For the Inquiry into the recognition of Australian Defence Force …€¦ · · 2010-02-18For the...

The Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans’ Association (Inc.)

Submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal,

For the Inquiry into the recognition of

Australian Defence Force Service in Papua New Guinea, from 16th September 1975 onward.

OPERATION PNG ASSIST, 23 Nov 2007.

Edited and Authored by: Paul Copeland, OAM, JP.

Contributors: Graham Castles.

© Copyright APPVA 2009 The material and information contained in this document constitutes Copyright and has

been developed for use by the Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans’ Association. You may download, display, print and reproduce only one copy of this

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Requests for further authorisation should be directed to:

The Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans’ Association Inc, P.O. Box 552,

TORQUAY, VIC, 3228, AUSTRALIA

www.peacekeepers.asn.au

Contents

Section Item Page Cover Page Copyright i Contents ii Executive Summary vi

PART A – BACKGROUND

1. Geographical. 1 2. Political System. 2 3. Recent Political Developments. 2 4. Economic Overview. 2 5. Bilateral Economic and Trade Relationship. 3 6. Defence. 3 7. Defence Relations 6 8. Australian Government Defence Relations 9 9. Risks 10 10. Trafficking in Persons. 11 11. Health 12 12. Environmental Risks 13 13. Weapons Control 13 14. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force 14 15. Conclusive Summary 17

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PART B – ADF SERVICE IN PNG.

16. Background 18 17. Aim. 18 18. Key Messages 19 19. Pre-Independence Service in PNG. 20 20. Medals Policy 21 21. Medals Principles 22 22. Defence Cooperation Program. 25 23. Presence of Australian Special Force in PNG 1980s. 25 24. Training Command Courses in PNG. 27 25. RAAF Presence in PNG. 27 26. Royal Australian Navy Hydrographic Ships. 28 27. OP HIGHWAY/HIGHWAY II 2000-2001. 28.

PART C – PEACEKEEPING SERVICE ON BOUGAINVILLE.

28. Background of Bougainville. 29 29. South Pacific Peacekeeping Force in Bougainville. 30 30. Truce Monitoring Group Bougainville. 31 31. Peace Monitoring Group Bougainville 31

PART D – HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN PNG.

32. Humanitarian Operations. 33 33. OPERATION CARAMINE – ADF Response to Rabaul Volcano Disaster September 1994. 36 34. OPERATION SHADDOCK 1998. 37

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35. OP SIERRA/PLES DRAI 1997-1998. 40 36. OP PNG ASSIST 2007. 42 37. Papua New Guinea Relief 20 May 2008. 43

PART E – ROYAL AUSTRALIAN SURVEY CORPS OPERATIONS IN PNG.

38. Army Survey Operations in PNG. 45 References. 47 Annexes: A. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S350, dated 9 July 1998, Australian Service Medal (1945-1975), Clasp “PNG”. B. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, Letters Patent, S336, dated 2 November 1988, Australian Service Medal; and Regulations. C. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, S122, dated 3 April 2005, Regulations Governing the Award of the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975; and Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, S220, dated 14 June 1995 Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 Determination. D. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Sub-Committee’s Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Torres Strait, Department of Defence Submission, 2009. E. Statement of Service in PNG by former 212207 Warrant Officer Class One, Graham William Castles, Royal Australian Corps of Signals.

F. ASM for the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF). G. Prime Minister of Australia Media Release dated 6 June 1999; LCAUST, MAJGEN Hartley Minute K89-01039, OUT 3595/99, dated 23 July 1999; Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Minute, MAJGEN Cosgrove, COMD 337/99, D98/02124, JADMIN 99/78760, dated 14 July 1999; ADHQ Signal SIC WAK, DTG: 172313Z JUN 99, Introduction of the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM). H. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S243, dated 9 June 1999, Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM) Regulations.

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I. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S230, dated 29 June 2001, Declaration and Determination of the Australian Service Medal Clasp “SPECIAL OPS”. J. Past Operation: OPERATION PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST.

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“Looking After Our Own”

Executive Summary PNG Page 1 12/24/2009

AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPER & PEACEMAKER VETERANS’ ASSOCIATION

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE P.O. BOX 552, TORQUAY, VIC, 3228

(INCORPORATED IN VICTORIA)

ABN 59 558 194 094

Patron Major General John Pearn AO, KSJ,

RFD (Ret’d) Affiliated with the Soldiers of Peace International Association – SPIA http://www.fname.info/aisp/eng/

Telephone & Fax: (03) 5264 8244 Mobile: 0419 355 226

Email: [email protected] Website: www.peacekeepers.asn.au

Also assisting Veterans of Iraq, Afghanistan and Peacetime Service

Commemorating 20 Years of The Australian Contingent to the United Nations Transitional Administration Group,

Namibia, South West Africa

24th December 2009

The Secretariat, Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, Locked Bag 7765, Canberra Business Centre, ACT, 2610 To whom it may concern : The Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans’ Association (APPVA) is pleased to provide our submission into the inquiry of Defence Service in Post 16 September 1975 onward in Papua New Guinea (PNG). This paper highlights the many factors of instability of a fledgling nation that has had violence within its communities; border incursions by Indonesian troops; lawlessness; threat of disease; Weapons and other high risk threats. Our paper highlights the principles used for previous medal inquiries, such as the Gration and Mohr Reports, in order to provide equilibrium toward service in PNG. In short this is a matter of equity toward those previously awarded the ASM (1945-1975) and recognition of Defence personnel working in dangerous and difficult environments within PNG, of which we believe warrants medallic recognition. Yours Sincerely,

Paul Copeland, OAM, JP, National President.

© APPVA 2009 Submission into the Inquiry of ADF Service in PNG on and after 16 September 1975 onward.

PART A - BACKGROUND 1. Geographical.

1.1 The mainland of Papua New Guinea, together with its six hundred other islands (463,000 square kilometres), has a population of approximately 6.1 million. Most of the people are Melanesian, but some are Micronesian or Polynesian. There are over seven hundred language groups, reflecting the diverse origins of the people. English, Tok Pisin (Pidgin), and Motu (the lingua franca of the Papuan region) are the official languages.

1.2 The spectrum of Papua New Guinean society now ranges from traditional village-based life, dependent on subsistence and small cash-crop agriculture, to modern urban life in the main cities of Port Moresby (capital), Lae, Madang, Wewak, Goroka, Mt Hagen, and Rabaul. Some 85 per cent of the population directly derive their livelihood from farming, and 15 per cent of the population live in urban areas. It is estimated that the population is growing at a rate of approximately 2.7 per cent per annum.

2. Political system

2.1 Historically, there has been a high turn-over of parliamentarians at general elections in PNG. In 2002, for example, around 80 per cent of sitting members lost their seats. Up to and including the June 2002 general election, members of parliament were elected on a first-past-the-post basis, and they frequently won with less than 15 per cent of the vote. After the 2002 election a system of limited preferential voting was introduced, under which voters are required to list a first, second and third preference.

2.2 To date, no single party has won enough seats to form a government in its own right; governments have been coalitions. The main parties include the National Alliance (NA), PNG Party, People’s Action Party (PAP), People’s Democratic Movement (PDM),

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PANGU Pati, United Resources Party (URP), People’s National Congress (PNC), People’s Progress Party (PPP), New Generation Party (NG) and the Rural Development Party (RDP).

2.3 The Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) or 'Integrity Law’ was enacted by the Morauta Government in 2001, with the aim of strengthening political parties and the executive government in PNG. The OLIPPAC included new regulations on the formation, composition and funding of parties; limitations on how MPs can vote on a motion of no-confidence against the executive; changes to the rules on the formation of government, defections from political parties and offences for breaking the law; and restrictions on independent MPs.

2.4 PNG governments are protected by the Constitution from no-confidence motions for the first 18 months of a five-year term. Once the 18-month moratorium expires, a successful no-confidence motion results in an alternative Prime Minister (nominated in the no-confidence motion) being able to form a new government without the need for a national election, unless the no-confidence motion occurs during the last twelve months of a five-year term in which case a national election must be held. With the exception of the recently completed 2002-2007 parliamentary term, changes in government following motions of no-confidence have been a characteristic of Papua New Guinea politics since independence.1

3. Recent political developments

3.1 At national elections held in June and July 2007, incumbent Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare’s National Alliance party won the highest number of seats (27 out of 109). At its first sitting, on 13 August, the new Parliament elected Sir Michael as Prime Minister for another term. National Alliance leads a coalition which includes the People’s Action Party, United Resources Party, PANGU Pati, People’s National Congress, People’s Democratic Movement and a number of smaller parties. The Opposition includes former Prime Ministers Sir Mekere Morauta (PNG Party), Sir Julius Chan (People's Progress Party) and former Treasurer Bart Philemon (New Generation Party).

3.2 Sir Michael announced his National Executive Council (Cabinet) on 29 August 2007. The 18 month period of grace during which the Somare Government was immune from a motion of no confidence expired on 13 February 2009.2

4. Economic Overview

4.1 PNG has a dual economy comprising a formal, corporate-based sector and a large informal sector where subsistence farming accounts for the bulk of economic activity. The formal sector provides a narrow employment base, consisting of workers engaged in 1 Country Brief – PNG, DFAT as at September 2009, website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/png_brief.html2 Country Brief – PNG, DFAT as at September 2009, website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/png_brief.html

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mineral production, a relatively small manufacturing sector, public sector employees and service industries including finance, construction, transportation and utilities. The bulk of the population is engaged in the informal sector. Migration to major city centres in the past decade has contributed to urban unemployment and social problems. Papua New Guinea's social indicators, in general, are well below those of lower middle income countries (particularly in rural areas).

4.2 In comparison to other Pacific island countries, PNG is in a reasonably strong economic position, with the savings it accrued during the commodity boom now acting as a fiscal buffer against the Global Economic Crisis (GEC), and its financial sector relatively sheltered from the impact of the global credit crunch.

4.3 However, while economic growth is expected to be positive in 2009, driven by strong domestic activity, recent forecasts show a significant slowing, from around 7 per cent in 2008 to around 4 per cent in 2009.

4.4 The prices of most of PNG’s key export commodities (copper, oil, palm oil, timber, coffee and cocoa) have fallen significantly, impacting on budget revenues and the balance of payments. PNG’s Final Budget Outcome for 2008 has swung around from an expected 2 per cent (of GDP) surplus to a 1 per cent deficit. With a heavy reliance on mineral extraction, a protracted global recession would pose a significant risk to the outlook for PNG’s economy.

4.5 On the upside, the fall in the oil price and in commodity income has taken some inflationary pressure out of the economy. The Bank of PNG (PNG’s Central Bank) now expects inflation to fall to 7 per cent in 2009, down from 13.5 per cent in the year to September 2008. The GEC has also boosted the price of gold, PNG’s third key export, to some degree offsetting declines in other commodities.3

5. Bilateral Economic and Trade Relationship

5.1 Australia is by far PNG’s largest source of imports and is also its number one export market. In 2007, Australia purchased 25.9per cent of PNG’s merchandise exports, ahead of PNG’s second and third largest export partners, Japan and China, on 9.5 per cent and 5.8 per cent respectively. Australia provided 50.9 per cent of PNG’s merchandise imports in diverse categories including crude petroleum, civil engineering equipment, specialised machinery and food, especially meat (excluding beef). In 2007, Australia was ahead of PNG’s next largest import sources, Singapore at 11.3 per cent and China at 7.7 per cent.

5.2 In 2008 Australia imported $2.9 billion worth of goods from PNG. Australia’s merchandise exports to PNG totalled $1.6 billion. Two way merchandise trade is valued at around A$4.5 billion annually, making PNG our 23rd largest trading partner.

3 Country Brief – PNG, DFAT as at September 2009, website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/png_brief.html

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5.3 The mining sector has traditionally been a focus of Australian investment in PNG, particularly gold mining and oil and gas. Key Australian companies in the mining and petroleum sector are Australian listed companies Oil Search Ltd, Lihir Gold Ltd and Highlands Pacific Ltd. Lihir's major shareholder is Rio Tinto.

5.4 Other key investors in PNG include Australia-based companies Coca Cola Amatil, Campbell Australia Pty Ltd and Nestle Australia.4

6. Defence. 6.1 In 1984 the government announced a list of measures to deal with law and order problems, including call-out of PNGDF personnel to assist police. Diro, by then a member of parliament, supported the use of troops. At the end of that year the PNGDF was called out to assist police following the declaration of a state of emergency occasioned by rising urban crime and violence in Port Moresby. ‘Operation Green Beret’, as the exercise was called, lasted for about four months and was generally regarded as a success, though the urban crime rate quickly rose again when the state of emergency ended, and two months later the troops were called out again in the National Capital District, in an operation which lasted five months.

6.2 On several occasions in the early 1980s there were demands from national politicians to use the PNGDF to quell tribal fighting, particularly in Enga Province. In a Post-Courier article in 1985 former PNGDF officer Ian Glanville opposed such suggestions, arguing:

“To have a disciplined, armed and trained Papua New Guinean in uniform, shooting other Papua New Guineans in a situation other than where ‘the national security or the preservation of public order exists’ [sic] will forfeit any claim we might have to being a Christian, democratic, and enlightened country, and destroy forever our fragile national unity (Post-Courier 10 December 1985).”

6.3 However, in 1987 the PNGDF was called out to assist police in law and order operations in Morobe, Madang and Eastern Highlands provinces, and the following year was mobilised to assist in ‘Operation LOMET 88’ in the highlands provinces, Morobe and Madang, and later East Sepik. LOMET 88 lasted for over three months and it attracted a great deal of publicity (see below); but the PNGDF’s role in it, though conspicuous, was limited – of 519 security forces personnel involved (including 308 from the Police Mobile Squad) only 33 were from the PNGDF (Draft Hansard 10 November 1988, p.28). Late in 1988 there was a further request, from the Morobe provincial law and order committee for PNGDF assistance to counter serious crime in Lae and Garaina (Post-Courier 20 December 1988). But by this time the Force was on standby awaiting a government decision on whether it was to be called out to assist the police on Bougainville. PNGDF personnel were used again 1991 to provide additional security 4 Country Brief – PNG, DFAT as at September 2009, website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/png_brief.html

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during the South Pacific Games in Port Moresby and to assist police in ‘crime busting operations’ in Morobe Province.

6.4 In 1992 it was something of a measure of the extent to which the army had come to be accepted as having a ‘law and order’ role that in outlining arrangements for the conduct of the national election is was said to be ‘necessary to call upon the services of the Defence Force … to assist the Electoral Commissioner before, during and after the election’ (Post-Courier 24 March 1992). On the eve of the elections some 1300 police and 50 soldiers paraded through Mount Hagen in a display of force.

6.5 Despite the general acceptance of the PNGDF’s role in internal security situations, however, the acceptance was slow to be recognised in official statements. In 1984, shortly before the first call-out of the PNGDF to aid the civil authority, the NEC’s list of priority functions put internal security last. The Defence Report 1984-85 (p.54), however, stated that ‘national security and development was foremost in our activities’. In 1987, in a statement delivered on resigning from cabinet (see below), Diro said

6.6 Clearly a military option for the defence of Papua New Guinea is out. The Defence Force must now be tailored to give priority to training in low intensity type of operations, civil aid tasks, internal security problems, rapid deployment to assist police or in instances of hijacking and of course surveillance of both land and sea boundaries (Times of PNG 19-25 November 1987).

6.7 The following year Defence Secretary Mokis told an Australian seminar that his department’s view was that ‘there is a far greater prospect of PNG being troubled seriously by internal rather than external security problems’; he saw the main challenges coming not from tribal fighting or separatism but from increasing criminal activities:

“… concentrations of unemployed people, many of whom are young and smarting from unfulfilled expectations, have provided a fertile breeding ground for criminal activities. These trends have coincided with a general decline in the efficiency of PNG administration and, perhaps most notably in this context, a significant weakening of the system of justice; the police, the courts and the gaols. Other potential sources of internal security, such as tribal fighting and separatism, have caused difficulties in the past but at present seem of far less concern”, (Mokis 1988:2).

6.8 Yet in 1989, having noted the PNGDF’s responsibility for defending the nation from ‘external threats and internal uprisings’, the Defence minister went on to say that ‘internal uprising and internal security [was] the responsibility of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary’ (Defence Report 1989).

6.9 In 1990, facing an escalating law and order problem across the country and with a crisis in Bougainville still unresolved, the Namaliu government set up a Security Review Task Force and, shortly after, convened a National Summit on Crime. As an outcome of these initiatives it released a report (PNG 1991) in which it was observed that ‘perceived

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political instability…is sometimes thought to have given rise to public questioning of the durability of particular leaders, policies and even laws’, and that the disciplined services had not been able to cope with ‘sources of law-breaking and disorder’ (ibid.:11, 17, unnumbered). It also referred to ‘the growing frequency with which call-outs of the PNGDF in aid to the civil power and states of emergency have been declared’ (ibid: 24). 6.10 Among a number of recommendations the report proposed the establishment of a Joint Services Command Centre and the progressive integration of the disciplined forces (‘subject to review and even possible reversal’) (ibid: 23-30). It also suggested that ‘the most serious, foreseeable threats facing Papua New Guinea are internal’ and that the priorities of the PNGDF ‘should be reviewed and, as may be appropriate, re-ordered’ (ibid: 36). The demand for a change of focus was supported by Defence Minister Benais Sabumei, who in 1991 told a PNGDF passing out parade that ‘The real future of our Defence Force is to assist the civil authorities deal effectively with these threats’ (Post-Courier 2 July 1991).

6.11 Coincidentally with the Papua New Guinea government’s security review, the Australian government undertook a review of its security assistance programs for Papua New Guinea, and in September 1991 the two governments released a statement which announced that Papua New Guinea was to give highest priority to internal security needs, and that Australian assistance would be geared to supporting Papua New Guinea’s disciplined forces in maintaining internal security, including law and order. This was to be done by way of training and the provision and funding of infrastructure, equipment and other support facilities. 6.12 But it is notable that, following well-publicised reports of abuses by Papua New Guinea’s security forces on Bougainville, an Australian government document described Australia’s military training efforts as having several components ‘designed to strengthen soldiers’ awareness of humanitarian law to provide guidance concerning proper treatment of civilians during security operations’. Operational training, it said, was ‘based on Australian Defence Force doctrine, which in turn draws on the Geneva Convention’ (Evans 1992:34-35).

6.13 Thus within sixteen years of independence the priorities of the PNGDF had been effectively reversed and the possibility of an integrated paramilitary force revived, though to date there has been no move to implement the latter proposal, which remains unpopular among both RPNGC and PNGDF personnel.

7. Defence Relations

7.1 The bilateral Australian and PNG Defence Cooperation Program involves the provision of assistance in training and technical advice, as well as a number of bilateral exercises that are conducted on a regular basis. Support is provided by 21 ADF personnel and 2 defence civilians who fulfil a variety of advisory and in-line roles in the PNG Defence Force.

