Fighting on All Fronts: A Critical Review of the US ... · 07-04-2016 :Master's Thesis TIJN 2015...

Fighting on All Fronts A Critical Review of the US Strategy Against ISIL

A Monograph

By

MAJ Ryan Nacin United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth Kansas

2016

Approved for public release distribution is unlimited

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14 ABSTRACT

The current US counter-ISIL strategy from the White House is to degrade and destroy ISIL in Iraq and Syria This strategy is a military focused strategy that fails to account for the deep complexity involved in the region of which ISIL is only a part Looking at ISIL through the lens of complexity makes it clear that military intervention should only be part of a much broader more comprehensive whole of government approach to address the root causes of ISIL As part of a comprehensive and long-term approach the United States should also be looking at ways to discredit the ISIL narrative while providing viable alternatives These changes will require strategic patience and many will be generational shifts Finally the use of information operations and strategic communications to effectively engage adversaries in the infonnation environment is key now in the fight against ISIL More importantly it will shape how the United States engages in future conflicts with near peer competitors who have already exercised these trade-crafts and have woven them into all aspects of their national strategy

15 SUBJECT TERMS

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISIL Infonnation Environment Information Operations Narrative Counter Narrative Complexity Science Complexity Theory Iraq Syria Strategic Communication Levant Counter ISIL Strategy

16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF

a REPORT b ABSTRACT c THIS PAGE

(U) (U) (U)

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PAGES (U) 52

19a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

MAJ Ryan Nacin 19b TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev 8 98) ___R_e_s_e_t _ _ Prescribed by ANSI S1d Z3918

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate MAJ Ryan M Nacin

Monograph Title Fighting on All Fronts A Critical Review of the US Strategy Against ISIL

Approved by

________________________________________ Monograph Director Alice Butler-Smith PhD

________________________________________ Seminar Leader Walter Schulte COL

________________________________________ Director School of Advanced Military Studies Henry A Arnold III COL

Accepted this 26th day of May 2016 by

________________________________________ Director Graduate Degree Programs Robert F Baumann PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency (References to this study should include the foregoing statement)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures maps graphics and any other works incorporated into this manuscript A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible

ii

Abstract

Fighting on All Fronts A Critical Review of the US Strategy Against ISIL by MAJ Ryan M Nacin 47 pages

The current US counter-ISIL strategy from the White House is to degrade and destroy ISIL in Iraq and Syria This strategy is a military focused strategy that fails to account for the deep complexity involved in the region of which ISIL is only a part In effect only the symptom of a problem is being addressed instead of the getting at the core of the problem Looking at ISIL through the lens of complexity makes it clear that military intervention should only be part of a much broader more comprehensive whole of government approach to address the root causes of ISIL such as political and security vacuums as well as radical Islamic extremism As part of a comprehensive and long-term approach the United States should also be looking at ways to discredit the ISIL narrative while providing viable alternatives These changes will require strategic patience and many will be generational shifts Finally the use of information operations and strategic communications to effectively engage adversaries in the information environment is key now in the fight against ISIL More importantly it will shape how the United States engages in future conflicts with near peer competitors who have already exercised these tradecrafts and have woven them into all aspects of their national strategy

iii

Contents

Acronyms v

Figures vi

Introduction 1

The Rise of ISIL and the Counter-ISIL Strategyhellip 5

Literature Review 13

Solving the Right Problem Framing ISIL Through Complexity Science 17

Asymmetric Strategy and the Elusive Decisive Blowhelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 26

A Battle of Narrativeshelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 34

Reframing Information Operationshelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 41

Conclusion 45

Bibliography 48

iv

Acronyms

ADP Army Doctrine Publication

AEI American Enterprise Institute

AQI Al Qaida in Iraq

BPC Building Partner Capacity

CARL Combined Arms Research Library

CGSC US Army Command and General Staff College

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CTF Combined Task Force

COG Center of Gravity

FM Field Manual

IO Information Operations

IRC Information Related Capability

IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

IS Islamic State

ISI Islamic State in Iraq

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Sham

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFC Joint Force Commander

JP Joint Publication

MISO Military Information Support Operations

NSC National Security Council

OIR Operation Inherent Resolve

SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USG United States Government

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

v

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures

Timeline The Roots of the Islamic Statehelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 8

Status of Islamic State Held Territory January 2016helliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 9

The Seven Phases for Islamic Caliphatehelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 10

The Information Environmenthelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 16

The White House Anti-ISIL Strategyhelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 27

Operation Inherent Resolve Targets Damaged and Destroyed Reporthelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip 28

vi

Introduction

We do not understand the movement and until we do we are not going to defeat it We have not defeated the idea We do not even understand the idea

mdash MG Mike Nagata Commander of Special Operations Command Central

The world is increasingly threatened by a dangerous ideology that manifests itself in the

physical world as radical Islamic extremism One of the most recent manifestations of this

ideology in the twenty-first century is the group that calls itself the Islamic State in Iraq and the

Levant (ISIL) Based out of Syria ISIL has expanded rapidly into Iraq using a calculated mixture

of horrific violence military organization governmental semblances and a propaganda campaign

which has allowed them to recruit fighters supporters and allegiances from across the globe

What started as a localized offshoot of Al Qaida in Iraq has grown into an organization of over

thirty-thousand gunmen in Iraq and Syria combined with an alarming increase in Islamic

extremist organizations and individuals from across the globe pledging support As ISIL

continues to gain territory additional recruits and momentum the global response has been

steadily mounting to counter them

A number of factors have converged to set the stage for how this phenomenon came to

flourish in the region One of the most critical factors included the United States Military

complete withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 Power in Iraq was left in the hands of a Shia hardliner

who polarized relations with the majority Sunni populations This coupled with the instability

that was created when the Assad Regime crumbled and began fighting its own people in Syria

helped create ripe conditions for ISILrsquos rise and propagation The resulting power vacuum in

Syria became the assembly area for the remnants of Al Qaida in Iraq and the beginning of what

would become ISIL ISILrsquos carnage began dominating international media in 2014 with their

capture of Mosul and Tikrit in northern Iraq rendering the borders between Syria and Iraq

politically irrelevant in the process With over 1 million Iraqi residents displaced from their

1

homes ISILrsquos brutal tactics against Christians and fellow Muslims made front page news on

media outlets around the world ISIL capitalized on this media surge on June 29 2014 when their

leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appointed himself as the leader of the Caliphate and therefore the

new leader of the worldrsquos roughly 15 billion Muslims In September 2014 a month after ISIL

beheaded the Western journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff the United States began an

intensive air campaign against ISIL in both Iraq and Syria In addition to the air campaign a

small number of US military advisers deployed to assist the fledgling Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

who at best were conceding vast swaths of territory after defeat by ISIL forces and at worst

abandoning their posts and US-provided vehicles and equipment without a fight and even

defecting to ISIL As US airpower and the training mission ramped up dramatically during the

first several months so did the ISIL brutality propaganda and recruiting campaign The

campaign harnessed the propaganda value of the United Statesrsquo intervention to fuel a popular

anti-Western narrative which drew thousands of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria to directly

support their cause in addition to eliciting indirect support from sympathizers around the globe

The United States was not alone in this fight though The White House emphasized that

there were sixty-five partners in the global coalition to fight ISIL Many of these partners are the

habitual partners such as the UK Germany and Australia Some of the other actors in the region

such as Russia and Iran add further complexity to an already complex problem set in the region

The first example of one of these countries is Iran Iran sent in two battalions of its Iranian

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to support the predominately Shia-based Iraqi government in

the fight against ISIL1 While at first glance it would appear that Iranian contributions would

directly support the US interests of supporting the ISF and defeating ISIL the Iranian political

and military leadership declined to coordinate with US military forces already operating in the

1 Colin Freeman ldquoUS Under Pressure to Act as Iran Helps Iraq Fight Al-Qaidardquo News Middle East (13 June 2014) Accessed 16 March 2016 httpwwwindependentieworldshynewsmiddle-eastus-under-pressure-to-act-as-iran-helps-iraq-fight-alqaida-30351513html

2

area Operational this disconnect forced the US military to halt offensive actions against ISIL

until proper battlefield coordination was established Strategically Iranrsquos support of the Shiashy

dominated Iraqi Government exacerbated Shia-Sunni relations that already served as the basis for

the ISIL movement

The second major event in the regional conflict was Russiarsquos deployment of military

support to prop up the Assad regime in Syria in October 2015 Under the guise of assisting the

coalition to defeat ISIL forces Russiarsquos true interest became apparent as it prioritized preserving

the Assad regimersquos survival through mitigating the opposition including the rebel forces that the

United States was directly supporting in the fight against ISIL Russiarsquos involvement further

muddied the waters in an already complex regional situation and dangerously risks the chances of

military miscalculations between the United States and Russia that could lead to an irreversible

escalation of tensions

Between the United States-led coalition and the Iranian and Russian interventions there

are numerous forces and strategies being leveraged in the fight against ISIL This monograph will

focus only on the current US counter-ISIL strategy and evaluate the strategyrsquos assumptions goals

and intent and methods and metrics The goal currently articulated from the White House

counter-ISIL internet homepage is ldquodegrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a

comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategyrdquo2 This website also has a running tally of

actions-to-date that are displayed as a metric of success The metrics presented span the last four

months and list the number of airstrikes carried out by the United States and its coalition partners

along with what countries are contributing to these airstrikes and to the train and advise mission

with the ISF

2 ISIL Strategy White House Homepage accessed March 15 2016 httpswwwwhitehousegovisil-strategy

3

The central question this monograph will address is whether the US military strategy that

currently shapes actions against ISIL is tailored to achieve the President of the United Statesrsquo

specified goal of degrading and defeating ISIL This monograph will argue that the current

military strategy against ISIL is based on an incomplete understanding of the overall ISIL

phenomenon as well as a national strategy prioritizing near-term impacts while minimizing

domestic political risks Subsequently the military strategy is disproportionately weighted

towards the destruction of ISIL in the physical environment and not on exploiting the causes and

ideology that underpins it Most importantly the United States has never had a contextual

understanding of ISIL as a phenomenon from its initial engagements against them

In order to expose this the monograph will look at the ISIL phenomenon in its strategic

setting through the lens of complexity theory to highlight the disconnects within the current

strategy This monograph will also examine external factors such as Iranian and Russian

involvement in Syria Iraq and the wider Middle East that would require a strategic reframing of

the environment and possibly a modification of the strategy

Next the monograph will explore the kinetically weighted strategy and the usefulness of

a center of gravity (COG) analysis This section endeavors to show how the US military strategy

against ISIL is too heavily weighted on the destruction of ISIL in the physical domain while

largely ignoring the information domain that ISIL so expertly exploits A discussion on the value

of a COG analysis of ISIL and whether or not that COG is being effectively engaged across any

of the aforementioned domains makes up the other part of this section

Finally this work shows how the United States participation in the battle of narratives

falls short for lack of relevance This will include an examination of the ISIL narrative the

usefulness and reality of a coalition counter narrative and credibility gaps in narrative delivery

