Forcible Entry Case

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    2004V678] SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL, petitioners,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. CHUA,respondents.2004 Jun 172nd DivisionG.R. No. 125375D E C I S I O N

    CALLEJO, SR., J.:

    This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38333 reversing the Decision,[2] on appeal, of the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 215, in Civil Case No. Q-94-21698.

    The Antecedents

    On September 3, 1993, the respondents, Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua,filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, SpousesElpidio and Amelia Apostol, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of MetroManila, docketed as Civil Case No. 7660. The respondents alleged, inter alia,that they had contracted with the Spouses Paulo and Georgina Pascua for

    the purchase of a parcel of land. The petitioners, who were present duringthe negotiations, verbally assured the respondents that they would vacatethe property within ten (10) days from the execution of the sale. Thepetitioners then acknowledged that their stay in the property was only uponthe tolerance of its former owners. On June 7, 1993, the Spouses Pascuaexecuted a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the improvementsthereon in favor of the respondents for P1,000,000. On the basis of the saiddeed, the respondents were issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.87610 over the property on June 8, 1993. Despite demands, however, thepetitioners refused to vacate the property.

    The respondents prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be renderedin their favor, thus:

    WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this HonorableCourt that after a summary hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of theplaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:

    1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them toimmediately vacate the above-mentioned parcel of land;

    2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 permonth from the filing of the complaint until they finally vacate and turn over

    completely the above-mentioned parcel of land representing the reasonablecompensation for the use and occupancy of the above-mentioned parcel ofland;

    3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 forand as attorneys fees, plus the sum of P1,000.00 appearance fee for everycourt attendance of plaintiffs counsel; and

    4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the costs of suit.

    PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as may bedeemed just and equitable in the premises.[3]

    In their answer with special and affirmative defenses and compulsorycounterclaim, the respondents alleged, inter alia, that Luz B. Pascua was theowner of the parcel of land located in Quezon City covered by TCT No.198936 with an area of 315 square meters. She sold a portion of theproperty, an area of 285.32 square meters, to the respondents on July 8,1976 for P45,548 of which P15,548 was paid. On the same day, the partiesexecuted a memorandum agreement covering the property, in which the

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    respondents agreed that the balance of the purchase price would be paid ininstallments. Thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor ofthe respondents over an unsegregated portion of the property, with an areaof 29.68 square meters, for P7,350 and, later, a deed of confirmation of deedof absolute sale with waiver over the said property. On June 20, 1979, the

    respondents executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the property,stating, inter alia, that they could not cause the registration of the said deedsbecause the owners duplicate of TCT No. 198936 was in the possession ofTeresita B. Jimenez, a former co-owner of the property. The respondentsfurther alleged that Luz Pascua, in her letter to the Register of Deeds datedAugust 6, 1979, confirmed that she failed to turn over the owners duplicateof TCT No. 198936 because the same was in the possession of Jimenez, who,in turn, gave it to Jose J. Burgos. Thereafter, on May 15, 1980, Luz Pascuafiled a Complaint against the petitioners in the RTC of Quezon City forrescission and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 29895 but the same wasdismissed on December 19, 1983 for lack of interest to prosecute. Paulo

    Pascua filed a similar complaint against the petitioners in the RTC, docketedas Civil Case No. 88-523, but the same was, likewise, dismissed. Finally, thepetitioners alleged that the Spouses Pascuas possession of the propertyafter the sale thereof to the respondents was by mere tolerance.

    In the meantime, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents,the Spouses Chua, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the RTCof Quezon City, for annulment of deed of sale and TCT No. 86338, and forreconveyance with damages. The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that theyhad been in possession of the property since 1973; their adverse claim overthe property was annotated on June 20, 1979 as Entry No. PE 8812; Luz

    Pascua died on December 2, 1984 but Paulo Pascua did not inherit theproperty from her because the same had already been sold to therespondents; Paulo Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudicationover the property on the basis of which he was able to secure, on May 20,1993, TCT No. 86338.

