Finding New Regional Mandalas: Indonesia Maritime Strategy ...
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2019
Finding New Regional Mandalas: Indonesia Maritime Strategy Between
India And China
Yusli Effendi
Prodi Hubungan Internasional ,Universitas Brawijaya
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
This paper aims to analyse Indonesia’s dilemmas and prospects in engaging maritime
strategic partner between China and India while pursuing its maritime reorientation. The
expanding presence of China in Indian Ocean and its aggressiveness in maritime territorial
dispute in East Asia has triggered India to transform Rao’s “Look East policy” to Modi’s
“Act East policy”. Modi’s ambitious foreign policy increased eastward focus and his
commitment in pursuing economic growth has been combined with India’s strategy in
balancing against China’s Silk Road strategy. Both emerging powers, China and India, see
Indonesia potential as strategic maritime partner in their strategic vision. Utilizing New
Maritime Silk Road strategy or One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative in 2013, China
engages ASEAN, including Indonesia, in infrastructure construction mega-project to enhance
connectivity. While India, began in 1996 as dialogue partner in ASEAN Regional Partner
(ARF), gets more involved in as ASEAN partner by joining ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in 2010 and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2015.
India and Indonesia have shared the common view of culture, colonial history, and political
sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and independent foreign policy. Theyhave been also
originated from the same ancient polity that habituate them to cooperate even under anarchy
situation. However, this mandala-inspired cultural legacy would also drive them toward
potential conflict as the two countries try to structure their spatial process centripetally using
maritime strategy. In this regards, the paper will also discuss the continuity and dissonance
of maritime perspective in Indonesia and India experience. Jakarta’s will to strengthen its
maritime posture marks its leitmotif to play its role as center within Southeast Asia mandala
will be contested by India and China strategic interests in the sea. In the cultural memory of
region, exerting power on the sea and ownership of huge armada symbolically marks and
legitimates a country’s supremacy within heterarchy or regional hierarchy that tends to be
equal. Using both contemporary and classical literature, this research intends to reveal how
the contending emerging powers seek to aspire regional leadership using maritime tradition.
While embarking from leadership-generational change and historical experience, this paper
will shed the light why maritime strategy acts as guiding principles for national security in
the global geopolitical shift and regional geo-strategy.
Keywords: mandala, maritime orientation, heterarchy, dissonance
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Abstrak
Paper ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dilemma dan prospek Indonesia dalam berpartisipasi
kerjasama maritim strategis antara China dan India sembari mengejar tujuan maritimnya.
Meluasnya kehadiran China di Samudera Hindia dan perilaku agresifnya dalam sengketa
batas maritim di Asia Timur menyebabkan adanya transformasi kebijakan “Look East
Policy” PM Narashima Rao menjadi “Act East Policy” PM Narendra Modi. Ambisi Modi
meningkatkan fokus kebijakan luar negeri yang mengarah ke Timur dan komitmennya
mengejar pertumbuhan ekonomi telah digabungkan dengan strategi India dalam
menyeimbangkan strategi Jalur Sytera milik China. Kedua kekuatan baru dunia, China dan
India, melihat Indonesia sebagai mitra kerjasama potensial dalam visi strategis mereka.
Memanfaatkan strategi baru jalur Sutera Maritim atau One Belt One Road (OBOR) tahun
2013, China mengajak ASEAN, termasuk Indonesia, dalam konstruksi infrastruktur mega
proyek untuk meningkatkan konektivitas. Sementara India, sejak tahun 1996 telah menjadi
mitra dialog dalam ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) dan semakin terlibat sebagai mitra
dengan bergabung pada ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) pada 2010 dan
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) pada 2015. India dan Indonesia telah berbagi
pandangan yang sama dalam hal budaya, sejarah kolonial, politik kedaulatan, kemandirian
ekonomi, dan kemeredekaan kebijakan luar negeri. Kedua negara juga berasal dari nenek
moyang yang memiliki tata kelola pemerintahan yang sama sehingga membuat mereka
terbiasa bekerjasama dalam situasi anarki. Hanya saja, warisan budaya Mandala dapat pula
mendorong mereka pada potensi konflik sebagaimana dua negara berupaya menyusun proses
spasial secara terpusat menggunakan strategi maritim. Dalam kasus ini, paper in juga akan
mendiskusikan kelanjutan dan disonansi atas perspektif maritim yang menjadi pengalaman
Indonesia dan India. Jakarta juga akan menguatkan postur maritimnya sebagai leitmotif untuk
memainkan peranannya sebagai pusat dalam Asia Tenggara dimana Mandala akan
dikontestasikan oleh India dan China terkait kepentingan strategis mereka di laut. Paper ini
akan memberikan pemahaman mengapa strategi maritim bertindak sebagai prinsip-prinsip
pengarah bagi keamanan nasional dalam pergeseran geopolitik dan geostrategi regional.
