FINAL EIA- HSL 01-09-2018 · 2018-09-08 · Providing flame arrestors on the top of all the storage...

Expansion of Sugar Complex from 4500 TCD to 7500 TCD, 14 MW/Hr to 30 MW/Hr and Establishment of 60 KLPD distillery & 3 MW/Hr from incineration boiler at Final EIA Report Saundatti Village, Belagavi District, Karnataka State

M/s. Harsha Sugars Ltd M/s. EHS Consultants Pvt Ltd

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ADDITIONAL STUDIES

6.1 Risk and Hazard Mapping M/s HSL has proposal for expansion of sugar cane crushing from 4500 TCD to 7500 TCD, 14 MW/Hr to 30 MW/Hr cogeneration and establishment of 60KLPD distillery within the existing facility. As per TOR prescribed by MOEF and guidelines for sugar plant we here-by appraise associated risk within project and also due to expansion. Apropos risk therefore need to be responded and hence will be the Disaster Management Plan towards preparedness. This is also statutory requirement as per MSIHC rule 1989 having hazardous material in process as well as in stock exceeding prescribe threshold limit. While preparing this concise text with respect to appraise risk and hazard being associated, we acclimatize with plant operation; lay out, storage, process particularly with respect to hazard and likely impact. It is duly composed on the basis of plant site visit, discussion with stake holders about operations and their understanding with respect to hazard and approach toward mitigation, preparedness as well as planning with to deal with any disaster or untoward incidence.

In our approach for Risk assessment we need to identify the hazards associated within plant and their potential which might result into disaster or any untoward incidence. Hence the criteria for assisting risk within plant quantity of hazardous material due to its intrinsic properties which may result into fire, explosion or may be toxic or in combo. Other risk areas are pressure equipment, high temp /pressure processes, pipeline, heavy movements etc. Though they are susceptible to potential risk but such systems are customized and equipped with safety gears and has safe operation as well as maintenance operational practices. Hence this assessment may be not appropriate. We therefore assess the associated risk with the Hazardous material quantification.

The raw materials, which will be required to run the plant, are discussed in detail in Chapter-2.0. Bagasse is by product after crushing operation. This is considered as main fuel supplement for power generation in co-gen mode. Apart some chemicals such as Lime, Caustic Soda, Sulphur etc which will be stored in isolation with due care for storage with instruction and written manual for handling. MSDS for all major chemicals are in place with appropriate person to deal with emergent situation.

6.1.1 Risk Assessment Need and Importance

Industrial accident results in great personal & financial loss. Managing these accidental risks in today’s environment is the concern of every industry including distillery also, because either real or perceived incidents can quickly jeopardize the financial viability of a business. Many facilities involve various manufacturing processes that have the potential for accidents which may be catastrophic to the plant, work force and environment or public. The main objective of the risk assessment study is to propose a comprehensive but simple approach to carry out risk analysis and conducting feasibility studies for industries and planning & management of industrial prototype hazard analysis in Indian context.

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6.1.2 Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment (HIRA)

Hazard analysis involves the identification and quantification of the various hazards (unsafe condition) that exist in the plant. On the other hand, risk analysis deals with the identification and quantification of the risk, the plant equipment and Personnel are exposed to accidents resulting from the hazards present in the plant.

Risk analysis involves the identification and assessment of risks to the population is exposed to as a result of hazards present. This requires an assessment of failure probability credible accident scenario, vulnerability of population etc. Much of this information is difficult to get or generate consequently, the risk analysis in present case is confined to maximum credible accident studies and safety and risk aspect related to Molasses based Distillery and power plant.

Activities requiring assessment of risk due to occurrence of most probable instances of hazard and accident are both onsite and off-site.

6.1.2.1 On-site

Exposure to fugitive dust, noise and other emissions will pose health hazards to employees in the work zone. Good Housekeeping practices requiring contact with solid and liquid wastes Emission/spillage etc. from storage & handling will be implemented.

6.1.2.2 Off-site

Exposure to pollutants released from offsite/ storage/related activities Contamination due to accidental releases or normal release in combination with natural hazard Deposition of toxic pollutants in vegetation / other sinks and possible sudden releases due to accidental occurrences

6.1.3 Identification of types of Hazards in Sugar, Distillery & Co-Generation Plant (HAZID)

Disaster at Sugar Mill, distillery and Co-generation plants may occur due to following hazards:

Fire Electric Panels, Oil room and alcohol storage

Explosion in Boiler house etc

Electrocution

Cleaning of barrels, which have held chemical substances

Fall of material etc

The potential hazardous areas and the likely accidents with the concerned area have been enlisted below

Table 6.1 Possible Hazardous Locations onsite

Sl. No. Hazardous Area Likely Accident 1 Boiler Area Explosion 2 Turbine room Explosion 3 Electrocution Lose fitting 4 Electrical rooms Fire and electrocution 5 Transformer Area Fire and electrocution



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6 Cable tunnel Fire and electrocution 9 Distillery (Alcohol storage

tank) Fire

10 Chimney Air pollution 11 Lagoon Storage Overflow, flooding 12 Bagasse storage Fire

6.1.3.1 Fire

Fire can be observed in the boiler area, Fuel spillage, Electrical rooms, Transformer area etc due to accidental failure scenario. Fire from bagasse storage area will cause fatality.

6.1.3.2 Explosion

Explosion may lead to release of heat energy & Pressure waves. Boiler (140TPH and 22TPH proposed incineration boiler) explosion causing fatality and property damage.

Fatal and property damage from alcohol storage tank in the event of spillage and leakage/ electrocution. Fatal Accident due to carelessness during working hours may lead to electrocution.

6.1.4 Proposed Mitigation Measures

6.1.4.1 Preventive Measures for Electricity Hazard

All electrical equipment is to be provided with proper earthing.

Earthed electrode are periodically tested and maintained

Emergency lighting is to be available at all critical locations including the operator’s room to carry out safe shut down of the plant

Easy accessibility of fire fighting facilities such as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations is considered All electrical equipment are to be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease

Use of approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder and not wearing metal ring and chain.

Flame and shock detectors and central fire announcement system for fire safety are to be provided.

Temperature sensitive alarm and protective relays to make alert and disconnect equipment before overheating is to be considered

Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit is to be prevented by providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection

Routine maintenance checks for boiler on pressure and temperature including valves, regular inspection from boiler inspectorate.

6.1.4.2 Preventive Measures/Precautionary Measures for Falling material

Safety helmets to be used to protect workers below against falling Material

Barriers like a toe boards or mesh guards is to be provided to prevent items from slipping or being knocked off the edge of a structure

An exclusion zone is to be created beneath areas where work is taking place.



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Danger areas are to be clearly marked with suitable safety signs indicating that access is restricted to essential personnel wearing hard hats while the work is in progress.

6.1.4.3 Preventive Measures for and safety Measures for Storage & Handling of Alcohol

Handling and storage of alcohol is done as per prescribed norms.

Proposed Safety measures for storage and handling of alcohol

Providing flame arrestors on the top of all the storage tanks.

Flame proof fitting to all the systems which handles the alcohol.

Transfer of alcohol is by pipes only.

All the lightings are of flame proof and Foam Extinguishers inside the warehouse

Removal of all ignition sources and maintaining sterile conditions in and around all areas

Hydrocarbon sensors will be provided to detect alcohol vapour release

In case of spill, mobile foam dispending system will be utilized.

Alcohol storage and handling area fire fighting facility as per OISD 117 norms

Type of foam compound used will be protein or fluro-protein of AFFF

Fire water mains, hydrants and monitor stand posts, raisers of water spray system will be painted with “ fire Red” paint as per IS: 5

Hose boxes, water monitors and hydrant outlets will be painted with “Luminous Yellow” paint as per IS:5

Double headed hydrants with two separate landing valves or monitor on suitably sized stand post will be used

Fire water ring main will be provided all around perimeter of the installation

Spray nozzles will be directed radially to the tank at a distance not exceeding 0.6 m from the tank surface. Only one type and size of spray nozzle will be used in a particular facility.

6.1.4.4 Accidental Release Measures

For Spill Cleanup well Ventilation, Shutting off or removal of all possible sources of ignition, absorbance of small quantities with paper towels and evaporate in safe place like fume hood and burning of these towels in a safe manner, Use of respiratory and/or liquid-contact protection by the Cleanup personnel will be promoted.

6.1.4.5 Need of Establishing a Fire Fighting Group

A small spark of fire may result into loss of lives, machines and the damage by fire may result in high economic losses. This type of losses can be avoided by preventing and controlling the fire instantly for which fire–fighting group will be established. The fire fighting group would house and keep in readiness, the following types of equipment and arrangements.

CO2 extinguishers

Dry powder chemical extinguishers



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Foam extinguishers

80 mm. spray hoses

Fire brigade

Fire hydrant

Protocol (chemical to combat oil fires).

In order to avoid fire in cable galleries, all the power and control cables of FRLS type (Fire Resistant Low Smoke) will be used.

6.1.4.6 Inspection

Fire alarm panel (electrical) will cover the entire plant. The inspection group will periodically inspect fire extinguishers in fire stations and machines and other places. The groups will display emergency telephone number boards at vital points. The group will regularly carry out general inspection for fire.

6.1.5 Procedure for Extinguishing Fire

The following steps will be taken during a fire accident in the system: As soon as the message is received about fire, one of the systems will be diverted to the place of the fire accident along with a staff member. Simultaneously plant fire station will be informed by phone walkie for fire brigades and fire stations of nearby area. In the meanwhile, the pipe system will be operated to obtain maximum pressure on output. In case cables are within the reach of fire, power supply will be tripped and the cables shifted.

6.1.5.1 Fire Fighting with Water

Adequate and reliable arrangement is required for fighting the fire with water such as:

Provision for Fire brigade and Fire hydrant.

Arrangement of pipelines along and around all vulnerable areas.

Provision of valves at appropriate points to enable supply of water at the required place/area or divert the same to another direction/pipe line.

Provision of overhead tanks which will be providing water during power failure and it would work by the gravitational force.

6.1.5.2 Sources of Water for Fire Fighting

The following two sources of water have been considered for fire fighting:

Overhead Tank

Raw Water Reservoir

6.1.5.3Fire Fighting with Fire Extinguishers

To deal with fire other than carbonaceous fires, which can be deal with by water suitable fire extinguishers are required to do the job effectively. It is therefore necessary to keep adequate number of extinguishers in readiness at easily approachable places. Adequate number of fire stations would be provided.

Further, other spray groups from the system will be diverted to the spot. In case of fire in the belt, it will be cut near the burning portion to save the remaining parts. After extinguishing the fire, the area will be well prepared for reuse. Foam System for fire fighting will be



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provided to control fire from the alcohol storage tank. The foam thus produced will suppress fire by separating the fuel from the air (oxygen) and hence avoiding the fire & explosion to occur in the tank. Foam would blanket the fuel surface smothering the fire. The fuel will also be cooled by the water content of the foam. The foam blanket suppresses the release of flammable vapours that can mix with the air.

6.1.6 Environment Health and Safety Cell

This plant has fully fledged EHS cell (Environment Health & Safety Cell). Main function of EHS cell is to assess the potential risks/hazards to environment, health of employees & society and safety within the plant. Installation of fire fighting system, fire alarm, provision of safety/protective equipment to workers and regular medical check-ups has been taken up. Plant is maintained at zero discharge so no likely impact is likely to occur on environment and society. Also regular monitoring of different parameters is being carried out to ensure safety of environment and society. Trainings and Mock drills are also carried out in regular intervals for workers to ensure the safety in case of any accident or natural hazard.

6.1.6.1 HSE Policy of this unit

Policy Statement on Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) assist in:

Protecting the health and safety of employees, their contractors, customers and neighbours.

Maintaining the security of people and assets

Protecting the environment

6.1.6.2 In addition to compliance with laws and regulatory requirements, Company will pursue the following objectives:

Ensure that all activities are conducted in a manner which is consistent with this plants Health, Safety, and Environment Standards

Ensure that business activities are conducted to prevent harm to employees, contractors, the public, other stakeholders and the environment.

Develop, manufacture and market our products with full regard for HSE aspects.

6.1.6.3 Targets set to achieve objectives

To ensure continuous progress improvement in HSE performance

Provide safe and healthy workplaces for our employees and contractors.

Provide information, instruction and training to enable employees to meet their responsibility to contribute to compliance with the Policy.

Provide appropriate HSE information for all contractors and others who work for them.

Protect the environment by preventing or minimizing the environmental impact due to plant activities and products through appropriate design, manufacturing, distribution and by promoting responsible use and disposal practices.