4

Tying these three components together will be an analysis of how the United States

engages adversaries in the information domain through information operations and strategic

communications This discussion will posit that if the United States has a hard time conducting

operations in the information environment against an asymmetric threat group like ISIL that it

will struggle to do the same against a near-peer opponent such as Russia whose mature

information operations are embedded into every facet of their updated military doctrine and

national strategy Before delving into the crux of the thesis a brief summation of the rise of ISIL

and the strategy being waged by the West to combat them will set the context for what follows

The Rise of ISIL and the Counter-ISIL Strategy

The story of ISIL began well before the name became a recurring theme on the nightly

news Even the name ISIL and its genesis tells a story about the group and how it sees itself In

fact the group has only recently become labeled as ldquoISILrdquo by officials in the Western

governments and mainstream media The name used by the group to refer to itself and the name

used by those who oppose it has undergone several iterations of change From October of 2006

until April of 2013 the group referred to itself as the Islamic State of Iraq or ISI From then until

June of 2014 they referred to themselves as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and from

June 2014 until the present day only as the Islamic State (IS)3 There have been debates within

government and media circles about what to refer to this group as and the term being used most

by the White House and the US Department of Defense is Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or

ISIL The term ldquoDAISHrdquo has also been used frequently in the media ldquoDAISH is the Arab

acronym for Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah fe Al-Iraq wa Al-Sham (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

3 Cole Bunzel From paper state to caliphate the ideology of the islamic state The Brookings Institute Project on US Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper no 19 (March 2015) 3

5

or Sham) for which the acronym is ISIL or ISIS as was originally used by the group that now

prefers to be called Khilafat or Islamic State (IS)rdquo4 The term DAISH carries a negative

connotation which is used intentionally by some Western media and governments as a jab at ISIL

but it has not caught on in official channels

There is significant meaning inherent in these names that are central to the understanding

of ISIL from a cultural and political perspective In 2006 when the Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI)

spokesman announced that it had changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq Cole Bunzel of

Brookings said it was a monumental shift in strategy for the group signaling ldquothe start of an

ambitious political project the founding of a state in Iraq a proto-caliphate that would ultimately

expand across the region proclaim itself the full-fledged caliphate and go on to conquer the rest

of the worldrdquo5 This is not just semantics as an Islamic State must exist to fulfill the claim of the

Caliphate Amin Saikal of the Sydney Morning Herald says

The reason for the groups insistence on using the term IS is because it wants to be recognized and respected as a sovereign independent entity in the region and beyond Its leadership under the self-styled khalif Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi wishes to promote this unit as borderless encompassing not only the Muslim Middle East but also the entire Muslim world and therefore attracting Muslims to support it and join it from wherever they are located6

This is the reason there is some resistance from the anti-ISIL coalition to call them by any

name that serves to feed the ISIL narrative that they are actually an ldquoIslamic Staterdquo as they claim

Although this is more than just a simple problem of semantics the term used in the White House

anti-ISIL strategy is ldquoISILrdquo and therefore is the term that will be used throughout this monograph

What later became ISIL was initiated by Abu Musab al Zarqawi who established AQI in

2004 When he was killed two years later by a US airstrike in Iraq Abu ayyub al Masri replaced

4 Amin Saikal What Should We Call Islamic State Daish or IS The Sydney Morning Herald January 18 2015 accessed March 14 2016 httpwwwsmhcomaucommentwhatshyshould-we-call-islamic-state-daish-or-is-20150117-12sii7html

5 Bunzel From Paper State to Caliphate 4

6 Saikal What Should We Call Islamic State Daish or IS

6

him at the helm A few months later on October 15th 2006 Masri announced that Abu Omar al

Baghdadi would be the leader of a newly established Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) This

announcement was the beginning of a new and radical path which sought regional and global rule

through the reestablishment of the caliphate Between 2007 and 2010 the ISI was achieving only

limited success in Iraq when a US-led military operation killed both Masri and Baghdadi in a

joint raid in April 2010 It was then that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi took the reins and began planning

for a resurgence in the region He ordered forces from Iraq into Syria in 2011 which later became

what is known as the ldquoNusra Frontrdquo another Al Qaida affiliate Another significant event in 2011

was the final withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq This helped to breathe new life into ISI

and ceded maneuver space to them across large swaths of Iraq where the Iraqi government was

unable to exert sufficient influence and security In 2013 the Syrian town of Raqqa fell to the

Syrian opposition and set the conditions for the Nusra Front and Baghdadirsquos ISI to coalesce in

that area and to build combat power refocus on recruitment and regain momentum Later in

2013 Baghdadirsquos ISI staged in Raqqa and declared that the ISI and Nusra Front have merged to

become the ldquoIslamic State in Iraq and Syriardquo but the leader of the Nusra Front rejected this

alliance and maintained his allegiance to Al Qaida This began to exacerbate some of the tensions

between ISIL and Al Qaida even though ISIL originated from Al Qaida7 Michael Morell the

former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) describes this relationship best

in his book ldquoThe Great War of Our Timerdquo when he writes

Although there is a deep rift between the leadership of Al Qaida and the leadership if ISIS (ISIL) it is important to note that ISIS shares Bin Ladenrsquos long-term goal of establishing a global caliphate it sees both the West and its allies in the Middle East as its primary enemies and it sees violence as the most effective means of achieving its goals The only reason that ISIS is not formally part of Al Qaida is that the group does not want to have to follow the guidance of Zawahiri Itrsquos an issue of lsquowho should be calling the shotsrsquo not an issue of a different vision8

7 ldquoTimeline Rise and Spread of the Islamic Staterdquo (Wilson Center March 22 2016) Accessed March 21 2016 httpswwwwilsoncenterorgarticletimeline-rise-and-spread-theshyislamic-state

7

ISIL spent the remainder of 2013 and 2014 expanding their footprint and span of control

in Syria with Raqqa as their Headquarters Meanwhile Al Qaida decided to completely cut

formal ties with ISIL due to their differences in approach and not necessarily difference in their

desired end states Al Qaida and ISIL both share the goal of establishing the Caliphate and

worldwide Sharia law but their timeframes for doing so their methodologies differ In June of

2014 ISIL publicly declared itself to be the caliphate and leader of all Islam around the world At

the same time it pushed into Iraq and began to take territory beginning with Tal Afar and Mosul

in northern Iraq and moving quickly south to Tikrit which is only a few hoursrsquo drive from

Baghdad While ISIL swept across northern Iraq they did so in an exceptionally violent way that

rapidly captured the awe of the civilized world Figure one provides graphical depiction of the

timeline and some additional details of these events overlaid on top of when US military forces

were present in Iraq

Figure 1 Timeline The Roots of the Islamic State

Source Christopher M Blanchard and Carla E Humud ldquoThe Islamic State and US Policyrdquo (Congressional Research Service February 9 2016) accessed March 21 2016 8 httpfasorgsgpcrsmideastR43612pdf

8 Michael Morell The Great War of Our Time The CIArsquos Fight Against Terrorism-shyFrom Al Qaida to ISIS (New York NY Little Brown amp Company 2015) 307

8

Figure 2 Status of Islamic State Held Territory January 2016


The military strategy ISIL is using is driven by its desired end states and beliefs systems

Dr Sebastian Gorka of the Knowledge Threat Group maintains that ldquoISIS presents itself first and

foremost as a theocratic enterprise with the goal to reestablish the Caliphate and return all

Muslims to a pure form of Islam as it was lived during the time of Mohammedrdquo9 He goes on to

say that ISILrsquos goal is to institute a lsquopurersquo form of Islam through the establishment of the

caliphate destruction of democracy and adherence to a strict form of Sharia law for everyone

These goals feed right into already established Al Qaida goals that were translated and published

by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein in a 2005 Al Qaida manifesto In this manifesto Al Qaida

outlined a seven-point plan that spanned over a 20-year period and labeled it as ldquoAn Islamic

Caliphate in Seven Easy Stepsrdquo See Figure 3 below

9 Sebastian L Gorka and Katharine C Gorka ldquoISIS The Threat to the United Statesrdquo Threat Knowledge Group (November 17 2015) 5 accessed March 7 2016 httpthreatknowledgeorgwp-contentuploads201511TKG-Report_The-ISIS-Threatpdf

9

Figure 3 The Seven Phases for Islamic Caliphate

Source mdashMatar Matar ldquoIslamic Caliphaste Birth After Long Pregnancyrdquo (The Syrian Times 26 June 2014) accessed March 21 2016 httpthesyriantimescom20140626islamic-caliphate-birth-after-long-pregnancy

Based on this diagram and the seven steps for the establishment of the Islamic

Caliphate it is clear that ISIL has taken the strategy from the Al Qaida playbook and is in the

execution phase While this strategy is vague and only represents major events it helps frame

the strategic goals of radical Islam and the ideology that fuels groups like ISIL and Al Qaida

Yet ISIL is not like Al Qaida Dr Gorka explains why ISIL is far more dangerous than Al

Qaida in four key points First ISIL holds territory roughly the size of the United Kingdom

with a population of around six million people This can be described as the worldrsquos first transshy

10

national insurgency in that it holds territories in at least three countries Second ISIL is the

richest threat group of its type in human history and this excludes funds from black market oil

sales and ransom from kidnappings Third the recruiting capacity of ISIL is staggering Their

combination of social media and one-on-one recruiting has proven highly effective Finally he

argues that there is no peer competitor for ISIL in the region and that airstrikes alone will not

stop their progress There will be a need for boots in order to take and hold territory back from

them10

When ISIL claimed the establishment of the caliphate this fundamentally meant their

influence will bound out of the confines of Iraq and Syria This creates the potential to draw

Muslim supporters from around the globe as their radical Islamic ideology spreads through the

media and social media For example ISIL has secured the allegiances of militant groups in

Egypt Nigeria Pakistan Afghanistan Indonesia and the Philippines11 ISIL has also supported

and inspired attacks around the globe including the tragic shootings in Paris France and San

Bernardino CA as well as the March 2016 attacks in Brussels Belgium The most recent

string of ISIL attacks against the West has Western leaders relooking at the strategies being

applied to ISIL in Iraq Syria and now at home

The United States policy against ISIL was hastily developed in 2014 in response to

ISILrsquos proclaiming the establishment of the caliphate and physically taking territory in northern

Iraq In September 2014 President Barack Obama made a public statement defining his

counter-ISIL strategy He defined the overall objective to ldquodegrade and ultimately destroy

10 Sebastian Gorka ldquo4 Reasons Why ISIS is More Dangerous Than Al Qaedardquo The Gorka Briefing (July 10 2015) accessed 27 March 2016 httpthegorkabriefingcom4-reasonsshywhy-isis-is-more-dangerous-than-al-qaeda

11 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters ldquoCouncil on Foreign Relations Backgrounder The Islamic Staterdquo Council on Foreign Relations last updated 22 March 2016 accessed 26 March 2016 httpwwwcfrorgiraqislamic-statep14811

