PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [Cranfield University]On: 12 August 2009Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 773511694]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The RUSI JournalPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t777285713

Focused logistics: Holy Grail or poisoned chalice?David Moore ab; Peter Antill c

a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence Management & Security Analysis, Cranfield University, b Co-director of the new Acquisition and Logistics Unit, c Research Assistant in the Department of DefenceManagement and Security Analysis, Cranfield University,

Online Publication Date: 01 October 1999

To cite this Article Moore, David and Antill, Peter(1999)'Focused logistics: Holy Grail or poisoned chalice?',The RUSI Journal,144:5,28— 33

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/03071849908446442

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849908446442

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

FOCUSED LOGISTICS:

HOLY GRAIL OR POISONED CHALICE?

BY DAVID MOORE AND PETER ANTILL

With the end of the Cold War and the disso-lution of the Warsaw Pact and SovietUnion, there has been an increasing desire

to reduce defence spending and divert scarceresources into other public sector services. In someways the MoD is facing the same challenges asmany commercial companies did in the late 1980sand early 1990s, in their bid to reduce costs in orderto maintain profitability. The Strategic DefenceReview (SDR) has generated new initiatives such as'Smart Procurement' and 'Lean Logistics' in orderto reduce costs in the procurement and sustainmentof the UK Armed Forces. This however, is importantdue to the fact that defence inflation has for manyyears exceeded normal economic inflation,1 leadingto the spiralling cost of new weapon systems.

With logistics having become more importantas the 20th century has progressed, and particularlysince the end of the Cold War, the need for moreefficient and effective logistics is becoming para-mount, as it is seen as both a 'competitive advan-tage' and a 'force enabler'. 'Focused Logistics' isthe latest term to enter usage, and this paper willexamine how different it is from what has gonebefore, and whether it is applicable to some of theoperational challenges that the armed forces mightface in the near future.

WHAT IS FOCUSED LOGISTICS?

As the 21st century dawns, the rate of change intechnology is, compared to earlier times, astonish-ing. Combined with the end of the Cold War andthe seeming necessity to be able to intervene effec-tively far away from the home base, the result hasbeen to change attitudes to war along with theapproach to business. In many ways, as the two areconverging, the military try to take on board someof the 'best' practices of the business and commer-cial world.

The term 'Focused Logistics' originated in the

US Armed Forces and is defined as 'the fusion ofinformation, logistics and transportation technol-ogies to provide rapid crisis response, to track andshift assets even while en route, and to delivertailored logistics packages and sustainment at thestrategic, operational and tactical level of opera-tions.'2 The key elements here are the embracing ofemerging technologies (particularly informationtechnology), transportation techniques, businessmethods of asset control and the concept of'tailoring'.3

EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?

Is 'Focused Logistics' a new concept or an evolutionfrom present ideas? Is it a military version of 'LeanLogistics'? 'Lean Logistics' has five principles:specify value, identify its stream and make it flow,pull just in time and strive for perfection.4 Addition-ally, the objective of integrating information, logisticand distribution systems is also known as 'supplychain logistics'. This includes 'the functions of pur-chasing, transportation, inventory control, materialshandling, manufacturing, distribution and relatedsystems . . . Its primary focus is the physical flows

David Moore is a SeniorLecturer in the Department ofDefence Management & SecurityAnalysis at Cranfield University,and co-director of the newAcquisition and Logistics Unit.

Peter Antill is a ResearchAssistant in the Department ofDefence Management andSecurity Analysis at CranfieldUniversity.

28

Downloaded By: [Cranfield University] At: 14:36 12 August 2009

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

and storage of materials and the system flows ofrelated information.'5 It seems that 'Focused Logis-tics' is very similar to 'Lean Logistics' in manyways, but it can be argued that they differ in theintention to adopt the principles of 'Lean Logistics'to the military environment.

However, given that the overriding imperativeseems to be that of reducing costs, the need to havea more efficient supply chain must be seen in thatlight. Ultimately, if revisions in the supply chainare going to be costly, then despite the military ben-efit, governments are unlikely to give the go aheadas the objective for them is thereduction of defence spending.

fix the problems and more faulty parts had to moveback up the supply chain.

In reducing the amount of inventory held inthe combat area, reducing the throughput in thesupply chain, and having a greater visibility inthe supply chain it would be possible to cutdown the logistics infrastructure. A smaller inven-tory requires less people for maintenance and lessstorage space, as well as fewer troops to guard it inthe theatre of operations and fewer consumables.As a result, less personnel and transport assets willbe needed to move these items.