Develop products and processes that help preserve resources and the environment



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6.1.6.4 Safety Organizational Cell

Fig 6.1 Safety organizational cell

6.1.7 Emergency Planning & Procedure

6.1.7.1 Emergency Control Centre

Emergency Control Centre (ECC) is cell from which emergency operations are directed and coordinated. This centre activates as soon as on–site emergency is declared.

6.1.7.2 General Description of ECC

The ECC is located in an area that offers minimal risk being directly exposed to possible accidents. During an emergency, the Emergency Management Staff, including the site controller shall gather in the ECC. Therefore, the ECC shall be equipped with adequate communication systems in the form of telephones and other equipment to allow unhampered organisations and other nearby facility personnel.

The ECC provides shelter to its occupants against the most common accidents; in addition, the ECC’s communication systems are protected from possible shutdown. ECC has its own emergency lighting arrangement and electric communication systems operation. Table 6.2 shows Team involved in Emergency planning & Table 6.3 names, details and contact numbers of Emergency Task Force.

Only a limited and prearranged number of people are admitted to the ECC, when in use. This eliminates unnecessary interference and reduces confusion. The ECC is always ready for operation and provided with the equipment and supplies necessary during the emergency such as:

Updated copies of the on–site Disaster Management Plan.

Emergency telephone numbers.

The names, phone number, and address of external agencies, response organizations and neighbouring facilities.



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The adequate number of telephone (more than two).

Emergency lights, Clocks, Personal protective equipment.

List of fire extinguishers with their type no. and location, capacity, etc.

Safety helmets – List of quantity & location.

Status boards/message board.

Material safety data sheets for chemicals handled at the facility.

Several maps of the facility including drainage system for surrounding area showing:

Areas where hazardous materials are stored.

Plot plans of storage tanks, routes of pipelines, all water permanent lines etc.

The locations where personal protective equipment are stored.

The position of pumping stations and other water sources.

Roads and plant entrances.

Assembly areas & layout of Hydrant line

Table 6.2 Emergency Team Chart

Emergency Task Force Core Team Support Team Coordinator Coordinator 1 Fir service 1 Finance 2 Safety 2 Accounting 3 Environmental cell 3 Material 4 Security 4 Transport 5 OHC 5 Welfare 6 Engineering service department 6 Purchase 7 HR 7 Computer system 8 Communication 9 Technology Onsite Chief Controller-President/Sr. VP Site Incident Controller(Senior most functionary) Deputy Site Incident Controller(Shift In charge Process)

Table 6.3 Emergency Task Force Table

Sl. No.

NAME Contact phone

Core Team Coordinator 1 Safety Services Santhosh Patil 9108709976 2 Emergency cell Vishwanath S Patil 9606951171 3 Security services Nagarchi 9741448381 4 OHS V B Dhundare 9606951183 5 Engineering Service Dept Abhay M Sale 9822622693 6 HR U C Choukimath 9448341808 7 Communication Vinayak Nayak 9972136544



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8 Technical services Suresh Adagimani 8105969193 9 Environmental Cell Katigeri 9686850132

SUPPORT TEAM COORDINATOR 1 Finance Sujay Jadav 9844304000 2 Material N S Mangsule 9606951172 3 Stores B K Shintre 9902706923 4 Transport Muttappa Hosur 7795738631 5 Purchase Samir Attar 9606951173 6 Computer /IT M A Bagwan 9606951177

6.1.7.3 Emergency Planning for Disaster due to Fire

Cable rooms, transformer, unit, auxiliary transformers, oil tanks, etc. within the plant are the likely areas for which disaster management plan is to be made to deal with any eventuality of fire. Stores, workshop, canteen and administrative building will be included.

6.1.7.4 The main hazard potentials in the proposed Harsha Sugar Plant are as under

Material hazards of Bagasse for boiler unit. Mainly prone to fire due to store in open yard.

Process hazards due to loss of containment during handling of hazardous materials or processes resulting in fire, explosion, toxicity etc.

Mechanical hazards –due to mechanical operation such as welding, maintenance, falling objects etc. basically those NOT connected to hazardous material.

Electrical hazards: electrocution, high voltage levels, short circuit, etc. Out of these, the material and process hazards are the one with a much wider damage potential as compared to the mechanical and electrical hazards, which are by and large limited to small pockets local pockets.

6.1.7.5Nature of Disaster

Disaster can occur as on site or off-site variety i.e. disaster on campus or disaster in nearby area causing indirect damage to site area & the complex. Disaster may occur due to 2 categories, natural and manmade calamities

Natural calamities cover Flood, Storm / typhoon, Earthquake, Tsunami, Heavy mist, fog, hail storm, Land slide.

Manmade calamities involve Fire & Explosion, All types of leakages & spillage, Electrocution, excavation, construction, erection, Sabotage, rail & road accidents, mass agitation, Looting, Morcha, war.

6.1.7.6 The identified hazardous areas in the process are

Boiler area � Explosion

Oil tanks � Fire and spillage

Turbine section � Explosion

Electrical rooms � Fire and electrocution

Transformer area � Fire and electrocution

Cable � Fire and electrocution



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Storage facilities – Fire / spillage for fuel and alcohol

Considering various probabilities, the management & safety department has to create awareness & preparedness in all employees and people in vicinity area in case of any sort of emergency to occur & a chalked out attempt to surely overcome the disaster in time. This includes preparation of onsite and offsite disaster control plans, mock drills at least 2 times calendar year, reports for the same to DISH & due amendments for the perfect implementation.

6.1.7.7 Level of Accident

If there is any disaster in any part of plant/work place due to any reason the level of accidents from damage point of view may vary. Accordingly, safety program will have to be initiated by safety department simultaneously.

6.1.7.8 Critical Targets during Emergency

6.1.7.8.1 Level I Accidents

Under this level disaster may happen due to electrocution, fire explosion, oil spillage and spontaneous ignition of combustible material. This level has probability of occurrence affecting persons inside the plant. Various hazardous areas identified above are to be affected due to level I accidents.

6.1.7.8.2 Level II Accidents

Disaster of this level can occur in case of sabotage and complete failure of all automatic control/warning systems, and also if the fuel oil stored in tank and covered by tank bunds leaks out. However, probability of occurrence of this is very low due to the proposed adequate security training, and education level of plant personnel for the captive power plant.

Hazardous inventory as per project data will be as under

Table 6.4 Hazardous material storage Inventory

Sl No

Hazardous Materials Quantity

1 RS 1000m3 2 ENA 1000m3 3 IS storage 1000m3 4 Day tank RS 80m3 5 Day tank ENA 80m3 6 Day tank IS 15m3 7 Sulphur 5 TPD or 150TPM 8 Bagasse 2250TPD

6.1.8 Safety Policy and Regulations

Keeping in view of the safety requirement during construction, operation and maintenance phase Harsha Sugar Plant has safety policy in place.

6.1.8.1 Harsha Sugar Plant has formulated safety policy with the following regulations.

To allocate sufficient resources to maintain safe and healthy policy at work place



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To take steps to ensure that all known safety factors are taken in to account in the design, construction, operation and maintenance of plants, machinery and equipment.

To ensure that adequate safety instructions are given to all employee

To provide wherever necessary, protective equipment, safety appliances and clothing and to ensure their proper use.

To inform employees about materials, equipment or processes used in their work area known to be potentially hazardous to health and safety

To keep all operations and methods of work under regular review for making necessary changes from the point of view of safety in the light of experience and up to date knowledge.

To provide appropriate instruction, training and supervision in health and safety, first aid and ensure that adequate publicity is given to these matters.

To ensure proper implementation of fire prevention and appropriate fire fighting services together with training facilities for personnel involved in this service.

To ensure that professional advice is made available wherever potentially hazardous situations exit or might arise.

To organize collection, analysis & presentation of data on accident, sickness & incident involving personal injury to health with a view of taking corrective, remedial and preventive action

To promote through the establishment machinery, joint consultation in health & safety matters to ensure effective participation by all employees.

To publish/ notify regulation, instruction and notice in the common language of employee.

To prepare separate safety rules for each type of occupation/process involved in a project.

To ensure regular safety inspection by a component person at suitable intervals of all buildings equipment, work places and operation.

6.1.8.2An Approach to Risk Assessment

The objectives of Risk assessment are to control, prevent or reduce loss of life, illness, or injury, damage to property and consequential loss and environmental impact.

Before risk can be effectively managed, it must be analyzed. The analysis of risk is a useful tool for:

Identifying risks and approaches to their solution

Facilitating objective decisions on the acceptability of risk

Meeting regulatory requirement

The results of risk assessment can be used by a decision-maker to help to judge the tolerability of risk and aid in choosing between potential risk reduction and avoidance measures. From the decision-makers perspective some of the principal benefits of risk assessment include:

Systematic identification of potential hazards

Systematic identification of potential failure modes

Quantitative risk statements or ranking



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Evaluation of possible modifications to reduce risk or achieve better dependability levels

Identification of the important contributors to risk and weak links in a system

Better Understanding of the system and its installation

Comparison of risks to those of alternative systems or technologies

Identification and communication of risks and uncertainties

Help in establishing priorities for improved health and safety

A basis for preventive maintenance and inspection to be rationalized

Post-accident investigation and prevention

Selection between alternatives such as different risk-reduction measures and technologies

Prevention of economic loss, etc

All these play an important role in effective risk management.

6.1.9 Scope of Work

a) Hazard Identification:

Study of ongoing operations being carried out at facility and Engineering information, Piping and Instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), plot and layout plans.

Identification of fire, explosion & other health hazards;

Analysis of inventories in storage and handling units with recourse to Manufacture, Storage & Import Of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 2000 and Fire- Explosion & Toxicity Index (FE& TI);

Identification of accident sequences and consequences with recourse to Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and to evaluate propensity of occurrence of the top event through Fault Tree Analysis (FTA);

Past accident data/information analysis in similar installations to develop the credibility of worst come worst accident scenarios; and

Visualization of Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenarios.

(B) Analysis of MCA Scenarios:

Analysis of identified MCA scenarios and quantification of primary effects and to evaluate the domino effects with recourse to computerized mathematical models pertaining to cases of:

Alcohol/ENA/RS outflow and its release

Spilled Product fire

Tank on fire and Pool Fire

Vapour cloud explosion (VCE)

Fire in bagasse stock piles

Fire/explosion in Sulphur storage

Application of damage criteria for heat radiation with recourse to health criteria, dose-response relations and vulnerability models.



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(C) Recommendations based on:

Observations on the operational practices & Installation hardware

Findings of the Risk Analysis & safety review Check-list

Fire fighting& other emergency facilities available

Observations during the Mock Drill

Manufacture, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 2000

Relevant OIL Industries Safety Directorate (OISD) Guidelines/PESO guidelines

6.1.10 Inventory of Hazardous Material

Inventory and type of flammable products plays the important role in analysis of risk, hazards and their consequences. To analyze Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Scenarios, maximum inventory of the Stock material at the along with the road tank trucks present in the vicinity of the site for loading/unloading have been considered. As well as, leakage through pipeline/bursting of line containing in transit.

Maximum storage capacity of Hazardous material according to Flammability class is tabulated as under:

Table 6.5 Maximum Inventories of Harsha Sugar Plant Products (with Flash Points)

Flammability Class

Flash Point Range oC Products Total Capacity

A FP < 23 Ethanol/RS/ENA 60 KLPD

6.2 Hazard Identification and Visualization of MCA Scenarios

6.2.1 Introduction

“Risk” is loss per unit time and is the product of the consequence of an event and the frequency of its occurrence. All activities involve some risk. In our everyday life, people engaged in an activity frequently perform their own risk assessment often intuitively. The level of risk deemed to be acceptable is highly subjective, varies from person to person, and depends on many factors. Total avoidance of risk (zero risk) is an unattainable goal. Risk can, however, be reduced through the implementation of control measures, engineering design and good management practices.

The starting point of the risk analysis study is the identification of hazards and selection of scenarios which are then addressed for further analysis.

"Hazard" is a characteristic of a system, Installation or processes that present potential for an accident. It is defined as a chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage to people, property or the environment. Therefore, all the relevant aspects of hazardous material storage and handling process have been thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unintentional event or sequence of events, which can lead to an accident or disaster. Type, quantity, location & conditions of release of the hazardous material under various scenarios have been examined in order to estimate its damage potential, area affected, and based on that, the precautionary measures needed to be taken are suggested in Independent Heading – “RECOMMENDATIONS”



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6.2.2 Hazard potential: Deciding factor

Factors considered to identify and analyze the hazard potential are:

Flash point & Boiling point of the alcohol /flammable Products as well as intrinsic chemical properties of bagasse and sulphur

Inventory of the alcohol /flammable, bagasse and sulphur.

