Filkow Verdict Paper Part 2

8/10/2019 Filkow Verdict Paper Part 2

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PART II

This is Part II of my paper titled The Unsettling Unfairness of the IRP Regime the first part

of which appeared in the last issue of The Verdict(Fall 2013).

I concluded Part I of this paper with the following paragraph:

I urge the public, the legislature, the defence bar and the media to be cognizant of the

consequential issues with the new regime and its potential for a culture of abuse,

evidence of which is already being seen. Hopefully the Court of Appeal decision will go

some long way to eclipsing these concerns by finding many aspects of the legislatedscheme unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal case referred to is Sivia v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor

Vehicles), which was heard by a three Justice panel in March 2013 and is currently under

reserve.37

For completeness I also observe that an appeal is being prosecuted attacking the constitutionality

of the statutory alterations made by the Province (Bill 46) in response to Justice Sigurdsons

lower court decision in Sivia. Post-SiviaGrounds for Review

The changes to the grounds of review implemented by Bill 46 have been canvassed in detail in

Part I of my paper. Generally speaking, the new grounds permit a review of the IRP based on:

(1) the reliability of the ASD results; and (2) whether the police officer advised the driver of the

right to a second test on a second ASD, and if a second test was performed, whether it was

carried out with a different ASD and whether the IRP was issued on the basis of the lowest of the

two readings. These new grounds do not make the process any fairer, for the following

reasons.

(a) Ground Relating to the Reliability of the ASD

37The lower court decision is reported as Sivia v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2011 BCSC

1639.


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In Sivia, Mr. Justice Sigurdson found that in some circumstances there can be serious issues

concerning whether an ASD accurately reflects blood-alcohol readings.38

Amongst other

reliability concerns: (i) an ASD does not provide a reading of a drivers actual blood -alcohol

level; (ii) an ASD has no mechanism to warn of residual mouth alcohol, which can lead to a false

warn or fail result; (iii) an ASD may fail to function if the force or volume of a breath

sample does not come within its operating parameters; and (iv) an ASD retains no record of what

was actually measured.

The evidence considered by an adjudicator in support of the proper functionality and reliability

of the ASD is provided solely by the police, namely, evidence in the Report and the Certificate

of Qualified ASD Calibrator39

that indicates the type, serial number and the calibration and

service expiry dates for the unit. A copy of the Certificate is attached as an appendix to thispaper.

This evidence provides little or no opportunity for the driver to challenge the reliability of the

ASD result. The driver cannot contradict the functionality of the ASD because the unit used is

not available for examination. Indeed, without a scientifically valid analytical control, such as

running a control sample at the time of the subject test, it is not possible to verify the units

proper functioning at the time the test is performed.

Other information relevant to the reliability of the ASD is also unavailable. The driver does not

receive information as to repairs and/or maintenance to the unit, or calibration check sheets. And

the OSMV will not allow an adjournment to provide time for the driver to obtain disclosure of

such materials if available from other sources.

The other issue bearing on the reliability of the ASD result is whether the officer operated the

unit properly. Yet it is impossible to challenge the officer on this issue because he or she is not

made available for cross-examination.

38Ibid. at para. 292.39A Certificate of Qualified ASD Calibrator is a document prepared by an officer who is a qualified to calibrate an

ASD.


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The problems regarding whether the ASD was working properly at the time in question, and

whether it was operated properly by the officer in administering the test, are serious enough. But

the challenges facing counsel grow even more daunting given the pre-printed wording contained

in Box #14 of every single police Report: Any ASD tests referred to in this Report were

conducted by a qualified ASD operator and the ASD units were functioning properly.

At the end of the day, the only information before the adjudicator concerning the functionality of

the ASD or the reliability of its result will come from the officer. Adjudicators adopt the

presumption that the ASD is working properly if the information supplied by the officer supports

this conclusion. And they use this presumption to dismiss out of hand affidavit evidence from

the driver, and perhaps other witnesses, which implicitly calls into question the reliability of the

ASD result based on the amount of alcohol consumed.

40

In sum, provided the police officer fills in a warn or fail result on the sworn Report, and the

ASD calibration and service expiry dates line up, there is little or no prospect for a successful

review based on the issue of the functionality, operability, or reliability of the ASD test.

