FORAN - Theories of Revolution Revisited. Toward a Fourth Generation

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Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?Author(s): John ForanReviewed work(s):Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 1-20Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/201977 .

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Theories of RevolutionRevisited:Toward a Fourth Generation?JOHN FORAN

University of CaliforniaRecent developmentsin sociological theorizing about revolution are surveyed, cri-tiqued,and evaluated in termsof an emergingnewparadigm.The irst sectionassessesthe strengths and weaknesses of 1970s theorizing by Tilly, Paige, and Skocpol. Asecond section takes up themes of state and crisis from 1980s work deepening thistradition.A third section identifiesand discusses recent work in new areas critical ofthe structuralists,on agency, social structure,and culture.Finally, the shape of a newparadigm based on conjuncturalmodeling of economic,political, and culturalproc-esses is suggested with a discussion of Walton and of very recent work by Farhi,Foran, and Goldstone.

Since the publication of Theda Skocpol's landmark States and Social Revolutions in therevolutionarily auspicious year 1979, both the literature on the subject and the empiricalrange of the phenomenon itself have expanded enormously. To cite only the most dramaticevents, the last dozen years have witnessed social revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua,watershed political transformations throughout eastern Europe, a valiant attempt at amovement for democratic change in China, and, in spring 1991, the armed overthrow ofthe Marxist government of Ethiopia. Under the impact of these events-particularly inIran and Central America-scholars have begun to refine older arguments and to generatenew insights and approaches to the understanding of revolution. The purpose of the presentessay is to map the coordinates of this recent thinking on the subject, and to argue thatthe first signs of a new school may be appearing on the intellectual horizon.

THE THIRD GENERATION: BREAKTHROUGHS AND LIMITSIn two influential review essays from the early 1980s, Jack Goldstone (1980, 1982)attempted to survey the state of the art in the sociology of revolution. He identified three"generations" of theorists: 1) a "natural history of revolutions" school led by comparativehistorians Lyford P. Edwards ([1927] 1972), George Sawyer Pettee (1938), and CraneBrinton (1938); 2) a second generation of "general theories" of revolution in the 1950sand 1960s, embodied in the work of modernization and structural functionalist theoristssuch as James C. Davies (1962), Neil Smelser (1963), Chalmers Johnson (1966), SamuelP. Huntington (1968) and Ted Robert Gurr (1970); and 3) in the 1970s, a new generationof structural models of revolution by Jeffery Paige (1975), Charles Tilly (1978), andTheda Skocpol (1979), which built on the work of Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) and EricWolf (1969).1 The strengths and weaknesses of the first two generations have been assessed

1 I am awarethat this classification of theoriesby generation s problematic,and that the best alternative s togroupthe theoriesby theme or approach.Thus, for example, Goldstoneplaces Tilly in the second generation,althoughhe belongs among the structuralists y both periodand perspective.There is no place in the schemafor the pioneeringworksof de TocquevilleandMarx, amongothers. In fact, de Tocquevilleanticipated nsightsof all threegenerations-for example, by showingthat the FrenchRevolutionwas a "natural" utcome of aspectsof the Old Regime ([1856] 1955, p. 203), by anticipatingDavies and Gurr on rising expectationsas a cause,and by anticipatingSkocpol on the outcome of a more stronglycentralizedstate. For our purposes,however,Sociological Theory 11:1 March 1993


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aptly by Goldstone (1980, 1982), Aya (1979), and Zimmermann 1983). The naturalhistoryschool developed elaboratedescriptionsof the stages of some of the majorsocialrevolutionsup to theirday (often surprisin, y accurate or later events as well) without aclear theory of why revolutions occurred or what accounted for their outcomes. Thegeneraltheoriesof the 1960s used social psychologicalandfunctionalistmodels to addressthe "why" question, but were subjectto the criticism thattheir causal variables(relativedeprivation, subsystems disequilibria,and the like) were vague, difficult to observe, orhard to measure,or were inferred autologicallyfrom a retrospectivevantage point.The "thirdgeneration," n Goldstone'sview, representeda significantadvance(this isso, but not unequivocally,as we shall see). Moore and Wolf were crucial precursors nsome important espects.Bothmovedto themacrosociologicalevel of comparingnationalcases in which the key variables included class relations, the state, the internationaleconomy, and the spreadof capitalisminto the countryside.Each avoided a pure struc-turalismby acknowledging the contingent factors in their respective cases (see Moore1966, p. 161; Wolf 1969, p. 98), and paid some, if not paramount,attentionto cultureas a contributing ause of rebellion. Also, despitethe respectivetitlesof theirbooks, eachanalyzedthe roles playedby urbanas well as peasantsocial forces. Moore's investigationcentered on the relationshipsamong monarchicstates, landednobilities, and commercialimpulses n agriculture.Peasantrebellionsoccurred n ChinaandRussia, whereagriculturewas not commercializedand peasantsretainedtheir social organization.Fascism was theresult in JapanandGermany,where landed classes commercialized hemselvesby keepingpeasants on the land. Moore adduced complex combinations of factors to explain theoutcomeof democracyfrom revolutionary ivil wars in England,France, and the UnitedStates. Moore's classic is ultimatelyless a study of the causes of revolutionthanof theoriginsof the political systems of democracy,fascism, and communism.Eric Wolf focused explicitly on the majorsocial revolutionsof the twentiethcenturyupto the 1960s, framinghis six narrativeaccounts somewhat loosely with a collection ofrich theoretical leads. He noted foreign pressures, includingwars, as a source of crisisfor the state in Russia and China. The key factor acrosscases, however, was the impactof the commercializationof agriculture,as capitalism, coupled with population growth,dislocatedcustomarysocial, political, and economic arrangements.States and elites suf-fered crises of legitimationin these circumstances;"tacticallymobile" middle peasantsreacted o the combinationof pressureandopportunity y rebelling,oftenenteringreluctantalliances with disaffected urban radicals. Outcomes varied accordingto the balance ofarmed forces and political organizations n each case (Wolf 1969, pp. 278-301). BothMoore and Wolf were sensitive to the historical variationamong their cases and (inter-estingly, in a decade dominatedby the grandsystems of structuralunctionalism)balkedat generalizingtheirfindingsinto more formal models.Paige, Tilly, and Skocpol went furtherin this direction;in the process they graftedmany of Wolf's and Moore's specific insights onto their models of revolution. JefferyPaige (1975) elaborateda formal economic structuralmodelof the possibilitiesof peasantunrest(rather han of social revolutionsper se). The economic organizationof the ruralexportsector is the independentvariable:nationalistrevolutionsare most likely to occuron migratory-laborstatesystemswhere landlordsown landindividuallyand farmwithoutextensivecapitalinvestment,andwhere the ruralwork force consistsof seasonalmigratorywage laborers.Socialistrevolutionsareprobable n decentralized harecroppingconomiesthe characterization f the thirdgenerationas a structuralist reakthrough, nd the ways in which theoristsmorerecentlyhave both extended and critiquedthis approach,make it appropriateo searchout common themes ingenerationalcohorts. These circumstancesalso permitus to highlightthe diversityand originalityof particularcases.