Potential for loss from containment/fire in stock

Pool size & dyke capacity

Potential for availability of ignition sources in the vicinity of leakage or spillage

Apart from the characteristics and process of its handling, size & layout of the sugar plant are also analyzed in order to assess the hazard potential.

6.2.3 Identification of Hazards

Identification of hazards is of primary significance in the analysis, quantification and cost-effective control of accidents involving hazardous stock of material and their operations.

Alcohol/ flammable, bagasse, sulphur require sufficient interaction with air or oxygen for their mixture to form in presence of ignition source and then for occurrence of their hazards associated with them. Under certain circumstances, vapours of the products when mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. Following methods of hazard identification have been employed in this study:

All hazardous materials present on the site, and or transported to and from the site are identified

The properties of these hazardous materials are reviewed in order to categories the possible hazards

Characterization of major hazardous units based on Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, Government of India, 2000; referred here as MSIHC Rules.

Identification of hazardous installations based on relative ranking technique, viz. Dow's Fire Explosion Index and Mond's Toxicity Index (FE & TI)

The site facilities and transport systems are examined to identify where the hazardous materials are present and the conditions under which they are contained

The major hazards in petrochemical, chemical plants and installations are due to substances within the Installations that can be released to cause either:

Fire

Explosion

Toxic effect (Poisoning)

At Harsha Sugar Plant, Fire and Explosion are the major hazards due to handling and storage of products. At Harsha Sugar Plant, Alcohol is the main HZ flammable material having potential threat to fire and explosion. We therefore consider all possible MCA with respect to these inventories. The credible accident scenarios with these materials can be –

Pool fire

Jet fire



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Spill fire

Tank on fire

VCE

BLEVE

Pressure waves

Stock pile fire and other incidental conducive conditions

However, each scenario can cause potential damage under favourable conditions. But obvious chances for incidences are remote as all safety gears are in place with due practice. More over all scenarios have been visualized vis-à-vis most credible one. IT can be quantified to assess possible damage and hence planning for preventive as well as protective arrangement also being designed, reviewed. Most of them are not credible scenarios under normal conditions. Their probability of occurrence has been rated lesser then 1 in million years as per standard prescribe text (TNO GREEN BOOK). Accordingly, such scenarios have been considered as acceptable risk. We therefore restricted our estimation of damage potential for spill fire/tank on fire cases for sake of symbolic risk assessment. OISD also prescribe safety measures towards mitigation measures and suggested control as well as fire fighting gears to be in place. Accordingly, hydrant lining monitors, cooling water, water storage static tank, ROV, automation etc. have been integrated.

For estimation of damage potential, we need to understand intrinsic properties of Hazardous stock. By simulating scenario and thus applying modeling software we can assess extent of damage potential as well as quantum. In our further collation, we are compiling those attributes and evaluate the different cases for risk mapping.

6.2.4 Physico – Chemical Properties of Alcohol /ENA/RS/AA

We use generic work Alcohol (similar almost RS/ENA/AA) is highly inflammable in their basic character (depending on Flammability class). They are dangerous because of their intrinsic properties, i.e. flash point, ignition energy required, heat of combustion, flammability limits, etc. In addition to such intrinsic properties, extrinsic factors like quantity of storage, Type of storage (A/G or U/G) and operating conditions are also considered for hazard identification. Physico-chemical properties of the Alcohol products, to be stored during operation phase of Harsha Sugars Ltd., are given in Table 6.6

Table 6.6 Hazardous Properties of Alcohol

SN Properties Ethanol

1 Physical State Highly Volatile

2 ALCOHOL Act/OISD Flammability Class

A

3 Specific Gravity 0.79

4 Reactive to -

5 Flash point ºC (Range) < 23

6 Boiling point ºC 78.32

7 Auto – Ignition Temperature ºC 422

8 Specific Heat (KJ/Kg °K) 2.13



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9 Heat of Evaporation (KJ/Kg) 85.38

10 Heat of Combustion (KJ/Kg) 30624

Table 6.7 Flammability Classification Criteria

SN Flammability Class Flash point (°C) 1 Class A Flammable Liquid FP < 23 2 Class B Flammable Liquid 23 > FP <65 3 Class C Flammable Liquid 65 > FP < 93 4 Excluded ALCOHOL More than 93

6.2.5 Applicable MSIHC Rules 2000

Major hazard installations in the country have been identified & characterized by MSIHC (Manufacturing, storage and Identification of Hazardous Chemicals) Rules, amended in 2000. The rules employ certain criteria based on flammable, explosive & toxic properties and quantity of the chemicals. Indicative criteria adopted in the MSIHC Rules, 2000 and description of applicable provisions of the rules is given in Appendix I.

As per provisions of the MSIHC Rules, 2000 quantity of alcohol Product Storage at the Installations has been analyzed and the applicable rules are identified based on the type of alcohol products, quantity of storage and the threshold quantity given in the rules. Applicable regulations of MSIHC Rules, 2000 to the Installations are identified in the following Table 6.9

All alcohol products marketing locations fall under the category of isolated storage, which comes under schedule 2 of MSIHC Rules. Threshold quantities and applicability of various rules are as follows:

Table 6.8 Applicability of MSIHC Rules

SN Product Storage Capacity

Threshold Quantity (MT) as per MSIHC Rules*

Applicable Rules Class In m3

For Rules 4,5,7 to 9 & 13 to 15

For Rules 10 to 12

1 Class A 1000 m3

(Bulk storage for each product at

distillery) 7000 7000

2(e)(i) & (ii), 2(h)(i), 4,5,7 to 9, 10 to 12

& 13 to 15

Rule 2: Identification for Existence of "Hazardous Chemicals”

"Hazardous chemicals" are existing in the HPCL, Installation as per rule 2(e)(i) & 2(e)(ii), alcohol products existing at the Depot are covered under Schedule I(b)(ii)

"Industrial Activity" carried out in the Depot involves operation / processes having hazardous chemicals and includes their on-site storage & transportation as per Rule 2(h) (i). “Isolated storage” of alcohol products is covered in schedule 2.

Rule 3: Duties of the Government Authorities

Duties of the Government Authorities as per schedule V.



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Rule 4: General Responsibility of Occupier

As "hazardous chemicals" exist in the Depot the occupier has to provide evidence to show that he has:

Identified the major accident hazards &

Taken adequate steps to:

Prevent such major accidents and to limit their consequences to persons & environment.

Provide information, training and safety equipments, including antidotes to the persons working on site to ensure their safety

Rule 5: Notification of Major Accidents

Notification of "Major Accidents" in the format given in Schedule 6 to Chief Inspector of factories and to other authorities as listed in Schedule V.

Rule 7: Notification of Site

Notification of site and updated information of the modifications to the competent authority as per Schedule VII.

Rule 8: Updating of the Site Notification Following Changes in the Threshold Quantity

Any change in the “threshold quantity” (storage quantity) is to be notified to the competent authority.

Rule 9: Transitional Provision

Transitional Provision for the existing activity

Rule 10: Safety Reports

Preparation of Safety report by the occupier & to carry out an independent safety audit once in a year.

Rule 11: Updating of report under rule 10

Updating of safety reports based on modification.

Rule 12: Requirement for further information to be sent to the authority

Further information on safety reports to the authority.

Rule 13: Preparation to On-sire emergency plan by the occupier

Preparation of onsite emergency plan by the occupier & to conduct mock drill once in every 6 months.

Rule 14: Preparation of Off-sire emergency plan by the occupier

Preparation of offsite emergency plan by the occupier & to conduct mock drill once in every Year.

Rule 15: Information to be given to persons liable to be affected by a major accident



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Rule 17: Collection, Development and Dissemination of Information on "Hazardous Chemicals" Employed by the Occupier

Material Safety Data Sheet is to be prepared as per Schedule IX

Every container of hazardous chemical should be labelled or marked to identify

Contents of the container

The name and the address of the manufacturer

Physical, Chemical and Toxicological data as per the criteria given in Schedule I : Part I

Rule 18: Import of Hazardous Chemicals

The rule is applicable as “hazardous chemicals” as per Schedule 1 Part I (b) (ii) exist in the Installation.

To provide timely information to various Govt. Authorities listed in Schedule V

Name & address of the company receiving the consignment in India

The port of entry in India

Mode of transport from exporting country to India

The quantity of chemicals being imported

Complete product safety information

6.2.6 Fire Explosion Index (FEI) Analysis

Introduction & Objectives

The most widely used relative ranking hazard indices are Dow chemical Company's Fire Explosion Index (FEI) and Mond's Toxicity Index (TI). They are commonly together referred to as Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FEI & TI).

FEI and TI involve objective evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion, toxicity and reactivity potential of process or storage units. The quantitative methodology relies on the analysis based on historic loss data, the energy content of the chemical under study and the extent to which loss prevention measures are already incorporated. FEI are primarily designed for operations involving storage, handling and processing of flammable, combustible and reactive chemicals.

Table 6.9 Fire & Explosion Index & Category

SN Fire & Explosion Index (FEI) Category 1 FEI <60 Light 2 61> FEI <96 Moderate 3 97>FEI <127 Intermediate 4 128 >FEI <158 Heavy 5 159 and more Severe

Computations of FEI for storage units of sugar plant are computed in the following Table. Here only FEI is computed, because alcohol is inflammable in nature and not toxic. Toxic



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effect is left just momentary and hence not dangerous as other real toxic chemicals e.g. Chlorine.

Table 6.10 Fire Explosion Index for Storage Units

SN Product Product Capacity

Material Factor Penalties Fire & Explosion

NH NF NR MF GPH SPH Index Category

1 Ethanol 60 KLPD 0 3 0 16 0.5 1.67 64.14 Moderate

Ethanol Storage Tanks (Coming under Moderate), all other Storage Tanks falls under light category

6.2.7 Visualization of MCA Scenarios

6.2.7.1 Introduction

A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized as an accident with a maximum damage potential, which is believed to be credible. For selection of a MCA scenario following factors have been taken into account.

Flammability of the alcohol Products

Quantity of Products present in the tank

Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and presence of incompatible materials

In addition to the above factors, location of the unit with respect to adjacent establishment has been taken into consideration to account for the potential of escalation of an accident. This phenomenon is known as the domino or secondary effect. In order to visualize MCA scenarios Chemical Inventory Analysis, Event Tree Analysis and Past Accident Review have been employed.

6.2.7.2 Chemical Inventory Analysis

Maximum inventory of ALCOHOL Products, bagasse, sulphur, in pipeline/transit sections, storage units and handling equipments has been considered.

6.2.7.3 Identification of Chemical Release & Accident Scenarios

Credible accident scenarios for the Depot have been divided into following categories according to the mode of release of alcohol products, physical effects and the resulting damages:

Jet fire (leakage of alcohol products from a tank/pipe/pump/joints and the products stream catching fire in case of Ethanol)

Spilled product Fire (Release of alcohol products from valve joints, loose connections, etc.)

Pool fire (release of alcohol products from a tank, rupture of pipeline sections, etc. forming a pool within the area thereafter catching fire)

Tank on Fire (due to external heat, joints of roof of tank get loose and it get thrown outside and if the surface of tank catches fire, it is termed as tank on fire)

Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) as a secondary effect of above mentioned scenarios



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Fire in stock pile of bagasse, sulphur under favourable conditions

6.2.7.4 Even Tree Analysis (ETA) to define outcome of release

Different outcomes of a leakage or catastrophic failure are possible depending on if and when ignition occurs and the consequences thereupon. ETA considers various possibilities such as immediate or delayed ignition for the different outcomes to occur.

ETA diagram for various modes of failures of storage tank/ pump/ pipe/ joints for atmospheric storage of alcohol products have been developed for conditions such as overfilling, over-pressure and remote incidents like missile, lightening or bomb attack and earthquake. The resultant ruptures of vessels or leak incidents have been identified with possible outcomes of such incidents. Even tree Analysis for Harsha Sugars Ltd., is shown in Figure 6.2. Scenarios pertaining to leakage & spillage are most credible in such Installation.

6.2.7.5 Fault Tree Analysis to Explore Propensity for Occurrence of the Top Event

In ALCOHOL Installations, it is important to analyze the possible mechanisms of failure and to perform probabilistic analysis for the expected rate of such failures. A technique like Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) can suitably be used for this purpose. Any system represented by a fault tree has components that operate in series or parallel, with the contribution of the two being most frequent. These components are studied for their failure and the possible causes are linked together through logical gates. Thus, a complete network is formed using logical gates for different causes and consequences. This network represents a system for which propensity towards top event is examined.

