TYSON S SUPER CONCRETE, INC. vs. CA Facts: Romana Dela Cruz is the registered owner of several parcels of land located at P. Dela Cruz St., Sta. Quiteria, Caloocan City. Sometime in October 1992, Dela Cruz entered into a contract of lease with Tyson s Super Concrete, Inc. (Tyson s for brevity) where it was agreed that the latter shall occupy the property as lessee for a period of twenty (20) years beginning January 1, 1993 until December 31, 2012.3

injunction, finding that there is no evidence to warrant the issuance 14 of the said writ. Tyson s elevated the case to the CA via a special civil action 16 for certiorari. The CA first decided in favor of petitioner, declaring the decision of MeTC and RTC null and void. It first rationalized that under normal circumstances, summons upon a domestic corporation may be served upon any of the officers enumerated under Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, since petitioner corporation was undergoing intra-corporate problems which had been taken over by the SEC, under this (sic) special circumstances, summons should "have been effected on the Management Committee created by the SEC and not on any of the officers enumerated under Sec. 13, Rule 14, Rules of Court. The service of summons on Francis Chua who is not among the persons enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was insufficient. It did not at all bind the petitioner corporation. When the statute designates a particular officer to whom the process may be delivered and with whom it may be left, as service upon the corporation, no other person can be substituted in his place However, upon respondent s motion for reconsideration, the CA reversed its decision. CA now rationalizes that as corporate secretary of the petitioner corporation, Francis Chua is a proper person under the aforementioned Rules to whom service of summons may be validly made. In addition, as member of the Management Committee, he is a responsible officer of the corporation, and may thus be deemed to be an agent thereof, as the term is used in connection with Section 13, Rule 14. . . . Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended 22 Decision but the same was denied in a Resolution issued by the CA 23 on September 20, 1999. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Sometime in March 1995, the two major blocs of stockholders of Tyson s comprising of Elsa and Francis Chua, on one hand, and Nancy, William, Genaro and Lydia, all surnamed Hao, on the other, due to internal squabbling, filed a joint motion with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) praying for the appointment of a receiver to oversee the functions of the corporation. On April 11, 1995, the SEC issued an order creating a Management Committee to undertake the management of Tyson s, to take custody of and control over all the existing assets, funds and records of the corporation, and to determine the best way to protect the 5 interest of the stockholders and creditors. On February 27, 1996, a complaint for ejectment was filed by Dela Cruz against Tyson s with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City for the alleged failure of Tyson s to pay its rentals 8 despite repeated written demands for such payment. Tyson s failed to file the required answer to the Complaint. MeTC rendered its decision in favor of de la cruz, demanding Tyson to vacate the leased premises and pay the rentals, attorney s fees and cost of suit. On May 24, 1996, Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of the MeTC judgment. Tyson s, on the other hand, filed a motion praying for the stay of execution of the MeTC decision contending that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant corporation on the ground that said corporation was not validly and effectively served with summons. On July 22, 1996, Tyson s filed a motion to vacate the judgment of the MeTC. On even date, the MeTC issued an order denying Tyson s motion to vacate judgment. The MeTc court reasoned that Sheriff Antonio del Rosario of such Court reported that he had exerted efforts on several occasions to serve the summons to any responsible officer of the defendant in their office at the leased premises but to no avail. Upon an information from the defendant s security guard, he was able to locate the spouses Elsa Hao Chua and Francis Chua at their residence at 1231 G. Araneta St., Tondo, Manila and served the summons on them last March 21, 1996. Elsa Hao Chua is the treasurer of the defendant and its authorized representative as regards the lease contract as aforestated, while her husband Francis Chua is its corporate secretary, and as it turned out a duly appointed member of the Management Committee since May 23, 1995. Receipt of the summons and its annexes was acknowledged by Francis Chua as evidenced by his signature on the file copy of the summons attached to the record of the case. Tyson s then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order seeking to stop the judgment of the MeTC. After hearing, the RTC, per its resolution dated August 26, 1996, denied Tyson s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

Issues: 1. Whether or not an extrinsic fraud was committed consisting of Francis Chua s deliberate omission to furnish the Committee and the bloc of Nancy Hao with the summons issued by the MeTC Whether or not Tyson s was validly and effectively served with the summons issued by the MeTC.

2.