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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDwhere the same kind of farm is workedby share tenants. In contrastto othereconomicarrangementsthe small holding, the commercializedplantation), hese are zero-sumlandtenuresystems with built-in potentialfor violent conflicts and organizationof the workforce; in contrast with the commercialhacienda,revolt in these situations s more likelyto lead to permanentchange. Nationalist anticolonialstruggles in Algeria, Kenya, andAngola fit the firstpattern; ocialist upheavals n Chinaand Vietnam the second.Paige's logical schemas are elegant but neitherhistoricallydynamicnor sociologicallyholistic, as various critics have pointedout. The state, urbanactors, and the nonexport-oriented ruralsector are bracketedout of the account, which reduces Third Worldsocialstructure o a two-class ruralmodel (Disch 1979);agricultural rganizations not a given,but rather the productof the world-system, internalpolitics, and other factors (Somersand Goldfrank1979). The result is a mapof the conditionsunderwhich certaintypes ofsocial movement may occur, rather than a causal account of the origins of particularrevolutions.CharlesTilly, in variousworks on collective violence generally(1973, 1975, 1978) hasarguedfor a political as opposedto an economic structuralism: [T]hefactors which holdupunderclose scrutinyare, on thewhole, politicalones. The structure f power,alternativeconceptionsof justice, the organizationof coercion, the conduct of war, the formationofcoalitions, the legitimacy of the state-these traditionalconcerns of political thoughtprovide the main guides to the explanationof revolution"(1973, p. 447). His 1978"contentionmodel" of revolutionemphasizedthe capacityof challengersto state powerto mobilize resources (territory,arms, popular allegiance) into a revolutionarycoalitionstrongenough to bring about a revolutionary ituation(in which two sides claim controlof a polity) andultimatelya revolutionaryoutcome(in which the challengerssuccessfullyreimposegovernmentalcontrol) (1978, pp. 216-17). The model does not investigateinmuch detail the root causes of revolutionaryoutbreaks,either internal or external tosociety;rather t tries to capture he dynamicsof theprocessof revolution,once unleashed.The search for causal patternsof social revolutions was pursuedin Theda Skocpol'spath-breakingwork, States and Social Revolutions,the 1979 capstoneof third-generationstructural heories. Skocpol's model is resolutely structural n at least two senses: 1) itargues for the centralityof analyzing relationships(classes with each other, state andclasses, states with each other) and 2) it maintains that revolutions are the productof"objectivelyconditioned"crises that are not made or controlledby any single grouporclass (thus her polemical agreementwith the bold propositionthat "revolutionsare notmade; they come"; (1979, p. 17)). Skocpol also provides the most widely cited recentdefinitionof a social revolution:"Socialrevolutions are rapid,basic transformations f asociety's state and class structures; nd they are accompaniedand in partcarried hroughby class-based revolts from below" (1979, p. 4). Along the way the book covers atremendousamount of ground: Skocpol arguesthat the state must be taken seriously asan "autonomousstructure"with interests of its own in societal resourcesand orderthatmaylead it to act at cross-purposeswith dominantclasses; that JohnStuartMill's methodsof agreementand difference can be appliedprofitablyto comparative-historicalmacro-analysesof causal regularities; hat the findingsof her studyof the French, Russian, andChinese revolutionsmay not be applied mechanicallyto more recent Third Worldcases(thetypes of stateinvolved aredifferent)but that the generalprinciples, including analysisof structural elationsamong states andclasses, are centrallyrelevant.The basic patternemerging from Skocpol's inductiveanalysis of France, Russia, andChina is one of political crisis arising when old-regime states could not meet externalchallenges (economic or military competition)because of internalobstacles in agrarianandelite relations(inefficienciesin agricultural roductionand/or ax mechanisms).Fiscal

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crisis was magnified by elite protests and opened the way for peasantrebellions frombelow. The rebellions themselveswere enabledby the persistenceof communaltraditionsof solidarityin France and Russia, and by Communistorganizingefforts in China, all ofwhich resulted n breakdownsof the state. Successful social revolutionshad characteristicoutcomes: landed classes lost groundto lower classes and to new stateofficials;therewas(for a time) more popular participation n the state; the states ultimately were morecentralizedand stronger n relation to society and otherstates.These arguments-especially those on the causes of revolutions-have elicited anenormous amount of commentaryand debate. Skocpol has been criticized for comparingstates in very different historicalandpower situationsand also, paradoxically, or failingto generalize beyond her three cases; for elevating the state to the highest level ofexplanation (Knight 1986, p. 559, note 386 calls this "statolatry");or emphasizingstructureat the expense of agency or culture(see, amongothers,Taylor 1989); for failingto weight properlythe contributionof urbanforces, or of coalitions generally;for mis-applicationsof Millian methodology (see Burawoy 1989; Nichols 1986); for inaccuracyregardingaspectsof this or that case (on France,see Goldstone1984, pp. 709-10). Manyof these criticisms are possible because Skocpol often chooses to make her points byexaggeratingthem;thus she is awareof the roles playedby ideologies, by urbangroups,andobviously by forces other than the state, but she casts her arguments n strongtermsto highlighttheirdistinctiveness.Thus she opens the way for the variouscriticisms, mostof which are thereforejustified to some degree. For our purposeshere, Skocpol is ofcentral mportancepreciselybecause States and Social Revolutions nitiated he next roundof theorizing;much of this work seeks to deepen the work of the thirdgeneration,andanotherpart attempts o corrector revise it in some fashion. This theorizing-all from thepast dozen years-is the subjectof the rest of this essay.DEEPENINGTHE THIRDGENERATION:RECENTWORK ON THE STATEANDREVOLUTIONARYCRISESMuch research in the 1980s explored precisely what type of state was vulnerable torevolutions. Robert Dix (1984) made a key distinction in noting that "relatively open"regimes, or "regimesruledby the militaryactingin its institutional apacityandin alliancewith other key elites," have avoided revolutions, whereas "an isolative, corrupt, anti-national,andrepressiveregime, especially a personalisticone" tendsto be vulnerable pp.437, 442). This view has been seconded ably and refined furtherby Jeff Goodwin andTheda Skocpol (1989) and by Timothy Wickham-Crowley 1989a, 1989b). The latterauthorsuggests that Che Guevaramay be credited with the thesis that "guerrillas houldnevertryto unseat elected governments,"advice that he ignoredfatallyin Bolivia in 1967.Goodwin and Skocpol point out that closed authoritarianegimes, whetherdictatorshipsor directlyruledcolonies, providea commonenemy for various classes becausethe lowerclasses are repressedand the middle classes and elites may be excludedfrom the halls ofpower.Some controversyhas revolved around he termforsuchregimes:Goldstone(1982,1986), following Eisenstadt(1978), proposes "neopatrimonial"o denote the patronagesystembehind the modem facadeof suchregimesas PorfirianMexico, CubaunderBatista,the shah's Iran, and Somocista Nicaragua. Matthew Shugart (1989) opts for anotherWeberianterm-"sultanistic"-to describeregimes that are narrower han the dominantclass, with unprofessionalarmies. Farideh Farhi (1990) characterizesthe IranianandNicaraguanold regimes as "personalistauthoritarian."Manus Midlarskyand KennethRoberts(1985) propose"autonomouspersonalist" or the vulnerablestatesof Batista andSomoza;they contrastthis type with "instrumentalist"lite-basedregimes in El Salvador



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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDand Guatemala (likely to be challenged, but unsuccessfully) and with the even lessvulnerable "autonomous nstitutional"states of Brazil and Mexico, which can coopt awiderrangeof class forces to ensure stability(also see Goldstone1987, p. 5; Liu 1988).

