26 August 2008 FIN/SEC/27.246-C

FINABEL COORDINATING

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DISPATCH NOTE

SUJECT

Promulgation of report Finabel Nr C.36.R

TITLE

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION OF THEATRE

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY

MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE

REFERENCE

FIN/SEC/27.233-C dated 26 May 2008

SENT FOR

Diffusion and exploitation.

OBSERVATIONS

These documents will only be put online on the Internet site of

the Finabel community : www.finabel.eu

(Original signed)

PH.KELLEN Commandant

Field officier attached Permanent Secretariat

Finabel

Promulgation of report Finabel Nr C.36.R

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION OF THEATRE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY

MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE

DATE OF PROMULGATION : 26 AUGUST 2008

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Table of content

0. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DATA STUDY C.36.R 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and purpose 1.2. Field of application

1.2.1. Scope 1.2.2. Limitations of the study

1.3. Study Definition

1.3.1. Conceptual study 1.3.2. Formulation of the problem 1.3.3. Lexicon

2. GENERAL CONCEPTS

2.1. Responsibilities in the area of logistics 2.2. Cooperation through the various phases of operations 2.3. Visibility and transparency 2.4. Multinational structure of NSEs 2.5. Relations among elements involved in a multinational operation

3. LOGISTIC PRINCIPLES 4. LOGISTIC PHASES

4.1. Planning

4.1.1. General 4.1.2. Availability of logistic resources in regard of the phase of the operation 4.1.3. Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC) 4.1.4. Possible contribution to a Finabel Affiliation 4.1.5. Lessons learned (LL) by Finabel countries out of their participation in

Multinational logistic units 4.1.6. Alternative ways to provide log support in a mission other than Troops 4.1.7. Logistic structure and composition of the task force

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4.2. Deployment 4.3. Operation/Sustainment 4.4. Redeployment

5. LOGISTIC FUNCTIONAL AREAS

5.1. Supply

5.1.1. Harmonisation of the term "Days of Supply" 5.1.2. Interoperability of logistic resources

5.2. Maintenance 5.3. Movement & Transportation (M&T) 5.4. Infrastructure Engineering for Logistics (IEL) 5.5. Medical Support 5.6. Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) 5.7. Host Nation Support / In-country Resources (HNS/ICR) 5.8. Logistic Services

5.8.1. Reimbursement Issues 5.8.2. Handling Refugees/Captured Personnel/Equipment

5.9. Logistic Information Management (LIM) 5.10. Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM)

6. LOGISTIC RELATED AREAS

6.1. Standardisation

6.1.1. Logistic assets which Finabel nations seek to achieve agreed standardization and acceptance

6.1.2. Training level for logistics units to be assigned to the multinational force 6.1.3. Harmonisation of national/ international regulations into ONE theatre 6.1.4. Additional standardisation beyond the use of NATO stock number

6.2. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 6.3. Environmental Protection (EP)

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Annex A : ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DATA STUDY C.36.R

1. References :

FIN/SEC/27.075-EMP

2. Other references :

- MC 319/2 - ALP 4.2 - AJP 4 Series - MC 0526 Logistics Support Concept for NATO

Response Force Operations - EU Battlegroups Logistic Concept dated

13 Jun 05 - EU Battlegroup Concept (13618/06 dated

5 Oct 06 - FINABEL C.33.R, C.34.R, C.35.R

3. Promulgation : 26 August 2008

4. Revision :

5. Number of pages : 30

6. Classification :

UNCLASSIFIED 7. Title :

“ PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION OF THEATRE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE ”

8. Originator :

GREECE

9. Address :

HAGS 4th STAFF OFFICE STG-1020 ATHENS - GREECE

10. Key words :

Theatre Logistic Support, Logistic Functions, Logistic Capabilities, Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell, C2 Arrangements, Logistic Principles, Visibility and Transparency, Movement & Transportation, Standardisation, CIMIC, Host Nation Support.

11. Summary :

The study defines the basic principles of organisation of Theatre Logistic Support for an expeditionary multinational task force. It covers all phases and logistic functions and emphasizes the C2 authority, visibility and capabilities are given to the Multinational Commander to execute his responsibilities for logistics efficiently and exercise his authority effectively. The coordination of support of a multinational force could be ensured by assigning an appropriate Logistics Staff under the Multinational Commander to conduct the detailed planning and execution of the JOA level plans and policies. Cooperation, coordination and synergy are fundamental to effective logistic support both among individual nations and within coalition frameworks and appropriate procedures must be in place to deliver operational effect.

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12. Conclusions and recommendations

- The Multinational Commander in an operation led by Finabel nations must be able to execute his responsibilities for logistics efficiently and exercise his authority effectively.

- Nations must provide the Multinational Commander with the logistic C2 authority, visibility and capabilities he requires to execute his mission throughout all phases of an operation. It will include coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of logistics.

- Visibility & Transparency for all committed assets between the Home Base and the Final Destination, regardless of the holder of the asset, is vital for the effective employment of logistic resources. Timely and accurate exchange of information between nations and the Commander of a MN operation will enhance the redirection of logistic assets in accordance with agreements between NSEs and the Multinational Commander.

- Logistics planning is an integral part of the Operational Planning Process. The relevant NATO AJP, ALP, MC documents should be taken into consideration, as well as the new “Logistics concept for NRF operations” and solutions applied for EU BG. There is a need for a collaborative (and dynamic) planning capability involving all staff branches within a Headquarters.

- The Logistic organisation must be flexible enough to be able to execute the results of the planning process and to adapt to the changes in the actual operational environment. Given the increasing need to conduct simultaneous cross-spectrum operations across the battlespace, logistic force elements need to be able to transition quickly and easily between both phases of an operation and types of operational activity.