To construct a fault tree for a present case, Pool fire scenario is designated as the "top event”. Tracing backward, exactly opposite to the forward approach followed in Event Tree Analysis (ETA), all failures that could lead to the top event are found. Then all failures leading to each of those events are identified. The word `event' means conditions, which are deviations from the normal or planned state of operation of a system.

The evaluation of fault tree may be qualitative or quantitative or both depending on the scope of analysis and requirement. The aim of fault tree evaluation is to determine whether an acceptable level of safety has been incorporated in the design of the system or not. Suitable design improvements to minimize the probability of occurrence of top event are found out. The system safety is upgraded by evaluating the critical events that significantly contribute to the top event and the measures provided to cope with such eventualities.

6.2.7.6 Short Listing of MCA Scenarios

Based on the hazard identification and comparing the nature of installation with that from past accidents in similar units, a final list of MCA scenarios for the Depot has been made, which is tabulated below. These are the maximum credible accidents, which may occur, in the respective unit.

Table 6.11 Short Listing of MCA Scenarios for Hazardous material

SI.No Tank No/stock piles. Hazardous Product

MCA Scenario

1 Bulk Storage Ethanol/ ENA/ RS/AA

Pool Fire, Spilled product Fire, Tank on Fire& VCE

2 Stock Bagasse/sulphur Stock pile fire/dust explosion



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The above foreseen accident scenarios will have certain adverse effects on the nearby units/structures in the Depot which may lead to escalation of the accident further. Consequences of the entire above maximum credible accident scenarios have been analyzed in detail in the section: Consequence Analysis.

Fig 6.2 Event Tree Analysis for Atmospheric Storage of Flammable Liquids

Fig 6.3 Fault Tree Analysis for Top Event of Pool Fire Scenario



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6.2.7.7 Consequence analysis

6.2.7.7.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the quantification of various effects of release of ALCOHOL/hazardous material products on the surrounding area by means of mathematical models and internationally recognized Safety software.

It is intended to give an insight into how the physical effects resulting from the release of hazardous substances can be calculated by means of computerized models and how the vulnerability models can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of injuries and damage to exposed population & environment.

Table 6.12 Mathematical and Analytical Model for Hazard Analysis

SN Phenomenon Applicable Models 1 Outflows:

Liquid, Two phase

Mixtures, Gas/vapour

Bernoulli flow equation; phase equilibrium; multiphase flow models; orifice/nozzle flow equations; gas laws; critical flow criteria

2 Discharges:

Spreading liquid

Vapour jets

Flashing liquids

Evaporation of liquids on land & water

Spreading rate equation for non-penetrable surfaces based on cylindrical liquid pools Turbulent free jet model Two zone flash vaporization models Spreading, boiling & moving boundary heat transfer models; Film & meta-stable boiling phenomenon; cooling of semi-infinite medium

3 Dispersion:

Heavy Gas

Natural Gas

Atmospheric stability

Boundary dominated, stable stratified & positive dispersion models (similarity)

3D Models based on momentum, mass & energy conservation

Gaussian Dispersion models for naturally buoyant plumes

Boundary layer theory (turbulence), Gauss Ian distribution models

4 Heat Radiation:

Liquid pool fires

Jet fires

Fire balls

Stock pile fire

Burning rate, heat radiation & incident heat correlation (semi imperial); Flame propagation behaviour models Fire jet dispersion model API fire ball models relating surface heat flux of flame, geometric view factor & transmission coefficients

5 Vulnerability:

Likely damage

Probit functions; Non-Stochastic vulnerability models

First, attention is paid to the factors, which are decisive for the selection of the models to be used in a particular situation, after which the various effect models are discussed.



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6.2.7.7.2 Factors which Influence the use of Physical Effect Model

In order to calculate the physical effects of the incidental release of hazardous substances the following steps have been carried out in succession:

Understanding of the form in which the hazardous substance is in existence (i.e. liquid of highly volatile nature in case of alcohol Product)

Determination of the various ways in which the release can take place

Determination of the outflow volume or quantity (as a function of time) i.e. estimating rate of evaporation from the pool of liquid;

Solid hazardous stock like bagasse as well as sulphur

In the case of ALCOHOL Product, quantity of leaked or spilled Product along with pool size has been calculated. Finally, the analysis results in computation of heat radiation intensity (KW/m2) with respect to distance for various MCA scenarios. In this analysis, final effect calculations have been made for pool fire for heat radiation intensity effects with respect to distance from dyke wall. However, for stock pile fire black body radiation strength can be computed.

6.2.8 Models for determining the source strength for the release of hazardous substances

Source strength of a release means the quantity of the substance released with respect to time. The release may be instantaneous or continuous. In case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in Kg whereas in continuous release source strength depends on the outflow time and expressed in Kg/s. In order to find the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel or pipe along with physical properties, viz. vapour pressure & minimum ignition energy required. Phase of alcohol Product at the time of accidental release is also to be determined. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid or liquid in equilibrium with its vapour.

6.2.8.1 Instantaneous Release

In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of pool size, volatile nature of the product (i.e. vapour pressure) and meteorological conditions.

6.2.8.2 Semi – Continuous Outflow

In the case of a semi continuous outflow, it is again first of all necessary to determine whether it is gas, a gas condensed to liquid or liquid that is flowing out. The following situations can occur here.

a) Gas Outflow:

The model with which the source strength is determined in the event of a gas outflow is based on the assumption that there is no liquid in the system.

b) Liquid Outflow:

In case of liquid outflow, discharge due to overall head difference takes place.



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6.2.9 Model for Evaporation

In application of evaporation models, alcohol product is a case of volatile liquid. From the pool, which has formed, evaporation will take place as a result of the heat flow from the ground and solar radiation. The evaporation model only takes account of the heat flow from the ground since the heat resulting from solar radiation is negligibly small compared with the former. The evaporation rate depends on the kind of liquid and the kind of subsoil.

6.2.10 Model for Dispersion

The gas or vapour released either instantaneously or continuously will be spread in the surrounding area under the influence of the atmospheric turbulence. In the case of gas dispersion, a distinction is required to be made between neutral gas dispersion and heavy gas dispersion. The concentrations of the gas released in the surrounding area can be calculated by means of these dispersion models. These concentrations are important for determining the nature of accidents for example an explosive gas cloud formation injuries will occur in the case of toxic gases.

6.2.10.1 Heavy Gas Dispersion Model

If the gas density is higher than that of air due to higher molecular weight or marked cooling, it will tend to spread in a radial direction because of gravity. This results in a "gas pool" of a particular height and diameter. As a result of this, in contrast to a neutral gas, the gas released may spread against the direction of the wind.

6.2.11 Model for Heat Load and Shock Waves

6.2.11.1 Model for flare

If an out-flowing vapour (in case of class A Products) forms a cloud with concentrations between the lower and upper explosion limit and ignition takes place, momentary/instantaneous/luminous fire film may occur for fraction of seconds. A model with which the length of a torch and the thermal load for the surrounding area can be calculated, assumes an elliptic shaped torch. The volume of the flare in this model is proportional to the outflow. In order to calculate the thermal load, flare is regarded as a point source located at the centre of the flare. This centre is taken as being half a flare length from the point of outflow.

6.2.11.2 Model for jet fire

In this event, if out-going stream is due to small opening / hole in the storage tank / valve joints having sufficient liquid head may result in jet fire if it catches ignition source.

6.2.11.3 Model for Spilled/Pool fire/Tank on Fire

The schematic of a pool fire is depicted in fig. The heat load on objects outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to-height ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the following factors:

Distance from the fire

Relative humidity (water vapour has relatively high heat absorbing capacity)



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The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the object irradiated with respect to the fire

6.2.12 Vulnerability Model

Vulnerability models or dose response relations, which, are used in order to determine how people are injured by exposure to heat load or a toxic dose. Such models are designed on the basis of animal experiments or on the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents, which have occurred. Vulnerability models often make use of a Probit function. In a Probit function a link is made between the load and the percentage of people exposed who suffer a particular type of injury. The Probit function is represented as follows:

Pr = k1 + k2 ln V in which,

P = Probit, a measure for the percentage of people exposed who incur a particular injury (relation between percentages & Probit is given in Table 6.13.

k1 = A constant depending on the type of injury and type of load

k2 = A constant depending on the type of load

V = Load or dose

Table 6.13 Relationship between Percentage and Probit

Percentage Probit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 - 2.67 2.95 3.12 3.25 3.36 3.45 3.52 3.59 3.66 10 3.72 3.77 3.82 3.87 3.92 3.96 4.01 4.05 4.08 4.12 20 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.29 4.33 4.36 4.39 4.42 4.45 30 4.48 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.61 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.72 40 4.75 4.77 4.80 4.83 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.92 4.95 4.97 50 5.00 5.03 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.18 5.20 5.23 60 5.25 5.28 5.31 5.33 5.36 5.39 5.41 5.44 5.45 5.50 70 5.52 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.64 5.67 5.71 5.74 5.77 5.81 80 5.84 5.88 5.92 5.95 5.99 6.04 6.08 6.13 6.18 6.23 90 6.28 6.34 6.41 6.48 6.55 6.64 6.75 6.88 7.05 7.33 - 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

99 7.33 7.37 7.41 7.46 7.51 7.58 7.65 7.75 7.88 8.09

6.2.12.1 Injuries resulting from flammable liquids and gases

In the case of flammable liquids and gases and immediate ignition a pool fire or a flare will occur depending on the conditions. The injuries in this case are mainly caused by heat radiation.

6.2.12.2 Damage Models for Heat Radiation

It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered by the fire ball, a torch, a burning pool or gas cloud will be burned to death or will asphyxiate. The following Probit functions are an example of a method, which can be used to calculate the percentage of lethality, and first-



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degree burns that will occur at a particular thermal load and period of exposure of an unprotected body.

Lethality: Pr = -36.83 + 2.56 ln (t.q4/3)

First degree burn symptoms: Pr = -39.83 + 3.0186 in (t.q4/3)

In which, t = exposure time in seconds and;

q = thermal load W/m2

Two values have been chosen for the exposure time to heat radiation:

10 seconds: for exposed persons in populated area it is assumed that they will have found protection from the heat radiation e.g. from a wall, within 10 seconds

30 seconds: this pessimistic assumption applies if people do not run away immediately or when no protection is available

Thermal radiations for particular Heat Radiation Intensity (KW/m2) give different impacts. It depends on Intensity of Heat Radiation and surrounding facilities. Following table describes the damage due to particular Heat Intensity.

Table 6.14 Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads

Incident Radiation intensity, KW/m2

Type of damage Intensity Damage to Equipment Damage to People

62.0 Spontaneous Ignition of Wood Table 6.14

100% Lethality (severe damage)

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

100% lethality in 1 min. and 1% lethality in 10 sec.

25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood, at infinitely long exposure (non-piloted)

50% Lethality in 1 min. and Significant injury in 10 sec.

19.0 Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed on thermally unprotected equipment

-

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

1% lethality in 1 min.

9.5 - Pain threshold reached after 15

seconds

6.4 - Pain threshold reached after 8

seconds. Second Degree burns after 20 seconds.

4.5

- Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds, however blistering of skin (first degree burns) is likely

2.0 PVC insulated cables damaged

-



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1.6 - Will cause no discomfort to long

exposure. Pain threshold reached after 60 seconds

0.7 - Equivalent to solar radiation.

Exposed skin reddens and burns on prolonged exposure

Source: Reference Green book “Methods for Determination of Possible Damage”, TNO, Netherlands; World Bank (1988); Technical Report No. 55: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards; D.C.: The World Bank

The level of damage caused is a function of duration of exposure as well as heat flux. This is true both for the effects on buildings and Installation equipment as well as personnel. However, the variation in likely exposure time is much more marked with personnel due to possibility of findings shelter.