Kata kunci: Mandala, orientasi maritim, heterarchy, dissonansi
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Introduction
Indonesia’s cross-road position in
the Indo-Pacific region has strategic
significance for geostrategic global forces.
In the Pacific Century, Indonesia's position
became very strategic because it is home
tothree Sea Line of Communications
(SLOCs) and five of the world’s seven
choke points (the Malacca Strait, the
Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the
Lombok Strait, the Ombai-Wetar Strait).
Not only does this position make
Indonesia as the busiest point for trade but
also as the arena of the great powers
struggles, including two growing forces,
India and China. If India projects its
influence into the South China Sea through
Indochina, China does the same thing by
expanding its power to Indian Ocean
through Myanmar. In their strategic vision,
Indonesia has potential as a maritime
partner positioning Indonesia at the center
of geostrategic interests.
This two power projection raises
the potential for instability in the region as
a result of two new regional mandalas,
twin power schemes of new 21st
centuryinvolving China and India. Power
projection clash occurs because India and
China developed a centripetal policy that
eventually gave rise to patronage under
anarchy conditions. These two countries
became two countries of civilization
thanks to the culture and its contribution to
the world civilization and both possessed
nuclear weapons and developed its marine
powers (Dellios, 2003b). They also share
the common ideals to be new mandalas at
the time, as well as they were home to
ancient kingdoms that apply similar
polities.
The practice of ancient India’s
mandala was documented in Chanakya’s
Arthasastra (or Kautilya’s). Chanakya, was
at that time the Chief Minister of the
Mauryan Empire, recorded the practices of
this polity. Interestingly, in ancient India,
the political mandala (statal circle) is more
to be secular rather than a sacred one.
Arthasastra also considered as a secular
work (Dellios, 2003). China, meanwhile,
also practiced a form of mandala polity at
the height of the Middle Kingdom
(Dellios, 2003b).
This study discusses the use of
mandala to analise how Asian powers
transforms regional political landscape.
Despite global power is still currently
under US shadow, Indonesia’s
geographical proximity to two new
emarging power has made it anticipate
their maritime maneuvers. To this end, this
paper aim to answer how Indonesia
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responds to India and China maritime
maneuvers.
Mandala Traditional Geopolitics and
Modern Geopolitics
In examining the political
landscape of Indonesia and Asia, I use the
concept of mandala as an alternative tool
in analyzing foreign and defence policy of
Indonesia which is dominated by Javanese
view (Sebastian and Lanti, 2010: 150) and
as well as Asian regional security that still
inherits the ancient cultural memory of
ancient China and India. Mandala,
meaning circle in Sanskrit, is a spiritual
diagram that is the reification of cosmos
(Dellios, 2003). Despite its mystical
meaning, the mandala is also a geopolitical
expression to describe the inter-
powerrelationships in ancient Indian and
later Hindu-Buddhist periods of Southeast
Asia. Mandala features also appeared in
tributary system without administrative
integration: as a circle of states, it is
defined by the center, and not by its
territory. Despite its roots in the Indian
political discourse (Kautilya’s Raj
Mandala) and the China’s mandala
formation (at the apex of the Middle
Kingdom dynasty), this concept has been
modified to accommodate the 21st century
geopolitical conditions. Higham (1989:
240) defines mandala as “the politics of
charismatic center, with its attraction of
deference and obligation from other power
centers through a demonstrated ability to
win allies and overtake enemies”.