Ruling: On the first issue, the court is not persuaded that an extrinsic fraud was committed. The RTC found that the Committee was sufficiently apprised of the complaint for ejectment when Francis Chua s lawyer sent a letter together with a copy of said complaint on March 22, 1996, to Mr. Gregorio Navarro, Chairman of the Committee, informing him that the complaint was received on March 21, 1996, that it was filed by the lessors of the land leased by Tyson s on the ground of unpaid rentals and that Tyson s is required to file an 30 answer within fifteen days from receipt. We find no cogent reason to disturb said findings of fact. Factual issues are beyond the province of this court. Further, well-settled is the rule that factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in an appeal by certiorari. On the second issue, the court ruled in the affirmative. The procedural rule in effect at the time the ejectment case was filed byPage 1

Dela Cruz with the MeTC is Rule 14, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. In the instant case, it is established that at the time Francis Chua received the summons from the MeTC, he was the incumbent corporate secretary of Tyson s. In addition, he was a member of the management committee created by the SEC to oversee the operations of Tyson s. Being a member of the Committee, there is no question that he was an agent of petitioner corporation as contemplated under then Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, whether he was acting in his capacity as corporate secretary or as an agent of Tyson s, or both, when he received the summons from the MeTC, the service of said summons upon him is valid.

estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. Further, petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights Whether or not private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.8 7

Even if we are to follow petitioners premise that the Committee is the only body authorized to receive summons, we still find no basis to conclude that only its chairman is authorized to receive summons. Like the chairman of the Committee, its members are also authorized to receive summons since they are also considered "responsible officers" as contemplated by the Rules of Court in effect at the time the ejectment case against Tyson s was filed. In the present case, since it is not disputed that Francis Chua is a member of the management committee, he is therefore authorized to receive summons for and in behalf of Tyson s. Furthermore, we agree with the pronouncement of the CA in its assailed decision that nothing in the order of the SEC creating the management committee nor in the language of P.D. No. 902-A, provides that only the chairman of the Committee is authorized to receive summons. We likewise agree with the CA that even if the SEC or the Committee has adopted a rule to the effect that only the chairman of the latter may receive summons, such rule cannot amend or alter the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, which allows officers of a corporation to receive summons on its behalf. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41970 dated May 20, 1999 is AFFIRMED. GUY vs. CA Facts: On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei'sCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

2. 3.

Ruling: The petition lacks merit. First issue: Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules. Second issue: As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.Page 2

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. Further, it would also be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail. Third issue: The ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. We also note that, while the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings. DE LA CRUZ vs. CA Facts: The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned a lot. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40 years. Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioner s dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees, including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not comply. On February 21, 1994, petitioner was served a written demand to vacate said lot but refused to leave. Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings against any of the lessees. On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan Te by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent bought the lot in question for residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up the lot. On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation proceedings at the barangay level but failed. As a result, a certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te. On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the Manila MeTC. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were inCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so. On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed from petitioner s forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant 2 protected by PD 20; (3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was subject of expropriation. Issue: Whether or not the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit. Ruling: Petition is denied. Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 129 provides: Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the allegations of the complaint. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. This general rule however admits exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held "that while the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations."

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The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. The settled rule is jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and the defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its determination. However, we relax the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an exception in view of the special and unique circumstances present. First, as in Ignacio v. 13 CFI of Bulacan, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer wherein there was an admission that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the former owners of the lot, the Reyeses, prior to the sale to respondent Tan Te. The fact that petitioner was a tenant of the predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te is material to the determination of jurisdiction. Since this is a judicial admission against the interest of petitioner, such admission can be considered in determining jurisdiction. Second, the ejectment suit was filed with the Manila MeTC on September 8, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. To dismiss the complaint would be a serious blow to the effective dispensation of justice as the parties will start anew and incur additional legal expenses after having litigated for a long time. Equitable justice dictates that allegations in the answer should be considered to aid in arriving at the real nature of the action. Lastly, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court clearly empowers the Court to construe Rule 70 and other pertinent procedural issuances "in a liberal manner to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." BALTAZAR vs. OMBUDSMAN Facts: Pacienda Regala owned a fishpond. His Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Faustino Mercado leased the fishpond to Eduardo Lapid for a period of three years, from August 7, 1990 to August 7, 1993. Thereafter, Eduardo Lapid subleased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven months of the original lease. Respondent Selanga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as a fishpond watchman. Salenga was also hired by Rafael Lopez. On March 11, 1993, Salenga sent a demand letter to Lourdes Lapid and Rafael Lopez for his unpaid salaries and unpaid 10% share in the harvest. On June 5, 1993, Rafael Lopez informed Salenga that he will be transferring his rights over the fishpond to Mario Palad and Ambit Perez. This prompted respondent Salenga to file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest. The Complaint was signed by respondent Jose D. Jimenez, Jr., Legal Officer of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), as counsel for respondent Salenga; whereas respondent Eulogio M. Mariano was the Chief Legal Officer of DAR Region III. The case was assigned to respondent Toribio E. Ilao, Jr., Provincial Adjudicator of DARAB, Pampanga. On May 10, 1993, respondent Salenga amended his complaint that now included a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. However, before the prayer for the issuance of a TRO could be acted upon, respondent Salenga filed a Motion to Maintain Status Quo and to Issue Restraining Order which was set for hearing. In the hearing, since the motion was unopposed, respondent Ilao, Jr. issued a TRO. Thereafter, respondent Salenga asked for supervision of the harvest, which the board sheriff did.