THE LEAN SUPPLY CHAIN

'Focused Logistics' seeks toreduce the logistic footprint,that is, to reduce the amount ofequipment and consumablesthat the MoD needs to storeand that commanders need totake on operations. This couldbe undertaken by better pre-dicting the rate at whichresources are used, whichwould enable the defenceindustry to better gear theirrate of production within thesupply chain to match theusage of the 'customer'.Therefore, the current philoso-phy of 'just in case' (where equipment and suppliesare stockpiled) would have to be replaced by a 'justin time'6 (JIT) one. However, it may be that com-mercial JIT is too risky in an operationalenvironment.

The second method would be to build agreater level of reliability into systems in order toreduce the maintenance burden. By reducing theneed for maintenance, it follows that the amount ofspare parts that have to be moved through the sup-ply chain can be reduced. Correspondingly, thenumber of faulty parts moving back up the chain isalso reduced. As an example, during the Gulf War,the Challenger I main battle tank was found initial-ly to have a poor Mean Time Before Failure rate,around 723 kilometres, instead of the planning fig-ure of 1235 kilometres.7 Thus, as the Challengerwas substantially less reliable than anticipated, farmore spares had to be moved down the supplychain, more man hours of work had to be put in to

The contracting ofcivilian firms toprovide a broad rangeof logistic servicescan be viewed as apotential forcemultiplier, especiallyin peacekeeper orhumanitariansituations in countriesthat have littleinfrastructure.

FOCUSED LOGISTICS:

THE ADVANTAGES

The setting up of a 'FocusedLogistics' system could haveseveral advantages:• Making available global

real-time logistic informa-tion for all those who needit (as in the US discountchain 'Wal-Mart' model).Automatic IdentificationTechnology will enhanceworldwide asset tracking.

• Electronic commerce sys-tems would allow on-lineordering and payment.

• Logistics will be centredaround speed instead ofmass, relying on rapid

transportation systems.Integrated distribution systems (supply chain inte-gration) should improve response times, accuratedelivery scheduling and forward delivery.Enhancing civil-military integration whichshould mean that the military capitalise on bestbusiness practice. Commercial lift can be usedand brought onto the battlefield as a part of theforce. The contracting of civilian firms to pro-vide a broad range of logistic services can beviewed as a potential force multiplier, especiallyin peacekeeping or humanitarian situations incountries that have little infrastructure.The accurate identification of future logisticrequirements should allow industrial baseplanning.Logistic supply planning tools would allow real-time awareness of unit and weapon system readi-ness, enabling the logistician to be 'proactive'and use a 'pull' supply chain.

29

Downloaded By: [Cranfield University] At: 14:36 12 August 2009

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

• It would enhance overall acquisition reform,such as the move to the paperless contractingprocedure, electronic commerce, the growth ofcivil-military integration and the use of life-cycle management.

Overall, 'Focused Logistics' is designed toreduce response times and costs, produce a moreagile infrastructure, and improve quality and readi-ness. This 'faster, better and best value' support isarrived at by first identifying and then concentrat-ing on the key elements of the logistic system, andsubstitutes speed of response for large 'just in case*inventories. The real question is, whether 'FocusedLogistics' can actually be made to work in anoperational environment, orwhether it is merely a buzz-word for an inappropriate busi-ness philosophy shoehornedinto a military context? Thereis a danger of being seduced bythe theory of cost saving andefficiency building - imple-menting 'Focused Logistics'and then cutting overall logis-tic capability. The FalklandsCampaign reminded the MoDthat the 'need to get the logis-tics right determined the abilityof a formation to conduct itsoperations'.8

FOCUSED LOGISTICS:THE DISADVANTAGES

The difficulty for the ArmedForces is knowing what theywant and need as well as finding out what is 'justenough' in order to accomplish their set goals.Allied to this are the possible disadvantages with'Focused Logistics':• A possible over-reliance on technology, where 'a

soldier who is a true information warrior may beso fascinated by what he is seeing . . . on his lap-top, that he fails to notice that his virtual battle-space is about to be violated by a real warriorwith a machete who has crept up behind him.'9

• The immense power of emerging technology(which continues to advance at a rapid rate) hascreated its own myths, and produced a myopiain which technology and automation is thepanacea for all situations. As the US DeputyUnder Secretary of Defense (Logistics) has said,'information and technological advances will

