) were created and anetwork was constructed by linkingcommon users with the IDs of re-tweeters coupled with various key-words. The word ‘goldfish’ returnedan unusual number of links in acommon cluster and enabled the an-alyst to converge on the centralnodes within the network whichparticipated in the messaging proc-ess of the goldfish theme. Withinminutes, the network, the centrality

and the theme was mapped to iden-tify the extent of the poaching net-work in the village.

The tools at hand to assist the analystin Social Media Intelligence are nu-merous but obligate the user to pos-sess a firm understanding of whatthe output and expectations are tobe. NodeXL, Palantir, Starlight, An-alyst Notebook, and Memex are buta few which can yield strong outputsbut no analytics in this environmentcan be effective unless viewedthrough the lens of big data manage-ment.

Social media data is colossal and thenoise is titanic—the tools necessaryto illuminate intelligence from suchvolume are not all embracing. GivenGladwell’s 10 000-hour prescriptionfor specialization and the “fresh-ness” of social media, real SM ana-lytical gurus are few and farbetween. To understand social me-dia is not enough. To secure an inclu-sive perception of a specific theme,the analyst’s ability to fuse assortedstreams of cross-platform data willbe imperative.

So, to trace the beloved Nemo viaTwitter, one would have to extractwho tweeted his disappearance, whotweeted his reappearance, howmany times his sightings had beenretweeted, and who finally tweetedhis arrival in Australia. That wouldnot take more than 4.3 degrees ofseparation and should be analytical-ly probable in lesser time than ittakes to explore the film.

Now, let’s go find Lord Lucan… •

IT tools

Finding Nemo

16 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

No investigation or project can startwithout deciding up front on howthe success of the investigation willbe measured. Evaluating the effec-tiveness of the information manage-ment and analysis approach istherefore crucial and often one ofthose critical aspects of an investiga-tion that is neglected. It generatesfocus areas for future improvementin the analytical approach andidentifies those analytical modelsand techniques that are noteffective.Note that the focus areas of evalua-tion, as far as information and anal-ysis activities are concerned, willdiffer from investigation to investi-gation. Evaluation should be fo-cused on the entire team’sperformance in all activities relatingto the management and analysis ofinformation:● Information management:

Here the focus can be on theeffectiveness of the analyst tomanage the information, thecreation and optimisation ofcommunication channels tostimulate participation, as wellas the effectiveness of the teamto maximise on informationavailable under guidance ofthe analyst.

● Participation and communi-cation: Here the focus can beon the participation of teammembers in analytical process,the quality of input providedby the team with regard toproduct requirements as wellas the willingness of teammembers to participate in in-formation sharing activities.

● Analytical products and serv-ices: Applicability of analyticaltechniques to the analysis ofspecific information sets. Effec-tiveness of analytical productsto meet the investigation re-quirements.

To make the review more effective,it may be useful to use an independ-ent evaluator to conduct the finaldebriefing session. All team mem-bers must be present, and partici-pate in the activity, while feedbackand recommendations must be doc-umented.Part of the evaluation process can beto develop a scorecard that can

need2share

Score Card Measuring the Effectiveness of the Information AnalysisApproach during an Investigation

Low Score High ScoreProject or Case Initiation

● No initial assessment of available information● No criminal value chains● No scenarios● No analytical plans

Analyst and investigator make contact with team mem-bers and do initial information assessment. Followingdocumentation is available:● Criminal value chain● Analytical plan

InvestigationNo planning for analysis Planning for analysisInformation pushed towards analyst with limited con-sultation on what is to be achieved.

Team take responsibility for entire investigation inclu-sive of the development of analytical products.

Analysis is seen as a support function Analysis is the driving factor that will push the investi-gation to a successful conclusion

Analyst provides feedback to client and investigationteam only during investigation and project meetings.The following is presented during formal meetings:● Link charts with no supporting analytical report.● Communication analysis containing no inferences

or conclusions.