Another, smaller stream of researchhas examined the state's claims to legitimation.Said Amir Arjomand(1988, p. 191) arguedthat the shah fell from power less becausehis army collapsed than because the structureof authoritycrumbled. Goldstone's majornew studyof earlymodem rebellionsin Europeand Asia pushesbeyond Skocpol's insightto proposethat the state should be consideredautonomous,as an economic, political, andcultural actor "whose strength(and pace of futuredevelopment) s affected by the ten-sions-or lack thereof-between state-sponsoredorthodoxyand alternativeideologicalclaims"(1991, p. 463). All of the work cited here on the state advancesthe agendaofSkocpol's original work on the autonomyof the state, in new empiricaland conceptualdirections.Vulnerableregimes now can be pinpointedmore accurately; he only cautionshould be against taking an excessively state-centeredapproach, whereby the state isabstracted romthe largerstructuresn which it is embedded.2Manya particularisticuleris not overthrown(ChiangKai-Shekon Taiwan;Kim Il-Sung in North Korea; Mobutu,among others, in Africa), while others leave the scene in ways that do not qualify associal revolutions (Stroessner in Paraguay;Pinochet in Chile). Therefore it must berecognizedthat this line of research has identifiedan often necessary,but not sufficient,cause of revolution(a strikingrecentstudythat identifies and accountsfor such differencesis Snyder 1992). A pertinentquestionbears further nvestigation:underwhat conditionsare governmentsunable to use force effectively or to retainthe allegianceof key groupsin the population?

Another fruitful area of work that builds on the third generationis research on theexternaldimensionof revolutionary rises and outcomes. Skocpol(1979, pp. 19-23) drewattentionto the context of international ompetitionbetween states and especially to theeffects of warfare; hese circumstances orcedearlymodemEuropean tatesto centralize,createstandingarmies, and tax the population.In analyzingthe causalityof the outbreakof social revolutions Skocpol included disadvantagedeconomic positions and militarydefeat in war (especially in eighteenth-centuryFrance and in Russia duringWorld WarI). In a more recentarticle(1988) she discussed the continuing mportanceof internationalwarfare n the postrevolutionary eriod:the new states used warfare o control and channelthe revolutionaryenergies of the populaceand to centralize their own power in relationto internalopponents.Skocpol's argumentson internationalpressureshave been challenged empiricallyandmodifiedanalytically by Goldstone(1991, pp. 20-21), who arguesthat war per se is notthe key (consider the constant Europeanconflicts of 1688-1714, without revolutions);more important, rising prices and the size of armies made warfare more expensive.Moreover,the cases of rebellion in Englandand the Netherlandscontravene he thesis offalling behind more advancedcompetitors.Goldstone seeks to amendstructuralismwitha temporaldimension:"whereSkocpolsees as the sourceof trouble[inFrance]a backwardeconomyundoneby the cost of wars, I see a backward ax system(too much a land-basedtax system)undoneby themountingpopulationandinflationary ressuresof theeighteenthcentury. . . . The structuralblockage pointedout by Skocpol thus had its effects in thecontext of dynamic forces buffeting the fiscal system" (1991, pp. 250-51; author'semphasis).

2 McDaniel (1991) provides a model for how to avoid this error. The book presents an excellent recentreassessment of the vulnerabilityof autocraticmodernizers n Russia and Iran;it also uncovers the multiplecontradictionsnherent n modernization rom abovewithouttapping heparticipatory otentialof the new classescreatedby the process.

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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYWalterGoldfrank's 1979) studyof the Mexicanrevolutionshifted the locus of externalcrisis for ThirdWorldcases fromunduepressure o its opposite-"a tolerantorpermissiveworld context." Several scenarios may aid revolutionaries:1) when the major outside

power is preoccupiedby war or internalproblems;2) when majorpowers engage inrivalry,thus negating each other's ability to influenceevents; or 3) when rebels receivegreateroutside help than does the state. Since Goldfrankwrote this article, the cases ofIran and Nicaraguahave suggested yet anothertype of permissive world context-theperceivedremoval of strong support or the repressivepracticesof a dictator,compoundedby subsequentpolicy divisions in the core actor.The precise degree to which external factors influence revolutionarysituations is amatterof ongoingdebate.Wickham-Crowley1989b, p. 513) considersthem of secondaryimportance.In contrast,severalof the syntheticperspectivesdiscussedin greaterdetail atthe end of this essay-notably those of Walton (1984), Farhi(1988, 1990), and Foran(1990)-consider themcentral,buteffective in slightlydiffering ways. IanRoxborough'sstudy of exogenous factors in the genesis of LatinAmerican revolutionsprovides someperceptive leads, one of which is "to decompose the concept of 'dependency' into anumberof dimensions,or differenttypes," suggesting political, investment,mono-export,and financial dependency as operative in different combinations in the cases of theMexican, Bolivian, Cuban,andNicaraguanrevolutions.The result was the emergenceofnationalistmovements aimed at regeneratingthe country in the face of governmentacquiescencewith foreigncontrol(Roxborough1989b, pp. 4, 5, 13; also see Roxborough1989a). These studies highlight the ways in which twentieth-centuryThirdWorld revo-lutionsdiffer fromthe agrarian-imperialases studiedby Skocpol (Chinabelongs to bothgroups).NEW DIRECTIONS:TOWARDA FOURTHGENERATION?The 1980s andearly 1990s also have witnessed a resurgenceof interest n themes that thethird-generationheorists had neglected. These include the somewhat nterrelated reasofagency, social structural onsiderations,and the roles played by culture and ideology inrevolutions. In the rest of this essay I examine new developments n these areas. I closewith some attempts o synthesizethese factorswith third-generationheoriesthatI believesuggest the outlinesof fourth-generationheorizingaboutrevolutions.The vexed issue of agency has entered and exited the theoreticalagendaas times andfashions change. Marx struck a balance in the often-cited EighteenthBrumaire:"Men[sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do notmake it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstancesdirectlyencountered,given and transmittedromthe past"(1977, p. 300). Subsequentgenerationsof theorists,however,have tendedto come down onone side or the otherof this theoreticaldivide;voluntaristsstress agency, whereas structuralists mphasizeobjectiveconditions.3In the naturalhistoryschool, while Brintonand Pettee made much of ideology, Edwards

3 Lenin andTrotskyretained more of Marx's ambiguous sophistication.Leninemphasizedthe importanceofboth objective and subjectivefactors in his 1905 essay "The Collapseof the Second International"1966, pp.358-59). Trotsky's history of the Russian revolution contains such rich passages as the following: "The mostindubitable eature of a revolution is the direct interferenceof the masses in historicevents. . . . The dynamicof revolutionaryevents is directly determinedby swift, intense and passionate changes in the psychology ofclasses which have alreadyformed themselves before the revolution."On the otherhand, "Entirely xceptionalcircumstances, ndependentof the will of personsor parties,are necessaryin orderto tearoff from discontentthe fetters of conservatism,andbringthe masses to insurrection"[1930] 1959, pp. ix-x). The degreeto whichTrotskyanticipates many of Skocpol's key structural actors is likewise striking([1930] 1959, p. xii; also seeBurawoy 1989).

