G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, Petitioners, vs.ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.

HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors.D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.

The Antecedents

On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:

2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;

4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;

5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;

6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;

7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.3The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:

a. actual damages, as follows:

a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case at P1,500.00 each schedule;

a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;

b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine; and

c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.5 He averred that

(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;

(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;

both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.

In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. 6The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and "the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value."

On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.

After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim.9 Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.

On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention10 making common cause with the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.11During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.12On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:

Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and

Dismissing defendants counterclaim.

SO ORDERED.13Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.14The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.16 Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.17The Ruling of the Court

The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.

The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.

The petition has no merit.

It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.18 The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.

We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.19The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.

When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.20 The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.

Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint.21 The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.22 Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.

We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.23We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:

The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.24It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.25Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.26Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.27WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.DIGEST.

HILARIO vs. SALVADOR

G.R. No. 160384 . April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .

FACTS:Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however, failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.

The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion was denied.

Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the complaint, contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property, and that absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered the refiling of the case in the proper court.

ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action

HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. [] In the case at bar, the complaint does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial

notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court noted that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than Php20,000.00. As the Court of Appeals had held:

The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria [sic] is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question.

For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is Php20,000.00 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo. 24

In an obiter, the Court discussed the nature of an accion publiciana, thus:

The action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. It does

not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of pos session of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding

of possession of the realty. []

The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC, including the RTC decision, are null and void, since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.

Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an

accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is inappropriate. The issue to be resolved by the court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one for accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I submit that what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-ownership by the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an action in ejectment against another co-owner?

Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession of and asset ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership.

The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possession because as co-owner, he also has the right to possess.

[G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005]

CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO, respondents.D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

In this verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Cesar Sampayan seeks the annulment and setting aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43557, to wit:

1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his petition for review and affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Agusan del Sur, Branch VII, which in turn reversed on appeal a favorable judgment of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a forcible entry case thereat commenced against him by herein private respondents, the brother-and-sister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano; and

2. Resolution dated November 7, 2002, which denied his motion for reconsideration.

From the pleadings and memoranda respectively filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following factual antecedents:

On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private respondents), substantially alleged that their mother Cristita Quita was the owner and actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after their mothers death on January 11, 1984, they became co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily absent from the lot in question, defendant Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a house thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite their repeated demands for Sampayan to vacate the lot and surrender the possession thereof to them, the latter failed and refused to do so.

In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession of Lot No. 1959 and that he does not even know plaintiffs identities or their places of residence. He claimed that he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because he asked and was given permission therefor by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. In the same answer, Sampayan alleged that the plaintiffs claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been possessed and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960, and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado, while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both vendees, so Sampayan averred, have actually possessed the respective portions purchased by them up to the present. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

In the ensuing proceedings following the joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to prove that they have been in actual possession of Lot No. 1959 when defendant Sampayan effected his entry thereto, submitted in evidence the following documents:

1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the name of Cristita Quita;

2. Certificate of Death showing the date of death of Cristita Quita on January 11, 1984;

3. Certificate issued by Fermina R. Labonete, Land Management Officer-III of CENRO X-3-E, DENR-X-3-9, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur showing that Lot 1959, PLS-225 is covered by a Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita;

4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to the effect that he was the one who gave the lot in question to Cristita Quita sometime in 1957 and that since then the latter had been occupying the lot;

Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental Position Paper dated July 13, 1994 for the purpose of showing that Cristita Quita is one of the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149. Together with said position paper, they submitted a copy of the Answer/Opposition earlier filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said cadastral case, Cristita Quita was claiming Lot 1959, thus her name appeared in the list of oppositors therein.

5. The decision in the said Cadastral Case No. 149 showing that the then Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the lots subject of the same cadastral case.