Investigation officer together with the analyst ensuresthat all clients and team members are updated on:● What is being analysed● What techniques are utilised during the analysis● What the expected end results will be● How these results will influence the outcome of

the investigationClients and investigating officer cannot peruse analyti-cal working files whilst the analysis of information is inprogress.

Investigation team have full access to all analyticalfiles.

ProsecutionNo role Testifying to analytical work conducted.

Case FinalisationNo debriefing session Debriefing of analyst and project/ investigation team.

The role of analysis incriminal investigations

Mario Eybers

greatly assist to measure theeffectiveness of informationmanagement during aninvestigation. Standard debriefingreports are often qualitative innature, whereas scorecards canassist to quantify the effectivenessbased on the specific criteria chosenfor evaluation. The table belowdepicts an example of such ascorecard.Understanding what contributes toa successful investigation is essentialto ensure that analytical effortsmake a positive contribution to theinvestigation and prosecution ofcriminals. •

Part 2: Evaluating effectiveness

October 2012 • Foreknowledge 17

The effective analystPart 4: Attributes

Janet EvansAssociate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia

In this last article in a series of four, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and MarkKebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.

In this the final ar-ticle in the series, I

will consider the fi-nal theme thatemerged from con-sidering what makesan effective analyst -

Attributes of the analyst. Secondly,and perhaps more importantly, I amgoing to reflect on the most ethicalway forward for us as a communityof practitioners now knowing thefindings offered by this study.

In the previous issues I describedhow 246 constructs were used by thesubject matter experts to describe thetheme of analytical products and 107constructs to describe the theme re-lating to the analysts attitude.  In con-trast only 21 constructs were used todescribe the attributes of the analystby subject matter experts.  The themeof attributes incorporated inherentcharacteristics and qualities as wellas physical characteristics like age orgender.

From this study it is asserted that theattributes of the analysts contributeless than other themes to indicate ananalyst as more or less effective.From an ethical or equity perspectivethis is heartening as there is no indi-cation that men or women, older oryounger analysts make better ana-lysts. The attribute factors that heldsome interest for the subject matter

experts were being confident, beingcalm and patient, and being likable.

The results of this research serve asthe first empirically-based set ofcharacteristics required to effectivelyperform the role of analyst.

The importance of the analyticalproduct in understanding and deter-mining an analysts’ effectiveness hasbeen clearly demonstrated. For ananalyst to be viewed as effectivethey need to have skills in develop-ing a product as well as disseminat-ing their results.  The most criticallyimportant variable in disseminatingthe product was the ability to com-municate with the recipient of theproduct both in general terms andthrough briefings and a writtenproduct.

This requires us to reconsider ourapproach to recruitment and devel-opment. It is our moral responsibili-ty to select analysts who canperform in these domains and, if wealready employ analysts, ensuringthey are servicing the goals of lawenforcement as effectively as theycan by having received the ‘right’training.  It is no longer enough totrain analysts on software or to givethem another tool. This study showsthat effective analysts derive mean-ing and develop inferences that re-quire enhanced thinking skills.

Analysts need to develop them-selves into advanced problem-solv-

ers. In this study computer andtechnical skills were barely men-tioned and the importance of think-ing skills and life experience werehighly sought after in determiningeffectiveness.

Although data collection and colla-tion are described as part of the in-telligence cycle they were notconsidered to be an indicator of ana-lyst effectiveness It is now our ethi-cal responsibility to decide if this isbecause they in fact are not part ofan analyst’s role and if so why are somany of our analysts consumedwith this task?  Is it because this iswhat they have become comfortabledoing? As managers can we pave anew path towards where analystspredominantly think (rather thancollect), derive meaning and createand deliver products?