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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDforeshadowedSkocpol in arguingthat Russian communism"was not the result of theory;it was the result of crisis" (Edwards [1927] 1972, p. 203, quoted in Kimmel 1990, p.48). The psychological reductionismof second-generationheorists from Gurrto Daviesand Johnson is typically criticized as too purposive;third-generationheorists such asSkocpol reacted with resolute (thoughoften misunderstood) tructuralisms f theirown.Alongsidethe deepeningof third-generationworkalongthe lines alreadynoted, agencyhas begun to resurfacein the concernsof some scholars of the past decade. As TeodorShaninremindedus acerbicallyin 1986:

Socialscientistsoftenmiss a centre-piece f anyrevolutionarytruggle-the fervourandanger hat drivesrevolutionaries nd makesthem nto whattheyare. Academic rainingandbourgeoisconventiondeaden ts appreciation. he "phenomenon"annotbe easily"operationalised"nto factors,tablesandfigures.... At the verycentreof revolutionlies an emotionalupheavalof moralindignation, evulsionandfurywith the powers-that-be, uch thatone cannotdemuror remain ilent,whatever hecost. Within ts glow,for a while, men [sic] surpassthemselves,breaking he shacklesof intuitiveself-preservation,onvention,day-to-day onvenience,and routine 1986, pp. 30-31).Scholars are beginning to approachagency anew from two key vantagepoints: that ofactors and coalitions, and that of the role played in motivatingthese actors by ideas,culture,beliefs, values, and/orideology. The first of these may be considered under thetheme of social structurebecause it is here that the structuralists' oncerns with large-scale factors such as state and world system intersectparadoxicallywith their critics'emphasison who makes the revolutions. Attention to social structure hereforefaces intwo directions, straddling he line between structureand agency.One question has received considerableattention:who, precisely, makes revolutions?The answerhas varied over the differentgenerationsof theory.Marx, despitehis reputedemphasis on urbanworkers, noted complex alliances of social forces in his historicalstudies (see Kimmel 1990, p. 24), as did Lenin ([1902] 1975, p. 111) after him. In thesecond generation, Huntington(1968, pp. 277, 308) arguedthat revolutionsrequireanalliance between urban intellectuals and peasants, often united around an ideology ofnationalism.Wolf (1969, pp. 289, 296-97) andMoore (1966, p. 479) essentially agreedwiththisview, althoughall threeemphasized hepeasantry. nsurveying hehistoriographyon the Frenchrevolution, Skocpol (1979, p. 110) concluded:"Peasantrevolts have intruthattracted ess attention from historians and social theorists thanhave urban lower-class actions in revolutions-even for the predominantly grarian ocieties with which weare concerned here. . . . peasantrevolts have been the crucialinsurrectionaryngredientin virtuallyall actual (i.e., successful) social revolutions to date, and certainly in theFrench,Russian, and Chinese Revolutions"(1979, pp. 112-13).4 This statementempha-sized the swing of the pendulumback in the opposite directionbecause third-generationtheoristssuch as Paige (1975), Migdal (1974), Scott (1976), andPopkin(1979) each hadstressedthe causal centralityof peasantrevolts.One reason why urbangroups systematicallywere overlooked in the 1970s' studiesmay have been the dismal recordof LatinAmerican urbanguerrillasas contrastedwiththe peasantsof Vietnam. Researchin the 1980s beganto documentand insist on the role

4 Skocpoladmits hat"thedifferenturbanndustrialandclass structures rofoundlynfluenced herevolutionaryprocess and outcomes," but she treats these "as backgroundsagainst which the (for me) more analyticallyimportantagrarianupheavalsand political dynamicsplayed themselves out"(1979, p. 235). Althoughshe thusacknowledgesurban orces, they definitelydo not receivethe samecausalstatusas statesandpeasants;moreover,all of these "factors"are structural ather hanagenticin Skocpol's work(that s, she downplaystheirsubjectivecomponents).

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of urban orces in France(Goldstone1984); in Cuba, Iran,andNicaragua Gugler 1988);in 1640 Englandand in Berlinand Viennain 1848 (Goldstone1991, p. 135). Rather hanallegingthe revolutionary apacityof a single class, however,eitheracross revolutionsorin particular ases, recent scholarsarestrivingto producea more balancedaccount. RobertDix (1984), drawingon Tilly (1973), underlined he need for coalitions involving urbanas well as rural forces to overthrowdictatorialstates in Third Worldrevolutions,notablyin Cuba andNicaragua.Goodwin(1987) notedthe same phenomenon hroughoutCentralAmerica, andGould(1987, pp. 204, 364) for the Englishrevolution. The populistnatureof cross-class coalitionshas been signaledby Moghadam 1989) andby Foran(1991) onIran, in which complex alliances among a rangeof urbanclasses have been required ofuel revolutionaryoutbreaks. Such broad alliances seem to have the best chance forsuccess, but in postrevolutionaryconflicts they tend to fragmentinto their constituentelements. Finally, Wickham-Crowley'sseveral studies (1987, 1989a, 1991, 1992) havewedded resourcemobilization heoryto quantitative echniques o shedlighton thepatternsof success and failureamong Latin Americanguerrillamovementsof the last 35 years.Wickham-Crowleyviews these movementsin terms of an alliance between intellectualsandpeasantsunder certainconditions, includingoveralldegreeof social support,type ofregime, and reactionsby the United States.With respect to the class dimension of social structure, then, the questions are asfollows: Whatclasses participate n revolutions,andwhy? What classes are divided, andhow? Ultimately,what patternsexist across cases, and how may these various coalitionsbe characterized?5Alongside the long-standingconcernwith social class, recentscholarship s just begin-

ning to theorize and study other central dimensions of social structuresuch as gender,ethnicity,andregion. The list of works on the roles of womenin particular evolutions sgrowing, includingthose of Norma Stoltz Chinchilla(1990) on Nicaragua;JohnettaCole(1986) on Cuba;LindaKelly (1987), amongotherson France;MaxineMolyneux (1985)on South Yemen; Guity Nashat (1982) and otherson Iran;and JudithStacey (1983) onChina. Most of these studies focus on women after the revolution. ValentineMoghadam(1990) offers an ambitiouscomparativesynthesis of the role of women in a numberofsocial revolutions. She seeks to incorporategender into the sociology of revolution interms of culturaland ideological struggles over the family and sex roles, noting howgender issues surface recurrentlyduring revolutionsto provide revealing insights intorevolutionaries' ntentions.A usefully complementaryapproach,I believe, would be to locate women in the socialstructureand to follow the logic of their participationas one would follow any othergroup, noting its intersectionwith race andclass. Similar workin recoveringthe roles ofvarious ethnic groups, such as Afro-Cubansin the Cuban revolution and indigenouspeoples in the Mexican revolution,remainsto be done. This approachalso awaits com-parative study, not to mention synthesis with other principles of social stratification.Regionalvariationswithingiven revolutionshavereceived somewhatmoreattention,with

5 Rational choice theorists have made a mark in this area, as one anonymousreviewer has pointed out.Rationalchoice theory, like the resourcemobilizationschool, offers a middle-rangeperspectiveon revolutions,focused on motivationsfor action (thoughit is more all-encompassing hanresourcemobilization n its objectsof analysis). These theorists address such issues as the role of perceptionsand calculationsof success, thereasons why some individuals and groups may participateratherthan others, and the strengthof insurgentsversusthatof the state. Because this theoryis cast at a level of explanationboth moregeneral(social action asa whole) andyet more specific (why actorsrebel rather han whatcausesrevolutions) han the work of the third-andfourth-generationheoristswho are the subjectof thisessay, I omit furtherdiscussionhere. Interested eadersmightconsult Calhoun(1991), Coleman(1990, pp. 500-502), Friedmanand Hechter(1988), and the collectioneditedby Taylor(1988).