11

ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategyrdquo He then described the

four pillars of his strategy

First we will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists Second we will increase our support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground Third we will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks Fourth we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this terrorist organization This includes Sunni and Shia Muslims who are at grave risk as well as tens of thousands of Christians and other religious minorities12

The US military began launching airstrikes on ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria in August of

2014 even before the President laid out the above strategy to the public On October 15 2014

the US Department of Defense Central Command (USCENTCOM) made the official

announcement that US military operations in Iraq and Syria against ISIL terrorists were

designated as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)13 The White House boasts that as of March

2016 there are sixty-six nations that are partnered with the United States in OIR The simple fact

is the United States is leads the effort in military and monetary commitments and in many cases

still trying to influence our partners to assist more substantially

To review the context ISIL is a growing danger that threatens regional and global

security and stability and must be dealt with Although ISIL was created from elements of Al

Qaida and in many cases still has members who were previously aligned with Al Qaida it is a

considerably more dangerous version of radical Islamic extremism ISIL is trying to co-opt the

worldsrsquo Muslim population into their struggle to establish the caliphate and impose Sharia law

throughout the world ISIL thrived in the perfect storm of events that included the United States

withdrawal from Iraq the internal conflict in Syria and an increasingly dissatisfied Sunni

12 Barack Obama ldquoStatement by the President on ISILrdquo White House Office of the Press Secretary September 10 2014 accessed 22 March 2016 httpswwwwhitehousegovthe-pressshyoffice20140910statement-president-isil-1

13 Department of Defense Operation Inherent Resolve Homepage updated on March 17 2016 accessed on March 21 2016 httpwwwdefensegovNewsSpecial-reports0814_Inherent-Resolve

12

population in the region that was promulgated by the strong-arming Shia-led Iraqi government

The US counter-ISIL strategy is one of airstrikes and limited ground forces responsible for

building partner capacity and arming the various organizations aligned against ISIL and creating

a coalition of allies who will help in the fight to degrade and destroy ISIL in Iraq and Syria With

a firm grasp of the overall context with regards to the situation in the region there are some

important military doctrinal references that require a brief understanding as they will support the

thesis development

Literature Review

Much has already been published about ISIL by analysts historians pundits and

academics What has already been written spans everything from the history of ISIL to policy

recommendations on combating them and everything in between When ISIL began making the

news on a regular basis in 2014 a slew of books and white papers flooded the media describing

ISIL and its origins Now a few years into the strategy to defeat ISIL there are a number of

papers books and editorials about the effectiveness of the strategy While many of these pieces

will be cited in the following pages this monograph will address an area that has thus far

received negligible attention from previous authors Few if any authors have attempted to take

the systems theory approach to the United States strategy to combat ISIL more specifically

examining the strategy specifically in the context of the information environment as opposed to

only the physical environment In attempting to fill that gap this monograph is informed heavily

by the open-source counter-ISIL strategies of the White House the United States Central

Command (USCENTCOM) statements from world leaders and subject matter experts joint

military doctrine media reports and commentary perspectives detailed reports and thought-

pieces from think tanks and academia and military professional journals Other background

resources include Islamic organization statements on ISIL primary source documents on the

13

Islamic religion and the teachings of Sharia Law a variety of books from interagency subject

matter experts and perhaps most importantly ISIL strategy in their own words which includes

their publications and propaganda

To fully comprehend the arguments presented below it is important to create a baseline

in understanding on how US military doctrine defines the space in which military operations

occur This is fundamental in that many of the key arguments presented in this monograph will

discuss the incongruities between the different domains with regard to the US military strategy

against ISIL United States military operations take place in what is termed the operational

environment The Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Operations has been described as the ldquolinchpinrdquo of

the US military doctrine hierarchy by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike

Mullen This publication provides the ldquocommon perspective from which to plan and execute joint

operations independently or in cooperation with our multinational partners other US

Government departments and agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental

organizationsrdquo14 The JP 3-0 defines the operational environment as

The operational environment is the composite of the conditions circumstances and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air land maritime and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace)15

This definition divides the operational environment into two separate environments that

always coexist and overlap the physical environment and the information environment The

physical environment contains the tangible elements of an area such as roads rivers mountains

population centers ports and military formations The information environment is defined in the

JP 3-0 as

14 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations (Washington DC Government Printing Office 2011) Introduction Letter Admiral Michael Mullen

15 Ibid IV-1

14

Where humans and automated systems observe orient decide and act upon information and is therefore the principal environment of decision making This environment is pervasive to all activities worldwide and to the air land maritime and space domains of the Joint Force Commanders operational environment The actors in the information environment include military and civilian leaders decision makers individuals and organizations16

The information environment is further broken down into three separate dimensions

physical informational and cognitive (see Figure 4) A further explanation of these three

domains is provided below from the Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations

Within the information environment the physical dimension is composed of command and control systems key decision makers and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit receive and respond to or act on information17

As the thesis depends heavily on the argument that the US military strategy is not being

effectively waged in the information environment it is critical to delve into more detail on each

of these three domains within the information environment so that there is a clear understanding

of what each encompasses and why it is so important

The physical dimension is composed of command and control systems key decision makers and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effectshellipThe informational dimension encompasses where and how information is collected processed stored disseminated and protected Actions in this dimension affect the content and flow of informationhellipThe cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit receive and respond to or act on information It refers to individualsrsquo or groupsrsquo information processing perception judgment and decision making18

Just as the information domain and the physical domains overlap the dimensions within

the information domain (physical informational and cognitive) also overlap and blend into each

other For example an influence operation aimed at garnering support for a new national law in a

conflict area can be targeted at the local influence leaders in the informational dimension by using

16 JP 3-0 IV-2

17 Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 Information Operations (Washington DC Government Printing Office 2014) ix

18 Ibid I2-I3

15

Figure 4 The Information Environment

Source Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 Information Operations (Washington DC Government Printing Office 2014) I-2

hand bills talking points and television radio and internet ads in the physical dimension to help

facilitate the message that will help influence the thoughts beliefs and behaviors of the wider

population in the cognitive dimension The cell phone towers television networks radio stations

and internet servers all exist in this physical dimension of the information environment as well as

in the overall physical environment This same example holds true for the elements of the

informational and cognitive domains The thought leaders people and their beliefs all exist in the

information environment as well as the physical environment This is an important distinction to

make as there is a tendency within the US military to focus a majority of the military efforts on

elements of the physical environment while the analysis on the information environment is left to

specialists such as information operations and intelligence officers The outcome of this divide

results in a plan that divorces the physical realities and the informational consequences The

16

information environment and operating environment are so inextricably intertwined that they

cannot be viewed as separate entities Armed with the doctrinal concepts and terminology that

will help frame the thesis being presented the first component of the thesis is to examine whether

or not the United States is solving the right problem in terms of its strategy against ISIL

Solving the Right Problem Framing ISIL Through Complexity Science

The United States entry point into the war against ISIL is based on an incomplete

understanding of the phenomena as a whole as evidenced by the strategy being executed on the

ground Since the US military and coalition partners began kinetic operations against ISIL there

have been over eleven-thousand airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria19 However the radical

Islamic extremist ideology persists and continues to spread its tentacles from the Middle East to

the furthest reaches of the globe In the physical realm of the operational environment surely

ISIL has taken some severe blows to their material organization but in an almost ldquocatch-22rdquo type

fashion their setbacks are being exploited to feed recruitment efforts through their sophisticated

propaganda apparatuses Even if the military strategy was one hundred percent successful at

eliminating ISIL fighters in Iraq and Syria the ideology behind the ISIL movement will continue

to swell outside of the region through social media and other groups who have pledged allegiance

to the cause Unless the United States is willing to lead or create Anti-ISIL military operations

around the globe indefinitely in a game of cat-and-mouse it is prudent that the right problem is

being solved

The current military strategy of airstrikes and building partner capacity (BPC) operations

is akin to an analogy in the medical world of conducting only pain-management instead of


17

treating the actual root causes of the pain While the treatments and the military strategy may

have some short term benefits they fail to address the underlying issues and will therefore never

solve the actual problem ISIL is the physical manifestation of the much more complex issue of

radical Islamic extremism which has taken advantage of a region rife with instability corruption

and ethnic grievances Applying complexity science to the study of the problems in the region

will help planners paint a more detailed picture of the of the underlying problems in a system as

opposed to only the superficial By examining the ISIL phenomenon through the lens of

complexity science it becomes evident that ISIL is merely the symptom of much deeper

underlying problems in the region

Complexity science is the scientific study of complex systems systems with many parts

that interact to produce global behavior that cannot easily be explained in terms of interactions

between the individual constituent elements20 In his book ldquoMaking Things Work Solving

Complex Problems in a Complex Worldrdquo Yaneer Bar-Yam defines complex systems as ldquoa new

approach to science which studies how relationships between parts give rise to collective

behaviors of a system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its

environmentrdquo21 Another leader in complexity science Antoine Bousquet reminds everyone that

complexity theory is not a unified body of theory It is an emerging approach or framework set of

theoretical and conceptual tools and not a single theory to be adopted holisticallyrdquo22 Robert

Jervis a notable author on issues of complexity and international relations describes some of the

distinctive attributes of a system ldquoWe are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or

20 ldquoComplexity Science Focusrdquo Agents Interaction and Complexity Group University of Southampton UK accessed 22 March 2016 httpwwwcomplexityecssotonacuk

21 Yaneer Bar-Yam Making Things Work Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World (Cambridge Mass Knowledge Press NECSI Knowledge Press 2005) 24

22 Antoine Bousquet and Curtis Simon Beyond Models and Metaphors Complexity Theory Systems Thinking and International Relations Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24 no 01 (2011) 43-62

18

elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in

other parts of the system and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are

different from those of the partsrdquo23 Thinking about this in terms of ISIL it becomes clear that the

situation in Iraq Syria the region as a whole and increasingly the worldwide information

domain is all part of a large system made up of a myriad of subsystems Using Jervisrsquo parameters

of a system ISIL is completely interconnected with its environment in both positive and negative

ways and that any change in this environment would in-turn produce changes across many other

parts of the environment For example coalition strikes against ISIL-held oil facilities will have

far reaching effects with troop movements vehicle capabilities overall funding their ability to

govern and the list can continue As for the second part of Jervisrsquo parameters for a system the

many different agents within the overall system of the Levant region interact together in

particular ways that cannot be understood simply by a close examination of one agent at a time It

is a futile effort to attempt an understanding of ISIL without understanding them in the context of

the dynamic relationships and linkages they have with the other actors in the system Without this

type of understanding or at least some attempt at it a successful strategy could not take form

Devising a strategy against a group like ISIL is inherently difficult because there is no

single solution to this complex problem Jervis highlights this issue when he says ldquoWe can never

do merely one thing in a system The chains of consequences extend over time and many areas

the effects of action are always multiplerdquo24 Applied to the situation in the Levant this would

suggest that airstrikes alone by the United States against ISIL will not achieve the desired goal

and may in fact have unintended consequences Jervis goes on to say that ldquooutcomes do not

follow from intentions In a system actions have unintended effects on the actor others and the

system as a whole which means that one cannot infer results from desires and expectations and