As a matter of fact, mandala is
created to structure the spatial process
centripetally, towards the center. But
unlike the rigid radial polity structures,
concentrating power, and creating
hierarchies, mandala is built to
accommodate heterarchy: dispersed
authority in satellite areas. Acharya and
Buzan (2010: 228) interpret the mandala as
polities without formal territorial
sovereignty and practices symbolic and
ritualistic authority. Chong (2010: 141)
argues that mandala offers a radical
potential for interpreting International
Relations (IR) in different sense of
Westphalian sovereignty. Other names for
this concept are “galactic polity”
(Tambiah), “theater state” (Geertz), and
“solar polity” (Lieberman, 2003).
In traditional polity like pre-
colonial Southeast Asia, the three
properties contained in the mandala are:
center, symmetry, and cardinal points
(Tambiah, 2003). The first property,
center, is the translation of cakravartin, the
king’s entity which shines outward and
represents the divine element. The center
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is said to have personal and devotional
power, not institutional. This power is not
derived from conquest (albeit military
force is the consequence), but from the
leader's ability to tap into “cosmic power”
with virtuous forces called “devaraja”
(king of gods) in Hindu terms or
“dharmaraja” in Buddhist terms. The
second property, symmetry, is believed to
be dynamic depending on the contextual
situation and needs of mandala. The center
should read the situation and adjust the
strategy to keep the order and security
within the mandala. The third property,
cardinal points, which means the points
that can affect how symmetry can be
defined, maintained, and reconfigured. In
pre-modern Southeast Asia, the two
cardinal points are trade and security that
play an important role in shaping and
reconfiguring the regional political
landscape.
As a concept, mandala is both
sacred and secular. In the internal circle it
becomes a powerful spiritual center for
domestic resilience, while on the outside it
is powerful in managing relationships for
external protection. The power gained by
the center is the power of God. Thus, the
mandala affinities of state are a network of
loyalties. Interestingly, however, in India
nad China practices, the concept of purely
secular. In India, the political mandala, the
statal circle, was secular affair of the
territorial state as in China the Middle
Kingdom implements a tributary system
based on cultural superiority (Dellios,
2003).
Applying the concept or theory of
non-Western International Relations such
as mandala or mandala anarchy culture
requires the transformation from hard
theory to soft theory. Acharya and Buzan
(2010) mapping resources of soft theories
in four categories: 1) Classical Asian
tradition or local religious, political, or
military classical thinking such as
Confucius, Kautilya, or Sun Tzu as
Western International Relations Theory
(IRT) drew inspiration from ancient
Western thoughts of Thucydides, Hobbes,
Machiavelli, Kant, and others. 2) Thoughts
or approach of foreign policy of state
leaders as the main source of formulating
theory. Like Nehru, Mao, Aung San,
Soekarno, Soeharto and other key foreign
policy makers. 3) The third type has been
done by most Asian scholars: using
western HI theory to be questioned and
evaluated for its relevance in analysis by
retrieving data from local/regional
experience. 4) This last type, could be an
alternative breakthrough, focuses on
assessing the events and experiences of
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Asia through local/regional data mining,
then formulating concepts as tool for
general pattern of analysis in International
Relations while placing Asia in a larger
international system and comparing it with
other world.
In addition to the mandala concept
rooted in Asian knowledge stocks, this
paper also uses an alternative framework
in IRT using Javanese thought framework.
From the standpoint of Java’s ontology
and epistemology, power has different
dimension to power from those of Western
point of view. According to Javanese,
ontologically, anarchy and its derivative
concepts such as the balance of power do
not exist. While epistemologically, for
Javanese thought, power is concrete,
homogeneous and transcends the
boundaries of morality. The West also
believes that international anarchy is
natural condition within international
system, and the extent of power depends
on the accumulation of matter and its use.
These differences on the level of
epistemology and ontology have logical
consequences on the foreign policy
characteristics of Javanese leaders.