(b) Grounds Relating to the Second ASD Analysis

Prior to Bill 46, a police officer, upon issuing an IRP, was not expressly required to inform the

driver that a second test could be administered, and adjudicators refused to read the legislation so

as to implicitly require the officer to do so.41

The officer was required to do no more than

administer a second test if requested by the driver. How would a driver know of the right to

receive a second test, if not told by the officer? He or she wouldnt, meaning that drivers

typically did not request a second test.

In an attempt to remove the unfairness of this Catch-22 scenario, Bill 46 amended the IRP

regime to impose an express obligation on the police officer to inform the subject driver of the

right to a second test. The amended legislation does not, however, expressly require the officer

to advise the driver that the lower of the two tests is to prevail, and adjudicators have refused to

40 I do want to note that the one defence has gained some traction is mouth alcohol; particularly if a police officer

allows that this residual factor could have been present.41See Sample Case 1, included as an appendix to this paper.


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read this requirement into the legislation.42

The unfairness thus persists, because many drivers

will not exercise their right to have a second test performed unless they know that there may be

some benefit, and there is nothing to lose, in doing so.43

(c) Review on Basis that the Ability to Drive is Affected by Alcohol

In a 2013 decision called Wilson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles),44

the

Court held that as a precondition to issuing an IRP the driver must not only register a warn

reading upon providing a breath sample into an ASD, but in addition the officer must conclude

that the drivers ability to drive is affected by alcohol.45

More specifically, and crucially, Wilson

holds that registering a warn reading is not without more sufficient basis for an officer toconclude that the drivers ability to drive is affected by alcohol .

46 The reasoning in Wilson

arguably applies to fail readingsas well.

Yet Wilson is under appeal, and in addition there is a judicial review matter, currently under

reserve, in which the Province is arguing that Wilson is contrary to binding authority and so

should not be followed, and even if correct should not be extended to fail cases.47

Unlawful Demands Are Off-Limits on a Review for a Fail or Warn

The legal authority to make the breath demand upon which an IRP is based comes from s. 254(2)

of the Criminal Code. Section 254(2) allows an officer to make an ASD demand only where the

42See Sample Case 2, included as an appendix to this paper. It is interesting to note that this reasoning is

inconsistent with Box 7 of the OSMV Report, which asks the officer to indicate whether the driver was informed

that the results of the lower test would prevail.43There are many other unfair issues relating to this ground of dispute including the requirement that the driver

request a second test forthwith, even though there is no corresponding requirement on the police to advise the driver

of his right to a second test forthwith. Further, there is no requirement on the police officer to administer the second

test forthwith.44Wilson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2013 BCSC 163845Ibid,para 19.46Ibid,paras 20-21.47Richardson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), Vancouver Registry No. S-137725.

.


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officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person was driving a vehicle with alcohol in his or her

system within the preceding three hours.48

Yet the IRP regime does not make the absence of

lawful grounds for an ASD request a valid basis for overturning a prohibition on review, at least

in the case of an IRP issued in response to a warn or fail reading. By contrast, an unlawful

demand is a valid basis upon which to revoke a prohibition imposed on a driver who refused or

otherwise failed to comply with an ASD demand, because the legislation provides for revocation

if the refusal was based upon a reasonable excuse.49

Police officers are thus able to make unlawful ASD demands with impunity, at least in the

context of the IRP regime, unless the driver refuses and files for review. The rather odd result is

that a driver has a better prospect on review where he or she refuses to provide a sample than

where he or she provides a warn or fail sample. This is borne out by the OSMVs Researchand Data Unit Report on Alcohol-Related Driving Prohibitions Served in British Columbia

between September 2010-November 2011 (attached as an appendix to this paper), which shows

greater success rates on review for refusals as opposed to fail results.

