Nonviolence Unrealized: The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989

Aaron Garrett

March 30, 2016

HIST 392

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In 1989, students and others in Beijing and throughout China unsuccessfully protested

against the government. The protests began as a localized use of nonviolent methods. However,

it quickly became overwhelmed by its size, competing interests, and repressions by the

government. This essay examines the events and analyzes why it failed. It begins with a brief

background of China prior to 1989, followed by a survey of each major event in the protest. The

conclusion includes retrospect analysis in order to add to and clarify why this student movement

failed to achieve nonviolent change.

China in the 1980s became ripe for revolutionary change. By the mid-1980s, “China’s

economic reforms were facing serious problems.”1 Students and intellectuals bore the brunt of

these economic woes.2 They knew once they graduated the system provided them few

opportunities for economic mobility. At this time another group faced hardship born of the same

economic issues. In the mid-1980s, “a power struggle…at the top echelons of the regime”

developed.3 This group included “eight party veterans” who “were most concerned with ensuring

stability…even at the expense of reform.”4 This “Gang of Elders” belonged to the generation

associated with the Communist Revolution by Mao Zedong. However, this very Communist

Revolution dragged down the entire country.

Mao Zedong instituted various programs to move China towards a modern industrial

power. In their overview of twentieth century nonviolent conflicts, Peter Ackerman and Jack

Duvall explain that one of these programs, the Cultural Revolution, became an abject failure and

sowed the seeds of democratic change in China.5 Following the death of Mao in 1976 his

1 Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 98.2 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 98.3 Joshua Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential, by Gene Sharp (Dexter, MI: Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 253-54. 4 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 253-54.5 Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000), 422.

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successor, Deng Xiaoping, initiated economic reforms aimed at trying to accomplish what Mao

failed to. Yet in the 1980s, students and intellectuals felt that “economic reform without

substantial political reform was contradictory” and democratic reforms needed to accompany

economic ones.6 All of this came to a head in 1989. During this year “the students of Beijing

shook off a long winter of complacency [and] moved suddenly to the center of the world’s

attention, and demanded democracy for China.”7 The students who started this nonviolent

movement soon found an event to rally around.

On April 15, 1989 the high ranking and influential leader Hu Yaobang died. Hu became

one of the few members of the government “who had tolerated student dissent.”8 Two days after

his passing, students “flocked to Tiananmen…in memory of Hu Yaobang.”9 The next day, April

18th, hundreds of students “began a sit-in at the Great Hall of the People and demanded to be

received by a ranking member” of the government.10 A sit-in remains one of the most basic

forms of nonviolence. The students soon realized that despite the nonviolent methods they used,

the government still viewed them as a disturbance. A report given to Party Central and the State

Council on April 20th said that the mourning activities for Hu Yaobang shifted to protest on the

18th “because of the destructive acts of certain people with ulterior motives.”11 The use of the

words “destructive” and “ulterior” quickly indicated that the government viewed the student sit-

in as a threat to their regime. This attitude became the dominant position the Chinese political

elite took towards the students throughout the movement. A report given on April 18th to the

Beijing Municipal Government summed it up this way, the government “[would] watch

developments closely” and “warn political manipulators against distorting the direction and 6 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 99. 7 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 421.8 Ibid.9 Ibid. 10 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 254.11 Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 1st ed. (New York, NY: PublicAffaris, 2001), 33.

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purposes of the mourning activities” for Hu Yaobang.12 Additionally, they pledged to “take steps

to block the activities of certain key persons.”13 The government sent a clear threat to the

students. They soon acted on that threat.

On April 20th the government instituted its first act of repression towards the student

movement. Early in the morning “the Chinese government ordered the mourning site for Hu

Yaobang cordoned off and any who wished to pay respects had to do so in orderly manner.”14

Accompanying this the government instituted temporary martial law “to get students back to

campuses.”15 This enraged students and the vast majority of them ignored the government’s

demands and stayed in Tiananmen Square. Once temporary martial law subsided and the

mourning period ended, the Politburo decided to modify their method against the students. This

shift included three objectives. First, get the students back into the classrooms. Second, punish

any and all students who used physical violence. Third, start a dialogue with the students.16

Unfortunately, the Politburo soon angered the students even more.