23 Robert Jervis System Effects Complexity in Political and Social Life 3rd ed (United States Princeton University Press 1998) 6

24 Ibid 10

19

vice versardquo25 Because of the complexity involved with ISIL and the region there is no way of

ever completely understanding all the elements of the system their linkages and their reactions to

changes in the any part of the environment Measuring success cannot be accomplished by

counting the number of airstrikes successfully striking an ISIL target Without understanding how

the many parts of the system react to this new input there is a real danger in not only failing to

achieve actual success but in also enabling an eventual catastrophic failure of the overall system

Complexity theory can be used to help build understanding of the system at all levels and

between all linkages so that the strategists can better frame and anticipate how the system might

react to perturbations The military strategist familiar with complexity science can then apply this

to common military planning efforts

Charles Lister captures this point best in his 2014 Brookings Institute research paper

ldquoProfiling the Islamic Staterdquo when he asserts that ldquoby expanding amidst a tremendous wave of

regional instability and by exploiting and exacerbating such conditions ISIL successfully gained

military power a multiplying international membership and unprecedented financial resources

The key to undermining ISrsquos long-term sustainability therefore is to solve the socio-political

failures within its areas of operationrdquo26 Lister identifies the underlying problems to be the socio-

political failures in the region that have created vacuums that ISIL has filled Jessica Lewis from

the Institute for the Study of War states ldquoISIS draws strength from the complex circumstances

that are independently causing Iraq and Syria to fail including domestic civil and sectarian

cleavages authoritarian leadership and polarizing regional stressorsrdquo27 The complexity of the


26 Charles Lister ldquoProfiling the Islamic Staterdquo Brookings Doha Center Analysis (Analysis Paper Number 13 November 2014) 2-3 accessed 24 February 2016 httpwwwbrookingseduresearchreports2201412profiling-islamic-state-lister

27 Jessica Lewis The Islamic State A Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State Institute for the Study of War (July 2014) 4 accessed March 7 2016 httpwwwunderstandingwar orgreportislamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state

20

systems at play in Iraq and Syria cannot be overstated The following points will assist

developing a base sense of the sheer complexity

The Shia led Iraqi government has exacerbated tensions with the Sunnis through its

heavy-handedness and dominant grip on Iraqi power ISIL has exacerbated this already present

rift and co-opted many Sunnis in their cause to re-establish the Caliphate at the expense of all

who oppose them The Kurds in the northern portion of Iraq have been fighting for their own

autonomous region that they refer to as ldquoKurdistanrdquo and though they are not necessarily loyal to

the Iraq government they fight against ISIL Iran which is predominantly Shia is assisting the

Shia dominated Iraqi government in its fight against ISIL while at the same time maintaining a

tenuous relationship with the United States The Saudi Arabian government which is

predominantly Sunni is also taking part alongside the United States in the airstrikes against ISIL

in Syria but not in Iraq With the exception of Jordan other Muslim nations in the region who

are conducting airstrikes against ISIL are only conducting them within Syria and not Iraq

Moreover Turkey who is a member of NATO and has a long-standing dispute with the Kurdish

forces in northern Iraq which are directly supported by the United States has been ratcheting up

tensions with the Russians in Syria while also enduring horrific terrorist attacks within its own

borders at the hand of ISIL and the militant Kurdistan Workers Party Exacerbating these

tensions was the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish forces in late November of 2015

over the Turkey-Syrian border region

The Russian military entered the fray in Syria to prop up the Assad regime under the

guise of fighting ISIL in September 2015 Fighting against the Assad regime in Syria is the Free

Syria Army (FSA) and other anti-Assad forces who are in many cases aligned with or even give

their tacit support to ISIL Enter the United States

The US military strategy has been to conduct airstrikes against ISIL leadership in both

Syria and Iraq as well as to provide military support to the remains of the Iraqi government the

Kurds in the north part of Iraq and the Free Syria Army in Syria There is a diverse cast of

21

competing characters currently receiving either direct or tacit military support from the United

States While all the factions receiving US military support are aligned against ISIL many of

them are also aligned against each other This dynamic should have policy makers in Washington

DC asking questions about what will happen after the physical manifestations of ISIL are

defeated in Iraq and Syria who will fill that void and what does that mean in regards to the larger

implications for the region The current actions being taken by the United States in the region

would indicate that the strategy against ISIL is shortsighted and does not take into account the

complex problem set that actually set a group like ISIL into motion in the first place A greater

appreciation of the operational and information environments that ISIL operates in may have

better shaped the United States strategy This highly complex problem-set is where complexity

science and operational design become invaluable tools for national level strategy development

and military campaign planning28

Joint military doctrine states that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and staff develops

plans and orders through the application of operational art and operational design They combine

art and science to develop products that describe how (ways) the joint force will employ its

capabilities (means) to achieve the military end state (ends)29 Operational art is the design studio

in which tactics are developed and executed to achieve the strategic aims while operational

design is a planning methodology based in conceptual planning that later feeds more detailed

planning efforts The complexity science described above informs the operational design process

and enables operational art The design methodology is applicable for complex ambiguous

problems and is one way to conceptualize and explore the intricacies of the environment in terms

of what it looks like in the present and what the desired future state is as well as how to frame the

28 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (Washington DC Government Printing Office 2011) III-2

29 Ibid III-1

22

problems being examined and then examine approaches to achieving that desired state It would

be nearly impossible to use this doctrinal methodology without incorporating elements of

complexity science One of the first elements of the design methodology is to frame the

environment as it currently is30 Complexity science allows the military planner to examine the

operating environment as a system of systems with many different agents who are linked together

in an unfathomable amount of non-linear ways31 This way of analyzing the operational and

information environment will garner a deeper understanding of the system and sub-systems

which will in turn help to frame the actual underlying problems as opposed to just the symptoms

that bubble to the surface and gain the most attention This view brings the United States strategy

against ISIL into question as an effective strategy

Unfortunately this appears to be the case with the United States approach to defeating

ISIL which complexity science helps illuminate The strategy that the United States is

employing against ISIL suggests that during the planning process the wrong problem was

defined With the wrong problem set defined the strategy will most certainly miss the mark in

achieving an overall successful strategy The problem set defined by the White House is one

where ISIL is at the root of all problems in Iraq and Syria32 This view does not take into account

the initial state of affairs that set the conditions for the manifestation of ISIL as well as all of the

other intricate linkages between the players incorporated within the system of systems While

ISIL certainly is causing many problems in the region it is not the root cause of what ails the

region It appears as if the military operation is being conducted in a vacuum devoid of political

and regional realities Carl Von Clausewitz discussed this in 1827 when he critiqued a friendrsquos

30 Ibid III-8

31 Antoine Bousquet and Simon Curtis Beyond Models and Metaphors Complexity Theory Systems Thinking and International Relations Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24 no 1 (March 2011) 46


23

military strategy created as a mental exercise Major von Roeder a Prussian general-staff officer

asked his friend and mentor Clausewitz for advice on his strategy for the fictitious defense of

Prussia from an Austrian aggressor When Clausewitz found out that the exercise was only from

the military purview and devoid of any politics he asked his friend ldquohow then is it possible to

plan a campaign whether for one theatre of war or several without indicating the political

condition of the belligerents and the politics of the relationship to each otherrdquo33 This same type

of question can be asked today of the military strategist who are executing a military campaign

against ISIL without a political strategy beyond the ldquodegrading and destruction of ISILrdquo34

Is ISIL really the problem or is the problem much deeper and more complex with ISIL

being only the symptom One way of answering that question is to ask another question What

happens if ISIL in its physical form it completely destroyed in Iraq and Syria Will all the major

problems in the Levant come to an end and stability and governance flourish abundantly This

question may sound ridiculous but it helps to frame the complexity involved in this problem set

Regrettably destroying ISIL in Iraq and Syria with a strategy focused almost completely on

military means will only create a new set of challenges in the region One of these new challenges

will likely include competition for power between the regional competitors who are supported by

the United States such as the Free Syria Army Kurds Iraq government and Saudi Arabia35

Each of these entities is vying for a political aim that does not necessarily compliment the others

Another challenge will be in denying the existence of a vacuum that helped precipitate the rise of

ISIL in the first place Of course there is also the expected backlash on social media that will

33 Carl von Clausewitz Peter Paret and Daniel Moran Carl Von Clausewitz Two Letters on Strategy (Fort Leavenworth Kansas US Army Command and General Staff College 1984) 22


35 BBC Syria Crisis Where Key Countries Stand BBC Middle East October 30 2015 accessed March 14 2016 httpwwwbbccomnewsworld-middle-east-23849587

24

surely frame the defeat of ISIL as a war against Islam and another Christian crusade All of these

new challenges will have to be addressed should ISIL be completely vanquished

The crux of the issue here is that the wrong problem is being solved in the region and

that even the complete destruction of ISIL in the absence of a much more comprehensive

strategy that at least addresses the multi-faceted politics and socio-economic issues in the region

will result in conditions that will likely be worse than the current conditions The strategy now

being used now against ISIL looks remarkably similar to the strategy that was waged against ISI

and Al Qaida in Iraq36 The differences between the groups are stark and an old strategy will not

work against this new threat as the environmental physical and informational contexts are

widely disparate These differences are the fundamental reason why there is a distinct asymmetry

in the overall strategy against ISIL a strategy that has an overwhelming military emphasis where

a whole of government approach is needed One step in the right direction came from the

Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Tina Kaidanow when she stated

Efforts will continue in the military realm with vigor and a continued amount of focus and attention but I think itrsquos clear we cannot address counterterrorism solely through military means We need to keep denying them the supply of foreign terrorist fighters cut off their access to financing disrupt and expose their messaging and stabilize the vulnerable communities that have been liberated from ISIL control37

Her comments reflect the complexity involved in the region by showing that one option for action

is not an option but that it will take many actions done over a span of time to many different

parts of the system

36 Audrey Cronin ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group Foreign Affairs January 14 2016 accessed March 15 2016 httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesmiddle-eastisis-not-terroristshygroup

37 Tina Kaidanow Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Department of State Transcript (Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington DC 3 FEB 2016) accessed on 22 March 2016 httpwwwstategovjctrls rm252082htm

25

Asymmetric Strategy and the Elusive Decisive Blow

The blame for the failure to adequately frame the operational and information

environment in regards to ISIL and the region cannot be placed solely on the US military

planners The overarching United States counter-ISIL strategy developed by the White house is

focused almost entirely on military objectives instead of regional desired end states In effect the

political strategy is the military strategy with only negligible asymmetric effort placed on

anything other than direct military action military partnerships and aid Figure 5 below shows

the White Housersquos four-part plan to defeat and degrade ISIL abroad These components include

military strikes training and equipping of anti-ISIL forces stopping the financing and recruiting

stream enabling ISIL and ironically in the last bullet to establish a cease-fire and political

resolution to the Syrian civil war More important that what is stated in the strategy is what is not

stated There is no mention of an overall strategic communications plan by Western governments

to combat the rise of radical Islamic extremism that is the driving force behind groups like ISIL38