Other CharterViolations Are Irrelevant to Review Process

An unlawful demand by definition constitutes a breach of s. 8 of the Charter. As noted in the

preceding discussion, such a breach is not a valid basis for revoking a prohibition under the IRP

review process. It warrants mentioning that other Charter breaches appear equally irrelevant

under the IRP regime in determining whether a prohibition should be upheld on review.50

Simply put, adjudicators have taken the position that Charter breaches are not listed in the

legislation as grounds upon which an IRP can be revoked, and that as administrative reviewers

48The wording in s. 254(2) has been judicially amended to account for a flaw that, if left uncorrected, would result

in the provision permitting ASD demands in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the individual was driving

with alcohol in his or her system within the preceding three hours: see R. v. Jaycox 2012 BCCA 365.49MVA, s. 215.5(1)(c) and (4)(c). See, e.g., Cully v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2005

BCSC 110, para. 21.50Whether the IRP regime itself violates various other Charterprovisions, most especially ss. 10(b) and 11(d), will

be decided by the Court of Appeal in Sivia, as mentioned earlier in this paper.


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they have no jurisdiction to exclude evidence or provide any other constitutional remedy under s.

24 of the Charter.51

In my view, there is considerable unfairness to this approach, especially with respect to the s.

10(b) right to counsel. Roadside access to counsel is easily obtained in the age of cell phones,52

and can be very useful to a driver who is being asked to provide an ASD sample. For instance,

counsel can advise the driver to request that the police hold off administering the ASD test for 15

minutes if there is a real concern about residual alcohol in the mouth, which as already noted can

cause false warn or fail results. Counsel can also advise a driver who is unsure whether to

comply with the ASD demand as to the legal requirement that he or she do so absent any

grounds to believe there is a reasonable excuse for refusing.

It is true that criminal courts have held that a breach of the right to counsel in the context of an

ASD demand is justified under s. 1 of the Charter, but this conclusion is based on the fact that in

criminal matters the ASD result is not used as evidence to help convict the accused but rather for

the limited purpose of grounding a subsequent demand that another breath sample be provided

using a (much more accurate) approved instrument at the police station. In sharp contrast, under

the IRP regime the ASD result is used, usually by itself, to justify the imposition of significant

penalties on the driver, and not merely as a stepping-stone to obtain evidence that is admissible

51The adjudicators view is supported byDoman v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2001

BCSC 1730;Helgesen v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2002 BCSC 1391, para. 6;Holosko

v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2007 BCSC 399, para. 22. Query, however, whether it

conflicts with the more recent decision inR v. Conway2010 SCC 22. Conway holds that an administrative tribunal

has the jurisdiction to decide Charter issues provided that: (a) it has the express or implicit jurisdiction to resolve

matters of law; and (b) the legislature has not clearly demonstrated an intention to withdraw Charter issues from itspurview. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, the only bar to the tribunal granting a Charter remedy

will arise if its statutory scheme clearly precludes it from doing so; i.e. where the remedy sought is not the kind of

remedy that the legislature intended would fit within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal. Relevant

considerations in this regard include the tribunals statutory mandate and function.52As noted in the next paragraph in the text, a breach of the s. 10(b) right in the context of roadside ASD demands

has been held to be justified under s. 1 of the Charterin the criminal context. It must be noted that the argument

that the widespread availability of cell phones undermines the s. 1 justification in criminal cases has recently been

rejected inJaycox, above Note 11 at para. 42. It can nonetheless be argued that the s. 1 justification applicable in

criminal matters should not apply in the IRP context, for the reasons set out in the next paragraph.


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at trial. Given this distinction, the justification for excusing the s. 10(b) breach under s. 1

appears much less convincing in the IRP context.53

Adjudicators and Their Decisions on Review

In Spencer v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles),54

Mr. Justice McEwan

pointed out that, as far as the IRP review hearing goes:

The process set out in the Motor Vehicle Act for administrative suspensions obviouslylimits due process. That does not mean, however, that within those limits the dictates of

fairness are truncated. A tribunal handicapped by the fact that hearings are not in person,

that evidence is not sworn, that there is no cross-examination, and that imposes no duty

on the officer to provide all the relevant material (including recordings of the event),

lacks most of the means by which courts or other tribunals ordinarily discern the truth.55

