Bordering at the nonstate window. The effects of public/private cooperation on the Schengen visa policy implementation.

Federica InfantinoFNRS/Université Libre de Bruxelles (Cevipol)

Sciences Po Paris (CEE)

• Object: the practicing of borders carried out by state and private actors, i.e. SLOs (Brodkin, 2011) policy‐making

• Implementation theoretical framework applied to border policies: the visa policy implementation understood as a distinct phase of the policy process.  

• Visa services outsourcing and the ‘neoliberal state’ embracing NPM paradigm. (Menz, 2013; Bezes, 2009). Shifts in mode of regulation involving nonstate actors, shifting sovereignty outwards (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). 

• Methodology: in‐depth fieldwork (12 months) Interviews and observations, immersion, informal settings 

Displaced borders in Casablanca

Plan of the presentation

1. Private actors and the making of Schengen: institutional legitimation

2. Process tracing of how companies are created and how they diffuse

3. Why outsourcing visa services?4. The invisible convergence of Schengen visa 

policy implementation practices

1. Private actors and the making of Schengen

• Since 2004, 18 out of 26 SSs have been outsourcing to VFSGlobal, TLSContact or IKS (only in Turkey) in 24 TCs. (but legalized in 2011)

• Outsourcing is presented as a cost effective strategy for the VIS (COM(2006) 269 final).

• Negotiations ex post to legalize and regulate the outsourcing in the Visa Code (art. 17‐45). 

• SSs’ official justifications: the solution ‐outsourcing ‐ has found the ‘problem’ – state administration. 

2.New markets for old companies• VFSGlobal, subsidiary of the Kuoni Travel Group. TLSContact part of Teleperformance group. 

Encounter with state actors (UK‐USA in India and France in China), consequence of a casual effect. Rani VFS: “VFS was born by accident; we discovered this market by accident. The USA embassy in Mumbai noticed the work of Kuoni India and asked us to go inside the embassy to do some data entry and things like that”.Jacques TLS: “He made the contact, I don’t know how, with a friend who worked at the Embassy, (…) and at the moment that there were call for tenders in China and some good relations, everything has started”.   

2. How diffusion worksVFS (2004‐2011), from 1 to 17 SSs in 16 TCs. TLS (2010‐2012), from 1 to 4 SSs in 8 TCs.• Diffusion local context by local context, state by state, region by region. Mimic effect, ‘do how the others do’ as legitimization. The prime mover is crucial. 

Civil servant BE: “Since we noticed that other countries like the United Kingdom, it was the pioneer, it started already in 2000s, and the United States too, we told to ourselves, maybe it is a good idea to do as they do”The case of Morocco confirms the pattern. 

2. Why outsourcing visas services?• Cooperation secured by businessopportunities. Profitable solution.

• Cost effective strategy (VIS).• ‘Do how the others do’• Outsourcing a bureaucratic ‘dirty work’• Redirecting the burden of the implementationof a policy that generates blame and complexdynamics.

3. Two new uniform implementing conditions

• Documents based assessment of the‘migratory risk’.

• The ‘missing document’ mechanism as a caseof administrative exclusion.

Documents based assessment of the ‘migratory risk’

When visa application centers handle applicants,agents’ decisionmaking is no more based onface‐to‐face interactions: the ‘migratory risk’ isassessed relying on documents.

The ‘missing document’ mechanism

“The only issue (with the outsourcing) is to havea completed file. By outsourcing, anuncompleted file will be directly refused, theywill tell us this is completed, this is uncompleted(…), we will not handle this anymore, we won’tdeal with such issue, we don’t outsource to havemore work to do! This is the reality of theoutsourcing that nobody understands”. Consul‐general of one of these consulates

Nonstate window interaction to convince applicants. 

1. Uncompleted file: the CRISIS of the interactionWindow‐clerk: “you must lodge a completed file”The threat ‐ Window‐clerk: “I may take theapplication, but the application will be processedon the basis of the documents you aresubmitting”.“It is your responsibility if you want to submit theapplication anyway”.

Effects

• Administrative exclusion: non participationattributable to organizational factors (Brodkinand Majmundar, 2010). Effects on outcomesand outputs.

• Relocating the responsibility of the policyimplementation from the consulate to the PSP,from the PSP to the applicant.

• New uniform decisionmaking: if a file isuncompleted, the visa is refused.

Conclusions Private actors play a crucial role in the making ofthe Schengen area because they are:• A strategic political resource, cost effectivestrategy (Lahav, 2006), and blame avoidancestrategy (Waever, 1987).

• A factor converging Schengen visa policyimplementing practices more than hard lawacts.

• A factor contributing to the automation ofborder control through the automation ofbureaucracies’ tasks.

• A factor contributing to the de‐politicization ofthe visa issue. Facing the nonstate windowreduces the scope of social conflict.

The private/public practicing of borders is apolitical not technical development.