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Task Force Officer Orientation

A reference guide for new JTTF Task Force Offiters

Volume 1 Revision 1 December 2009

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION' COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION

0/-1 '~. ,r... I Joint Terrorism Task Force

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Task Force·Offl cer Orientation-·

A reference guide for ,new JTTF Task Force Officers

Volume 1 Revision 1 December 2009

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab 1: INTRODUCTION 1 Heraldry of the FBI Seal FBI Priorities Thumbnail History of the FBI Where the FBI Got its Name Where the Title "Special Agent" Came From FBI Organizational Chart FBI Field Offices and Resident Agencies!

14

• MOU, Reimbursement Agreement, Vendors Forms • RA Access Badge / Publi;c Key Infrastructure (PKI) • Deputation 1.

• Credentials • Photograph • Computer Access • JTTF Vehicle and Gas Card • Equipment Issues • Radio Frequencies/Call Sign • TFO's Chain of Command • TURK • Electronic Equipment Security Form • Law Enforcement On-Linea (LEO) • Internet Access • Outside facility Access Badges and Briefings • Personnel Security Polygraph Program

Security Classification Guide 16 • Definitions • Classification • Methods of Transmission

Security Awareness Briefing 22 • Personnel Security

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Tab 2: IN-PROCESSING

• TFO/TFA In-Processing List • Security

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TAB.L E 0 F CON TEN T S

Tab 1: INTRODUCTION ...•....................•... ,~ ........ · ..........•......................•.......... 1 Heraldry of the FBI Seal FBI Priorities Thumbnail History of the FBI Where the FBI Got its Name Where the Title "Special Agent" Came Frhm FBI Organizational Chart I FBI Field Offices and Resident Agencies! .

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Tab 2: ~~6~i~~~~~?s~~i~~.Li~~ ............. { ...................................................... 14 I

• Security I • MOD, Reimbursement Arreement, Vendors Forms • RA Access Badge / PUbl,· c Key Infrastructure (PKI) • Deputation . • Credentials; . • Photograph , • Computer Access I • JTTF Vehicle and Gas C~d • Equipment Issues it

• Radio Frequencies/Call S~gn • TFO's Chain of Comman4

• TURK \ • Electronic Equipment Sec~rity Form • Law Enforcement On-Line! (LEO) • Internet Access • Outside facility Access Badges and Briefings • Personnel Security Polygraph Program

Security Classification Guide ..•.••.........•....•••.....••....... o •••••• 0 •• 0 •••••• 0 •••• 0 ••• 0 ••••• 16 • Definitions • Classification • Methods of Transmission

Security Awareness Briefing ..................................................................... 22 • Personnel Security

1

39

Extending a Full Field Inv stigation Annual Summary for a Fun Field Investigation Issuing a Grand Jury Subpc\ena Reporting Grand Jury Subpoena Return Issuing a National Security Letter Serving National Security Letter Return Requesting Surveillance by SSG Reporting Surveillance Conducted by SSG Reporting Surveillance Conducted by JTTF Request Training Reporting an Interview Reporting a Trash Cover

Tab 4: DOCUMENTATION Required Documentation

• • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • •

•

ent ent nt to a Preliminary Invest. or Full Field Invest. vestigation estigation nvestigation Investigation to a Full Field Investigation tigation igation

Opening a Threat Assess Closing a Threat Assess Convert Threat Assessm Opening a Preliminary I Closing a Preliminary In Extending a Preliminary Converting a Preliminary Opening a Full Field hive Closing a Full Field Inves

• Facility Security • Information Security/Computers • Threats to National Security • Telephone and Facsimile Machine

Security Incident Program • Proper Handling of Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) • Security. Awareness Certification

Tab 3: LEGAL APPLICATION 29 Criminalizing Terrorism •

• Statutes Title 8 Title18

Title 31

1 . Title 42 Title 49 Title 50

• Investigative Guidelines • Conclusion

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• Facility Security • Information Security/Computers • Threats to National Security • Telephone and Facsimile Machine

.• "Security Incident Program • Proper Handling of Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) • Security Awareness Certification

Tab 3: LEGAL APPLICATION ................... !, .................................................... 29 Criminalizing Terrorism I •

• Statutes Title 8 I Title18 I . Title 31 Title 42 Title 49 Title 50

• Investigative Guidelines • Conclusion

Tab 4: DOCUl\l.lENTATION ........................................................................... 39 Required J?ocumentation

• Opening a Threat Assess ent • Closing a Threat Assess ent • Convert Threat Assessm nt to a Preliminary Invest. or Full Field Invest. • Opening a Preliminary I vestigation • Closing a Preliminary In estigation • Extending a Preliminary nvestigation • Converting a Preliminary Investigation to a Full Field Investigation • Opening a Full Field Inve tigation • Closing a Full Field Inves igation • Extending a Full Held Inv stigation • Annual Summary for a Ful\ Field Investigation • Issuing a Grand Jury Subp~ena • Reporting Grand Jury Subpoena Return • Issuing a National Security Letter • Serving National Security Letter Return • Requesting Surveillance by SSG • Reporting Surveillance Conducted by SSG • Reporting Surveillance Conducted by JTTF • Request Training . • Reporting an Interview • Reporting a Trash Cover

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a to a

0 • Reporting a Collision • Submitting General Evidence

a . Submitting Film for Processing • • Submitting Electronic. Evidence to be Analyzed II

• Submitting Toll Records to be Entered into Telephone Apps.