    The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered intheir favor, thus:

    WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment berendered as follows:

    1. Nullifying the deed of sale executed by Paulo Pascua in favor of EdnaChua, marked as Annex "G" hereof and TCT No. 87610 (Annex "H") in thename of Edna L. Chua; including TCT No. 86338 RT-432 (Annex "F") in thename of Paulo Pascua; and in the alternative to reconvey the aforesaidproperty to herein plaintiffs;

    2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT Nos.87610 and 86338;

    3. Sentencing defendants to pay plaintiffs:

    a) P100,000 as actual and consequential damages;

    b) P50,000 as moral damages;

    c) Exemplary damages, P50,000;

    d) P15,000 as attorneys fee;

    e) Cost; and,

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    f) Praying for other reliefs and remedies, equitable and just under thepremises.[4]

    On February 17, 1994, the MeTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 7660defining the issues, thus:

    1. Whether or not the complaint is for Forcible Entry or UnlawfulDetainer;

    2. Who is entitled to the lawful possession of the subject property;

    3. Whether this case has to be suspended in view of the filing of anaction for Annulment of Title in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and

    4. Whether the plaintiffs can lawfully eject the defendants from thepremises.[5]

    The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents on August 11,1994. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

    WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment infavor of plaintiffs and against defendants by ordering as follows:

    1) Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacatethe premises denominated as No. 39, Visayas Ave., Project 6, Diliman,Quezon City, and to surrender the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs;

    2) Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 per month

    representing the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of thepremises from the time of formal demand until the possession of thepremises shall have been fully restored to plaintiffs;

    3) Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneysfees; and

    4) Defendants to pay the costs of this suit.

    SO ORDERED.[6]

    The MeTC ruled that having acquired the property from the Spouses Pascua,

    and being the registered owners of the property, the respondents areentitled to the possession thereof:

    The Court holds that plaintiffs are the ones entitled to the material orphysical possession of the subject property. This is so because they havesufficiently established their title over the premises in question. They haveshown that they are the registered owners of the subject premises located atNo. 39 Visayas Avenue, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City, as evidenced byTransfer Certificate of Title No. 87610 issued in their name by the Registry ofDeeds of Quezon City, which property they acquired from its formerregistered owners, the Sps. Paulo and Georgiana (sic) Pascua. Hence, as an

    incident to their ownership over said property, plaintiffs are entitled to itspossession.[7]

    The court also ruled that the proceedings were not suspended by thependency of Civil Case No. Q-94-19352.

    The respondents appealed the decision to the RTC, which rendered judgmenton April 15, 1996 in their favor, reversing the decision of the MeTC and

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    ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The RTC anchored its decision onthe following findings:

    It is the contention of the plaintiff that as registered owners of the subjectlot, they have the right to take possession thereof and eject defendants fromthe premises. On the other hand, it is the contention of the defendants thatthey are the rightful owners of the land and have been in possession thereonfrom the time they acquired the land from the real owner Luz B. Pascua.

    In ejectment cases, the only issue to be determined by the Court is the factof prior physical and material possession over the subject property. UnderArticle 538 of the New Civil Code (NCC), it is provided that:

    "Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time intwo different personalities except in cases of co-possession. Should aquestion arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shallbe preferred, if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the

    dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if allthese conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial depositpending determination of its possession or ownership through properproceedings."

    In this case, defendants were able to establish the fact that they have beenin physical and material possession of the subject premises from the timethey purchased the same from Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976. Defendants,therefore, are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, andunder the law, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor thelegal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot beobliged to show or prove it (Art. 541, NCC).

    Moreover, it is important to note that defendants purchased the subjectpremises from Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976 while plaintiffs purchased thesame from Paulo Pascua only on June 4, 1993, a much later date. This isshown by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Luz B. Pascua in favor ofdefendants on July 8, 1976 (Annex 1); Deed of Absolute Sale ofUnsegregated Portion of Land executed by Luz B. Pascua and Paulo Pascuain favor of the defendants on July 14, 1977 (Annex 2) and a Deed ofConfirmation of Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land with Waiver dated

    July 14, 1977 executed by Paulo Pascua (Annex 3). These documents put indoubtful validity the subsequent sale of the same land by Paulo Pascua infavor of the plaintiffs. Paulo Pascua had no right, therefore, to transferownership of the subject land to plaintiffs because, Luz B. Pascua, theoriginal owner, had already sold the same land to defendants during herlifetime. And upon the death of Luz B. Pascua, Paulo Pascua had no right toadjudicate the subject lot to himself because he even confirmed such saleand waived any rights, interest and participation over the subject residentialhouse and lot in a Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale with Waiver datedJuly 14, 1977 (Annex 3). It bears emphasis, however, that the validity of therespective titles of the parties is now the subject of controversy in Civil CaseNo. Q-94-19352 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 102.