This study has raised a number ofquestions that require further inves-tigation, including how we best testfor effective communication skillsand how do you measure an ana-lyst’s attitude to the position. Thesequestions and others have at theirheart an ethical responsibility tomake choices not just at a point intime, for the sake of your career, toease the pain of recruitment or to si-lence an analyst who just wants an-other mapping course, but for aprofession in it’s development yearsand in many cases for the safety ofour communities or countries. •

need2share

18 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

Brouard’s model

insight

The all-disciplineintelligence

process:wanted -

a simplifiedconstruct with realexplanatory power

The two preceding contributionsargued that the traditional in-

telligence cycle as a notional con-struct that do not accuratelyconvey the way in which intelli-gence ‘works’. This was based onthe central contention that the intel-ligence cycle does not accommo-date counterintelligence at all. Insubstantiation, an outline of thecounterintelligence process wasprovided and this was comparedwith the traditional cycle. The latterwas shown to be, at most, a posi-tive intelligence model. It was fur-ther mentioned that an overarchingintelligence process model shouldaccommodate all main intelligence

processes in a simplified constructwith real explanatory power.Business Intelligence – canwe borrow?

Such integrative proposals are inshort supply within IntelligenceStudies. Significant progress has,however, been made in BusinessIntelligence. A seminal model inthis regard was forwarded by No-lan in 1997. This was followed bycontributions by various others.While copyright restriction pre-vents an inclusion of Nolan graphi-cal depiction in this magazine, theproposal by Brouard1 (2004) belowis an example of the work donewithin in Business Intelligence.

Business Intelligence models areuseful, but for various reasons can-not be summarily applied to thestatutory context and thus Intelli-gence Studies.Intelligence Studies – noeureka-type insights as yet

Within Intelligence Studies, weneed to be frank that we don’tknow. We don’t as yet have an eu-reka-type insight on an overarch-ing intelligence process model thatactually works. How then shouldwe progress toward this goal? Pro-gression has several requisitewhich are discussed in the articlecited below. Suffice to state herethat the forwarding of high-leveltheoretical constructs is but one di-mension of this quest.

Duvenage & Hough’s (2011)2 prop-osition serves as an example such atheoretical contribution on a highlevel of abstraction:Key contentions on which the nex-us rests are:

● The overarching statutoryintelligence process is thesum of processes executedin three principal disciplines3,namely, positive intelli-gence, counterintelligenceand covert action. Each ofthese has a distinctive and,to a degree, a unique pat-tern of activities.

In this 3rd instalment of a discussion on the intelligence cycle and counterintelligence functions process, thescholar and practitioner B offers a model that might assist us in understanding the complexity of our discipline.

October 2012 • Foreknowledge 19

Conceptual nexus towards an all-discipline intelligence process: Duvenage & Hough

● Analysis and collection arefunctional areas of activityperformed within all threeprincipal disciplines and aspart of the collective all-dis-cipline process. Notwith-standing obvioussimilarities, there are simul-taneously significant differ-ences in emphasis andmethodology in the mannerin which these functions areexecuted within the respec-tive primary disciplines. Incomparison with positiveintelligence, counterintelli-gence analysis for one ismore diverse in its scope,methodology and tech-niques. Cognisance is takenof the fact that some practi-tioners may categorise col-lection and analysis as‘disciplines’ or ‘subdisci-plines’. If so, then they arefunctional, not primary dis-ciplines. Be that as it may,functional areas are not lim-ited to analysis and collec-tion. The identification offurther functional areaswould require dedicated re-search and only ‘intelligencemanagement’ is proposed asan addition here.

● The intelligence process isperformed by means of amulti-directional activity flow.The latter applies to the re-spective principal disci-plines, the functions and thecombination thereof in theall-discipline process.

The contour provided above clearlyrequires considerable refinementand substantiating research. Not-withstanding its cursory nature, thenexus holds out against one of thelitmus test for theories, namely con-ceptual clarification. The notional‘uncluttering’ of the relationshipbetween counterintelligence andtransnational security concernssuch as counter-proliferation (ofWeapons of Mass Destruction –

insight

WMD), organised crime and coun-terterrorism serves as an example.While some scholars consider coun-terterrorism as part of counterintel-ligence, others assertcounterterrorism to have “devel-oped” into a “separate intelligencediscipline.” Counterterrorism is nei-ther a separate intelligence disci-pline, nor is it part ofcounterintelligence. It is a securityconcern that involves facets of posi-tive intelligence, covert action aswell as counterintelligence. Thesame applies to counter-prolifera-tion and organised crime.Is this really helpful?