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is Investigative Reports 41 • EC (Electronic Communication)

• • FD-542 (Statistical Accomplishment) • • FD-71 (Complaint Form)

ID • FD-302 (Report Discoverable Information)

ID • FD-320 (Notification to DOJ) • FD-515 (Statistical Accomplishment)

411 • FD-930 (Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File)

. • • LHM (Letterhead Memorandum) ID

II t Tab 5: INVESTIGATION 1 50

. Investigative Plan II •

Tab 6: INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 54 Polygraph Matters

• Consensual (telephonic) Monitoring ID Consensual (non-telephonic) Monitoring

ID Taping of Interviews and/or ConfessionS Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Public Area Viewing/Pole Cameras

ID Group II Under-Cover Operation Group I Under-Cover Operation

ID Purchase of Drug Evidence Administrative Subpoenas

ID Mail Cover • Pen Registers / Trap and Trace

ID Title DI Electronic Surveillance (non-sensitive) Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas National Security Letter FISA Procedures

• •

Tab 7: INTELLIGENCE REPORTING 61 Intelligence Information Report (IIR)

fa Purpose • Protocol

Tab 8: PONIES, FORMS, AND RESOURCES 65

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• Reporting a Collision • Submitting General Evidence • Submitting Film for Processing • Submitting Electronic Evidence to be Analyzed • Submitting Toll Records to be Entered into Telephone Apps.

Investigative Reports .............................................................................. 41 • EC (Electronic Communication) • FD-542 (Statistical Accomplishment) • FD-71 (Complaint Fonn),' ' • FD-302 (Report Discovera~le Information) • FD-320 (Notification to DOJ) • FD-515 (Statistical Accomplishment) • FD-930 (Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File)

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• LHM (Letterhead Memofrj.ndum) I

I Tab 5: INVESTIGATION ........................ ~ ..................................................... 50

Investigative Plan ' I

Tab 6: INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES ... ! ....................................................... 54 Polygraph Matters I Consensual (telephonic) Monitoring Consensual (non-telephonic) Monitoring Taping of Interviews and/or Confession~ Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) , Public Area ViewingJPole Cameras Group II Under-Cover Operation Group I Under-Cover Operation Purchase of Drug Evidence Administrative Subpoenas Mail Cover Pen Registers I Trap and Trace Title ill Electronic Surveillance (non-sensitive) Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas National Security Letter FISA Procedures

Tab 7: INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ....................... , ...................................... 61 Intelligence Information Report (IIR)

Purpose Protocol

Tab 8: PONIES, FORMS, AND RESOURCES ..................................................... 65

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Miscellaneous 68

EXTRA RESOURCES

Terrorism Statutes 71 Common FBI Acronyms 87 NJTTF Personnel Roster 113

Appendix A: NJTTF Resources EC... .116 Appendix B: DIOG Reference Slides 163

4

• Ponies • EC (Electronic Communications):

• Threat Assessment • Preliminary Inquiry • Full Field Investigation • Criminal Case • Leads • Evidence • Title HI • Request Assistance

a • Asset

• FD-542 66 • Surveillance

• • National Security Letter

• • Participating in an Event • Miscellaneous

FD-302 67

• LHM (Letter-Head Memorandum) 67

• NSL (National Security Letter) 67 • Request for Emergency Disclosure of Information • ECPA E-mail Subscriber

• • ECPA E-mail Transactional Records • ECPA Telephone Subscriber • ECPA Toll Billing • FCRA Consumer Identifying and Financial Institutions Info. • FCRA Consumer. Identifying Information

• • • FCRA Financial Institutions • • FCRA Full Credit Report

• RFPA Financial Records

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Ponies EC (ElectroniC Conununications):

• Threat Assessment • Preliminary Inquiry • Full Field Investigation • Criminal Case • Leads • Evidence • Title m • Request Assistance • Asset

FD-S42 ......••.........••.•••••••.•.•..............•.....•...•..••••••..•••.•••••..•..••••• 66 • Surveillance • National Security L,etter • Participating in an Event • Miscellaneous

FD-302 ...................................................................................... 67

LHM (Letter-Head Memorandum) •••••••.••.•...•.••....•••....•••......•••.•...••••••• 67

NSL (National Security Letter) •.•.••••••.•••.•.•..•.•.....•.••..•.•••....••.....•••••.• 67 • Request for Emergency Disclosure of Information • ECPA E-mail Subscriber • ECPA E-mail Transactional Records • ECPA Telephone Subscriber • ECPA Toll Billing • FCRA Consumer Identifying and Financial Institutions Info. • FCRA Consumer Identifying Information • . FCRA Financial Institutions • FCRA Full Credit Report • RFPA Finap.cial Records

Miscellaneous ..............••.••.•••....•••.....•••••................•••••••..•.•••....•. 68

EXTRA RESOURCES

Terrorism Statutes ...................................... : ............................... 71 Common FBI Acronyms ............................................................... 87 NJTTF Personnel Roster ............................................................... 113

Appendix A: NJTTF Resources EC .................................................... 116 Appendix B: DIOG Reference Slides .......................................... , ...... 163

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The mission of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the NJTTF's vision for the more than 100 JTTFs nationwide, is to enhance communications, coordination and cooperation between federal, state, and local government agencies representing the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety and homeland security community by providing a point of fusion for terrorism intelligence and investigations.

As a Task Force Officer (TFO), you represent an indispensable asset to JTTFs• and the FBI as a whole. Your specialized training and localized expertise represent a window into your community that could not be duplicated by any government department. Together with the FBI and the participating agencies of your JTTF, you will provide resources and regional proficiency that ensure the safety of the United States, your state, your neighborhood and your family and friends.

This orientation manual is provided to assist your transition from local, state, or federal official to JTTF Task Force Officer. We anticipate-that your time with the JTTF will be rewarding, and trust that your presence will greatly contribute to the mission of the FBI Counterterrorism Division. Thank you for your service.

Michael J. Heimbach

Assistant Director Counterterrorism Division

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The mission of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the NJTTF's vision for the more than 100 JTTFs nationwide, is to enhance communications, coordination and cooperation between federal, state, and local government agencies representing the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety and homeland security community by providing a point of fusion for terrorism intelligence and investigations ..