Nor is there any mention of a plan to ease ethnic tensions between the Shia-based Iraqi

government and the majority Sunni population in Iraq which feeds Sunni recruits straight into the

ranks of ISIL There is also no mention of how Russian Iranian and Saudi Arabian involvement

in the conflict each in their own way and with their own agenda change the overall calculus of

the situation Undoubtedly these are being discussed behind closed doors at the highest levels of

the US government but even so none of these issues have made their way into the strategy being

executed on the ground Military means are being used to achieve limited military objectives It is

apparent that a more comprehensive whole of government approach that addresses political and

strategic objectives is needed to defeat ISIL combat the ideology that feeds it and to work to

38 Graeme Wood What ISIS Really Wants The Atlantic February 15 2015 accessed March 14 2016 httpwwwtheatlanticcommagazinearchive201503what-isis-reallyshywants384980

26

create political resolutions that address more than just Syria Only then can stability begin to take

hold in the region and deny other radical groups from filling the void that ISIL will leave

Figure 5 The White House Strategy Against ISIL

Source White House ldquoISIL Strategy The US Strategy to Defeat ISIL and Combat the Terrorist Threatrdquo accessed March 15 2016 httpswwwwhitehousegovisil-strategy

It will not come as a shock to anyone that based on the US military strategy success is

being measured in terms of kinetic effects on the enemy as Figure 6 describes below The

Department of Defense is quick to show the financial costs associated with this military strategy

as well ldquoAs of February 29 2016 the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic

operations started on August 8 2014 is $65 billion and the average daily cost is $114 million

for 571 days of operationsrdquo39 This conflict is already six billion dollars deep and growing daily

all the while the politicians in the United States talk of fiscal austerity and cuts to the military

forces which have already begun limiting capabilities40 This is exactly why having a correct

39 Department of Defense Operation Inherent Resolve Homepage updated on March 17 2016 accessed March 21 2016 httpwwwdefensegovNewsSpecial-reports0814_ Inherent-Resolve

40 Mark Moyar How Obama Shrank the Military The Wall Street Journal August 2 2015 accessed March 12 2016 httpwwwwsjcomarticleshow-obama-shrank-the-militaryshy1438551147

27

strategy is so important Defining success in terms of enemies killed and equipment destroyed is

surely the wrong measure of effectiveness in this complex problem set

Figure 6 Operation Inherent Resolve Targets Damaged and Destroyed Report

Source US Department of Defense Operation Inherent Resolve Homepage accessed on 28 March 2016 httpwwwdefensegovNewsSpecial-Reports0814_Inherent-Resolve

As it stands the US military is executing a military strategy based on the strategic

guidance given to them by the US President and his National Security Council (NSC) There is

nothing inherently wrong or improper about this as this is how military doctrine defines the chain

of command and the relationship between the Presidentsrsquo administration and the military The

President and the NSC are responsible for giving strategic guidance Joint military doctrine

defines strategic guidance as the formulation of politico-military assessments at the strategic level

that develop and evaluate military strategy and objectives apportion and allocate forces and other

resources formulate concepts and strategic military options and develop planning guidance

leading to the preparation of courses of action A whole of government approach is used to

28

formulate strategic end states with suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect

US national interests41

Herein lies the tension with the current US counter-ISIL strategy The strategic guidance

from the White House did not address strategic end states but instead chose to focus on the

military end states to degrade and defeat ISIL in Iraq and Syria This could have been the case for

a number of reasons ranging from politics and risk to a lack of clarity on the desired end states

Whatever the reason the US military has been given a mission that they are currently executing

and are using easily identified metrics such as body counts and equipment strikes to measure

success

As with any military action leaders want to achieve a quick and decisive victory and

therefore spend a lot of time trying to decide where to deliver the decisive blow to the enemy

Clausewitz refers to this as the ldquocenter of gravityhellipthe point against which all our energies should

be directedrdquo42 US Joint military doctrine defines the center of gravity (COG) as a source of

power that provides moral or physical strength freedom of action or will to act and that an

objective is always linked to a COG43 The Joint doctrine goes on to explain that ldquothis process

cannot be taken lightly since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have

very serious consequences such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at

an acceptable costrdquo44

A quick search of the internet or any number of recent military professional journal will

turn up several author who have solved the ISIL problem single-handedly by identifying the

enemy COG Part of the problem is that there are so many different ideas circulating within the

41 JP 5-0 II-19

42 Carl von Clausewitz On War edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton Princeton University Press 1976) 595-596

43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29

military academia think tanks and media circles that each have identified different COGs and

they cannot possibly all be correct or wrong for that matter Is finding the ISIL COG an exercise

in futility or is it that having so many different COGs identified by such a wide audience of so-

called experts just a testament to complexity involved with ISIL and the region as a whole While

this monograph has no intention of trying to add to the list of identifying the one COG that will

solve all the problems in the region it will take a brief look at some of the COGs that have been

identified to examine the utility of COG analysis and the breadth of the complexity

In July of 2014 the Institute for the Study of War published a paper called The Islamic

State A Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State In it author Jessica Lewis proposed that ISIL has

two distinct COGs that combine together to give them strength in the region ldquoThe first is a

classical military center of gravity that ISIS uses to wrest physical control from modern states and

hold what it has gained The second ISIS center of gravity is a political capacity to provide

essential state functions within the territory that ISIS controls ISIS strength emanates from the

ability to translate military control into political control and thereby to claim that the Caliphate is

manifestrdquo45 Simply stated she proposes the COG as ISILrsquos combination of military and political

capabilities

Dr Anthony Cordesman a well-known national security analyst from the Center for

Strategic and International Studies cites his view of the COG in the battle against ISIL as

ldquohaving an Iraqi government and set of political compromises that is functional enough to unite

its key factions that offers all the incentives of security and a fair share of power and the nationrsquos

oil wealth and that can make a quick and real start in job creation economic development and

reviving the nationrsquos education and medical systems when security is restoredrdquo46 In agreement


46 Anthony Cordesman ldquoThe Real Center of Gravity in the War Against the Islamic Staterdquo Center for Strategic and International Studies 30 September 2014

30

with Dr Cordesman is Michael Doran from the Brookings Institute who says the COG is ldquoSyria

where Assad Iranrsquos closest ally presents the alliance at its most brutal if also its most

vulnerable Until Assad is gone Syria will remain the regionrsquos most powerful magnet of global

jihad So long as the Jihadis enjoy a safe haven in Syria they will continue to dominate the Sunni

heartland of Iraqrdquo47 Again there are other experts pointing to something other than a military

focus as key to the defeat of ISIL

Another perspective comes from Retired Army Four-star General Jack Keane who states

that the ISIL COG is Syria ldquoThe facts are the headquarters is there The logistical infrastructure

is there Thats where the recruiting takes place And thats where the training takes place48

General Keanersquos assessment is that the COG is a physical location as opposed to the previous two

assessments that had listed it as the grouprsquos military control and a system of functional

governments in the region This is interesting since ISIL is attempting to reestablish a Caliphate

and in order to do so needs to possess a territory to do so with With that logic it could be

deduced that to deny ISIL any territory they are denied the ability to establish their caliphate

which then delegitimizes their strategic goals This view is also shared by Dr Michael Williams

of the Mackenzie Institute where he states ldquoThe most critical center of gravity then is territory

Territory provides ISIS with legitimacy which helps recruitment and provides the ability to fund

the ISIS state and war Thus unlike de-territorialized networked actors like Al-Qaida ISIS must

be dismantled on the ground Allowing ISIS to maintain control of physical territory in the

Middle East will only allow the cancer to grow and eventually expandrdquo49

47 Michael Doran ldquoMisidentifying the Conflict in Iraq and Syriardquo (Brookings July 10 2014) accessed March 21 2016 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsmarkazposts20140710shydoran-obama-iraq-syria-strategy

48 Wanda Carruthers ldquoGen Jack Keane Syria Center of Gravity for ISISrdquo News Max (January 16 2015) accessed 21 March 2016 httpwwwnewsmaxcomNewsfrontJack-KeaneshySyria-ISIS-Islamic-State20150116id619065

31

Counter-Insurgency Expert Dr Sebastian Gorka declares that the ISIL COG is their

ideology Dr Gorka asserts that ldquoyou can stop or kill an individual terrorist or jihadi leader but

that wonrsquot stop the ideology that will continue to motivate people to commit terrorist attacksrdquo50

Scholars from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) including Fred and Kimberly Kagan

agree with Dr Gorka in that ideology is the COG for ISIL and Al Qaida In a paper published in

December of 2015 titled ldquoA global strategy for combating al Qaida and the Islamic Staterdquo the

authors state that ldquothe center of gravity for both ISIS and al Qaida is their ideology a form of

Jihadi-Salafism That is by delegitimizing the ideology that attracts Muslims to al Qaida and

other extremist organizations and motivates their subsequent actions we can defeat them

Conversely if we fail to deal with the underlying ideology that motivates al Qaida and its

affiliates we are likely to enjoy only limited successrdquo51

It is evident that there is a wide array of ideas on what exactly the ISIL COG is Ideas

include the actual ISIL fighters ISIL leadership Syria and other physical locations the

governmental and political conditions in the region that allowed ISIL to manifest as it did and the

ideology that feeds the recruits and fervor in the organization Some of the COGs similarly look

at the COG as a physical manifestation while others agree that it is an intangible idea or

condition As was mentioned earlier none of these are wrong It would be interesting to pair

these COG ideas up with the current counter-ISIL strategy to gauge if the strategy could

potentially affect any of these COGs mentioned Those who believe the ISIL COG is the fighters

49 Michael Williams ldquoISIS as a Strategic Actor Strategy and Counter-Strategyrdquo (Mackenzie Institute APR 15 2015) accessed 22 March 2016 httpmackenzieinstitutecomisis-strategic-actor-strategy-counter-strategy

50 Sebastian Gorka ldquoTargeting the Center of Gravityrdquo The Gorka Briefing (4 JAN 2016) accessed March 21 2016 httpthegorkabriefingcomtargeting-center-gravity

51 Mary Habeck et al ldquoA Global Strategy for Combating Al Qaeda and the Islamic Staterdquo (American Enterprise Institute December 7 2015) accessed March 17 2016 httpwwwaeiorgpublicationa-global-strategy-for-combating-al-Qaeda-and-the-islamic-state

32

the leadership and the physical locations are likely satisfied that the strategy is addressing the