In the subsequent hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, again, only respondent Salenga appeared and presented his evidence for the issuance of the writ. Pending resolution of the case, Faustino Mercado, as Attorney-in-Fact of the fishpond owner Paciencia Regala, filed a motion to intervene which was granted by respondent Ilao, Jr. After the trial, respondent Ilao, Jr. rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit; but losing plaintiff, respondent Salenga, appealed the decision before the DARAB Appellate Board. Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, through a Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents in the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner charged private respondents of conspiracy through the issuance of the TRO in allowing respondent Salenga to retain possession of the fishpond, operate it, harvest the produce, and keep the sales under the safekeeping of other private respondents. Moreover, petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P 93 filed by respondent Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face. While the other respondents submitted their counter-affidavits, respondent Ilao, Jr. instead filed his February 9, 1995 motion to dismiss, February 21, 1995 Reply, and March 24, 1995 Rejoinder. The Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding cause to bring respondents to court, denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Ilao, Jr. Subsequently, respondent Ilao, Jr. filed his Motion for Reconsideration and/or Re-investigation which was denied. Consequently, an information is filed against all the private respondent before the Sandiganbayan. In this case, petitioner contends that DARAB Case No. 552-P 93 is not an agrarian dispute and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. He maintains that respondent Salenga is not an agricultural tenant but a mere watchman of the fishpond owned by Paciencia Regala. Moreover, petitioner further argues that Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid, the respondents in the DARAB case, are not the owners of the fishpond. Issue: Whether or not the Hon. Ombudsman erred in reversing his own resolution where it was resolved that accused as provincial adjudicator has no jurisdiction over a complaint where there exist no tenancy relationship considering complainant is not a tenant but a watchman overseer hired for a salary as alleged in his own complaint. Ruling: This argument is likewise bereft of merit. Indeed, as aptly pointed out by respondents and as borne out by the antecedent facts, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not have acted otherwise. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Given that respondent Salenga s complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever defense asserted in anPage 4

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answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the defendant. CADIMAS vs. CARRION Facts: The instant petition stemmed from the complaint for accion reivindicatoria and damages filed by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas, through her attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales, against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo. The complaint was raffled to Branch 85 of the RTC of Quezon City. In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract To Sell wherein petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town house. According to petitioner, Carrion had violated paragraph 8 of said contract when she transferred ownership of the property to respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which authorized the latter to manage and administer the property for and in behalf of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent Carrion in writing to explain the alleged violation but the latter ignored petitioner s letter, prompting petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo vacate the property and to cancel the contract.6 Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss8 on her behalf and on behalf of respondent Carrion on 18 November 2004, citing the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on the part of the RTC and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner. Respondent Hugo argued that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint because ultimately, the sole issue to be resolved was whether petitioner, as the owner and developer of the subdivision on which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing unsound real estate business practices. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It held that the court s jurisdiction is not determined by the defenses set up in the answer or the motion to dismiss. However, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, praying that the Omnibus Order dated 21 March 2005 and Order dated 17 January 2007 issued by Judge Teodoro T. Riel be reversed and set aside. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision granting respondents petition for certiorari. The appellate court set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of petitioner s complaint for lack of jurisdiction Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter based on the allegations of the complaint. Ruling: RTC has jurisdiction. The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise,5