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7.2 On the eve of independence, many, especially among Papua New Guinea’s emerging political leaders, looked with some apprehension to the future role of the PNGDF. Well funded by the colonial government, well trained and possessing a degree of cohesion which was unusual in the fragmented society of the emerging state, and actively involved in village-level civic action, the military was seen by some as a potential challenge to the authority of an independent government and a threat to the continuation of a democratic political system. 7.3 Not all of those who foresaw a political role for the military, however, anticipated a coup-style takeover. Hastings, for example, suggested that ‘Australian democracy’ was unlikely to take root and that ‘we might be sensible to look towards ‘guided democracy’, to a presidential system, to a strong army loyal to a strong central executive’ (1969:191-92. Also see Nelson 1972:208).

7.4 Concern about the future role of the PNG Defence Force was reflected in the independence constitution, which rejected the idea of the military’s participation in government and defined the PNG Defence Force’s primary function as that of defending the country against external threat, placing restrictions on its use for internal security purposes.

7.5 Contrary to pessimistic predictions, after independence Papua New Guinea’s democratic system prospered, and in the absence of external threat the military languished, notwithstanding substantial financial assistance through Australia’s Defence Co-operation Program. But within a decade of independence, growing problems of lawlessness and disorder began to threaten the position of national political leaders, and even some who had earlier looked apprehensively at the PNGDF, began to call for an expanded role of the Defence Force in assisting police to maintain internal security.

7.6 The first rift between civil and military leaders – the so-called Diro Affair of 1977 – was not long in coming; but though it generated rumours of an impending coup it proved to be inconsequential. On the other hand, the resignation of several senior officers, including the deputy commander and the commander, to pursue careers in civil politics, established an early precedent and suggested a possible safety-valve against the build-up of military antagonism towards the civilian government. There was also, from the early 1980s, clear evidence of a politicisation of at least the senior levels of the PNGDF.

7.7 With a resurgence of tribal fighting and a growing problem of criminality, more and more politicians looked to the military to support the increasingly inadequate attempts of the police to contain lawlessness and maintain the authority of the state. From 1984 the army was regularly involved in ‘law and order’ operations and there was growing acceptance that the PNGDF’s role in internal security was likely to be more significant than its function of safeguarding the country against external threat.

7.8 In this respect, the emergence of the Bougainville crisis was a watershed in changing perceptions of the PNGDF. What began as a police action against disgruntled

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landowners developed into a full-blown insurrection in which the PNGDF was called upon to maintain the integrity of the Papua New Guinea state. In the process, severe doubts have been cast upon the capacity of the PNG Defence Force to act in internal security situations. 7.9 A belief within the security forces that they have been deprived of adequate funding and have been subjected to ‘political’ interference predates the Bougainville crisis but has been exacerbated by events on Bougainville since 1988. The effects of such feelings have been a growing tension in relations between military personnel and civil authorities, factionalism within the PNGDF’s senior command structure, and a general lowering of morale and discipline. 7.10 Notwithstanding this, by the early 1990s, with the Bougainville conflict still not resolved and growing threats to the authority of the state from urban and rural lawlessness, a series of reviews and summit meetings resulted in a significant shift in perceptions of the role of the PNGDF, placing primary emphasis on its role in maintaining internal security.

7.11 Such developments have coincided with an apparent tendency towards tighter social control in Papua New Guinea and an expressed admiration of Indonesian, Singaporean and Malaysian models (see May 1993:74). In 1992 this prompted a group of NGO and church organisations to warn against an ‘increasing and dangerous trend towards the militarisation of [Papua New Guinea] society’; ‘We need not have a military coup’, their statement said, ‘to militarise society’ (Post-Courier 7 August 1992).

7.12 The spectre of a military coup has been raised on several occasions. Indeed, in many respects Papua New Guinea presents the classic preconditions for military intervention (see chapter 1). Most observers, however, continue to see a coup as a remote possibility. This is not least because of the logistic difficulties which an attempted coup would pose for a relatively small army with limited transport capabilities in a physically and socially fragmented society in which even popularly elected national and provincial governments have difficulty maintaining their authority. 7.13 Beyond this, even in relation to Bougainville the military’s corporate interests do not appear to have been well defined in political terms, and electoral politics has provided a well-trodden exit route for soldiers with personal political ambitions. But while the military’s subordination to civilian authority seems to be fairly well assured in the foreseeable future, the PNGDF has become politicised at senior levels and appears increasingly prone to challenge government decisions. 7.14 If the integrity of the Papua New Guinea state becomes more dependent on the support of the security forces in the face of growing law and order problems, these tendencies may increase. Such a development would involve a slight shift along the

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‘civilocracy’/‘militocracy’ continuum (Bebler 1990), but, at least in terms of participation and competition, within a continuing essentially democratic political framework.5

8. Australian Government Defence Relations. 8.1 The Department of Defence seeks to maintain Australia's position as the key strategic partner in the South Pacific region. Australia conducts a broad defence engagement strategy in the South Pacific. The Defence Cooperation program is the means through which Defence provides assistance to security forces in the region. 8.2 The aim of the Australian Defence Cooperation program is to support Australia's defence relationships throughout the region by contributing to the maintenance of regional security and, where appropriate, assisting with the development of the security self reliance of South Pacific countries. The core of our defence engagement with the region is through the Pacific Patrol Boat program, which provides most South Pacific nations with the capability to patrol and protect their valuable exclusive economic zones (EEZ).6 8.3 The Australian Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) activities also provide assistance to regional security forces in the areas of strategic planning, training, infrastructure and command and control. The Australian Department of Defence will continue to target assistance carefully under the Defence Cooperation program to assist those South Pacific countries in which declining law and order is of concern and could see them become more vulnerable to transnational crime such as smuggling in arms, drugs or people. The aforementioned situation would have security implications for Australia. 8.4 Although the Australian Government has endeavoured to foster stability and peaceful change within our immediate neighbourhood, the region faces large economic and social challenges which pose a potential threat to the stability of the South Pacific.7 8.5 The defence relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea is both a strong and enduring one. It is founded on the bases of history and shared experiences: many current Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) units trace their regimental history to Papuan and New Guinea units formed as part of the Australian Army during and after the Second World War. 8.6 In more recent years, the relationship has concentrated on the renewal of the 5 1998, 2004 R. J. May and Viberto Selochan, et al, Melbourne, Australian National University E-Press Publication, “The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific”, Chapter 10, “Government and the Military in Papua New Guinea”, “The Role of the Military in Post-independence Papua New Guinea” website: http://epress.anu.edu.au/mdap/mobile_devices/ch10s05.html6 Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Sub-Committee’s Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Torres Strait; Department of Defence Submission, 2009. 7 Department of Defence Submission into the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with Papua New Guinea and Other Pacific Island Countries, 25 July 2002.

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Papua New Guinea Defence Force's capabilities. Under the auspices of the Defence Cooperation Program, the Australian Government is providing significant assistance to the Papua New Guinea Government's Defence Reform Program. This home-grown initiative aims to create a smaller and more affordable Defence Force, able to respond effectively to the demands of Papua New Guinea's security environment. 8.7 The Defence Cooperation Program spans combined exercises between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and PNGDF; professional military education for PNGDF personnel; technical advice; joint infrastructure projects and support provided by ADF officers posted to 'in-line' positions within Headquarters PNGDF and the PNG Department of Defence.8 8.8 Recent achievements included the refurbishment of the PNGDF's Forward Operating Base at Kiunga, Western Province by ADF and PNGDF engineers under Exercise PUK PUK; the recovery of water and sewerage infrastructure at Murray and Taurama Barracks; and the preparation of PNGDF personnel for deployment to the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands.9

9. Risks.

9.1 FOR some time now Papua New Guinea has been living with a breakdown of law and order. Gangs of unemployed youths - ``rascals" (Raskols) as they are colloquially known have been running wild through Port Moresby and the major towns, intimidating the population.10 Violence is endemic, particularly in the capital where people live in fear even inside their own homes. A law and order conference, convened in February 2001 in response to growing community concern, called on the Government to take corrective action.11 If proof were needed that action was necessary, it was supplied tragically in 1991 when an Australian soldier was fatally shot outside his Port Moresby home.

9.2 On 10th of March, 1991, an Australian Army Warrant Officer was shot outside his Port Moresby home appeared to have been killed by a gang of criminals, known as rascals. Warrant Officer Gregory Ronald Dowsett's wife, Jenny, told police they returned to their Australian Government house in East Boroko from a party about 3.45am. About five youths surrounded their car when they stopped to open the security gate.

9.3 Warrant Officer Dowsett was dragged from the car and when he attempted to stop the youths reaching his wife, he was shot in the back. He died in hospital. Warrant Officer Dowsett, who had been in PNG for two years, was among more than 150 Australian Defence Force personnel posted to Papua New Guinea as part of our Defence 8 Website: http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Military_of_Papua_New_Guinea9 Australian High Commission, Papua New Guinea website: http://www.png.embassy.gov.au/pmsb/defence.html 10 Law and order in a weak state: crime and politics in Papua New Guinea, By Sinclair Dinnen.

11 Law and order in a weak state: crime and politics in Papua New Guinea, By Sinclair Dinnen.

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Co-operation Program with PNG. He was working with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force on a technical assistance project involving electronic communications equipment.

9.4 The Prime Minister, Mr Rabbie Namaliu, then, in 2001, announced draconian measures aimed at stopping the rot. They include the death penalty for convicted murderers and pack rapists, tattooing on the foreheads for convicted criminals, the introduction of boom gates leading into Port Moresby, and a daytime curfew in a number of towns. It all amounts to a clear admission that things have got out of control.

9.5 Other incidents during 1991 included five attacks on foreigners, which included the armed robbery of an Australian diplomat by youths outside a government building. Other incidents have involved the ambassadors of the Philippines and Germany.12 9.6 The most obvious symptom is the collapse of law and order. People risk their lives simply by moving around the country in which they live - an Australian telecommunications man who drove to his Mount Hagen home on a November 1994, evening was murdered for his car; women in a mourning party taking the body of a relative home for a village burial last month were raped on the roadside. 9.7 In 2003, rascals set up a road-block on the Hiritano Highway, north of Port Moresby, separating two trucks from a third that was carrying a dead relative home for a village burial. Near Brown River bridge, 40 km from the city, a log blocked the road where steep verges made escape to left or right impossible. Those in the third truck noticed the second slowing. The driver, realising it was a stick-up, reversed and raced to the nearest police post. In the meantime the bandits - 20 men armed with guns, knives and axes - commandeered the second truck, robbing the mourners of their money and food and raping two women.13

10. Trafficking in Persons. 10.1 The current situation: Papua New Guinea is a country of destination for women and children from Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and China trafficked for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation; internal trafficking of women and children for the purposes of sexual exploitation and involuntary domestic servitude occurs as well.

10.2 Tier rating: Tier 3 - Papua New Guinea does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the current legal framework does not contain elements of crimes that characterize trafficking; the government lacks victim protection services or a systematic procedure to identify victims of trafficking; the government did not prosecute anyone in 2007 for trafficking; Papua New Guinea has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol (2008).14

12 “Army man killed by youth gang”, by Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, Sydney Morning Herald, March 11, 1991. 13 Law and order in a weak state: crime and politics in Papua New Guinea, By Sinclair Dinnen.14 CIA World Fact Book – Papua New Guinea site: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.html

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11. Health

11.1 Public expenditure was at 3 % of the GDP in 2004, whereas private expenditure was at 0.6 % of the GDP. PNG has the highest incidence of HIV and AIDS in the Pacific region and is the fourth country in the Asia Pacific region to fit the criteria for a generalised HIV/AIDS epidemic. Lack of HIV/AIDS awareness is a major problem, especially in rural areas. There were 5 physicians per 100,000 people in the early 2000s.15

11.2 Major Infectious Diseases are rated as a very high degree of risk, food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhoea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vector-borne diseases: dengue fever and malaria (2009).16

11.3 Each year 10,000 children die from diseases that no longer should be killers. Yet the failure of the health department to process a sheaf of paperwork was blamed for hundreds of boxes of urgent medical supplies being discovered last month on a Port Moresby wharf - they'd been there for almost two years.

11.4 Hospitals face closure. At Goroka, to the east, there are no funds to pay casual hospital workers; garbage, electricity, water and transport bills simply are not paid. Water supplies in Port Moresby are erratic and the emergency water carters rip off people. Power supplies are doubtful. Ambulances are an on-again, off-again proposition and those unfortunate to be stuck in a PNG hospital or prison can rely on only one or two meals a day.

11.5 In the Aitape district, in West Sepik province, the Catholic Church closed health services to 50,000 people in November because government funding dried up. 11.6 Medical facilities in Papua New Guinea vary between hospitals in Port Moresby and the larger towns, to aid posts (including some missionary stations) in remote areas. Medical facilities vary in quality, but those in the larger towns are usually adequate for routine problems and some emergencies. 11.7 However, equipment failures and sudden shortages of common medications can mean even routine treatments and procedures (such as X-rays) may become unavailable. A hyperbaric recompression chamber for diving emergencies is available in Port Moresby. Pharmacies in Papua New Guinea are found only in urban centres and at missionary clinics. They are small and may be inadequately stocked. Doctors and hospitals often expect immediate cash payment for medical services. 17

15 http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Military_of_Papua_New_Guinea16 CIA World Fact Book – Papua New Guinea site: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.html17 US State Department Travel advisory to PNG of U.S. citizens dated 28th October 2009

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12. Environmental Risks.

Travel Alert: Papua New Guinea is troubled by a high level of serious crime, particularly in the urban centres of Port Moresby, Lae and Mt Hagen. Travellers should use common sense to avoid any trouble - don't travel alone, especially at night and respect any local advice regarding safety. All travel to the Highlands region, except on essential business, should be reconsidered because of high levels of crime and inter-tribal violence. This includes the Southern Highlands, Enga, Western Highlands, Chimbu and Eastern Highlands provinces. Travellers should stay away from the no-go zone around the former Panguna mine in Bougainville. Check travel advisories and news services before travelling. See Safe Travel for updated government warnings.

12.1 Papua New Guinea has been plagued by ethnic violence, most dramatically in 2003 when more than 500 people died in armed clashes. Dozens of people died in 2004 in further episodes of ethnic violence. Police impunity, the excessive use of force by its officers and corruption at all levels of government are endemic problems.18 12.2 Crowds can react emotionally and violently after road accidents. Crowds form quickly after an accident and may attack those whom they hold responsible, by stoning and/or burning vehicles. Friends and relatives of an injured party may demand immediate compensation from the party they hold responsible for injuries, regardless of legal responsibility. Persons involved in accidents usually should proceed directly to the nearest police station, rather than stopping at the scene of the accident.19

13. Weapons Control. 13.1 Two years ago the Guns Control Committee formed to investigate and campaign against the growing number of illegal arms in PNG warned the national government there was a real threat that illegal guns would be used in the 2007 elections. The committee’s report was presented to PNG Parliament last year, however, the government has not taken any actions since.

Illegal guns in the community... pose a serious threat to elections in PNG. 18 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), website 19 US State Department Travel advisory to PNG of U.S. citizens dated 28th October 2009

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13.2 A recent study by Philip Alphers, an associate professor at the University of Sydney’s School of Public Health, has revealed that in the Southern Highlands alone, there were 2450 factory-made firearms owned privately, of which majority were assault rifles obtained exclusively for use against humans. 13.3 However, security forces operating in the province have recently put the number of arms as high as 15,000. The Southern Highlands Province is currently under a state of emergency since August last year with its provincial government suspended following widespread abuse of powers and corruption within the provincial government.20 13.4 Police and the army have been deployed to maintain law and order in the province. One of the tasks of the security forces was to disarm the warlords in the province. But to-date, very few weapons have been recovered. The security forces who believe the weapons were being kept for use during the national election, were considering asking the government to extend the amnesty period for the weapons to be handed in. 13.5 Meanwhile, the PNG Police and Defence Forces have also been independently assessing the security situation. However, both have also expressed concern about the shortage of manpower to carry out effective operations during the election. 13.6 The disciplined forces have been experiencing a reduction in numbers due to the retrenchment of officers since 2002. 13.7 PNG Defence Force Commander, Commodore Peter Ilau, also said the force needs K2 million to service its aircraft so that they can be used for contingency operations during the general election. 13.8 VOTERS’ CONCERNS: The 2002 general election throughout the highlands region was disrupted by gun related violence and the situation in the Southern Highlands alone was so bad that polling had to be suspended for some months. 14. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force. 14.1 The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) is the unified armed forces of Papua New Guinea. It originated from the Australian Army land forces of the territory of Papua New Guinea before independence, coming into being in January 1973 and having its antecedents in the Pacific Islands Regiment. At independence it numbered 3,750 all ranks, whilst another 465 Australian personnel augmented the force to assist in training and technical support.

