First Congo War 1

First Congo WarThe First Congo War (1996 – 1997) was a revolution in Zaire that replaced a decades-long dictator, Mobutu SéséSeko with rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Destabilization in eastern Zaire that resulted from the RwandanGenocide was the final factor that caused numerous internal and external actors to align against the corrupt and ineptgovernment in the capital, Kinshasa. The new government renamed the country to the Democratic Republic of theCongo, but it brought little true change. Kabila alienated his allies and failed to address the issues that had led to thewar, which ultimately allowing the Second Congo War to begin in 1998, mere months after coming to power. In fact,some experts prefer to view the two conflicts as one war.[1]

Background

Failing stateMobutu, an ethnic Ngbandi, came to power in 1965 and enjoyed support from the United States during the ColdWar. However, Mobutu's authoritarian rule and policies allowed the Zairian state to decay, evidenced by a 65%decrease in Zairian GDP between independence in 1960 and the end of Mobutu's rule in 1997.[2] Following the endof the Cold War, the United States stopped supporting Mobutu in favor of what it called a "new generation ofAfrican leaders,"[3] including Rwanda's Kagame and Uganda's Museveni.A wave of democratization swept across Africa during the 1990s and under substantial internal and external pressurefor a democratic transition in Zaire, Mobutu promised reform. He officially ended the one-party system he hadmaintained since 1967 but was ultimately unwilling to implement broad reform, alienating allies both at home andabroad. In fact, the Zairian state had all but ceased to exist. The majority of the Zairian population relied on aninformal economy for their subsistence, since the official economy was not reliable.[4] Furthermore, the Zairiannational army, Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ), was forced to prey upon the population for survival; Mobutu himselfonce asked FAZ soldiers why they needed pay when they were provided weapons.[5]

There had been considerable internal resistance to Mobutu's rule and, given the weak central state, rebel groups wereable to find refuge in Zaire's eastern provinces, far from the capital, Kinshasa. Opposition included leftists who hadsupported Patrice Lumumba as well as ethnic and regional minorities opposed to the dominance of Kinshasa.Laurent-Désiré Kabila, an ethnic Luba from Katanga province who would eventually overthrow Mobutu, had beenfighting Mobutu's regime since its inception.[6] The inability of the Mobutuist regime to control rebel movements inits eastern provinces eventually allowed its internal and external foes to ally.

Ethnic tensionsTensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern Zaire for centuries, especially between the agrariantribes native to Zaire and semi-nomadic Tutsi tribes that had emigrated from Rwanda at various times.[7] In additionto some Tutsi who were native to eastern Congo, the earliest of these migrants arrived before colonization in the1880s, followed by emigrants who were forcibly relocated to Congo to perform manual labor by the Belgiancolonizers (after 1908), and another prominent wave of emigrants fleeing the social revolution of 1959 that broughtthe Hutu to power in Kigali.[8] All Tutsi emigrants to Zaire before Congolese independence in 1960 are known asBanyamulenge, meaning "from Mulenge," and were privy to citizenship under Zairian law.[9] Tutsi who emigrated toZaire following independence are known as Banyarwanda, although the 'native' locals often fail to distinguishbetween the two, naming them both Banyamulenge and considering them foreigners.[10]

After coming to power in 1965, Mobutu gave the Banyamulenge political power in the East in hopes that they, as a minority, would keep a tight grip on power and prevent the more populous ethnicities from forming an opposition.[11] This understandably aggravated the existing ethnic tensions, which manifested itself in several events.

