Fighting Byzantine Adversaries in Networks: Network Error-Correcting Codes Michelle Effros Michael...

Fighting Byzantine Adversaries in Networks: Network Error-Correcting Codes

Michelle Effros

Michael Langberg

Tracey Ho

Sachin Katti

Muriel Médard

Dina Katabi

Sidharth Jaggi

Obligatory Example/Historys

t1 t2

b1 b2

b2

b2

b1

b1 b1

b1 b1

b1 (b1,b2)

b1+b2

b1+b2b1+b2

(b1,b2)

[ACLY00] [ACLY00] Characterization Non-constructive

[LYC03], [KM02] Constructive (linear) Exp-time design

[JCJ03], [SET03] Poly-time design Centralized design

[HKMKE03], [JCJ03] Decentralized design

EVER

BETTER

.

.

.

C=2

[This work] All the above, plus security

Tons of work

[SET03] Gap provably exists

Multicast

Wired

Wireless

Simplifying assumptions• All links unit capacity

•(1 packet/transmission)• Acyclic network

Network = Hypergraph

ALL of Alice’sinformationdecodableEXACTLYbyEACH Bob

Network Model

[GDPHE04],[LME04] – No intereference

Multicast Networks

Webcasting

P2P networks

Sensor networks

Multicast Network Model

ALL of Alice’sinformationdecodableEXACTLYbyEACH Bob

3

2

2

Upper bound for multicast capacity C,

C ≤ min{Ci}

[ACLY00] With mixing, C = min{Ci} achievable!

[LCY02],[KM01],[JCJ03],[HKMKE03] Simple (linear) distributed codes suffice!

Mixing

)2(1,0)...( 21mm

m Fxbbb

2x

kx

b1b2 bmx

1x

kk xxx ...2211

β1

β2

βk

F(2m)-linear network[KM01]

Source:- Group together m bits,

Every node:- Perform linear combinations over finite field F(2m)

Generalization: The X arelength n vectors over F(2m)

X1

X2

Xk

kk XXX ...2211

Problem!

Eavesdropped links

Attacked links

Corrupted links

Setup

1. Scheme A B C2. Network

C3. Message A C4. Code C5. Bad links C6. Coin A7. Transmit B C8. Decode B

Eureka

Eavesdropped links ZI

Attacked links ZO

Who knows what

Stage

Privacy

Result(s)First codes Optimal rates (C-2ZO,C-ZO) Poly-time Distributed Unknown topology End-to-end Rateless Information theoretically secure Information theoretically private Wired/wireless

[HLKMEK04],[JLHE05],[CY06],[CJL06],[GP06]

Error Correcting Codes

Y=TX+E

Generator matrix

Low-weightvector

YX

(Reed-Solomon Code)

1

0

0

0

0

c

T

E

Error Correcting Codes

X

TY

TZ

Z

Y=TX+E=TX+TZZ

Networktransform matrices

Low-weightvector

Unknown

When stuck…“ε-rate secret uncorrupted channels”

•Useful abstraction/ building block

•Existing model ([GP06],[CJL06])

•We improve!

Example

1X

2X

3X

Z

ZX 111

ZX 222

ZX 333 C=3

ZO=1

ZβXαY

ZβXαY

ZβXαY

33 33

22 22

11 11

n-length vectors

3n known 4n unknown

scalars

4n+6 unknownX3=X1+X2

non-linear

R = C - Zo

2 3 1

6 secret hashes of X

4n+6 known4n known

)1()1(0)1(

)1()1(0)1(

)1()1(0)1(

333

222

111

yzx

yzx

yzx

)2()2(22)2(

)2()2(1)2(

)2()2(1)2(

3333

2222

1111

yzx

yzx

yzx

3

2

1

)1(

z

'

'

'

)2(

2 3

2

1

3

2

1

z

'

'

'

3

2

1

)3()3(33)3(

)3()3(22)3(

)3()3(1)3(

3333

2222

1111

yzx

yzx

yzx

'

'

'

)3(

3

2

3

2

1

3

2

1

zZ''βXαY

Z''βXαY

Z''βXαY

33 33

22 22

11 11

Redundancy addedat source 'β,'β,'βααα 3213,2,1,Solve for

Example

1X

2X

3X

Z

ZX 111

ZX 222

ZX 333 C=3

ZO=1

X3=X1+X2

6 secret hashes of X

4n+6 known4n+6 unknown

3

2

1

2

1

333

22

11

Y

Y

Y

Z'

X

X

'βαα

'βα0

'β0α

Z''βXαY

Z''βXαY

Z''βXαY

33 33

22 22

11 11

Invertible with high probability

3

2

1

3

2

1

)1(

'