The following table gives the relationship between exposure time and heat flux against the fatality probability factors. Fatality Probability due to thermal radiation:

Table 6.15 Relationship between exposure time and heat flux

Percentage of Fatality 10% 50% 99% Heat Flux (KW/m2) Times in Seconds

1.6 500 1300 3200 4.0 150 370 930 12.5 30 80 200 37.5 8 20 50

In general, it might be possible to take to a “shelter” within 30-60 seconds. As can be seen from above table, the change between very low to very high fatality probabilities occurs between flux levels of 12.5 kw/m2 and 37.5 kw/m2. For transient fires like fire ball, the steady state heat flux levels cannot be used to estimate the damage. The degree of thermal radiation in terms of total incident thermal energy dose levels are relevant as shown in table below:

Table 6.16 Physiological effect of Threshold Thermal Dose:

Thermal Threshold Dose (KJ/m2) Effects

37.5 3rd Degree Burns 25.0 2nd Degree Burns 12.5 1st Degree Burns 6.5 Threshold of Pain or blistering of skin

6.2.13 Impact of Overpressure

Pressure wave’s results due to catastrophic failure or rupture of storage tank/pipeline etc. it results in generation of high pressure waves which have potential to cause damage to property/personnel/equipments/neighbouring areas. A peak over pressure of 0.1 bar is taken as the limit for fatal injury and 0.03 bar as the limit for the occurrence of wounds as the result of flying fragments of glass. Following inferences are used to translate an explosion in terms of damage to the surrounding area:

Everyone within the contours of the exploding gas cloud will die as a result of burns or asphyxiation. Establishments in this zone will be fully destroyed.



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In houses with serious damage it is assumed that one in eight persons present will be killed as a result of the building collapsing. Within the zone with a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of death in houses is 0.0125, i.e. one in eighty people will be killed.

Table 6.17 Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure

Peak Overpressure (Bar) Damage Level 5.0 – 8.0 Major structural damage (assumed fatal to people

inside building or within other structures) 100% Lethality

3.5 – 3.0 Oil storage tank failure 50% Lethality

2.0 – 3.0 Eardrum rupture Threshold Lethality

1.33 - 2.0 Repairable damage. Pressure vessels intact; light structures collapse Severe lung Damage

1.0 – 1.33 Window breakage, possibly causing some injuries 50% eardrum Rupture

0.3 Heavy (90% Damage) 0.1 Repairable (10% Damage) 0.03 Damage of glass 0.01 Crack of windows

6.2.13.1 Summary of Damage Criteria

The summary of damage criteria adopted in the study based on vulnerability models and published health criteria for arriving at damage distances for the identified effects are:

Table 6.18 Damage Criteria for Pool Flare/Jet Fire

SN Damage Exposure Time = 10s Exposure Time = 3s

With Protection

Without Protection

With Protection

Without Protection

1 100% lethality & severe damage to life & property

Within pool

Within pool

Within pool Within pool

2 1% Lethal Injury (kW/M2) 21.1 16.5 9.3 7.3 3 1% First Degree Burns (KW/m2) 8.5 6.9 4.5 3.0

6.2.14 Result of Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCA)

The maximum credible accident scenarios for the Harsha Sugars Ltd. have been identified and listed in Table below. Results of those identified scenarios are tabulated in subsequent headings as under.

6.2.15 Spilled Product Fire Scenario

In Harsha Sugar Plant, handling of Alcohol products (here, Ethanol,) for any leakage or spillage from Pipelines at Receipt area or leakage in any of the Tank Truck at the Tank Lorry Gantry and at the Pump House, there will be accumulation of Alcohol products. In either of the cases if it catches fire depending on availability of potential ignition source in the vicinity,



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it will take form of a Spilled Product Fire. But this fire has comparatively less impact on the surrounding area and there are less chances of damaging the other facilities of the plant.

Using Software Model, damage distances for Spilled product fire scenario at TT Gantry area and Pump House area are calculated and tabulated as under:

Table 6.19 Damage Distances Due to Spilled Product Fire Scenario for considered Areas

SN Name of Product

Maximum Intensity of Heat

Radiation Calculated

Using Spilled Fire Model (KW/m2)

Damage Distance in meters Calculated For Exposure Time of 10s


1% Lethality (21.2 KW/m2)

First Degree

Burn (8.5 KW/m2)

1% Lethality

(9.3 KW/m2)

First Degree

Burn (4.5 KW/m2)

1 Ethanol/ RS/ ENA

33 NR 1.01 0.934 1.74 NR NR NR 1.94 NR NR NR 1.3

NR: Not Reachable (Within the area under fire)

From results of Spilled Product Fire scenario, it is concluded that, the effect of spilled fire will be for a lesser distance & will not affect the nearby facilities properties or surrounding area. Chances of any severe lethality will be least in case of spill fire, however there can be first degree burns to the people if any close to fire area.

Note: NR in above table represents that radiation of that particular heat intensity will be limited to spilled fire area only.

6.2.16 Pool Fire Scenario

At Harsha Sugar Plant, during handling or storage operation of Alcohol products (Ethanol, HSD), if there is a major leakage/total rupture from storage unit within the boundary (due to any reasons), there will be formation of pool within the Dyke wall in case of less volatile or non-volatile liquid. If the liquid does not overflow firebreak wall, then the pool will be limited to the respective unit. However, if the liquid overflows the firebreak wall, it may engulf the complete dyke area. In both of the cases if it catches fire depending on availability of potential ignition source in the vicinity, it will take form of Pool fire.

There are dyke walls enclosing tanks of Alcohol products. Individual Alcohol product for each dyke wall is considered for pool fire study and using software model, results have been obtained for pool fire scenario. In another possible case, there can be pipeline failure due to some accidental conditions. In this case pipeline volume and pressure, isolation time through control system and other software requisite were considered to predict damage potential Damage distances for particular heat radiation intensity are being tabulated as under:

Table 6.20 Results of Pool Fire Scenario for all Dyke walls

SN Dyke No. Considered For Pool Fire

Storage tanks enclosed in Dyke wall

Name of Product

Maximum Intensity of Heat Radiation Calculated Using Spilled Fire Model (kW/m2)



1% Lethality First Degree Burn 1% Lethality

First Degree Burn

1 Dyke 1000 KL Ethanol/ 33 8.02 19.5 18.38 33.34



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(each) RS/ENA 2 TT Gantry Due to

pipeline major leak

Ethanol/ RS/ENA

33 5.6 22.58 20.68 36.54

Damage distances for pool fire scenario of each Alcohol product are well within the depot boundary area. Heat radiations may cause burn injury to personnel’s and heating of nearby tank. Strict precautions and safe operations need to be carried out by Harsha Sugar Plant officials.

From above calculations, it is inferred that damage distance (at radiation level 4.5 KW/m2) 36.54m. This is well within HSL boundary and as per license limit.

6.2.16.1Tank on Fire Scenario

Escaping of roof of storage tank due to internal pressure (due to surrounding heat or any other reason) or due to roof structure failure may result in tank on fire if product within the tank catches fire.

Each tank of Oil is examined for this scenario and the results were scrutinized. The effect of fire on people and property outside and inside the HSL is in the form of thermal radiations. A criterion was selected for deciding the maximum level of thermal radiation to which the outside population can be subjected. Thermal radiation levels from fire scenarios of each tank were worked out at various distances and their effects are evaluated against the set criteria.

For HSL, each product tank is examined for Tank on fire scenario. The results are shown in following table:

Table 6.21 Damage Distances Due to Tank on Fire Scenario

SN Product

Damage Distance (m) From Tank Surface For Radiation Intensity KW/m2

37.5 KW.m2 12.5 KW/m2 4.5 KW/m2

1 ETHANOL/ RS/ ENA/AA

0 0.3 2.8

Analyzing the damage distances and heat radiation intensities for various Tank on fire scenarios it can be inferred that there will not be any fatality outside the Harsha Sugar Plant premises as there will be sufficient time to escape and there is no any habitation or facility. Only burn injuries may occur inside Harsha Sugar Plant to personnel. Thus, damage in the plant could be limited to the plant only if any. However, necessary due precautions must be undertaken by plant Personnel to ensure safety within the depot. Frequency of occurrence of such accidents has been found extremely low.



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Fig 6.4 Schematic of a Flare/Jet Fire

Fig 6.5 Schematic of a Pool Fire/Spilled Fire



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Radiation Intensity KW/M2 Effect A >37.5 100% Lethality B 25-37.5 50% Lethality C 12.5-25 1% Lethality D 4.5-12.5 First Degree Burns

Fig 6.6 Symbolic representation of pool fire and radiation effect from source at centre (pool/spill)

Centre represents burning pool. Radiation effect diminishes with distance from pool. Radiation at 12 KW/m2 can be considered as safe distance for burn injury.

D

C

B

A



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Wind Direction

6.2.17 Vapour Cloud Explosion Scenario

Continuous Alcohol evaporating vapour moves in wind direction and finds ignition source results into this scenario. It may also likely to be dispersed into atmosphere and diluted into it. If continue to drift, it will reach below LEL level sometime and thus there will be no chance of ignition. It will disperse totally. It is not considered as credible scenario.

6.2.17.1 Risk Associated With Solid Hazardous Material Bagasse and Sulphur

Risk Assessment for Bagasse and Sulphur Storage are also being identified. The process for manufacturing and refining sugar is a standard process. Areas of concern from hazard and risk points of view in the plant manufacturing of sugar are

Bagasse Storage

Sulphur Storage

Bagasse generation per day will increase to 2250T/day. Present area reserved for of storage will be increased proportionately.

Large quantity of bagasse stored poses the serious hazard of fire as it is easily ignitable and fire spreads rapidly. Serious fire accidents have been reported. Mitigation Measures.

Point Source



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6.2.17.2 Precautions for fire accident

It should be ensured while routing high tension voltage lines to avoid storage of bagasse storage below & near high voltage (H.T.) transmission lines.

Avoid route of electric supply cables & AC cable trenches far away from stored bagasse or bagasse heaps.

Always keep raw & useful material far away from storage of bagasse area.

Installation of Fire Hydrant (self auto-mode fire fighting) system around the area of bagasse yard.

Posting of proper supervision staff with necessary communication facility.

Hot work, like welding, gas cutting should not be carried out near bagasse storage.

Daily record of bagasse storage data, proper review of conditions taken by higher authority.

Training of all the involved staff in normal & emergency operating system.

Proper planning & installation of fire hydrant system around the bagasse storage yard and not depending exclusively on fire tender for fire fighting.

Creating awareness among workers about sudden bagasse fire and emergency action plan will definitely avoid risks of heavy fire.

In this way, we can save valuable fuel & life of human being working near bagasse handling and storage.

6.2.18 Design and Installation of Fire fighting: Measures suggested

It is recommended to install fire hydrant piping system around the bagasse storage yard with fire hydrant points considering it as high hazard category [(6.7) of code IS 13039] and installing hydrant point every 30 meters and minimum 5.25 Kg/cm sq. pressure should available at the remotest point. Hydrants should be located 15 meters away from the storage area boundary. Also, it is recommended to install self auto-mode fire fighting system.

6.2.18.1 Sulphur Storage

120T (1 month stock) of Sulphur will be stored in a closed shed and is transfer manually to the Sulphur burner in 30-50 Kg bags. Following are the hazards in storage and handling Sulphur.

Dust Explosion

Fire Dust Explosion

As Sulphur is stored and handled in granular form, there is always some dust formation, which can lead to dust explosion. A dust explosion occurs when a fine dust in suspension in air is ignited, resulting in a very rapid burning, and the release of large quantities of gaseous products. This in turn creates a subsequent pressure rise of explosive force capable of damaging plant and buildings and injuring people. It is generally considered that a dust explosion can only be initiated by dust particles less than 500 microns diameter.

6.2.19.2 Conditions for Dust Explosion

Under the following conditions dust explosion can take place in the industry.

The dust must be combustible like Sulphur, Bagasse



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The dust cloud must be of explosive concentration, i.e. between the lower and upper explosion limits for the dusts.

Sufficient oxygen in the atmosphere is must to support and sustain combustion.

A source of ignition must be present.

The dust must be fine enough to support an explosion.

6.2.19.3 Explosion Prevention:

Dust explosions can be prevented by ensuring that the following conditions are met:

Formation and Suspensions of Sulphur dust in air are avoided.

To prevent dust formation during the storage and handling of Sulphur, it is necessary to take necessary precautions to avoid spillage and crushing of granular Sulphur during bulk loading and unloading in the storage area.

Storage shed should be constructed with a minimum number of horizontal surfaces to avoid dust accumulation.

All sources of ignition are excluded.

Presence of moisture helps in preventing dust explosion

6.2.19.4 Fire in Sulphur storage

There is a risk of fire in Sulphur storage as ignition temperature is low 190 degree C. Solid and liquid Sulphur will burn to produce Sulphur dioxide gas, which is extremely irritating and toxic (refer to appendix 2 & MSDS of SO2). The effects of the fire hazard itself are slight.