For his part, defendant Sampayan, to prove the allegations in his answer, offered in evidence the following:

1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels Tax Declaration 8103;

2. Tax Declaration No. GRB-01-930 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol which cancels Tax Declaration No. A-11698;

3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by Jesus Oriol for and in behalf of the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol, conveying the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 1959 to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida who possessed the one-half (1/2) portion and introduced improvements thereon, such as coconut and caimito trees;

4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of Portion of Land, executed by the spouses Oriol in favor of the same couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida, to further strengthen the transfer of possession and whatever possessory rights the Oriols had in the lot in question;

5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol with the conformity of Teodosio Mosquito (another claimant), to prove that the other half of Lot No. 1959 was sold in 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado whose overseer allowed Sampayan to enter and occupy the premises;

6. Protest filed with the CENRO, Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana Sambale-Occida against the Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita;

7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting to the fact that she is residing in Lot No. 1957, a lot adjacent to the lot in question, since 1960 up to the present. In the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed that neither Cristita Quita, much less the plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. She claimed that it was the Occida couple who possessed said lot and introduced improvements thereon; and

8. Affidavit of Juliana Occida and Maria Ybaez to show the impossibility of plaintiffs possession of the same lot.

Meanwhile, on March 21, 1996, while the case was pending with the MCTC, the presiding judge thereof personally conducted an ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the parties and/or their counsels. Among those found in the area during the inspection are: the house of defendant Sampayan; the dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon; and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of Sampayans witnesses.

Based on his ocular findings, the judge concluded that the improvements he saw in the premises could never have been introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of the same lot. Reproduced by petitioner Jose Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in the Memorandum he subsequently filed with this Court, the MCTC judges findings and observations during the ocular inspection, about which the herein private respondents took no exception whatsoever, are hereunder quoted, as follows:

Noted inside the land are the house of the defendant, Cesar Sampayan, of Peter Siscon, which appears to be dilapidated, and part of the house of Macario Noynay which encroached to the land in question. Planted on the land are five (5) coconut trees, fruit bearing, three (3) not fruit bearing coconut trees, and three (3) star apple or caimito trees. Defendant Sampayan admitted that he started occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted by the parties during the ocular inspection that one-half (1/2) portion of the land was bought by a certain Occida from certain Mr. and Mrs. Felicisimo Oriol.

The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question.Nothing can be seen on the land that plaintiffs had once upon a time been in possession of the land. The allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.Clearly, from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the predecessors-in-interest of the defendant, it is showed that they have been in possession of the land for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the plaintiffs, if any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de possession[1] (Emphasis supplied).

In time, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for lack of merit.

Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Agusan del Sur, which appeal was raffled to Branch VII thereof. In a decision dated December 5, 1996, said court reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of such finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein private respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of Lot No. 1959.

Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43557.As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein assailed Decision dated May 16, 2002,[2] denied Sampayans petition. His motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by that court in its Resolution of November 7, 2002,[3] Sampayan is now with us via the present recourse, it being his submissions -

I.

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF BAYUGAN, AGUSAN DEL SUR, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, CONSIDERING THAT DURING THE HEARING THEREOF IT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE SAID MUNICIPAL COURT THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION, AND NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER ACTION;

II.

THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN PRIOR ACTUAL POSSESSION IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND CONSIDERING THAT THE POSSESSION TO BE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CONSIST (SIC) IN THE EXERCISE OF DOMINIUM OVER IT, SUCH AS FENCING, CULTIVATING OR OTHER UNMISTAKABLE ACTS OF EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL FACTS WHICH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NEVER DONE - IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

In the main, petitioner maintains that based on the pieces of evidence on record, he had sufficiently proven his prior physical possession of the subject lot. Upon this premise, he argues that private respondents complaint for forcible entry has no leg to stand on, adding that the proper remedy available to the latter is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion which falls under the original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

As we see it, the arguments put forward by the petitioner crystallize to one pivotal question: will the complaint for forcible entry in this case prosper? To resolve this, however, we must first determine as to who between the herein parties was in prior actual physical possession of the subject lot at the time the complaint was filed in the MCTC. For, as we have said in Gaza vs. Lim[5],

xxx In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. xxx

We emphasize, absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his complaint.

Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA,[6] we wrote:

[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties' during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are present in this case.

However, before delving into the question of who as between the petitioner and private respondents had prior physical possession of the subject lot, we deem it best to first resolve the issue of whether or not the MCTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case, an issue also raised by the petitioner.

Relying on the conclusion of the MCTC that private respondents proper remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion, and not forcible entry, petitioner would deny the MCTCs jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner is in error.

In Sarmiento vs. CA[7], we held:

[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. x x x

Clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth.[8] The complaint in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.

We shall now address the more decisive question of prior physical possession.

After a careful evaluation of the evidence at hand, we find for the petitioner.

To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.

Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had been residing since 1960 onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither the private respondents nor their mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor, Dionesias statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the MCTC judge himself found during the ocular inspection that a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959.

We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold that the mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution, respectively dated May 16, 2002 and November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

SAMPAYAN vs . COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005 GARCIA , J .

FACTS:On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. In their complaint, Crispulo and Florencia asserted that they were co-owners pro-indiviso of the said lot, their mother Cristita Quita being the ownerand actual possessor thereof. Upon the latters death and while they were absent from the said lot, Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, allegedly built a house on the lot, to their exclusion. After repeated demands, Cesar Sampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said lot. Thus, they filed an action for unlawful detainer.

In his defense, Cesar Sampayan asserted that his occupation of the lot was by tolerance of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs. Terrado, who were then residing in Cebu. The permission was given by the lots overseer, Maria Ybanez. Sampayan further asserted that Crispulo and Valencias action had long prescribed, inasmuch as the said lot had already been owned and possessed by the spouses Oriol since 1960, as evidenced by the latters payment of taxes. The Oriols, in turn, sold half the land to the Terrados. Together, they maintained possession of their respective portions.

Both the plaintiff siblings and defendant Sampayan submitted their respective evidence consisting of affidavits and tax declarations. Meanwhile, the MCTC judge also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, where he found improvements. The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question. The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that it is clear that defendants have been in possession for more than one year and that the appropriate remedy would have been accion publiciana or lenaria de possession. Upon appeal to the RTC, it reversed the decision, relying on the involvement of Cristita Quita, plaintiffs mother, in a cadastral case involving the lot in 1957.

Sampayan then appealed to the CA, which denied the same. Thus this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry would prosper

HELD: YES. In Sarmiento vs. CA, the Court held:

[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or

deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. . . .

It is clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. The complaint in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had prior physical possession

HELD: YES. To begin with, the Court is at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.

x x x

The Court noted that in the assailed decision herein, the Court of Appeals

attached much significance to the fact that private respondents mother, Cristita Quita, was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. The Court ruled and held that the mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.

G.R. No. 137013 May 6, 2005RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs.SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution2 dated December 11, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.

In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.

Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued.

In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.

On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subject properties and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.

Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent months thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorney's fees of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."3On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.4 The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents' occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court action.

Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus:

"In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondent's bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners' possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners' possession is not decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petitioners' possession from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been 'occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.' Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners' possession of the premises. x x x.

Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED."5Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1998.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:

"I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.

II

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE."

The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.

Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents' occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper.

Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.

We sustain the petition.

It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.6 This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.7 All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.8 The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.9Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, reads:

"Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs."

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.10Petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:

"4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property;

5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants to vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no settlement was had. Thereafter, a 'Certification To File Action' dated March 27, 1996 was issued x x x;

x x x."11 (underscoring ours)

Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.12 Here, there is an allegation in petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.

It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals13 is applicable in this case: "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

SANTOS v s . AYON

G.R. No. 137013, Ma y 6, 2005, SANDOVAL -GUTIERREZ, J .

FACTS: In 1996, the petitioner, Santos, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against the respondents, spouses Ayon. In his complaint, he averred that a building used by the respondents as a warehouse, encroached on a portion of his land. As early as 1985, he had allegedly already informed respondents that the said building occupies a portion of his land, but allowed them to continue using the building. In 1996, needing the entire portion of his lot, he demanded that respondents remove the part of the building encroaching

on his property, but respondents refused and continued to occupy the contested portion.

The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the respondents to vacate and surrender possession of the property. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment, and upheld the finding that respondents occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. On petition for review however, the CA held that petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC and not anaction for unlawful detainer, and thus dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the MTCC properly exercised jurisdiction over the complaint.

HELD: YES. All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.

The Court found no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in petitioners complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance.

Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996.

It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 391 SCRA 351 is applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

G.R. No. 150755 June 28, 2005RENE GANILA,* EDUARDO DUMADA-OG, SR., RAFAEL GANILA, JOSE PASTRANA, LOURDES GANILA, FLORENTINO GANILA, SERAFIN GANILA, LORETO ARELLANO, CONRADO GANILA, VIVENCIO ALVIOR, EDUARDO GANTALA, AMPARO VILLANUEVA, ELEUTERIO SILVA, ADELINA GANILA, FELIZARDO GANILA, SR., ENRIQUE GANILA, ABRAHAM TANONG, EMILIO ALFARAS, JR., BAPTIST CHRISTIAN LEARNING CENTER, petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VIOLETA C. HERRERA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:For review on certiorari are the D E C I S I O N1 dated March 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58191, and its Resolution2 dated October 18, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision denied the petition to set aside the Resolution3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, Branch 65, affirming the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for the 19 petitioners to vacate the contested parcel of land.