COGs that they have identified The experts who believe that the COG is the stability of the

region through governmental and political conditions are most likely not happy with the strategy

as it does little if anything to address the issues that they see as key to the conflict Similarly the

experts who think that the ISIL ideology of radical Islamic extremism is the COG are left with

little consolation as the strategy is monopolized by military action through airstrikes and partner

capacity building operations52

The White Housersquos current counter-ISIL strategy is only effectively engaging ISIL in the

physical part of the operational environment and not in the information environment where ISIL

is making its most strategically significant gains with recruiting and propaganda that promotes its

growth and resilience The strategy remains narrowly focused on the symptoms of more strategic

concerns such as socio-economic instability that comprise the root cause Without an amended

strategy to address the primary socio-economic and political conditions that sustain ISIL the

military-centric strategy will likely fail to achieve the current administrationrsquos stated goal of

degrading and destroying ISIL in Iraq and Syria Military means will remain only one aspect of a

comprehensive anti-ISIL strategy that would ideally include plans to address Iraqi governance

political structures and most importantly radical Islamic extremism

ISIL is winning in the information environment and in the battle of wills due to the White

Housersquos minimal efforts to contest ISIL in the information environment ISILrsquos narrative

continues to gain momentum despite military setbacks due in part to their mastery of media

propaganda and recruiting The flaws in the White Housersquos current anti-ISIL strategy are driven

home in the US Army Strategic Land Power study of 2013 which states ldquolasting strategic success

is not a function of enemy units eliminated or targets destroyed A successful strategic outcome


33

rests as it has since time immemorial on winning the contest of willsrdquo53 These wills are shaped

by the information environment and are driven by powerful narratives that must be addressed

A Battle of Narratives

While the kinetic fight against ISIL is underway the one fight that is not being waged

against ISIL in a strategic manner is the fight within the information environment In order to

counter the radical Islamic ideology that fuels terrorism around the globe a battle must also be

waged in the information environment on a strategic not just tactical level While speaking of

Al Qaida in the book Fighting the Ideological War Winning Strategies from Communism to

Islamism Dr Sebastian Gorka writes ldquoAlthough we have proven our capacity in the last 10 years

kinetically to engage our enemy at the operational and tactical level with unsurpassed

effectiveness we have not even begun to take the war to Al Qaida at the strategic level of

counter-ideology to attack it at its heart ndash the ideology of global jihadrdquo54 This is where the

asymmetry in strategy comes into play again The United States is fighting a localized kinetic war

against a transnational and ideologically driven enemy that has mastered the information

environment This sentiment is further confirmed by the former commander of US Special

Operations forces in the Middle East Army Major General Mike Nagata General Nagata

summed up the power of the narrative and the information environment when he says of ISIL

ldquoAmong all its various strengths the one that has increasingly demanded attention has been the

53 Raymond Odierno John Amos and William McRaven ldquoStrategic Landpower Winning the Clash of Willsrdquo US Army US Marine Corps and US Special Operations Command combined white paper (October 2013) 7 accessed date 11 March 2016 httpwwwarcicarmymilapp_DocumentsStrategic-Landpower-White-Paper-28OCT2013pdf

54 The Westminster Institute Fighting the Ideological War Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism ed Patrick Sookhdeo and Katharine C Gorka (United States Isaac Publishing 2012)185-186

34

ldquointangiblerdquo power of DArsquoISHmdashits ability to persuade its ability to inspire its ability to attract

young men and women from across the globe and its ability to create an image of unstoppable

power and spiritual passion and commitmentrdquo55 General Nagata goes on to say that this is one

area where the current US strategy is inadequate and vulnerable

The current overall US strategy to counter ISIL would suggest that there is little

understanding of the enemy in the information domain The previous sections of this monograph

emphasized the battle occurring almost exclusively in the physical domain of the operational

environment Intelligence analysts across the US Government who work against ISIL can almost

certainly point to data about the size composition and movement of ISIL forces with extreme

accuracy It is highly questionable whether the same number of people in the intelligence

community and policy circles would be able to discuss the ISIL beliefs goals threat doctrine and

their narratives This incomplete and unbalanced understanding of the enemy is the driving force

behind the failings of the current strategy to defeat ISIL

There is much more to the story than just ISIL in its physical form The ideology and

narratives that feed the ISIL movement should be examined closely as part of any strategy to

defeat them Army Lieutenant Colonel Brian Steed a subject matter expert on narratives

describes the importance of understanding the narrative when he says ldquoThe lsquodecisive operationrsquo

on the current Middle Eastern battlefield is narrative Violence is still a critical portion of armed

conflict but it optimally serves a supporting role Darsquoash (ISIL) and others use violence primarily

to communicate confirm or advance their narrativerdquo56 Based on Lieutenant Colonel Steeds

point the US strategy is focusing its own main effort on the supporting effort of the enemy The

terms lsquonarrativersquo and lsquocounter-narrativersquo have been increasingly used in defense strategy circles

55 Hriar Cabayan and Sarah Canna Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL (Washington DC Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office Office of the Secretary of Defense 2014) 1

56 Brian Steed ldquoChanging the Conversation Conceptualizing the Fight against Non-State and Post-State Actorsrdquo (May 2015) 3

35

over the past several years when trying to describe ways to understand what motivates groups of

people and how best to influence them It may be useful examine a few definitions of the concept

of narrative from a scholarly perspective a military practitioner perspective and a military

doctrine perspective These three unique ways of looking at a narrative provide insight on what a

narrative is and how a narrative can be used as influencing agents internally and externally

A scholar on narratives and narrative theory H Porter Abbott defines narrative simply

as ldquothe representation of events consisting of story and narrative discourse story is an event or

sequence of events (the action) and narrative discourse is those events as representedrdquo57 In the

2016 white paper Maneuver in the Narrative Space a narrative is said to be an

organizing framework through which individuals make sense of their world and provides insight into the beliefs norms and values of a group Narratives facilitate sense-making the process of interpretation and production of meaning Insurgent groups often employ narratives as a means of communicating grievances goals and justifications for their actions within a story-like framework58

Army doctrine also mentions narrative in the 2013 version of the ldquoInform and Influence

Activitiesrdquo manual Field Manual 3-13 where narrative is said to be ldquoa brief description of a

commanderrsquos story used to visualize the effects the commander wants to achieve in the

information environment to support and shape their operational environmentsrdquo59 These three

definitions provide a broad understanding from both a civilian and a military perspective on what

a narrative is In its most basic form a narrative is a story with events that aids in the

understanding and recognition of multiple world views One example is the American narrative of

the tragic events on 9-11 America was attacked by terrorists but pulled together as a country to

57 Porter H Abbott The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative 2nd ed (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2008) 19

58 Brigadier General Charles L Moore et al ldquoStrategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper Maneuver and Engagement in the Narrative Spacerdquo (January 2016) 5 accessed 17 March 2016 httpwwwsocmilswcsProjectGrayManeuver20in20the20Narrative 20Spacepdf

59 Field Manual (FM) 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities (Washington DC Government Printing Office 2013) 1-4

36

show the terrorists and the world that the American spirit can never be crushed60 Some version of

this narrative would likely resonate with everyone who was old enough to remember that day in

2001 These narratives the stories that people tell themselves and each other become woven into

the fabric of their lives and shape their world view and decisions61 This is why understanding the

concept of narratives and more importantly understanding the narratives of an enemy is critical

to any strategy

The ISIL narrative is rich with history religion stories of victimization and triumph and

the belief that everything the organization is trying to achieve has been pre-ordained through their

religious beliefs It is a multi-faceted narrative that can be tailored to specific audiences

depending on what their target of influence is In its most basic form components of the ISIL

strategic narrative include the establishment of the Caliphate universal Sharia law conquest of

the Infidels and a message of hope and purpose for a largely hopeless and disenfranchised

population While an entire separate monograph can be written on the ISIL narrative there is one

summation provided in the US Special Operations Command Strategic Multilayer Assessment

White Paper Maneuver and Engagement in the Narrative Space that succinctly sums up the

salient points included in the ISIL narrative This White Paper suggests that some of the key

components of the ISIL narratives include ldquovictimization the plight of Iraqi Sunni Arabs Sunni-

Shia antipathy an alternative to chaos and an alternative to the nation-staterdquo62 The paper goes on

60 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt How Resilient is Post-911 America Sunday Review August 24 2014 accessed February 11 2016 httpwwwnytimescom201209 09sunday-reviewhow-resilient-is-post-9-11-americahtml_r=0

61 Julie Beck The Story of Your Life The Atlantic August 10 2015 accessed March 10 2016 httpwwwtheatlanticcomhealtharchive201508life-stories-narrative-psychologyshyredemption-mental-health400796


37

to explain that ldquoWhile narratives provided the informational backdrop for ISILrsquos appeal the

group was able to take advantage of regional instability to transform its goal of a state into reality

and implemented successful recruiting practicesrdquo63 This suggests that ISIL had successfully

synchronized their operations across the information and the physical domains of the operational

environment and lend credibility to Lieutenant Colonel Steeds assertion that ISIL uses violence

and military action as an enabler to their main effort of controlling and propagating their

narrative Omar Hammami a relatively notorious Islamic extremist who used the pseudonym

ldquoAbu Mansoor Al-Amrikirdquo made the comment that ldquoThe war of narratives has become even

more important than the war of navies napalm and knivesrdquo64 That statement provides a telling

look inside the mindset that drives the ideology fueling ISIL

ISIL puts forth a significant amount of effort into running their media campaign

propaganda and recruiting They see themselves at war in the information environment equally

if not more so than in the physical environment65 The leader of Al Qaida Ayman al-Zawahiri

said back in 2005 that ldquowe are in a battle and more than half of this battle is taking place in the

battlefield of the mediahellipwe are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our ummardquo66 This

media campaign appears to be successful if the number of foreign fighters recruited to the cause

is a valid metric As of early 2015 over twenty-thousand foreign fighters have traveled to Syria to

63 Moore Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper Maneuver and Engagement in the Narrative Space5

64 Omar Hammami The Story of an American Jihadi (Abu Muhammad As-Somaali 2012) accessed on 22 March 2016 httpwwwscribdcomdoc93732117The-Story-of-anshyAmerican-Jihaadiscribd

65 Ayman Al-Zawahri ldquoLetter from Al-Zawahiri to Al-Zarqawirdquo Global Security October 11 2005 accessed 15 March 2016 httpwwwglobalsecurityorgsecuritylibrary report2005zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005htm

66 Ibid

38

join the ranks of ISIL67 The message is obviously resonating with their intended audiences and

poses a significant challenge to the counter ISIL strategy

One of the best ways to understand ISIL is to look at what they say and publish on a

regular basis They publish professional-quality magazines and periodicals in English to aid in

their narrative propaganda and recruitment efforts They are also active on social media sites

like Twitter Facebook YouTube etc where they release propaganda videos and recruit both

passive and active support from the broader Muslim community68 In a 2015 Brookings Institute

paper titled ldquoHere to Stay and Growing Combating ISIS Propaganda Networksrdquo Alberto