20 Politics/ PNG: Security a Challenge as PNG Heads to the Poll, 2007, Patrick, Matbob, website: http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=17312/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl

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14.2 The PNGDF Land Element includes two infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, a signal squadron, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit, and a preventive medicine platoon. The Air Operations Element is a small air wing operating several helicopters and light transport aircraft. 14.3 The Maritime Operations Element consists of four Pacific class patrol boats. 14.4 The army is under the direct command of Headquarters PNGDF, whilst the air force and navy have their own commanding officers. The PNGDF is under the political oversight of the Minister for Defence. 14.5 During its history the PNGDF has sent 400 troops to assist the Vanuatu government put down a secessionist revolt in 1980 and was called out in aid to the civil power in Port Moresby in 1983. It has also conducted operations against the OPM (Organisais Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement Free Papua Movement), The Free Papua Movement is a separatist organization established in 1965 to seek independence for Western New Guinea from Indonesia, based in Irian Barat, and which had been involved fighting the Indonesian armed forces. From 1989 to 1997 the PNGDF was involved in fighting the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). 14.6 The Bougainville Revolutionary Army was formed in 1988 by Bougainvilleans seeking independence from Papua New Guinea .BRA leaders argue that Bougainville is ethnically part of the Solomon Islands and has not profited from the extensive mining that has occurred on the island. More on the BRA under the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) Part to this paper. 14.7 During these operations the PNGDF was criticised for its treatment of civilians, human rights violations and the use of mercenaries. More recently, following the passage of a constitutional amendment allowing the stationing of the PNGDF on foreign soil, 80 personnel joined the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003. As of 2008 PNGDF personnel remain in the Solomon Islands as part of the scaled down, rotational Pacific contingent. 14.8 PNGDF capability is considered modest at best, with the army facing significant problems including a chronic budget crisis, a lack of experience in conventional operations, limited ability to be deployed independently overseas as well as internal tensions. The air force and navy also suffer major equipment and funding shortfalls—to the point of sometimes almost being grounded—and are both too small and poorly equipped to take part in operations overseas. Indeed the entire PNGDF is badly in need of new equipment. 14.9 Successive attempts to reduce the size of the PNGDF in response to the country's economic problems have provoked fierce resistance; with the army mutinying in March 2001. The government capitulated after 10 days to the mutineer's demands, agreeing not to cut the army's strength. However, in 2002 it was announced that the PNGDF would be reduced from 4000 to around 2100 personnel. In early 2004 the government reaffirmed

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its commitment to implement cuts within the armed forces, with a definitive restructuring expected to take place. Ultimately this target was reached in 2007. 14.10 Australia, New Zealand, France and several other nations are assisting in the training and the professionalisation of the PNGDF, whilst others—including Germany and China—provide budgetary assistance. Australia's aid for the PNGDF is currently worth AUD9.2 million with an additional AUD40 million committed the reform programme. AUD20 million was committed initially, mainly for paying off redundant personnel. A second tranche of AUD20 million is for the refurbishment of barracks over five years (AUD5 million). 14.11 As of January 2006 29 Australian defence personnel were engaged in training and advising in areas including policy, management, maritime, infantry, engineering, personnel, logistic and finance areas of assistance. Two more Australian personnel were seconded as advisers on logistics and personnel matters in August 2006, whilst an Australian bureaucrat from the Department of Defence is posted to the PNG defence department. “Australia is particularly interested in supporting Port Moresby in the areas of counter-terrorism, maritime patrols and defence organisation structures and procedures.” 14.12 The current restructure has focused on the removal of men of a quality now judged to have been unsuitable for the Bougainville campaign and since the end of operations there the army has, with Australian assistance, attempted to reform all aspects of its training and administration. 14.13 In the early 21st century terrorism has become increasingly a concern for Papua New Guinea policy-makers and one of the major objectives of the army for 2008 is to prepare itself to deter any attack on its sovereignty but more particularly to terrorist attacks. Equally, although the army has no history of peace support contributions, its involvement in RAMSI has proven a catalyst to determine how it could train for and be used in UN operations. Despite these efforts the army is still not in a position to provide forces with the appropriate “level of training and discipline” without significant risk, according to Janes. To be sure, however, “the army command views such deployment as their contribution to the ‘economic well-being of PNG’ and a way of maintaining any semblance of a proficient armed force.” 14.14 Australian procedures are followed as a matter of course, and their influence is increasing as more joint training exercises are held. 14.15 An international dispute relies on assistance from Australia to keep out illegal cross-border activities from primarily Indonesia, including goods smuggling, illegal narcotics trafficking, and squatters and secessionists.21

14.16 It is well documented that the PNGDF has suffered from a lack of structured 21 CIA World Fact Book – Papua New Guinea https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.html

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training, discipline and financial resources. The latter being that money has not been made available to appropriately equip the PNGDF, along with payment of salary and allowances to PNGDF Servicemen. This has caused instability within the PNGDF and presents significant challenges to the Australian Government sponsored Defence Cooperation Program personnel posted to PNG. 14.17 Along with fighting the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) for some time, the PNGDF and the Constabulary have also been aware of border incursions by Indonesian troops, following-up on the OPM separatists who are fighting the Indonesians in West Irian or Irian Jaya. There are simply inadequate resources for patrolling the International Borderline with the Indonesian annexed nation, which has seen a large number of Indonesian incursions into PNG, post Independence. 15. Conclusive Summary. 15.1 It would appear that the ADF personnel who have been deployed to PNG from 16 September 1975 to the current day serve in a higher risk environment than that of service within Australia. This has been evident by the declining situation with law and order, violence and significant threat by “Raskols”. Health matters are also considered to be of a high risk, which have been highlighted in this Part. It is therefore concluded that the service in PNG since 16th September 1975 to the current time is significantly above and beyond ADF service required within homeland Australia.

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PART B – ADF SERVICE IN PNG. 16. Background. 16.1 The Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans’ Association (APPVA) is pleased to present this submission to the members of the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal into the recognition of Defence members in PNG from 16th September 1975 onward. 16.2 It has been difficult in obtaining information from various sources into the level of Australian Defence Force commitments to PNG since Independence. However, given the information of PART A, it would be estimated that well over 2,000 Defence members have served on either postings to PNG, or have been sent to PNG to conduct training of various tasks to the benefit of the PNGDF. 16.3 This is Strategic Development in terms of ensuring that our closest neighbour is able to competently operate as a Defence Force and provide surveillance within the region. It is of strategic importance to the Foreign Policy of Australia to have such involvement in terms of Australian and PNG national security. This strategic approach creates stability in our region and is therefore deemed to be above and beyond that of some of the Defence Cooperation Programs (DCP), located throughout Oceania. 16.4 The threat levels are significant to ADF personnel, along with Australian High Commission workers, particularly in regard to Personal Security. Australian and other International diplomatic staff, along with other expatriates live in compound-like accommodation, with high fences, barbed wire, security gates, barred windows and other security measures to ensure the safety of these people from the high degree of lawlessness in PNG. 16.5 This paper will examine a number of points, particularly in consideration of Part A, which has provided a background of the dangers toward Australian Defence Personnel, who serve in PNG. 16.6 Additionally, this paper will also present cases for medallic recognition of DCP Staff, Embassy staff, ADF members of the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF), ADF members who have been involved in training in PNG, and ADF service during natural disasters in PNG and Irian Jaya. 17. Aim. 17.1 The aim of this document is to provide the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal Inquiry into Defence Force service on and from 16th September 1975 onward in Papua New Guinea, evidence of service that deserves recognition in the form of medallic awards for ADF personnel who have served in PNG during the Inquiry period from 16th September 1975 onward. Essentially, this Organisation seeks the award of the Australian Service Medal (1975-) to ADF members who have served in any capacity in PNG.

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18. Key Messages. 1. That an anomaly exists that eligible ADF members and other eligible persons were previously recognised for service in PNG from 3rd September 1945 to 16th September 1975 (PNG Independence Day); of which those eligible persons are not eligible for such recognition toward the ASM (1975-) onward. It is contended that both the ASM (1945-1975) and ASM (1975) are awarded to those ADF and eligible persons as appropriate recognition for eligible service during the periods of both the Imperial and Australian Award Systems on 13th February 1975 and 14th February 1975 respectively. 2. That Defence service in PNG is considered above and beyond that of normal service within Australia and it is appropriate to recognise this service with the award of the ASM (75- ), Clasp PNG for service on and after 14th February 1975. 3. NIGHT FALCON (SF) exercises by Australian Special Forces are considered as effective rapport building with indigenous people of PNG of which the special nature of this service within the SF Community in PNG as being above and beyond that of normal service within Australia and it is appropriate to recognise this service with the award of the ASM (1975- ), Clasp PNG. 4. This paper recommends that the conduct of Training Courses in PNG, particularly under the DCP or ad hoc arrangements are above and beyond that of normal service within Australia and it is appropriate to recognise this service with the award of the ASM (75-), Clasp PNG. 5. This paper recommends that RAAF Detachments to PNG are considered for the award of the ASM (1975- ) Clasp PNG, for eligible service on and after 14th February 1975. 6. This paper recommends that RAN Hydrographic Ship crews are considered for the award of the ASM (1975- ) Clasp PNG, for eligible service on and after 14th Feb 1975. 7. That the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) is considered for the award of the ASM (1975) Clasp “SPPKF” or Clasp “PNG”, for service during OP LAGOON. 8. That Humanitarian Operations listed in Part D is considered for the award of the Humanitarian Overseas Medal (HOSM), or the ASM Clasp “HUMANITARIAN OPS.” 9. That the Tribunal Investigate the Army Survey Operations in PNG for the OP KUMUL Series of Operations 1989 through to 1994, and any subsequent Survey operations onward. That the Survey Operations are considered above and beyond that requirement for Peacetime Service and the award of the ASM (1975), Clasp PNG is awarded to those Sappers who served in PNG.

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19. Pre-Independence Service in PNG. 19.1 Viewing the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (CAG) S350 of 9 July 1998,22 it would appear that all ADF service, including Defence Civilians; Defence Contractors; Members of the Merchant Navy; members of the Salvation Army; and members of the Australian Red Cross,23 are eligible for the ASM 1945-1975, Clasp “PNG”. This is for service of up to 30 days, or in aggregate of up to 30 days, for service in PNG during the period 3 September 1945 to 16 September 1975. CAG S350 is at Annex A. 19.2 It is unknown as to why further service after the 16th September 1975, as mentioned in CAG S122 of 3 April 1995,24 onward has not been recognised in the same manner as that prior to Independence Day in PNG. This appears to be an anomaly in terms of equality of recognition of service in a given space, namely PNG, after 16th September 1975 onward. It also highlights a potential administrative error, in which the ASM (1945-1975) is normally awarded for eligible service from 3 September 1945 to 13 February 1975, within the Letters Patent CAG S336. CAG S336 is at Annex B; and CAG S122 is at Annex C. 19.3 Therefore, the ASM (1945-1975) for eligible service in PNG on and from 14 February 1975 to 16 September 1975 is inconsistent within the ASM Regulations.25 It is contended that any eligible person with eligible service is entitled to both the ASM (1945-1975) and the ASM (1975-), provided that they meet the eligibility criteria of the ASM Regulations for both periods of medal eligibility. 19.3.1 The Letters Patent S336, dated 2nd November 1988, of the Australian Service Medal (1975), within Regulation 4 (Conditions for award of the medal), makes no reference in terms of not being eligible for both ASM (1945-1975) and ASM (1975). It is understood however, that the ASM 1945-1975 was not instituted until 22 February 1995.26 19.3.2 Within the ASM (1945-1975) CAG S350, there is also no reference in terms of denial of the awarding of a subsequent medal (ASM 1975), during the prescribed period on and from 14 Feb 1975. Therefore, those ADF and eligible persons who served within the eligible periods of service on and prior to 13 Feb 1975 and then subsequently served on and from 14 Feb 1975 are considered to be eligible for both ASMs. 19.3.3 It is considered that the service of 1945-1975 was as a result of the S.E.

22 Australian Service Medal (1945-1975) Clasp “PNG”. 23 CAG ASM (1945-1975) Clasp “PNG” Determination under Paragraph 4(1)(b); dated 14 May 1998. 24 CAG S122 of 3 April 1995, Letters patent to ASM (1945-1975). 25 Declaration and Determination under the Australian Service Medal (1945-1975) Regulations, contained in the Schedule to Letters Patent dated 22 February 1995. 26 CAG ASM Letters Patent S122-95 3 April 1995, and S220 14 June 1995 (ASM Determination).

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Asian Study by Mohr in 2000; and CIDA 1993/1994 (Gration Report). However, the ASM 1975 was instituted in Nov 1988 for a specific period of service and both periods of service that signify the introduction of Australian Awards from the Imperial Awards system is symbolic in terms of specific recognition. 19.3.4 Therefore, it is contended that both the ASM (1945-1975) and ASM (1975) are awarded to those ADF and eligible persons as appropriate recognition for service during the periods of both the Imperial and Australian Award Systems 19.4 In summary to ADF and eligible service from 3 September 1945 to 16 September 1975, there is inequity in terms of medallic recognition for those ADF and other eligible persons to be awarded the ASM (1975-) Clasp PNG.27

20. Medals Policy. 20.1 The management of the honours system requires clear policies to be developed and applied to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the system. It is important that these policies are clearly enunciated so that the intent of the policies is understood. Ever-changing circumstances require continuous reviews so that the policies in place remain relevant and responsive to the demands of the stakeholders.28

20.2 However, upon investigating these clear policies, it appears that there are a number of anomalies that provide inequitable circumstances in terms of medallic recognition for some operations. The policy appears to be driven by the Nature of Service, within the realms of the Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF). 20.3 It has been a normal practice and certainly an understanding that if an ADF member serves on prescribed operations approved by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), that the nature of service, inclusive of Veteran Entitlement is commensurate to the given award. For example eligible warlike service in East Timor between 16 September 1999 to 17 August 2003 is warlike service,29 the appropriate Veteran Entitlement of Qualifying Service (warlike service) is provided. For the same period the awarding of the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM), Clasp “EAST TIMOR,”30 is made to the eligible persons with the respective warlike service. 20.4 However, there have been confusing and mixed messages in terms of medallic recognition from the Nature of Service Directorate of which regardless of the Nature of service that an ADF member serves, that does not necessarily entitle the ADF member to medallic recognition of the particular prescribed operation. This policy is not available at the Directorate of Honours and Awards and it is apparently “driven” by the Directorate of Nature of Service. A confusing situation indeed, that lacks consistency in terms of

27 CAG S350 of 9 July 1998 28 Defence Honours and Awards Honours Policy, website: http://www.defence.gov.au/medals/29 Instruments of Warlike Declaration, VEA, Operations FABER (16 Sep 99 – 20 Feb 00) dated 21 Jun 00; WARDEN (16 Sep 99 – 23 Feb 00) dated 16 May 02; and TANAGER (20 Feb 00 – 19 May 02) dated 21 Jun 05. 30 CAG S515 of 16 December 2004, AASM EAST TIMOR.

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Conditions of service, nature of service and the appropriate medallic recognition that complements the approved service. 20.5 However, this submission is not about a Reclassification of Service, but a case for medallic recognition for service that is above and beyond the normal requirements of Peacetime service in homeland Australia. 21. Medal Principles.

21.1 In terms of Medallic Recognition, it is important to observe some of the past accepted principles of awarding medals to individuals over the years. The Committee into Defence and Defence Related Awards (CIDA aka Gration Report), 93/94 Report provided a construct of such principles, of which some of those Principles have been selected for use in past consideration, particularly with the Mohr Report. It is noted however, that the CIDA Report is of the view of 1994, and not commensurate with precedents that have been made since 1994 onward. Mohr went further and indicated that recognition of S.E. Asia had been overlooked and recommended changes to Government to ensure that an equitable system was available in terms of Australian medallic recognition. 21.2 CIDA established a Statement of Principles, which is of the following:

“The Committee recognises that the Australian system of honours and awards is underpinned by values which are held in high regard in our society and which characterise the way Australians view the world around them. These values include a sense of fairness, equity and compassion, and an egalitarian commitment to acknowledge the quality of service and substance of action without regard to status or class. In considering the issues raised by the variety of submissions forwarded for its consideration, the Committee has sought to approach its task in a spirit that remains true to the above values. In addition, the Committee has been mindful that honours and awards must be geared towards recognising the extraordinary, not simply signposting ordinary events in our society. The Committee has also been conscious that in considering service in defence and defence-related areas, it is important to maintain the distinction between warlike and non-warlike service, as well as the distinction between service in operational theatres and that in non-operational areas. The Committee has developed ten principles to guide its consideration of the many submissions placed before it and the diversity of issues raised therein.” These principles are as follows: 1. Recognition of service by medals (other than medals for long service or special occasions such as a coronation) should only occur when that service has been rendered beyond the normal requirements of peacetime. Normal duties such as training and garrison duties should not be recognised by the

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award of a medal, even though they may be demanding, hazardous and uncomfortable, and may be undertaken in countries other than Australia. As a general rule, medals should be reserved for the recognition of service in military campaigns, peacekeeping or other military activities clearly and markedly more demanding than normal peacetime service. Note: This Principle has been outdated in terms of recognition of the Australian National Service Commemoration Medal, and the Australian Defence Medal (ADM). 3. To maintain the inherent fairness and integrity of the Australian system of honours and awards care must be taken that, in recognising service by some, the comparable service of others is not overlooked or degraded. The Committee is conscious of the need for consistency in its recommendations to Government. The standards of measurement for service that apply must be transparent and fair in the eyes of the community. Note: This Principle (3), is considered as the Key Principle toward recognizing service in PNG. 5. Decisions to recognise service through the award of a medal must be made against the background of a range of practical considerations, including the practicability of confirming the accuracy of claims and identifying the eligible participants. Another consideration is the passage of time and the proportion of total persons eligible who might be able to claim personally a medal for service which they rendered. The integrity of any system of honours and awards requires service to be recognised by a medal to be validated and verified through official records. The Committee is aware that this is not possible in certain cases because of an absence of records or other compelling evidence. There is also a consideration that generally those who rendered the service should be the ones who enjoy personally the celebration of that service through a decoration or award. Note: This Principle (5) is supported, particularly in terms of service in PNG. 10. Matters relating to honours and awards should be considered on their merits in accordance with these principles, and these considerations should not be influenced by the possible impact, real or perceived, on veterans' entitlements. Even though the terms of reference for the Committee preclude it from considering issues relating to the Veterans' Entitlements Act, the Committee remains conscious of the nexus between medals and entitlements in some cases. The Committee considers, however, that entitlement issues are a separate matter for consideration by Australian Government and its agencies.

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Note: This Principle (10) is agreed in terms of medallic recognition for service in PNG from 14th February 1975, or under the TOR for this Submission the date 16th September 1975 onward. 21.3 Having considered the aforementioned CIDA Principles for medallic recognition, along with notated comments, the following is suggested to be considered by the Tribunal when determining cases for medallic recognition: 21.3.1 Type of Operation. For PNG it is suggested to be a Special Service or prescribed service for either an operation or Non-warlike service (Hazardous Service). 21.3.1.1 Hazardous Service is interpreted by the following: Activities exposing individuals or units to a degree of hazard above and beyond that of normal peacetime duty. This may include in terms of service in PNG as Defence Force Aid to Civil Power (DACP), assisted evacuations (MEDEVAC), and other operations requiring the application of minimum force to effect the protection of personnel or property, or other like activities.31 21.3.2 For Humanitarian Operations, it is interpreted by the Nature of Service Review (NOSR) as an activity that would normally involve the provision of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian relief does not include normal peacetime operations such as cyclone or earthquake relief flights or assistance.32 Note: This approach by NOSR is contended as not equitable in terms of recognising service that is beyond that of the requirement for normal Peacetime Service. Whilst force is not normally required in DACP or Humanitarian Relief, it must be highlighted that this service is unique and special. It is therefore viewed that Humanitarian Relief, DACP, MEDEVAC, and Disaster Response and Recovery Operations fit into the realms of serving beyond the requirements of normal Peacetime Service. 21.3.3 Objective Danger. Was there a threat of endangerment toward the eligible members within the given Area of Operations (AO), by either an identified or unknown enemy, or by belligerents? This may also include bandits, or in the case of PNG, “Raskols.” Country briefs and DFAT updates have indicated ongoing social and political unrest since Independence within PNG. Therefore, objectively the threat of endangerment is one that is known unto the Defence member prior to deployment or posting to PNG. 21.3.4 Risk or Harm. What was the Risk to the individual in terms of

31 Veterans’ Entitlement Law, 2nd Edition, Creyke and Sutherland, Part I (s5C), page 25, ISBN 978 186287 720 7 (pbk), Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2008. 32 Ibid

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environmental factors for example diseases; contamination of a given area; health pandemics (spread of disease); psychological risk; and physical environment exposure? This has been explained in some detail within PART A, and it would be reasonable to accept that the level of Risk or Harm is above that of normal service requirements within homeland Australia. 21.3.5 Expectation of Casualties. May not include a risk of physical battle casualties, however it has been evident in the past that attacks on expatriates, particularly some Australians has seen a number of Non-Battle Casualties (deaths) due to violence in PNG.33 21.4 It is therefore drawn conclusively that service in PNG satisfies the principles of CIDA (Principles 1,3,5 & 10), noting the view was of 1994; and that the NOSR view of recognition of Service in terms of the Decision Support Tool (DST), in most cases would be service that is beyond the normal requirements of Peacetime service in Australia. 22. Defence Cooperation Program (DCP). 22.1 A copy of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Sub-Committee’s Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Torres Strait, Department of Defence Submission is attached at Annex D. 22.2 This paper explains the current situation of the DCP in PNG, along with the importance of maintaining the Program. The Report also notes of the instability within PNG, along with the Health Risks to the PNG Population. Further, it is noted that it is intended to have a Maritime Surveillance capability operating within PNG and Torres Straits. This further adds a dimension to forward defence for Australia and promotes regional stability. 22.3 In conclusion, The service with DCP in PNG has its hazards as significantly discussed in this paper. Therefore, the service with DCP is considered above and beyond that of normal service within Australia and it is appropriate to recognise this service with the award of the ASM (1975-), Clasp PNG. 23. Presence of Australian Special Forces in PNG 1980s. 23.1 In November 1986, Australian Special Forces deployed to PNG on EXERCISE NIGHT FALCON 86 (SF) during November 1986. EXERCISE NIGHT FALCON 86, involved an SASR Sabre Squadron (with Troop 152 Signal Squadron); and was conducted in the Port Moresby region. 23.2 1st Commando Regiment’s participation involved the Swan Island Detachment (Special Warfare Wing) and elements of 1 Commando Company and 126 Signal Squadron, commanded by MAJ Jeff Kidner. A number of PNGDF soldiers were allocated to the force after the Regiment (1 Cdo Regt) arrived. 33 Extract from the Directorate of Nature of Service Review Enclosure 3 to COSC Agendum 23/03.