The government sent mixed messages throughout the month and a half long protests. The

best example of this came on April 26th when “the state sent a clear warning” to the students “by

publishing a harshly worded editorial in the People’s Daily”, the main newspaper of the

Communist Party.17 In no uncertain terms the Communist Party “labeled the movement

counterrevolutionary turmoil instigated by a small number of conspirators” with the threat of

troops to end the protests if necessary.18 At this stage of the student movement, the students used

little to no direct violence against the government or police. Such rhetoric only came from the

12 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 28. 13 Ibid.14 Ibid., 30-31.15 Ibid.16 Ibid., 50.17 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 100. 18 Ibid.

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government. The students responded with a massive nonviolent demonstration of some “100,000

students, joined by 400,000 other citizens” from Beijing in Tiananmen Square.19 Again when

faced with threats from the government, the students acted peacefully. The real significance to

this protest became the support the students gained from citizens. Perhaps sensing the need for

more organization to support an ever growing movement, in late April 1989 leadership began to

emerge in the movement.

In late April 1989 the students formed leadership. Four came forward in the movement –

Wu’er Kaixi, Chai Ling, Li Lu, and Wang Dan.20 At this point in time they all shared similar

visions about what they wanted the movement to accomplish. However, a disturbing trend began

with these four that eventually undermined the entire movement. Of the four student leaders,

“none of them [were] elected by a reasonable number of movement participants.”21 For

nonviolent movements to succeed, leadership needs support from the majority of its participants.

Therefore, these four students acted as voices for the movement but lacked any real degree of

unity. As April passed into May, new challenges arose between the government and the students,

and this dearth of unity haunted the movement.

May 4, 1989 marked the apogee of the nonviolent student movement. The date holds

special significance in China, and especially for Chinese students. It marked the 70th

Anniversary of a 1915 student democratic movement in China.22 The author Joshua Paulson

pointed out that this 1915 student movement became a first of its kind “in China’s modern

history.”23 In commemoration of the anniversary the students decided to “renew the ‘May Fourth

Values of democracy, science, freedom, human rights, and rule of law’.”24 The “students” also 19 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 423.20 Ibid.21 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 105.22 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 113.23 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 257.24 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 113.

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loosely adopted a four-point resolution. First, on May 5th they agreed to return to classes.

Second, talks with the government still remained the goal. Third, if negotiations regressed, then

they vowed to protest again. Fourth, they promised to educate people throughout Beijing about

them.25 Three problems arose in this resolution. First, since the leadership of the movement

lacked majority support, such a resolution only applied to whomever felt like adopting it.

Second, the language in the resolution clearly opened the door for the movement to continue.

Third, the students articulated no specific criteria for the point at which negotiations became

ineffective. The movement unofficially ended on May 5th for some of the students. Yet, “the

student movement entered a new phase” after May 4th, a phase “characterized by internal

division.”26 Failure in student leadership to draft a concrete resolution led to greater division.

While many students returned to classes on May 5th, the movement continued. The loose

grounds for continuing it, per the resolution, created new conflicts. Paulson writes that by “the

middle of May the Student Protest Movement had expanded to include workers and residents in

dozens of cities in China.”27 In nonviolent theory and practice, a movement works best when it

remains localized. However, if a movement becomes regional, national, or international the local

levels needs unified leadership. The student movement failed these three criteria. Up until the

middle of May the only real organization within the movement with any credibility, the

Autonomous Federation of Students only “loosely coordinated student activities, [drafting]

documents and demands.”28 This group failed to manage the diverse crowds of students in