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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDexcellent cases studiesby Alan Knight(1986) on Mexico and William Brustein(1986) onFrance. Futurework must deliver on the promiseof paying fuller attention o ethnicity,gender,andregion as well as class in conceptualizingsocial structureand social change.A second majornew directionin the recent scholarshiphas been taken in culture andideology. Again, this is a responseto the purely politicaland economic structuralisms fthe thirdgeneration,especially Skocpol's work. In some sense, this, too is a return o thepreoccupationsof theoristsas early as de Tocqueville([1856] 1955, p. 6) on the FrenchEnlightenment,Brinton("thedesertionof the intellectuals"), r the structuralunctionalistsof the second generation.(Thereseems to be almostnothing completelynew in writingson revolution!)Empirically,social historiansof particularcases, such as George Rude([1964] 1973 and otherworks) and ChristopherHill (1965 and otherworks), had soughtto specify the relative weight of ideas in the French and English revolutions. Third-generationprecursorsWolf (1969) and Moore (1966) had invoked issues of culture andlegitimation,but withoutraisingthemto causal significance.Alreadyin the 1970s Eisen-stadt(1978) had tried to carveout a theoretical-if abstract-place for the role of "culturalorientations"n the makingof revolutions he hadheterodoxreligiousmovements n mind)and Mostafa Rejai (1973, pp. 33-34) had surveyedthe uses of ideology. James Scott(1976) also offered a unique reply to the structuralists' earch for the determinantsofpeasantrevolt. In Scott's view, peasants, who live close to the marginsof subsistence,expect a minimum ivelihood from landlordsand a certainamountof justice; violation ofthese standardsprovokesresentment,resistance,and sometimesrebellion. Tilly likewisemadesuggestivereferenceto "cultural epertoires" f revolution(1978, pp. 151-59, 224-25). When Goldstonesurveyedthe field in 1982 (p. 204), however,he placedthe role ofideology on the "frontiersof research"as an underexploredarea for future scholars toprobe.Thispromisenow is reachingfulfillment n a numberof ways. In 1985, in an importantearly discussion, William Sewell debated with Theda Skocpol about the precise role ofideas in the Frenchrevolution. Statesand Social Revolutionshardlyfails to recognizetherole played by ideology (1979, pp. 78, 114-15, 170-71, 187, 329-30 note 23), butSkocpol insists that ideologies cannotpredictor explainoutcomes, rules out new valuesor goals as relevant to peasant revolts, and believes that ideologies are shaped andcontradictedby structural ituationsand crises. Sewell charges Skocpol with failing torecognize"the autonomouspowerof ideology in the revolutionaryprocess"(1985, p. 58)and with smuggling in ideas under the rubric of differing"world-historicalontexts" inFrance and Russia. Sewell, invoking the works of Althusser, Foucault, Geertz, andRaymond Williams, calls for a structural,anonymous, and transpersonalanalysis ofideology. Such collective human productsare capable of transformation;nterestingly,Sewell believes that state, class, and international tructures hould be viewed similarlyas human constructionsin Anthony Giddens's dual sense of constrainingand enablingaction. Sewell then applies this framework o the Frenchcase, examiningthe emergenceof contradictory onceptionsaboutmonarchyand sovereigntyin the course of the eigh-teenthcentury.The crisis of 1789 was provokedby statebankruptcy, [b]utonce the crisishad begun, ideological contradictionscontributedmightilyto the deepeningof the crisisinto revolution" 1985, pp. 66-67). Sewell thenproceedsto assess the weightof ideologyand war in the making of the Terror,the dynamicsof the strugglesamong competingideologicalvariants n terms of a dialoguebasedon a common stockof concepts, and theneed to broaden the definition of revolution to encompass the transformation f "theentiretyof people's social lives" (1985, pp. 71-84).Skocpol's (1985) reply to Sewell shows that her thinkinghad developed to include amore nuanced considerationof the role of ideas in revolution.Notably, she distinguishes

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nicely between long-standing,anonymous, socially diverse culturalidiomsemployed bypopular groups and the self-consciously elaboratedideologies that politically articulateactors fashion from the formerfor specific purposes.These conceptionsthen interactwiththe structural ituations describedin her earlierwork;the centralsignificancestill seemsto lie in "strugglesover the organizationand uses of state power" (1985, p. 96). Thisrethinkingby Skocpol flows from her reflections on the case of Iran, which led her torecast her definition of social revolutions as "rapid,basic transformations f a country'sstate and class structure,and of its dominant deology";herewas one revolution hat "wasdeliberatelyand coherentlymade"(1982, pp. 265 (emphasisadded), 267).All of this discussion may contain an unansweredquestion:what are the origins ofideas, beliefs, and desires? As Michael Taylor (1989) argued, again specifically withSkocpol, social structuremay explain desires and beliefs, but past actions also explainsocial structures.Neitherindividualismnor structuralisms the "ultimate"only) cause ofsocialchange:"Socialchangesareproducedby actions;socialchangesrequirenew actions.New actions require changed desires and/or beliefs" (1989, p. 121; author'semphasis).Taylor seems to be arguingthat social structure tself must be studied as conditionedinpart by culture, and by reference to intentional actions. Culture, in turn, is sociallyconstructedand "made"by actors.Two social theoristswho have madeconceptualcontributions o understandinghe roleof culture in social change are CraigCalhoun(1983, 1988) and Carlos Forment(1990).Calhoun has subtly stressed the intersection between the everyday social practices ofclosely knit communities and the ways in which membersconstantlydraw on living,traditionalcultures, update them to meet new challenges, and engage them to defendthemselves against threatening changes. Such actors thus are viewed as "reactionaryradicals,"enlistingtraditional ulturalvalues to wagedefensive social struggles.Forment'swork extends the "linguistic urn" n European ocial theory nto the studyof revolutionarypolitics in colonial LatinAmerica;this work is organizedaround he concept of "politicalspace," the interplayof discourse and power, and the role of culturalrepresentationnpolitical practices. In the process by bringingthe concernsof Foucault and Skocpol intomutual contact it will perhapscreate a quite novel mode of analysis.Finally, the most recent work of James Scott (1990) providesleads for understandingthe performativeaspects of domination and subordinationn the reproductionof powerand the elaborationof resistance. His analysisof the infrapoliticsof resistance uncoversa spectrumof activities rooted in sharedexperiences of domination and issuing in actsranging from everyday rituals and interactions (gossip, poaching, aspects of popularculture)to overt, large-scalerebellions and social explosions. He brilliantly deploys theconceptof a "hidden ranscript"f culturallyandmaterially onstitutedresistance,to shedlight on this range of oppositionalactivities, althoughin the end he stops well short ofexplainingthe causes of rebellion (or even the precise origins of the hidden transcriptsthemselves). Each of these theorists takes useful steps towardcreatingan independentcausal space for culture and the relatedbut distinct concept of ideology; each providesclues for integrating hese elements with a broadersociology of revolution.