'

'

z

Z=(0 z(2) z(3)… z(n))

3

2

1

3

2

1

0

'

'

'

3

2

1

2

1

33

2

1

Y

Y

Y

Z'

X

X

0αα

0α0

00α

Thm 1,ProofTheorem 1: Rate C-ZO-ε achievable with ZI={E},ε-rate secret uncorrupted channelImproves on [GP06/Avalanche] (Decentralized) and [CJL06] (optimal)

R = C - Zo

01...0000)()()1(

0...1...00)()()1(

0...10000)()()1( 111

nxjxx

nxjxx

nxjxx

X

RRR

iii

CxC identitymatrix

n>>C

[HKMKE03] IXX 1

T

packets

TTXTY 11

Thm 1,ProofTheorem 1: Rate C-ZO-ε achievable with ZI={E},ε-rate secret uncorrupted channel

TTXTY 11

LZ1

T

TZ

LTTZTTXTY ZZ 111 '

LTTT

ZTTXY

Z

Z

'

111

LTTT

LXTLXTZTTXY

Z

ZZZ

'

11111

LTTT

LXZTXTY

Z

Z

'

)(' 1111

Crrr ...21

nnnC

C

C

rrr

rrr

rrr

P

21

21

21

222

PXH 1CxC matrix

HTPYS '1 )('))('( 1111 PXTPLXZTXT Z

PLXZTZ )( 11

Q

XSTY

11 '

Invertible w.h.p.

Thm 2Theorem 2: Rate C-2ZO-ε achievable with ZI={E}

Example revisited

1X

2X

3X

Z

ZX 111

ZX 222

ZX 333

ZβXαY

ZβXαY

ZβXαY

33 33

22 22

11 11

X3=X1+X2

n more constraints added on X

3

2

1

3

2

1

)1(

'

'

'

z

Z=(0 z(2) z(3)… z(n))

3

2

1

3

2

1

0

'

'

'

DX=0

Z=(0 0 0… 0)

R = C – Zo - redundancyR = C – Zo

2 3 11 3 1 1

R = C – 2Zo

Tight (ECC, [CY06])

nZO

nZO

Thm 2,“Proof”Theorem 2: Rate C-2ZO-ε achievable with ZI={E}

R = C - 2Zo

01...0000)()()1(

0...1...00)()()1(

0...10000)()()1( 111

nxjxx

nxjxx

nxjxx

X

ZoCZoCZoC

iii

01 DX

nZO extra constraints

D chosen uniformly at random,known to Alice, Bob and Calvin

)(' 1111 LXZTXTY Z

Theorem 2: Rate C-2ZO-ε achievable with ZI={E}

Disjoint

?

T’’

''''' 11 ZTXTY

non-linearlinear

0DXInvertible

Basis changeMay not be

0'

''

XD

ITIZ

I

D of appropriate dimensions crucial

Thm 2,“Proof”

Thm 3,ProofTheorem 3: Rate C-ZO-ε achievable, with ZI+2ZO<C

ZI<C-2ZO

Using algorithm 2 for small header, can transmit secret, correct information…

… which can be used foralgorithm 1 decoding!

Algorithm 2 rate

Eavesdropping rate

ZI<R Information-theoretic Privacy

Theorem 4, etc:

SummaryRate Conditions

Thm 1 C-ZO Secret

Thm 2 C-2ZO Omniscient

Thm 3 C-ZO Limited

Optimal rates Poly-timeDistributedUnknown topologyEnd-to-endRatelessInformation theoretically secure/privateWired/wireless

Backup slides

Network Coding “Justification”

R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S.-Y. R. Li and R. W. Yeung,"Network information flow," IEEE Trans. on Information

Theory, vol. 46, pp. 1204-1216, 2000.

http://tesla.csl.uiuc.edu/~koetter/NWC/Bibliography.html ≈ 200 papers in 3 years

NetCod Workshops, DIMACS working group, ISIT 2005 - 4+ sessions, tutorials, …

Several patents, theses…

“The core notion of network coding is to allow and encourage mixing of data at intermediate network nodes.”

(Network Coding homepage)

But what IS Network Coding?

Point-to-point flows

)(maxmin)(

cutsizeCflowtscut

C

1P

2P

CP

Min-cut Max-flow (Menger’s) Theorem [M27]

Ford-Fulkerson Algorithm [FF62]

s

t

Multicasting

Webcasting

P2P networks

Sensor networks

s1

t1

t2

t|T|

Network

s|S|

Justifications revisited - I

s

t1 t2

b1 b2

b2

b2

b1

b1 ?b1

b1 b1

b1 (b1,b2)

b1+b2

b1+b2b1+b2

(b1,b2)[ACLY00]

Throughput

Gap Without Coding

. . .