- A Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC) could be formed to facilitate and coordinate, at the operational level, various support options and execute the theatre level plans and policies of the CJ4 staff. Provision of this coordination capability would assist the Multinational Commander to discharge his collective responsibilities for logistics between the participating nations, component commands, HN and associated non-military organisations that may be involved in any combined and/or Joint operation.

- Cooperation, coordination and synergy are fundamental to effective logistic support both among individual nations and within coalition frameworks and appropriate procedures must be in place to deliver operational effect.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and purpose

The aim of this study is to define the principles of Theatre Logistic Support for an expeditionary multinational task force. This study is coherent with allied documents and terminology and considers the integration of logistic resources, both in the theatre of operations and outside.

1.2. Field of application

1.2.1. Scope

All phases and logistic functions of Theatre Logistic Support for an expeditionary multinational task force are covered.

1.2.2. Limitations of the study

- There are no geographic limitations. - The study will focus on each separate phase of an operation in turn. - Only logistic support for Land forces is considered. - Logistic force regeneration is an exclusively national responsibility and is

therefore not a part of this study.

1.3. Study Definition

1.3.1. Conceptual study

On the organisation of logistic support to a multinational expeditionary task force dealing with any type of operation carried out by Finabel nations under a mandate from an international organisation.

1.3.2. Formulation of the problem

Geopolitical developments and the current international situation, including recent crises, clearly show the requirement to revise the basic principles of Theatre Logistic Support to reflect changing realities. This work can be improved by incorporating other aspects of logistic integration such as :

- Harmonization of procedures - Pooling of logistic resources - Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILU)

1.3.3. Lexicon

See ANNEX A

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2. GENERAL CONCEPTS

2.1. Responsibilities in the area of logistics

A possible division of responsibilities in the area of logistics among the Finabel members has been analysed in study C.33.R. A brief summary of that study is :

“ This study analyses national logistic capabilities and potential areas of further enhancements in multinational logistic approaches. Based on NATO and EU agreements, potential further developments and limitations of multinational logistics are assessed. NATO and EU multinational logistic documents are assessed as a solid basis on which Finabel countries should build further progress. Areas of real and potential enhancements, the potential for some nations to specialise in specific logistic domains, visionary proposals for more multinational solutions and a proposed listing of existing and planned national logistic capabilities increase the options of Finabel nations to solve multinational logistic challenges more effectively and economically ”.

The coordination of support to a multinational force could be ensured by assigning an appropriate Logistics Staff under the Multinational Commander to conduct the detailed planning and execution of the JOA level plans and policies. The establishment of a Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC) as referred in the study C.35.R :

- “ Is likely to have potential utility across the full spectrum of conflict. The

decision to employ an MLCC type organisation should always be based upon the logistic operational requirements resulting from the operational planning process. The need or otherwise for a MLCC should not be an automatic assumption taken simply on the basis of a particular type of operation. In some instances where a particular component is dominant, that component could be tasked with cross-component coordination responsibilities ”.

- “ It could also facilitate and coordinate, at the operational level, various support options and execute the theatre level plans and policies of the CJ4 staff. Provision of this coordination capability assists the coalition commander who discharges his collective responsibilities for logistics between the participating nations, component commands, HN and associated non-military organisations that may be involved in any combined and/or Joint operation. If established, it would also be responsible for routinely tasking : logistic units; LNs, HNS and RSNs; and contracted logistic support assigned by nations for the benefit of the overall force ”.

Additionally it may:

- Assist the Multinational Commander in co-ordinating logistic support within the

force, including the creation and control of multinational integrated logistics and commonly funded resources.

- Co-ordinate the implementation of HNS agreements.

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- Where appropriate, and as authorised by TCNs, co-ordinate and arrange the

provision of common supplies and services. - Co-ordinate and administratively support national, NGO and HN liaison staffs

within the MLCC according to specific arrangements.

The concept of a Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) is currently described in MC 0526 (Logistics support concept for NATO response force operations). The JLSG will be task orientated to match the mission with functional logistics staff elements under one commander. A strong relationship between the JLSG and the deployed Coalition Component Commands is essential for effective theatre support. The JLSG will assign liaison officers responsible for integrating the service contributions to the joint mission. These officers will report to the Multinational Chain of Command. The core of the JLSG will be the focus for the peacetime training, certification of CJSOR units and attached elements and contribute to the planning of theatre-level logistics functions.

2.2. Cooperation through the various phases of operations

Much will depend on the C2 arrangements put in place and the command relationships allowed by the TOA. Nations should provide the Multinational Commander with the logistic C2 authority, visibility and capabilities that he requires to execute his responsibilities throughout all phases of an operation. This will include coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of logistics. Nations will retain control of their resources, until such time as they are released, under TOA arrangements, to the Multinational Commander. Cooperation evolves through liaison between : the Multinational Commander, the contributing nations, and the Host Nation(s). A report on the desirable cooperation is contained in Paragraph 3.1.6 of the study C35R :

“ Cooperation, coordination and synergy are fundamental to effective logistic support both among individual nations and within coalition frameworks and appropriate procedures must be in place to deliver operational effect. Cooperation at all levels helps ensure economy of effort, increased reserve capacity/capability and improved overall quality of support - but cooperation must be co-ordinated to be effective. The effectiveness of the relationship between multinational headquarters and individual Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), and their respective force elements, is key, requiring a near ‘real-time’ coordination capability. From a logistics perspective the C2 relationship between the NSEs and the MN Logistic Command structure is key. Recognising that C2 arrangements will vary between operations, the consensus of Finabel WG CHARLIE is that this C2 relationship must at least confer the authority to coordinate logistic activity within the AOO ”.

