MARTINEZ VS CA

G.R. No. 170409

FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedoniaand under that name applied for free patents over the properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents to file the instant complaint.The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of petitioners titles. Before the Court of Appeals, She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.ISSUE: Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their issuanceRULING:No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of Celedonia.Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied.

CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA132 SCRA 718FACTS:Petitioner, Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera, were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one roof in the care of a common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera died. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. De Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Veras estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an inventory showing that De Veras property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De Veras estate

RULING:

No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime; that when de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latters land was erroneously included.

The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A recalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Veras estate.In the case at bar, the principle of indefeasibility applies only in the claimed portion or property wherein it can be adjudged not on the illegally included area.

IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE208 PHIL 441FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the National Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondent court upheld the primacy of the respondent banks title and ordered the cancellation of the petitioners title. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: which of the two titles is superior, an earlier title secured administratively or a latter title secured thru judicial proceedings?.

The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the name of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said property was acquired by the plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name the same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead patent; that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria Maravilla who was the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land in question under O.C.T. by virtue of a decree/decision, of the CFI of Nueva Ecija . The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court denied it. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review oncertiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land registration proceedings.

Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case No. 3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the petitioner attacks the validity of the homestead patent and title issued to the respondent banks predecessor, Emilio Libunao.

In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor, is recorded and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding." Applying the case of Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39 SCRA 676) Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. Supreme Court should add that the Director of Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead patent.

HEIRS OF SPS, LIM VS. RTC JUDGE G.R. No. 173891FACTS:Amparo E.Caosa(respondentCaosa) filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court ofQuezonCityseeking the reconstitution of the original Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 169395 of the Register of Deeds of the same city. The trial court hadex partepresentation of evidence before the branch clerk of court.Convinced that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with and finding merit in the petition, the trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original and owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395.Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial courts decision. According to petitioners, their parents,spousesLucianoP.LimandSaludNakpilBautista, are the registered owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from Domingo L. Santos. The lot contained an area of 795 square meters more or less and wascoveredbyTCT No. 27997.Furthermore, they alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession of the property. A fired razed QuezonCity Hall, the records destroyed was the original copy of TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of the petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-97223, in September 1994.Petitioners claimed that when respondentCaosafiled a petition forthereconstitutionofTCT No. 169395. They insisted that the petition for reconstitutiondid not comply with the requirements found in Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 26 as it failed to state specifically the boundaries of the property subject of the petition as well asthe names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Petitioners considered these circumstances as extrinsic fraud. Caosaallegedthat there was no fraudand that the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication had been complied with.The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the resolution, but their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right to be notified of the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have any right to file the petition for annulment of judgment.

Ruling:

Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395 will have no effect on their property, the latter being different from, and not even a part ofthe property covered by the reconstituted title.One having no right or interest of his own to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action, thus petitioners petition for annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed.Petitioners impute error to the Court of Appeals when it dismissed theirpetitionafterit concluded, on the basis of its simple comparison ofpetitioners and respondentsTCTs, that the properties covered by the two titles are entirely different.Petitionersarguethatthe Court of Appeals should have conducted a trial and received evidence; and having failed to do so, its conclusion was allegedly not only flawed but was also arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without due process.Supreme Court does not agree.The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment outright.In fact, it required respondentCaosato file her answer, and even allowed the filingofanamendedanswerproofthat itwas predisposed to considerthe arguments of both parties before it even decided to finally dismiss the petition.Mere filing of a petition for annulment of judgment does not guarantee the holding of trial or reception of evidence. A petition forannulmentofjudgmentmay in fact be dismissed outright if it has no primafaciemerit.With more reason that the Court of Appealsmay dismiss a petition even without ahearing if it finds thatbased on the averments in the petition and the responsive pleading, the annulment of the assailed judgment is not warranted.

TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANOG.R. No. 152007FACTS:On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to partition the subject property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest in 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein, did not sign the conveying deed; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, ong before the purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Hence, Petitioners, pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus damages.Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence adduced by the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that petitioners are barred from filing their petition due to laches.ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners is valid.RULING: No. The recourse must fail. As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. Their action calls for the determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve. It appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution. More so, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title. Petition was denied.

NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ173 SCRA 534FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia Realty, filed separate ejectment cases against respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully occupying parcels of lands which were covered by the petitioners transfer certificates. The respondents file a consolidated answer moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that there is no valid issue raised by the respondents, but only conclusions that they have been in actual possession of the subject lands for more than 30 years. They were then ordered to vacate the lots and to pay monthly rents. So the respondents filed an appeal with the Intermediate Appellate Court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the disputed land?RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower court that the certificate of title issued to the petitioners in accordance with the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. The said titles were issued to the petitioners more than 30 years ago. Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential. There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title. Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA201 SCRA 165FACTS:On August 27, 1974, Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora) filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land. It alleged that the parcel of land has an area of 156 hectares, more or less; and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954. Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares and praying for a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8. Same with Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas, holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425; Ortigas then filed a motion for reconsideration praying the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the application for registration, the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title. Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land registration case,the trial court then rendered the decision in favor to Ortigas.ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be subjected to a collateral attack?RULING:Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void.

ESLANISLAO VS. HONRADA114 SCRA 748FACTS;This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo.In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square meters.By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961.On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng. Alfredo Ching was appointed then asthe administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966. Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be the true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo ching to surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its cancellation. The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon knowing, Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980.ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title?RULING:An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death.The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748).Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter one year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

FERRER VS. BAUTISTA231 SCRA 748FACTS:Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 .On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated Civil Case No. A-514.

Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint forreivindicacion(Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.

Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error in outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and an excess of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral attack.

RULING: Yes. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately owned.

Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe; in fact, it is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC

157 SCRA 380

FACTS:On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit ,herein private respondents, as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.

On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority (NGA).

On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this case, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.

The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale. The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.

On July 10, 1974, NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. A month after, the private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment and claimed ownership of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same. The private respondents are in possession of subject property were asked by the NGA to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.

On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the NGA and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises.

In its answer to the complaint, the National Grains Authority maintained that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, cause of action of Nena Magcamit has already prescribed.

After due hearing, the trial courtrendered its decision in favor of National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains Authority.

The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the rightful owner of the disputed land.

RULING:Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.

It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the possibility of losing his land. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed.

The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the propertyhas not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.ROXAS ET. AL VS TAGAYTAYFACTS: On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformityin which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the respondents is proper.

RULING:Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period.

DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL 64 OG 19FACTS:

On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to the Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands Agency. On February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3918 (T-320) was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate was among the friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to actual tenants or occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine Commission.

Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation proceedings, the government constructed Mango Avenue, a municipal road, passing through Lot No. 638. A claim for compensation was filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was still unpaid when World War II broke out.RupertaCabucos died in 1940. In 1951 her heirs subdivided Lot No. 638 into eight lots.

On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida Samson, became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos. On February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10, 1963. On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this Court from said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On August 7, 1963 the Auditor General desisted from rendering a decision on the amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the case was already sub judice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled to compensation for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.

RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due compensation for Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. 638 was subject to the Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way and other public servitudes under Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 and Section 39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the claim for compensation is barred by prescription and laches.

The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack merit. Firstly, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no authority for the Government to take private lands covered by said Act for public use without just compensation. Sections 19, 20 and 21 state:

SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for the common benefit of those interests dependent upon them. And the Government reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable contribution or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation works, the assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of benefits received, and each purchaser under this Act, by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be given, shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further provided that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals, ditches, and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter see fit to construct.

SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with reference to the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done.

SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or tracts of said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same for public use, and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject to sale, lease, or other disposition under this Act.

Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive right to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. It also subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such canal, ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the friar lands subject to public servitudes also imposed on other lands owned by private persons. Section 21 gives the Civil Governor, upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, the authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as non-alienable and reserve the same for public use. Needless to say, the road construction through Lot No. 638-B is not the servitude contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted. Moreover, it has not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable by the Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta Cabucos so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.

Ozaeta v Palanca, 63 OG 36, p. 7675

FACTS: Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda, Bulacan. Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as they have been occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied.Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was granted. The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin, however, when the latter went to the premises he was again barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again, granted. Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of possession served orto issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.

ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper remedy.

RULING: An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy." An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title.

ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC.

G.R. No. 134692 August 1, 2000

Facts:

Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioners, a house and lot in Barangka, Marikina, Manila. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners contained a Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as easement of two meters in front, second storey expansion to be placed above the back of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building, and the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house. Petitioners, despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall.Respondent filed an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. The RTC ruled against Spouses Fajardo and directed them to immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The spouses filed petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid.Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the provisions of the covenant.