The difficulty for theArmed Forces isknowing what theywant and need aswell as finding outwhat is 'just enough'in order toaccomplish their setgoal. Allied to thisare the possibledisadvantages with'Focused Logistics'.

revolutionise warfare'.10 There is very little inthe concept of 'Focused Logistics' that doesmake imaginary use of such advances.While many factors in the post-Cold War worldhave created a drive for new ideas, we shouldnot 'make the mistake of equating reception ofconcept and volume of debating noise withstrategic truth'.11 Purely basing a paradigm shifton upcoming technology (and hence changingthe fundamental structure of our armed forces)without any true regard or appraisal as to thenature of future opponents has its own dangers.Technology has many advantages, but in manyareas in the world 'the

ultimate determinant inwar is the man on thescene with a gun'.12

• Future warfare is increas-. ingly seen as being domi-nated by coalition orinternational cooperation.'We take it as a "given"that the future battlespacewill be joint . . . and . . .multinational.'13 True inte-gration between nationswill be very difficult giventhe disparity between bud-gets and the size of armedforces.

• Not only is there disparitybetween frontline forces,but also in strategic lift.The UK has just over sixtyHercules transports and afew surface ships. The US

used some 350 transport aircraft in the GulfWar.14 It is capability differences such as thesethat raise questions about full integration. Assettracking depends on an uninterrupted stream anda capability mismatch anywhere along the line,

. could prove dangerous.15

Modern deep battle doctrine stresses the need tostrike at the enemy's rear areas, where he isvulnerable and his supply system is located. Ifwe are fighting a reasonable competent and tech-nologically sophisticated opponent (given thatwe are conducting deep battle) then we canassume that he will be looking to do the same tous, that is, dislocate our fighting forces from oursupply line. 'Focused Logistics' has notaddressed the issue of its own vulnerability toenemy action.

30

Downloaded By: [Cranfield University] At: 14:36 12 August 2009

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

• Transportation is another central tenet of'Focused Logistics'. Many of the current trans-port methods use sophisticated technology andare thus open to exploitation. The balancebetween 'just in time' and 'just in case' as indi-cated by Paul Kaminski seems to rely heavily ondelivery rather than storage. It requires 'the sub-stitution of fast transportation for logistics infra-structure',16 which focuses on actual customerrequirements when those requirements arise.Transportation assets are vulnerable, not only toa sophisticated opponent employing deep battle,but also to a well-placed insurgent.

• There are risks in becoming too dependent oncorporate outsourcing in that the military maycease to be an 'intelligent customer'.17

• Is one of the true drivers behind 'Focused Logis-tics' that of cost? While costand value have a legitimateplace in all defence policycalculations, it is dangerousto dress them up as militaryadvantages. 'Cost was theever present limitation.Before Hitler came topower, there seemed verylittle prospect of the BritishArmy being called upon tofight a (European) land battle. Theorists spoke ofthe 'expanding torrent' in which armouredforces, with close air support, would make deeppenetrations through fortified fronts. Suchexpensive ideas were far too Napoleonic for anarmy mainly concerned with putting down riotsin the colonies.'18

• If 'tailoring' is a cost cutting exercise then itshould be acknowledged as such and adapted to.Cutting the cloth to produce a more elegant fit isvalid, stretching it until the seams go, is not.User confidence in 'Focused Logistics' will beessential, and cost-cutting is a great disincentiveto the acceptance of innovation.

THE TAILORED SUPPLY CHAIN -'SUITS YOU, SIR?'

Whatever happens in the way of moving the supplychain towards a more 'just in time' approach, theMoD must match the logistic capability with itswarfighting capability. This is actually prettydiverse with high intensity conventional warfare atone extreme and peacetime training at the other,with many other types of conflict in-between. The

Cutting the cloth toproduce a moreelegant fit is valid,stretching it until theseams go, is not.

logistic requirements of these two scenariosare quite different, and for the UK's Armed Forcesto be an effective tool in foreign and defencepolicy, the best solution may be to have a systemthat could cope with the worst case scenario - aconventional war. But that may incur additionalcosts in peacetime with significant capability goingunused.

It would appear that the concept of 'FocusedLogistics', advocating as it does the tailoring of thesupply chain to the operational need, provides theanswer. In peacetime the assets and resources thatthe military need will be quite small. But as theybegin to move along the spectrum of conflict, moreassets and resources could be allocated to meetincreasing requirements. This, however, maynot only have implications for the production

capacity within the supplychain, but for the relationshipsbetween customers andsuppliers.