In the case before him, Mr. Justice McEwan quashed the adjudicators decision to affirm

the IRP, and ordered a rehearing to be conducted on the basis that:

the police are not deemed to have a credibility advantage, but that the case bedetermined impartially on the evidence;

the evidence not be unfairly parsed to create standards that are unknown to andunknowable by, the petitioner;

such parsing as takes place recognize the deficiencies or gaps in the policerecord as well as those in the petitioners evidence;

if there is insufficient evidence to decide the case, it be resolved in favour of thepetitioner, in line with the proper allocation of the burden of proof and the

concept of a balance of probabilities.56

The sorts of concerns expressed in Spencer are equally evident in the more recent decision

of Scott v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles).57

In Scott, Mr. Justice

53It must be acknowledged, however, that the argument I have set out here is expressly rejected in Sivia,above Note

1 at paras. 331-75. Of course, as noted earlier in this paper, the decision in Sivia regarding s. 10(b) is currently the

subject of an appeal.54Spencer v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2011 BCSC 1311.55Ibid, para. 52.56Ibid, para. 63.57Scott v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2013 BCCA 554.


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Schultes and the Court of Appeal were highly critical of the adjudicators credibility

assessment because:

the drivers affidavit evidence was rejected as being improbable largely on the

basis that it conflicted with the evidence of three witnesses outlined in theofficers report, yet the adjudicator failed to note that the driver had submitted

affidavits from three other individuals whose evidence supported her version of

events;

the drivers failure to respond to two aspects of the police report was treated asa basis for accepting these facts as true, which improperly presupposed abaseline reliability in the report that the driver was compelled to refute, and in

any event failed to appreciate that, in the circumstances, the failure to respond

was wholly understandable;

circular reasoning was used to reject aspects of the drivers affidavit evidence;

the narrative in the police report was found to be reliable simply because it wasdetailed, which amounted to an improper failure to assess the weight to be

given to the narrative.58

The adjudicators reasoningwas held to be fundamentally flawed and illogical;59

no adjudicator

acting reasonably would have approached the assessment of credibility in this way.60

The

decision was therefore set aside and a rehearing of the drivers IRP review was ordered.61

Most lawyers who have experienced the frustration of acting on an IRP review will agree that

adjudicators consistently or even usually ignore the principles that should guide a proper and fair

credibility assessment. As the comments in Spencer and Scott adroitly recognize, the review

process is difficult to categorize as anything but imbalanced. This imbalance is accentuated on

many files where a predisposition against a driver by certain adjudicators seems to be at play.

The culture creates an unsettling apprehension.

58Ibid, paras. 23, 32-37.59Ibid, paras. 23, 32.60Ibid, para. 24, 36.61Ibid, para. 32.


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I will address these and other problems concerning adjudicators in the remainder of this section.

It is helpful to begin by setting out a general problem, raised in Spencer, as to whether

adjudicators are properly trained to carry out reviews under the IRP regime.

(a) Adjudicators Are Ill-Equipped to Make Fair Determinations on Review

There is a real concern that adjudicators are ill-equipped to undertake reviews in a fair and

competent manner. In this respect, I agree with the following comments by Mr. Justice McEwan

in the Spencer case:

The statutory scheme raises many questions beyond those put in issue in this case. The

unfairness inherent in the approach taken by the delegates in both Gillesand here certainly

hints at larger questions about whether the delegates are equipped with the degree oftraining or independence necessary to conduct fair hearings, or to demonstrate that they do

so. I think it highly anomalous that a person who challenges a speeding ticket may appear

personally before an independent and legally trained judicial justice of the peace, while theoften far more serious consequences of the administrative prohibition provisions of the

Motor Vehicle Act are adjudicated in this stripped-down manner. The compelling social

objective of removing drinking drivers from the road cannot justify a process that isincapable of reliably differentiating between those who have and those who have not

offended. This case and Gillesgive rise to a concern that the scheme is seriously flawed.

Whether or not that is, in fact, so, will have to await a day when these broader issues are

more squarely before the court.62

Its also worth noting that, unlike judges or other individuals who carry out administrative

reviews, adjudicators often use pseudonyms in performing their functions under the IRP regime.