Geopolitics and Geostrategy
If geography is understood as
physical reality, then geopolitics contains
human factor in geography: geographic
distribution of resources centers and
communications lines which assign values
to locations according to their strategic
importance. While geostrategy is the
geographic direction of a state’s foreign
policy. It relates to how a state
concentrates its efforts through projection
of military power and directs its diplomatic
activity (Grygiel, 2006: 22). For Grygiel,
geopolitics is not as constant as geography,
it reflects the changing geographic
distribution of routes and natural and
economic resources. Geostrategy of a
country is not always due to geographical
or geopolitical considerations, but can be
ideologically motivated, interest groups, or
merely the whim of its leaders. The
challenge for strategists is that geostrategy
does not necessarily reflect geopolitics
Geopolitics is determined by two
variables: communication lines or routes
and resources centers. The first variable is
determined by the interaction between
technology and geography.
Communications line or route has
economic and political significance (i.e.
for the projection of power and access to
resource centers). While the route is
determined by three parameters: the
discovery and creation of new routes, the
invention of transportation technology, and
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changes in resource location. In short, the
route is not just about geography, but also
human factors. The second variable,
resources center, is determined by the
mastery of natural and economic
resources. Natural resources are geological
wealth based onterritory such as oil, water,
coal, tin, while economic resources are
human creations in the form of industrial
goods such as machinery, steel and
manufactured goods.
Geostrategy is defined by
geographical focus or location where the
state directs its power. According to
Rogers and Simon (2010) geostrategy is
characterized by the presence of political
and extensive military presence and
requires a network of alliances with great
powers that share common interests or
with linchpin state as lesser power located
in perceived important location.
Theycriticise thatgeostrategywas in the
past built from colonialism so that
geostrategy is nothing but a form of
imperialism. However, not all geostrategy
is imperialism. It can be concluded
thatgeostrategy is none other than
exercising hard power. Herein lies the
difference between traditional geostrategy
and mandala geostrategy in the matter of
exercising power. The former relies
heavily on hard power, while the latter is
more on soft power.
The Javanese Concept of Power
To give a demarcation line between
non-Western thought and Western thought,
the author will distinguish the concept of
Javanese power and its difference to the
concept of Western power. Anderson
(2006: 21-23) argues that there are at least
four major differences between the
concept of Western and Javanese power.
First, according to Western thinkers,
power is abstract, as does the concept of
authority or legitimacy. Power can only be
judged by its consequences, in the context
of patterns of social interaction-such as
obedience, order or expectations against
others. As for the Javanese thinkers, power
is concrete/real and is not a theoretical
proposition. Power is an independent
entity and is independent of something
else and it exists in every aspect of the
universe: in rocks, trees, fire, and so on.
Second, sources of power, in
Western thought, are heterogeneous.
Power sources can come from wealth,
social status, office positions,
organizations, weapons, populations, and
so on. Meanwhile, according to Javanese
thought, Power is homogeneous. The
source of power comes from Power itself,
not dependent on anything else.
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Third, the accumulation of power
is infinite and varies from time to time.
Referring to the second point, it can be
said that the accumulation of power today
is much greater than 100 years ago. In
contrast to Western thought, Javanese
thinkers assume that the number of Powers
is constant throughout the world. The
amount of Power cannot increase or
decrease, they can only be concentrated or
splitted. Thus, the collection/concentration
of Power in one place automatically
reduces Power elsewhere.
Fourth, according to Western
thought, power is ambiguous in morality.
In Western political thought there is a
debate about legitimate power depending
on the moral values held. While in
Javanese political thought, Power is
automatically legitimate, because Power is
the moral itself. Thus, the party that
acquires Power by itself has legitimacy
over its people.
Table1
Comparison of Power in Western and
Javanese Thought
Source: Self Design
Power Western Javanese
Character of
Power
Abstract Real
Sources of Heterogenou Homogenou
Power s (Wealth,
weapon,
population,
etc.)
s (Power
does not
depend on
anything
else)
Accumulatio
n of Power
Unlimited Constant
Legitimacy Morally-
bound
Beyond
moral
values
Since the source of power does not depend
on anything other than power itself, the
central issue of Javanese political thought
lies not in its use, but on its concentration
and maintenance. This has become one of
the most important characteristics in
understanding Javanese politics—or
further later, specifically, international
politics in Javanese perspective.
One of the outstanding
characteristics of Javanese political
thought is to make kings as center of
cosmic power. The king in Javanese
culture is microcosmic exponent of the
kingdom, which connects the cosmic
cosmos with the macrocosmic world
(Moertono cited by Ali, 1986: 27).