would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. The cancellation of the contract and the recovery of possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.32 Thus, the allegations in respondents motion to dismiss on the unsound real estate business practices allegedly committed by petitioner, even if proved to be true, cannot serve to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over actions for breach of contract and damages which has been conferred to it by law. MERCADO vs. UBAY Facts: Herein petitioners - The MERCADO (siblings) filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cavite Br. 1 against the SAMONTE siblings. The defendants filed their answer to the complaint thru their counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine. CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Since no appeal was made by any of the defendants, the decision became final and executory, then the trial court issued the corresponding writ of execution. Before the writ of execution could be carried out, the defendants filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to annul the writ of execution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Respondent Lucina and Trinidad Samonte filed an action before the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the trial court alleging that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Pine to represent them in said case. Petitioner s motion to dismiss was denied. Issue: Whether or not a CFI or a branch thereof has the authority to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by another branch of the same court? Ruling: Petition is granted and respondent judge of the CFI or Rizal is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 2442. BP 129 enacted August 10, 1982, transferred jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment to the Court of Appeals. Although the prevailing rule before the enactment of BP 129 was that the CFI and their branches have jurisdiction to annul eachPage 5

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other s final judgments. However fundamental principles still dictate that the better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and branches thereof, the annulment of cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main action sought to be annulled, pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. SALMORIN vs. ZALDIVAR Facts: Dr. Pedro Zaldivar, as legal possessor of a lot situated in Mapatag, Hamtic, Antique, entered into an agreement with Salmorin designating him as administrator of the lot with a monthly salary of P150. Salmorin allegedly did not comply with the terms of the Kasugtanan when he failed to till the vacant areas. This compelled Zaldivar to terminate his services and eject him from the lot. When Salmorin refused to vacate the property, Zaldivar filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against him in the MCTC of Tobias FornierAnini-y-Hamtic. In his answer, Salmorin alleged the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and Zaldivar. Thus, he claimed that the case was an agrarian matter over which the MCTC had no jurisdiction. After an examination of the position papers submitted by the parties, the MCTC found that the case was in the nature of an agrarian dispute and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Zaldivar appealed to the RTC of San Jose, Antique which ruled in his favor. The RTC found that the consent of the landowner and sharing of the harvest, which were requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship, did not exist. Thus, it ruled that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case. Salmorin appealed the RTC decision to the CA but the latter upheld the decision of the RTC. He now seeks a reversal of the RTC and CA decisions. Issue: WON the regular court had no jurisdiction over the case and Zaldivar had no right to possess the subject property.

complaint and the law, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. Zaldivar's complaint concerned the unlawful detainer by Salmorin of the subject lot. This matter is properly within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The allegation of tenancy in Salmorin's answer did not automatically deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction. Contrary to the findings of the MCTC, both the RTC and the CA found that there was no tenancy relationship between Salmorin and Zaldivar. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. All these elements must concur. It is not enough that they are alleged. To divest the MCTC of jurisdiction, these elements must all be shown to be present. Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of particular facts as required by law. In this case, the RTC and CA correctly found that the third and sixth elements, namely, consent of the landowner and sharing of the harvests, respectively, were absent. We note that agricultural share tenancy was declared contrary to public policy and, thus, abolished by the passage of RA 3844, as amended. Share tenancy exists: [W]henever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant. Since the MCTC has jurisdiction over the Civil Case, we will refrain from discussing the right of Zaldivar to possess the lot as it is more correctly the subject of the appropriate action in the trial court. The case is REMANDED to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tobias Fornier-Anini-y-Hamtic which is directed to proceed with and finish the case as expeditiously as possible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAWALING Facts: Former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, 3 Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo were convicted of murder for killing Ronie Ilisan. Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office. Issue: WON SANDIGANBAYAN has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. Ruling: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing suchPage 6