. . .

h2

hh2

Coding capacity = h Routing capacity≤2

[JSCEEJT05]

s

Multicasting


C ≤ min{Ci}

s

t1

t2

t|T|

C|T|

C1

C2

Network

[ACLY00] - achievable!

[LYC02] - linear codes suffice!!

[KM01] - “finite field” linear codes suffice!!!

Multicasting

)2(1,0)...( 21mm

m Fbbb

2

k

b1b2 bm

1

kk ...2211

β1

β2

βk

F(2m)-linear network[KM01]

Source:- Group together `m’ bits,

Every node:- Perform linear combinations over finite field F(2m)

Multicasting


C ≤ min{Ci}

s

t1

t2

t|T|

C|T|

C1

C2

Network

[ACLY00] - achievable!

[LYC02] - linear codes suffice!!

[KM01] - “finite field” linear codes suffice!!!

[JCJ03],[SET03] - polynomial time code design!!!!

Thms: Deterministic Codes

For m ≥ log(|T|), exists an F(2m)-linear network which can be designed in O(|E||T|C(C+|T|)) time.

[JCJ03],[SET03]

Exist networks for which minimum m≈0.5(log(|T|))

[JCJ03],[LL03]

Justifications revisited - II

s

t1 t2

One link breaks

Robustness/Distributeddesign

Justifications revisited - II

s

t1 t2

b1 b2

b2

b2

b1

b1

(b1,b2)

b1+b2

Robustness/Distributeddesign

(b1,b2)

b1+2b2

(Finite field arithmetic)b1+b2 b1+b2

b1+2b2

Thm: Random Robust Codes

s

t1

t2

t|T|

C|T|

C1

C2

Original Network

C = min{Ci}

Thm: Random Robust Codes

s

t1

t2

t|T|

C|T|'

C1'

C2'

Faulty Network

C' = min{Ci'}

If value of C' known to s,same code can achieve C' rate!

(interior nodes oblivious)

Thm: Random Robust Codesm sufficiently large, rate R<C

Choose random [ß] at each node

Probability over [ß] thatcode works

>1-|E||T|2-m(C-R)+|V|

[JCJ03] [HKMKE03]

(different notions of linearity)

Decentralized design

b1b2 bm

b’1b’2 b’m

b’’1b’’2 b’’m

’

’’

Much “sparser” linear operations

(O(m) instead of O(m2)) [JCE06]

Vs. prob of error - necessary evil?

Zero-error Decentralized CodesNo a priori network topological

information available - informationcan only be percolated down links

Desired - zero-error code design

One additional resource - eachnode vi has a unique ID number i(GPS coordinates/IP address/…)

Need to use yet other types of linear codes[JHE06?]

Inter-relationships between notions of linearity

C

B

M

M Multicast G General

Global Local I/O ≠ Local I/O =

a Acyclic

A AlgebraicB BlockC Convolutional

Does not exist

Є epsilon rate loss

G

a

GЄ

A Ma

Ma

Ma

G?

M

G

a

G

Ma G

G

[JEHM04]

Justifications revisited - III

s

t1 t2

Security

Evil adversary hiding in networkeavesdropping,

injecting false information[JLHE05],[JLHKM06?]

Greater throughputRobust against random errors...

Aha!Network Coding!!!

Xavier

Yvonne1

Zorba

???

Yvonne|T|

???

.

.

.

Setup

1. Scheme X Y Z2. Network Z3. Message X Z4. Code Z5. Bad links Z6. Coin X7. Transmit Y Z8. Decode Y

Eureka

WiredWireless (packet losses, fading)

Eavesdropped links ZI

Attacked links ZO

Who knows what

Stage

Xavier

Yvonne1

?

Zorba

??

Zorba sees MI links ZI, controls MO links ZO pI=MI/C, pO=MO/C

Xavier and Yvonnes share no resources (private key, randomness)

Zorba computationally unbounded; Xavier and Yvonnes -- “simple” computations

Setup

Zorba knows protocols and already knows almost all of Xavier’s message (except Xavier’s private coin tosses)

Goal: Transmit at “high” rate and w.h.p. decode correctly

Zorba (hidden) knows network; Xavier and Yvonnes don’t

C

MO

Yvonne|T|

??

?