The main activities and general characteristics of the Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) process are described in detail in study C34R (Paragraphs 2and 3).

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2.3. Visibility and Transparency

Visibility and Transparency (V&T) is particularly important to the achievement of “ unity of effort ” on MN operations. A Multinational Commander and his staff must enjoy Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) (shared across both command and functional boundaries) in order to ensure the planning and execution of logistic activity is fully matched to the operational requirement and the priorities of the operational commander. Importantly, SSA (through visibility and transparency) enables shared situational understanding. V&T for all assets from the Home Base to the Final Destination, regardless the holder of the asset, is vital for the effective employment of logistics resources. Timely and accurate exchange of information between nations and the Commander of a MN operation will enhance the redirection of logistic assets in accordance with agreements between NSEs and the Multinational Commander. However, the NSEs’ obligations towards the commander will depend on national command considerations and will therefore be decided on a case by case basis.

2.4. Multinational structure of NSEs

Grouping NSEs into a multinational structure is an issue of interest to the Finabel members. However, nations still wish to maintain NSEs under national control and provide national support from the home base with the deployed force elements. The activity of NSEs should be coordinated (and as a minimum deconflicted) in order to : deliver economies of scale and unity of effort; provide real estate management; enable collective force protection activities; optimise logistic footprint and ensure appropriate utilisation of shared assets and facilities in support of the operational commanders priorities. The concept of “Joint Logistics Support Group” (JLSG) has been drafted on NATO MC 0526 where NSEs in the form of monitoring LOGCON are subordinated to a joint commander.

2.5. Relations among elements involved in a multinational operation

During operations various organisations may operate in the same geographical area as the Finabel Coalition forces. It is therefore essential that the logistic staffs establish the appropriate coordination through the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff with all elements operating in the area. An important requirement is to limit the negative effects of competition for civil resources and, of course, to avoid any adverse impact on local populations, economies, environment and infrastructure. Detailed procedures and division of responsibilities should be the subject of negotiations during the force generation process and into the early stages of the planning process. The requirement to enhance existing capabilities at all levels to meet future HNS requirements and arrangements is among the new NATO Ministerial Guidance 2006 logistics objectives, for Multinational logistics support and legal arrangements.

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3. LOGISTIC PRINCIPLES

The Multinational Commander in an operation led by Finabel nations must be able to execute his responsibilities for logistics efficiently and exercise his authority effectively. The following Logistic principles have been agreed by Finabel members and are listed in NATO MC 319/2 (NATO PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR LOGISTICS) :

- Collective responsibility - Authority - Primacy of Operational Requirements - Cooperation - Coordination - Assured provision - Sufficiency - Efficiency - Flexibility - Visibility and transparency

In addition, we may include the term “ Simplicity ” with the definition provided in AJP-4(B)1 :

- Simplicity: Simple plans and orders and uncomplicated mission-oriented logistic

organisations minimise confusion and help ensure the support provided meets the operational commander’s requirements. Simple reporting mechanisms ensure the accurate and efficient dissemination of information to all those who require it.

4. LOGISTIC PHASES

4.1. Planning

4.1.1. General

Logistics planning is an integral part of the Operational Planning Process. The relevant NATO AJP, ALP, MC documents should be taken into consideration, as well as the new “ Logistics concept for NRF operations ” and solutions applied for European Union Battle Group (EU BG). There is a need for a collaborative (and dynamic) planning capability involving all staff branches within a Headquarters – fundamentally the Multinational Commander can only plan for the operation he can sustain. The complexity of MN Ops and the desire to optimize the Logistic footprint makes planning even more demanding.

1 Second Study Draft

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The logistic plan will be driven by consideration of :

- Demand (what force elements and level of operational activity have to be sustained);

- Distance (how long is the Line of Communication); - Destination (environmental considerations – eg. desert, national

infrastructure etc) and duration (for how long do force elements require sustainment).

The complexity associated with MN operations is an added dimension and may best be resolved through the identification of a Lead Logistic Nation. Reliance on ad-hoc solutions is unlikely to deliver the effectiveness and efficiency sought by nations. When applicable, the existing solutions in EU, NATO or bi/multinational arrangements should be followed.

4.1.2. Availability of logistic resources in regard of the phase of the operation

The type and quantity of logistic resources required are determined by the operation being conducted and the particular phase of that operation. The Logistic organisation must be flexible enough to respond to the conclusions of the planning process and to adapt to the changes in the actual operational environment. Given the increasing need to conduct simultaneous cross-spectrum operations across the battlespace, logistic force elements need to be able to transition quickly and easily between phases of an operation and types of operational activity – that is whilst some force elements are still engaged in warfighting, others may be conducting PSO/Stabilisation operations whilst others may be engaged in Humanitarian Relief activity. In an “ expeditionary operation ”, the force commander’s logistic centre of gravity might be the LOC. This is because the log Organization within the theatre could be limited and all functional areas therefore depend on the LOC and the availability of transportation means.

4.1.3. Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC)

Finabel Nations believe that there is no requirement for establishing a permanent Finabel MLCC as there is no standing force structure to support. Nevertheless, nations should develop appropriate concepts and procedures for operating a MLCC and conduct relevant training and exercises.