Ruling: We disagree. On one hand, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian related cases, i.e., rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and other related agrarian laws, or those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders. On the other, Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7691, provides that exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is lodged with the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and MCTCs. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of theCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment. Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., "[I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]) Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices." Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. PAMINTUAN vs. JUAN TIGLAO Facts: This action was instituted in the court of the justice of the peace of Mabalacat, Pampanga, by Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan for the purpose of recovering from Juan Tiglao the possession of 2 parcels of land described in the complaint, as well as quantity of palay and sugar, as rent, together with damages and an attorney's fee, and costs. In the said court the cause was decided favorably to the plaintiff, whereupon the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the latter court the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the court . Upon the trial of the cause in the Court of First instance justice was again rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the land in question and requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff rentals for the agricultural year 1925-1926. It appears from the record that after this action was begun, and before the case was decided, the defendant voluntarily surrendered possession of the land to the plaintiff. Upon this it is contended by the attorney for the defendant that the court of the justice of the peace and consequently the Court of First Instance lost jurisdiction to entertain the action. Issue: WON defendant is correct Ruling: The jurisdiction of the court having once attached, that jurisdiction continues until the complete remedy is granted. The defendantappellant further contends that inasmuch as he set up a counterclaim for damages in the amount of P6,000, the jurisdiction of the court of justice of the peace over the main action was destroyed. But this proposition also is untenable. FLORES vs. SUMALJAG

Facts: This is an administrative case against Judge Antonio C. Sumaljag, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law in connection with the preliminary investigation of three criminal cases and the arrest of complainants. Respondent, whose regular station was at Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Albuera, Leyte, retired on December 13, 1996. Complainants Perlito D. Flores, Arlyn H. Arabilla, Domingo Ramirez, Jorge Bandalan, Vicente Asilom, Mary Jane Villegas, Joel Diaz and Elvira Valenzona are members of the Sangguniang Pambarangay of Domingo C. Veloso in Baybay, Leyte, who were charged with three counts of falsification of public document as defined in Art. 171, pars. 2, 4 and 8 of the Revised Penal Code. That on or about the 19th day of November, 1996, at Barangay Domingo C. Veloso (Zone 8) of baybay, Leyte, [all the herein complainants] in their capacities as members of Sangguniang Pambarangay of the said barangay (Zone 8) of Baybay, Leyte, conspiring together and confiderating (sic) themselves did then and there willfully and feloniously (sic) prepare a spurious and falsified excerpt from the alleged minutes of the purported regular session allegedly on August 24, 1996, which never was to falsely substantiate the purported Resolution No. 14, Series of 1996, unduly protesting the application of complainant Gualberto Parmis to own Lot No. 521-A with the DENR, located in Sitio Hayahay, Barangay Domingo C. Veloso (Zone 8), Baybay, Leyte, with DENR of Ormoc City, intercalating thereby that Gualberto Parmis is not a resident of said Barangay when he is a bona fide resident thereat and in fact he has his house of abode erected thereat, by letting it appear also in that spurious minutes allude to as the result of a regular session on August 24, 1996, when in fact and in truth, no regular session was held on August 24,1996, on the aspect of the said undue protest to the application of Gualberto Parmis to own Lot No. 521-A with the DENR, that none of the accused deliberated nor discussed re the concocted Resolution 14, allude to, none of them signed the minutes or excerpt thereof because no minutes whatsoever on that aspect was obtaining then on August 24, 1996, and the spurious minutes or excerpt thereof was only crafted unduly and contrively prepared only on November 19, 1996, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned complainant Gualberto Parmis in violation of item 8, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. On November 25, 1996, respondent judge conducted a preliminary examination, during which the complainant, Gualberto Parmis, and his witness, Diego Cala, Jr., testified in each of the criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein complainants. By virtue of warrants of arrest, the herein complainants were arrested detained. They were later released on bail. Issue: Whether or not the court lost jurisdiction by the fact that the judge had ceased office during the pendency of the case. Ruling: As already stated, respondent has since retired. This fact, however, does not render this case moot and academic. As held in Gallo v. Cordero:Page 7

Civil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

[T]he jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filling of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. . . . If innocent, respondent officials merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. On the other hand, considering that respondent judge has retired, the only appropriate penalty that could be imposed on him, in light of what he failed to do in this case, is a fine of 5,000.00. Accordingly, a FINE of 5,000.00 is hereby imposed on respondent Judge Antonio Sumaljag, the amount to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he may be entitled to receive.