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23.3 The major Commando objective was to raid the hydro-electric power station in the mountainous area north-east of Port Moresby. MAJ Kidner’s 2IC Captain Bob Rhodes was appointed Raid Commander to conduct a nigh insertion by sea from a PNGDF Landing craft – a tortuous two-day cross-country approach to the target, a night offensive and a similar trek back to Moresby. The extraction of the force was by night, by C-130 from Jackson Airfield relying on short field operational procedures. 23.4 The insertion of the Commando raid by four Zodiacs, launched from the PNGDF craft BUNA, went very much according to plan. However, the ensuing cross-country transit with its tight time constraint saw six commandos drop out because of heat exhaustion, fatigue and ankle injuries. They were evacuated by Helicopter. 23.5 At base camp, members of SF Headquarters, along with those deployed in the field were exposed to the ever-present threat of malaria which seen some members hospitalised the previous year (1985), after elements of 126 Signal Squadron had deployed to PNG.34 23.6 It is understood that the Exercise was conducted during 4-6 weeks. Recollections are that members of the Special Warfare Wing and 660 Signal Troop (Special Warfare Field Troop), who are specialists in Guerrilla Warfare, flew by UH-1H to undisclosed locations. It is suspected that the Troop was engaged in the training of indigenous forces in remote locations on PNG. SASR had dispatched numerous patrols at undisclosed locations and it is unknown if the patrols were carrying live ammunition. 23.7 However, the EXERCISE NIGHT FALCON (SF) series continued through the mid 1980’s to the early 1990’s. A former Australian Army Aviation Corps Kiowa pilot, MAJ Ray Dousset, chronicles his experience in May 1989 with 1 Squadron, SASR in New Britain. 23.8 It would appear that the SASR had a role of winning “hearts and minds” of villagers. The SAS Troops were inserted and extracted in various locations on New Britain. This entailed gaining their confidence and providing medical aid and other practical assistance. Word was certainly getting around the villages of the help these SAS soldiers were providing.35 23.9 It would appear that the NIGHT FALCON (SF) series was conducted in PNG and Northern Australia. It is suggested that the training was of benefit to the Australian SF Community and included tangible benefits to the people of PNG, along with the cooperation of the PNGDF. It is considered to be live training, particularly when actively seeking the cooperation of indigenous peoples in the remote areas of PNG.

34 “Strike Swiftly,” The Australian Commando Story, Peter Collins, Watermark Press 2005, p. 201. ISBN 0 949284 70 X 35 “Rotor in the Green, an Autobiography,” Ray Dousset, 2nd Edition, Xulon Press, USA, pp149-150. ISBN 978-1-60200-316-9.

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23.10 In conclusion, this paper recommends further investigation into the NIGHT FALCON (SF) exercises by Australian Special Forces and consider the nature of service and training within the SF Community in PNG as being above and beyond that of normal service within Australia and it is appropriate to recognise this service with the award of the ASM (1975-), Clasp PNG. 24. Training Command Courses in PNG. 24.1 Through the DCP and the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby, the ADF sent a team of Communications specialists to conduct a senior management course in Communications Management to the PNGDF and the Police. The training team came from the Australian Army School of Signals, located in Macleod, Victoria. 24.2 One of the members of this team, former WO1 Graham Castles, has written a brief statement of his service in PNG during January to March 1995. He states that there was a constant threat in PNG and rates the danger or potential danger levels as 8 out of 10. Please find attached a copy of former WO1 Graham Castles’ Statement at Annex E. 24.3 This paper recommends that the conduct of Training Courses in PNG, particularly under the DCP or ad hoc arrangements are above and beyond that of normal service within Australia and it is appropriate to recognise this service with the award of the ASM (75-), Clasp PNG. 25. RAAF Presence. 25.1 Since 1965, a flight from No 38 Squadron had been operating from Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, providing transport support for the PNG Defence Force. Until their withdrawal in 1975, the crews of the three Caribou of the detachment flew nearly 27,000 hours. 25.2 One of the Caribou's great virtues is its capability to operate from relatively crude dirt strips that cannot be used by other military transports. This light 'footprint' has been lacking in any of the Caribou's competitors or successors. The aircraft has been used by the RAAF for flare-dropping missions, medical evacuation, search and rescue and paratroop training exercises, but the main task is the airlift of troops, civilians, supplies, ammunition, mail and food.36 The Caribou was therefore the ideal aircraft for use in PNG, particularly with the capability of Short Take Off and Landing limits. 25.3 Caribou and UH-1H have been deployed to assist in a range of tasks Post Independence. On 5 September 2008, a Caribou was damaged at Efogi, PNG. It is thought to have had a heavy landing. During Relief Operations in PNG after the effects of Cyclone Guba a Caribou was deployed to assist with the ADF response and relief operations in November 2007. Another Caribou was in service with 35 Sqn, crashed 18/10/78 on takeoff at Eliptamin PNG. 36 RAAF Museum Point Cook: http://www.raaf.gov.au/raafmuseum/research/aircraft/series3/A4.htm

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25.4 The RAAF had various detachments and training with the PNGDF Air Transport Wing, along with supporting various training exercises and operations. With the hand-over of UH-1H to the Army from the RAAF in the early 1990’s, the UH-1H has seen extensive service in PNG. 25.5 This paper recommends that RAAF Detachments to PNG, are considered for the award of the ASM (1975-) Clasp PNG. This is not only due to the service that is above and beyond that of service in homeland Australia, but to also recognised the exceptionally dangerous flying conditions that are apparent within PNG. 26. Royal Australian Navy Hydrographic Ships. 26.1 It is known that RAN Hydrographic Ships have operated in the area of PNG and the Torres Straits Islands for some years. These Ships would have spent considerable time within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of PNG and would have made numerous calls to Port Moresby and elsewhere for refuelling and resupply for the respective crew. 26.2 This paper recommends that RAN Hydrographic Ship crews are considered for the award of the ASM (1975-) Clasp PNG. 27. OP Highway/Highway II 2000-2001. 27.1 These Operations provided Transport Assistance to the PNGDF Reparation Program to transport redundant PNGDF Personnel and their dependents to their Home Provinces, during the period November 2000-January 2001. 27.2 No further information is available on these Operations, as they were listed within the ADF’s Contribution to the Global Security Environment, An Overview of Operations, “Supporting our Neighbours”, dated 25 Aug 2004. 27.3 It is requested that the Tribunal further investigates the details of OP HIGHWAY/HIGHWAY II, in order to determine the ADF commitment to the Operation, along with identifying ADF members who served on this operation. 27.4 As this Operation appears to be in support of the PNGDF, it is recommended that the ASM Clasp “PNG” is the appropriate award for those members who served on OP HIGHWAY/HIGHWAY II, during the period November 2000 to January 2001.

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PART C – PEACEKEEPING SERVICE ON BOUGAINVILLE.

28. Background of Bougainville.

28.1 The Autonomous Region of Bougainville, also known as North Solomons, is an autonomous region in Papua New Guinea and is the largest of the Solomon Islands group. The largest island is Bougainville Island, and the province also includes the adjacent island of Buka and assorted outlying islands including the Carterets. The capital is temporarily Buka, though it is expected that Arawa will once again become the provincial capital. The population of the province is 175,160 (2000 census).

28.2 Bougainville Island is ecologically and geographically, although not politically, part of Solomon Islands. Buka, Bougainville, and most of the Solomons are part of the Solomon Islands rain forests ecoregion.

Map of Papua New Guinea highlighting Autonomous Region of Bougainville

Topographic map of Bougainville

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28.3 The island was named after the French navigator Louis Antoine de Bougainville (whose name has also been lent to the creeping tropical flowering vines of the genus Bougainvillea ). In 1885 it came under German administration as part of German New Guinea. Australia occupied it in 1914 and, as a League of Nations mandatory power, administered it from 1918 until the Japanese invaded in 1942 and then again from 1945 until PNG independence in 1975, as a United Nations mandatory power.

28.4 The island was occupied by Australian, American and Japanese forces in World War II. It was an important base for the USAAF, RAAF and RNZAF. On 8 March 1944 during World War II, American forces were attacked by Japanese troops on Hill 700 on this island. The battle lasted five days, ending with a Japanese retreat.

28.5 The island is rich in copper and gold. A large mine was established at Panguna in the early 1970s by Bougainville Copper Limited, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto. Disputes over the environmental impact, financial benefits, and social change brought by the mine renewed a secessionist movement that had been dormant since the 1970s. The independence of Bougainville (Republic of North Solomons) was unsuccessfully proclaimed in 1975 and in 1990.

28.6 In 1988 the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), led by Francis Ona, increased their activity significantly. Prime Minister Sir Rabbie Namaliu ordered the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) to put down the rebellion, and the conflict escalated into a civil war. The PNGDF retreated from permanent positions on Bougainville in 1990, but continued military action. The conflict involved pro-independence and loyalist Bougainvillean groups as well as the PNGDF. The war claimed an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 lives. 28.7 In 1996 Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan requested the help of Sandline International, a private military company previously involved in supplying mercenaries in the civil war in Sierra Leone, to put down the rebellion. This resulted in the infamous Sandline affair.37

28.8 Prior to the “Sandline Affair”, concerned Governments within the South West Pacific Region attempted to implement peace between the BRA and the PNGDF. A rather hurried plan was put into place involving Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu, and Tonga. The plan was to insert a peacekeeping force and disarm the warring factions to bring peace to the troubled island. 29. South Pacific Peacekeeping Force Bougainville.

29.1 The South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) aka “OPERATION LAGOON” was conducted in October 1994. This was an Australian planned operation, however the ADF was to support the Royal Fijian Military Forces (RFMF) for a Peace Conference in Arawa on the PNG Island of Bougainville. 37 Wikipedia site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bougainville_Province#History

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29.2 However, due to the political and military situation the Australian Government withdrew the ADF Contingent from Bougainville, as a result of a break-down of the talks, the failure for the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) to disarm and the continual interference from the PNGDF, were contributing factors toward the effort of a Peace Agreement on Bougainville. 29.3 The case for medallic recognition of the SPPKF is at Annex F to this paper.

29.4 After the failure to establish peace in Bougainville, under the SPPKF, a number of other ADF Operations were undertaken. The ADF Operations are the following: TERRIER – October 1997-January 1998; BEL ISI – Nov 97-Apr 98; USHERETTE – January 1998; BEL ISI II – May 1998-August 2003; CORBEL – September 1998; and ABSEIL – February 2001

30. Truce Monitoring Group Bougainville. 30.1 The conflict ended in 1997, after negotiations brokered by New Zealand. A peace agreement finalised in 2000 provided for the establishment of an Autonomous Bougainville Government, and for a referendum in the future on whether the island should become politically independent. This was known as the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) aka “OP BEL ISI (I),” which was led by New Zealand.

30.2 Up to 100 ADF members and civilians served with the TMG as the prelude to the PMG.

31. Peace Monitoring Group Bougainville. 31.1 Australia has made an important contribution to the Bougainville peace process, particularly through its leadership of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) aka “OP BEL ISI (II)”. The PMG remained on Bougainville from May 1998 to 30 June 2003, and involved unarmed military and civilian personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu. 31.2 It helped build confidence in the peace process, including by facilitating meetings and distributing peace-related information. At its peak the PMG comprised around 300 personnel. In total, around 3,800 Australian Defence Force personnel and 300 Australian civilians served at various times in the PMG. Australia also led the civilian Bougainville Transition Team (BTT) that replaced the PMG from 30 June 2003 until 31 December 2003. The BTT continued the peace-related activities of the PMG, but on a reduced scale.

31.3 Australia has complemented its support for peacekeeping with substantial reconstruction aid. Since 1997, Australia has provided over A$250 million to support

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Bougainville’s peace process and post-conflict reconstruction. Australia and New Zealand also provided Kina 2.8 million (A$1.2 million) in funding to help cover the cost of the 2005 Bougainville elections.38

31.4 Elections for the first Autonomous Government were held in May and June 2005, Joseph Kabui was elected President. He died on 6 June 2008.

31.5 On 25 July 2005 rebel leader Francis Ona died after a short illness. A former surveyor with Bougainville Copper Limited, Ona was a key figure in the secessionist conflict and had refused to formally join the island's peace process.39

38 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: “Bougainville Peace Process”, website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/png/bougainville_peace_process.html 39 Wikipedia site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bougainville_Province#History

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PART D – HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN PNG. 32. Humanitarian Operations. 32.1 Papua New Guinea is prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and sudden tidal movements. There are numerous active volcanoes throughout Papua New Guinea. Australia has had its fair share of ADF commitment to PNG during times of Natural Disasters, which will continue into the future in assisting and supporting our neighbours. 32.2 The Australian Defence Force has had a significant involvement with relief work, which includes Disaster Relief Response. To date only two Disaster Relief and Recovery Operations have been inclusive of the ADF in recognition of the HOSM, and was approved as an eligible organisation for the award of the HOSM for the following Operations:

• Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 (OP SUMATRA ASSIST I&II), and • Pakistan earthquake 2005 (OP PAKISTAN ASSIST).

32.3 On the 6th of June 1999, the then Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard AC, announced the introduction of the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM). Within his media release Mr Howard explains that the HOSM is for recognition of service in a range of environments, including Hazardous, Peacekeeping, Natural Disasters and at times of civil strife.40 This Media Release is attached at Annex G. This award is considered unique in that it officially recognises Humanitarian service or service in Hazardous circumstances for a range of Government and Non-Government agencies. 32.4 Having previously (over the past decade) dealt with the National Awards and Symbols Office, now known as the Awards and Culture Branch (Within the Department of the PM & Cabinet), in relation to this matter, it has been made clear that the reference by PM Howard in describing the Tsunami Disaster on the Aitape area (North Coast of PNG) was not the intention of the HOSM, a stark contradiction to what the PM announced in his Media Release. On the 29th July 1999, MAJGEN J.C. Hartley, then Land Commander of Australia (LCAUST), made recommendation to the Chief of the Army, for recognition of soldiers for service on Operations SHADDOCK, PLES DRAI, and AUS INDO JAYA. 32.5 This letter provides the fact that the LCAUST had recognised that the operations served by ADF members was worthy of recognition in terms of satisfying the criteria of the HOSM CAG.41 CAG S243 HOSM Regulations are attached at Annex H. 32.6 The then Commander 1st Division, MAJGEN Peter Cosgrove, supported the awarding of the HOSM, although it would appear that the PM & Cabinet, National Awards and Symbols Branch advised that the ADF is not entitled to this medal. This was further analysed and disagreed, with the recommendation continuing. This Minute is 40 Prime Minister Media Release dated 6 June 1999. 41 LCAUST Minute K98-01039, Out 03595/99, dated 23 Jul 1999.

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within Annex G. 32.7 The interpretation of the CAG S243 HOSM Regulations is presented as the following: 3 Declared operations (1) The Governor-General may, on the recommendation of the Minister, declare, in writing, an operation to be a declared operation if it occurs or occurred: (a) (ii) in which an operation to render humanitarian service at a time when civilians or refugees are exposed to a situation that causes, or has the potential to cause, death or significant distress is, or has been, carried out by, or under the auspices of, an organisation; and (b) in dangerous circumstances, that is, circumstances in which persons are, or were, exposed to the risk of death or significant harm.42 Note: It is contended that the Humanitarian Operations conducted by the ADF satisfy the Declared Operations. One may recall the Television coverage of OPERATION SHADDOCK, when a tearful LTCOL had amputated an 8-year old boy’s leg was interviewed. The exposure to death and significant harm was evident throughout the Area of Operations in Northern PNG. This is suggested to have been the case for the listed Humanitarian Operations listed in this paper within the table to this Part at 35.12.

4 Eligible service: (1) A person gives eligible service during a declared operation if the person gives humanitarian service: (a) in the hazardous area specified under sub-regulation 3 (2) in relation to that declared operation (in this regulation called the specified hazardous area); and (b) as a member of an organisation so specified; and (c) for the qualifying period so specified; and (d) within the period of the overall operation; and (e) within the period of each relevant organisation's participation.43

(4) In making a recommendation under sub-regulation 5 (1), the Secretary may treat as eligible service a period of service by a person that is shorter than the qualifying period if:

42 CAG S243 HOSM Regulations, 3 – Declared Operations. 43 Ibid Regulation 4 – Eligible Service.

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(a) the person's service was terminated, because of death, disability or illness of the person due to that service, before the qualifying period was completed; and (b) in the opinion of the Secretary, the person would have completed the qualifying period, but for the termination.44

Note 1: It is contended that within Regulation 4(1)(c), 4(1)(d), and 4(1)(e); that whilst the qualifying service may in some ADF Humanitarian Operations in PNG was less than 30 Days, as specified in the HOSM Regulations, there is scope to place the qualifying period within the period of the overall operation, within the period of the relevant ADF participation. Note 2. It noted that Regulation 4(4) provides flexibility toward the specification of eligible service toward the HOSM as being shorter, within the reason of 4(4)(b). That is “in the opinion of the Secretary, the person would have completed the qualifying period, but for termination. This is contended that ADF assets deployed on Humanitarian Service are placed within extremely short notifications; and that the Disaster Response and Recovery necessitates a rapid operational development due to the urgency of the prevention of the spread of disease and further deaths. The early intervention of the ADF providing such Humanitarian Service to PNG has in many cases saved hundreds of lives. 32.8 Australian Service Medal Clasp “HUMANITARIAN OPS” as an alternative view or approach for medallic recognition, is to have the Tribunal recommend that a Clasp to the ASM is instituted, signifying the service rendered by ADF personnel toward Natural Disasters and Relief operations. It is suggested that this clasp be identified as “HUMANITARIAN OPS”, should there be shortfalls in satisfying the criterion for the HOSM. It is anticipated that this would be a “one-off” award within the ASM Regulations, similar to the Clasp of “SPECIAL OPS.” 32.9 Within the Regulations of the ASM (1975) Clasp “SPECIAL OPS”, it is within the discretion of the CDF to declare the minimum period for qualifying for the medal. Within CAG S230 dated 29 June 2001 (Attached at Annex I), the following Regulation is noted in support of this proposal: “(c) determine under sub-regulation 4(2) of the Regulations, that the conditions for the award of the Australian Service Medal with Clasp “SPECIAL OPS" ("the Medal") in respect of each such operation are: (i) the Medal may be awarded to a member of the Australian Defence Force who rendered service as such a member for a period which is

44 Ibid. Regulation 4 – Eligible Service sub-regulation (4)

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not less than the minimum qualifying period specified by the Chief of the Defence Force in relation to the operation”45

Note 1: The rationale is therefore placed into the context that the CDF, should there be a problem in seeking awarding of the HOSM for a period of service toward a given Humanitarian Operation is less than 30 days, then the option is placed for DHA to recommend to the CDF that the Humanitarian Operations listed in this paper have potential for successful medallic recognition. Note 2: Therefore, this remains consistent with the integrity of the Defence Honours and Awards system and allows for service that is above and beyond that of the normal requirement of Peacetime service to be appropriately recognised. 32.10 The above is considered the Economic Option, however looking into the HOSM Regulations, it would appear that the ADF would have eligibility toward the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM), as a Government organisation. However, according to the administrators of the HOSM, it appears that the ADF is not inclusive of the many Humanitarian Operations, as they believe that the ADF has it’s own medallic recognition system in terms of the ASM.46 32.11 ADF involvement in Disaster Humanitarian Response, Relief and Recovery Operations are a quintessential component to the Nation’s International reputation as a country prepared to assist in such operations, along with providing and sustaining good International Relations with the countries assisted in terms of Strategic alliances in order to provide Foreign Diplomatic and Security measures that are of benefit to Australia and our neighbours. 32.12 ADF Humanitarian Relief Operations to PNG are detailed in the table below.