This fact led Mr. Justice McEwan to further comment in Spencer:

Deference on the part of the reviewing court does not include ascribing to the delegate [i.e.adjudicator] a seer-like insight into truth that no court would ascribe to itself. This is

particularly so when the delegate is faceless, nameless (and therefore unaccountable),possessed of unknown qualifications, and carrying out an essentially judicial, as opposed to

a specialized, function.63

[emphasis added]

(b) Adjudicators Show Decided Preference for Police Evidence

62Spencer, above Note 21 at para. 60.63Ibid. at para. 58.


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While the onus is on the officer to justify the prohibition on a balance of probabilities,64

adjudicators typically show an overwhelming preference for police evidence whenever it

conflicts with that of the driver. This is so even where the police evidence is brief and the

drivers evidence detailed, sworn and supported by the sworn evidence of other witnesses.

For instance, the driver may swear an affidavit stating that something happened that is highly

relevant to the issues on review; e.g. she told the officer that she burped or drank alcohol five

minutes ago (which if true may cause a false warn or fail), or was having significant trouble

breathing due to an asthma attack (which if true may amount to a reasonable excuse for a failure

to blow). The police Report may be silent on the particular factual point, and the officer may

provide no further information in response to the drivers sworn assertion. Yet even in these

circumstances, the adjudicator will generally find a way to reject the drivers evidence, forexample by holding that police officers are trained to note things of relevance in their reports and

so the officers failure to mention the disputed fact must mean that it did not occur, or by

refusing to accept that the driver and his or her supporting witnesses could accurately recall

when the last drink was consumed.

Adjudicators routinely make these sorts of inferences, correct mistakes, interpret errors as

clerical, and make other highly dubious holdings in relying on challenged police evidence so as

to justify the IRP.

(c) Case Law is Misunderstood by Adjudicators

Most OSMV adjudicators lack an understanding of case law or the reasons why case law has

been submitted by counsel for the driver. The concept of extracting a principle of law from a

case and applying it to the drivers matter is often lost on the adjudicator. The adjudicator might

purport to distinguish a case on the ground that it is not precisely identical to facts before him orher, even though the fundamental principle espoused in the case applies squarely to the matter

under review.

64Taylor v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2004 BCCA 641, paras. 7, 16; Spencer, above

Note 21 at para. 31; Scott, above Note 24 at para. 32.


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(d) Successful Reviews are Given No Precedential Value

On the rare occasion where an IRP is revoked by an adjudicator, the reasons provided are brief,

and thus may hold little value as a precedent. And where the reasons are capable of being used

as a precedent in another matter, adjudicators time and time again insist that they are not bound

by the decisions of their colleagues.

(e) Judicial Review is Rarely A Viable Option

A driver can always bring a judicial review application for the purpose of attacking an

adjudicators unfavourable decision. But it is rarely worth doing so, for one or more of several

reasons.

First, the standard that the driver must meet on a judicial review application is very demanding.

Barring a clear error of law or jurisdiction, courts will only quash an adjudicators decision

where it is unreasonable.65

Moreover, courts extend deference to the supposed expertise of

adjudicators in most areas related to the typical drinking and driving scenario, extending even to

what medical conditions might provide a reasonable excuse for failing to blow.66

Ultimately, if

there is some evidence upon which the adjudicators decision can reasonably be supported, the

court will not interfere on judicial review unless the adjudicators reasoning process was itself

unreasonable.67

Even if the driver has a good chance of succeeding on judicial review, he or she may lack the

financial resources to launch a court proceeding. There is also the problem of obtaining a stay

pending the courts decision on the judicial review; absent a stay, it is almost certain that the

prohibition will have ended by the time the court case is decided.68

Finally, the remedy on a

65Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick2008 SCC 9, paras. 47-49 (general discussion of reasonableness standard);Nagra v.

British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2010 BCCA 154 (reasonableness standard applied in ADP

case); Scott, above Note 24 at paras. 28-31 (IRP case).66Graham v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)2012 BCSC 1168, paras. 46-56 (ADP case).67Scott, above Note 24 at paras. 28-31.68Of course, absent a stay a litigant who wishes to drive after the prohibition has ended will have to pay his or her

fine and enter/complete the various programs required under the IRP scheme.


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successful review may simply be that the matter is sent back to an adjudicator for a new review

hearing, which given the problems inherent in the IRP review process is hardly cause for

optimism in terms of overturning the prohibition.