release of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed for improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. In his comment, respondent Judge Bellosillo explains that in the exercise of his sound discretion and in the greater interest of justice and fair play, he required a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of the police-impounded vehicle to answer for damages by way of subsidiary liability in case of accused s insolvency. The requirement of a bond for the release of impounded vehicles involved in reckless imprudence cases is practiced As for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory Liner bus, respondent Judge claims that it was just under the circumstances considering that its prior release was illegal. In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza, the OCA Consultant to whom this case was referred by the Court, submits that Judge Bellosillo s resignation, which was accepted by the Court En Banc effective 27 March 2002, does not render moot and academic the instant administrative complaint. He finds that the respondent Judge erred in ordering the impounding of the Victory Liner bus and in requiring a cash bond of P50,000 for its release. Issue:11

VICTORY LINER, INC. vs. BELLOSILLO Facts: On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF935 was cruising along the National Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March 2000, VLI 1 and the heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement/Undertaking. On 14 March 2000, after payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M. Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of the heirs of the victim, executed a Release of Claim2 and an Affidavit of 3 Desistance in favor of VLI and the driver Reino de la Cruz. However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marciana s sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, who were also signatories 4 to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay against Reino de la Cruz. On the strength of that document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of DinalupihanHermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10512. After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted in cash. He further directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to immediately impound the bus involved in the accident, which could be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50,000. On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion7 manifesting that it was depositing to the court under protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. The bus was released. On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent s court a petition to declare null and void the order directing it to post bond for theCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)8

Whether or not the court lost jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case. Ruling: Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the respondent from the charges of inaction on a pending motion and of compelling the police authorities to file a criminal case against De la Cruz. We, however, hesitate to hold the respondent administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law in ordering (1) the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident and (2) the posting of a P50,000 bond for the release of the vehicle, both of which were found by OCA Consultant Atienza to be erroneous. ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE Facts: Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethal injection.

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SC issued a temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner on January 4, 1990. Public respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution. The submission of public respondents is that, the Decision having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; Issue: WON the Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.

CA held that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. Issue: WON the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks. And WON respondent CA erred in holding that it is the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) which has jurisdiction over said action and not the civil court. Ruling:

Ruling: The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the SC of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Jurisprudence tells us the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final, facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied). GMA NETWORK, INC. vs ABS-CBN, et. al

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner GMA Network Inc., filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against the respondents ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN'), Central CATV, Inc. (SkyCable'), Philippine Home Cable Holdings, Inc. (Home Cable') and Pilipino Cable Corporation (Sun Cable') for allegedly engaging in unfair competition when the cable companies arbitrarily re-channeled petitioner's cable television broadcast on February 1, 2003, in order to arrest and destroy its upswing performance in the television industry. SkyCable and Sun Cable moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum-shopping since there was a similar case pending before the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) entitled 'GMA Network, Inc. v. Central CATV, Inc., Philippine Home Cable Holdings, Inc., and Pilipino Cable Corporation. The case, docketed as NTC ADM Case No. 2003-085, allegedly involved the same cause of action and the same parties, except for ABS-CBN. SkyCable and Sun Cable also asserted that it is the NTC that has primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in the complaint. Moreover, GMA had no cause of action against the two entities and failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar, while also applied with the Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." IEI was advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the Minister of Energy before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was finalized and approved by the BED, and etcCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

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In due course, the trial court issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint. The trial court held that the resolution of the legal issues raised in the complaint required the determination of highly technical, factual issues over which the NTC had primary jurisdiction. Issue: WON the NTC has primary jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: The wrongful acts complained of and upon which the damages prayed for are based, have to do with the operations and ownership of the cable companies. These factual matters undoubtedly pertain to the NTC and not the regular courts. Consequently, while it is true that the regular courts are possessed of general jurisdiction over actions for damages, it would nonetheless be proper for the courts to yield its jurisdiction in favor of an administrative body when the determination of underlying factual issues requires the special competence or knowledge of the latter. In this era of clogged court dockets, administrative boards or commissions with special knowledge, experience and capability to promptly hear and determine disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, are well nigh indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, therefore, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former. In this regard, we note that there is a pending case before the NTC in which the factual issues raised in petitioner's complaint have also been pleaded. Although petitioner prays in the NTC case for the administrative remedy of cancellation of the cable companies' certificates of authority, licenses and permits, it is inevitable that, in granting or denying this prayer, the NTC would have to pass upon the same factual issues posed in petitioner's complaint before the trial court. The latter was thus correct in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction if only to avoid conflicting factual findings between the court and the NTC. PAAT vs. CA Facts: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the DENR personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan,Civil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence this petition. Issue: 1. Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines? 2. Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government? Rulings: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregardedPage 10