As a Task Force Officer (TFO), you represent an indispensable asset to JTTFs· and the FBI as a whole. Your specialized training and localized expertise represent a window into your community that could not be duplicated by any government department. Together with the FBI and the participating agencies of your JTTF, you will provide resources and regional proficiency that ensure the safety of the United States, your state, your neighborhood and your family and friends.

This orientation manual is provided to assist your transition from local, state, or federal official to ITTF Task Force Officer. We anticipate-that your time with the ITTF will be rewarding, and trust that your presence will greatly contribute to the mission of the FBI Counterterrorism Division. Thank you for your service.

Michael J. Heimbach

Assistant Director Counterterrorism Division

ACLURM005484

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The actual FBI Seal is in color and was adopted in 1940.

Each symbol and color in the FBI Seal has special significance. The dominant blue field of the Seal and the scales on the shield represent justice. The circle of 13 stars denotes unity of purpose as exemplified by the 13 original states. The laurel leaf symbolizes academic honors, distinction, and fame. There are 46 leaves in the two branches, since there were 46 states in the Union when the FBI was founded in 1908. Red parallel stripes stand for courage, valor, and strength, while the white stripes convey cleanliness, light, truth, and peace. As in the American Flag, the red bards exceed the white by one. The motto, "Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity," describes the motivating force behind the FBI. The peaked bevelled edge surrounding the Seal symbolizes the challenges facing the FBI and the ruggedness of the agency, and the gold color in the seal conveys its overall value.

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. The actual FBI Seal is in color and was adopted in 1940.

Each symbol and color in the FBI Seal has special significance. The dominant blue field of the Seal and the scales on the shield represent justice. The circle of 13 stars denotes unity of purpose as exemplified by the 13 original states. The laurel leaf symbolizes academic honors, distinction, and fame. There are 46 leaves in the two branches, since there were 46 states in the Union when the FBI was founded in 1908. Red parallel stripes stand for courage, valor, and strength, while the white stripes convey cleanliness, light, truth, and peace. As in the American Flag, the red bards exceed the white by one. The mollo, "Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity," describes the motivating force behind the FBI. The peaked bevelled edge surrounding the Seal symbolizes the challenges facing the FBI and the ruggedness of the agency, and the gold color in the seal conveys its overall value.

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1

2. Protect the United States against foreign Intel operations and espionage



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THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF THE FBI

On July 26, 1908, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte ordered a small force of permanent investigators (organized a month earlier) to report to the Department of Justice's Chief Examiner, Stanley Finch. All Department of Justice [DOJ] investigative matters except certain bank frauds, Bonaparte declared, were to be reported to this new group of detectives for handling. At first, little seemed to come of Bonaparte's reorganization. In fact, this small special agent force evolved into the FBI, the primary federal law enforcement agency in the United States.

In 1909, this agent force was named the Bureau of Investigation [BOI]. At this time, it investigated antitrust matters, land fraud, copyright violations, peonage, and twenty other matters. Over the next decade, federal criminal authority and Bureau jurisdiction were extended by laws like the 1910 "White-Slave Traffic" Act that put responsibility for interstate prostitution under the Bureau for a time and the 1919 Dyer Act that did the same for interstate auto-theft. U.S. entry into WWI in April 1917 increased the Bureau's jurisdiction too. Congress and President Wilson assigned the BOI's three hundred employees responsibility for espionage, sabotage, sedition, and selective service matters.

Rising prosperity and a growing criminal threat characterized the 1920's. With the advent of the automobile and Prohibition, bank robbers, bootleggers, and kidnapers crossed state lines to elude capture because of jurisdictional boundaries. A flourishing criminal culture marked by violent gangsters arose as no federal law gave the BOI authority to tackle their crimes and other law enforcement efforts were fragmented. The Bureau addressed these matters as its jurisdiction permitted throughout the 1920's.

In 1924, Attorney General Harlan Stone appointed John Edgar Hoover as Director. Director Hoover [1924-1972] implemented a number of reforms to clean up what had become a politicized Bureau under the leadership of William J. Burns [1921-1924]. • Hoover reinstated merit hiring, introduced professional training of new agents, demanded regular inspections of all Bureau operations, and required a strict professionalism in the Bureau's work.

Under Hoover, the Bureau also began to emphasize service to other law enforcement agencies. The Identification Division was created in 1924 to provide U.S. police a means to identify criminals across jurisdictional boundaries. The Technical Crime Laboratory, created in 1932, provided forensic analysis and research for law enforcement, and the FBI National Academy, opened in 1935, provided standardized professional training for America's law enforcement communities.

In answer to the violent crime of the 1930's, Congress began to assign and expand new authorities to the Bureau. The kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby in 1932 led to the passage of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which allowed the Bureau to

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3

ACLURM005487

• • • • • • • • I. !. I. I :. • • • • • • • • • • • • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF THE FBI

On July 26, 1908, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte ordered a small force of permanent investigators (organized a month earlier) to report to the Department of Justice's Chief Examiner, Stanley Finch. All Department of Justice [DOJ] investigative matters except certain bank frauds, Bonaparte declared, were to be reported to this new group of detectives for handling. At first, little seemed to come of Bonaparte's . reorganization. In fact, this small special agent force evolved into the FBI, the primary federal law enforcement agency in the United States.

In 1909, this agent force was named the Bureau oflnvestigation [BOI). At this time, it investigated antitrust matters, land fraud, copyright violations, peonage, and twenty other matters. Over the next decade, federal criminal authority and Bureau jurisdiction were extended by laws like the 1910 "White-Slave Traffic" Act that put responsibility for interstate prostitution under the Bureau for a time and the 1919 Dyer Act that did the same for interstate auto-theft. U.S. entry'into WWI in April 1917 increased the Bureau's jurisdiction too. Congress and President Wilson assigned the BOI's three hundred employees responsibility for espionage, sabotage, sedition, and selective service matters.