DISCERNINGTHE SHAPE OF THE FOURTH GENERATIONWe may close this survey of recent writingin the sociology of revolutionswith a closerlook at severalworks thatsuggesta new, moresyntheticapproach.Thisapproach ombinesthe strengthsof the third-generation tructuralists nd their supporterswith some of theconcerns we have just seen expressed by their critics. Although I can discuss only a

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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDhandfulof works in any detail here, othersalreadydiscussed also providehints of a newsynthesisor go some distancein thatdirection,includingTilly (1978), Goldfrank 1979),Gould (1987), Goodwin and Skocpol (1989), Wickman-Crowley 1989a and especially1992, whichappeared oo lateforproper reatment ere),Roxborough 1989a), Moghadam(1989), and Kimmel (1990). Otheruseful recent contributionsare made by DeFronzo's(1991) analysis of six case studies and by Aya's (1990) conceptualgroundclearing. AsJackGoldstonecommentedin 1989, the dominantmodel in the studyof revolution s nolonger simple class analysis, but a constellation of factors and interactionamong thosefactors. The metaphor n this approach o historyis no longer thatof a locomotive, butof a kaleidoscope (Goldstone (1989). We now may examine more closely the variousideas about these factors and interactions.Much of this work was generated by attemptsto come to grips with the changingrealitiesunderlyingtwentieth-century evolutions n the Third World. In this regardJohnWalton's (1984) Reluctant Rebels broke provocativenew ground, especially in taking"nationalrevolts" as his object of analysis-that is, "the entire field of insurrectionaryprocesses that lie beyond the (inevitably qualitative)bounds of routinepolitics" (p. 13).The termthereforeencompassesnot only the so-called "greatrevolutions"but also Wal-ton's case studies-the failed Huk rebellion in the Philippines, the fratricidalcivil warknown as La Violencia in Colombia, and the anticolonialMau Mau uprisingin BritishKenya, all dating from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. Waltonclassifies these togetherwith other revolutionsbecause he arguesthat first, their causes are similar,and second,the greatrevolutionsresultedin less transformationhanis usually thought.To buildhis own theory,Walton drawson aspectsof fourapproaches all fromthe thirdgeneration): he peasant revolt thesis of Scott, Moore, and Wolf; Wallersteinianworld-system theory; Tilly's conflict theory;and state-centeredapproaches.Walton, however,goes well beyond these approaches o createa new synthesis, based largelyon his deepknowledge of the sociology of development. The elements include "(1) the context ofuneven development;(2) the conditions of protestmobilization; 3) modernization risesand coalitions;and (4) the role of the state"(1984, p. 161). The analysis itself is richerthan this list, for it includes consideration of culture and political consciousness:"[E]conomicgrievances cannot be separatedfrom the culturalforms in which they areexperiencedand understood,nor from the political forms in which they are expressed.Economicgrievanceswere necessaryconditions, but theirmobilizingpotentialwas onlyrealized in the sufficient condition of political organizationrootedin culturaltraditions"(pp. 29-30). In particular,"culturalnationalismwas a key contributor o each nationalrevolt"(p. 155). Another ntriguingpattern hatemergesfromthe case studiesis the crisiscaused by a combinationof absoluteeconomic deteriorationand a sharp political crack-down on movements that had been making legal gains.The results varied in each case: rebellion never advancedvery far in the Philippines nthe Huk period;it was intermediate n Colombia,with a revolutionary ituation n someregionsbut no coalescence of forces; it was most advanced n Kenya. In examiningwhomade revolutions, Walton calls for careful analysis of coalitions. He finds supportforWolf's thesis on the middle peasantryand follows Hobsbawm in identifyingan urbanequivalent (not the most marginalpopulation, but artisans, petty traders, lower civilservants, and labor leaders; 1984, pp. 16, 151). The outcomes followed the patternofoutbreaknoted above, with minimal displacementof elites in the Philippines, transfor-mationof the political systembutnot of the class structuren Colombia,and the hasteningof independence n Kenya. Waltonfocuses more on the state than on society in charac-terizingoutcomes:Kenya is a postcolonialstate, Colombia an associated-dependenttate,

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the Philippinesneocolonial. He closes with the astute prediction(for 1984) that in thePhilippines, "[T]he political situation is precarious, and it invites a new mass revolt(beyond continuing guerrillaactivities) or at least, a coup that could buy time for theinitiation of real reforms" p. 177).Walton's overall accomplishment n this book is certain,althoughvariouscriticismsofthe particularscan be advanced. The thesis that revolts and revolutions are similar incausality and trajectoryis provocative, but it collapses the successes and the failureswithoutprovidingmore thanhints of how to distinguishthem. Walton can perhapsclaimplausiblythat the Mexican revolution went no farther han the Mau Mau revolt, but theargumentworks less well in comparingthe limited consequencesof revolts in the Phil-ippinesand Colombiawith thoroughgoing tructural ransformationsn Cuba, China, andeven Nicaragua. Among the unexamined hints that might explain such variation is theobservation hat in his cases, elite groupsleft the coalitions, thus weakeningthem beforethey could come to power. Also, althoughWalton deserves creditfor linkingThird Worldrevolutions o the processof unevendevelopment,this conceptneeds further pecification.The negative consequences-inflation, control by landlords,commercializationof agri-culture, and urbanmigrationand crowding-are well documented,but less so the devel-opmentalgains in terms of industrialization, isinggrossnationalproductandtrade,whichare capturedbetter by Cardosoand Faletto's (1979) notion of dependent development.Thechallengeis to specify morepreciselyexactly whatprocessesin the changingsocietiesof the ThirdWorld touch off revolutions. Finally, the incorporationof culture into themodel is a good beginning, but much morework is neededin this area,boththeoreticallyandempirically:examiningdistinctpoliticalculturesamongandacrossgroups,discerningthe impact of culture at the various stages of the movement, using it to explain bothsuccesses and limits, and so on. These criticismsduly noted, ReluctantRebels achievesan admirable heoreticalsynthesisandrepresentsa pioneeringattempt o link ThirdWorldconditions to Third Worldcases of nationalrevolt.FaridehFarhi's study of the Nicaraguanand Iranianrevolutions, States and Urban-Based Revolutions(1990; also see 1988), works along lines broadlysimilarto Walton's.Buildingon Skocpol's discussionof stateautonomy,Farhi ooks at "thechangingbalanceof class forces occasioned by uneven developmentof capitalismon a world scale" andintroducesa "broaderunderstandingof ideology" (1990, pp. 9-10). In both Iran andNicaragua, internal crises coincided with a permissive world context that activated amulticlass "negative"coalition to overthrowand transform he state. Farhi approachesoutcomesnicely by focusing on "thepoliticalstrugglesto control andmaintainstatepowerwithin the constraints mposed, andthe opportunitiesafforded,by the existing economic,political, and ideological structures,and international ontext, and the class relationsofthe revolution itself" (pp. 110-11).In addition o this empirical ocus on the two mostrecentThirdWorldsocialrevolutions,Farhigoes beyondWalton n workingout anapproacho ideology in revolutions.Drawingon Calhoun(1983), GoranTherbom(1980), and Gramsci(1971), she writes that"culturalpractices,orientations,meaning systems, and social outlooks"(1988, p. 249) play a role.Ideologyis not "asystemof ideas";rather t is a "socialprocess" nvolving "knowledgeableactors" which invokes larger cultural systems rather than "consciously held politicalbeliefs":"successful deologicalmobilizationalways managesto fuse and condenseseveralideological discourses into a single major theme, usually expressed in a single slogan"(1990, p. 84). From feminist liberationtheology (Welch 1985) Farhi appropriates heintriguingnotionof "dangerous"memoriesof conflict andexclusion-past suffering,actualor imaginedinstancesof resistanceandchange(Shi'i imagery n Iran,Sandino'srebellionin Nicaragua).She also analyzes perceptivelythe legitimationclaims of the old regimes