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4.1.4. Possible contribution to a Finabel Affiliation

Most Finabel Nations can participate in operations across the full spectrum of operations but commitment to any particular operation is, of course, entirely a political decision. Possible involvement and the size/nature of the contribution will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

4.1.5. Lessons learned (LL) by Finabel countries out of their participation in

Multinational logistic units :

LL are collected at various levels in the different land forces of Finabel nations and injected in the organisation. As a general LL, we may say that MN Log and the optimisation of the Log footprint is a difficult and slow process due to the nature of the threat, the wide variety of the operational environment, chances in partners and other. In addition LL in Bosnia within the Multinational Division South (MND-S), (for example), highlighted that multinational logistic integration is possible in certain areas such as transportation, re-supply (class I and III), recovery and evacuation. Moreover, it has been proved the need of having a robust Combat Service Support organization in abroad operations, due to lack of local resources, distance from homeland, worst condition of means/equipment employment. That requires an increase of maintenance teams, spare parts and frequency of replacement of means/equipment. The existence of complete and detailed agreements among nations participating in multinational formations would facilitate the cooperation among them. Multinational operations carried out in the past have often had the “ national logistic responsibility ” label and even though bi/multilateral logistic agreements have been established, no real multinational logistics units have been employed. Most Finabel countries have formal mechanisms for capturing LL from exercises and operations and this is used to inform future Force Development – there are of course multitudes of LL held within the database. Similarly, when participating in MN operations, they contribute to the coalition/alliance LL process.

4.1.6. Alternative ways to provide log support in a mission other than Troops

There are different possibilities to support an Ops without contributing troops :

- Financing ; - Intelligence ; - Strategic lift ; - Transport lift ; - Equipment/Medical equipement ;

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- Provide training of allied/coalition troops in Training Centers ; - Network of contacts ; - Reachback ; - HNS ; - Contractors ; - Satellite and log distance communication links ; - Use of national infrastructures, airspace, waters ; - Diplomatic support ;

The contribution to an operation with means other than forces seems to be more appropriate at a high level, with strategic and operational capabilities. At tactical level, the contribution will always imply the presence of troops even for not combat units.

4.1.7. Logistic structure and composition of the task force

The logistic structure and composition of the logistic task force will always be dependent on the requirements of the mission and the availability of time and resources. An extant analysis of structural options is provided in study C35R. Relevant information is also provided in ALP-4.2 (Land Forces Logistic Doctrine) Relevant factors that influence or change the logistic organization might be :

- The size of the supported force ; - The kind/area of the operation ; - Its scale and intensity ; - The number of contributing nations and level of their involvement (LN,

RSN) ; - Political implications.

4.2. Deployment

The deployment phase of an operation is a wide-ranging activity covering more than just logistic matters. Generally, it includes strategic transportation, the RSOM procedure up to the Forward Deployment Area and the transfer of command from the nation owning the force to the commander of the multinational force. The strategic deployment phase and support concepts have been thoroughly analysed in study C.34.R (Paragraph 5). A comprehensive description of the organization of this phase is also covered by relevant NATO publications such as AJP-4.4(B) 2nd SD and AJP-3.13 (NATO’s strategic deployment and reception, staging, onward movement and integration) and can be applicable for planning Finabel operations.

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4.3. Operation/Sustainment

The sustainment process needs to be reflected in the C2 arrangements put in place to support the operation. Whilst logistics remains a national responsibility, combined approaches should be exploited (especially at force level/3rd line) enabling mutual cross-servicing between nations. Shared Situational Awareness will be key to enabling mutual support between contributing nations. Close co-ordination (enhanced through the Multinational Logistic Information Management System (LIMS)) between national support elements and the MN logistic Staff in order to meet sustainment requests is also vital. The support relationships are described in study C.35.R (paragraph 4.2.4) as follows :

“ Support relationships can exist between nations without the need to establish command relationships between them. This is especially the case at the theatre or operational level where various NSEs might establish working arrangements that do not necessitate formal regrouping of assets. Logistic elements could be assigned support missions that ensure the support is provided without changes to the command authority over them. Within this context of ‘supporting’ and “ supported ” relationships, the support missions, as generally understood on existing coalition operations ”.

4.4. Redeployment

In general, the redeployment of a multinational task force from the theatre is a national responsibility. Nevertheless it depends on the agreed time of the transfer of the command and control responsibility from the commander of the multinational force to the nations. Multinational cooperation and co-ordination among contributing nations and the commander of MN force is key to this phase. The type of forces (light, medium, heavy), environment, availability of transport infrastructure (e.g., port, airport, roads, railways) may influence this phase. Sometimes, for small size forces, a multinational task could be assigned to a Lead Nation or Role Specialist Nation. In general, management of transportation assets is a national responsibility, while movement control of those assets, in the context of this study, is a multinational responsibility. Redeployment of multinational task force can be separated in three different phases, with different responsibilities :

- From foxhole to Staging Areas (SA): responsibility remains in the Operational

Commander. - From SA to POEs: although is a national responsibility, the Op Cdr needs some

kind of authority: minimum is Coordination Authority. - From POEs to FD: national responsibility coordinated, if needed, by Strategic

Command.

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5. LOGISTIC FUNCTIONAL AREAS

5.1. Supply

5.1.1. Harmonisation of the term " Days of Supply "

For planning purposes it would be useful to harmonize the content of “ Days of Supply ” (DOS). Unfortunately, different national perspectives make such harmonization unlikely. There are some NATO initiatives within Logistic Functional Area Services (LOAFS) (ACE Resources Optimisation Software System (ACROSS) and Sustainment Planning Module II (SPM II) that may offer a way forward. In UK, DOS is used for planning purposes within the NATO framework although for detailed planning at the national level the new metric Daily Consumption Rate (DCR) has been developed. This reflects varying levels of operational activity needed to achieve strategic effect; the four levels being: Warfighting, Other Combat Rate, In-Theatre Training and Steady State. These levels are then mapped over time.