Therefore, integrating Javanese political
thought into the Study of International
Relations needs inclusion of king or state
leader as an analytical unit.
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The Political Landscape of Asia and
Southeast Asia: Past and Contemporary
In examining the political
landscape of Asia and Southeast Asia, we
can refer to the pre-colonial period. It has
been said in several works during colonial
times, Southeast Asia is an integral part of
China’s tributary system. Southeast Asia is
the backwater receiving passively the
dominance of great power (Peng Er and
Teo, 2012: 2 in Manggala, 2013: 1). Kang
(2007, in Manggala, 2013) states that
under the order of China, Asia was a stable
region until the arrival of the colonial in
the 19th century.
This China-centric view is
supported by Jacques (2011: 465-468) who
states that China is not a conventional
nation-state in the Western sense, but the
civilisational state whose highest political
priority is caring for the unity, cohesion,
and integrity of Chinese civilization. The
state is regarded as the embodiment,
protector, and defender of his civilization.
In this context, state and community
relationships are in patron-client
relationships. China has also developed a
tributary system, not a nation-state system,
which has the principle of co-existence
with other systems of lesser power. This
opinion is opposed by Shu (2012, in
Manggala 2013) stating that sharp
competition for survival and fighting for
dominance is the character of this region.
Manggala (2013) also states that the area
of international relations of Southeast Asia
has a complex political structure that
inspired the value of mandala.
The contemporary political
landscape of Asia is liquid and shows the
absence of clear patterns and orders
(Shambaugh and Yahuda, 2008: 341). In
Asia’s international relations, there is no
single integrated “regional system” that
makes its political architecture
multilayered. There is no agreement from
actors (states) that became the code of
ethics of their relationship. It is interesting
to note that the region has no conceptual
unity if combined, but the still it produces
order even though has not yet able called
as “system”.
In this region, United States—
albeit considered to be declining in power
and influence—stillplays a major role in
this region accompanied by the dynamics
of major power such as China, India and
Japan. These major powers develop their
own pattern of relationships that
combinescompetition and cooperation at
the same time. This patternis well
represented by the expression of Chinese
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scholars, “one superpowers, many powers”
(yichao, duo qiang).
US superiority can be seen from
the reluctance of major powers—including
China—to challenge its hegemony. China
deliberately and consciously avoids open
and direct confrontation with the United
States. China continues to set the road to
building cooperation with its Asian
neighbors while maintaining good
relations with the United States. The major
powers of Asia-China, India, Japan,
Russia-do not even combine the power to
offset US power for three reasons. First,
all four require the United States and
cannot alienate Washington. Second, they
have distrust each other. Third, all three
are spoiled by the existing order.
India and China, in this context, are
also the same: engaging in cooperative
relationships as well as competition. The
relationship between the two is an uneasy
relationship. India's modality: its size,
contribution to world civilization, and its
independent foreign policy tradition, made
it impossible to coalesce with China
(Shambaugh and Yahuda, 2008: 348). As a
subsystem, both develop different systems.
China once established the traditional
hierarchy of Sinic, or Sinocentric
(commonly called tributary system) that
shadowed Asia and is now entering its
fourth wave in history. While India built
an Indic system that stretches from the 4th
to the 18th centuries and survives in
modern South Asia consisting of 6
countries.
Many worry that China is building
a new version of this ancient hierarchical
hegemonic system through some of its
policies. It is said that the vision of 21st
New Maritime Silk Road or One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) initiative introduced by
President Xi Jinping in 2013 is a
contemporary interpretation of this
ambition 2017. India—and Japan—areseen
adopting internal and external policies for
balancing against China. Domestically
they build up their military power, and
along with it they strengthen military
cooperation with US. India did not remain
silent, responded it by Act East policy.
PM Modi’s Act East policy envisions the
epople to people, trade, and other relations
of India and Asian countries, but in fact it
marks India's larger strategic role in Asia-
Pacific due to China’s expanding presence
in the region and its assertiveness in East
Asia maritime territorial dispute
(Rajendram, 2014).