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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDand contradictions nherent in these (the shah's godlike creatorimage also made himresponsiblefor Iran'sproblems;Somoza's brandingof all opponentsas communistsgavethe term communista positive valuation).Farhi is less strong than Walton in analyzingThirdWorld social structure."Unevendevelopment"s never defined or theorized; ndeed, Farhidownplayseconomicand socialeffects of peripheraldevelopmentbecause these are found in "almost all peripheral or-mations" n favor of a focus on the state, which she holds primarilyresponsiblefor theprocess of class formation(1988, p. 234; 1990, pp. 26, 68, 130-31). As a result weobtainno clear pictureof urbanor ruralsocial structure n Nicaragua 1990, pp. 40-41).Iranian ocial structures conceptualizedalmostentirelyas a processof urbanizationatherthanaccordingto its own ongoing historicaldynamics(1990, p. 68); Farhifocuses on themiddleclasses, which she calls the "prominent"lasses, at the expenseof otherkey actorssuch as the Iranianworking class and the lower classes generally. Overrelianceon thestate as the critical variable at the expense of social structure s dangerouseven on itsown termsbecause, as we have seen, such statesdo not always fall. Even if they do so(eventually),explanationof the timing is a problem.A secondareaopento some criticism s Farhi'sgenerallyexcellent discussionof culture.The case studies focus on religionrather han on nationalismor populism. ParticularlynIran,Farhiviews religionas an undifferentiated slam. She leaves out of the accountboththe secularideologies and the organizations hathelped overthrow he shah and some ofthe radical socialist and liberal strands within the Islamic movement (perhaps readingbackwards romthe fundamentalist lerical outcome). Her analysisof Nicaraguacontainsa "fusion" of Sandinismo and liberationtheology, which similarlyoverlooks the hetero-geneoususe of different deologies to mobilizedifferentsectors. As withWalton'sachieve-ment, however, these criticisms should not obscurethe conceptualadvances andthe neatcomparativeanalysisof Farhi'swork.Some of these weaknesses are addressed n my own recent(1990) theoryof the outbreakof Third World social revolutions, a comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and ElSalvador.Drawingon earlier workon developmentand social changein Iran(Foran1988;also see Foran 1993), the 1990 essay tries to elaboratea more general theory, testing itagainstrevolutionary uccesses in IranandNicaragua,andagainststalemated"failure" nEl Salvador.This model takes ThirdWorld social structureas a startingpoint, conceivedas a complexproductof internalandexternaldynamics.Whenpreexistingsocial structuresare shaped over time by the economic, political, and military pressuresexerted by thecore powers of the world system, the result (in many but not all ThirdWorldcountries)is an accumulationprocess that may be called one of dependentdevelopment(Cardosoand Faletto 1979); essentially this is a process of growthwithin limits. That is, the gainsin gross national product, industrialcapacity, and trade typically are accompanied bynegativeconsequencesfor a broadrangeof classes, including heunemployment,nflation,food imports, poor health, and inadequateeducational acilities notedby Walton(1984).Reproductionof such a system often requiresa repressivestate to guaranteeorder in achanging social setting in which much of the population s suffering;personalist,exclu-sionarymilitarydictatorships,as identifiedby Dix and others, are especially vulnerableto revolutionarymovements from below.Takingthis synthesisof perspectiveswithinthe sociology of developmentas a structuralstartingpoint found in some Third World nations, I hypothesize that three additionalconditionsare likely to lead to the outbreakof a revolution.The first of these is termed"politicalcultures of opposition":as far-reaching ocioeconomicchangeengulfsa society,varioussectors of the population"live"this changeandinterprett in light of the culturalandvalue orientations hey find readyto hand, includingideas of nationalism,socialism,

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religion, and other cultural forms rooted in their society. From these orientationstheyforge a rangeof political culturesof oppositionand resistanceto the repressivestate andits foreignbackers, which contribute n importantways to the capacityto organizesocialmovements. Finally, the timing of revolution is determinedby the emergenceof a crisiswith two basic features: an internaleconomic downswing (a discernible worsening ofeconomic conditions beyond the "normal"problemsencountered n most of the ThirdWorld most of the time) and, simultaneously,a "world-systemicopening" (analogoustoGoldfrank's"permissiveworldcontext"),a letupof externalcontrolsin the core power(s)thatcreatesa momentaryopening for insurgency.The model hypothesizesthatif all of these conditions aremet, a revolutionaryoutbreakwill occur, in which a multiclass coalitionof aggrievedsocial forces will emergeto carryout a revolutionaryproject.Such a broadcoalition will proveto have the best chances forattainingstate power. Once this power is achieved, however, the coalition is likely tofragmentas the constituentclasses begin to struggle amongthemselves over the shapeofthe new order.I then test this theory against the cases of Iran and Nicaragua,which broadlyconfirmit: in both countries, social structurewas affected and diversifiedby dependentdevelop-ment in the 1960s and 1970s under the repressive regimes of the shah and of Somoza.Those leaders sought to control the elite, weakening it in Iran and alienating it inNicaragua.In each case, multiple political cultures of oppositionarose: in Iran, severalstrands of Islam as well as secular nationalist, socialist, and guerrillamovements; inNicaragua, the Sandinistas' synthesis of nationalism and social justice alongside theliberationtheology base communities.Finally, crises arose in 1977-1978: the oil boomcame to an end in Iran, and the politicaleconomy of Nicaraguaneverrecoveredfrom thedevastationand corruptionsurrounding he 1972 earthquake.The humanrights foreignpolicy of the Carteradministration ent mixed signals to each regime, emboldened theopposition, and provedunwilling or unableto intervenemilitarilyonce revolutionswereunderway.This patterncontrastspoint by point with the situationin El Salvador,where a morepowerful coffee elite was allied with institutional not personalist)army rule in a moreclassic exploitative pact;the politicalculturewas moreMarxist,anti-imperialist, ndclass-oriented(a situationnot likely to mobilize as broada coalitionof social forces);economicconditions were deplorablebut painfully"normal"n the 1970s; and the uprisingsof the1980s led by the FarabundoMartfNational LiberationFront(FMLN)had to contend withmassive interventionby the Reaganadministration.The result was not a successful socialrevolution but a civil war locked in military stalemate(and resolved by a negotiatedcompromise n 1991-1992).This model is subject to a number of furtherquestions. In precisely what ways doesdependentdevelopmentlead to revolution,and why has it not done so in SouthKoreaorBrazil? How does politicalculturebecome effective? Whatinterveningvariables(such asorganizationor resources) are necessary to carry it? Is an economic downturnalwaysfound before revolution?This last question raises the issue of generalizability:can themodel be applied to other Third World social revolutions (Cuba, Mexico, China), toanticolonial truggles n Algeria,Zimbabwe,Angola, andMozambique,orto otherfailuresand reversalssuch as Chile under Allende or Grenada?Althoughthese and other issuesneed empiricaland conceptualwork, this synthesis may representa fruitful directionforfuturestudy.A final, and quite different, new approach s found in Jack Goldstone's (1991) Revo-lution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Goldstone's object of analysis is the"state breakdown"-a severe political crisis entailinga constellationof state, elite, and



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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDpopularproblemsthatmay result in reform, rebellion, revolution,coup, or civil war. Heoffers a conjuncturalmodel of revolutionemployingeconomic, political, and ideologicalfactors:

Inthistheory,revolutions likelyto occuronlywhena societysimultaneouslyxperiencesthreekindsof difficulties:1) a statefinancial risis,brought n by a growing mbalancebetweenthe revenuesa government an securelyraise and the obligationsand tasksitfaces; (2) severe elite divisions,includingbothalienation rom the state andintra-eliteconflicts,brought n by increasing nsecurity ndcompetitionor elitepositions;and(3)a high potential or mobilizingpopulargroups,broughton by rising grievances e.g.,regarding ighrents or low wages)and socialpatternshatassistor predisposepopulargroups o action e.g., largenumbers f youth n thepopulation,ncreasinglyutonomousruralvillages, growingconcentrationsf workers n weaklyadministeredities). Theconjunction f these three conditionsgenerallyproducesa fourthdifficulty:an increasein the salience of heterodox ulturalandreligious deas;heterodox roups henprovidebothleadership nd an organizationalocus foroppositiono the state(1991, pp. xxiii-xxiv, author's mphasis).