5.1.2. Interoperability of logistic resources

A number of approaches may facilitate interoperability of logistic resources, both in the theatre of operations and outside. Depending on the level of interoperability sought (ranging from the ability to “ deconflict ”, through the ability to “ interoperate ”, to “ integration ” of capability) the following approaches may be considered:

- Standardization of procedures and materiel ; - Common logistic support concepts ; - Common training and cooperation ; - Preferring MN Units above purely national ones ; - Application of the agreed NATO Standards ; - Visibility and transparency of each nation’ capabilities and resources ; - Clear agreements for mutual support ; - Widely assumed criteria to determine the cost of goods and services to

make easy reimbursement procedures ; - Common approaches to Command and Control.

5.2. Maintenance

Generally, the maintenance of national equipment in-theatre is a national responsibility. Most Finabel members express their will for interoperable solutions depending on the appropriate planning/bilateral-multilateral agreements (part of the Ops plan) prior to the beginning of the operation.

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There is considerable scope to enable combined solutions for the recovery and evacuation of equipment within the theatre of operation and, subject to established and understood command relationships, this should be developed in a force equipment recovery and evacuation plan by CJ4 staff.

5.3. Movement & Transportation (M&T)

A M&T Cell formed as a part of a “ Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell ” (similar to the NATO concept) should be established to coordinate the movement and transportation of forces and supplies to/from/in theatre. Similarly, for Intertheater Lift through the MN Strat Lift Coordination Centers and for Intratheater Lift through the MN Command. This coordination must take place early in the planning process, and certainly before force elements begin to arrive in theatre. Coordination may also be enhanced by a planning and simulating system (like NATO ADAMS (Allied Deployment and Movement Systems)) and through good relations with HN authorities and coordination in the area of HNS (where applicable). Once deployment is complete and the sustainment operation begins then the MFHQ needs to designate a coordinating authority (with appropriate command authority) to oversee the C2 of theatre entry points and the movement of men and materiel within the theatre itself. As a minimum there should be deconfliction but this could be extended to coordination or full C2. The levels of command authority will be key (unity of effort vs unity of command) – LOGCON as a minimum and perhaps even OPCON if acceptable to nations within the terms of TOA. For the time being the transport of supplies and stocks is a national matter and the responsibility goes exclusively to each nation participating in an operation with forces. Recent MN operations have seen more and more MN transport assets under MN Command, mainly for Intra-theatre but also for inter-theatre lift. This option allows optimisation of resources and enhances the MN Log Commander authority. The use of asset visibility and the implementation of the principles of visibility and transparency are of great importance for the co-ordination of logistic supplies, stocks and equipment. Study C.35.R presented a possible Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (or other logistic coordination option) with the appropriate M&T Cell and Supply & Services Cell which might be responsible for coordinating logistic support between participating nations, component commands, host nations, NGOs, etc at the operational level.

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5.4. Infrastructure Engineering for Logistics (IEL)

Notwithstanding that logistics remains a national responsibility, it should be possible for the logistic staff (during the operational planning) to identify the force requirement for theatre wide logistic infrastructure – taking account of Demand, Distance, Destination and Duration – and of course taking account of existing in-theatre infrastructure and legislative and environmental requirements. Finabel nations should evaluate their capability to operate in an environment with no or low HNS and no ICR. They should also seek to identify common basic infrastructure standards for Finabel operations. The standard quality of infrastructure must at least satisfy the TWR requirement. The achievement of a standard intra-theatre requirement level and the accomplishment of the Multinational Commander’s priorities in this area could be ensured, if possible, by assigning the overall responsibility to a single nation as RSN/LN or to a single provider under a MN contract.

5.5. Medical Support

A medical support approach is provided in NATO manuals such as: MC 326/2 “ NATO Principles And Policies For Operational Medical Support ” and AJP-4.10 “ Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine ”. Coordination of medical support should be an integral part of the planning process with overall responsibility for force medical support being vested in the MLCC Med Cell in the HQ. Collaborative arrangements might be agreed between nations – either multilaterally or bilaterally – although legal and clinical issues can complicate such arrangements due to different national medical standards. Nations may be prepared to accept medical support from other nations providing the standard of products and care meets the national (legal and medical) standards and requirements of the “ client ” nation. Multinational cooperation may also lead to economy in this sector. Good progress has been achieved lately in the medical support area by setting up Multinational Medical Units. It is possible if two or more nations agree to provide medical support under the OPCON of the Multinational Commander. For example Greece (EL) as a Lead Nation has deployed in Afghanistan (KABUL) the Hospital Force Army-2/299 Field Hospital with personnel from FYROM, Croatia and Albania. Its mission is to provide, on a 24 hour basis, medical support Role 2 as well as a Casualty Staging Unit to: the whole ISAF personnel; the members of EU services; UN delegation (UNAMA); NGOs and Afghanistan citizens. Finally the planning of medical support should aim to ensure continuity of care in all stages of the operation.

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5.6. Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)