6.3 Mitigation Measures Smoking and the use of matches shall be prohibited in all areas where Sulphur dust is

likely to be present. Prominent NO SMOKING signs shall be placed around such areas.

Naked flames or lights and the use of gas cutting or welding equipment is prohibited during the normal operation of the plant. Repairs involving the use of flames, heat, or hand or power tools in areas where Sulphur may be present shall be made only after getting hot work permit from the authorities.

Where this is not possible the Sulphur shall be wetted down.

6.3.1 Safety and Fire Fighting ascribes

Always use Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Sulphur fires produce hazardous Sulphur dioxide gas. Sulphur dioxide gas is heavier than air and will accumulate in the vapour spaces of the rail car.

Small Sulphur fires are easily extinguished by adding more Sulphur on top of the burning Sulphur. This depletes the oxygen and smothers the fire.

For larger Sulphur fires use a light water fog or CO2 to extinguish. Do not use heavy water streams as this may create Sulphur dust which could potentially explode.

Apart from obvious risk from Hazardous material inventory other areas like power plant components such as Boiler and turbine are potential hazards. However, the system is



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customized and at times proprietary commodity. It has its own SOP s as well as maintenance strategy with well define documents as well as skilled manning. Hence all hazards and associated risks were already being accounted and ascribed for due care and operation. Just for symbolic representative collation with respect to associated risk being presented as under

6.3.2 Risk Classification Screening Table for Boiler and Turbine

(Risk acceptance criteria are being adopted from standard referred text “Industrial fire protection“)

Table 6.22 Risk Classification Screening Table for Boiler and Turbine

Boiler Hazards Sl. No Hazard

Description Initiating event

likelihood

Unmitigated consequences Risk

class Corrective

action Life safety

Property damage

1 Explosion in boiler due to over pressure and temperature

1 4 4 C Maintenance

2 Explosion in boiler due to improper combustion of fuel.

1 4 4 C Regular

inspection, maintenance

3 Burn injury due to hot water and hot steam pipeline leakage

3 3 3 B

Inspection, maintenance

4 Exposure to the hot surface of pipeline or machineries.

3 1 - A Regular

inspection, maintenance

5 Water tube burst due to Failure in boiler water level control

2 - 4 C

Continuous monitoring, maintenance

6 Fire in diesel supply line 3 3 3 B

Regular inspection,

maintenance 7 Burn injury by hot

fly ash 4 1 - A

Maintenance, proper exhaust

8 Catches on the moving part of the machinery like F.D. fans or motors

3 2 1 A

Proper fencing on the moving part of turbine

9 Burst of the equipment body due to over pressure and over temperature

3 1 4 A

Regular inspection,

maintenance

10 Sleep, trip and from the height

4 4 2 B Training,

proper



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during routine work, maintenance or inspection

supervision, PPE’s

GENERATOR AND TURBINE HAZARD 1 Explosion in

turbine due to cooling system failure

1 4 5 C

Regular inspection,

maintenance

2 Damage on generator due to lack of lubrication in coupling shaft

2 1 4 A

Regular inspection,

maintenance

3 Fire on cooling oil sources

3 3 3 B Proper storage, isolation from

the ignition 4 Fire and explosion

on hydrogen tank

2 5 4 D

Proper storage, isolation from

the ignition sources

5 High noise level 1 3 - B

Ear plug, ear muff will be

provided

Table 6.23 Risk Classification with respect to Above Reference

Class General Description Action

A Low risk events Low risk level

Further risk reduction action required

B Moderate risk events Required minor risk reduction improvements; generally addressed by codes, standards, company or industry practices

C Moderate-High risk events Generally required further analysis to determine an optimal risk reduction strategy or reliability analysis of propose risk controls

D High risk events Risk required immediate risk reduction analysis

Numbers 1,2,3,4 are the ratings of likelihood of occurrences of such events for sake of assigning risk level and required mitigation as well as prescribing safety gears. However, co-gen power plants have its own tailor made safety manual as well as risk mapping.

In power plant operation, towards safety, it is integrated logically for safe operation to isolate/cut off operation if exceeds limit due to reaching out unintended outcome. Some of them are being mentioned here for gross understanding as under



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6.3.3 Standard Safety Features

Turbine is interlocked with high and low steam inlet pressure

Turbine is interlocked with high and low steam inlet high and low pressure

Turbine is interlocked with high vibration of any bearing of turbine, gear box, and alternator.

Turbine is interlocked with any bearing high temperature.

High axial displacement of the rotor

Turbine is interlocked with high lube oil temperature

Separate Turbine over speed protection has been provided and interlock has been incorporated for turbine to trip on high speed.

For reducing noise, all stem out lets have been provided with silencers.

Pressure safety relief valves have been provided on stem drum and stem lines.

In addition to mechanical SRVs electrometric safety relief valve is provided.

Smoke leak detector alarm has been provided with alarm.

Jockey pump with auto start has been provided for fire fighting with low pressure interlock to automatically start main pump on low pressure.

For boiler following safety and interlocks are built in -

Low drum level interlock,

Furnace high pressure interlock

Boiler feed pump interlock

De aerator level interlock

6.4 Disaster Management Plan Definition - A major emergency in an activity/project is one which has the potential to cause serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption both inside and outside the activity/project. It would normally require the assistance of emergency services to handle it effectively. This is also a mandatory requirement pursuant to MSIHC 2000 rule for any MAH unit like this one. This is to be updated at every major /process change as well as at regular interval.

Scope - An important element of mitigation risk is planning for emergency, i.e. identifying accident possibility, assessing the consequences of such accidents and deciding on the emergency procedures, both on site and off site that would need to be implemented in the event of an emergency.

Objective - The overall objectives of the emergency plan will be: To localize the emergency and, eliminate it; and to minimize the effects of the accident on people and property. Elimination will require prompt action by operations and works emergency staff using, for example, fire–fighting equipment, water sprays etc. Minimizing the effects may include rescue, first aid, evacuation, rehabilitation, head counting and giving information promptly to people living nearby.

Phases of Disaster-There are various phases of Disaster including Pre and Post Management of Hazardous Event that may or has occurred.



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Warning Phase- Emergencies /disasters are generally preceded by warnings during which preventive measures may be initiated. For example, uncontrollable build-up of pressure in process equipment, weather forecast give warning about formation of vapour cloud, equipment failure etc.

Period of Impact Phase - This is the phase when emergency /disaster actually strike and preventive measures may hardly be taken. However, control measures to minimize the effects may be taken through a well-planned and ready-to-act disaster management plan already prepared by organization. The duration may be from seconds to days.

Rescue Phase - This is the phase when impact is almost over and efforts are concentrated on rescue and relief measures. This will be followed by head count and search of missing.

Relief Phase - In this phase, apart from organization and relief measures internally, depending on severity of the disaster, external help are also to be summoned to provide relief measures (like evacuations to a safe place and providing medical help, food clothing etc.). This phase will continue till normalcy is restored.

Rehabilitation Phase - This is the final and longest phase. During which measures required to put the situation back to normal as far as possible are taken. Checking the systems, estimating the damages, repair of equipment and putting them again into service are taken up. Help from revenue/insurance authorities need to be obtained to assess the damage, quantum of compensation to be paid etc.

6.4.1 Proposed On–Site Emergency Plan

The onsite emergency is an unpleasant situation that causes extensive damage to plant personnel, surrounding area and its environment due to in operation, maintenance, design and human error. Onsite plan will be applied in case of proposed expansion. Following points are to be taken into consideration:

To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their places, potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above happenings.

Review, revise, redesign, replace or reconstruct the process, plant, vessels and control measures if so assessed.

Measures to protect persons and property of processing equipment in case of all kinds of accidents, emergencies and disasters

To inform people and surroundings about emergency if it is likely to adversely affect them.

6.4.2 Disaster control Management system

Disaster management system is all about preparedness in the event of all untoward incidences /accident or any unpredicted harmful events. A management is expected to prepare well versed prepare plan to enact in emergency and bring normalcy. This is written and approved plan wherein all plant persons are assigned with certain duties in the event of emergency. They are expected to be in readiness for all emergencies. Well-rehearsed team composition will be formed and tested with mock drill. In this preparedness plant owner shall also make mutual aid arrangement with nearby installations and shall participate actively in all mock drill, updating of plan and appraising lacunas if any.



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Disaster Management group plays an important role in combating emergency in a systematic manner. In this management, all personnel from top to bottom are aware of assigned duties being enumerated in this report.

Table 6.24 List of Key Persons at Factory

Sl No Name Designation Contact Detail 1 Smt. Laxmi R

Hebbalkar Chairman & Managing Director

2 Shri. Channaraj B Hattiholi

Executive Director 9449014000

3 Mr. Sadashiv Thorat General Manager 7338662031 4 Mr. V.B. Dhundare Process Manager 9606951183 5 Mr.Vishwanath S Patil Environmental Engineer 9606951171 6 Mr.U C Choukimath Admin 9448341808

Table 6.25 Disaster Control Management System

Sl No Name Designation Contact Detail 1 Mr. S.D. Thorat Onsite chief controller 7338662031 2 Mr. Vishwanath Patil Site incident controller 9945383441 3 Mr. N.S.Mangsule Deputy site in charge controller 9611595107 4 Mr. S.D.Thorat Plant manager 9970900555 5 Mr. V.B.Dhundare HOD(p/I) 9420011103 6 Mr.Ningangouda

Mangsule Section in charge

9606951172 7 Mr. Vishwanath S Patil Maintenance 9606951171 8 Mr. M.A.Bagwan Medical coordinator 9606951177 9 Mr. U C Choukimath GOVT Liaison coordinator 9448341808 10 Mr. Vishwanath S Patil Maintenance 9945383441 11 Mr. U C Choukimath Fire/security 9448341808 12 Mr. Samir Attar Communication 9606951173 13 Mr. N M Patil Emergency coordinator 9449171375 14 Mr. Mahesh Shelar Personnel/Adm coordinator 9900560643 16 Mr. Abhay M Sale Transport coordinator 9822622693



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6.4.3 Onsite Disaster Management - Disaster Control Management System

Fig 6.7 Onsite Disaster Management - Disaster Control Management System (Block Diagram)

6.4.3.1 Control Room Facility

Following are the facilities to be provided at the control room of Harsha Sugar to tackle the emergency failure scenarios: Fire Detection System is to be installed in the control room VHF base station with a range of 25 km and VHF handsets of range 5 km is to be installed for ready communication in emergency Public address System (PAS) is to be installed to ease the communication to various corners of the site The duties and responsibilities of different coordinators of Onsite Disaster Management Plan are to be displayed in the Control Room.

6.4.3.2 Alarm System

A siren shall be provided under the control of Security office in the plant premises to give warning. In case of emergencies this will be used on the instructions to shift in charge that is positioned round the clock. The warning signal for emergency shall be as follows: Emergency Siren: Waxing and waning sound for 3 minutes. All clear signal: Continuous siren for one minute.



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6.4.3.3 Communication

Walkies & Talkies shall be located at strategic locations; internal telephone system EPBX with external P&T telephones would be provided.

6.4.3.4 Fire Protection System

Fire Fighting System- The fire protection system for the unit is to provide for early detection, alarm, containment and suppression of fires. The fire detection and protection system has been planned to meet the above objective an all–statutory and insurance requirement of Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) of India. The complete fire protection system will comprise of the following.

6.4.3.5 Fire Fighting Facility: Available in existing unit and will be maintained in future

6.4.3.6 System Description of Fire Fighting System: The entire fire safety installation shall be compliant with the most stringent codes / standard for the entire complex to ensure the highest safety standard and uniformity of system. Further, before property is operational, the fire protection shall be fully operated and tested under simulated conditions to demonstrate compliance with the most stringent standards, codes and guidelines

A) Fire pumping system

The fire pumping system shall comprise of independent electrical pumps for hydrant and sprinkler system, diesel engine driven pump & jockey pump for hydrant & sprinkler system. Electrical pump shall provide adequate flow for catering requirement of hydrant system. Diesel engine driven fire pumps shall be provided for ensuring operation & performance of the system in case of total electrical power failure. Jockey pumps shall compensate for pressure drop and line leakage in the hydrant and sprinkler installation. Provision of PRS/ orifice plate shall be made in sprinkler riser to restrict pressure on sprinkler system. Individual suction lines shall be drawn from the fire reserve tanks at the basement level and connected to independent fire suction header. The electric fire pumps, diesel engine driven fire pumps and the jockey pumps shall all draw from this suction header. Delivery lines from various pumps shall also be connected to a common header in order to ensure that maximum standby capacity is available. The sprinkler pump shall be isolated from the main discharge header by a non-return valve so that the hydrant pump can also act as standby for the sprinkler system. The ring main shall remain pressurized at all times and Jockey pumps shall make up minor line losses. Automation required to make the system fully functional shall be provided.