This three part contribution demon-strated an abundance of fragmentedknowledge of ‘what we know’ and‘what we think we know’ in as faras the intelligence process is con-cerned. What counterintelligencepractitioners and scholars ‘do notknow’ is how to structure thesemulti-facetted processes in a man-ner that satisfactorily meet modelconstruction’s demand of reflectingthis reality in a simplified notionalconstruct with real explanatorypower.Similar to other contemporary mod-els, the nexus above neither attainsthis evasive goal, nor does it escapeseveral deficiencies cited in respectof other existing postulations. Itshould thus be viewed as part ofthe gradual progression towards toa viable intelligence process model.

Who knows perhaps it will befound to be a circle after all? •

1 Nolan, J A. 1997. “Confusing Counterintelligence withSecurity Can Wreck Your Afternoon” CompetitiveIntelligence Review, 8(3)

2 Article based on Petrus Duvenage and Mike Hough,2011, The conceptual structuring of the intelligenceand the counterintelligence processes: enduring holygrails or crumbling axioms – quo vadis? StrategicReview for Southern Africa, vol. 33, no. 1, pp.29-77.Download here. (10MB pdf)

3 The axiom of intelligence consisting of the four princi-pal disciplines is thus contested. It is unclear howthe common acceptance of ‘analysis’, ‘collection’,‘counterintelligence’ and ‘covert action’ as the princi-pal intelligence subdisciplines originated or evolved.Future studies by Intelligence Studies’ historians andhistoriographers might well find that it was influencedby the organisational structuring of some post-WorldWar II, Western statutory intelligence services.Whatever the reason, this axiom is incongruent withreality.

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20 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

Richards Heuer

There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of In-telligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge.

This is an excerpt of chapter 4 on Strategies for Analytical Judgment - applying theory. You can also download the entirebook here.

Psychologyof

intelligenceanalysis

thinking

In the previous Foreknowledge,we looked at situational logic asone of the means in which an ana-lyst generate hypotheses if availa-ble data is insufficient to provideforesight. In this edition, we lookat how we apply theories to under-stand data.Theory is an academic term notmuch in vogue in the IntelligenceCommunity, but it is unavoidablein any discussion of analyticaljudgment. In one popular meaningof the term, "theoretical" is associ-ated with the terms "impractical"and "unrealistic". Needless to say,it is used here in a quite differentsense.A theory is a generalization basedon the study of many examples ofsome phenomenon. It specifiesthat when a given set of conditionsarises, certain other conditions willfollow either with certainty or withsome degree of probability. In oth-

er words, conclusions are judgedto follow from a set of conditionsand a finding that these conditionsapply in the specific case being an-alyzed. For example, Turkey is adeveloping country in a precariousstrategic position. This defines aset of conditions that imply con-clusions concerning the role of themilitary and the nature of politicalprocesses in that country, becauseanalysts have an implicit if not ex-plicit understanding of how thesefactors normally relate.There are both advantages anddrawbacks to applying theory inintelligence analysis. One advan-tage is that "theory economizesthought." By identifying the keyelements of a problem, theory ena-bles an analyst to sort through amass of less significant detail. The-ory enables the analyst to see be-yond today's transientdevelopments, to recognize whichtrends are superficial and which

are significant, and to foresee fu-ture developments for which thereis today little concrete evidence.Consider, for example, the theoret-ical proposition that economic de-velopment and massive infusion offoreign ideas in a feudal societylead to political instability. Thisproposition seems well estab-lished. When applied to SaudiArabia, it suggests that the days ofthe Saudi monarchy are num-bered, although analysts of theSaudi scene using situational logicfind little or no current evidence ofa meaningful threat to the powerand position of the royal family.Thus, the application of a general-ly accepted theoretical propositionenables the analyst to forecast anoutcome for which the "hard evi-dence" has not yet begun to devel-op. This is an important strengthof theoretical analysis when ap-plied to real-world problems.

