for (person us: (alice, bob, charlie)) { person match ... · for (person us: (alice, bob, charlie))...

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Transcript of for (person us: (alice, bob, charlie)) { person match ... · for (person us: (alice, bob, charlie))...

Page 1: for (person us: (alice, bob, charlie)) { person match ... · for (person us: (alice, bob, charlie)) { person match { case Alice'") case Person("Bob", Bob!" ) case Person(name, age)

Bitcoin Scalability Solutions - Lightning Network BTC Alice and Bob Multisig Channel Address 1 BTC Alice Refund Address 1 BTC Valid Tomorrow Signed by Bob Alice 0.8 BTC Bob 0.2 BTC

Bitcoin Scalability Solutions - Lightning Network BTC Alice and Bob Multisig Channel Address 1 BTC Alice Refund Address 1 BTC Valid Tomorrow Signed by Bob Alice 0.8 BTC Bob 0.2 BTC

screening for Bob - UChicago Economics · Alice Bob Engage Bob Don’t engage Bob −A, B 1, 1 0, 0 Treat Alice well Treat Alice poorly Alice Bob Engage Bob Don’t engage Bob 1,

screening for Bob - UChicago Economics · Alice Bob Engage Bob Don’t engage Bob −A, B 1, 1 0, 0 Treat Alice well Treat Alice poorly Alice Bob Engage Bob Don’t engage Bob 1,

Alice and Bob in the Quantum Wonderland

Alice and Bob in the Quantum Wonderland

Encryption - Alice, Bob and co.

Encryption - Alice, Bob and co.

Converting Tamarin to extended Alice&Bob protocol specifications · 2016-04-05 · Alice&Bob notation is frequently used to describe security protocols, while proto-col verification

Converting Tamarin to extended Alice&Bob protocol specifications · 2016-04-05 · Alice&Bob notation is frequently used to describe security protocols, while proto-col verification

IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Information Security & Privacy · 2019-02-17 · Alice, Bob share keys with trusted party Cathy The judge must trust Cathy Alice. Bob. Bob. Cathy. Cathy. Bob {

IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Information Security & Privacy · 2019-02-17 · Alice, Bob share keys with trusted party Cathy The judge must trust Cathy Alice. Bob. Bob. Cathy. Cathy. Bob {

Alice Bob Celia Don are members of a club.

Alice Bob Celia Don are members of a club.

help@rt.torproject · 6'4.233.161.83 ISP 7-9. Alice ISP Bob ISP Alice ? ISP Bob ISP Alice snail-corn ISP Bob ISP Alice snail-corn ISP Bob ISP Alice email-corn ISP Bob

[email protected] · 6'4.233.161.83 ISP 7-9. Alice ISP Bob ISP Alice ? ISP Bob ISP Alice snail-corn ISP Bob ISP Alice snail-corn ISP Bob ISP Alice email-corn ISP Bob

CS3516-10-P2P - Worcester Polytechnic Institute · (1) Alice “optimistically unchokes” Bob (2) Alice becomes one of Bob’s top-four providers; Bob reciprocates (3) Bob becomes

CS3516-10-P2P - Worcester Polytechnic Institute · (1) Alice “optimistically unchokes” Bob (2) Alice becomes one of Bob’s top-four providers; Bob reciprocates (3) Bob becomes

SMART UMA Alice-to-Bob sharing.

SMART UMA Alice-to-Bob sharing.

Nikalexis Nikos - nikalexis@gmailNikalexis Nikos - nikalexis@gmail.com Concept Digital money Decentralized applications Transaction Send from Alice to Bob Send from Alice to Bob -

Nikalexis Nikos - nikalexis@gmailNikalexis Nikos - [email protected] Concept Digital money Decentralized applications Transaction Send from Alice to Bob Send from Alice to Bob -

Review: Game theory - Computer Sciencelazebnik/fall11/lec10_game_theory2.pdf · Review: Game theory Alice: Testify Alice: Refuse Bob: Testify-5,-5 -10,0 Bob: 0 -10 -1 -1 Refuse, ,

Review: Game theory - Computer Sciencelazebnik/fall11/lec10_game_theory2.pdf · Review: Game theory Alice: Testify Alice: Refuse Bob: Testify-5,-5 -10,0 Bob: 0 -10 -1 -1 Refuse, ,

Alice and Bob get Physical: Introducing Physical Contexts into Security … · 2020. 10. 30. · Alice and Bob get Physical: Introducing Physical Contexts into Security for the Future

Alice and Bob get Physical: Introducing Physical Contexts into Security … · 2020. 10. 30. · Alice and Bob get Physical: Introducing Physical Contexts into Security for the Future

Asymmetric Message Franking - Cornell Universitytyagi/slides/amf.pdfSetting: End-to-end encrypted messaging Platform Alice Bob 3 From: Alice To: Bob Hello - Confidentiality and Integrity

Asymmetric Message Franking - Cornell Universitytyagi/slides/amf.pdfSetting: End-to-end encrypted messaging Platform Alice Bob 3 From: Alice To: Bob Hello - Confidentiality and Integrity

Quantum communication from Alice to Bob

Quantum communication from Alice to Bob

Cryptography. Alice and Bob Plaintext Cyphertext Plaintext.

Cryptography. Alice and Bob Plaintext Cyphertext Plaintext.

Alice and Bob’s Revenge? Alice Bobtpc/cwi/Teaching/MASPPapers/Lecture13.pdf · –Alice and Bob can recognize the exchanged data –The data is uniformly reconstructable. •Alice

Alice and Bob’s Revenge? Alice Bobtpc/cwi/Teaching/MASPPapers/Lecture13.pdf · –Alice and Bob can recognize the exchanged data –The data is uniformly reconstructable. •Alice

(a) Alice and Bob are back together. Today Alice wants to send Bob a message that is secret and also authenticated, so that Bob "knows" the message came.

(a) Alice and Bob are back together. Today Alice wants to send Bob a message that is secret and also authenticated, so that Bob "knows" the message came.

Information Security Technologyist.ujs.edu.cn/file/jianggao/11 Key Management.pdf · Bootstrap problem: how do Alice, Bob begin? Alice can.t send it to Bob in the clear! Assume trusted

Information Security Technologyist.ujs.edu.cn/file/jianggao/11 Key Management.pdf · Bootstrap problem: how do Alice, Bob begin? Alice can.t send it to Bob in the clear! Assume trusted

Quantum Alice and Silent Bob - Cryptology ePrint Archive · Quantum Alice and Silent Bob Qubit-based Quantum Key Recycling with almost no classical communication Daan Leermakers and

Quantum Alice and Silent Bob - Cryptology ePrint Archive · Quantum Alice and Silent Bob Qubit-based Quantum Key Recycling with almost no classical communication Daan Leermakers and