Rising prosperity and a growing criminal threat characterized the 1920's. With the advent of the automobile and Prohibition, bank robbers, bootleggers, and kidnapers crossed state lines to elude capture because of jurisdictional boundaries. A flourishing criminal culture marked by violent gangsters arose as no federal law gave the BOI authority to tackle their crimes and other law enforcement efforts were fragmented. The B~reau addressed these matters as its jurisdiction permitted throughout the 1920's.

In 1924, Attorney General Harlan Stone appointed John Edgar Hoover as Director. Director Hoover [1924-1972] implemented a number of reforms to clean up what had become a politicized Bureau under the leadership of William J. Bums [1921-1924]. Hoover reinstated merit hiring, introduced professional training of new agents, demanded regular inspections of all Bureau operations, and required a strict professionalism in the Bureau's work.

Under Hoover, the Bureau also began to emphasize service to other law enforcement agencies. The Identification Division was created in 1924 to provide U.S. police a means to identify criminals across jurisdictional boundaries. The Technical Crime Laboratory, created in 1932, provided forensic analysis and research for law enforcement, and the FBI National Academy, opened in 1935, provided standardized professional training for America's law enforcement communities.

In answer to the violent crime of the 1930's, Congress began to assign and expand new authorities to the Bureau. The kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby in 1932 led to the passage of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which allowed the Bureau to


• • • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

investigate interstate kidnappings. The 1933 Kansas City Massacre spurred the passage of the 1934 May/June Crime Bills. These laws gave the Bureau authority to act in many new areas, to make arrests, and to carry weapons. Renamed "Federal Bureau of Investigation" in 1935, the FBI dealt with gangsters severely, earning its anonymous agents the sobriquet of ''G-Man."

S As the gangster threat subsided, a threat of a different nature emerged. In 1936,

President Roosevelt directed the FBI to investigate potential subversion by Nazi and Communist organizations. In 1940, he tasked the Bureau with responsibility for foreign intelligence in the western hemisphere and domestic security in the United States. In response, the Bureau created a Special Intelligence Service [SIS] Division in June 1940.

fl The SIS sent undercover FBI Agents throughout the Western Hemisphere. These Agents successfully identified some 1,300 Axis intelligence agents [about 10% of whom were

lb prosecuted]. When President Truman ordered the program's end in 1947, several former SIS offices became the backbone of the FBI's foreign liaison efforts, now serving as Legal Attach6 Offices [Legat Offices]. FBI efforts also thwarted many espionage, sabotage, and propaganda attempts on the home front including Frederick Duquesne's spy ring in 1941 and George Dasch's band of saboteurs in 1942.

When Germany and Japan surrendered in 1945, concern about the threat of

ED foreign intelligence did not end. Revelations that year from former Soviet intelligence agents like Igor Guzenko and Elizabeth Bentley, information gleaned from FBI investigations during and after the war, and decrypted/decoded Soviet cable traffic called "Venona" [available to the Bureau from 1947] convinced the FBI of the seriousness of the Soviet intelligence threat long before Senator Joseph McCarthy made his 1950 speech

S about communist "moles." Under the Hatch Act [1940] and Executive Orders issued in 1947 and 1951, the Bureau exercised responsibility for ensuring the loyalty of those who sought to work in the government. The FBI played a critical role in U.S. handling of the Cold War.

• In the 1950's, civil rights violations and organized crime became matters of

increasing concern. As in the past, lack of jurisdiction hindered the Bureau from effectively responding to these problems when they first emerged as national issues. It was under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act that the Bureau received legislative authority to investigate Civil Rights violations. Under existing laws,

lb the Bureau's efforts against organized crime also started slowly. Then, with the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the1970 Organized Crime Control Act, Congress gave the Bureau effective weapons with which to attack organized criminal enterprises, Title III warrants for wiretaps and the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICO].

• During the 1960's, subversion remained a central focus of Bureau efforts. The counter-cultural revolution turned the Bureau's attention towards violent student movements as criminal groups like the Weather Underground and the Black Panthers engaged in both legitimate political action and illegal crime. The Bureau responded to

• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Y 4

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investigate interstate kidnappings. The 1933 Kansas City Massacre spurred the passage of the 1934 May/June Crime Bills. These laws gave the Bureau authority to act in many new areas, to make arrests, and to carry weapons. Renamed "Federal Bureau of Investigation" in 1935, the FBI dealt with gangsters severely, earning its anonymous agents the sobriquet of "G-Man."

As the gangster threat subsided, a threat of a different nature emerged. In 1936, President Roosevelt directed the FBI to investigate potential subversion by Nazi and Communist organizations. In 1940, he tasked the Bureau with responsibility for foreign intelligence in the western hemisphere and domestic security in the United States. In response, the Bureau created a Special Intelligence Service [SIS] Division in June 1940. The SIS sent undercover FBI Agents throughout the Western Hemisphere. These Agents successfully identifjed some 1,300 Axis intelligence agents [about lO% of whom were prosecuted]. When President Truman ordered the program's end in 1947, several former SIS offices became the backbone of the FBI's foreign liaison efforts, now serving as Legal Attache Offices [Legat Offices]. FBI efforts also thwarted many espionage, sabotage, and propaganda attempts on the home front including Frederick Duquesne's spy ring in 1941 and George Dasch's band of saboteurs in 1942.

When Germany and Japan surrendered in 1945, concern about the threat of foreign intelligence did not end. Revelations that year from former Soviet intelligence agents like Igor Guzenko and Elizabeth Bentley, information gleaned from FBI investigations during and after the war, and decrypted/decoded Soviet cable traffjc called "Venona" [available to the Bureau from 1947] convinced the FBI of the seriousness of the Soviet intelligence threat long before Senator Joseph McCarthy made his 1950 speech about communist "moles." Under the Hatch Act [1940] and Executive Orders issued in 1947 and 1951, the Bureau exercised responsibility for ensuring the loyalty of those who sought to work in the government. The FBI played a critical role in U.S. handling of the Cold War.