HELD:

The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights but it can also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true easements,but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements, which is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are crafted not solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be. Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is intended.It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has neither right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the restriction has been imposed. Thus, a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions, even as against remote grantees of lots, only if he retains part of the land.There would have been merit in the argument of petitioners - that respondent, having relinquished ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is precluded from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not the homeowners' association, confirmed by its board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant.The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATIONA. APPEALa. Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt.i. As against the government.

REPUBLIC VS SAYO 191 SCRA 71

FACTS: The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default was thereafter entered against the whole world except the oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development, Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of land?

HELD: The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.

REPUBLIC VS CA135 SCRA 156FACTS: In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a decree of registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree, and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. The Maxinos opposed the petition. The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the same was dismissed on the ground that the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so the Government was estopped thru the registration made by its agents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the registration order?

RULING:No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus non-registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50 Phil. 975, 980), where it held that the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.

GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS 168 SCRA 503

FACTS:A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them. After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final and executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverios recommendation. Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.

ISSUE:Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had become final and executory.

HELD:Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Republic vs. Estenzo158 SCRA 282FACTS:On 11 November 1961, the Land Tenure Administration, representing the Republic, initiated and prosecuted expropriation proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the acquisition of some 591.0654 hectares of private agricultural lands situated in San Isidro, Leyte, and owned by respondents Espeletas, Martinezes and Pachecos, for resale to tenants, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1400.chanroblesvOn 14 June 1962, the lower court rendered a decision condemning the said land for P411,995.78.1The Republic, having already paid the partial sum of P206,850.00, was, accordingly, ordered to pay the balance of P205,145.78, plus the further sum of P20,000.00 for a farmhouse, copra drier and warehouses, or a total of P225,145.78. This was supplemented by an amendatory order providing for payment of 6% per annum interest starting 14 June 1962 on the unpaid balance. Implementing orders, the last of which was dated 28 July 1962, were thereafter successively issued.chanroblesiCame 12 April 1963 and the balance of P143,150.00 still remained unpaid despite an order directing payment thereof. Respondents-landowners then filed a motion in the lower court imploring the latter to (1) annul its amended decision of 24 August 1962 on the ground that its basis - the compromise agreement - was secured through fraud;and (2) resuscitate its original decision of 14 June 1962.chanroblesvanrobThe Republic went to the Supreme Court on a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition, however, the parties entered anew into another compromise agreement. The Republic, now represented by the Land Authority, covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of P143,150.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962. Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any and all further claims against the former which had been recognized and ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26 April 1963 "in the event (of) full payment of said compromise price . . . on or before said date," The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full, as per agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay, as of 31 August 1964, P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on the interest, or a total of P102,271.63 only.This precipitated the filing of respondents-landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964, in the lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the Sheriff of the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28 July 1962.nroblesvirtualawThe Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order alleging, in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised in its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10 November 1964, that the garnishment of the funds of the Land Authority violates Sections 14 and 2110of Republic Act No. 992, otherwise known as the Revised Budget Act, because the money garnished was appropriated by Congress "for the operation and maintenance of the nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve (12) Agencies under the administration of . . . (the) Authority, pursuant to the provision of R. A. 3844, (and) to cover salaries of personnel, travelling, supplies and materials and other administrative expenses," and are, therefore, not funds for the payment of expropriated estates. This was opposed by respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure and/or payment by the government official charged with custody of such funds but are not applicable to forcible seizure through garnishment pursuant to a writ of execution," as in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrHence, this present petition forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction.ISSUE: whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrobHELD: The first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance of Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section 154 (3) of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted on 8 August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3) provides that -Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with interest on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of execution could be issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be predicated on the second compromise, and conform to the terms thereof.chanroblesvirand that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not made full payment of P143,150.00, plus legal interest from 24 August 1962, on or before 31 August 1964. Such default, however, only entitled respondents to demand execution on the basis of the compromise approved by this Court.chanroblesblesvirtualThe lower court was, therefore, already divested of its control over the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed; it was already shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26 April 1963 was issued pursuant thereto, ordering payment of the original award made in 14 June 1962. All that the lower court could do under the circumstances was to enforce the amended decision of 24 August 1962. Instead of a motion for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the proper move for respondents-landowners would have been to file a separate and independent civil action to set aside, by annulment or rescission, both the first compromise agreement and the amended decision embodying the same.chanroblesvirtualawl libraryanroblesvirtualawThe writs ofcertiorariand prohibition are granted, and the respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further proceeding in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be sent to the Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice.

