Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service...

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Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites Jaeyeon Jung MIT Laboratory for Computer Science Balachander Krishnamurthy and Michael Rabinovich AT&T Labs-Research

Transcript of Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service...

Page 1: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites

Jaeyeon JungMIT Laboratory for Computer Science

Balachander Krishnamurthy and Michael RabinovichAT&T Labs-Research

Page 2: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Motivation✔ Flash crowd is a sudden, large surge in traffic to a

particular Web site

– September 11, Ken Starr’s report, Victoria’s

Secret webcast

✔ Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt

to prevent legitimate users of a service from using

that service

– HTTP request flooding, attack to crack

password-protected web pages, ���� ���

worm, TCP SYN flooding, etc.

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Questions✔ Part I: Flash events vs. DoS attacks

– What properties differentiate DoS attacks from

flash events?

– How can we use them to identify and separate

DoS attacks from flash events?

✔ Part II: Flash crowds and CDNs

– What is the locality of file reference like during

flash events and its implication for CDNs?

– How can we improve protection of Web servers

from flash crowds using CDNs?

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Network-Aware Clusters [KW00]

✔ Clustering uses a large collection of unique

network prefix from BGP tables

✔ Classify all the IP addresses that have the same

longest matched prefix into a cluster

✔ It helps determine topological distribution of

clients in FE and DoS

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Flash Events

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Trace Requests Documents Clients Clusters

Play-along Total 13,018,385 7,084 53,745 14,100

FE 71.0% 68.9% 63.9% 61.6%

Chile Total 2,634,567 10,302 20,532 1,739

FE 88.2% 90.2% 89.0% 86.6%

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DoS Attacks

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bit.nl 35,657 1 11,092 6,155

✔ ���� ��� : In the earlier variant, each instance

uses the same random number generator seed to

create the list of IP addresses it scans [CERT].

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Page 7: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Part I: Flash Events vs. DoS Attacks

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Client Characteristics

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✔ [FE] Clients can be effectively aggregated into

clusters

✔ [DoS] Distribution of DoS attackers is broad

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Client Characteristics - contd.

✔ [FE] Many old clusters are represented in flash

events

Play-along : 42.7% and Chile: 82.9%

✔ [DoS] Very few previously seen clusters are

involved in DoS attacks

creighton: 0.6%, fullnote: 0%, spccctxus: 1.8%,

and rellim: 14.3%

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Per-client Request Rate

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✔ [FE] There is a decline in per-client request rate

during the flash event

✔ [DoS] The per-client request rate does not change

during the surge in requests

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Server Strategy✔ Monitor the clients that access the site and their

request rate

✔ Periodically perform network aware clustering over

the client set accumulated over the past period

without flash or DoS events - old clusters

✔ When performance degrades to a threshold level,

discard packets that come from clients that do not

belong to old clusters as well as from non-proxy

clients whose request rate deviates significantly

from average

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Part II: Flash Crowds and CDNs

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File Reference Characteristics✔ Large number of documents are accessed only

during FEs (Play-along : 61% and Chile: 82%)

➔ Many cache misses at the beginning of FEs

✔ 10% of popular documents account for more than90% of requests.

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Flash Events and CDN

CDN node CDN node

CDN nodeCDN node

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

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OriginServer

✔ CDN with 1,000+ cache nodes might not be able to

provide an absolute protection against FE due to the

peaks in the beginning of FE

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Flash Events and CDN

CDN node CDN node

CDN nodeCDN node

Client

Client

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Client

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Client

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✔ Limiting the number of caches would increase the

load on individual caches

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Page 16: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Flash Events and CDN

CDN node CDN node

Client

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Client Client

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Client

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✔ Limiting the number of caches would increase the

load on individual caches

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Page 17: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Flash Events and CDN

CDN node

Client

CDN nodeClient

Client Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client Client

Client

OriginServer

✔ Limiting the number of caches would increase the

load on individual caches

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Page 18: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Adaptive CDN

✔ Lower the peak rate forwarded to an origin server

while spreading load over cache nodes

Delegate

Delegate

Primary

Primary Primary

Primary

Client Client

DNS

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3

OriginServer

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Adaptive CDN

✔ Lower the peak rate forwarded to the origin server

while spreading load over cache nodes

Delegate

Delegate

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Primary Primary

Primary

Client Client

DNS

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OriginServer

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Page 20: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Adaptive CDN

✔ Lower the peak rate forwarded to the origin server

while spreading load over cache nodes

Delegate

Delegate

Client Client

Primary

Primary Primary

Primary

Client

DNS1

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OriginServer

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Page 21: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Dynamic Delegation

lhl <

lll <

ll lh< l <

lh, l(d) >

OverloadedUnderloaded

; release delegates ; redirect request to; add a new one if

; process requests

l > lh

of the lowest loadd

; HTTP request redirect to; add delegate d

d

d

✔ Load on primary cache, �, is computed as requests

per second averaged over two-second interval.

✔ Cache is assigned based on cluster and used for ttl

period.

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Page 22: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Simulation Results

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✔ Peak request rates are reduced by a factor of 50

(Play-along), and 20 (Chile)

✔ It ensures that load on each cache remains low (50

rps) and that proximity-based cache selection is not

compromised.

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Page 23: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacksahaque/FlashCrowd.pdf · Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites ... Flash crowd

Conclusion

✔ Client clustering technique is useful for source

identification and for distinguishing legitimate

requests and malicious attacks.

✔ Per-client request rate drops and remains lower

during the FEs unlike DoS attackers who generate

requests independently of a server load

✔ Adaptive CDN is effective in terms of reduction of

flows from the main server and dynamic load

distribution over cache nodes.

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