Tiananmen Square, and this new phase of expansion in the movement only worsened matters. As

the movement became more disorganized it began to also explore more radical ideas.29 On the

25 Ibid.26 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 258.27 Ibid., 260.28 Ibid., 256.29 Ibid., 259.

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13th of May “some 3,000 students started a hunger strike in Tiananmen” and demanded a

meeting with the Chinese Premier, Li Peng.30 In conjunction with this hunger strike, a new

organization called the Hunger Strike Group formed and displaced the Autonomous Federation

of Students as the leading voice for the movement.31 When the Hunger Strike Group pushed out

the Autonomous Federation of Students, the movement quickly crumbled under weight of

competing interests. The Premier, Li Peng, met with some students on the 19th. In this

“nationally televised discussion…Wu’er Kaixi angered the premier.”32 In this uncertain situation

with a movement disorganized and crumbling, the May 19th meeting only exasperated the

situation. Hereafter the government moved swiftly and directly to combat the students.

One month into the student movement, the Chinese government reached their limit of

tolerance. In an excerpt from a Party Central meeting on May 19th, government officials agreed

that if they “[didn’t] put a stop to this quickly…it [would] be hard to assure that it [would] not

end in a way nobody wants.”33 At this time the Chinese government resolved to alter the

situation, but not to the point of direct violence. In an effort to not antagonize the students and

other protesters further, the government reassured the people of Beijing that same day that the

“troops that have moved to the outskirts of Beijing are in no way directed at the students” adding

that their “purpose [was] to restore normal order in the life and work of Beijing.”34 Officially on

May 20th the government declared martial law in many areas of Beijing.

The student movement responded quickly. Soon after the martial law declaration

“hundreds of thousands of Beijing students and citizens set up roadblocks and checkpoints

30 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 424. 31 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 259.32 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425. 33 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 225.

3434 Ibid., 226.35 Ibid., 237-38.

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around the city in an effort to prevent troops from moving in.”35 At this point each side

entrenched themselves to the point that a nonviolent end seemed unlikely. The Gang of Elders

became increasingly nervous at the slow pace of the martial law’s implementation. The President

of the PRC (People’s Republic of China), Yang Shangkun, reassured them of the martial law’s

success, adding that it “created a strong intimidating effect” on the students and other

protesters.36 An atmosphere of mistrust permeated the two sides, creating a climate where direct

violence seemed only a matter of when and who not if. On May 23rd another demonstration

occurred with some “three hundred thousand protesters, mostly from outside Beijing” in an

attempt to end martial law and to force the premier to resign.37 This protest became the first one

in the movement to incorporate a mostly non-Beijing crowd. Many local students who initiated

this protest returned to classes a couple weeks prior. Disorganization within the movement failed

to allow it to incorporate this new pool of support. This disorganization in the movement became

evident on May 27th when “Wu’er Kaixi and Wang Dan…called on the students to abandon

their occupation of the Square” altogether. However, “Chai Ling…broke with the others and

supported staying.”38 The student movement failed to unite its base, incorporate new support, and

coordinate demonstrations.39 All of these failures became apparent to the movement as May

turned to June.

The climate of mistrust created by the martial law declaration on May 20th carried over

into June. On June 1st “every member of the Politburo received a copy of a report entitled ‘On

the True Nature of the Turmoil’” which “portrayed the unarmed students and the crowds of

3536 Ibid., 239.37 Ibid., 285.

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3838 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425.39 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 264.

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citizens who supported them as terrorists who were preparing an armed seizure of power.”40

Because the government officially adopted this viewpoint of the students and other protesters,

the last hopes of nonviolent resolution by the government slipped away, the only hope rested

with the students. But by June 1st the students “exhausted, disorganized, and unlikely to take any

more large-scale actions” became incapable of influencing the outcome of the event towards

positive peace.41 Many who took part in the hunger strikes either abandoned it or succumbed to

fatigue. The movement crumbled, with no nonviolent solution coming from the students. On

June 2nd a Party Central Meeting concluded that the student’s “plot is to provoke conflict and

create bloodshed.”42 Perception became reality for the government in early June, now they

needed justification for force.