Dates Operation Name Location Sep 1994 OP CARMINE Rabaul 17 Jul – 29 Jul 1998 OP SHADDOCK Vanimo, North West PNG. Aug 1997 to Apr 1998 OP SIERRA/PLES DRAI 10 Provinces in PNG. 21 Nov 2007 OP PNG ASSIST Oro (Northern) Province 30 Apr to 9 May 2008 Papua New Guinea Relief PNG Highlands Region 33. OPERATION CARMINE – ADF Response to Rabaul Volcano Disaster September 1994. 33.1 The ADF support to the Papua New Guinea (PNG) government after the eruption of the Rabaul volcanoes in September 1994 was codenamed Operation Carmine. Three Volcanoes in the vicinity of Rabaul erupted on 19 September, covering Rabaul in volcanic ash. Electric power was lost, and the drinking water was contaminated. The 45 CAG S230 dated 29 June 2001, ASM (1975) “SPECIAL OPS” Regulations, (c). 46 Telephone conversations, various, between P. Copeland and the Awards and Culture Branch during 1999-2009.

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local airport and harbour were closed. 33.2 About 30 000 of the city’s population of 70 000 were evacuated. ADF support consisted of three C-130 support aircraft airlifting donated food, fuel, water, medical supplies and personnel over a period of about one week. There were two casualties.47 34. OP SHADDOCK 1998.

34.1 A series of three tsunamis struck the north Papua New Guinea coast, west of the village of Aitape, at about 1930 (local time) on Friday 17 July 1998. The local population had virtually no warning of the approaching waves, variously reported as 7, 10 and 15 m in height, which travelled across the surface of the Pacific Ocean at speeds in excess of 100 km/h and struck the coast across a 33-km front.48 34.2 The first of the waves ran parallel to the coast and surged inland for some 500-700 metres. With only a 3-5 second warning, in the form of a roaring “like a jet plane” (or “jet balus” in Pidgin English), some ten villages were destroyed with the loss of 2,202 confirmed dead, of which the bodies of many were never recovered. Another 4,000 villagers lost everything but their lives, and live as displaced persons in sanctuary village’s inland, which provide succour.49

34.3 News of the disaster and the plight of the people first became known when a Catholic Church mission began its daily radio broadcast to its outstations the following morning. By mid morning of Saturday 18 July, reports received in Port Moresby revealed the magnitude of the disaster.

34.4 As a result of the tsunamis at least 16 villages were destroyed, causing more than 2200 deaths, displacing about 9000 people and devastating an area of 40 km2. More than 700 people were hospitalised in the various medical facilities in the area.

34.5 Operation Shaddock was the name given to the deployment of a major field medical unit of 58 Australian Defence Force medical and other personnel to Vanimo, in north-western Papua New Guinea. Hundreds of victims of the tsunami disaster were treated and more than 200 surgical procedures performed in a 10-day mission. 34.6 When the extent of the devastation caused by the Aitape tsunami was realised, over 12 hours after the wave hit, a request from the Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) for air transport support and a field hospital was sent to the Australian Government aid agency AusAid. The request was passed to Emergency Management 47 Volcano! Evacuation and military medical implications Colonel Jay A Clemens DO, MPH, MC, SFS, USAF, ADF Health Vol 3 April 2002, P. 29 48 The Medical Journal of Australia, MJA 1998; 169: 606-609, “Orthopaedic Surgery after the Aitape Tsunami” website: http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/xmas98/holian/holian.html49 Callsign Vampire, the Official website of the 1st Australian Field Hospital Association, (incl 1FH & 1HSB), “The 1998 Aitape Tsunami Disaster,” written by Prof (MAJGEN (Retired)) John Pearn, 27 September 2007, website: http://callsignvampire.org/content/view/25/36/

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Australia (the link organisation between military and civilian agencies), which in turn asked the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to respond. By 1900 on Saturday 18 July, the requirements were more clearly defined as:

• Surgical teams; • Nursing teams (for low and medium dependence patients); • Primary healthcare teams; • An aeromedical evacuation capability; and • Preventive medicine (public health) support.

Map outlining the Tidal wave destruction, 17 July 1998.

34.7 Personnel from the 1st Parachute Surgical Team, the 1st Field Hospital and an Aeromedical Evacuation (AME) team from No. 3 RAAF Hospital (all Sydney units, based at Holsworthy and Richmond) worked through the night of 18 September to prepare essential equipment. Early on the evening of Sunday 19 July two RAAF C-130 transport aircraft carrying the health facility left Richmond RAAF base and landed at dawn the next day at Vanimo, a town some 70 km to the west of the disaster area.

34.8 By nightfall the initial team of 25 ADF health personnel (six doctors, six nurses, two operating theatre technicians, 10 medical assistants and a preventive medicine officer), supported by logistics, movements and communications staff, had erected a field health facility around an abandoned PNG military barracks about 1 km from Vanimo hospital. The threat of further seismological events was very real and an evacuation plan

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was put in place in the event of a subsequent tsunami. The team worked around the clock for the next four days, stopping only briefly to grab a snack from field ration packs.

34.9 RAAF aircrew worked to transport food, water, and counter-disaster equipment, and to evacuate the victims of the disaster. In all, nearly 200 ADF personnel contributed to Operation Shaddock.

Around the periphery of the area devastated by the 33 km wide tsunami, houses like the one above were badly damaged; in the central area nothing was left standing.

34.10 The ADF team at Vanimo was later reinforced by an orthopaedic surgical team (three surgeons, one physiotherapist, one operating theatre nurse and a cast technician) from Monash Medical Centre in Melbourne (see Holian & Keith)50, an additional ADF orthopaedic surgical team (surgeon and anaesthetist from Sydney), a health team from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and one from the US military (one surgeon, two preventive medicine officers). An ADF health team consisting of a medical officer, a nursing officer, a health logistician and two health administration officers, who were in Port Moresby to assist in the review of the PNG Defence Force Health Services, were also made available to support the mission.

34.11 In total, 251 patients were treated at the ADF health facility during Operation Shaddock and 209 surgical procedures were completed. Hundreds more patients were seen and treated by the teams in the disaster area and the care centres. Only two deaths occurred in the facility, both non-surgical cases involving aspiration pneumonitis from near-drowning.

50 The Medical Journal of Australia, MJA 1998; 169: 606-609, “Orthopaedic Surgery after the Aitape Tsunami” website: http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/xmas98/holian/holian.html

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34.12 While the surgeons operated, primary health care and public health teams worked with engineers and aircrew to prevent the outbreak of disease. ADF personnel were involved in ensuring that drinking water was potable, waste (including sewage) was disposed of, and the dead were buried.51

34.13 In all, 124 primary surgical procedures and 85 secondary procedures were performed at the ADF health facility in Vanimo in the space of 10 days. In addition, about 25 other patients were operated on by ADF personnel at both Vanimo and Wewak hospitals.52

34.14 The success of our mission, in both humanitarian and international terms, lay in the ADF team approach -- fast, efficient and effective management of the casualties, and utilisation of all available personnel and resources for the best possible patient care. Medical officers, nursing officers and medical assistants, both regulars and reservists, all worked tirelessly to achieve this common goal.53

34.15 When we completed our mission each of the hospitals and care centres in the area had the staff, experience, stores and pharmaceuticals needed to continue its work. Displaced persons camps were well established, with shelter, clean water, food, health support and appropriate preventive health measures in place. Vaccination programs were planned, and resources and staffing needs identified. We were satisfied that we were leaving with all of the infrastructure in place to cope with the needs of the people, now and for the foreseeable future.54

34.16 Many of the soldiers deployed knew well the stories of how, during the second world war, the PNG people, who became known as the "fuzzy wuzzy angels", had helped wounded Australian soldiers back to aid posts. We considered our mission as simply "returning an old favour". A very moving farewell "sing sing" was testimony to the difference that our efforts had made and of the special relationship that exists between Australia and Papua New Guinea.55

35. OP SIERRA/PLES DRAI 1997-1998.

35.1 As a result of a severe drought, described by the Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Bill Skate as one of the greatest disasters in the country’s history, 660,000 people did not have enough daily food. Of these, some 101,000 are in critical need of immediate aid. 35.2 OPERATION SIERRA was the name for the Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the Papua New Guinea Drought Relief effort. The Papua New Guinea 51 Operation Shaddock -- the Australian Defence Force response to the tsunami disaster in Papua New Guinea, The Medical Journal of Australia, MJA 1998; 169: 602-606, Paul R P Taylor, David L Emonson and James E Schlimmer 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

40


Defence Force used the name OPERATION PLES DRAI, which is Pidgin English for DRY PLACE. The Australian Defence Force has adopted this name for the operation locally in Papua New Guinea.56 The Operation was ADF assistance with the PNGDF in the provision of Australian drought relief to aid to PNG. The period of this operation was August 1997 to April 1998. 35.3 Defence personnel, worked closely with the PNG Government, PNG Defence Force (PNGDF), and the Australian Government's overseas aid program AusAID, helped bring many of the isolated drought-affected villages in 10 provinces back from the brink.

35.4 Together they delivered more than 3.2 million kilograms of aid with military precision into the worst affected areas which could only be reached by air.

35.5 The $30 million six-month-long operation was the ADF's largest ever-humanitarian effort and AusAID's biggest and longest running emergency operation. The final sortie was flown yesterday and today (2nd and 3rd April 1998 respectively), the ADF and PNGDF personnel will hold a closing parade at their Air Transport Squadron base in Port Moresby.

35.6 "We have seen a dramatic difference as remote communities recover from the ravages of the drought - we have fed about 90 000 hungry villagers," said the Commander of the Australian drought relief forces in PNG, Lieutenant Colonel Norm Cognet.

35.7 "PNG offers some of the most challenging flying conditions in the world and to get more than three million kilograms of emergency food aid out to isolated villages is a big achievement. I'm very proud of the tremendous effort put in by all the ADF and PNGDF personnel involved," he said.

35.8 Operation Ples Drai, or dry place in Pidgin, renewed old bonds for Australian servicemen and women with the local community. Australians had fought side-by-side with local infantry units in the Second World War, and PNG "fuzzy wuzzy angels" had saved the lives of many in the ranks. In Operation Ples Drai, Australian Defence personnel had the opportunity to repay the kindness shown to many of their forefathers.

35.9 Army S70A-9 Black Hawks and CH-47D Chinooks from Townsville's 5th Aviation Regiment, RAAF C-130 Hercules from Richmond's 37 Squadron, and DHC-4 Caribou from Townsville's 35 Squadron, carried out monthly delivery cycles to hard-hit areas. The Hercules and Caribou aircraft returned to PNG to fly the final sorties of Operation Ples Drai

35.10 Demand for emergency aid dropped dramatically in many areas in the last month (March 1998). This is in stark contrast to October (1997), when the ADF joined forces with the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) and AusAID to start the drought relief operation. 56 Papua New Guinea Drought. The PNGDF & ADF working together for the people of PNG during the 1997-1998 Drought, website: http://www.global.net.pg/png_drought_relief/frameset1.html

41


ADF aid deliveries peaked in January 1998, with 657 tonnes of aid being delivered to approximately 60,000 people during that month. Rain and self sufficiency have improved the situation markedly, with ADF assistance not being required after April 1998.

35.11 About 450 ADF personnel have rotated through the operation since its inception, with up to 170 personnel in place when two Cairns based Navy Landing Crafts, HMAS Labuan and HMAS Tarakan, were in port. About 60 Army and RAAF personnel remained in PNG for the final delivery.

35.12 Combined Task Force Commander, PNGDF Lieutenant Colonel John Navi, said the effort had been a success. "The Australian Defence Force has played a huge role in helping Papua New Guineans to recover from this devastating drought. We are very thankful to Australia for its support," he said.

35.13 While the ADF focus has been on the air aid delivery operation, it's not just aircrew who have been hard at work helping the PNG community.

35.14 A number of ADF projects have provided basic services, training, and equipment in a range of fields including health, communications and finance. For some remote villagers, the medical team visits were a rare opportunity to meet with outsiders and their first ever access to western medical treatment in regions where often-fatal tropical diseases are common.57 35.15 This service is considered to be above and beyond that requirement of normal Peacetime service within homeland Australia and it is recommended that either the ASM Proposed Clasp “HUMANITARIAN OPS” is awarded to JTF636, or the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM) Clasp “PNG”

36. OPERATION PNG ASSIST 2007.

36.1 Substantial flooding took place in Oro (Northern) Province, caused by several days of torrential rain from Cyclone Guba which struck Oro around 15 November 2007.

36.2 The region has suffered substantial damage to infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and telecommunications, making accurate reporting difficult. Most bridges in the province have been destroyed. Bridges providing the main road access to Popondetta, the capital of Oro Province, have been cut.

36.3 Australia’s humanitarian effort, led by AusAID and supported by the Australian Defence Force, is helping the PNG Government bring desperately-needed relief to Oro province. AusAID has distributed $500,000 to key NGOs who are well placed in Papua New Guinea to contribute to the relief effort.

57 Defence Public Information Office, DPIO 047/98, Media Release, dated 3 April 1998, updated 9 April 1998, website: http://www.defence.gov.au/media/1998/04798.html

42


36.4 Australia received a request on 21 November to provide urgent assistance to support PNG's emergency operations. Defence has been working with AusAID and other agencies to establish the most effective response.

36.5 Joint Task Force 636, led by Group Captain Tim Innes, provided assistance to help an estimated 40,000-60,000 villagers displaced by floods which have already claimed the lives of more than 150 people.

36.6 The ADF provided:

• One Kingair aircraft to assist with aerial inspections of the disaster zone; • Two Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying

AusAID humanitarian stores and people to the disaster area; • Three Caribou transport aircraft and three Army Black Hawk helicopters to

provide access to remote and isolated regions of Oro province; • One C-17 Globemaster for strategic airlift; • A Navy heavy landing craft (LCH) to transport about 150 tonnes of rice, oil and

food stores from Lae to Gona Beach and Oro Bay; • Specialist Navy clearance divers to conduct an assessment of the harbour and

wharf; • A health assessment team to report on what is needed to help the victims of the

disaster. • An engineering team to assess the damage to local infrastructure including port

facilities, roads and availability of water and sanitation; and • A small ADF support and command element to coordinate the deployment in

close consultation with the PNG Government.

36.7 Three Black Hawk helicopters from the Australian Army were also called to move aid into Oro province where the flooding has occurred. Further information on this Operation is detailed at Annex J to this Submission. 36.8 ADF Humanitarian Service is considered to be above and beyond that of normal Peacetime service within homeland Australia and it is recommended that either the ASM Proposed Clasp “HUMANITARIAN OPS” is awarded to JTF636, or the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM) Clasp “PNG”. 37. Papua New Guinea Relief 20 May 2008. 37.1 Another Relief Operation was conducted during the period 30 April to 9 May 2008, by ADF assets in Papua New Guinea after a series of mudslides in mid-April cut off a main highway in the country’s highlands region, affecting the supply of food and other supplies to towns throughout the country.

37.2 A series of mudslides in mid-April 2008, cut off a main highway in the Papua New Guinea highlands region, affecting the supply of food and other supplies to towns throughout the country.

43


37.3 RAAF Caribou aircraft were in PNG from April 30 to May 9 2008, on a pre-planned training exercise, and were called upon to deliver aid and PNG Defence Force personnel to towns which had been cut off by the landslides. 37.4 Amongst the highlights for the trip included one flight with 450 kilograms of medical supplies to Tapini in the Central province, while another aircraft airlifted 900 kilograms of food to the town of Goroka, capital of the Eastern Highlands province. 37.5 No. 38 Squadron conducts routine training exercises in Papua New Guinea throughout the year, and is often called upon to assist the civil community by moving people and much-needed supplies and equipment. Papua New Guinea is a very challenging training environment, with its combination of high mountain peaks and rapidly-changing weather conditions. 37.6 The Caribou is adept at flying in and out of the many short, unprepared mountain airstrips throughout Papua New Guinea, which are inaccessible to larger aircraft. The recent trip continues a tradition of RAAF Caribous supporting the PNG community. 37.7 Last November (2007), three Caribou were deployed the Oro Province as a part of Operation PNG Assist, providing humanitarian aid to communities in to following heavy flooding caused by Cyclone Guba. RAAF Caribou have also assisted the country during drought and tsunami relief operations. 37.8 This service is considered to also be above and beyond that of normal Peacetime service within homeland Australia and it is recommended that either the ASM Proposed Clasp “HUMANITARIAN OPS” is awarded to 38 Squadron, RAAF, or the HOSM Clasp “PNG”. 37.9 The ADF is able to provide immediate Disaster Response, Relief and Recovery Operations that are beyond the capabilities and scope of the host country’s assets and resources. The ADF is also responsive toward UN requests, Victim Country requests and the Emergency Management of Australia (EMA) requests for such assistance.

44


PART E - ROYAL AUSTRALIAN SURVEY CORPS OPERATIONS IN PNG.