Whatcaused such a conjuncture n the early modem period?"[T]hebroad-based mpactthat sustained population growth (or decline) had on economic, social, and politicalinstitutions of agrarian-bureaucratictates" (p. xxiv). The model thus is designated ademographic/structuralorm of analysis.Goldstone asks the following empirical questions: why was there widespreadstatebreakdown n the mid-nineteenthand mid-nineteenthcenturies,with stabilityfrom 1660to 1760, and why was this so both in western Europeand in Asia, but with differentoutcomes? He traces causes to "a single basic process. . . . The main trend was thatpopulationgrowth, in the context of relativelyinflexible economic and social structures,led to changes in prices, shifts in resources, and increasingsocial demandswith whichagrarian-bureaucratictates could not successfully cope" (1991, p. 459; author'sempha-sis). Thus fiscal crisis, elite conflicts, rising popularunrest, and critical ideologies cametogetherto producestate breakdowns.The differences in outcomes, are tracedlargely tothe radicalpressuresof transformativedeologies in FranceandEngland,contrastedwiththe lack of cultural nnovation n China andthe Ottomanempire.Along the way this richand provocativestudy advances numerousother ideas: observationson urban actorsandthe state's culturalautonomy,which we have notedalready,new quantifiablemeasuresofstructuralproblems (called "the mass mobilization concept" and "the political stressindicator"),nsightson social structure s "near-fractal"a geological metaphorconnotingthe layered structureof institutions),and the search for "robustprocesses in history,"among many others.Goldstonerecognizes some of the limits of the study:it explainswhy crisis was likelyin given places and times rather han how particular roupswere mobilized in each case;it is a modelapplicable o theagrarianocieties of theearlymodemworld,whenpopulationgrowth was a more independentforce than in the twentiethcentury, even in the ThirdWorld (1991, pp. 468-71). AlthoughGoldstone states explicitly that this is not a one-sidedlydemographiccausalmodel, it could be morereflexive in investigating he interplayof populationand social structure.Moreover,in the Japanesecase, he arguesthatpopu-lation stability rather than growth led to crises, thus raising the question of whetherpopulationis a key factor at all (pp. 468; also see p. 26). Goldstone attemptsrathersuccessfully to add a dynamic, temporaldimension to third-generationtructuralism,butstill does not combine structurewith agency to any great degree.

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Anothermajorarea of contentionhinges on Goldstone's extensive reflectionson theproperrole of culturalfactors in the studyof revolution(1991, pp. 415-55). His analysisis organized according to phases of state breakdown.In the prerevolutionaryperiod,criticisms of injustice and calls for restoringtraditionalbalances make up ideologies of"rectification."n the course of the struggle,elites makeuse of folk conceptionsto forgeideologies of "transformation" ith a broadappealaroundsuch themes as redistribution,rectification, and, most effectively, nationalism. Goldstone claims that ideology plays itsgreatestrole in the outcomes of revolutions,and indeedthatit is the single most importantfactor in explainingthe problemat hand-the difference between revolutionarypoliticalreconstructionin France, England, and Japan and the conservative outcomes in theOttomanempire, Spain, and seventeenth-centuryChina. High levels of "ideologicalten-sions" (challenging monarchyto the core) left Englandand Francepoised for dynamicevolution after their state breakdowns; he absence of such tension, linked to a cyclicalrather han aneschatologicalview of history,is saidby Goldstone o account or subsequentstagnationin the Chinese and Ottoman cases. Here Goldstone seems to go too far: byprivilegingculturein the reconstructionperiod, he misses the role of materialfactors inexplaining divergentoutcomes. Conversely, he downplaysthe contributionof cultureinthe prerevolutionaryperiod. Nor does he explain why cultureassumed different shapesamonghis cases.AlthoughGoldstonethus correctspartiallyfor a Eurocentricbias by documentingthatthe East did notpossess thechangeless,ahistorical ssence sometimesposited by a previousgenerationof scholars, one is reminded of modernization heory by the imputationofculturealone as the explanation or outcomes andby some of the languageused to describethe process ("dynamic"versus "stagnationist,""traditional," conforming" ersus "inno-vative," and so on). Goldstoneseems to believe that culturepreventedChina, Spain, andthe Ottomansfrom meeting the challenge of world capitalism;this argumentdownplaysmilitary,political, and economic power considerations.Finally, he attributes he rise ofthe West to the happy marriage of democracy and capitalism, and offers this as aprescription or today's Third World as opposed to the authoritarianutcomesof revolu-tion. These controversialclaims aside, Revolutionand Rebellion in the Modern World sa storehouseof bold conjectures or fourth-generationheorists o disproveor substantiate.

CONCLUSIONSOver the lastdozenyears, thedeepeningof the concernsof the structuralisthirdgenerationof the 1970s has yielded clearer insights into the natureof vulnerable states and crises.Social theorists' new preoccupationswith culture have spilled fruitfullyinto the area ofsocial change. Social structurehas begunto be assessedfrom a varietyof new angles thatpromisefresh insight. Against this backdrophas emergedthe profileof a new approachthat uses conjuncturalmodels involving economy, polity, andculture, seeking to explaincoalitionaldynamics and the logic of outcomes with a new flexibility. The convergencearoundconjuncturalmodels by diverse writers from various theoretical orientationsissignificant n several respects:social theoristsare reaching increasinglyfor models morecomplex and more multicausal hanthe often one-sidedargumentsof opposingcampsandthependulum wings of intellectual ashion;thenew dataproducedby recentrevolutionarysocial processes are forcing a reproblematizing f the relationsof structure ndagency asexplanatoryprinciples;and in the sociology of revolutions,at least, the way forwardfortheoryseems to be carefulcomparativework on diversecases, conductedwith awarenessof current heoreticalcontroversies.In this respect, theoriesof revolutionandconjunctural

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THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITEDmodels of revolution become inseparable:history infuses theory, and the models arrivedat through nductive case study providenew theoretical eads.6In the present essay I have tried to identifysome of the themes thatare likely to shapethe next round of studies. Thereremainsignificant heoreticaldifficultiesin consolidatingthe emergentfourthgeneration:a simple additivemodel of "factors"will not amounttoan integrated heoryof revolutions,even if previously neglectedareas such as culture andagency arereturned o the forefront.Nor are the currentmultipledebates aboutparticularcauses settled fully by any means. The whole domainof culture, for example, must beexplored, more deeply;we must sort out the interrelationships mongdiscourse,politicalculture, ideology, and motivation, an enormous field for future students of revolution.How will these contributionsshape overall theories about the causes, processes, andoutcomes of revolution?Thisquestionraises an even moreprofoundchallenge,withwhichthe researchersof the 1990s and beyond must grappleas they continueto try to accountfor our changingsocial world, past and future.

REFERENCESArjomand,Said Amir. 1988. The Turban or the Crown:The Islamic Revolutionin Iran. New York:Oxford

UniversityPress.Aya, Rod. 1979. "Theoriesof Revolution Reconsidered:ContrastingModels of Collective Violence." Theoryand Society 8(1): 39-99.- . 1990. RethinkingRevolutions and Collective Violence: Studies in Concept, Theory, and Method.Amsterdam.Het Spinhuis.Brinton,Crane. 1938. TheAnatomyof Revolution. New York:Vintage.Brustein, William. 1986. "Regional Social Orders in France and the French Revolution." Pp. 145-61 in

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