First Congo War 2

From 1963 to 1966 the Hunde and Nande ethnic groups of North Kivu fought against Rwandan emigrants — bothTutsi and Hutu - in the Kanyarwandan War, which involved several massacres.[12] In 1981 a restrictive citizenshiplaw was adopted, which denied the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda citizenship and therewith all political rights.[13]

From 1993 to 1996 Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga youth regularly attacked the Banyamulenge, leading to a total of14,000 deaths.[14] In 1995 the Zairian Parliament ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent to berepatriated to their countries of origin, including the Banyamulenge.[15] Due to political exclusion and ethnicviolence, the Banyamulenge developed ties to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a mainly Tutsi rebel movementbased in Uganda and with power aspirations in Rwanda, as early as 1991.[16]

Rwandan GenocideThe deciding event in precipitating the war was the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, which sparked a mass exodusof refugees known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis. During the 100-day genocide, hundreds of thousands of Tutsisand sympathizers were massacred at the hands of predominantly Hutu aggressors. The genocide ended when theHutu government in Kigali was overthrown by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front.Of those who fled Rwanda during the crisis, about 1.5 million settled in eastern Zaire.[17] These refugees includedthose who fled the Hutu génocidaires as well as those that fled the Tutsi RPF fearing retaliation. Prominent amongthe latter group were the génocidaires themselves, such as elements of the former Rwandan Army, Forces ArméesRwandaises (FAR), and independent Hutu extremist groups known as Interahamwe.[18] They set up camps in easternZaire from which they attacked both the newly-arrived Rwandan Tutsi as well as the Banyamulenge andBanyarwanda. These attacks were the cause of about one hundred deaths a month during the first half of 1996.[19]

Furthermore, the newly arrived militants were intent on returning to power in Rwanda and began launching attacksagainst the new regime in Kigali, which represented a serious security threat to the infant state.[20] Not only was theMobutu government incapable of controlling the former génocidaires for previously mentioned reasons but actuallysupported them in training and supplying for an invasion of Rwanda,[21] forcing Kigali to act.

Banyamulenge Rebellion

Zaire, ca. 1996

Given the exacerbated ethnic tensions and the lack ofgovernment control in the East, Rwanda was to takeaction against the security threat posed by thegénocidaires that had found refuge in eastern Zaire.The government in Kigali had begun forming Tutsimilitias for operations in Zaire as early as 1995[22] andchose to act following an exchange of fire betweenRwandan Tutsi and Zairian Green Berets that markedthe outbreak of the Banyamulenge Rebellion on August31, 1996.[23] While there was general unrest in easternZaire, the rebellion was unlikely a grassrootsmovement; Uganda president Yoweri Museveni, whosupported and worked closely with Rwanda in the FirstCongo War, later recalled that the rebellion was incitedby Zairian Tutsi who had been recruited by theRwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).[22]

First Congo War 3

The initial goal of the Banyamulenge Rebellion was to seize power in Zaire's eastern Kivu provinces and combat theextremist Hutu forces that were attempting to continue the genocide in their new home. However, the rebellion didnot remain Tutsi-dominated for long. Mobutu's harsh and selfish rule had created enemies in virtually all sectors ofZairian society. As a result, the new rebellion benefited from massive public support and grew to be a generalrevolution rather than a mere Banyamulenge uprising.[24]

Banyamulenge elements as well as non-Tutsi militias coalesced into the Alliance of Democratic Forces for theLiberation of Congo (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who had been a long-time opponent ofthe Mobutu government and was a leader of one of the three main rebel groups that founded the AFDL. While theAFDL was an ostensibly Zairian rebel movement, Rwanda had played a key role in its formation. Observers of thewar, as well as the Rwandan Defense Minister and Vice President at the time, Paul Kagame, claim that the AFDLwas formed in and directed from Kigali and contained not only Rwandan-trained troops but also regulars of theRPA.[25]

Foreign Actors

RwandaAccording to expert observes as well as Kagame himself, Rwanda played the largest role of a foreign actor, if not thelargest role of all, in the First Congo War. Kigali was instrumental in the formation of the AFDL and sent its owntroops to fight alongside the rebels. While its actions were originally sparked by the security threat posed by theZairian-based génocidaires, Kigali was pursuing multiple goals during its intervention in Zaire.The first and foremost of these was the suppression of the génocidaires who had been launching attacks against thenew Rwandan state from Zaire. Kagame claimed that Rwandan agents had discovered the plans to invade Rwandawith support from Mobutu; in response, Kigali began its intervention with the intention of dismantling the refugeecamps in which the génocidaires often took refuge and destroying the structure of these anti-Rwandan elements.[26]