Although some Southeast Asian
countries adopt counter-China policies
with hedging strategies, the majority of
ASEAN countries take the opposite
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direction. Most ASEAN countries use
what Goh (2008) calls as “enmeshment
strategy” to attract not only China in the
intraregional network of mechanisms, but
also drags other major power in the
regional order. ASEAN countries try not to
get caught in major power struggle by
building a concert of power to rebalancing
the comprehensive distribution of power
capabilities between these forces. This
strategy of international relations in
Southeast Asia seems to conform the
mandala logic of anarchy rooted in
regional ideas and culture and focus on
cooperation rather than competition.
Indonesian Maritime Orientation:
Continuity and Dissonance
The election of Joko Widodo
(commonly recognised as Jokowi) in 2014
as the 7th Indonesian president marks a
major change in the Indonesian policy
orientation. From the Phinisi Ship at Sunda
Kelapa Harbor on July 22, 2014, Joko
Widodo—shortly after declaration of his
victory in the presidential election—
released his enormous ambition of making
Indonesia as “World Maritime Axis”. In
addition to this national political stage,
Indoesia’s land-based orientation changes
to the maritime were also expressed at two
international forums, APEC CEO Summit
in Beijing, China (10/11/2014) and the 9th
East Asia Summit in Myanmar
(13/11/2014).
The change in maritime orientation
is summarized in five pillars: 1)
development of maritime culture, 2)
maintenance and management of marine
resources with a focus on food security
through the fishery industry, 3) priority on
infrastructure development and maritime
connectivity by building sea tolls, deep
seaports, logisctis, ship industry, and
maritime industry, 4) maritime diplomacy,
and 5) maritime defense (Antara News
Online, 2014). Not only marking a shift in
the direction of foreign policy, this new
doctrine also reflects the expansion of
Indonesia's influence from ASEAN-
centered to the Indo-Pacific region with a
broader focus on trade, infrastructure, and
the role of Indonesia in the global and
regional arena (The Jakarta Post, 2017).
To translate this Maritime Doctrine,
Jokowi describes it in several documents:
1) Vision-Mission, 2) RPJMN, 3) White
Book of 2015, and 4) Presidential
Regulation no. 16/2017 consisting of a)
National Document of Indonesian Marine
Policy, and b) Indonesian Ocean Policy
Action Plan
In 2011 when India became
chairman, IORA added 6 priority agenda:
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1) Maritime safety and security, 2) Trade
and investment facilitation, 3) Fisheries
management and sustainable of harvesting
Maring Food Resources, 4) Disaster Risk
Reduction, 5) Academic and S & T
Cooperation, and 6) Tourism Promotion
and Cultural Exchanges that marks the
expansion of the agenda from mere trade
into maritime and environmental security
(Agastia and Perwita, 2010). The IORA
agenda has much in common with the
Indonesian agenda in Indian Ocean,
especially maritime security and economic
interests in the pillars of Jokowi’s
Maritime Axis (Agastia and Perwita,
2014)
Despite its status as archipelagic country,
Indonesia is dominantly using land-based
view in its foreign and defense policy.
Susanto (2015) charts the evolution of
Indonesia's maritime strategy in three
stages: 1) Shifting from the Indonesia
Raya conception to the Indonesian
Archipelago, 2) Development of the
Archipelagic Document into Wawasan
Nusantara (Insight of the Archipelago), 3)
Maritime Reorientation. The first and
second stages still reflect a land-based
view, of whichSusanto called
“territorialisation of maritime”. The third
stage marks an attempt to reverse the way
of maritime-based view or "maritimisation
of territory”.
It is commonly believed, Jokowi is
considered as a pioneer of Indonesian
maritime re-orientation. However, the third
stage of the evolution of maritime strategy
that coincided with the period of reform
(after fall of Soeharto, 1998) actually
recorded Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur),
the 4th president, already has a maritime
vision by forming the Department of
Marine Exploration which later changed
into the Department of Marine and
Fisheries (DKP) as a ministry authorized
to manage the maritime field. After
establishing the Department of Marine
Exploration, President Wahid also
established the National Maritime Council
as a marine public policy consultative
body headed by the president, chaired
daily by the DKP Minister with 10 related
ministers as members.