In the 1950's, civil rights violations and organized crime became matters of increasing concern. As in the past, lack of jurisdiction hindered the Bureau from . effectively responding to these problems when they first emerged as national issues. It was under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act that the Bureau received legislative authority to investigate Civil Rights violations. Under existing laws, the Bureau's efforts against organized crime also started slowly. Then, with the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the1970 Organized Crime Control Act, Congress gave the Bureau effective weapons with which to attack organized criminal enterprises, Title ill warrants for wiretaps and the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICO].

During the 1960's, subversion remained a central focus of Bureau efforts. The counter-cultural revolution turned the Bureau's attention towards violent student movements as criminal groups like the Weather Underground and the Black Panthers engaged in both legitimate political action and illegal crime. The Bureau responded to


• UNCLASSIFIEDI/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• • the threat of subversion with Counterintelligence Programs, COINTELPRO, first against

ID the Communist Party [1956], later against other violent/subversive groups like the Black • Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan [1960's].

During the 1970's, Bureau actions, which were publicly revealed through a strengthened Freedom of Information Act [1966, amended in 1974], resulted in congressional investigations like the Church Committee and the Pike Committee hearings

ID in 1975. In response to criticisms emerging from these revelations, the Bureau worked with Attorney General Levi to develop guidelines for its domestic counterintelligence

ID investigations.

• In the wake of Director Hoover's death in May 1972, Director Clarence M. Kelley

[1973-1977] refocused FBI investigative priorities from the quantity of results to the quality of cases handled. Working with the Bureau and Congress in 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi issued a set of investigative. guidelines to address the concerns of

ID Bureau critics and to give the FBI the confidence of having public, legal authority behind its use of irreplaceable investigative techniques like wiretaps, informants, and undercover

ID agents. These investigative techniques were used to great effect in cases like ABSCAM [1980], GREYLORD [1984], and UNIRAC [1978]. In 1983, as concerns about terrorist acts grew, Attorney General William French Smith revised the Levi Guidelines to adjust

111 the Bureau's ability to prevent violent radical acts.

ID Director. William H. Webster [107-1987] built upon Director Kelley's emphasis • on investigative "quality" cases by focusing Bureau efforts on three Priority Programs - ID White Collar Crime, Organized Crime, and Foreign Counterintelligence. Later Illegal

ID Drugs [1982], Counterterrorism [1982], and Violent Crimes [1989] were identified as priority programs too. This concentration of resources brought great success against Soviet and East Bloc intelligence as more than 40 spies were arrested between 1977 and

ID 1985. The FBI also made breakthroughs against white-collar crime in investigations like

• ILLWIND [1988] and LOST TRUST [1990], and in organized crime cases like BRILAB [1981] and the PIZZA CONNECTION [1985].

During the 1990's, criminal and security threats to the United States evolved as new technology and the fall of communism in the Soviet bloc changed the known geopolitical world. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centers and the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building highlighted the potentially catastrophic threat of both international and domestic terrorism. The FBI responded to the emerging • international face of crime by aggressively building bridges between U.S. and foreign law

ID enforcement. Under Director Louis J. Freeh [1993-2001], the Bureau expanded its Legat • Program [39 offices by fall-2000]; provided professional law enforcement education to

foreign nationals through the International Law Enforcement Academy [ILEA] in Budapest [opened in1994] and other international education efforts; and created working groups and other structured liaisons with foreign law enforcement.

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• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5

ACLURM005489

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UNCLASSIFIEDJIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the threat of subversion with Counterintelligence Programs, COINTELPRO, first against the Communist Party [1956], later against other violent/subversive groups like the Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan [1960's]. .

During the 1970's, Bureau actions, which were publicly revealed through a strengthened Freed9m ofInformation Act [1966, amended in 1974], resulted in congressional investigations like the Church Committee and the Pike Committee hearings in 1975. In response to criticisms emerging from these revelations, the Bureau worked with Attorney General Levi to develop guidelines for its domestic counterintelligence investigations:

In the wake of Director Hoover's death in May 1972, Director Clarence M. Kelley [1973-1977] refocused FBI investigative priorities from the qUailtity of results to the . quality of cases handled. Working with the Bureau and Congress in 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi issued a set of investigative guidelines to address the concerns of Bureau critics and to give the FBI the confidence of having public, legal authority behind· its use of irreplaceable investigative techniques like wiretaps, informants, and undercover agents. These investigative techniques were used to great effect in cases like ABSCAM [1980], GREYLORD [1984], and UNIRAC [1978]. In 1983, as concerns about terrorist acts grew, Attorney General William French Smith revised the Levi Guidelines to adjust the Bureau's ability to prevent violent radical acts.

DirectorWilliam H. Webster [1977-1987] built upon Director Kelley's emphasis on investigative "quality" cases by focusing Bureau efforts on three Priority Programs -White Collar Crime, Organized Crime, and Foreign Counterintelligence. Later illegal Drugs [1982], Counterterrorism [1982], and Violent Crimes [1989] were identified as priority programs too. This concentration of resources brought great success against Soviet and East Bloc intelligence as more than 40 spies were arrested between 1977 and 1985. The FBI also made breakthroughs against white-collar crime in investig~tions like ILLWIND [1988] and LOST TRUST [1990], and in organized crime cases like BRILAB [1981] and the PIZZA CONNECTION [1985].

During the 1990's, criminal and security threats to the United States evolved as new technology and the fall of conununism in the Soviet bloc changed the known geopolitical world. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centers and the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building highlighted the potentially catastrophic threat of both international and domestic terrorism. The FBI responded to the emerging . international face of crime by aggressively building bridges between U.S. and foreign law enforcement. Under Director Louis 1. Freeh [1993-2001], the Bureau expanded its Legat Program [39 offices by fall-2000]; provided professional law enforcement education to foreign nationals through the International Law Enforcement Academy [ILEA] in Budapest [opened in1994] and other international education efforts; and created working groups and other structured liaisons with foreign law enforcement.

UNCLASSIFJEDJIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5

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The Bureau also strengthened its domestic agenda. Responding to criticism of its actions in the 1993 standoffs at Waco, Texas, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, the Bureau revamped its crisis response efforts. The FBI's commitment to law enforcement service was strengthened by the computerization of its massive fingerprint collection database, enhancements in the National Crime Information Center [NCIC] and in NCIC 2000, and by the revitalization of the FBI Laboratory. In 1997, the Bureau hired its first professional scientist to head the Lab. The Lab

tightened its protocols for evidence control, instituted organizational changes to optimize research specialization, and earned national accreditation.

On September 4, 2001, former U.S. Attorney Robert S. Mueller III [2001 to present] was sworn in as Director with a mandate to address a number of steep challenges: upgrading the Bureau's information technology infrastructure; addressing records management issues; and enhancing FBI foreign counterintelligence analysis and security in the wake of the damage done by former Special Agent and convicted spy Robert S. Hanssen.

Then within days of his entering on duty, the September 11 terrorist attacks were launched against New York and Washington. Director Mueller led the FBI's massive investigative efforts in partnership with all U.S. law enforcement, the federal government, and our allies overseas. On October 26, 2001, the President signed into law the U.S. Patriot Act, which granted new provisions to address the threat of terrorism, and Director Mueller accordingly accepted on behalf of the Bureau responsibility for protecting the American people against future terrorist attacks. On May 29, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued revised investigative guidelines to assist the Bureau's counterterrorism efforts.

To support the Bureau's change in mission and to meet newly articulated strategic priorities, Director Mueller called for a reengineering of FBI structure and operations that will closely focus the Bureau on prevention of terrorist attacks, on countering foreign intelligence operations against the U.S., and on addressing cyber crime-based attacks and other high technology crimes. In addition, the Bureau remains dedicated to protecting civil rights, combatting public corruption, organized crime, white-collar crime, and major acts of violent crime. It is also strengthening its support to federal, county, municipal, and international law enforcement partners. And it is dedicated to upgrading its technological infrastructure to successfully meet each of its priorities.

At the start of the new millennium, the 1~73I stands dedicated to high values and ethical standards. Commitment to these values and standards ensures that the FBI effectively carries out its mission: Protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats; uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States; and provide and enhance assistance to its federal, state, municipal, and international partners.


ACLURM005490

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


The Bureau also strengthened its domestic agenda. Responding to criticism of its actions in the 1993 standoffs at Waco, Texas, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, the Bureau revamped its crisis response efforts. The FBI's commitment to law enforcement service was strengthened by the computerization of its massive fingerprint collection database, enhancements in the National Crime Information Center [NCIC] and in NCIC 2000, and by the revitalization of the FBI Laboratory. In 1997, the Bureau hired its first professional scientist to head the Lab. The Lab

tightened its protocols for evidence control, instituted organizational changes to optimize research specialization, and earned national accreditation.

On September 4,2001, former U.S. Attorney Robert S. Mueller III [2001 to present] was sworn in as Director with a mandate to address a number of steep Challenges: upgrading the Bureau's information technology infrastructure; addressing records management issues; and enhancing FBI foreign counterintelligence analysis and security in the wake of the damage done by former Special Agent and convicted spy Robert S. Hanssen.

Then within days of his entering on duty, the September 11 terrorist attacks were launched against New York and Washington. Director Mueller led the FBI's massive investigative efforts in partnership with all U.S. law enforcement, the federal government, and our allies overseas. On October 26,2001, the President signed into law the U.S. Patriot Act, which granted new proviSions to address the threat of terrorism, and Director Mueller accordingly accepted on behalf of the Bureau responsibility for protecting the American people against future terrorist attacks. On May 29. 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued revised investigative guidelines to assist the Bureau's counterterrorism efforts.

To support the Bureau's change in mission and to meet newly articulated strategic priorities, Director Mueller called for a reengineering of FBI structure and operations that will closely focus the Bureau on prevention of terrorist attacks, on countering foreign intelligence operations against the U.S., and on addressing cyber crime-based attacks and other high technology crimes. ·In addi,tign, the Bureau remains dedicated to protecting civil rights, combatting public corruption, organized crime, white-collar crime, and major acts of violent crime. It is also strengthening its support to federal, county, municipal, and international law enforcement partners. And it is dedicated to upgrading its technological infrastructure to successfully meet each of its priorities.

At the start of the new millennium, the FBI stands dedicated to high values and ethical standards. Commitment to these values and standards ensures that the FBI effectively carries out its mission: Protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats; uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States; and provide and enhance assistance to its federal, state, municipal, and international partners.

UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6

•


Ever wonder how the FBI got its name?

a It's more confusing than you might think.

in First, it had no name. In 1908 when Attorney General Charles Bonaparte created the entity that would become the FBI, he did not name it. He simply referred to the group as a "special agent force" when he announced his work to Congress in the 1908 Attorney

• General's Annual Report.

Second, it was named the Bureau of Investigation but, sometimes, called the Division of Investigation. In 1909, Attorney General Wickersham formally named Bonaparte's "force" the Bureau of Investigation [30I]. At the time, the Bureau was composed of less than seventy employees. Over the next several years the Bureau was also referred to as the Division of Investigation, but this title did not stick. Between 1913 and 1933, the Bureau remained the Bureau of Investigation. In 1933 it was named the United States Bureau of Investigation.

Third, and most confusingly, the Bureau became the Division of Investigation. In the spring of 1933, newly elected President Franklin Roosevelt

ED

reorganized the Department of Justice [DOJ]. This reorganization grew out of the end of Prohibition: In 1919, the 18th Amendment had been passed, outlawing the sale and manufacture of alcohol and enforced by the Treasury Department's Bureau of Prohibition [BOP]. In 1929, the BOP was transferred to the DOJ from the Treasury Department. But what does this have to do with the FBI?