A second goal that is cited by Kagame, and which is universally regarded as accurate, is the overthrow of Mobutu.While this was partially a means to minimizing the threat in eastern Zaire, it was also a chance for the new Rwandanstate to set up a puppet-regime in Kinshasa.[27] This goal was not particularly threatening to other states in the regionbecause it was ostensibly a means to securing Rwandan security and because many of them were also opposed toMobutu. Internationally Kigali was also aided by the tacit support of the United States, which supported Kagame asa member of the new generation of African leaders.[3]

However, the true intentions of Rwanda are not entirely clear. Some authors have proposed that the dismantling ofrefugee camps was a means of replenishing Rwanda's depleted population and workforce following the genocide,because the destruction of camps was followed by the forced repatriation of Tutsi regardless of whether they wereRwandan or Zairian.[28] The intervention may also have been motivated by revenge; the Rwandan forces, as well asthe AFDL, massacred retreating Hutu refugees in several known instances.[29] A commonly cited factor for Rwandanactions is that the RPF, which had recently come to power in Kigali, had come to see itself as the protector of theTutsi nation and was therefore partially acting in defense of its Zairian brethren.[30] There is also a distinct possibilitythat Rwanda harbored ambitions to annex portions of eastern Zaire. Pasteur Bizimungu himself, President of Rwandafrom 1994-2000, presented the then US ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gribbin, with the idea of a "GreaterRwanda." This idea purports that the ancient state of Rwanda included parts of eastern Zaire that should actuallybelong to Rwanda.[31] However, it appears that Rwanda never seriously attempted to annex these territories. Thehistory of conflict in the Congo is often associated with illegal resource exploitation but, although Rwanda didbenefit financially by plundering Zaire's wealth,[32] this is almost universally denied as a motivation for Rwandanintervention in the First Congo War.[33]

First Congo War 4

UgandaAs a close ally of the RPF, Uganda also played a major role in the First Congo War. Museveni had allowed the RPFto use Uganda as its headquarters after it had fought alongside Ugandan rebels to bring Museveni to power. In 1994,Uganda was the base from which the RPF launched its attack against the genocidal government in Kigali. Giventheir historical ties, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were closely allied and thus Museveni worked closelywith Kagame throughout the First Congo War. Ugandan soldiers were present in Zaire throughout the conflict andMuseveni likely helped Kagame plan and direct the AFDL.[22] Lt. Col. James Kabarebe of the AFDL, for example,was a former member of Uganda's National Resistance Army, the military wing of the rebel movement that broughtMuseveni to power, and French and Belgian intelligence reported that 15,000 Ugandan-trained Tutsi fought for theAFDL.[34] However, Uganda did not support Rwanda in all aspects of the war. Museveni was reportedly much lessinclined to overthrow Mobutu, preferring to keep the rebellion in the East where the former génocidaires wereoperating.[35]

AngolaAngola remained on the sidelines until 1997 but its entrance into the fray greatly increased the already superiorstrength of anti-Mobutu forces. Angola chose to act primarily through Katangese Gendarmes called the Tigres,which were proxy groups formed from the descendents of police units that had been exiled from Zaire and thus werefighting for a return to their homeland.[36] Luanda did also deploy regular troops. Angola chose to participate in theFirst Congo War because members of Mobutu's government were directly involved in supplying the Angolan rebelgroup UNITA.[37] It is unclear exactly how the government benefited from this relationship, other than personalenrichment for several officials, but it is certainly possible that Mobutu was unable to control the actions of somemembers of his government. Regardless of the reasoning in Kinshasa, Angola entered the war on the side of therebels and was determined to overthrow the Mobutu government, as this would be the only way to address the threatposed by the Zairian-UNITA relationship.