38. Army Survey Operations in PNG. 38.1 It has been noted for the Mohr Report (2000), that the ASM (1945-1975) & (1975) was awarded to Royal Australian Survey Corps (RASVY) Operations in Indonesia. It would appear that the Operations in the South West Pacific were not included in this recognition. 38.2 It is contended that the “OPERATION KUMUL” Series of RASVY Operations58 was service above and beyond that of normal requirements of Peacetime Service. Therefore, the following operations are noted for inclusion into the Medallic Recognition of the ASM (1975), Clasp PNG:59

Dates: Operation Name Country 31 Mar-28 May 1989 KUMUL 89 Papua New Guinea 9 Oct – 28 Nov 1990 KUMUL 90 Papua New Guinea 1991 (dates unknown) KUMUL 91 Papua New Guinea 1 Jun – 14 Sep 1991 KUMUL 92 Papua New Guinea 8 Jul – 27 Aug 1993 KUMUL 93 Papua New Guinea 4 Jun – 24 Oct 1994 KUMUL 94 Papua New Guinea 38.3 Within the Conclusion of the Mohr Report, there was an identification of medallic recognition of RASVY Operations in SW Pacific by the Committee. That being: “It is my opinion that the claims appear to warrant a full re-examination of this Service especially the Indonesian segment of the claim”60

Note 1: The Indonesian segments have been identified and medallic recognition provided to those servicemen who served on the Indonesian Survey Operations. 38.4 The recommendation by the Mohr Report was: “It is recommended that the matter of recognition of Army survey tasks be referred to Army for consideration”.61

38.5 Further notation to the table listing the OPERATION KUMUL Series of Army Survey Operations, was made in the Mohr Review as: (Note: Excluded from this listing are operations conducted in the Territory of Papua

58 Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-75, His Honour Justice Mohr, aka “The Mohr Report”, February 2000. 59 Ibid, Annex H. 60 Ibid, page 106. 61 The Mohr Report Page 106.

45


New Guinea by Australian-based units prior to the granting of independence in 1975, and those of 8 Field Survey Squadron from 1971 until 1995.)62

SURVEYING IN THE FIELD

38.6 To date, there has been no medallic recognition for Post 14 February 1975 (ASM 1975), Clasp PNG for Army Survey Operations in PNG. Whilst the Mohr Report passed this matter onto the Chief of the Army (CA) in 2000, it would appear that the medallic recognition of service, particularly under the recommendation by Mohr to review the case, has been unsuccessful, or put aside. 38.7 It is therefore recommended that the Tribunal Investigate the Army Survey Operations in PNG for the OP KUMUL Series of Operations 1989 through to 1994, and any subsequent operations onward. That the Survey Operations are considered above and beyond that requirement for Peacetime Service and the award of the ASM (1975), Clasp PNG is awarded to those Sappers who served in PNG.

62 Ibid Annex H Page 1.

46


References: 1998, 2004 R. J. May and Viberto Selochan, et al, Melbourne, Australian National University E-Press Publication, “The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific”, Chapter 10, “Government and the Military in Papua New Guinea”, “The Role of the Military in Post-independence Papua New Guinea” website: http://epress.anu.edu.au/mdap/mobile_devices/ch10s05.htmlAustralian High Commission, Papua New Guinea website: http://www.png.embassy.gov.au/pmsb/defence.htmlCIA World Fact Book – Papua New Guinea https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.htmlCommonwealth of Australia Gazette (CAG) S350 of 9 July 1998 CAG S515 of 16 December 2004, AASM EAST TIMOR. CAG S243 HOSM Regulations, 3 – Declared Operations CAG S230 dated 29 June 2001, ASM (1975) “SPECIAL OPS” Regulations, (c). Callsign Vampire, the Official website of the 1st Australian Field Hospital Association, (incl 1FH & 1HSB), “The 1998 Aitape Tsunami Disaster,” written by Prof (MAJGEN (Retired)) John Pearn, 27 September 2007, website: http://callsignvampire.org/content/view/25/36/Defence Honours and Awards Honours Policy, website: http://www.defence.gov.au/medals/Defence Public Information Office, DPIO 047/98, Media Release, dated 3 April 1998, updated 9 April 1998, website: http://www.defence.gov.au/media/1998/04798.htmlDepartment of Defence Submission into the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with Papua New Guinea and Other Pacific Island Countries, 25 July 2002 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: “Bougainville Peace Process”, website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/png/bougainville_peace_process.htmlExtract from the Directorate of Nature of Service Review Enclosure 3 to COSC Agendum 23/03 Instruments of Warlike Declaration, VEA, Operations FABER (16 Sep 99 – 20 Feb 00) dated 21 Jun 00; WARDEN (16 Sep 99 – 23 Feb 00) dated 16 May 02; and TANAGER (20 Feb 00 – 19 May 02) dated 21 Jun 05 LCAUST Minute K98-01039, Out 03595/99, dated 23 Jul 1999 Operation Shaddock -- the Australian Defence Force response to the tsunami disaster in Papua New Guinea, The Medical Journal of Australia, MJA 1998; 169: 602-606, Paul R P Taylor, David L Emonson and James E Schlimmer Papua New Guinea Drought. The PNGDF & ADF working together for the people of PNG during the 1997-1998 Drought, website: http://www.global.net.pg/png_drought_relief/frameset1.htmlPolitics/ PNG: Security a Challenge as PNG Heads to the Poll, 2007, Patrick, Matbob, website: http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=17312/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tplPrime Minister of Australia (J. Howard), Media Release dated 6 June 1999 - HOSM. RAAF Museum Point Cook: http://www.raaf.gov.au/raafmuseum/research/aircraft/series3/A4.htmReview of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-75, His Honour Justice Mohr, aka “The Mohr Report”, February 2000 Veterans’ Entitlement Law, 2nd Edition, Creyke and Sutherland, Part I (s5C), page 25, ISBN 978 186287 720 7 (pbk), Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2008.

47


“Rotor in the Green, an Autobiography,” Ray Dousset, 2nd Edition, Xulon Press, USA, pp149-150. ISBN 978-1-60200-316-9 “Strike Swiftly,” The Australian Commando Story, Peter Collins, Watermark Press 2005, p. 201. ISBN 0 949284 70 X The Medical Journal of Australia, MJA 1998; 169: 606-609, “Orthopaedic Surgery after the Aitape Tsunami” website: http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/xmas98/holian/holian.htmlUS State Department Travel advisory to PNG of U.S. citizens dated 28th October 2009 Volcano! Evacuation and military medical implications Colonel Jay A Clemens DO, MPH, MC, SFS, USAF, ADF Health Vol 3 April 2002, P. 29 Wikipedia site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bougainville_Province#History

48

Annex A to

APPVA Submission for the Inquiry into Recognition of Australian Defence Force Service in PNG 16 September 1975

Onward

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S350 dated 9 July 1998,

Australian Service Medal (1945-1975), Clasp “PNG”.

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S 350,9 July 1998 Special C a n e 3

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALLA

AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAL 1945-1975 REGULATIONS

DECLARATION UNDER REGULATION 3

DETERMINATION UNDER SUBREGULATION 4(2)

I, WILLIAM PATRICK DEANE, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, acting under the Australian Semce Medal 1945-1975 Regulations set out in the Schedule to Letters Patent dated 22 February 1995 ("the Regulations"), and on the recommendation of the Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel, hereby:

(a) revoke the Declaration and Determination made on 2 June 1996 under regulation 3 and subregulation 4(2) respectively of the Regulations;

@) declare under regulation 3 of the Regulations, the Australian Defence Force activities in Papua New Guinea, that is to say, the Territory of Papua and the Territory of New Guinea, as administered in an administrative union under the name of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea or the name of Papua New Guinea, and inclusive of all islands forming part of either Territory to a distance of 16 1 kilometres to seaward from the coast during the period commencing 3 September 1945 and extending to the independence of Papua New Guinea on 16 September 1975, to be a declared operation for the purposes of the Regulations; and

(c) determine, under Subregulation 4(2) of the Regulations that the conditions for award of the Australian Savice Medal with Clasp 'PNG' for the declared operation are:

(0 the Medal may be awarded to a member of the Australian Defence Force who rendered service as such a member while posted to or serving as a member of the Australian element of the declared operation for a period of 30 days or more, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to 30 days or more;

(i) the Medal may be awarded to a member of the Ausbalian Defence Force who rendered service as such a member for a period of 30 days or more, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to 30 days or more, as part of the contribution of a foreign Defence Force to the declared operation while on secondment or exchange with the foreign Defence Force;

( i the Medal may be awarded to a member of the Australian Defence Force who rendered service as such a member for a period of 30 days or more, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to 30 days or more, for official visits, inspections or other occmences of a temporary nature while assigned for duty with the military contribution in the declared operation;

4 Special Gazette Commonwealth of AustraIia Gazette

No. S 350.9 July 1998

(iv) the Medal may be awarded to a person who rendered service as part of the Australian element of the declared operation,for a period of 30 days or more, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to 30 days or more, and who, in accordance with a determination made by the h4inista under paragraph 4(1)@) of the Regulations, is in a class of persons who may be awarded the Medal with Clasp 'PNG';

(v) the qualifLing periods of service as described in subparagraphs (cxi). (c)(ii), (cxiii) or (c)(iv) may be deemed by the Chief of the Defence Force or a delegate of the Chief of the Defence Force to have been established notwithstanding that the member has not met the qualifymg periods described; and

(vi) the Chief of the Defence Force or a delegate of the Chief of the Defence Force in exercising the discretion to deem under subparagraph (c)(v) shall take into account whether service in relation to the declared operation:

(A) was terminated owing to the death, evacuation due to illness or injury or other disability due to service, of a member as described above;

(B) was terminated due to Govtmment or Defence Force reasons; or

(C) was terminated due to fomgu Government or foreign Defence Force reasons.

Governor-General

By His Excellency's Command pp& Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel

- ~

Produced by AGPS, Rinting Division of CanRint Communications Pty. Ltd.

26/05 '98 16:06 =+61 2 6273 4138 HON B BISHOP MP 1 .

' L ,

",

f I

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAL 1945-1975 REGULATIONS

DETERMINATION UNDER PARAGRAPH 4(1)(b)

I, BRONWYN BISHOP, Minister for.Defence Industry, Science and Personnel, acting under the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 Regulations set out in the Schedule to Letters Patent dated 22 February 1995 ("the Regulations") make the following determination.

Dated /&&/+

~ i n i & for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel

Classes of persons who may be awarded the Australian Service Medal 1945- 1975 with clasp 'PNG'

For the purposes of paragraph 4(l)(b) of the Regulations, I determine the persons described below to be a class of persons who may be awarded the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 with clasp 'PNG':

(a) civilian members of the Department of Defence; (b) civilian contractors of the Department of Defence; (c) members of the Australian Merchant Navy; (d) members of the Australian Salvation Army; and (e) members of the Australian Red Cross.

Annex B to


Onward

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, Letters Patent, S336, dated 2 November 1988, Australian Service Medal; and

Regulations.

fiJ$ - Commonwealth Y!."

.,2y5?gt,-~c of Australia

ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth:

TO ALL to whom these Presents shaI1 come,

GREETING:

WHEREAS it is desirable that there be instituted an Australian medal for the purpose of according recognition to members of the Defence Force and certain other persons who render service in certain. non-warlike military operations:

KNOW YOU that We do by these Presents institute a medal to be designated and styled the Australian Service Medal:

AND WE DO ordain that the award of the Australian Service Medal shall be governed by the Regulations set out in the Schedule.

IN WITNESS whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

By Her Majesty's Command,

-- GIVEN under the Great Seal of Australia at St '~amcs's on I 17 w.

Prime Minister 151 35/88 Cat No. 88 6326 9 @ Commonwulth of Australia

~

, ... --- . I

.CC-ORD ADPIIN SERVICES

SCHEDULE

AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAL REGULAT~ONS

Short title

I. These Regulations rney b r cited us the Australian Scrvicc Mcdrl Regulationr.

Interpretation

2. In thcse Rcgulutionr- "clusp" means a device to denote u prcscrlbcd operation; "Pcfcncc Forcc" has the same meaning us in the Dc/mcr Rcr 1903; "Mcdul" meunr the Australian S c n l c c Medal; "Minister" mcans the Ministcr of S ta te fur Defence; "prescribed operalion" means an operation in r e spa t of which u

declaralion has been made under r eg l a t i on 3.

Dcclnrriiun of prescribed opcr~t lanu

3. The Governor-General, on the rccommcndntion o r rhc Ministcr, muy , declare a non-warlikc operalion, in which members or the Delencc Forcc are. o r have bccn on or after 14 February 1975. enguged. to be a prescribed operation for thc purposcs of thcse Regulations.

Conditions lor award of the Mednl

4. ( 1 ) The Mcdnl may be awarded Tor service in or In connection with (I prcscribcd opcrwtion.

(2) The conditions for the award of thc Mcdal ore the conditions determined by l h e Governor-Gcnerrl on the rccommendalion of thc Mlnisrer.

(3) Any subscqucnt award of thc Mcdal t o tlrc rarnc person shall be made in the form of r further clasp to thc Mcdal,

( 4 ) Thc pcrsons to whom thc Medel may bc awwrdcd we-.

( a ) persons who served in a prcscribcd operation as mcrnbcrs o r the Dcfcncc Force; and

(b) persons included in B class of pcrsons determined by thc Minister, for thc purposcs or tliis regulation.

( 5 ) The Mcdsl may not be awarded c x c c p ~ t o a person who fulfils the conditions Tor thc award of the Mcdnl.

Making of awards

5. Awards of the Medal shall bc made by ~ h c Governor-Gcncral on the recomrncndation of the Chicf o f the Defence Forcc or his Jclc~urc.

Design of the Medal

6. T h e design of the Mcdal rhall bc us prescribed.

Wearing of the Medal

7. T h e manner of wearing the Mcdal shall ~ ' s s ' d e t e r r n i n c d by the Governor-Gcncral.

. ~ O - O R D RDMIN SERVICES TEL N O .

C ~ n * r a r s ~ * ~ o l ~ h d . 4 u a r r r l i r C-.rrr. No. S Jlb, 2 Povrmkr I988

Rcglstrrr of Awards 8. ( 1 ) There shall be a Registrar of Awards who shall be appointed by the

Governor-General and who shall maintain a Register of the names o l persons t o whom the Medal l l i l ~ been awarded.

( 2 ) T h e Rcyis~ror s l~al l keep such o ~ h c r records relaling 10 thc award o r the Medal a s the Governor-General directs.

Canccllatlon and reinst~terncnt

9, ( 1 ) Thc Governor-General may cancel a n award of the Medal and may reinstate a n award so cancelled.

(2) Where an award of he Medal is cancelled, the name 01 the person l o whom the sward war mudc shall be erased from the Register and the person shall return the Mcdal to the Registrar.

(3) Where an sward that has been cancelled pursuant lo sub-regulation ( I ) i s reinstpted. the Registrar shall restore the entry or entries in the Kcgis~er that had been erased.

COMMONWFALTH OF AUSTFtALIA

AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAL REGULATIONS

DETERMINATION BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of the Australian

Service Medal Regulations which are set out in the

Schedule of Letters Patent given on 13 September 1988 I,

Robert Francis Ray, the Minister of State for Defence,

HEREBY DETERMINE that members of foreign defence forces

who render service with the Australian Defence Force in

prescribed operations to be persons eligible for the

award of the Australian Service Medal.

ROBERT RAY

Annex C to


Onward

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, S122, dated 3 April 2005, Regulations Governing the Award of the Australian Service Medal

1945-1975; and Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, S220,

dated 14 June 1995 Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 Determination

fi Commonwealth ;,, ? L S T R A L I A L

Lnm~,c(:,.~~c- of Australia Gazette No. S 122, Monday, 3 April 1995 Publlsned by the AustraIlan Government Puo.lshlng Setvlce. CanDana

n1ZABETI-I THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Aushalia and Her other Realms and Territories. Head of the Commonwealth:

TO ALL to whom these Presents shall come.

GREETING:

WHEREAS it is desirable that there be instituted an Australian medal for the purpose of according recognition to members of the Defence Force. and certain other persons. who rendered service in non-warlike milimy operations:

' KNOW YOU that We do by these Prcsenu institute a medal to be called the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975:

AND WE DO ordain that the award of the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 is governed by the Regulations set out in the Schedule.


GIVEN under the Great Seal of Australia at Our C o w at St James's on

By Her Majesty's Command.

Prime Minister

72820 Cat. No. 95 3241 2 ISBN 0644 277136 ISSN 1032-2347 O Commonwealth of Australia, 1995

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S 12Z,3 April 1995 Regulations Governing the Award of the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 3

Registrar of Awards 8. (1) The Governor-General must appoint a Registrar of Awards.

(2) The Registrar must: (a) maintain a Register of the names of persons to whom the Medal has been

awarded; and (b) keep such other records relating to the award of the Medal as the

Governor-General directs.

Cancellation and reinstatement 9. (1) The Governor-General may cancel an award of the Medal and may reinstate a

cancelled award.

(2) If an award of the. Medal is cancelled: (a) the name of the person to whom the award was made must be erased from

the Register; and (b) the person must return the insignia of the award to the Register.

(3) If a cancelled award is reinstated. the Registrar must: (a) restore in the Register the entry that was erased; and (b) return the insignia of the award to the person to whom the award was made.

Produced by the Australian Government Publishing Service

& Commonwealth I., AUSTRALIA .. --j~~w&,~c:cc~!.- of Australia Gazette

No. S 220, Wednesday, 14 June 1995 Published by the Austra~lan Government Publ sntng S e ~ c e . Canberra

Govemmcnl House Canberra ACT 2600

7 June 1995

IT is notified for general information that the Governor-General has made the following Determination regarding the Australian Service Medal 1945-1975.

AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAL 1945-1975

I, WILLIAM GEORGE HAYDEN. Governor-General of the Commonweallh of Ausmlia. acunq under the orov~s~ons o i rceulatlom 6 an0 7 of the Aus lm~ao Srrvtce Medal 1945-1975 Reaulalmns. deterrmne as follows:

,Medal design 1. The Ausualian Service Medal 1945-1975 is a nickel-silver medal 38 millimeva in diameter ensigned wtth a Crown of Saint Edward in ~ c k t i - ~ i l v e r . The obvcne bean a cenual device of the Ausualian Coat of Arms above a spray of watdt leaves and blossom, sunounded by the inscription "THE AUSlR4LIAN SERVICE MEDAL 1945-i975'. The revene bears a centnl horimnul panel 25 millimetres a a u s s and 8 millimetres high superimposed on a Federation Star with the same s p y of wat~le leaves and blossom used on the obverse beween each of the seven p i n t s of the Slar.

Medal ribbon 1 The Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 is suspended from a r i b b o ~ 32 millimetres wide. having a central gold smpe 2 millimetres wide flanked by two green stripes 3 millimeves wide, which are in turn flanked by w o silver-grey stripes 4 millimems w~de, then on the extreme left as seen by an observer there is a dark blue stripe 8 millimetres wide while on the extreme r ~ g h t there is a light blue suipc 8 millimems wide.

Medal dress 3. The Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 is worn on h e left breast whenever full size orders, decorations and medals are worn.

Mcdnl hlinialure 4. The min~ature of the Australian Setvice hledal 1945-1975 is a half-size replica of the Medal susoended from a m i n i a ~ r e ribbon 1G m~llimeues wide. The m b i a a r e Medal is worn whenever mhiatures o i orden. decorations and medals are worn.

Clasp 5. Each hledal presented has a nickel-silver claso 37 millimetres wide and 6 millimeues high alrached la Ihc ribbon beanng the name of the theatre where the recipient served.