Τhe use of contracted logistic solutions (particularly in non-Article V CRO, when the operational environment is relatively safe for civilian personnel and equipment) provides satisfactory solutions in many cases provided it is in accordance with an agreed policy. An important factor for the selection of a solution is the ensured and unhampered provision of the specific services. It is necessary to include contracting coordination cells, comprising military and civilian staff, within logistic structures in order to coordinate operational requirements and civil capabilities. From the experience gained so far from NATO operations, in the initial stage of the operation the use of contractors in Logistics is expected to be minimum if not, non-existent. Gradually as the operations progress, and always after assessing a situation, a selective choice of the specific solution takes place in some areas of Logistics. The practical application of this procedure has proved that there are no serious integration problems in the overall organisation of Logistics support to the Ops Theatre. Belgium has the necessary legal tools and fully understands the advantages of using contracted logistic solutions but is very reluctant to do so. For national capabilities BE will always look for a military solution. The contractor option will only be used if nation really needs the capability for his national level of ambition and if it is too expensive to acquire it (i.e. Strat Lift). The UK does employ contractors in support of operations – the key criteria are that they are used to provide endurance and flexibility in benign operational environments, they do not replace irreducible military manpower. The use of Contractors comes under the general heading of Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) and comprises two elements: Contractor Logistic Support (CLS), which concerns the provision of contracted support solutions for Service equipment; and Contractor Logistics (CONLOG), providing a wide range of logistic support to operations (such as the provision of camps, fuel, interpreters and vehicles). All those logistic force elements involved in force sustainment are described, and controlled (as part of the normal C2 framework), as a Total Logistic Force (TLF) – comprising regular and reserve military, contractors, HNS, coalition partners and (operation specific) Other Government Departments. Force protection of contractors is a key issue (for which the MOD has a clear legal and moral responsibility) as is the management of operational risk (and aggregated risk) where capability is outsourced to the private sector. Additionally the forthcoming study C.37.R with the title “ Contractor Support to Multinational Forces on Deployed Operations ” will provide a description of the acceptability of employing contractors on deployed operations.

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5.7. Host Nation Support / In-country Resources (HNS/ICR)

Issues related to infrastructure, allocation and estate management, coordination of these elements, host nation support, contracting and in-country resources activities, must be faced in the early stage of preparation and operational planning process. Very detailed MOU and TA for HNS and other bi/multilateral agreements, clearly defining responsibilities and financial procedures should enhance and facilitate the coordination. This coordination can be achieved by the establishment of a multinational Logistic Coordination Cell which may include the appropriate Infrastructure, HNS & Contracting, etc Cells. There are relevant figures of the possible functional linkages in study C.35.R (paragraph 4.3.3.2 Command Relationships figure 1 and paragraph 4.3.3.4 Structure Figure 2). Study C.35.R Paragraph 2.1.2 also refers to : “ Key elements operating within the logistic support framework may include some or all of the following :

- The Civil Economy and Infrastructure :

* Contractors. * Host Nation Support. * In-Country Resources. * Local Labour ”.

The whole issue could be managed through the MN C2 chain.

5.8. Logistic Services

5.8.1. Reimbursement Issues

The issue of reimbursement related to logistic cooperation is a subject of discussion during the phase of the procedure “ Force generation ”. It depends on the MOUs and TAs negotiated between the interested parties. Reimbursement is only one approach – replacement-in-kind and loan as well as cash payment should also be considered. Importantly, NATO nations have established standardised procedures for affecting logistic assistance during peace, crisis, or conflict, to the forces of other NATO nations, international headquarters, or multinational formations. Procedures are applicable to the request, issue, receipt, reimbursement and documentation for logistic support in the form of supplies and services provided in international logistic assistance. These procedures complement, but do not replace, national supply procedures. Full details of NATO procedures and provisions can be found in STANAG 2034 – NATO Standard Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance. Internal regulations could be a problem in the case of exchanging services allocated to different services/budgets.

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In general, the exchange of services and goods related to logistic cooperation seems to be a very good option although reimbursement is not excluded.

5.8.2. Handling refugees/Captured personnel/Equipment

The handling of refugees/captured personnel and equipment must follow procedures in accordance with international laws, conventions and agreements. The handling of refugees takes place under the supervision and the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The handling of prisoners and their equipment is governed by the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War and in STANAG 2033 “ Interrogation of POW ”, STANAG 2044 “ Procedures for dealing with POW ” and STANAG 2084 “ Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents ”. This issue is a logistic matter and has to be handled as a MN responsibility. It should be addressed in the planning phase and there must be additional Logistic capacity deployed to meet this requirement. Finally, captured materiel could potentially be exploited to reduce the overall force sustainability requirement.

5.9. Logistic Information Management (LIM)

Finabel nations should develop and implement a LIM system to meet the logistic information requirements of the MN Commander. The desired and necessary exchange of information should cover a number of issues including: situation, changes in the personnel force, level of supplies and materiel, means of transportation, repair echelons etc. The information systems/tools adopted and used by NATO would form a suitable solution (in order to avoid duplications), given that all Finabel member states are familiar with the use of these systems. Some of them might be :

- Stock Holding & Asset Requirements Exchange (SHARE) ; - The NATO Ammunition Database (NADB) ; - The NATO Master-Cross Reference List (N-MCRL) ; - Random Brokerage Services ; - Mutual Emergency Support ; - Common Item Material Management (COMMIT) ; - NATO Depot & Support System (NDSS) ; - Asset Tracking (AST) ; - Coalition Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (CORSOM) ; - Host Nation Support (HNS) Capability Planning Catalogue (CAPCAT) ; - Logistics Functional Services Capability Package (LOG-FS CP) ; - Medical Information & Coordination System (MEDICS) ; - Single Source Ammunition Data Base (SSADB) ; - APP-11; - Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3, Volume V (Logistics Reports).

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If national tools are used they must be connected to a common platform via a data exchange interface. The Information Exchange Requirement (IER) should be based on the process-mapping of roles, responsibilities and activities between all related logistic nodes and logistic C2 nodes in the operating space. Fundamentally the IER feeds the development of a Common Operating Picture (COP) and is key to effective and timely decision making. The IER should enable Asset Visibility, Asset Tracking and Asset Management. Beyond IERs there is a need to define data exchange protocol standards.

5.10. Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM)

RSOM activities have been comprehensively covered in study C.34.R with the title “ participation in the setting up of a reception, staging and onward movement organisation in crisis response operations carried out by the Finabel countries ”. The summary of the study and brief information are provided as follows :

- “ Expeditionary operations are different from cold war operations with in –

place forces. The process to transform forces from their peacetime location to combat ready units at their final destination is a key enabler for the combat capability of the mission.