(1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.Civil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar. PALOMA vs. MORA Facts: Petitioner Nilo Paloma was General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District but whose services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95, passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC to contest his dismissal with the prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager. Petitioner argued that his dismissal was a 'capricious and arbitrary act on the part of the Board of Directors; that the grounds relied upon therein to terminate him were never made a subject of a complaint nor was he notified and made to explain the acts he was said to be guilty of. Fundamental is the rule and also provided for in the Civil Service Rules and Regulations that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended, separated or dismissed except for cause and after due process, so stressed petitioner. The RTC dismissed the petition for being a premature cause of action. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Complaint on 29 March 1996 with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) against same respondents herein, for alleged Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for Illegal Dismissal. However, such petition was likewise dismissed by the Civil Service Commission for lack of prima facie case. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Issue: Whether or not the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal of petitioner. Ruling: Petitioner, heaves censure on the Court of Appeals for subscribing to the trial court's view that the petition for mandamus was prematurely filed. We recall in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton that water districts are government instrumentalities and that their employees belong to the civil service. Thus, '[t]he hiring and firing of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case at bar is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and willPage 11

not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of their expertise. This is consistent with the powers and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws, including, in this case, P.D. No. 198. Petition is DENIED. FABIAN vs. DESIERTO Facts: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. Later, when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995. Respondent Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges. In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied). However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final andCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issue: The propriety of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770. Ruling: There is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgement. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among other."ch It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court over appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appealsPage 12

from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states: SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. The provisions of Rule 43 should apply not only to "ordinary" quasijudicial agencies, but also to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. Therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasijudicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. CALIMLIM vs. RAMIREZ Facts: Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali The Notice of Levy made on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title." The same was also stated in the Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan. When the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land referring to TCT No. 9138 and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in theCivil Procedure Compilation of Case Digest (Rm 402)

name of the said corporation. Due to non-compliance of Manuel, the former filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and a new title was issued as TCT No. 68568. Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an order dismissing the petition. Petitioner then filed the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180, praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, dismissed civil case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. Issue: Whether or not Civil Case No. SCC-180 is barred by estoppel by prior judgment. Ruling: We find merit in this appeal. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently considered. The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not of their own making. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate. It may neither be claimed that the parties have mutually agreed to submit the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court, it being a fact that herein private respondent was not a party in the petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Incidentally, although the said petition was filed by the herein petitioners on November 21, 1967, the Opposition filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation to the said petition made no mention of the alleged sale of the property in question in favor of private respondent Francisco Ramos on July 5, 1967. This circumstance places in grave doubt the sincerity of said sale and the claim that the private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value of the property in question. The ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of the doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to the propertyPage 13

owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There is no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. The justness of the relief sought by herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly doubtful applicability herein. FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION vs. RICARDO T. SYCIP Facts: In November, 1989, petitioner and respondent entered into a contract to sell a house and lot covered. Upon execution of the contract to sell, respondent made a down payment of P119,700.00. The townhouse subject of the contract to sell was transferred in the name of respondent as evidenced by TCT No. T-281788. Despite the transfer of the title in the name of respondent, the latter refused to pay the balance of P250,000.00. Despite several demands made by petitioner to respondent, the respondent refused to reconvey the subject property to petitioner. Petitioner then a filed a case against respondent and a motion to dismiss was filed by the latter in the ground of lack of jurisdiction. After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA held that the case involved not just reconveyance and damages, but also a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957; hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. The appellate court observed that respondent and other buyers of the townhouses had notified petitioner of their intention to stop paying amortizations because of defective structures and materials used in the construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also before the HLURB, against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice. Issues: Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling: The Petition lacks merit. Petitioner contends that the lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, a party may be barred from questioning a court's jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. The general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.[16] The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover,jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all defenses and objections -except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior judgment and/or prescription -- must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer; otherwise, they are deemed waived. [20] As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time 'when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists. The Court has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory note issued by a subdivision lot buyer involves the 'sales of lots in commercial subdivisions' ; and that jurisdiction over such case lies with the HLURB, not with the courts. Petitioner avers that the present controversy is not cognizable by the HLURB, because it was filed by the developer rather than by the buyer, as provided under PD No. 1344. The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer. ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS, INC. vs. HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR Facts: At bar is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appea