Unaccountability Risks Fostering a Pervasive Culture Abuse of Power

The IRP regime has now been in place for over three years. The amendments instituted through

Bill 46 in the wake of Siviahave, on paper at least, expanded the scope of review for the better.

Yet, as detailed above, the review process remains hopelessly unfair because of the overall lack

of due process afforded the driver and various problems regarding the adjudicators handling of

reviews. And, distressingly, it is arguable that the IRP regime will become even more unfair as

time passes, because of the very real risk that a culture of abuse will pervade the entire process,

the inevitable result of a system that is heavily skewed against the driver and lacks transparency

and accountability.

I say this because police officers are given substantial powers to impose serious penalties on

drivers with only a very limited scope for review, and adjudicators approach the review process

with a decided bias against drivers. In these circumstances, it is only natural that those

administering the IRP regime will over time begin to cut corners and act arbitrarily in carrying

out their duties, whether consciously or not. Why wouldnt they, knowing that their actions are

subject to very little scrutiny? A system lacking due process, without checks and balances to

keep an overweening State in check, which falls far short of acceptable standards in terms of

transparency, portends a culture of abuse, and it is the citizens of this province who will bear the

brunt of this culture.

In Spencer, Mr. Justice McEwan stated:

One of the purposes for review mechanisms like these, apart from attempting to do

justice in individual cases, is to ensure that over-reaching behaviour on the part of stateagents is detectable and discouraged. This is certainly not possible if the tribunal starts

from the proposition that the police have no reason to be careless or inaccurate or

untruthful, and such a mind set will do nothing to discourage such behaviour if and when


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it occurs. Human nature being what it is, a tribunal that assumes that such things never

happen virtually guarantees that they will.69

These are wise words. Unfortunately, the converse is equally true: a review process that is

unable to detect unfairness and over-reaching by the State will invariably encourage creeping,

harmful encroachments on our liberties as the States representatives grow to appreciate the

extent to which their actions are protected from any sort of searching review. Routine deferral to

decision-makers who exhibit the flaws identified in Spencerand Scottdoes nothing to enhance

the image of the administration of justice in British Columbia.

Of course, every right-thinking citizen wants to see an efficient and effective regime to control

the evils and tragedies of impaired driving. But in attempting to create such a regime, the

Province has created a bureaucracy that runs roughshod over civil liberties, due process, and the

rule of law itself. McEwan, J. could perhaps have closed his judgment in Spencer with a

quotation from another judge who was concerned by the states intrusions into the freedoms of

its citizens, the American judge William O. Douglas, who said:

As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there is atwilight when everything seems seemingly unchanged. And it is such twilight that we all

must be most aware of change in the air however slight- lest we become unwitting

victims of the darkness.70

Conclusion

The Government appears to find it politically advantageous to proclaim that the IRP legislation

represents the strictest impaired driving laws around. This claim simply isnt true, at least as a

general proposition. Those who have financial resources and dont depend on driving for their

employment are far less penalized by the IRP regime than they would be under the Criminal

Code. They pay for the fines and the programs imposed, and resume driving after three months.

It is lower income, rural and/or younger drivers who are more likely to be harshly affected

often for years because they cannot afford to pay for the mandatory post-prohibition programs.

69Spencer, above Note 21 at para. 38.70William Douglas, The Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private papers of Justice William O. Douglas , Adler

& Adler, 1987, p. 162.


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Those whose employment requires being able to drive may also suffer inordinately, as they lose

their jobs and they and their families suffer serious corollary effects from the loss of income.

The very real and substantial penalties that often flow from the IRP regime would be acceptable

if the review process were fair. But it is not. There is virtually no means of challenging the

word of the officer regarding what took place at the roadside, and the lack of checks and

balances in turn will almost inevitably lead to an arrogant undesirable police culture.

The cynical culture of the IRP regime should not be allowed to perpetuate. There is some hope

that the constitutional challenge in Sivia will receive a more comprehensive resolution from the

Court of Appeal. In the meantime, we must fight for just outcomes and a fairer regime as best

we can with the resources at our disposal.

Filkow Verdict Paper Part 2

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