- All parties involved with the operation have a collective responsibility for the planning, control and execution of the RSOM process.

- RSOM is not an exclusive logistic problem, but a multi-disciplinary one, with a large number of different capabilities. RSOM is a process with involvement of CIS, FP, Engineering, CS, Med and Log support, HN arrangements, TOA, CIMIC, intelligence gathering, MOU, SOFA and technical agreements, movement and deployment planning, finance, legal, etc. And this is more than bringing troops together in theatre.

- RSOM should be tailored for each specific operation as the type and size of operations may vary, reflecting the nature of the operation, mission, terrain and climate conditions, enemy, civilian and even religious considerations, as well as troops available.

- Technological evolutions will improve ITV, better design of deployment capabilities and C4I systems. This must enable Finabel countries in future to reach an Expeditionary Deployment and RSOI Concept, with all characteristics to provide ready forces to the mission to be performed.

- “ The aim of the study was twofold. It gave a description of the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement process (RSOM), providing a basis for deployment of forces of Finabel countries conducting expeditionary Crisis Response Operations (CRO) and secondly, it gave an overview of possible areas of co-operation and constraints for the execution of an RSOM mission ”.

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- It has been clarified that RSOM process cannot be separated from the strategic

deployment and the integration phases of an operation. The Strategic deployment, the RSOM and Integration processes are complementary and critical to the commander‘s initial success factors.

- The RSOM process is not limited to logistic functions; it requires a broad spectrum of capabilities in order to achieve the operational readiness of forces at their final destination. Chapter 5 gives an overview of the deployment and support issues, closely related to RSOM.

- All RSOM capabilities of Finabel nations can be integrated in a multinational framework structure and have the required interoperability standards. Some national standards can be different, but interoperability is always possible.

- A clear articulation of responsibilities is the first step in conducting RSOM of Forces. During the planning process we must organise the multinational co-operation and detect the difficulties. The result is the identification of nations willing to take multinational responsibilities and the possibility to target specific combat service support capabilities for the operation. Division of responsibilities is best undertaken once the size and nature of operation and deployment is known by establishing a Multinational Logistics HQ to co-ordinate RSOM on behalf of the Theatre Commander.

- The training has to cover the needs of the national and multinational certification. The certification is a responsibility of the respective National/Alliance Cdr.

- A possible diagram for RSOM process is also provided in Annex 1 of study C.34.R.

NATO has an Alliance RSOM doctrine (AJP 3.13). Once the activities are standardised it will be possible to plan how to train the specific units. EUMS agreed on 9th of September 2006 on the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration concept for EU led Crisis Management Operations.

6. LOGISTIC RELATED AREAS

6.1. Standardisation

6.1.1. Logistic assets which Finabel nations seek to achieve agreed standardization and acceptance.

The issue has been thoroughly analysed in study C33R. There are areas in which standardisation and acceptance may be agreed such as :

- Transportation ; - RSOM operations ; - POL supply ; - Fuel standards ; - Storing facilities ;

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- Ammunition storage ; - Individual field support (including food and tentage) ; - Medical support ; - Base support ; - Environmental support ; - Health and Security at Work during operations ; - Command and control standards.

There remains, however, a national requirement to have a certain level of independence in order to be able to conduct operations with only national means [eg Non combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)]. A movement towards permanent Lead Nations would reduce the degree of freedom to choose one’s partners. Additionally, the designation of Lead Nation (LN) and Role Specialisation Nation (RSN) to specific nations would enable long-term planning and acquisition to be conducted with trained and experienced personnel but would present problems in the case of non-participation of this nation in an operation.

6.1.2. Training level for logistics units to be assigned to the multinational force

There is a general consensus on the need to achieve the necessary level of operational readiness. Familiarity with multinational logistic procedures, policy and doctrine as well as participation in multinational training exercises enhances the cooperation/experience among Nations. The training level achieved by logistic units should match that of the forces being supported and the units should be certified accordingly. A relevant procedure is provided in NATO ACO FORCES STANDARDS Volume VII “ Combat Readiness Evaluation of Land HQs and Units ” (CREVAL). For UK there is a formal mechanism to generate “ Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R) ” which are then held available to undertake the full range of Contingent Tasks ranging from Humanitarian/Disaster Relief, through Peace Support Operations (PSO) to warfighting. Training is geared towards delivering capability against the most demanding task – that is warfighting – but which is itself adaptable to operations at lower levels of the “ operational spectrum ”.

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6.1.3. Harmonisation of national/international regulations into ONE theatre

Although there are difficulties stemming from differences in existing national laws, there are several possibilities to harmonize national/international regulations (eg dangerous goods, operating hours for drivers, health-regulations, work place safety...), (by developing common requirements and procedures) into ONE theatre regulation through international agreements.

Taking into account :

- EU legislations and regulations ; - NATO Mil Standards (STANAGs) ; - Others like International Air Transport Association (IATA) (dangerous

goods), International Regulations Concerning the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID).

Finabel members should already be conforming to common EU and international legislation and regulations. These “ international agreements ” and the HN regulations might be the minimal level for a theatre wide regulation (TWR).

6.1.4. Additional standardisation beyond the use of NATO stock number

The usage of NATO stock numbers is deemed sufficient as far as the standardisation of supplies-equipment is concerned. This usage is tested and familiar to Finabel member states. Any additional standardization may lead to a duplication and unnecessary complexity.

6.2. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Generally, CIMIC is not a logistic function. It can be seen as a support issue in the way of helping create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of the operational needs. Nations have highlighted the importance of establishing and maintaining full cooperation between the Multinational Commander and the civilian authorities, agencies and population within the AOO in order to fulfill the Commander’s mission. CIMIC can facilitate the access to local logistics resources to cover the logistics requirements of the operating force as well as to coordinate the use of these resources with other non military organisations active in the region (IOs, NGOs). CIMIC activities can require logistic support in addition to the logistic support for the whole operation. Finally it may be considered as an independent area closer to Command and Control than to Logistics.