The facts are as follows:

On March 19, 1997, private respondent Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment Complaints4 before the 16th MCTC, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Jordan, Guimaras. Private respondent alleged that she owns Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square meters; that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1996, private respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove their houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by way of assistance to them. After the barangay conciliation failed, private respondent filed the complaints.In their Answers,5 eight6 of the petitioners claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline which they developed when they constructed their respective houses. Another eight7 maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three8 asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area.

At the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to designate two geodetic engineers as commissioners of the MCTC to conduct a relocation survey of Lot 1227 and to identify who among the petitioners have houses within the lot.9The commissioners reported that: (1) the house of Henry Gabasa, defendant in Civil Case No. 288-J, is almost outside Lot 1227; (2) the house of Ludovico Amatorio, defendant in Civil Case No. 289-J, diagonally traversed the boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19 petitioners are inside Lot 1227.10Eight months after herein petitioners failure to comment on the manifestation of private respondent to terminate the preliminary conference, the MCTC terminated the preliminary conference.11 Thereafter, petitioners counsel Atty. Nelia Jesusa L. Gonzales failed to file her clients position papers and affidavits, even after they sought a 30-day extension to file the same.12Consequently, the MCTC decided the cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff whereby each of the twenty-one (21) defendants are hereby ordered:

1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras;

2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) per month from October, 1996 as compensation for the use of the property until the same is vacated; and

3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.13Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at Jordan, Guimaras, which decided as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0270-J, 0272-J, 0273-J, 0274-J, 0275-J, 0276-J, 0277-J, 0278-J, 0279-J, 0280-J, 0281-J, 0282-J, 0283-J, 0284-J, 0285-J, 0286-J, 0287-J, 0291-J and 0292-J are hereby affirmed.

The decision of the court below in Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are set aside. Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.14The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent to possess Lot 1227. Private respondents position paper, affidavit and tax declaration supported her allegations. In addition, the commissioners report and sketch plan showed that indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other hand, according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to present evidence which would show that they are entitled to possess the lot.

Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed the cases against Gabasa and Amatorio since their houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio believed in good faith that the whole area they occupied was part of the seashore.

The 19 petitioners, who were ordered to vacate the lot, filed a joint petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and filed an amended petition. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the factual findings and conclusions arrived at by the trial courts and denied the amended petition for lack of merit.15 It also denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners are now before us, on a petition for review, alleging that:

The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect and deference, committed a reversible error in the interpretation/application of the law in the instant case and in the appreciation of the facts and evidence presented. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it denied and dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners.16After considering the parties submissions, we find three basic issues: (1) Did the MCTC err in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the MCTCs judgment? (3) Did the CA err in denying the petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected?

Petitioners insist that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment, for two reasons. One, they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners. And two, there was no withholding of possession since private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.

Private respondent states in her Comment before us that the allegations in her Complaints make out a clear case of unlawful detainer which is cognizable by the MCTC. We are in agreement with her stance. There was no error in the choice of the complainants remedy, a matter left to her determination as the suitor. And the complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the allegations of the defendants.

At the outset, we note that petitioners question the MCTCs jurisdiction yet they admit in their preliminary statement that the Complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer, and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure), much less ownership.17While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.18 Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.

If only to stress the fundamental principles related to present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in municipal trial courts.19 And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint.20In this case for ejectment, private respondents allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis.

Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure with the RTC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our jurisprudence.

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.21It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now the private respondent, what her initial recourse should be. Her choice of an action for ejectment against so-called squatters is well within her rights.

Petitioners cite the case of Bayubay v. Court of Appeals,22 and argue that the MCTCs decision was without jurisdictional or legal basis because the MCTC did not issue a preliminary conference order. They assert that the 10-day period to file position papers and affidavits only starts after the parties had received a preliminary conference order. They insist they were denied due process when the MCTC decided the cases based merely on private respondents Complaints and affidavit, without considering their Answers.