October 2012 • Foreknowledge 21

thinking

Yet this same example also illus-trates a common weakness in ap-plying theory to analysis ofpolitical phenomena. Theoreticalpropositions frequently fail to spec-ify the time frame within which de-velopments might be anticipated tooccur.The analytical problem with respectto Saudi Arabia is not so muchwhether the monarchy will eventu-ally be replaced, as when or underwhat conditions this might happen.Further elaboration of the theoryrelating economic developmentand foreign ideas to political insta-bility in feudal societies wouldidentify early warning indicatorsthat analysts might look for. Suchindicators would guide both intelli-gence collection and analysis of so-ciopolitical and socioeconomic dataand lead to hypotheses concerningwhen or under what circumstancessuch an event might occur.But if theory enables the analyst totranscend the limits of available da-ta, it may also provide the basis for

ignoring evidence that is truly in-dicative of future events.When evidence is lacking or ambig-uous, the analyst evaluates hypoth-eses by applying his or her generalbackground knowledge concerningthe nature of political systems andbehavior.Logic-of-the-situation analysis alsodraws heavily on theoretical as-sumptions. How does the analystselect the most significant elementsto describe the current situation, oridentify the causes or consequencesof these elements, without some

implicit theory that relates the like-lihood of certain outcomes to cer-tain antecedent conditions?For example, if the analyst estimat-ing the outcome of an impendingelection does not have currentpolling data, it is necessary to lookback at past elections, study thecampaigns, and then judge howvoters are likely to react to the cur-rent campaigns and to events thatinfluence voter attitudes. In doingso, the analyst operates from a setof assumptions about human na-ture and what drives people andgroups.These assumptions form part of atheory of political behavior, but itis a different sort of theory thanwas discussed under theoreticalanalysis. It does not illuminate theentire situation, but only a smallincrement of the situation, and itmay not apply beyond the specificcountry of concern. Further, it ismuch more likely to remain im-plicit, rather than be a focal pointof the analysis. •

Theory enables theanalyst to transcend

the limits of availabledata, but it may alsoprovide the basis for

ignoring evidence thatis truly indicative of

future events

Former US Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette, who has written a controver-sial book detailing the Abbotabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden,

has credited a ‘feisty’ female CIA analyst for leading them to their tar-get, after spending five years hunting him. Bissonnette said that heand the other SEALs asked the young agent, "What you do think?Think he's there? "She's like, ''One hundred percent. One hundred

percent he's there,” he said. Read more here.

Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Com-mon Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab haveembarked on several innovative programs that allow both

intelligence analysts and tactical operators to visualize the bat-tlefield as never seen before. The lab’s staff is comprised of an

eclectic group of researchers that includes interdisciplinaryfaculty partnered with seasoned special operators with yearsof boots-on-the-ground experience. Together, they aim to

illuminate the “human terrain” by utilizing advanced analyticalmethodologies. Read more here

A part-time army of civilian spies is set to be re-cruited by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ tohelp in the war against cyber crime. Hundreds ofcomputer experts will work one or two days aweek at the agency’s Cheltenham headquartersand they have already been dubbed “iPlods”, un-der plans being discussed by ministers. The move

is part of an ongoing drive to harness the bestskills in the private sector to combat the growing

threat of hackers. Read more here.

Snippets

Top 5 Things Only Spies Used To Do (But Everyone Does Now)Kris Wheaton

1. Use satellites: even our cell phones have capabilities that were noteven dreamed of by spies 10 years ago!

2. Have an agent network: sure, that's not what we call twitter,LinkedIn etc, but that is what they are!

3. Use passwords and encrypt data: buying/selling on the internet,007?!

4. Shake a tail: we are all using sophisticated tools to help us navigatethe internet without being followed.

5. Have a cover story: we all have multiple email accounts for variousaspects of their lives or different social media platforms for differentpurposes.

22 October 2012 • Foreknowledge

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