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6.3. Environmental Protection (EP)

Logistic Support is frequently seen as the environmental lead on operations, however, Environmental Protection is a wide-ranging issue, which needs coordination at a higher level. Environmental damage may be an inevitable consequence of operations, but appropriate environmental planning can minimise these effects without compromising either operational or training requirements. The Multinational Commander (with an understanding of applicable environmental legislation and regulations) should take the following into account in the planning process :

- The environmental compliance ; - Pollution prevention ; - Waste management ; - Conservation ; - Heritage protection (natural and man-made) and protection of flora and fauna.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. The Multinational Commander in an operation led by Finabel nations must be able to execute his responsibilities for logistics efficiently and exercise his authority effectively.

7.2. Nations must provide the Multinational Commander with the logistic C2 authority,

visibility and capabilities he requires to execute his mission throughout all phases of an operation. It will include coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of logistics.

7.3. Visibility & Transparency for all committed assets between the Home Base and the

Final Destination, regardless of the holder of the asset, is vital for the effective employment of logistic resources. Timely and accurate exchange of information between nations and the Commander of a MN operation will enhance the redirection of logistic assets in accordance with agreements between NSEs and the Multinational Commander.

7.4. Logistics planning is an integral part of the Operational Planning Process. The

relevant NATO AJP, ALP, MC documents should be taken into consideration, as well as the new “Logistics concept for NRF operations” and solutions applied for EU BG. There is a need for a collaborative (and dynamic) planning capability involving all staff branches within a Headquarters.

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7.5. The Logistic organisation must be flexible enough to be able to execute the results

of the planning process and to adapt to the changes in the actual operational environment. Given the increasing need to conduct simultaneous cross-spectrum operations across the battlespace, logistic force elements need to be able to transition quickly and easily between both phases of an operation and types of operational activity.

7.6. Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC) could be formed to facilitate and

coordinate, at the operational level, various support options and execute the theatre level plans and policies of the CJ4 staff. Provision of this coordination capability would assist the Multinational Commander to discharge his collective responsibilities for logistics between the participating nations, component commands, HN and associated non-military organisations that may be involved in any combined and/or Joint operation.

7.7. Cooperation, coordination and synergy are fundamental to effective logistic support

both among individual nations and within coalition frameworks and appropriate procedures must be in place to deliver operational effect.

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A N N E X 1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations used in this document as well others commonly used in joint and combined operations : A AAP Allied Administrative Publication AC Allied Commands ACROSS ACE Resources Optimisation Software System ADAMS Allied Deployment and Movement System AJP Allied Joint Publication ALP Allied Logistic Publication AMCC Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre AOO Area of Operations AOR Area of Responsibility AP Allied Publication APOD Airport of Debarkation AST Asset Tracking B Bi-SC Bilateral-Strategic Command C CC Component Command CCIS Command, Control and Information Systems CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CIS Communication and Information System CJ Combined Joint COMMIT Common Item Material Management CONOPS Concept of Operation CONSUP Concept of Support CRO Crisis Response Operation

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CSO Contractor Support to Operations CSS Combat Service Support C2 Command and Control C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Information D DOS Days of Supply E EP Environmental Protection EU European Union F FP Force Proposals G GOP Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning H HN Host Nation HNS Host-Nation Support HNSA Host Nation Support Arrangements HNSCC Host Nation Support Coordination Centre HOC Head of Contracts (SC) HRF High-Readiness Force HQ Headquarters I IA Implementing Arrangement ICC Infrastructure Co-ordination Cell IEL Infrastructure Engineering for Logistics IO International Organisation IS International Staff IT Information Technology

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J JFEngr Joint Force Engineer JFC/JC Joint Force Commander / Joint Commander JLCC Joint Logistic Coordination Centre JLSG Joint Logistics Support Group JOA Joint Operation Area L LCC Logistic Co-ordination Centre LIM Logistic Information Management LLN Logistic Lead Nation LN Lead Nation LOC Lines of Communications LOGBASE Logistic Data Base LOGCON Logistics Control LOGFAS Logistics Functional Area Services LOGREP Logistic Reporting System LRSN Logistic Role Specialist Nation M M&T Movement and Transportation MC Military Committee MEDCC Medical Co-ordination Cell MFHQ Multinational Force Headquarters MILU Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit MIMU Multinational Integrated Medical Unit MJLC Multinational Joint Logistic Centre MLU Multinational Logistic Unit MMU Multinational Medical Unit MOU Memorandum of Understanding

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MSA Mutual Support Agreement (or Arrangement-UK) N NAMSA NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NC3A NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NRF NATO Response Force NSE National Support Element O OPCOM Operational Command OPCON Operational Control OPLAN Operation Plan OPP Operational Planning Process P PfP Partnership for Peace POD Port of Debarkation POE Port of Embarkation POL Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants R RS Role Specialisation RSN Role Specialist Nation RSOM Reception, Staging and Onward Movement

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S SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SC Strategic Command/Commander SD Strategic Deployment SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SHARE Stock Holding and Asset Requirements Exchange SN Sending Nation SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SOR Statement of Requirements SPG Stockpile Planning Guidance (SC) SPM II Sustainment planning Module II SPOD Seaport of Debarkation STANAG Standardisation Agreement (NATO) T TA Technical Arrangement TAV Total Asset Visibility TCN Troop Contributing Nation TOA Transfer of Authority TPLSS Third Party Logistic Support Services U UN United Nations