UNITADue to its ties to the Mobutu government, UNITA also participated in the First Congo War. The greatest impact thatit had on the war was probably that it gave Angola reason to join the anti-Mobutu coalition. However, UNITA forcesfought alongside FAZ forces in at least several instances.[38] Among other examples, Kagame claimed that his forcesfought a pitched battle against UNITA near Kinshasa towards the end of the war.[39]

OthersNumerous other external actors played lesser roles in the First Congo War. Burundi, which had recently come underthe rule of a pro-Tutsi leader, was supportive of Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in Zaire but provided verylimited military support.[40] Zambia and Zimbabwe also gave measured amounts of military support to the rebelmovement.[41] Likewise, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the South Sudanese rebel army the SPLA were all financial or moralsupporters of the anti-Mobutu coalition. Other than from UNITA, Mobutu also received some aid from Sudan, whomMobutu had long supported against the SPLA, though the exact amount of aid is unclear and ultimately was unableto hinder the advance of opposing forces.[42] Zaire also employed foreign mercenaries from several African andEuropean countries.

First Congo War 5

1996With active support from Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila's AFDL was able to capture 800 x 100 km of territory alongthe border with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi by December 25, 1996.[43] This occupation temporarily satisfied therebels, because it gave them power in the East and allowed them to defend themselves against the formergénocidaires. Likewise, the external actors had successfully crippled the ability of the same génocidaires to useZaire as a base for attacks. There was a pause in the rebel advance following the acquisition of this buffer territorythat lasted until Angola entered the war in February 1997.[44]

During this time, Rwanda was able to destroy refugee camps, which the génocidaires had been using as theirsafe-bases, and forcibly repatriate Tutsi to Rwanda. During this process, Rwandan and aligned forces committedmultiple atrocities, mainly against Hutu refugees.[29] The true extent of the abuses is unknown because the AFDLand RPF carefully managed NGO and press access to areas where atrocities were thought to have occurred[45]

however Amnesty International claimed as many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred by them andthe Rwandan Defence Forces and aligned forces.[46]

1997There are two explanations for the restart of the rebel advance in 1997. The first and most probable, is that Angolahad joined the anti-Mobutu coalition, giving it numbers and strength far superior to the FAZ and demanding thatMobutu be removed from power. Kagame presents another, possibly secondary, reason for the march on Kinshasa:that the employment of Serbian mercenaries in the battle for Walikale proved that "Mobutu intended to wage realwar against Rwanda."[47] According to this logic, Rwanda's initial concerns had been to manage the security threat ineastern Zaire but it was now forced to dispose of the hostile government in Kinshasa.Throughout the rebel advance, there were attempts by the international community to negotiate a settlement.However, the AFDL did not take these negotiations seriously but instead partook so as to avoid internationalcriticism for being unwilling to attempt a diplomatic solution while actually continuing its steady advance.[48] TheFAZ, which had been weak all along, was unable to mount any serious resistance to the strong AFDL and its foreignsponsors. Throughout the month of April, the AFDL made consistent progress down the river, and by May were onthe outskirts of Kinshasa. On May 16, 1997, the multinational army headed by Kabila battled to secure Lubumbashiairport in the southeast of the country after peace talks broke down and Mobutu fled the country. Kabila proclaimedhimself president on September 7, 1997, the same day that Mobutu died in Morocco, and immediately ordered aviolent crackdown to restore order. He then attempted to reorganize the nation as the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC).