Distributed design (interior nodes oblivious/overlay to network coding)

Background

Noisy channel models (Shannon,…)Binary Symmetric Channel

p (“Noise parameter”)0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

0 1

H(p)

0.5

Background

Noisy channel models (Shannon,…) Binary Symmetric Channel Binary Erasure Channel

p (“Noise parameter”)0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

0 E

1-p

0.5

Background

Adversarial channel models “Limited-flip” adversary, pI=1 (Hamming,Gilbert-Varshanov,McEliece et al…)

Large alphabets (Fq instead of F2)

Shared randomness, cryptographic assumptions…

pO (“Noise parameter”)0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

0 1

0.5

pO (“Noise parameter”)

0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

Upper bounds

0.5

0.5

1-pO


0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

Upper bounds

0.5

0.5

??

?

0

pI=pO (“Noise parameter” = “Knowledge parameter”)

0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

Unicast – Results [JLHE05]

0.5

0.5


0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

Full knowledge [Folklore]

0.5

(“Knowledge parameter” pI=1)

t1

t|T|

S

Multicast Networks [HKMKE03]

ys(j)=Txs(j)

x

y1

β1

βi

βh

y|T|

xb(i)

01...0000),(),()1,(

0...1...00),(),()1,(

0...10000),1(),1()1,1(

nhxjhxhx

nixjixix

nxjxx

xb(i)

xs(j)

xb(1)

xb(h)

Rate h=C-MO

Block

Slice

hxh identitymatrix

x’b(i)

h<<n

T

xs(j)=T-1ys(j)

pO

0

1

1

C

(N

orm

aliz

ed b

y h)

0.5

0.5

Multicast Networks

R1

R|T|

S

S’|Z|

S’2

S’1

Observation 1: Can treatadversaries as new sources

Multicast Networks

)(']T' T[)('

)( 1 jyjx

jxs

s

s

01...0000),(),()1,(

0...1...00),(),()1,(

0...10000),1(),1()1,1(

nhxjhxhx

nixjixix

nxjxx

y’s(j)=Txs(j)+T’x’s(j)

SS

Supersource

Observation 2: w.h.p. over network code design, {TxS(j)} and {T’x’S(j)} do not intersect (robust codes…).

Corrupted Unknown

Multicast Networksy’s(j)=Txs(j)+T’x’s(j)

ε redundancy

xs(2)+xs(5)-xs(3)=0

ys(2)+ys(5)-ys(3)=vector in {T’x’s(j)}

{T’x’s(j)}{Txs(j)}

xs(3)+2xs(9)-5xs(1)=0

ys(3)+2ys(9)-5ys(1)=another vector in {T’x’s(j)}


ε redundancy

{T’x’s(j)}{Txs(j)}

Repeat MO timesDiscover {T’x’s(j)}“Zero out” {T’x’s(j)}

when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth

Estimate T (redundant xs(j) known)

Linear algebra Decode


xs(2)+xs(5)-xs(3)=0

ys(2)+ys(5)-ys(3)=vector in {T’x’s(j)}

x’s(2)+x’s(5)-x’s(3)=0

ys(2)+ys(5)-ys(3)=0

Scheme 1(a)“ε-rate secret uncorrupted channels”

Useful abstraction

Scheme 1(b)“sub-header based scheme”

Works… kind of…

… for “many” networks

Scheme 2“distributed network error-correcting code”

(Knowledge parameter pI=1)

[CY06] – bounds, high complexity construction

[JHLMK06?] – tight, poly-time construction

pO (“Noise parameter”)0

1

1

C

(C

apac

ity)

0.5


pO

pO

y’s(j)=Txs(j)+T’x’s(j)error vector

1-2pO


y’s(j)=Txs(j)+T’x’s(j)

01...0000),(),()1,(

0...1...00),(),()1,(

0...10000),1(),1()1,1(

nhxjhxhx

nixjixix

nxjxx


y’s(j)=T’’xs(j)+T’x’s(j)

01...0000),(),()1,(

0...1...00),(),()1,(

0...10000),1(),1()1,1(

nhxjhxhx

nixjixix

nxjxx

e

e

e’



e

e

e’

Linear algebra

Scheme 3“non-omniscient adversary”


MI+2MO<C

MI<C-2MO Scheme 2 rate

Zorba’s observations

Using Scheme 2 as small header, can transmit secret, correct information…

… which can be used forScheme 1(a) decoding!

Variations - FeedbackC

p

0

1

1

Variations – Know thy enemyC

p

0

1

1C

p

0

1

1

Variations – Random NoiseC

p

0

CN

1

SEPARATION

Fighting Byzantine Adversaries in Networks: Network Error-Correcting Codes Michelle Effros Michael...

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