Fernandez makes a compelling case as to why the ISIL media is so effective He argues that if

one was to summarize all the ISIL media into a few short words the concepts that would emerge

would be urgency agency authenticity and victory The urgency is created by emphasizing that

innocent Sunni Arab Muslims including children are being slaughtered in Syria by the nonshy

believers The agency comes into play in that the viewer can do something to join the cause to

right this wrong Authenticity is established by the actions on the ground that show the

establishment of the Caliphate as already underway The last is victory which is evident by the

success on the ground in Iraq and Syria and the fact that despite the amount of international

attention focused on the region ISIL still thrives69 These four elements combine to drive home a

powerful narrative that has acted as an accelerant to fuel the fire of this dangerous brand of

radical Islamic extremism To contest this powerful narrative the West will need more than just

airstrikes and a few boots on the ground

67 Peter Neumann ldquoForeign Fighter Total in SyriaIraq Now Exceeds 20000 Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980srdquo The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence January 26 2015 httpicsrinfo201501

68 Javier Lesaca Fight Against ISIS Reveals Power of Social Media Brookings November 19 2015 accessed January 14 2016 httpwwwbrookingsedublogstechtank posts20151119-isis-social-media-power-lesaca

69 Alberto Fernandez ldquoHere to Stay and Growing Combating ISIS Propaganda Networksrdquo Brookings Institute October 2015 11-12

39

A 2015 white paper endorsed by General Joseph Votel the commander of US Special

Operations Command (USSOCOM) comments that ldquoThousands of airstrikes helped to check

their (ISILrsquos) rapid expansion but the decisive effort against them will require discrediting their

narrative and connecting the people to legitimate governing structures - areas where Department

of Defense should not have primacyrdquo70 There is considerable talk in strategic communications

circles about developing a counter-narrative to ISIL that discredits their narrative71 Some are

directed directly towards ISIL others towards the radical extremism that feeds it It is as if the

term narrative is being weaponized to further onersquos cause and if someone wants to negate

someone elsersquos narrative they fire back with their own There are several problems with this

notion though To begin with narratives are not just lsquothingsrsquo that can be manipulated and negated

through crafty wordsmithing Going back to the earlier example it would be hard to imagine that

a non-Westerner could sell a counter-narrative to an American regarding the events of 9-11 that

would fundamentally change any Americanrsquos perceptions of that event That event is woven into

the collective memory of the society and even a well-crafted message has little chance of

changing that How then can anyone expect to create a counter-narrative to the ISIL narrative

and expect to gain traction

This is especially true if that narrative was to come from the Western world where the

population is comprised mostly of what ISIL would call ldquoInfidelsrdquo There is a significant gap

between the reality of the West and that of ISIL and Muslims in general in the Middle East This

gap creates a perception challenge from both sides that clouds how each side interprets the others

messages and intentions American attempts to message ISIL on a more moderate method of

70 US Special Operations Command White Paper ldquoThe Gray Zonerdquo September 15 2015 7 accessed 15 March 2015 httpwwwsocmilswcsProjectGrayGray20Zones20shy20USSOCOM20White20Paper 20920Sep202015pdf

71 Simon Cottee Why Itrsquos So Hard to Stop ISIS Propaganda The Atlantic March 2 2015 accessed February 2 2016 httpwwwtheatlanticcominternationalarchive201503whyshyits-so-hard-to-stop-isis-propaganda386216

40

practicing Islam would meet certain dismissal as it would not be a credible message from that

particular source That same message coming from respected Islamic clerics would carry more

credibility Part of any potential counter narrative efforts should take the audience and the

messenger into great account to ensure that there is as little gap in understanding and credibility

as possible A counter narrativersquos aim should not be to completely change what the target

audience believes as that would be near impossible Narratives are comprised of stories that are

part of everyday life and the reality of that cannot simply be erased from the mind It is possible

though to alter perceptions of the stories within the narratives that are being countered This leads

to counter narratives being more of a long term project as opposed to an immediate response to a

threatening narrative Therefore a counter narrative is most successful when woven into a

broader strategy that supports the overall strategic objectives72

There is an ongoing in the information domain that the West is losing While airstrikes

and more troops flow into Iraq and Syria ISIL continues to spread its narrative beyond the

borders of the current conflict In order to devise a strategy with any possibility for long term

regional stability and to slow the growing cancer that is radical Islamic extremism United States

policy makers must begin focusing on the ISIL problem in a broader context and with a more

comprehensive strategy This should include following the lead of ISIL in that the Western

narratives start driving operations instead of the other way around A serious review is needed in

terms of Information Operations and Strategic Communications at the strategic level

Reframing Information Operations

Successfully challenging ISIL in the information environment requires serious

introspection about how the United States wages war in this domain Strategic level engagements

72 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr Fixing How We Fight the Islamic Statersquos Narrative War On the Rocks January 4 2016 accessed March 16 2016 httpwarontherockscom201601fixing-how-we-fight-the-islamic-states-narrative

41

in the information environment occur typically through the White House and Department of State

and fall into the realms of diplomacy and strategic communications73 Military-type engagements

in the information environment are executed by the Department of Defense specifically through

information operations and have effects that range anywhere from tactical to strategic The

military is in the unique position of being able to conduct direct actions in both the physical and

information environment and is therefore the usual implementation instrument for disseminating

messaging and propagating narratives Yet when no higher level strategic plan or narrative exists

to nest into military information operations will inevitably be relegated to only tactical

information operations that achieve local and limited effects To be effective messaging at all

levels should be tied to an overall strategy and strategic messaging that guides all actions and

communication efforts This would typically be created by the administration and the Department

of State In the absence of an overarching strategy and narrative there should be little surprise

when successful tactical and operational successes still manage to result in a strategic failure

A poignant example of the disconnect between military success on the ground yet a

failure to win the enduring narrative is presented in Steven Cormanrsquos 2013 book Narrating the

Exit from Afghanistan Corman examines a case study of the well-planned and orderly Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan and explains how despite this the enduring narrative is that the

Soviets were forced out of Afghanistan by the Mujahedeen His case study concludes that the

military aspects of the withdrawal plan were quite well planned and organized but it was the

strategic level politics and dialogue particularly with Pakistan that forever branded the entire

venture as a failure in the eyes of anyone but the Soviets themselves74 This case study helps

illuminate the challenges of synchronizing military and diplomatic efforts to ensure that the

73 Christopher Paul Strategic Communication Origins Concepts and Current Debates (Santa Barbara CA Praeger Publishers 2011) 1-16

74 Steven Corman Narrating the Exit from Afghanistan (Tempe AZ Center for Strategic Communication 2013) 38-70

42

desired strategic narratives are reinforced The narrative from the Afghan Mujahedeen and the

West on the Soviet withdrawal representing a strategic failure is by far the more powerful and

remembered of any competing narrative from that event75

Present day Russia has taken an increased interest in information operations and has

woven it into nearly every aspect of their newly released Russian Federation National Security

dated December 15 2015 Russia has identified the importance of information in both defensive

and offensive capabilities and has worked it into all of their elements of national power as a tool

to shape their internal and external narrative76 While this interest is not necessarily new the

successes that Russia had with their information operations against Estonia Georgia and most

recently the Ukraine have validated the utility of incorporating and synchronizing information

operations during all levels of conflicts77

Russiarsquos incorporation of information operations at all levels of strategy and warfare

should be a warning for the West In the United States information operations are typically used

to accentuate military plans instead of drive them Part of the reason for this is a lack of

understanding of the capabilities that information operations specialists bring to the fight78 Joint

military doctrine defines information operations as ldquothe integrated employment during military

75 Corman Narrating the Exit from Afghanistan 67-70

76 Vladimir Putin Russian Federation Presidential Edict 683 approving appended text of The Russian Federations National Security Strategyrdquo accessed 21 March 2016 httpwwwieeeesGaleriasficheroOtrasPublicacionesInternacional2016Russian-NationalshySecurity-Strategy-31Dec2015pdf

77 Maria Snegovaya Putinrsquos Information Warfare in Ukraine Soviet Origins of Russias Hybrid Warfare Institute for the Study of War Russia Report 1 (September 2015) 21 accessed March 1 2016 httpunderstandingwarorgsitesdefaultfilesRussian20Report20120Putin 27s20Information20Warfare20in20Ukraine-20Soviet20Origins20of20Russias 20Hybrid20Warfarepdf

78 Brigadier General Ralph O Baker and US Army Information operations from good to great Military Review July-Aug 2011 (July 2011) accessed April 1 2016 httpusacacarmymilCAC2MilitaryReviewArchivesEnglishMilitaryReview_20110831_art00 4pdf

43

operations of Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of operation to

influence disrupt corrupt or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potentialrdquo79 The IRCs

mentioned in the definition include capabilities such as psychological operations civil affairs

public affairs military deception electronic warfare computer network attack defense and

exploitation capabilities and special technical operations The Information Operations Officers

at all levels of the military serve to synchronize these assets to best meet the commanderrsquos

military objectives These officers spend a considerable amount of time trying to understand the

overall strategy and driving narratives of any operation because unlike a bullet from a gun which

has a small impact on its target the information operations officer has the ability to have far-

reaching effects with the information related tools at his or her disposal When a military

commander understands how to use an Information Operations Officer it becomes a force

multiplier and in some cases may even become the main effort This was evident in Afghanistan

in 2013 and 2014 as the military was restricted from conducting offensive operations outside of

the relative safety of the forward operating bases Commanders began to realize that they could

still have powerful effects in their assigned areas of operations in the information environment

through the use of information operations While this is a tactical example it has strategic

implications

Another key component of engagement in the information environment is through

strategic communication At the most basic level strategic communication is the synchronization

of words deeds and images on a strategic level Thinking of it like a three-legged stool where

words deeds and images are each a leg If even one leg is missing the chair will fall This

concept advocates saying what is going to be accomplished doing what was said then showing

audiences that you did what you said It sounds simple but it is the building block of a successful

information campaign that builds credibility A common misperception is that strategic

79 JP 3-13 ix

44

communication is just the making of talking points and writing speeches for senior leaders in

government While that may be a part of it Christopher Paul debunks this in his book Strategic

Communication when he states ldquostrategic communication does not seek to have everyone in

government speaking with the same voice or repeating the same three talking pointshellip but to

have everyone speaking in the same direction and avoiding orthogonal and contradictory

utterances and behaviorsrdquo80

It will take a synchronized effort between the information operations and strategic

communications practitioners to effectively wage war on ISIL in the information environment

and to begin chipping away at the credibility of their narrative as well as the larger narrative of

radical Jihadism It does not matter if this is done by an actual schoolhouse-trained information

operations officer or strategic communications officer but it should be done by someone who

understands the importance of these types of engagements Ideally the information environment

will be given as much prominence as the physical environment during campaign planning and

done in conjunction with as opposed to after major combat operations planning

Conclusion

The current United Statesrsquo strategy against ISIL is based on a myopic understanding of

the overall system in which ISIL is but one of many members Because of this the counter-ISIL

strategy is disproportionately weighted towards the destruction of ISIL in the physical

environment and not on exploiting the root causes and ideology that underpins it While the

White House may in-fact achieve its stated goal of defeating ISIL the narrow lens used to view

the problem will lead to a symptom being treated instead of the actual cancer in the region

making it ripe for further instability even after the mission has been accomplished

80 Christopher Paul Strategic Communication Origins Concepts and Current Debates (Santa Barbara CA Praeger Publishers 2011) 61