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR 25 SCRA 316

Facts: Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lots in questions with reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the Benuvar. A petition for reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long before the second world war. For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the petition. However, in its later order the court reconsidered and granted the petition.The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order. Respondent court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the required bond," but withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to lot 1 "until after this order dismissing the appeal shall have become final." The herein petitioners then filed a petition for mandamuswith the Court of Appeals, to compel the trial court to give due course to their appeal. This petition was finally dismissed.De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot 1.The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not final and executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have appealed from the said decision by virtue of a notation the counsel received the same "Con mi excepcion making the execution of the said decision impossible. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of the decree is but a ministerial duty of the respondent court.Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already become final and executory. Issue: Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory because the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be seen from the notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi copia. Con mi excepcion.Ruling: This contention is without merit.Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had long become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate, dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by the Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered." The notation found at the foot of the last page of the reconstituted decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted from that decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an appeal. An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi exception." The judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the decision.The requirement contained in the decision of March 24, 1938 regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while it does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted to refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and may be accomplished anytime after the decision became final and executory.

NIETO V. QUINES6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)

FACTS: Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to inform the court that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?

HELD: The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a cadastral proceeding is onein remand any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, including the Government. As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud."Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.

NIETO V. QUINES6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)

FACTS: Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to inform the court that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?

HELD: The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a cadastral proceeding is onein remand any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, including the Government. As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud."Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.

TALAVERA VS MANGOBA 8 SCRA 837, 1963

FACTS:On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former. Defendants presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted some and denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also interposed separate counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the hearing scheduled on March 10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor their counsel appeared, so that the trial court received Talaveras evidence in their absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was rendered in favour of Talavera.Appellant claims that the above decision was received by him on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated that the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza which was evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April 2, 1958, however, one day ahead of the date, the trial court denied said motion. In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in denying the motion for new trial, the courta quodeprive him of his day in court.

RULING:Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not, motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular case, however, it was shown that the absence of counsel was explained and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion for new trial, accompanied by an affidavit of merit, and a medical certificate, were presented. Said motion for new trial could well be considered as motion to set aside judgment or one for relief, since it contained allegations purporting to show the presence of good defenses. The ends of justice could have been served more appropriately had the lower court given appellant the chance to present his evidence at least. Furthermore, it appears that payments had been made by appellant to appellee, which were duly received and receipt for. This particular circumstance merits consideration. After all, court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and in this present case, to find out the correct liability of defendant-appellant to appellee. A trial, by which both parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best way to find out such truth. A denial of this chance, would be too technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of legitimate grievances, should not be barred by technicalities (Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962; Santiago, et al. v. Joaquin, L-15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial court resolved the motion for new trial, one day before the date set for its hearing, the defendant-appellant could have presented the documents (receipts of payments), itemized in his brief, to counteract appellant's claim. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and another entered, remanding the case to the court of origin, for the reception of appellant's evidence and for the rendition of the corresponding decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

ANTONIO VS RAMOS2 SCRA 731, 1961

FACTS:On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for recovery of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas Francisco. Only Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring Nicolas and Leonora in default. On the date of trial, neither Francisco not his counsel appeared despite early notice. Hence, evidence was presented by the plaintiffs. On August 23, 1956 a judgment has been redndered in favour of the Antonios. Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on September of 1956, praying that the decision dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside, alleging that their failure to appear during the hearing of the case was due to accident, mistake and excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against(Counsel lost the envelope containing the notice to the trial before he has the opportunity to open the same). This, however, was denied by the court. Francisco appealed to the CA, denied. Appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an excusable mistake and negligence, so as to entitle his client, the appellant herein, to be heard.

RULING:The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of hearing in his calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute the accident, mistake or excusable negligence, contemplated by the Rules of Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part could have guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence. Counsel did not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform his routine job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his calendar. On this point, the learned trial judge commented:Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition thereto, the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not excusable in view of his admission that he received theregistry noticefrom the court on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly registered and thatits envelope shows it came from the courtwhich made the envelope and its contents so important that he should have immediately opened the same and not just put it aside, that he misplaced the same is also indicative of his recklessness (See Gonzales vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb. 29, 1956). Furthermore counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco had all the time from March 24, 1956, until the date of the trial on Aug. 20, 1956 to inquire from the Court records or Clerk of Court about the nature of the registered notice that was sent to him on March 24, 1956, if he really misplaced the same. This is what a diligent counsel should do as required by ordinary prudence. All he had to do was examine the records of this case. This Court noted that since it reconvened June 18, 1956, counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco has been appearing in Court almost every week if not everyday. He had therefore, ample opportunity to verify the nature of the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced upon his receipt thereof on March 24, 1956. Little need be added to these observations of the trial court, except to state that lawyers should always be vigilant and alert, in order to properly safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. Upon the lawyers specially devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency and importance of registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply their trade.

PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ207 SCRA 632 (1992)

FACTS: In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. in Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the poblacion during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9, 1991). While standing at the aforementioned place, a man smelling of liquor, who was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant herein), stood beside him. Subsequently, Merly Caburnay, a neighbor of Soliven, passed by, proceeding towards the direction of Barangay Pogomboa. Appellant, who appeared drunk followed the girl but Soliven did not mind. Instead, he went home.Early the following morning, Soliven, while in his house, heard the cry of Carmelita Caburnay, mother of his neighbor, Merly. When he went out of the house, he learned that Merly was raped and her dead body was found in a nearby ricefield (pp. 5-6, tsn,id.). Prior to Soliven's knowledge of the happening, Mayor Domingo Madrid of Aguilar was already informed of the discovery of the dead body of the victim and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. There, the Mayor was informed that a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just left the place. So, Mayor Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and overtook the man. The man was identified as appellant and he was found with dirty clothes, his maong pants torn and his T-shirt stained with blood. He also bore scratches on his neck and arms. When asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried straws of palay at the back of his pants, appellant only answered that on his was home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the field. Because of his unsatisfactory explanation, the police arrested him on that same morning on suspicion that he was the perpetrator of the crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).Four days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police headquarters for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the early dawn of March 19, 1990 following the victim Merly Caburnay. Standing in front of the prison cell, Soliven pointed to appellant, who was among the four men inside the cell, as the person he saw. The victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the crime only ten years oldwhile the accused was forty-eight years old. In his defense, the accused asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by one Andoy Versoza, his landlord, to cook and prepare food for the latter's visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the said date, he, together with his two aunts, went around the plaza and watched some shows until midnight. Thereafter, he drank a bottle of gin and another bottle of beer until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. They then strolled about the plaza for two hours. Afterwards, they rested for awhile near the highway beside the church and at about 5:00 a.m., they attended mass. When he was advised by his aunts to go home, he decided to walk because he had no more money. Along the way, he was arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He vehemently denied having committed the crime. He likewise claimed that there were no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was arrested.Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness, the trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit. Nor is the non-presentation of the victim's companions of any help to the cause of the accused. In the first place, it was never established that the two companions were with the victim when she was on her way home or when she was raped and killed. It was duly established that, after obtaining permission from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with her cousin and her mother's sister-in-law,and that immediately before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was following persons." Accordingly, her two companions, who were not eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and killing of the victim. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of its own assessment of their necessity. Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered waived.Moreover, the bloodstains on the pants of the accused were testified to by Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta28and Mayor Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of scratches on his neck and arms was not satisfactorily explained by the accused. Taken together with the other circumstances present here, this fact serves to buttress the prosecution's case.

ISSUES: (a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed.31In this case, the place where the accused claims to be32is more or less ten meters away from the scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay Pogomboa).33Furthermore, the place where he was questioned by Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police authorities is twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the victim was found.34Hence, the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene, which is necessary is order that the defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10-year-old; he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which caused her untimely demise. Another life was lost because a beast in man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what he did in prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much better than what he truly deserves.WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y Laoang.

REPUBLIC V DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS: Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the purpose of high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. However, in 1963, she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the parcel of land, was used by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934. On 1963, respondent wrote the Mayor of the municipality regarding her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by petitioner. On 1964, respondent filed a complaint in the CFI for recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal cemetery. However, the petitioner defended its alleged ownership of the subject lot, having bought it from Simeona Ditching in 1934. The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the possession and ownership of the petitioner which dates back to more than 30 years.

RULING: It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which is included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the property comes. The beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.

GARCIA VS MENDOZA203 SCRA 732 (1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who then took possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza, their son.Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of judgment but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does not apply to a cadastral proceeding.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act).

HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral Act, all the provision of the Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.

RUBLICO VS ORELLANO30 SCRA 511 (1969)

FACTS: Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N-2, L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the Court of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and praying that the said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On 20 November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment adjudicating Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respo