AftermathThe new Congolese state under Kabila's rule proved to be disappointingly similar to Zaire under Mobutu. Theeconomy remained in a state of severe disrepair and had even deteriorated further under Kabila's corrupt rule.[49]

Furthermore, he failed to improve the government, which continued to be weak and corrupt. Instead, Kabila began avigorous centralization campaign, bringing renewed conflict with minority groups in the east who demandedautonomy. Kabila also came to be seen as an instrument of the foreign regimes that put him in power. In order tocounter this image and increase domestic support, he began to turn against his allies abroad. This culminated in theexpulsion of all foreign forces from the DRC on July 26, 1998. The states with armed forces still in the DRCbegrudgingly complied although some of them saw this as undermining their interests, particularly Rwanda, whichhad hoped to install a proxy-regime in Kinshasa.Several factors that led to the First Congo War remained in place after Kabila's accession to power. Prominent among these were ethnic tensions in eastern DRC, where the government still had little control. There the historical animosities remained and the opinion that Banyamulenge, as well as all Tutsi, were foreigners was reinforced by the

First Congo War 6

foreign occupation in their defense.[50] Furthermore, Rwanda had not been able to satisfactorily address its securityconcerns. By forcibly repatriating refugees, Rwanda had imported the conflict.[51] This manifested itself in the formof a predominantly Hutu insurgency in Rwanda's western provinces that was supported by extremist elements ineastern DRC. Without troops in the DRC, Rwanda was unable to successfully combat the insurgents. In the first daysof August 1998, two brigades of the new Congolese army rebelled against the government and formed rebel groupsthat worked closely with Kigali and Kampala. This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War.

References[1] e.g.: Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 194[2][2] Gondola, Ch. Didier. The History of Congo. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002. p. 6[3][3] Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed.

Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 147[4][4] Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed.

Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 157[5] "Congo's Curse" (http:/ / www. irinnews. org/ Report. aspx?ReportId=61006). IRIN. 5 October, 2010. .[6][6] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 190[7] Vlassenroot, Koen. "Conflict & Malitia Formation in Eastern Congo." Ed. Preben Kaarsholm. Violence, Political Culture & Development in

Africa. Athens: Ohio UP, 2006. 49-65. p. 53[8][8] Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p. 32[9] Vlassenroot, Koen. “Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge.” Review of African Political

Economy. 2002. 499-515.[10][10] Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p. 32[11] Autesserre, Severine. “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict.” Foreign Affairs. 2008. 87(3). 94-110.[12][12] Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p. 13[13][13] Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. pp. 15-16[14][14] Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. pp. 13-14[15][15] Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009. p.16[16] Vlassenroot, Koen. “Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge.” Review of African Political

Economy. 2002. 499-515. p. 508[17][17] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 45[18] "North Kivu: How to end a war" (http:/ / www. isn. ethz. ch/ news/ sw/ details. cfm?id=18434). ISN Security Watch. .[19][19] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 143[20][20] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 30[21][21] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 18[22][22] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 48[23][23] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 49[24][24] Afoaku, Osita. "Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and Strategies." Ed. John F. Clark. The Africa Stakes of the Congo War. New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 109-28. p. 121[25][25] Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post.

09 July 1997: A1.[26][26] Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post.

09 July 1997: A1.[27][27] Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed.

Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 147[28][28] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 107, 201[29][29] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 213-14[30] Longman, Timothy. “The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo." Ed. John F. Clark. The African Stakes of the Congo War.

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 129-44. p. 131[31][31] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 175-76[32][32] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 147-48[33] Samset, Ingrid. ‘Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC.’ Review of African Political Economy. 2002.

463-480. pp. 470-471[34][34] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 54, 58[35][35] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 59[36][36] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 218[37][37] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 62[38][38] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 63

First Congo War 7

[39][39] Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post.09 July 1997: A1

[40][40] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 42, 61[41][41] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 65-66[42][42] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 44[43][43] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 55[44][44] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. pp. 61-63[45][45] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 100[46] Democratic Republic of Congo. An long-standing crisis spinning out of control (http:/ / www. amnesty. org/ en/ library/ asset/ AFR62/ 033/

1998/ en/ 4d95fd3e-d9c6-11dd-af2b-b1f6023af0c5/ afr620331998en. pdf). Amnesty International, 3 September 1998. p. 9. AI Index: AFR62/33/98

[47][47] Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005. p. 213[48][48] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 130[49][49] Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed.

Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005. p. 154[50] Longman, Timothy. “The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo." Ed. John F. Clark. The African Stakes of the Congo War.

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 129-44. pp. 131-32[51] Vlassenroot, Koen. “Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge.” Review of African Political

Economy. 2002. 499-515. p. 173

Further reading•• Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge

UP, 2009.•• Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005.• Clark, John F. (2002) The African Stakes in the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN

1-4039-6723-7.• Edgerton, Robert G. (2002) The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo St. Martin's Press. ISBN

0-312-30486-2.• Gondola, Ch. Didier. (2002) The History of Congo, Greenwood Press, ISBN 0-313-31696-1. Covers events up to

January 2002.•• Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the

Economics of War. Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center,2005

• Michael Nest with François Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani: The Democratic Republic of Congo: EconomicDimensions of War and Peace, Lynne Rienner, 2006 ISBN 1-58826-233-2

•• Prunier, Gérard. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a ContinentalCatastrophe. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.

• Vlassenroot, Koen. “Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge.”Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 499-515.

• Vlassenroot, Koen. "Conflict & Malitia Formation in Eastern Congo." Ed. Preben Kaarsholm. Violence, PoliticalCulture & Development in Africa. Athens: Ohio UP, 2006. 49-65.

•• Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009.• Jackson, Stephen. ‘Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War Economy.’ Review of African

Political Economy. 2002.• Samset, Ingrid. ‘Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC.’ Review of African

Political Economy. 2002. 463-480• Auterresse, Séverine. “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention.”

International Organization. 2009. 249-80•• Reyntjens, Filip. "The Privatisation and Criminalisation of Public Space in the Geopolitics of the Great Lakes

Region." Journal of Modern African Studies 43.4 (2005): 587-607.

First Congo War 8

• Autesserre, Severine. “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict.” Foreign Affairs.2008. 87(3). 94-110.

• Thom, William G. (1999). Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of MilitaryConflict in Africa in the Era of Independence (http:/ / www. lib. unb. ca/ Texts/ JCS/ bin/ get5.cgi?directory=fall99/ & filename=THOM. htm). XIX. Journal of Conflict Studies.

Article Sources and Contributors 9

Article Sources and ContributorsFirst Congo War  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=539687149  Contributors: -js-, 3s, Aaronbrick, Aborig, Againme, Antemister, BanyanTree, Bejinhan, Bento00, Bluedenim,Brianski, Bryan Derksen, Buckshot06, BusterD, CL8, CanadianLinuxUser, Charles Essie, Chris the speller, Clarificationgiven, Dabloodz, Damifb, Digamma, Dimadick, Enric Naval, Estlandia,FayssalF, Ffnone, Fusion7, Gob Lofa, Good Olfactory, Gotipe, Gouerouz, Grenavitar, Grendelkhan, Hoshie, IR393davis, Ian Burnet, Idaltu, Illegitimate Barrister, Iridescent, JForget,Jazzman831, Jean-Jacques Georges, John Sheridan 1234, JonEastham, Joonasl, Joshua DeFord, Killerman2, Kirill Lokshin, Krzysztof, Lapsed Pacifist, Letdemsay, LtNOWIS, MadMax,Mangostar, Martin Wisse, Martpol, Mary quite contrary, Mickeymouse1955, MinnesotanConfederacy, Mlleangelique, Nicke L, Nutsheller, Oleyva, Patapsco913, Patstuart, Perspicacite, Pichpich,Publicus, Red King, Rich Farmbrough, RoyBoy, Sideshow Bob Roberts, Stumink, Themalau, Tobi, Txomin, Wandalstouring, Warofdreams, Xact, Xed, Yinon, Ziegelstein, Zscout370, 124anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:Zaire 96map.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Zaire_96map.png  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Electionworld, Hoshie

LicenseCreative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported//creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/