45

Complexity theory helps to paint a picture of a much more complex system at work in the

region that goes well beyond just ISIL and highlights radical Islamic extremism which has taken

advantage of a region rife with instability corruption and ethnic grievances It also helped to

show that a solely kinetic approach to combat ISIL and the underlying issues that enable them to

thrive will not achieve anything more than tactical effects What is needed is a more

comprehensive approach that incorporates operations in both the information and physical

environments targeted at ISIL but also at the root causes such as the radical Islamic ideology

that fuels ISIL as well as regional governmental and socio-economic issues

An analysis was also conducted to look at why the current strategy being waged against

ISIL is almost strictly kinetic while little is being done to combat them in the information

environment Given that the White House framed the strategy based on the physical manifestation

of a much deeper problem it is no wonder that the military strategy is having limited effects and

ISIL continues to grow as a threat to Western civilization Seven different expert opinions on the

ISIL COG were also examined and compared These COGs ranged from the physical and

geographical to the intangible and are only a small sample of the ideas floating around on this

subject While this may have brought the usefulness of a COG analysis into question the intent

was to show that the ideas generated by this function created space for ideas It is not a bad thing

that there are different views None of the ideas are wrong and each was argued logically by its

proponent It is important to remember the frame that each expert took when looking at the COG

Some looked at it through the lens of the symptom as outlined by the White House counter ISIL

strategy while others took the cognitive leap in recognizing that ISIL was only the symptom and

that any COG analysis would have to take the larger contextual issues into consideration

Through a consideration of the role of narratives it becomes possible to see the futility of

trying to offer competing narratives However by gaining a thorough understanding of an enemy

narrative it is possible to discredit and delegitimize portions of it as part of a more

comprehensive strategy that includes a whole of government approach Discrediting a narrative

46

typically requires strategic patience and the ability to offer credible alternative perceptions to

stories already present in that narrative The battle of the narrative requires a long term approach

a whole of government strategy and actions commensurate with the message Words deeds and

images and the three-legged stool metaphor capture this point nicely

Finally a review of information operations functions and integration revealed that only a

synchronized effort with strategic communications planners will be able to successfully engage

ISIL within the information domain with any lasting effects That can only happen within the

framework of a strategic plan and narrative though Therefore due to the absence of either of

these in the current fight against ISIL only tactical and operational victories are likely possible in

the information environment More emphasis should be placed on coordinating strategic level

information operations to fight the enemy where it is having largely unimpeded effects

The fight against ISIL is an enormously complex scenario but strategy drives action If

the overall US counter ISIL strategy is based on a military objective and not an overarching

regional strategy the results will reflect this strategy Fighting against ISIL should be done on all

fronts not just the physical front As the West struggles to engage ISIL in the information

domain the near peer Russia continues to evolve in this realm giving them a potential advantage

should a worst case scenario of confrontation ever take place The time to explore and exploit the

information environment for development of lessons learned is now in this fight against ISIL

Maybe that shift will also take the strategy out of the weeds and back to a level where the effects

can have lasting positive regional effects

47

Bibliography

Abbott Porter H The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative 2nd ed Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2008

Aronson Elliot and Anthony R Pratkanis Age of Propaganda The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion 2nd ed New York Henry Holt and Co 2001

As-Somaali Muhammad The Story of an American Jihaadi Scribdcom 2012 Accessed March 22 2016 httpwwwscribdcomdoc93732117The-Story-of-an-AmericanshyJihaadiscribd

BBC Syria Crisis Where Key Countries Stand BBC Middle East October 30 2015 Accessed March 14 2016 httpwwwbbccomnewsworld-middle-east-23849587

Baker Brigadier General Ralph O and US Army Information Operations From Good to Great Military Review July-Aug 2011 (July 2011) 2ndash6 Accessed April 14 2016 httpusacacarmymilCAC2MilitaryReviewArchivesEnglishMilitaryReview_20110831_ art004pdf

Bar-Yam Yaneer Making Things Work Solving Complex Problems in A Complex World Cambridge MA Knowledge Press NECSI Knowledge Press 2005

Beck Julie The Story of Your Life The Atlantic August 10 2015 Accessed March 10 2016 httpwwwtheatlanticcomhealtharchive201508life-stories-narrative-psychologyshyredemption-mental-health400796

Bousquet Antoine and Simon Curtis Beyond Models and Metaphors Complexity Theory Systems Thinking and International Relations Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24 no 1 (March 2011) 43ndash62

Bunzel Cole From Paper State to Caliphate The Ideology of the Islamic State The Brookings Institute Project on US Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper no 19 (March 2015) 3

Cabayan Hriar and Sarah Canna Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL 2014 Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington DC Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office 1

Carruthers Wanda Gen Jack Keane Syria lsquoCenter of Gravityrsquo for ISIS Newsfront January 16 2015 Accessed March 21 2016 httpwwwnewsmaxcomNewsfrontJack-KeaneshySyria-ISIS-Islamic-State20150116id619065

Clausewitz Carl von Michael Howard Peter Paret Beatrice Heuser Notes Carl Von Clausewitz and Beatrice Heuser On War (Oxford Worldrsquos Classics) New York NY Oxford University Press USA 2007

Complexity science Agents Interaction and Complexity Group University of Southampton UK Accessed March 14 2016 httpwwwcomplexityecssotonacuk

Cordesman Anthony The Real Center of Gravity in the War Against the Islamic State Center for Strategic and International Studies (September 30 2014)

48

Corman Steven Narrating the Exit from Afghanistan Tempe AZ Center for Strategic Communication 2013

Cottee Simon Why Itrsquos So Hard to Stop ISIS Propaganda The Atlantic March 2 2015 Accessed February 2 2016 httpwwwtheatlanticcominternationalarchive201503whyshyits-so-hard-to-stop-isis-propaganda386216

Cronin Audrey ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group Foreign Affairs January 14 2016 Accessed March 15 2016 httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesmiddle-eastisis-not-terrorist-group

Doran Michael Misidentifying the Conflict in Iraq and Syria Brookings July 10 2014 Accessed March 21 2016 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsmarkazposts20140710-doranshyobama-iraq-syria-strategy

Fernandez Alberto Here to Stay and Growing Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks Brookings (October 2015) 11ndash12

Freeman Colin US Under Pressure to Act as Iran Helps Iraq Fight Al-Qarsquoida News Middle East June 13 2014 Accessed March 15 2016 httpwwwindependentieworldshynewsmiddle-eastus-under-pressure-to-act-as-iran-helps-iraq-fight-alqaida-30351513html

Gartenstein-Ross Daveed and Nathaniel Barr Fixing How We Fight the Islamic Statersquos Narrative War On the Rocks January 4 2016 Accessed March 16 2016 httpwarontherockscom201601fixing-how-we-fight-the-islamic-states-narrative

Gorka Sebastian 4 Reasons Why ISIS Is More Dangerous Than Al Qaeda Global Jihad July 10 2015 Accessed March 14 2016 httpthegorkabriefingcom4-reasons-why-isis-is-moreshydangerous-than-al-qaeda

Gorka Sebastian L and Katharine C Gorka ISIS The Threat to the United States ThreatKnowledgeGroup Special Report 2015 5

Gorka Sebastian Targeting the Center of Gravity The Gorka Briefing January 4 2016 Accessed March 20 2016 httpthegorkabriefingcomtargeting-center-gravity

Gray zones 2015 US Special Operations Command Department of Defense

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49

Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 Information Operations Washington DC Government Printing Office 2014

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50

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51

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52

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MAJ Ryan Nacin

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14 ABSTRACT

The current US counter-ISIL strategy from the White House is to degrade and destroy ISIL in Iraq and Syria This strategy is a military focused strategy that fails to account for the deep complexity involved in the region of which ISIL is only a part Looking at ISIL through the lens of complexity makes it clear that military intervention should only be part of a much broader more comprehensive whole of government approach to address the root causes of ISIL As part of a comprehensive and long-term approach the United States should also be looking at ways to discredit the ISIL narrative while providing viable alternatives These changes will require strategic patience and many will be generational shifts Finally the use of information operations and strategic communications to effectively engage adversaries in the infonnation environment is key now in the fight against ISIL More importantly it will shape how the United States engages in future conflicts with near peer competitors who have already exercised these trade-crafts and have woven them into all aspects of their national strategy

15 SUBJECT TERMS

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISIL Infonnation Environment Information Operations Narrative Counter Narrative Complexity Science Complexity Theory Iraq Syria Strategic Communication Levant Counter ISIL Strategy

16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF

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Standard Form 298 (Rev 8 98) ___R_e_s_e_t _ _ Prescribed by ANSI S1d Z3918




Approved by








ii

Abstract



iii

Contents

Acronyms v

Figures vi

Introduction 1







Conclusion 45

Bibliography 48

iv

Acronyms










FM Field Manual




IS Islamic State















v

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures







vi

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52




Approved by








ii

Abstract



iii

Contents

Acronyms v

Figures vi

Introduction 1







Conclusion 45

Bibliography 48

iv

Acronyms










FM Field Manual




IS Islamic State















v

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures







vi

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

Abstract



iii

Contents

Acronyms v

Figures vi

Introduction 1







Conclusion 45

Bibliography 48

iv

Acronyms










FM Field Manual




IS Islamic State















v

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures







vi

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

Contents

Acronyms v

Figures vi

Introduction 1







Conclusion 45

Bibliography 48

iv

Acronyms










FM Field Manual




IS Islamic State















v

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures







vi

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

Acronyms










FM Field Manual




IS Islamic State















v

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures







vi

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figures







vi

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

Introduction
























1

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

























2




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52




the ISIL movement


















with the ISF


3
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























4























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52























5























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52























6






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52






















7
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
















8














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52














9










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52










10







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52







them10
















11





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52





















12







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52







thesis development

Literature Review

















13




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52




















JP 3-0 as


15 Ibid IV-1

14















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52















16 JP 3-0 IV-2


18 Ibid I2-I3

15














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52














16



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52



















being solved




17
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























18

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

























24 Ibid 10

19
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























20



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52



























21
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























29 Ibid III-1

22






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52






















30 Ibid III-8



23
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























24

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

















parts of the system



25
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























26















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52















27














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52














28









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52









success













41 JP 5-0 II-19


43 JP 5-0 xxi

44 Ibid III-23

29
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
















capabilities









30























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52























31























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52























32

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

























33





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52





















34

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

























35






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52






















36






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52






to any strategy
















37





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52





















66 Ibid

38
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























39
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























40
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52
























41

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

























42





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52





















43

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52

















implications








79 JP 3-13 ix

44















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52















Conclusion









45



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52



























46





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






52





















47

Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















51






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Bibliography















48
















49
















50
















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50
















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Fighting on All Fronts: A Critical Review of the US ... · 07-04-2016 :Master's Thesis TIJN 2015...

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Transcript of Fighting on All Fronts: A Critical Review of the US ... · 07-04-2016 :Master's Thesis TIJN 2015...