For her part, private respondent maintains that there was substantial compliance with the rules in the MCTCs conduct of the preliminary conference, hence there was no violation of due process nor disregard of its proper jurisdiction.

Petitioners present contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC. Raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel.23 They should have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC. In our view, this issue is a mere afterthought, when the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the petitioners for the first time on appeal.24Besides, petitioners did not question initially the MCTCs Order dated February 19, 1999, when they moved for an extension of time to file their position papers and affidavits. They wanted another 30 days on top of the 30 days set by the MCTC, which strictly should have been 10 days only. In this regard, petitioners could not claim that they were denied sufficient time to file their position papers and affidavits before the trial court. Further, they cannot validly invoke our ruling25 in Bayubay, for in that case there was no order at all terminating the preliminary conference and requiring the parties to submit position papers and affidavits.

We note with dismay petitioners insistence that we order the MCTC "to conduct the requisite preliminary conference." The summary character of ejectment suits will be disregarded if we allow petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings, designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases.26Lastly, petitioners aver that private respondent failed to prove her allegation of ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a tax declaration which is not an evidence of ownership. They also claim that their possession of the lot was not and could not be by mere tolerance. However, this is a factual matter best left to the trial courts.

What we have now is sufficient evidence showing that private respondent has a better right to possess Lot 1227. The commissioners report and sketch plan show that the 19 petitioners occupy the lot, which corroborate private respondents allegation and disprove petitioners defense that Lot 1227 is a shoreline; or that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. While not a conclusive evidence of ownership, private respondents tax declaration constitutes proof that she has a claim of title over the lot. It has been held that:

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.27The lower courts did not err in adjudicating the issue of possession. Mere absence of title over the lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. Plainly stated, the trial court has validly exercised its jurisdiction over the ejectment cases below. The policy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what she claims is hers. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his or her own hands.28 For their part, herein petitioners could not be barred from defending themselves before the court adequately, as a matter of law and right.

However, petitioners in their defense should show that they are entitled to possess Lot 1227. If they had any evidence to prove their defenses, they should have presented it to the MCTC with their position papers and affidavits. But they ignored the courts order and missed the given opportunity to have their defenses heard, the very essence of due process.29 Their allegations were not only unsubstantiated but were also disproved by the plaintiffs evidence.

In sum, we find no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.30 His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.31WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 and its Resolution dated October 18, 2001 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

GANILA vs . COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150755, 06/28/2005 QUISUMBING, J .

FACTS:Private respondent, Violeta Herrera, filed 21 ejectment complaints in the MCTC, which ordered the 21 defendants, now petitioners, to vacate the property in question (Lot 1227). The RTC sustained the decision as to 19 defendants but dismissed the case against 2. The 19 defendants who were ordered to vacate Lot 1227 filed a petition for review with the CA based on two arguments, namely: first, that they possessed lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners, and second, that there was no withholding of possession since private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.

I S S U E S / H E L D:

Whether prior physical possession by the plaintiff is necessary for a complaint for unlawful detainer to prosper

NO. While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual and prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in a forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the palintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession, here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.

Whether private respondent properly filed complaints for unlawful detainer

YES. If only to stress the fundamental principles related to the present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in Municipal Trial Courts. And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In the case for ejectment, private respondents allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227, (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand

of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis.

Whether private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, as argued by petitioners on appeal

NO. Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure with the TC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our jurisprudence. Petitioners present contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC. Raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel. They should have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC. In our view, this issue is a mere afterthought, when the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the petitioners for the first time on appeal.

The Court noted with dismay petitioners insistence that it must order the MCTC to conduct the requisite preliminary conference. The summary character of ejectment suits will be disregarded if the Court would allow petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings, designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases.

In sum, the Court found no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand

to vacate.

G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915

FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.

TRENT, J.:The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.

This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.

The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the Government. The sections of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the question whether the remedy by injunction is exceptional.

Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history of the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as distinguished from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government does, by section 139 and 140, take away the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it, the same ordinary remedial actions which prevail between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount law which prohibits such a course. While, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that the two sections are unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property without due process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them by Acts Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question because the section, in speaking of a "tax," means only legal taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. There is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109 U.S., 189.) And, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further showing that there are special circumstances which bring the case under some well recognized head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law in the United States, even in the absence of statutory enactments such as sections 139 and 140. (Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547; Indiana Mfg. Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. vs. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of t