First, there will be impli-cations for the supply of mate-rial to formations on theground that are at the end ofthe supply chain. Because ofthe rising costs of running andmaintaining equipment, cou-

pled with the high costs of certain consumables(such as ammunition, missiles and torpedoes), thereis a move towards a greater reliance on simulationto cover the needs of peacetime training. If this iscombined with the concepts of lean supply man-agement, that is, keeping the minimal amount ofinventory and producing goods as and whenrequired, it is possible that the production of suchgoods will be small or even zero in peacetime. Theproblem is, however, that commercial organisationsare unlikely to want, or be able to leave productioncapacity unutilised whilst awaiting MoD require-ments. Chances are that they will want to employthese resources satisfying other customers, andare unlikely to divert these resources back to theMoD.

Secondly, financial pressure may mean theincreased outsourcing of certain services, such asthe maintenance of equipment, to a greater extentthan happens now. This may also become morecommonplace as systems become more complicat-ed and the MoD has to rely on the system's produc-ers to maintain their product in service. While in apeacetime role, this may not present a problem, butthe MoD has to prepare to engage in other

31

Downloaded By: [Cranfield University] At: 14:36 12 August 2009

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

operational deployments, up to, and including, highintensity conventional warfare.

How the MoD satisfies this need, either byhaving civilian contractors or sponsored reserves isnot the question. What matters is that the opera-tional commander can be guaranteed their partici-pation, particularly where it is a foreign company,whose government does not support the actions ofthe UK. Transport assets need to be earmarked andcontracts placed, to acquire the necessary resourcesas the MoD's needs expand and contract accordingto the situation. This principle isn't new, but SDRidentified a number of flaws inthe system, as did the NationalAudit Office report regardingthe contracting of sealift forOperation Granby.19

CONCLUSION

FLEXIBILITY AND

RESPONSIVENESS

In times past, there was anassumption in the MoD thattransport assets could beobtained from commercialsources if the need was suffi-ciently great. In the SDR, theMoD announced its intentionto purchase four more roll-on/roll-off ships and four largestrategic lift aircraft (C-17 or equivalent)20 inrecognition that, while resources such as these maybe obtainable given sufficient lead time, the timeframes that the MoD may sometimes have to dealwith makes it unlikely that commercial resourceswould be available.

Of the few definitions that exist of 'FocusedLogistics' none explain rapid response in terms oftime frame. The British Army holds combat units atvarying states of readiness, some as little as twenty-four hours. As a benchmark^however, it anticipatesbeing able to deploy a fully operational brigade inthirty days. Any logistic support for this formationmust therefore be able to respond in the sametimescale. It is unlikely then that in a normal situa-tion, civilian production facilities, support assetsand transport assets will be available at such shortnotice unless they remain uncommitted to otherventures and earmarked solely for MoD use, whichin all probability will command a premium price. Itmay therefore be more cost effective in certain situ-ations to rely on military assets rather than civilianones.

The United States Armed Forces believe that'Focused Logistics,' once fully implemented, willbe a seamless system where there is total asset visi-bility to enable logistics to be based on velocity ofdistribution rather than stockholding. Rapid forceprojection will be possible thanks to an adequatebut small logistic footprint and an 'agile supplychain'.21 The use of commercial best practice, com-petitive sourcing and partnering, combined with a

decreased in-theatre logistic: footprint and infrastructure,

reduced inventory andreduced numbers of mainte-nance personnel are all part ofthe strategy. It will reducecosts, increase flexibility and

nave LO

implement a number

The MoD has notstated that they willadopt 'FocusedLOgiStiCS' aS SUCh, a n d provide them with the tailored

support to take on an enemyanywhere in the world at shortnotice.

It thus seems an answerto budgetary prayers. Not

t h e y wi l l h a v e t h e only would h remove ±e

financial drain of under-Capabl l l ty tO SUppOrt utilised assets, but a properlySUCh a System. constructed and tested

J 'Focused' supply chainshould ensure that the right

warfighting assets are in the right place at the righttime and in the right amount. The MoD has not stat-ed that they will adopt 'Focused Logistics' as such,and will have to implement a number of changesbefore they will have the capability to support sucha system.

While some operations (such as those in theBalkans) have shown 'Focused Logistics' to work,it would be inappropriate to draw the conclusionthat it can therefore work in all scenarios. In largescale conventional operations, the dependence ontechnology and logistics based on velocity of distri-bution, may leave the forces involved vulnerable tothe possibility of a shortfall in transport assetsavailable to accomplish the mission, unanticipatedweather, capability mismatches with other allies,maintenance problems, enemy interdiction and the'fog' or 'friction' of war.