Although it seems only in the
reform era Indonesia has a maritime
vision, in fact it is not entirely true. In
Soekarno’s office, and not in Soeharto's,
Indonesia was the second strongest
maritime power in Asia. Sukarno also
incorporated maritime aspects in his
geopolitical considerations and conveyed
his maritime visions of an independent
Indonesia in his speeches though still
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referring to the classical conception of the
archipelago, in contrast to the 1957
Declaration of the Djuanda (Susanto,
2015: 18).
At the time of preparation for
Indonesian independence, Soekarno, the
father of the nation as well as the first
president of Indonesia initiated the concept
of Indonesia Raya inherited the territorial
lands of Majapahit and Sriwijaya. This
idea is a way of view of the expansionist
Nusantara character so that the
neighboring country is concerned. But the
situation of independence only allowed
this notion to materialize only in the
smaller territory of the East Indies legacy,
which became the territory of Indonesia
today.
What is the continuity of
Indonesia's maritime strategy is that
despite its shifting and changing,
Indonesia's maritime strategy in the course
of time generally consistently defines itself
as an archipelagic state and maintains an
archipelagist position in the formulation of
marine general policy (Susanto, 2015:
37).Another continuity is that Indonesian
maritime policy is largely enacted from a
land-based territorial orientation. Land
orientation becomes dominant due to a
combination of historical factors (such as
territorial consolidation) and geopolitical
areas. The experience of guerilla warfare
also creates a vision of Indonesian inward-
looking territorial mastery. This posture
also continued in Soeharto's New Order
period when the TNI focused more on
internal security such as separatism and
domestic violence and maintaining
national stability. The projection of forces
by sea is not Indonesia’s priority in the last
decade
Suharto, the second president of
Indonesia, despite of his effort developing
an archipelagic worldview as geopolitical
insight, has built the power of the sea to
secure the territory internally and not to
build it for external influences such as
post-modernisation China built deterrent
effect through the forces of the sea. New
Order Indonesia’s claim to larger
boundaries through the Continental Shelf
and Exclusive Economic Zone can actually
be a rationale to build an outward-looking
maritime orientation. But instead of
changing the worldview outward,
Indonesian maritime strategy in the New
Order era to respond to two maritime
claims is only for economic development
and is defensive externally.
What constitutes dissonance or
discontinuity in the evolution of maritime
strategy arises from the tendency to
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discontinue land-based “territorialisation
of maritime” perspective. The weakness
tendency of Orde Reformasi in the
systematization and consolidation of
maritime strategy which is reflected in
their vague and scattered Post-1998
maritime initiative is understandable for it
is still seeking for form. However, Orde
Reformasi Indonesia's is sporadically
attempting towards maritimisation of
territory.
Indo-Pacific Mandala and Jokowi’s
Maritime Strategy
The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine
of the Jokowi period through the
“Maritime Axis” made Indonesia expand
its influence from Southeast Asia to Indo-
Pacific. This maritime reorientation is a
response to the increased ignificance of the
geostrategic Indian Ocean Rim. Gindarsah
(2014) notes that major power, such as
India and China, in this region will be
more involved in strategic competition
than cooperation.
Although the center of the global
mandala is still held by the US, but the
Indo-Pacific region also raises its own
mandala. In the mandala circle of this
region, at least China and India are worth
anticipating as candidates for the new
mandala center fighting for their vassal
polity influence. These three major power
mutual suspicions constitute the top five
military power making the Indian Ocean
the location for the greatest military
spenders (Rumley, 2013, in Agistia and
Perwita).
In the framework of rebalancing
strategies, the US released the “Pivot to
Asia” doctrine to confirm its political
presence in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) in
order to strengten its political and
economic commitment in the region
(Clinton, 2011 in Agistia). China with its
growing military power, increased
aggressiveness and economic strength also
marks its presence in the region. The Navy
China PLA ensures their presence in the
South China Sea around the disputed
territories of Malaysia and the Philippines.
China builds “string of pearls” which later
turns into OBOR. India, meanwhile, is in
the midst of the battle of both great powers
above and seeks also to expand influence
on Indian Ocean. Modi’s Act of East
policy is an attempt to respond to this. The
three major power positions itself as the
central mandala and seeks to concentrate
the cosmic forces resulting in stability.