F u n h e r awards 6. A funher award o r awards for subsequent service in another area or areas is remgnixd by the presentation of an additional clasp or clasps. The clasp or clarps a n atlacbed lo the ribbon of h e Medal above the ortgind clasp. Clasp sets conslst of an attachment for both the full-size and miniamre medals.

Order of Precedence 7. The Ausual~an Service Medal 1945-1975 is wom in accordance wilh the Austnlian Order of Precedence of Honoun and Awards as approved from lime to time by The Sovereign.

Dated

Governor-GenenL

Produced by the Australian Government Publishing Service 74062 Cat. No. 95 3344 3 ISBN 0644 381736 ISSN 1032-2345 O Commonwealth of Australia, 1995

11 1111 II I 9 780644 3817316 Lb

Annex D to


Onward

Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Sub-Committee’s Inquiry into Matters

Relating to the Torres Strait, Department of Defence Submission, 2009.

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE

REFERENCES SUB-COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO MATERS RELATING TO THE TORRES STRAIT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE SUBMISSION Australia plays a major role in providing assistance to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) through the Defence Cooperation Program. The Program's budget for Papua New Guinea is approximately $12 million per year and is focused on increasing the sustainability, professionalism and effectiveness of the PNGDF. Activities funded by the Defence Cooperation Program include bilateral exercises, training and nfrastructure projects. The Program also funds the 23 Defence personnel who support the Defence Cooperation Program in-country. At Defence policy talks in December 2007, Papua New Guinea agreed to Australia's package of support to Phase II of the Reform Program valued at $48 million over 10 years. The Phase II support package will focus on assisting the PNGDF to reconstitute its border security role, primarily through support to forward operating bases and border patrols. This will involve infrastructure upgrades, capital equipment, personal military equipment and ongoing sustainment of forward operating bases. Australia deploys Royal Australian Navy maritime surveillance and technical advisers in-country to help maintain and operate four PNGDF Pacific Patrol Boats. The role of the PNGDF patrol boats is to conduct surveillance of Papua New Guinea's maritime borders, and Economic Exclusion Zone, an area that includes the Torres Strait region. Our Defence Cooperation Program contributes to enhancing the PNGDF's ability to patrol the Torres Strait region by improving its maritime surveillance capabilities. The Australian Defence relationship with Indonesia is progressing toward a partnership marked by frank and open dialogue, increased institutional cooperation, and by joint regional leadership in combating terrorism, people smuggling and illegal fishing. The Lombok Treaty, which was agreed in 2006 and came into force in 2008, has provided a strong foundation for this partnership. The Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation, signed by Australia's Chief of the Defence Force and the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) in Jakarta in January 2009, reflects this progress. The Defence Cooperation Program budget for Indonesia is approximately $5.1 million in 2009-10, and we expect to spend approximately $3.5 million on education and training alone, which includes staff college positions, scholarships, single service training, central Australian Defence Force (ADF) courses, seminars, and support to Indonesia's academic institutions, Lemhannas and the recently established Indonesian Defence University. Our education and training program continues to have an important focus on human rights awareness, accountability, and respect for the rule of law. Training and education contributes to greater professionalism and reform within TNI and the Department of Defence.

Our program also focuses on practical cooperation through combined exercises, visits and information exchanges in the areas of maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping, governance, and defence industry. We look forward to the broader relationship developing and opening up in new areas that further promote security and stability within the region. Australia's strategic future is directly linked to our neighbours across the Torres Strait. Unsurprisingly, it has played an important role in our strategic history. Indeed, the new Defence White Paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, which was released by the Australian Government in May 2009, noted that Australia's most important strategic interest is the defence of Australia against direct armed attack, which requires controlling the air and sea approaches to our continent. In a time of crisis, this may require military use of force. In times of peace, and certainly in the current strategic environment, this requires the fostering and enhancement of the security of our immediate neighbourhood by maintaining and growing a resilient regional community in our immediate neighbourhood. This corresponds with Australia's second priority interest: the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood. It is vital that our immediate neighbours do not become a source of threat to Australia, and that no major military power, that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia, has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us. Defence will continue to take a strong interest in the humanitarian welfare, political stability and economic progress of our neighbours across the Torres Strait; a function of our shared history as well as our long-standing strategic interests in ensuring community resilience is sustained. Australia's interests are inevitably engaged if countries in the region become vulnerable to the adverse influence of strategic competition. The tasks of the ADF, as outlined in the Defence White Paper, are designed to support these interests and objectives. The geographical and physical characteristics of the Torres Strait, as well as its proximity to Australia, present many challenges to Government and security planners within our region. Confined in width and depth, the waters of the Torres Strait further test transiting vessels with complex tidal regimes and strong tropical winds and rain. The Straits region also represents a vital economic link as the main shipping route between the Arafura and Coral Seas and hosts several key commercial fishing zones. The Straits is home to around eight thousand people most of whom follow traditional Livelihoods that do not necessarily conform to contemporary border control systems. Defence contributes in a number of ways to the Whole-of-Government efforts that provide for security and stability in the Torres Strait. Within the border security context, Defence support includes the provision of valuable policy advice to the Homeland and Policy Coordination Group, Strategic Policy Coordination Group and other subordinate border security committees of Government. Along with this policy advice, Defence provides critical intelligence, surface and aerial support for the protection of Australia's borders and maritime interests through Operation Resolute and is also responsible for the

hydrographic charting of the Straits. The provision of this operational support, along with close and collaborative working relationships with Australian Government agency counterparts and Indonesian, East Timorese and Papua New Guinean authorities demonstrates Defence's ongoing commitment to ensuring the security, stability and cohesion of the Torres Strait as part of our immediate neighbourhood. The Defence White Paper highlighted the challenges facing the South Pacific. Many South Pacific island states and East Timor will continue to be beset to some degree by economic stagnation and political and social instability. Weak governance, crime and social challenges will continue to jeopardise economic development and community resilience, against a background of climate change (to which many of these states are vulnerable) and more frequent natural disasters. On occasion, these factors will cause security problems of the kind to which Australia may need to respond directly with appropriate forms of humanitarian and security assistance, including by way of ADF deployments. Papua New Guinea's long-term prospects are enhanced by its significant resources and relatively large population and land area. But it faces huge challenges, including very high unemployment, criminality and high rates of HIVIAIDS. Many of Papua New Guinea's basic social and economic indicators are declining from an already low base. Major efforts are required to build and maintain basic infrastructure, improve law and order, and improve education and health standards

Annex E to


Onward

Statement of Service in PNG by former 212207 Warrant Officer Class One, Graham William Castles,

Royal Australian Corps of Signals..

Statement of Service in PNG by former 212207 Warrant Officer Class One, Graham William Castles, Royal Australian Corps of Signals. I deployed to Port Moresby PNG in January 1995 as part of a five man training team. My task was to establish a training platform for future courses in Tactical Communications Management. I did this by running a course for approximately 20 officers and SNCOs in the PNG Army and Police Force. My specific tasks were:

• Write a Training Management Plan (TMP) for use by the PNG Defence Force and Police Force in Tactical Communications Management.

• Write lesson plans, assignments, examination papers and exercises from the TMP. • Conduct a six week course in Tactical Communications Management including

assessments, examinations and conduct exercises (Command Post Exercises (CPX) & Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT)) as part of the final assessment.

• Produce the final TMP for approval and use within the PNG Defence Force and Police Force.

The course concluded late March 1995 and we returned to Australia. The course was a great success and I was personally nominated for a Conspicuous Service Medal (CSM) for my efforts. PNG is a malaria prone area. We were required to take medication during the deployed period and for some weeks after the deployment. The water in Port Moresby is not suitable for extended consumption and we were required to buy drinking water or purify tap water before consumption. Tropical diseases are rife in PNG and one had to be careful not to cut themselves. Any cuts should have been treated by a medical practitioner to ensure proper treatment and reducing the risk of disease. Medical assistance was provided by the Australian Consultant in Port Moresby, (Military Advisor Staff). The majority of PNG was under threat from a group called Rascals. Rascals were unemployed people who use gang type tactics to mainly rob people of money and valuables. A lot of cases reported Rascals conducting rape and murder activities mainly in the Port Moresby area. Although I was not personally involved in any of these activities, I was constantly looking over my shoulder in public places and mentally making escape plans in the event of an attack. Daytime was generally safe as these people did not attack in fear of being caught and facing the harsh punishments dealt out to these types of activities. Night-time was a “no go” as this was the time the Rascals would attack. If you were required to move at night, you always took one of the guards employed by the Australians as early warning and advice on Rascals tactics. Police road blocks were also a threat. Some cases were reported where police would set up a road block and rob people at gun point. During my stay at Port Moresby, the PNG police and defence were not being paid as there was no money to pay these people. The threat level from both sides was high and the best action was to restrict movement to a minimum were possible. We were fortunate to have a high ranking police officer as a student on the course and he warned his police officers not to touch us. I spent 8 months in Cambodia during the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) deployment and I would have to say I felt more secure in Cambodia then I did in PNG. This was due to being armed in Cambodia in order to provide self protection to Rules of Engagement (ROE). PNG was a very unpleasant place, and safety was the number one priority. We were given 2 security guards to assist in the security of our accommodation and movement around Port Moresby. These 2 members were untrained and very undisciplined. They were not issued with any type of weapon, uniform and were paid the absolute minimum wage. One member would be high on most occasions (dope) and the other would spend most of his shift sleeping. I felt the security situation was of a high concern, so much so I purchased a 9mm pistol (not for publication please). When I was required to move at night, I was always armed.

We were issued with a Toyota 4WD vehicle for movement around Port Moresby. The vehicle was used to pickup bodies from the airport that had been killed in Bougainville and transferred to the local morgue. There was a distinct smell of death in this vehicle which was very unpleasant. Our accommodation was in a two story 1940s style house outside of the Australian Compound. The stairwells had steel gates that could be locked while sleeping. All of the bedrooms were upstairs. Apart from the security arrangements, the accommodation was of a satisfactory standard. We cooked our own meals and did our own housework. We were given allowances for meals etc. All other expenses were paid for via the Australian High Commission. I consider the deployment to PNG was above and beyond normal peacetime service within Australia. On a scale of 1 to 10, ten being the highest threat, I would have to give this deployment an 8. The largest threat would have to be being robbed possibly injured or killed by the PNG Rascals. This is a very real threat that still exists today. The next threat would have to be being robbed and possibly injured by the PNG Police. A minor threat exists with malaria and other tropical diseases that can easily spread if adequate medical facilities are not in place. Psychological harm was present due to the lack of experienced security. Living in a city that has a record of robbing, bashings and murder are very real that played on your mind and made you very alert and took away the need to relax during out of hours periods.

Annex F to


Onward

ASM for the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF).

ASM for the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF).

1. ASM (75- ) for the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) Bougainville. Whilst the operation was short lived due to hostilities and the refusal of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) to disarm, elements of the ADF were exposed to near warlike conditions. 2. Although the operation was meant to be a peacekeeping force per se, the operation was a failure before the required 30-day period to qualify for the ASM. Subsequently the contributing South Pacific Infantry and Australian contribution withdrew from the Operation, known as OPERATION LAGOON. 3. OPERATION LAGOON was led by Australian Brigadier Peter Abigail. Up to 200 ADF members were involved providing Logistics and Communications Support; including the crews of HMA Ships TOBRUK and SUCCESS, who were stationed in the waters within the AO of Bougainville. The SPPKF mission was to “Provide a secure environment for the conduct of the Bougainville Peace Conference and to provide security and movement of the selected delegates.”1 4. The ROE of the Operation was to use lethal force to defend the members and SPPKF or Conference Delegates. The SPPKF could not secure the Arawa zone until the day before proceedings began. Small ADF detachments were posted in other zones. The process was also being rushed by the PNG Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan. 5. The incurred danger to the ADF was that the BRA did not trust the Australians within the SPPKF. This was due to the interests that Australia had on Bougainville in the form of a number of resource mining industries. The BRA was also suspicious of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and of the Australians. 6. The BRA were armed with a range of weaponry, including spears, arrows, blow darts and a range of small arms including M-16 weapons. The BRA was not disarmed during the SPPKF Operation and this presented a military threat and risk to the ADF members serving on the operation. 7. The Operation was hampered by plain clothed members of the PNGDF who infiltrated the Arawa site of the Conference. The PNGDF also set-up an ambush site using Claymore mines on the main route into Arawa, in order to ambush the Bougainville delegates. SPPKF troops also came under attack, including a RAN Sea King Helicopter from HMAS TOBRUK taking ground fire, which is believed to be the first RAN battle damage since the Viet Nam war.2

1 On the SPPKF, B. Breen, Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: a case of military action and diplomacy, Canberra papers on strategy and Defence, 142: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2001, p. 53. 2 Other People’s Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping; Peter Londey, 2004, p. 218.

8. The SPPKF was not large enough for the role and was consequently abandoned by the BRA. The SPPKF withdrew on the insistence of Australia on 22 October 1994. 9. Under Schedule 3/23 of the VEA, The SPPKF is listed as NWLS. Therefore, the ADF members who served with the SPPKF are covered by Veteran Entitlements under the auspices of the VEA and should therefore be recognised for this service. 10. Many Younger Veterans feel that this should be sought as the award of the ASM, perhaps with Clasp “SPPKF”, in order to recognise the particular Operation. 11. After the failure of SPPKF, and some 6 years later after civil war, the BRA came to the table to discuss peace. The Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) headed by New Zealand was established and in 1998, the Australians took command of the operation of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in Bougainville. 12. The special recognition of the SPPKF in the form of a Clasp to the ASM as such would particularly identify the operation, rather than classed with the TMG or PMG Bougainville in the form of the ASM Clasp BOUGAINVILLE. 13. Australian Service Medal Regulations Declaration under “Regulation 3, Determination under Sub Regulation 4(2); set out in the Schedule to Letters Patent dated 13 September 1988, ("the Regulations"), that: (v) the qualifying period of service as described as 30 Days for a Defence Member, may be deemed by the Chief of the Defence Force or his delegate to have been established notwithstanding that the member has not met the qualifying periods described; and (vi) the Chief of the Defence Force or his delegate in exercising his discretion to deem under subparagraph (c)(v) shall take into account whether service in relation to the prescribed operation: (A) was terminated owing to the death, evacuation due to illness or injury or other disability due to service, of a member as described above; (B) was terminated due to Government or Defence Force reasons; or (C) was terminated due to foreign Government or foreign Defence Force reasons”. 14. Given the ASM Regulations above, it would be therefore prudent to seek the CDF or his delegate to exercise his discretion to deem that the service rendered with the SPPKF would satisfy the requirements for the premature withdrawal of the ADF Contingent from SPPKF due to Government, foreign Government and Defence Force reasons as explained in this case.

15. Therefore, it is contended that the ASM Clasp “SPPKF” would be appropriate recognition for those ADF elements that deployed on OPERATION LAGOON from September to 22 October 1994.

Annex G to


Onward

Prime Minister of Australia Media Release dated 6 June 1999; LCAUST, MAJGEN Hartley Minute K89-01039, OUT 3595/99,

dated 23 July 1999; Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Minute, MAJGEN

Cosgrove, COMD 337/99, D98/02124, JADMIN 99/78760, dated 14 July 1999;

ADHQ Signal SIC WAK, DTG: 172313Z JUN 99, Introduction of the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal

(HOSM).

Annex H to


Onward

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S243, dated 9 June 1999, Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal (HOSM) Regulations.

Commonwealth A JJ~~~,,~w-+ IUSTRAL1A L. of A u st ra 1 i a Gazette

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

ELIZAB?3H THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Ausmlia and Her other Realms and Temtories, Head of the Commonwealth:

TO AJL to whom tbese Presents shall come,

GREETING:

WHEREAS it is desirable that then be instituted an Australian medal for the purpose of according recognition to persons who have given humanitarian service in hazardous circumstances outside Australia;

KNOW YOU ha t We do, by these Rcsents, institute a medal to be called the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal;

AND WE DO ordain that h e award of the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal is governed by the Regulations set out in the Schedule.


GIVEN under the Great Seal of Australia at Our Coun at St James's on

16" Ap'iC (954

B y Yer Majesty's Command.

u rime Minister

Produced by AusInfo Cat. No. 99 0333 6 ISBN 0642 411107 ISSN 1032-2345 O Commonwealth of Australia, 1999

2 Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations Commonwealrh of Ausrralia Gazerre

No. S 243.9 June 1999

Schedule

. Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations

Part 1 Preliminary

1 Name of regulations

These regulations are the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations.

2 Interpretation

In these Regulations, unless the contrary intention appears: clasp means a device that denotes the declared operation for which the Medal was awarded. .declared operation means an operation for which a declaration has been made under regulation 3. Department means the ' Department responsible for the administration of the Australian system of honours and awards. eligible service means service of the kind mentioned in regulation 4. humanitarian service means service giving immediate remedy or action to assist needy or distressed persons in order to sustain the life and dignity of those persons. Medal means the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal. Minister means the Minister responsible for the administration of the Australian system of honours and awards or a Minister or member of the Federal Executive Council authorised by the Minister to act on behalf of that Minister.

Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations 1

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S 243, 9 June 1999

Schedule


organisation means: (a) a class of persons included in, or operating under the

auspices of: (i) an Australian government organisation; or

(ii) an Australian non-government organisation; or (iii) a foreign government organisation; or (iv) a foreign non-government orgariisation; or (v) an international organisation; or

(vi) an international non-government organisation; or @) a contingent to, or a component of, an organisation

mentioned in subparagraphs (a) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi); or

(c) a class of persons declared by the Governor-General, in writing, on the recommendation of the Minister, to be an organisation for the purposes of these Regulations.

overseas means outside Australia and the external tenitories as defined in paragraph 17 (pd) of the Acts Intelpretation Act 1901. Register of Awards means the register maintained under paragraph 10 (2) (a). Registrar 'means the registrar appointed under subregulation 1 0 (1).

Secretary means the Secretary of the Department administering the Australian system of honours and awards.

2. Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations

4 Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations Commonwealth of Australia Gazette

No. S 243.9 June 1999

Schedule

Part 2 Award of Medal

3 Declared operations

(1) The Governor-General may, on the recommendation of the Minister, declare, in writing, an operation to be a declared operation if it occurs or occurred: (a) in a specified hazardous area, that is, an area overseas:

(i) in which an operation is, or has been, carried out by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations in accordance with action taken under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of

. the Vnited Nations Charter; or (ii) in which an operation to render humanitarian service

at a time when civilians or refugees are exposed to a situation that causes, or has the potential to cause, death or significant distress is, or has been, carried out by, or under the auspices of, an organisation; and

(b) in dangerous circumstances, that is, circumstances in which persons are, or were, exposed to the risk of death or significant harm.

(2) A declaration under subregulation (1) must specify the following in relation to the declared operation: (a) the name by which the operation is to be known for the

purpose of these Regulations; (b) the geographical extent of the hazardous area; (c) the dates during which the operation occurred or, if the

operation is continuing, the date when the operation commenced;

(d) the organisation, or organisations, service with which is eligible service;

(e) the period within which each such organisation participated in the operation or, if the participation is continuing, the date when the participation commenced;


Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S 243, 9 June 1999

Schedule


( f ) the qualifying period of service required to be given by a member of an organisation to be eligible for an award of the Medal;

(g) whether the period of qualieing service must be calculated as continuous service or may be aggregated from several periods of service in one or more organisations;

(h) whether inspection visits may be counted as humanitarian service, and any special conditions attaching to calculation of that service.