B) Fire hydrant system

Internal and external standpipe fire hydrant system shall be provided with landing valve, hose reel, first aid hose reels, complete with instantaneous pattern short gunmetal pipe in the Complex. The internal diameter of inlet connection shall be at least 80 mm. The outlet shall be of instant spring lock type gunmetal ferrule coupling of 63 mm dia. for connecting to hose pipe. Provision of flow switch on riser shall be made for effective zone monitoring. The flow switch shall be wired to FAP and shall indicate water flow on hydrant of the identified zone. Recessed cupboard/ fire hydrant cabinet shall be strategically located for fire fighting requirement. Location of cabinets shall be accessed as per compartmentation plan in consultation with the Architect. Provision of fire man’s axe shall be made for internal hydrant. External hydrant shall be located within 2 m to 15 m from the building to be protected such that they are accessible and may not be damaged by vehicle movement. A



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spacing of about 45-50 m between hydrants for the building shall be adopted. Details of fire hydrant system are as follows:

Piping - Mild Steel pipes (heavy class) as per IS: 1239 shall be provided throughout the complex. Pipes buried below ground shall be suitably lagged with 2 layers of 400-micron polythene sheet over 2 coats of bitumen. External Hydrants:

External hydrants shall be provided all around the Complex. The hydrants shall be controlled by a cast iron sluice valve or butterfly valve. Hydrants shall have instantaneous type 63mm diameter outlets. The hydrants shall be double outlet with CI duck foot bend and flanged riser or required height to bring the hydrant to correct level above ground.

For each external fire hydrant two numbers of 63mm dia. 15 m long controlled percolation hose pipe with gunmetal male and female instantaneous type couplings machine wound with GI wire, gunmetal branch pipe with nozzle shall be provided.

Each external hydrant hose cabinet shall be provided with a drain in the bottom plate.

Each hose cabinet shall be conspicuously painted with the letters “FIRE HOSE”.

Internal Hydrants: Internal hydrant shall be provided on each landing and other locations as required by NBC with double headed gunmetal landing valve with 100 mm diameter inlet, with shut off valves having cast iron wheels. Landing valve shall have flanged inlet and instantaneous type outlets.

Instantaneous outlets for fire hydrants shall be standard pattern and suitable for fire hoses.

For each internal fire hydrant station two numbers of 63 mm dia. 15 m long rubberized fabric lined hose pipes with gunmetal male and female instantaneous type coupling machine would with GI wire, fire hose reel, gunmetal branch pipe with nozzle shall be provided.

Standard fire hose reels of 20mm diameter high pressure rubber hose 36.5 m long with gunmetal nozzle, all mounted on a circular hose reel of heavy duty mild steel construction having cast iron brackets shall be provided. Hose reel shall be connected directly to the wet riser with an isolating valve. Hose reel shall be mounted vertically.

Each internal hydrant hose cabinet shall be provided with a drain in the bottom plate. The drain point shall be led away to the nearest general drain.

Each internal hydrant hose cabinet containing items as above shall also be provided with a nozzle spanner and a Fireman’s Axe. The cabinet shall be recessed in the wall.

Each hose cabinet shall be conspicuously painted with the letters “FIRE HOSE”.

Hose Reel: Hose reel shall be heavy duty, 20 mm diameter, length shall be 36.5 meter long fitted with gun metal chromium plated nozzle, mild steel pressed reel drum which can swing up to 170 degree with wall brackets of cast iron finished with red and black enamel complete.

C) Sprinkler system

Elaborate automatic sprinkler system shall be provided. The system shall be suitably zoned for its optimum functional performance. The sprinkler system shall be provided with control valves, flow and tamper switches at suitable location and shall be connected to control module of the fire alarm system for its monitoring and annunciation in case of activation. Sprinkler type along with its Quartzite bulbs rating shall be selected based on the requirement of the space and shall be specified accordingly. Inspector’s test valve assembly with sight glass shall be provided at remote end with discharge piped to drain outlet / pipe.



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D) Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers of water (gas pressure), Carbon-di-oxide, foam type, Dry Chemical Powder and FM-200 or Clean agent type shall be provided as first aid fire extinguishing appliances. These extinguishers shall be suitably installed in the entire areas as per IS: 2190. The appliances shall be so installed over the entire sections, that a person is not required to travel more than 15 m to reach the nearest extinguisher. These shall be placed or hanged on wall in a group on several suitable places.

E) Fire Pump

The fire pump shall be horizontally mounted, variable speed type. It shall have a capacity to deliver and developing adequate head so as to ensure a minimum pressure at the highest and the farthest outlet. The pump shall be capable of giving a discharge of not less than 150 per cent of the rated discharge, at a head of not less than 65 per cent of the rated head. The shut off head shall be within 120 per cent of the rated head. The pump casing shall be of cast iron and parts like impeller, shaft sleeve, wearing ring etc. shall be of non-corrosive metal like bronze/brass/gun metal. The shaft shall be of stainless steel. Provision of mechanical seal shall also be made. Bearings of the pump shall be effectively sealed to prevent loss of lubricant or entry of dust or water. The pump shall be provided with a plate indicating the suction lift, delivery head, discharge, speed and number of stages. The pump casing shall be designed to withstand 1.5 times the working pressure.

F) Foam System

For Fire Fighting Aqueous Film-Forming Foams (AFFF) based on combinations of fluoro-chemical surfactants, hydrocarbon surfactants, and solvents will be used as foam agent. These agents require a very low energy input to produce a high-quality fire fighting foam. Foam concentrate will be stored in a bladder tank system. In AFFF systems a bladder tank containing a nylon reinforced elastomeric bladder is used to store the foam concentrate. System water pressure is used to squeeze the bladder providing fire fighting foam concentrate, at the same pressure, to the proportioner. An aqueous film will be formed on the surface of the alcohol by the foam solution as it drains from the foam blanket. This film is very fluid and floats on the surface of most alcohol. This gives the AFFF unequalled speed in fire control and control the spill fire.

First Aid

A first aid centre with adequate facilities shall be provided. It shall be maintained round the clock by a compounder cum dresser and a doctor. An Ambulance shall also be provided at site to carry affected people to hospital.

Security

The security requirements of the company premises shall be taken care of by CSO assisted by a Fire In charge. The team, apart from the normal security functions will manage the role required during a disaster management operation as a part of the crisis control team.

Safety

The safety wing led by a Safety Manager will meet the requirement of emergencies round the clock. The required safety appliances shall be distributed at different locations of the plant to



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meet any eventualities. Poster/placards reflecting safety awareness will be placed at different locations in the plant area.

Evacuation Procedure

As the major hazard is only due to fire, which has more or less localized impact no mass evacuation, procedures are required. Evacuation would involve only the people working very close to the fire area.

Personal Protective Equipments (PPE)

This equipment is used mainly for three reasons; to protect personnel from a hazard while performing rescue/accident control operations, to do maintenance and repair work under hazardous conditions, and for escape purposes. The list of Personal Protective Equipment provided at the facility and their locations shall be available in ECC. Effective command and control accomplish these functions necessitates personal trained in this on–site Disaster Management Plan with adequate facilities and equipments and equipment to carry out their duties and functions. These organizations and the facilities required to support their response are summarized in the following subsections. Personal protective equipments play a vital role in overcoming major disastrous situation saving life during onsite emergency. List of recommended Personal Protective equipment (PPE) is given below in Table.

Table 6.26 Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment According to hazard onsite

Objective Workplace Hazards Suggested PPE Eye and face protection Flying particles molten metal,

liquid chemicals, gases or vapours, light radiation

Safety glasses with side-shields, protective shades, etc.

Head protection Falling objects, inadequate height clearance, and overhead power cords

Plastic helmets with top and side impact protection

Hearing protection Noise Ultrasound Hearing protectors (ear plugs or ear muffs0

Foot protection Failing or rolling objects, points objects.

Corrosive or hot liquids Safety shoes and boots for protection against moving and failing objects, liquids and chemicals

Hand protection Hazardous materials, cuts or lacerations, vibrations, extreme temperatures

Gloves made of rubber or synthetic material (Neoprene), leather, steel, insulation materials, etc.

Respiratory protection Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, vapour

Facemasks with appropriate filters for dust removal and air purification (chemical, mists, vapours and gases). Single or multi-gas personal monitors, if available Portable or supplied air



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Oxygen deficiency Onsite rescue equipment Body / leg protection Extreme temperatures,

hazardous materials, biological agents, cutting and laceration

Insulating clothing, body suits, aprons etc. of appropriate materials

Contact with HSD Fuel Oil storage and Fuel Handling

Canister type gas mask. PVC or Rubber. Goggles giving complete protection to eyes. Eye wash fountain with safety

Fly Ash Fly ash handling and storage Wear dust-proof goggles and rubber or PVC gloves. When using large quantities or where heavy contamination is likely, wear: coveralls. At high dust levels, wear: A Full-face Class P3 (Particulate) or an Air-line respirator where an inhalation risk exists, wear: a Class P1 (Particulate) respirator

Mock Drill

As per the Industrial Major Accident Hazard Rules, Mock drills of the on-site emergency plan are conducted every month. A detail report of the mock drill conducted is to be made immediately available to all the concerned authority Also, Major Fire and Minor Fire mock drills are conducted once in three months and one month respectively.

Training

On job training to the engineers on various stages of risk analysis and preparedness during emergency to reflect in the operation of terminal, especially from the safety stand point. The fire team belonging to the fire fighting department are to be intensively trained for the use of all equipment and in various fire fighting methods for handling different types of fires

Details of Training facilities for Safety Fire Fighting Occupational Health & safety

Monthly Monthly Monthly

Procedure for Testing & Updating the Plan

Simulated emergency preparedness exercises and mock fire fighting exercises including mutual aid scheme resources and in conservation with district emergency authority to be carried out time to time.

Disclosure of Information to Worker & Public

Awareness System in Existence & Anticipated

Safety awareness among workers by conserving various training programs and Seminars, competition, slogans etc. Practical exercise, Distribution and practices of safety Instructions, Safety Quiz contests, Display of Safety Posters & Safety Slogans, Developing Safety



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Instructions for every Job and ensuring these instructions/booklets or manuals by the workers.

In this management, all types of emergencies are forecasted and all likely actions have been documented as to how to take on emergencies and to enact in situation be it in bagasse area/power plant/cane crushing/evaporation/distillery /MCB /transmission section /transform area etc. Procedure for every emergency shall be handled as per written protocol and shall be documented as per mandate for MSIHC and factory act 1948 pursuance. Further in the event if the incidence /situation is out of control and beyond installation boundary, in such instances Offsite emergency plan will be enacted by district authority. Plant head will assist district authority in all possible help. It is also a written document prepared for district authority to act. Following plan is prepared as Offsite emergency plan for district authority.

6.4.4 Off-Site Emergency Planning

The off-site emergency plan is an Integral part of any hazard control system. It is based on those accidents identified by the works management, which could affect people and the environment outside the works. Thus, the off-site plan follows logically from the analysis that took place to provide the basis for the on-site plan and the two plans therefore complement each other. The roles of the various parties that may be involved in the implementation of an off-site plan are described below. The responsibility for the off-site plan will be likely to rest either with the works management or with the local authority. Schematic representation of various organization involved during emergency is shown below

Table 6.27 Local statutory Government bodies

Sl.No.

Name of Government Agency

Phone Nos

1 District Collector 0831-2407200 2 Sub Divisional Officer (Tahsildar Saundatti) 08330-222223 3 Factory Inspector of the district 0831-2428066 4 KSPCB, Belagavi 0831-2459956 5 PSI L &O - CPI 08337-222303 6 Deputy Superindent of Police 0831-2405206 7 Fire brigade 0831-2429441 8 Director Ind. Safety and Health (DDF-I) 0831-2421292 9 Dy. Chief Controller of Explosive, Mangalore 0824-2420167/244588 10 Hospital (Dr.Navadgi Nursing Home, Saundatti) 08330-222278

Either way, the plan must identify an emergency coordinating officer who would take overall command of the off-site activities. Consideration of evacuation may include the following factors:

In the case of a major fire but without explosion risk (e.g. an oil storage tank), only houses close to the fire are likely to need evacuation. If fire is escalating very fast it is necessary to evacuate people nearby as soon as possible. In acute emergency people are advised to stay indoors and shield themselves from the fire.