'Tailoring' needs to provide the best, and notjust the cheapest, if the troops on the ground aregoing to have confidence in the system. In the finalanalysis, the final shape of the supply chain,whether it is closer to 'just in case' or 'just in time',

32

Downloaded By: [Cranfield University] At: 14:36 12 August 2009

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

must be constructed and tested under the concept ofkaizen or the eternal drive for perfection. The sys-tem must be constantly tested under conditions asclose as possible to what will be found under opera-tional deployment. As such, logistics planning musttake into account the huge variety of scenariospossible in the post-Cold War world. •

NOTES

1. 'Platform Envy', The Economist, 12 December 1998, p. 25.2. Department of Defense, Army Vision 2010 and related doc-uments, US Army Home Page.3. J S Gansler, US Undersecretary of Defense, (Acquisitionand Technology) in FY 98 DoD Strategic Plan.4. Taylor, David, 'Supply Chain Improvement: The LeanApproach', Logistics Focus, Corby, January 1999.5. Coyle, Bardi, Langley, The Management of Business Logis-tics, (West Publishing Company, 1992), p. 9.6. Kaminski, P G, 'Lean Logistics: Better, Faster, Cheaper',Defense Issues, Volume 11, Number 99.7. Moore, David, Bradford, Jeffrey and Antill, Peter, 'TheRole of Logistics in Modern Warfare: Operations Desert Shieldand Desert Storm', RMCS Paper, p. 15.8. Poffley, Major M W, 'The Logistic Lessons from the Falk-lands Campaign and their Relevance to future British ArmyOperations within Defence Role 3', MA (Mil Studies) Disser-tation, September 1994, p. 16.

9. Gray, Colin S, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs' in TheNature of Future Conflict: Implications for Force Development,SCSI Occasional Paper 36, September 1998.10. In Kallock, R, A Glimpse of the Future: Joint Vision 2010,At the RUSI Focused Logistics Conference, London, 18-19January 1999.11. Gray, Colin S, op cit.12. Wylie, Rear Admiral J C (USN). Cited in Gray, Colin S,op cit.13. Applegate, Col Dick, 'Towards the Future Army' in TheNature of Future Conflict: Implications for Force Develop-ment, op cit.14. The Global Military Toolbook, a research group projectpresented to the Air Command and Staff College, March 1997,15. Campbell, John, 'IS/IT and Organisations', Lecture toMDA 13, RMCS, 22 March 1999.16. -Kaminski, P G, op cit.17. Evans, Brigadier P A D OBE, 'Contractors on the Battle-field', Discussion Paper D/ACDS(L)/520/1/1. 25 October 1998.18. Deighton, Len, Blitzkrieg - From the Rise of Hitler to theFall of Dunkirk, (Johnathan Cape Ltd, London, 1979).19. National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Movements ofPersonnel, Equipment and Stores to and from the Gulf, HC693,(HMSO, London, June 1993), pp. 5-10.20. Strategic Defence Review, CM3999, (The StationaryOffice, London, July 1998), pp. 24 and 39.21. Christopher, Professor Martin, 'Creating the Agile Supply.Chain', Logistics Supplement, Haymarket Publications, March1999.

DIGITIZATION IN AN ERA OFEXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

A RUSI Conference10-11 November 1999

The United Kingdom, in conjunction with the NATO alliance and coalition partners, has increasingly found itselfconducting military operations far from its national borders. In 1998, this reality was formalised as part of the Govern-ment's Strategic Defence Review.

One key enabler of this strategy will undoubtedly be digitization of the battlespace. Recent conflicts in the MiddleEast and the Balkans have revealed how technology acts as a force multiplier, to limit friendly and civilian casualtieswhilst delivering the vast majority of ordnance with extreme precision. However, failures of intelligence and surveil-lance collection still have to be addressed.

Digitization is designed to maximise the potential of combat systems, coordinating their capabilities in order to pro-duce overwhelming battlespace superiority. Implementation has risks, however, such as achieving interoperabilitybetween the equipment programmes of different Armed Forces. A key factor will be to present the information to thecommander in such a way that sound and timely decisions can be made to take full advantage of the capabilities of sen-sors and weapon systems.

This two-day RUSI conference will seek to illuminate these issues through expert military, industrial and academicspeakers.

33

Downloaded By: [Cranfield University] At: 14:36 12 August 2009