June 3rd finally gave the Chinese government the pretext necessary for using direct

violence. Under the suspicion that students killed a soldier in Beijing and injured several more,

“the regime sent 30,000 unarmed soldiers” towards Tiananmen Square.43 Nonviolent movements

become difficult to maintain and when an act of direct violent occurs, either real or contrived, the

response from the opposition greatly outweighs what happened to them. Government troops

quickly realized by midday that the use of force to confront this “counterrevolutionary riot”

needed to occur.44 At 9 p.m. the government approved the People’s Liberation Army and military

police to use “all means necessary” to stop the protesters.45 The troops moving ever closer to

Tiananmen Square, meeting heavy resistance. The line between citizen and student blurred. That

distinction long since slipped away when the government labeled all protesters “terrorists” and

“revolutionaries.” One action of direct violence the government troops encountered occurred 40 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 330.41 Ibid., 353.42 Ibid., 355-56.43 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425.44 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 356.45 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 265-66.

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when the 38th Group Army, the main group responsible to clear the Square, encountered

protesters throwing bricks at them on their way with obstacles obstructing their way. Rioters also

attacked them “with clubs and steel reinforcing bars while a sea of smoke and fire arose” in front

of the troops.46 Nonviolence ended on both sides, and the government quickly ended the

movement.

The next day, June 4th, proved the deadliest of all. Early on that day, Paulson points out

that “while most students remained nonviolent, many protesters fought back violently.”47 The

movement among the remaining students stayed nonviolent, but since the government broad

brushed the protesters, the masses who reacted violently to the troops became the students. At 6

a.m. students and others who left the Square reached an area west of it called Liubukou. At this

point “soldiers opened fire…killing eleven.”48 The objective of the troops soon became more

about restoring peace by any means necessary than just clearing Tiananmen Square. Official

death totals remain varied to this day. The Chinese government estimated some 300 deaths,

“other reports claim as much as 2-10 thousand.”49 However small the number, the fact remains

that the government acted on its objective to end violently the student movement, and the

movement failed to change the situation before it grew too late.

In retrospect, the movement proved unsuccessful. The student’s actions translated into a

movement incapable of real nonviolent change. Many reasons make this abundantly clear. In his

survey of nonviolent movements in non-democratic states, Kurt Schock explained that the

“movement wasn’t resilient because it was disorganized and didn’t have a sufficiently

coordinated network to plan protests.”50 The methods primarily used by the students, the sit-in 46 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 390.47 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 266.48 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 383.48

4949 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425-426.50 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 104.

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and hunger strike, quickly became overused and unsuccessful. Without any real effective

leadership, no diversity of tactics became applied. Also their lack of organization best accounts

for the demands changing often to the government.51 A nonviolent movement works best when

the demands given represent clear, concise, and agreed upon conditions. When this failed to

happen no new borders of relations became drawn that satisfied the parties involved. Also

Schock mentioned that on top of disorganization and limited nonviolent methods, the movement

failed to gain international support, hindering its effectiveness.52 As stated before, a nonviolent

movement works best at a local level. When it becomes regional, national, or international it

requires strong leadership at its local core. Failing in this led to little to no international support,

and even if such support came who in movement really represented its voice? No single voice

emerged at any time during the protests. These failures led to the ultimate crumbling of the

movement and its incapability to translate nonviolent direct action into positive peaceful change.

Bibliography

Ackerman, Peter, and Jack Duvall. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000.

Nathan, Andrew J., and Perry Link, eds. The Tiananmen Papers. 1st ed. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2001.

Paulson, Joshua. “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989.” In Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential, by Gene Sharp, 253-270. Dexter, MI:

Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

51 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict, 424.52 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 113.

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