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6.4.4.1 Various Organization Involved During Emergency (Block Diagram)

Fig 6.8 Various Organization Involved During Emergency (Block Diagram)

6.4.4.2 Organization

Organizational details of command structure, warning systems, implementation procedures, emergency control centres include name and appointments of incident controller, site main controller, their deputies and other key personnel involved during emergency.

6.4.4.3 Communications

Identification of personnel involved, communication centre, call signs, network, list of telephone numbers.

6.4.4.4 Special Emergency Equipment

Details of availability and location of heavy lifting gear, specified fire-fighting equipment, fireboats etc.

6.4.4.5 Voluntary Organizations

Details of Voluntary organizations, telephone numbers nearby of hospitals, Emergency helpline, resources etc. are to be available with chief authorities. Medical Aid Local Authority Environmental Health & Safety Department District Level Emergency Committee Plant Level Emergency Committee Hazard works Management Fire Department Emergency Control Centre Chief Coordinators Police/Traffic Department Public Education EMERGENCY



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6.4.4.6 Non-governmental Organizations (NGO)

NGO’s could provide a valuable source of expertise and information to support emergency response efforts. Members of NGOs could assist response personnel by performing specified tasks, as planned during the emergency planning process. Evacuation of personnel from the affected area Arrangements at rallying posts and parking yards Rehabilitation of evacuated persons

6.4.4.7Chemical information

Details of the hazardous substances (MSDS information) and a summary of the risks associated with them are to be made available at respective site.

6.4.4.8 Meteorological information

There are arrangements for obtaining details of weather conditions prevailing at or before the time of accident and weather forecasts updates.

6.4.4.9 Humanitarian Arrangements

Transport, evacuation centres, emergency feeding, treatment of injured, first aid, ambulances, temporary mortuaries.

6.4.4.10 Public Information

Dealing with the media-press office, informing relatives, etc. will be carried out by the team

6.4.4.11 Assessment

Collecting information on the causes of the emergency Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of all aspects of the emergency plan

6.4.4.12 Role of local authority

Local Authorities like Panchayat, Sabha, Samity, municipalities can help in combating emergency situation after assessing the impact scenario in rescue phase.

6.4.4.13 Role of police

The police are to assist in controlling of the accident site, organizing evacuation and removing of any seriously injured people to hospitals. Co-ordination with the transport authorities, civil defence and home guards, Co-ordination with army, navy, air force and state fire services, Arrange for post mortem of dead bodies, Establish communication centre with easy contact with ECC.

6.4.4.14 Role of Fire Brigade

The fire brigade is to be organized to put out fires and provide assistance as required during emergency.

6.4.4.15 Media

The media is to have ready and continuous access to designated officials with relevant information, as well as to other sources in order to provide essential and accurate information to public throughout the emergency and to avoid commotion and confusion. Efforts are made



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to check the clarity and reliability of information as it becomes available, and before it is communicated to public. Public health authorities are consulted when issuing statements to the media concerning health aspects of chemical accidents Members of the media are to facilitate response efforts by providing means for informing the public with credible information about accidents involving hazardous substances

6.4.4.16 Role of health care authorities

Hospitals and doctors must be ready to treat all type of injuries to causalities during emergency. Co-ordinate the activities of Primary Health Centres and Municipal Dispensaries to ensure required quantities of drugs and equipments. Securing assistance of medical and paramedical personnel from nearby hospitals/institutions.

6.4.5 Occupational Health Surveillance

In this Integrated Sugar Plant, there will be utilization of chemicals. The usage of this above chemicals will be in low quantities and exposure of these chemicals to the employees will be also very low. However all the precautionary measures are being taken while handling these chemicals. The following are the details of the Occupational Health Surveillance

Occupational Health Surveillance (OHS) is being under taken as regular exercise for all the employees specifically for those engaged in handling hazardous substances.

All the first aid facilities are provided in the Occupational Health Centre.

The medical records of each employee are being maintained separately.

Occupational health centre for medical examination of employees with all the basic facilities have been established with in the plant.

The noise levels in critical area are being monitored regularly and the workers at high noise level generating areas will undergo audiometric tests once in six months.

The potential occupational hazardous work places will be monitored regularly. The health of employees working in these areas will be monitored once in a year.

Liver function test is also being planned for the workers as a part of surveillance.

The equipment and facilities such as First aid medical units, Safety belts, Ear muffs, masks against dusts, aprons against chemical spillage, Shock proof gloves and mats, Leather aprons, Safety items - shoes, gum shoes, hand gloves, helmets, goggles, Safety ladder, Face masks & gas masks (against SO2 gas), Leather gloves, Breathing apparatus, Stretchers and oxygen cylinder, Flame proof battery and lighting, Emergency lighting facilities are kept at administrative building/stores building and are under the control of emergency coordinator

All workers engaged in material handling system will be regularly examined for lung diseases such as PFT (Pulmonary Function Test) tests; Scheme for occupational health monitoring will be prepared in detail [BIS code of practices IS: 11451-1986 (Reaffirmed 2005) (Recommendations for safety health requirements relating to occupational exposure to asbestos)]



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Table 6.28 Health Evaluation schedule

Occupation Type of evaluation Frequency Pre-placement Cane Crushing Area Chest X-ray, spirometry

and vision testing Every 5 years to age <30; Every 4 years to age 31-40; and every 2 years to age 41-50

Sugar Process Area & Cogeneration Area

Chest X-ray, spirometry and vision testing

Every 5 years to age <30; Every 4 years to age 31- 40; and every 2 years to age 41-50

Noise prone areas Audiometry Annually Main Control Room Far & Near Vision; Colour

Vision; and Hearing tests Every 5 years to age <30; Every 4 years to age 31- 40; And every 2 years to age 41-50

Ash Handling Area& Bagasse Handling Area

Chest X-ray, spirometry, Vision; and Hearing tests

Every 5 years to age <30; Every 4 years to age 31- 40; And every 2 years to age 41-50



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6.4.6 Summary of Hazard identification and details of proposed safety systems

Table 6.29 Hazard identification and details of proposed safety systems

AREA EFFECT HAZARD MITIGATION MEASURES.

Cane yard Serious nature of injuries.

Due to bad maintenance of vehicles.

Personnel sleeping/taking rest near the vehicles.

Driving by unauthorized persons.

Maintain vehicles properly.

Personnel will not allow sleep/rest near vehicles.

Only allow drivers having valid licenses.

Safety officer will monitor continuously.

Cane unloading bay.

Serious nature of injuries

Snapping of slings & wire ropes

Over loading of cranes.

Dragging of loads

Unauthorized personnel operating the cranes.

Maintaining and testing regularly & in good condition.

Following S.O.P. strictly.

Authorised agencies will verify the weighing tools regularly.

Mill house. Serious nature of injuries.

Cleaning while the machines running.

Broken plat-forms

Slippery surface.

Dust

Follow S.O.P. strictly.

Good house-keeping.

Use of P.P.E. (safety wears)

Work permit procedure before attending height oriented jobs.

Clarifier & evaporators.

Fire & explosion. Hot atmosphere.

Steam leakages.

Faulty gauges.

Defective valves and vents

Maintain equipment properly. Provide good ventilation like roof extractors, air circulators.

Regular inspection of shell thickness, Hydro trials before in operation.

Regular hydro testing of boiling vessel calendria



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tubes and valves

Provision of safety valves and vents.

Crystallizer Injuries Slippery floor and damaged floor

Good housekeeping & working properly.

Proper testing and alignment of drives and internal ribbon/ coils

Regular inspection of shell thickness, Hydro trials before in operation.

Centrifugal Injuries. Non-functioning or removal of inter-lock guards.

Breakage of basket and internals

Maintain the equipment properly.

Regular balancing of baskets, testing of rubber buffers and brake pads, bearing housing assembly, etc.,

Regular inspection of thickness, internal cracks by DP test/ ultrasonic test

Drying grading and bagging

Creation of fine sugar dust

Dusty atmosphere Installation of dust collecting points and proper setting of C/F machine plough operation system and Hot and Cold air blowers.

Provide P.P.E.

Boiler house Explosion Safety valves not working etc.

Failure of auxiliary and choking of flue gas path, etc.,

Breakage of boiler vessels and valves

Proper maintenance of boilers, safety valves, gauges etc.

Hydro testing of above and ultra sonic testing of above.

Keeping quality of boiler feed water and fuel

Engaging trained certified boiler operating staff.

Inspection of boiler pressure vessels/ components by authorised govt agencies before in operation



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Turbo generators

Explosion Improper alignment

Failure of valves and unbalancing of prime mover rotary assembly

Failure of AVR/ Governer controller, etc.,

Proper service and alignment of internal components.

High axial displacement rotar.

Fully automated with interlocks, alarms

Smoke detector alarm

Storage tanks Spillages/ leakages of chemicals. Breakage of vessels.

Corrosion, Wear and tear.

Reducing of shell thickness

Improper provision of drain valves and internal steam coils

Provision of unsafe ladders, railings, walkways and structural design

Proper maintenance of storages and keeping the equipment in good condition and to be regularly inspected and tested.

Compliance with standard operating procedures for material loading and unloading and working properly

Dyke walls to be provided.

Electrical installation like transformer, switch- yard, M.C.C. room. etc.

Fire or electrocution. Suffocation of persons inside.

Over loading.

Loose contact.

Short circuit.

Improper earthing, insulation

Providing enclosures

Installation as per electricity rules.

Other controls will be provided.

Lying of insulation mat at MCC rooms.

Adopting TEFC motors

Application of Fire extinguishers and multi-core cables.

Fireproof paints and primers to be applied.

Bagasse yard Fire Sparks from exhaust of the vehicles.

Smoking.

External fires.

Provide spark arresters.

Smoking to be prohibited.

Follow work permit system



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Factory area Fire Electrical Short circuit

Internal combustion of molasses tanks

Improper insulation of electrical cables, loose contacts, flashing of electric control panels

Prohibiting smoking.

Providing fire hydrant system etc.

By laying and maintaining electrical all equipments properly.

Strictly following work permit systems as per requirement.

Lightening arrestor will be provided.

Maintaining equipment properly

Sulphur storage / sulphur burner station

Fire and explosion Dust/ vapours can cause fires and explosion.

Escape of sulphur vapours.

Store in a cool ventilated area separately.

Providing fire hydrant system etc.

Proper maintenance of gas generation furnace and gas lines.

Usage of Non corrosive material, safety valves, drains, etc.,

Feeding of sulphur in closed system. Arrest leakages.

Sugar bag conveying and godown

Injuries Electric short circuiting, non provision of safety guards, fire hydrants

Non provision of walk ways, railings, overhead bag conveying system

Follow standard procedures

Providing of TEFC motors and enclosures, fire hydrants nearby bag conveying system as well as inside the sugar godown.

Proper stacking of sugar bags up to the desired permissible stack height i.e., 32 ft.

Do not stack sugar bags adhered to godown walls. Keep 1 mt distance and below 3 mts height from above roof.

Godown floor height should be 300 mm



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above the FFL/ GL to avoid rainwater entry.

Distillation section

Static Electricity generation

Electric short circuiting, non provision of safety guards, fire hydrants

Distillation units will be fitted with flame proof electrical fittings

Distillation units will be earthed.

Proper training of employees and installation of fire extinguishers

ENA/ RS storage

Spillage/ leak Contamination of the area, prone to fire

Will be stored in the MS vertical tanks with secondary containment

Spill kits will be placed

Sugar bag conveying and godown

Injuries Electric short circuiting, non provision of safety guards, fire hydrants

Non provision of walk ways, railings, overhead bag conveying system

Follow standard procedures

Providing of TEFC motors and enclosures, fire hydrants nearby bag conveying system as well as inside the sugar godown.

Proper stacking of sugar bags up to the desired permissible stack height i.e., 32 ft.

Do not stack sugar bags adhered to godown walls. Keep 1 mt distance and below 3 mts height from above roof.

Godown floor height should be 300 mm above the FFL/ GL to avoid rainwater entry.

Distillation section

Static Electricity generation

Electric short circuiting, non provision of safety guards, fire hydrants

Distillation units will be fitted with flame proof electrical fittings

Distillation units will be earthed.

Proper training of employees and installation of fire extinguishers



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ENA/ RS storage

Spillage/ leak Contamination of the area, prone to fire

Will be stored in the MS vertical tanks with secondary containment

Spill kits will be placed

Fig 6.9 Structure of Onsite Emergency Preparedness and Response

FINAL EIA- HSL 01-09-2018 · 2018-09-08 · Providing flame arrestors on the top of all the storage...

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