Chavez v. Pea andAmari24SEPChavez v. Pea and AmariFact:In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.Issue:w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitutionw/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.Held:On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Republic vs. CARepublic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs. Court of Appeals & De La RosaG.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988

Cruz, J.:Doctrine:The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.

Facts:These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.Issue:Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct.Held:No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

CARQUELOOMANDAMandROSITOITOMvs. COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA

Facts:On January 29, 1974, theBureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor ofCamilo Lasola Homestead Patentcovering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada, Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28, 1978, theRegister of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title in his name.On April 28, 1983,respondent Blas Trabasas bought the land from a DoloresSayson who claimed she was the ownerof said land.In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitionersCarquelo Omandam and RositoItom had occupied the land.Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patentbefore the Bureau of Land.UponSayson'sadvice,Trabasasrepurchasedthe landfrom Lasola, whoexecuted a deed of sale. On August 9, 1989, Trabasas acquired a new transfercertificate of title.OnApril16, 1990,spousesBlasTrabasasandAmparBonillafiledacomplaint against petitioners for recovery of possession and/or ownership ofthe land. They alleged that they were the true and registered owners of the landand Omandam and Itom should vacate it.Petitioners answered thatthey purchased the land from one Godofredo Selawho had been inpossession for almost twenty years.Regional Trial Court issued its decision, declaring that neither respondentsherein nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever inpossession of the land. 1.Finding the defendants to have equitable right to the possession of the land inlitigation. 2. Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvene the title of the land.the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners' collateral attack on thehomestead title,todefeatprivaterespondents'accion publiciana,was notsanctioned by law; that the patent and title of Camilo Lasola, private respondents'predecessor-in-interest, had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; andthat petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with theBureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer tothe complaint for recovery ofpossession, already prescribed.Issue: won the court have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree ofregistration issued by the Director of Lands and only the DENR Secretary can review, onappeal such decree.Held: The court's order reversed theaward made by the Directorof Lands in favor of Lasola.This reversal was in error, for the proper administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141,had prior jurisdiction over the patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homesteadarea.DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of court of justice toresolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR hasnot settled the respective rights of public land claimants.11But once the DENR has decided,particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later,its decision prevails.We note that the parties did not manifest as to whether an appeal was made from thedecision of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no mention was ever made in theirpleadings regarding the matter. From the said Order of the DENR Regional Director up tothe present, five years have lapsed. From this, we can conclude that no appeal has beenmade andthat theDENR decision dismissingthe petitioners'protestand upholdingrespondents' right on the contested area hasattained finality.By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, havebeen duly confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. Byvirtue of the deed of sale executed by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as September 24,1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then secured a transfer certificate of title in his name,private respondentsclearlyhave superiorright overthe landclaimedbypetitionersOmandam and Itom