• • Well...in June of 1933, President Roosevelt ordered the formation of a Division

of Investigation composed of the Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Prohibition. Director Hoover was appointed as Director of Investigation but also remained Director of the 1301. The leadership of the BOP was left largely to John S. Hurley as Assistant Director in charge of the BOP. Hoover maintained a stark separation between the two Bureaus and he refused to integrate. BOP personnel into the BOI. [For more on this confusing period, see the "Byte Out of History on Elliot Ness and the Bureau."]

In the fall of 1933, the 18th Amendment was repealed and the Bureau of Prohibition withered and died. Its enforcement functions were ended so its Agents were transferred or fired; a very small number became FBI Agents. BOP property was

• transferred throughout the government (we kept a lot of cars, most of the boats and airplanes went to other departments) and its tax law enforcement authority was

in

transferred back to Treasury. The few remaining enforcement functions related to crimes committed under the old prohibition laws were handled by the Division of Investigation.

Finally, the FBI. By default, the Bureau of Investigation had become the • Division of Investigation. This was confusing as there were several "Divisions of

Investigation" in the federal government at that time. Director Hoover, therefore, asked

a UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• ' •

ACLURM005491

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I·' I·


Ever 'wonder how the FBI got its name?

It's more confusing than you might think.

First, it had no name. In 1908 when Attorney General Charles Bonaparte created the entity that would become the FBI; he did not name it. He simply referred to the group as a "special agent force" when he announced his work to Congress in the 1908 Attorney General's Annual Report.

Second,it was named the Bureau oflnvestigation but, sometimes, called the Division ofInvestigation. In 1909, Attorney General Wickersham formally named Bonaparte's "force" the Bureau of Investigation [BOI]. At the time, the Bureau was composed of less than seventy employees. Over the next several years the Bureau was also referred to as the Division ofInvestigation. but this title did not stick. Between 1913 and 1933, the Bureau remained the Bureau of Investigation. In 1933 it was named the United States Bureau ofInvestigation.

Third, and most confusingly, the Bureau became the Division of Investigation. In the spring of 1933, newly elected President Franklin Roosevelt reorganized the Department of Justice [DOJ]. This reorganization grew out of the end of Prohibition: In 1919. the 18th Amendment had been passed, outlawing the sale and manufacture of alcohol and enforced by the Treasury Department's Bureau of Prohibition [BOP]. In 1929. the BOP was transferred to the DOJ from the Treasury Department. But what does this have to do with the FBI?

Well...in June of 1933, President Roosevelt ordered the formation of a Division of Investigation composed of the Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Prohibition. Director Hoover was appointed as Director of Investigation but also remained Director of the BOr. The leadership of the BOP was left largely to John S. Hurley as Assistant Director in charge of the BOP. Hoover maintained a stark separation- between the two Bureaus and he refused to integrate BOP personnel into the BOr. [For more on this confusing period, see the "Byte Out of History on Elliot Ness and the Bureau."]

In the fall of 1933. the 18th Amendment was repealed and the Bureau of Prohibition withered and died. Its enforcement functions were ended so its Agents were transferred or fired; a very small number became FBI Agents. BOP property was transferred throughout the government (we kept a lot of cars, most of the boats and airplanes went to other departments) and its tax law enforcement authority was transferred back to Treasury. The few remaining enforcement functions related to crimes committed under the old prohibition laws were handled by the Division of Investigation.

Finally, the FBI. By default, the Bureau of Investigation had become the Di vision of Investigation. This was confusing as there were several "Divisions of Investigation" in the federal government at that time. Director Hoover. therefore. asked



that his Division be given a distinctive name. Attorney General Cummings broached the issue with President Roosevelt and Congress and they agreed. In the 1935 the Department of Justice appropriation, Congress officially recognized the Division as the

ID Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI. Almost immediately, Inspector W. Drane Lester coined the FBI's motto - Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity. It was quickly adopted and published in The Investigator for all Bureau employees to see. The name became effective on March 22, 1935, when President Roosevelt signed the appropriation bill. We have been known under this distinguished name ever since.

• Where did the title "Special Agent" come from? •

The bottom line: no sources say why the term "special agent" was first used in the 1870's by the Department of Justice, only that it was used...and evolved into today's FBI Special Agent.

ED Here are the facts:

In 1870, after Congress appropriated $50,000 for the detection and prosecution of

111111 crimes, Attorney General George Williams appointed a "special agent" in the Department • of Justice and paid him with monies from this appropriation. This agent conducted

CD "special" investigations for the Attorney General, i.e. the Attorney General assigned which cases his agent was to investigate. Other government law enforcement agencies may have also used a similar title from time to time, but none used it for an extended period of time.

• By 1879, the DOJ title was changed to General Agent, a supervisory role [this

position was abolished in 1907]. In 1894 a "special agent" was assigned to work under the General Agent, investigating violations of the Indian Intercourse Act. The bulk of Department investigations between 1879 and 1908 were handled by Secret Service personnel who were borrowed on a case-by-case basis. In 1907, the year before the

• Bureau of Investigation (the FBI's precursor) was created, one DOJ special agent investigated antitrust matters, one handled investigations related to the Government's defense of suits before the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, and one special agent handled Indian Intercourse Act violations. •

ID In 1908 when Attorney General Charles Bonaparte reorganized the Department's investigators into a ''special agent force," he hired 9 Treasury agents as special agents and put them together with 13 peonage investigators, and 12 bank examiners. Whether all or some of the peonage investigators were called special agents is not known. The bank examiners were accountants and were usually called "special examiners." A distinction immediately arose between special agents and special accountants. This distinction existed into the 1930's; at which point, it was decided that all investigative agents--

agents a and accountants--were to be called Special Agents. It was around this time that the convention of capitalizing "Special Agent" became uniform in the Bureau. •


• ACLURM005492

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFJEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that his Division be given a distinctive name. Attorney General Cummings broached the issue with President Roosevelt and Congress and they agreed. In the 1935 the Department of Justice appropriation, Congress officially recognized the Division as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI. Almost immediately, Inspector W. Drane Lester coined the FBI's motto - Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity. It was quickly adopted and published in The Investigator for all Bureau employees to see. The name became effective on March 22, 1935, when President Roosevelt signed the appropriation bill. We have been known under this distinguished name ever since.