However, Indonesia's efforts to
expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific
region can also be interpreted as an
attempt to become a regional player and a
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mandala center in subregion. The
application of Java model power can be
done in a hard, soft way, or blend of both.
The adoption of an offensive strategy, in
the sense of the use of military offensives
against the enemy, is a rough way. In
Javanese political thought, hardness
implies weakness and has a counter
productive effect on power concentration
efforts. Instead of increasing the power,
the use of violence against the enemy is
prone to be exploited by a third party to
“absorb” the power of the party being
attacked. Conversely, subtlety in behavior
shows the magnitude of power. This
subtlety is manifested in the form of
dialogue, diplomatic pressure, and all other
subtle ways, which stem from the
recognition of the superiority and power of
one country. This method is also referred
to as absorption. According to Anderson,
absorption is defined as the voluntary
surrender of the neighboring state to the
supreme power of the ruler (Anderson,
2006: 45). One main concept that the
author wants to convey here is absorption
politics. As mentioned above, Javanese
political thought emphasizes stability and
security, which depend heavily on the
concentration of Power. If the
concentration of Power is complete, then
domestic confusion can be overcome and
threats from abroad can be absorbed into.
In the second property, symmetry,
Indonesia should be able to cautiously read
the geopolitical conditions of the region
with competing major powers of US,
China and India. However, in the
Indonesian marine national policy
document, the effort to translate the
Jokowi Maritime Poros remains unclear:
whether the core internal focus is to
maintain domestic resilience focusing on
infrastructure development for logistics
such as sea tolls, or involving in external
protection in the Indian Ocean by joining
in the mega-project of the China’s Silk
Road or India’s Act East. If it is a center,
then Indonesia should carefully read the
situation and adjust its strategy to maintain
order and security within the mandala.
So far, the cardinal points that
serves to define, maintain, and reconfigure
symmetry in Jokowi’s office is more on
trading and lacking in security. Yet both
points play an important role in shaping
and reconfiguring the regional political
landscape. To conclude, Jokowi’s
maritime stratgey still lack of systematic
and measurable policy to understand its
maritime doctrine.
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Conclusion
This paper shows above that the
regional political architecture and
Indonesia’s response can be analised using
the concept of mandala. Indonesia’s
strategic cross road position in Indo-
Pacific makes it asa potential strategic
partner for major powers such as India and
China. The Asian political landscape,
which in realist view, has been multi
layered and does not have a clear and
coherent pattern that produce regularity
like a “system”, can actually be more
clearly analised through the concept of
mandala. The existing political landscape
of the Indo-Pacific region and two
emerging mandalas, China and India, can
be explained by applying three mandala
properties: center, symmetry, and cardinal
points. Both are positioning themselves as
centers that must adapt to US global
influence whichmanage to continue
maintaining their political and military
presence through Pivot to Asia doctrine.
The adjustment tactics of China and India
can be seen from its Maritime Silk Road-
OBOR strategy while India through Modi's
Act East. Both still rely on the old cardinal
point: security and trade.
The majority of ASEAN countries,
including Indonesia, respond through the
realist enmeshment strategy. This pacifist
strategy is based on cooperative approach
because just like Javanese values, Asian
cultural memories assume the hard way is
not the initial option because it will
actually make the other party absorb the
power of attacked party. Indonesia's
response to the political configuration of
the region through maritime reorientation
can also be explained through the concept
of mandala. The modern Indonesian
Maritime Strategy from time to time has
continuity in two ways. First, Indonesia is
an archipelagic country, and maintains
archipelagist status. Second, pre-existing
strategies are closer to a land-based
“territorialisation of maritime” policy.
Jokowi’s maritime strategy in the World
Maritime Axis doctrine which tends to
adopt maritimization of territorial
perspective in mandala’s lens is politics of
absorption to respond the changing
regional political landscape. Jokowi's
adjustment to the changing environment is
through the reconfiguration of three
cardinal points: security, economy,
identity. In sum, Jokowi's maritime
strategy still lacks explanatory documents
that systematically and clearly guide
itspractices.
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