4 Eligible service

(1) A person gives eligible service during a declared operation if the person gives humanitarian service: (a) in the hazardous area specified under subregulation 3 (2)

in relation to that declared operation (in this regulation called the specified hazardous area); and

(b) as a member of an organisation so specified; and (c) for the qualifying period so specified; and (d) within the period of the overall operation; and (e) within the period of each relevant organisation's

participation.

(2) Service may be eligible service whether the service was paid or unpaid.

(3) A declaration under subregulation 3 (1) may also specify, in relation to the declared operation, conditions about ineligibility for an award of the Medal, including specifying that a person, or a person included in a specified class of persons, is not eligible for an award of the Medal if: . (a) the person has previously received, or is entitled to, an

award of another medal for the person's service in the same operation; or

(b) the person (whether in the specified hazardous area as a refugee or resident) is a locally-engaged member of the staff of an organisation in that area; or

4 Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations


No. S 243.9 June 1999

Schedule

(c) t h e person is, or is an employee of, a commercial contractor to an organisation in the specified hazardous area.

In making a recommendation under subregulation 5 (I), the Secretary may treat as eligible service a period of service by a person that is shorter than the qualifying period if (a) the person's service was terminated, because of death,

disability or illness of the person due to that service, before the qualifylng period was completed; and

(b) in the opinion of the Secretary, the person would have completed the qualifylng period, but for the termination.

5 Award of Medal

(1) The Governor-General may, on the recommendation of the Secretary, award to a person who has given eligible service during a-declared operation the Medal and a clasp denoting that declared operation.

(2) If a person has been awarded the Medal and a clasp for eligible service during a particular declared operation and the person gives eligible service during a different declared operation, the person may be awarded the Medal in the form of a further clasp to the Medal.

(3) The Medal may be awarded posthumously.

6 Cancellation of award

(1) The Governor-General, acting on the recommendation of the Minister, may cancel an award made under these Regulations.

(2) If an award of the Medal is cancelled: (a) the Registrar must note the cancellation in the Register of

Awards; and (b) the person must return the Medal to the Registrar.


CommnweaIth of Australia Gazette No. S 243, 9 June 1999

Schedule


(3) If an award of a clasp is cancelled: (a) the Registrar must note the cancellation in the Register of

Awards; and (b) the person must return the clasp to the Registrar.

7 Reinstatement of award

(1) The Governor-General, acting on the recommendation of the Minister, may reinstate an award that has been cancelled.

(2) If an award is reinstated, the Registrar must: (a) note the reinstatement in the Register of Awards; and (b) return the Medal or clasp.

Part 3 The Medal

8 Design of the Medal or clasp The design of the Medal, or of a clasp, is the design determined by the Governor-General.

9 Wearing of the Medal or clasp The manner in which, and occasions on which, the Medal, or a clasp, may be worn are as determined by the Governor-General.

Part 4 Administration

10 Registrar of Awards

(1) The Governor-General must appoint a Registrar of Awards.

(2) The Registrar must: (a) maintain a Register of Awards, containing the names of

each person to whom the Medal or a clasp has been awarded; and

6 Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal Regulations


No. S 243.9 June 1999

Schedule

(b) keep such other records relating to the award of the Medal as the Governor-General directs.

(3) The Registrar may: (a) correct an error in an entry in the Register of Awards or

another record kept under this regulation; or (b) annotate:

(i) an entry in the Register of Awards in accordance with regulation 6 or 7; or

(ii) an entry in another record kept under this regulation.

11 Delegations

(1) The Secretary may delegate, in writing, to a Senior Executive Service officer in the Department: (a) the power under subregulation 4 (4) to treat a period of

service as eligible service; and (b) the power under regulation 5 to recommend the award of

the Medal.

(2) A delegation under this regulation: (a) is revocable; and (b) continues in force until expressly revoked.


Printed by CanPrint Communications Pty Ltd. Canberra

Annex I to


Onward

Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S230, dated 29 June 2001, Declaration and Determination of the Australian Service Medal

Clasp “SPECIAL OPS”.

10 Special Gazette Commonwealth of Australia Gazette

No. S 230.29 June 2001

COMBIONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

DECLARATION AND DETERMINATION UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAX REGULATIONS

I, WILLIAM PATRICK DEANE, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, pursuant to the Australian Service Medal Regulations contained in the Schedule to the Letters Patent dated 13 September 1988 ("the Regulations") on the recommendation of the Minister for Defence, hereby:

(a) revoke the Declaration and Determination made on 3 1 October 1997 under regulation 3 and subregulation 4(2) respectively of the Regulations;

(b) declare under regulation 3 of the Regulations, each special Australian Defence Force activity (being non-warlike operations) occurring on or after 14 February 1975 as is specified by the Chief of the Defence Force for the purposes of this declaration to be a prescribed operation for the purposes of those Regulations; and

(c) determine under subregulation 4(2) of the Regulations, that the conditions for the award of the Australian Service Medal with Clasp 'SPECIAL' UPS" ("the Medal") in respect of each such operation are:

(i) the Medal may be awarded to a member of the Australian Defence Force who rendered service as such a member for a period which is not less than the minimum qualifying period specified by the Chief of the Defence Force in relation to the operation;

(ii) the Medal may be awarded to a person who rendered service as part of the Australian element of the.prescribed operation which is not less than the minimum qualifying period specified by the Chief of the Defence in relation to the operation, and who, in accordance with a determination made by the Minister under paragraph 4(4)(b) of the Regulations, is in a class of persons who may be awarded the Medal with Clasp 'SPECIAL OPS';

Commonwealth ofAustralia Gazette No. S 230,29 June 2001 Special Gazette 1 1

(iii) the qualifying period of service as described in subparagraph (c)(i) of this Instrument 'may be deemed by the Chief of the Defence Force or delegate to have been established notwithstanding that the member has not met the qualifying periods described if service in relation to the prescribed operation was terminated due to the death, evacuation due to illness or injury or other disability due to service.

(d) determine, for the purposes of this d e t e d t i o n , that a person is not eligible for an award of the Medal for service:

(i) during the same period in which that member renders service attracting a separate award of the Australian Active Service Medal or Australian Service Medal; or

(ii) where a separate award of the Australian Service Medal 1945-75 'SPECIAL OPS' has been awarded.

Dated 200 1

Governor-General

By His Excellency's Command

P ~ T E R REITH Minister for Defence

Annex J to


Onward

Past Operation: OPERATION PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST.

Past Operation: Operation PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST Home > Global Operations > Operation PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST

PLEASE NOTE: The text and links contained on this page refer to a past operation. It is provided for archive purposes only. Current Operations are listed on the Global Operations webpage.

Substantial flooding has taken place in Oro (Northern) Province, caused by several days of torrential rain from Cyclone Guba which struck Oro around 15 November 2007.

The region has suffered substantial damage to infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and telecommunications, making accurate reporting difficult. Most bridges in the province have been destroyed. Bridges providing the main road access to Popondetta, the capital of Oro Province, have been cut.

Australia’s humanitarian effort, led by AusAID and supported by the Australian Defence Force, is helping the PNG Government bring desperately-needed relief to Oro province. AusAID has distributed $500,000 to key NGOs who are well placed in Papua New Guinea to contribute to the relief effort.

Australia received a request on 21 November to provide urgent assistance to support PNG's emergency operations. Defence has been working with AusAID and other agencies to establish the most effective response.

Joint Task Force 636, led by Group Captain Tim Innes, is providing assistance to help estimated 40,000-60,000 villagers displaced by floods which have already claimed the lives of more than 150 people.

The ADF has provided:

• One Kingair aircraft to assist with aerial inspections of the disaster zone;

• Two Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying AusAID humanitarian stores and people to the disaster area;

• Three Caribou transport aircraft and three Army Black Hawk helicopters to provide access to remote and isolated regions of Oro province;

• One C-17 Globemaster for strategic airlift;

• A Navy heavy landing craft (LCH) to transport about 150 tonnes of rice, oil and food stores from Lae to Gona Beach and Oro Bay;

• Specialist Navy clearance divers to conduct an assessment of the harbour and wharf;

• A health assessment team to report on what is needed to help the victims of the disaster.

• An engineering team to assess the damage to local infrastructure including port facilities, roads and availability of water and sanitation; and

• A small ADF support and command element to coordinate the deployment in close consultation with the PNG Government.

Links:

For information about AusAID’s assistance to PNG go to: www.ausaid.gov.au

First aid leaves for Papua New Guinea

22 November 2007

The Australian Government has begun delivering substantial disaster relief assistance to Papua New Guinea, following the terrible impact of flooding in Oro (Northern) Province caused by Cyclone Guba.

Bridges providing the main road access to Popondetta, the capital of Oro Province, have been cut and the town has very limited water and power supplies. According to some reports, around 150 people have lost their lives in the flooding and many thousands are homeless.

Australia received a request late yesterday to provide urgent assistance to support PNG's emergency operations. Defence has been working with AusAID and other agencies to establish the most effective response.

Two Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying AusAID humanitarian stores and two Caribou transport aircraft departed for PNG today. Another Caribou and three Army Black Hawk helicopters will join the effort tomorrow to aid the internal relief effort.

A Navy heavy landing craft (LCH) has been placed on short notice to sail from Cairns if required by the PNG Government.

Australian aid arrives in Papua New Guinea

23 November 2007

The first of two Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules flights landed in Port Moresby just after dusk on 22 November, bringing humanitarian support as part of Operation PNG Assist, the Australian Defence Force’s support of the Papua New Guinean (PNG)-led disaster relief effort in Oro Province, which was struck by Cyclone Guba.

Joint Task Force 636, led by Group Captain Tim Innes, will provide assistance to help villagers injured and displaced by floods which have already claimed the lives of more than 150 people and cut off road access to the region.

A health assessment team has arrived and will report what is needed to help the victims of the disaster. They are joined by an engineering team who will assess the damage to local infrastructure including port facilities, roads and availability of water and sanitation.

Working with AusAID and other agencies, the ADF has established the most effective response and has sent a small support and command element in close consultation with Papua New Guinea’s Government.

Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules will be joined by three Caribou aircraft and three Black Hawk helicopters from the Australian Army to move aid into Oro province where the flooding has occurred.

A Royal Australian Navy Heavy Landing Ship (LCH) has also been made available and is on standby in Cairns if required.

Australia has always cherished a close friendship with Papua New Guinea and will always respond quickly and work in close cooperation when help is requested.

Aviation Task Group deploys to Operation PNG Assist

23 November 2007

Members of Townsville's 5th Aviation Regiment prepare for deployment to Papua New Guinea, to participate in Operation PNG Assist.

An Aviation Task Group including elements of 5th Aviation Regiment are to provide aviation support to compliment the Government of Australia Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid provided to the disaster-affected areas in the vicinity of Popondetta in Papua New Guinea.

Aid delivered during Operation PNG ASSIST

26 November 2007

Operation PNG Assist began in earnest as Royal Australian Air Force Caribou aircraft carrying Defence, AusAID, Oxfam, Care and Papua New Guinean disaster relief coordinators set out for Oro province, scene of devastating floods caused by Cyclone Guba, that claimed the lives of over 150 villagers and displaced thousands more.

One aircraft headed for the village of Kokoda and surrounding villages to distribute much needed supplies to desperate villagers cut off from outside access on the ground.

RAAF aircrews distributed sweets to the delight of the local children while assessment personnel handed out basic foodstuffs to older villagers who have been without adequate freshwater and food since floods washed away their crops and destroyed rainwater tanks.

The Joint Task Force will be expanding its relief effort over the next week visiting all villages in the province.

Operation PNG Assist is the Australian Defence Force’s mission to provide substantial disaster relief assistance to Papua New Guinea, as they help villages destroyed by flooding in the wake of Cyclone Guba.

Working with AusAID and other agencies, the ADF has established the most effective response and has sent over a small support and command element. Joint Task Force 636, under the command of Group Captain Tim Innes, will coordinate ADF support in close consultation with Papua New Guinea’s Government.

Royal Australian Air force C-130 Hercules will be joined by three Caribou aircraft and three Black Hawk helicopters from the Australian Army to move aid into Oro province where the flooding has occurred.

29 November 2007 Commander Joint Task Force 636 Group Captain Tim Innes Operation PNG Assist is the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) mission to provide substantial disaster relief assistance to Papua New Guinea, as they help villages destroyed by flooding in the wake of Cyclone Guba.

Working with AusAID and other agencies, The ADF has established the most effective response and has sent over a small support and command element. Joint Task Force (JTF) 636, under the command of Group Captain Tim Innes, will coordinate ADF support in close consultation with Papua New Guinea’s Government.


A Royal Australian Navy Heavy Landing Ship (LCH) has also been made available and is on standby in Cairns if required.

Australia has always cherished a close friendship with Papua New Guinea and will always respond quickly and work in close cooperation when help is requested.

29 November 2007 Relief aid at Girua Airfield Girua Airfield has become a scene of heightened activity as representatives of the Australian Defence Force, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, AusAID and the Salvation Army, stepped up the processing and distribution of aid to waiting aircraft, in the wake of floods that devastated Oro province in Papua New Guinea after Cyclone Guba.

The former World War Two base has received a new generation of military aircraft that’s been joined by civilian helicopters, in an effort to move vast amounts of food, shelter and medicine to those effected by the disaster.

Set up and run by the 382nd Expeditionary Combat Support Squadron (ECSS), the forward operating base has turned the quiet airstrip into an airport with capabilities in handling air traffic and cargo that rivals Port Moresby International and provides administrative logistics support, to ADF activities in the region.




29 November 2007 VIPs visit Oro Province A group of very important people visited Oro Province to view damage and see the progress made in relief efforts after floods devastated villages when Cyclone Guba hit the northern region of Papua New Guinea (PNG).

Mr Chris Moraitas (Australian High Commissioner to PNG) was joined by Group Captain Tim Innes (Commander of Joint Task Force 636), Colonel Francis Agwi (Chief Intelligence with the Papua New Guinean Defence Forces), Dame Carol Kidu (Minister for Community Development) and Ms Margaret Thomas (Coordinator of AusAID in PNG), surveyed the damage to the region before landing at the operations centre at Girua Airfield.

The dignitaries then moved to the village of Popondetta, where disaster coordination was taking place and discussed the operation before meeting some of the locals, displaced by the flooding.

Operation PNG Assist is the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) mission to provide substantial disaster relief assistance to Papua New Guinea, as they help villages destroyed by flooding in the wake of Cyclone Guba.

Working with AusAID and other agencies, the ADF has established the most effective response and has sent over a small support and command element. Joint Task Force (JTF) 636, under the command of Group Captain Tim Innes, will coordinate ADF support in close consultation with Papua New Guinea’s Government.

29 November 2007 Black Hawks provide vital aid The Black Hawk helicopters of B Squadron 5th Aviation Regiment, led civilian helicopters out of the village of Popondetta to deliver desperately needed aid to remote villages affected by the floods that struck Oro province in Papua New Guinea (PNG) after Cyclone Guba.

Using their exceptional heavy-lift capability, the Black Hawk pilots hauled thousands of pounds of rice, water and medical aid to the remote communities of Korisata, Kikinonda and Magure, cut off by road and too inaccessible for Royal Australian Air Force Caribous.

Members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force flew on the Black Hawks to help distribute aid as part of the PNG-led relief effort and were joined by officers of the PNG Police Force and villagers who formed human chains to move the precious cargo from the helicopters landing sites.

Off Gona Beach, the Royal Australian Navy landing Craft Heavy HMAS Wewak, offloaded thousands of tons of rice and other aid to the villages in Oro Province.

Operation PNG Assist is the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) mission to provide substantial disaster relief assistance to Papua New Guinea, as they help villages destroyed by flooding in the wake of Cyclone Guba.


04 December 2007 ADF aircraft deliver aid The Black Hawk helicopters of B Squadron 5th aviation Regiment and Royal Australian Air Force Caribous from 38 Squadron have, with the help of civilian aircraft out of Girua Airfield, delivered the last of aid needed in remote villages effected by the floods that struck Oro province in Papua New Guinea after Cyclone Guba.

Using their exceptional heavy lift capability, the Black Hawks and Royal Australian Air Force Caribous have taken hundreds of metric tonnes of rice, water and medical aid to the remote communities, previously cut off by road.

Members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and PNG Police have joined locals at the airfield to handle the last of the aid stores onto aircraft as well as local trucks.

The completion of fords across the once flood-affected rivers is gradually opening up key routes from Girua Airfield to Popondetta, through to the beach head at Gona, allowing local authorities to establish a supply route for the last of the aid that has been sent by many countries.

The Royal Australian Navy landing Craft Heavy HMAS Wewak will offload thousands of tons of rice and other aid, with the construction of a dirt and stone jetty in the next couple of days. All aid will be able to travel by road from Gona reaching all major centres of Oro Province.


04 December 2007 ADF aircraft deliver aid The Black Hawk helicopters of B Squadron 5th aviation Regiment and Royal Australian Air Force Caribous from 38 Squadron have, with the help of civilian aircraft out of Girua

Airfield, delivered the last of aid needed in remote villages effected by the floods that struck Oro province in Papua New Guinea after Cyclone Guba.

Using their exceptional heavy lift capability, the Black Hawks and Royal Australian Air Force Caribous have taken hundreds of metric tonnes of rice, water and medical aid to the remote communities, previously cut off by road.

Members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and PNG Police have joined locals at the airfield to handle the last of the aid stores onto aircraft as well as local trucks.

The completion of fords across the once flood-affected rivers is gradually opening up key routes from Girua Airfield to Popondetta, through to the beach head at Gona, allowing local authorities to establish a supply route for the last of the aid that has been sent by many countries.

The Royal Australian Navy landing Craft Heavy HMAS Wewak will offload thousands of tons of rice and other aid, with the construction of a dirt and stone jetty in the next couple of days. All aid will be able to travel by road from Gona reaching all major centres of Oro Province.


05 December 2007 HMAS Wewak delivers aid to Gona Beach Carrying 60 tonnes of water, rice and dried fish, the Royal Australian Navy Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) HMAS Wewak left the port of Lae on Papua New Guinea’s northern coast to deliver cargo of humanitarian aid to Gona Beach as part of Operation PNG Assist, to help the villages of Oro Province recover from devastating floods after Cyclone Guba.

Since leaving its home port at HMAS Cairns in Queensland, HMAS Wewak has already made trips to the area, carrying 190 tonnes of aid to the coastal areas hit by the floodwaters.

Unable to land at the beach due to silt build up caused by the affected rivers, the ship’s crew of 16 and groups of local volunteers have offloaded the cargo by hand to waiting banana boats which move the aid to shore.


Working with AusAID and other agencies, The ADF has established the most effective response and has sent over a small support and command element. Joint Task Force (JTF) 636, under the command of Group Captain Tim Innes, will coordinate ADF support in close consultation with Papua New Guinea’s Government. Source: Operation PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST (Defence Website). Website: http://www.defence.gov.au/oppngassist/index.htm

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