    From the foregoing, it is clear that defendants have priority of right andpossession over the subject property and have, therefore, the right to berespected in their present possession thereon.[8]

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    The petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, whichlater rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstated thedecision of the MeTC. The CA held that in ruling against the petitioners, whowere the registered owners of the property, the RTC thereby violated theprescription against the collateral attack of a torrens title.

    The Present Petition

    In the present recourse, the petitioners, the Spouses Apostol, assert thefollowing: (a) their possession of the property since 1976 preceded the saleof the property to the private respondents; (b) the respondents werepurchasers of the property in bad faith; and, (c) in declaring that thepetitioners had priority of possession of the property on the sale thereof byLuz Pascua and Paulo Pascua way back in 1976 and 1977, the RTC did notthereby collaterally attack the title of the respondents over theproperty. According to the petitioners, an inflexible adherence to theproscription against a collateral attack of a torrens title may result to gross

    injustice.

    In their comment on the petition, the respondents assert that contrary to thepetitioners claim, the petition raises questions of facts. The respondents alsoaver that the CA did not commit any error in its decision.

    The petitioners contend that the respondents themselves admitted in theircomplaint before the MeTC that they knew that the petitioners were in actualpossession of the property even before they purchased the same. Hence,the petitioners argue, the respondents were purchasers in bad faith.

    The petitioners also point out that since they purchased the property beforethe respondents, they cannot be ejected therefrom. Under Article 1544 ofthe Civil Code which, according to Justice Jose C. Vitug, is self-operating,the sale of the property to them prevails over the sale in favor of therespondents. Thus, the sale in favor of the respondents is null and void;consequently, TCT No. 87610 issued in favor of the respondents is, likewise,null and void. Finally, the petitioners aver that they may very well havebecome the owners of the property by prescription under Article 1134 of theNew Civil Code.

    For its part, the CA held as follows:

    The respondent court erred in dismissing the action for unlawful detainer onthe sole ground that the private respondents are possessors in the conceptof an owner of the subject premises and cannot, thus, be dispossessed of thesame. The subject property is registered under the Torrens System in thenames of the petitioners whose title to the property is presumed legal andcannot be collaterally attacked, much less in an action for unlawfuldetainer. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of theregistered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession(Caina vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 256; Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals,233 SCRA 615; Calang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA257). The presumption of ownership granted by law to a possessor in the

    concept of an owner under Article 541 is only prima facie and cannot prevailover a valid title registered under the Torrens System.[9]

    The Ruling of the Court

    We agree with the Court of Appeals. In Pangilinan v. Aguilar,[10] we heldthat it is an accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title over theproperty, such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof. We

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    reiterated our ruling in the Pangilinan Case in Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,[11] and declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possessionof the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issuedin their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never in priorphysical possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical

    possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases.

    The petitioners claim that, as alleged in their answer to the complaint forunlawful detainer, the respondents title over the property is a nullity; hence,the complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners should bedismissed for lack of merit. Such allegation does not help their presentrecourse. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate oftitle shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified orcancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance withlaw. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only beassailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.[12] Whether or

    not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property isbeyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawfuldetainer.[13]

    The following issues are now the subject of Civil Case No. Q-94-19352 beforethe RTC of Quezon City: (1) whether the respondents were buyers in badfaith; (2) the validity of the deed of absolute sale over the property executedby the Spouses Pascua in favor of the respondents; and (3) the validity ofthe title issued to and in the names of the respondents. Hence, the Courtshall no longer delve into such issues.

    IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

    decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38333 is AFFIRMED. Costsagainst the petitioners.

    SO ORDERED.