Where did the title "Special Agent" come from?

The bottom line: no sources say why the term "special agent" was first used in the 1870's by the Department of Justice, only that it was used ... and evolved into today's FBI Special Agent.

Here are the facts:

In 1870, after Congress appropriated $50,000 for the detection and prosecution of crimes, Attorney General George Williams appointed a "special agent" in the Department of Justice and paid him with monies from this appropriation. This agent conducted "special" investigations for the Attorney General, i.e. the Attorney General assigned which cases his agent was to investigate. Other government law enforcement agencies may have also used a similar title from time to time, but none used it for an extended period of time.

By 1879, the DOJ title was changed to General Agent, a supervisory role [this position was abolished in 1907]. In 1894 a "special agent" was assigned to work under the General Agent, investigating violations of the Indian Intercourse Act. The bulk of Department investigations between 1879 and 1908 were handled by Secret Service personnel who were borrowed on a case-by-case basis. In 1907, the year before the Bureau of Investigation (the FBI's precursor) was created, one DOJ special agent investigated antitrust matters, one handled investigations related to the Government's defense of suits before the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, and one special agent handled Indian Intercourse Act violations.

In 1908 when Attorney General Charles Bonaparte reorganized the Department's investigators into a "special agent force," he hired 9 Treasury agents as special agents and put them together with 13 peonage investigators, and 12 bank. examiners. Whether all or some of the peonage investigators were called special agents is not known. The bank examiners were accountants and were usually called "special examiners." A distinction immediately arose between special agents and special accountants. This distinction existed into the 1930's; at which point, it was decided that all investigative agents-agents and accountants--were to be called Special Agents. It was around this time that the convention of capitalizing "Special Agent" became uniform in the Bureau.

UNCLASSIFJEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 8

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NATym,

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EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR

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NJTTF Organization and Function

• NJTTF Management • ;UTE' Policy &

Program Management

• Operations Case Support • Crisis Support • Special Projects

• Management of ALA, MLA, & RLA sub-programs • National polices and strategies related to transportation domain

• Nati( nal Threat Identification & Development

• Analysis & Production • Intelligence Sharing Program

Support

12 UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY


Domestic Terrorism Strategic Operations Section Section Chief

NJTTT Unit Chief

Program Management

Operations Intelligence Transportation Security Program

Deputy Unit Chief—DMS Deputy Unit Chief — DoD

Program Mgt. Coord.

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ACLURM005496

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


Domestic Terrorism Strutegic Operations Section Sectioll Chief


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•

• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• • TFO/TFA IN-PROCESSING LIST •

1) Security a) SF-86 (Category I - Full Top Secret Background must cover 10 years) ® b) Initial FD-857 and FD-868 (retained at until Official Security Clearance comes

• back. Initial must be destroyed). c) Final Set of noted forms are sent with EC requesting Computer Access and RA

• Access Badges. i) Security Clearance Brochure ii) PSI

• iii) NCIC Checks • iv) ACS Checks

v) IA Checks • vi) Local Involvements

vii) NADDIS Checks • viii) Fingerprints

d) SCI Indoctrination (if applicable) • e) For individuals possessing a Security Clearance from their "home" agency, they

must have it passed from their agency to FBIHQ, Security Office. • 2) MOU, Reimbursement Agreement, Venders Forms

a) Send EC to NJTTF via SAHQ (Coordinator's responsibility) 40

3) RA Access Badge/Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) - (See Coordinator) • a) FD-889 • b) FD-857

c) FD-868 d) SF-312

• e) Security Awareness f) PKI registration form and subscriber agreement

• 4) Deputation (TFO's only) • a) USM-3R

• b) FD-739 c) Photo d) Appropriate EC must be forwarded to NJTTF (Coordinator's responsibility)

• • 5) Credentials - (Must have FD-281/1-BI Hand Receipt) • a) FD-281 is turned into FBI Property Management Unit with EC

• 6) Photograph a) One Photograph is used for both Access Badge and Credentials b) Contact office photographer to schedule photograph

7) Computer Access (Access EC and Security Forms) a) FBI Data Base Access (Access EC and Security Forms)

• •


14

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ACLURM005498

• • • • • • • • • • 1\: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


TFO/TFA IN-PROCESSING LIST

1) Security a) SF-86 (Category I - Full Top Secret Background must eover 10 years) b) Initial FD-857 and FD-868 (retained at until Official Security Clearance comes

back. Initial must be destroyed). c) Final' Set of noted forms are sent with EC requesting Computer Access and RA

Access Badges. " i) Security Clearance Brochure ii) PSI iii) NCIC Checks iv) ACS Checks v) IA Checks vi) Local Involvements vii) NADDIS Checks viii) Fingerprints

d) SCI Indoctrination (if applicable) e) For individuals possessing a Security Clearance from their "home" agency. they

must have it passed from their agency to FBIHQ. Security Office.

2) MOU, Reimbursement Agreement, Venders Forms a) Send EC to NJTTF via SAHQ (Coordinator's responsibility)

3) RA Access BadgelPublic Key Infrastructure (PKI) - (See Coordinator) a) FD-889 b) FD-857 c) FD-868 d) SF-312 e) Security Awareness f) PKI registration form and subscriber agreement

4) Deputatio'n (TFO's only) a) USM-3R b) FD-739 c) Photo d) Appropriate EC must be forwarded to NJTTF (Coordinator's responsibility)

5) Credentials - (Must have FD-2811FBI Hand Receipt) a) FD-281 is turned into FBI Property Management Unit with EC

6) Photograph a) One Photograph is used for both Access Badge and Credentials b) Contact office photographer to schedule photograph

7) Computer Access (Access EC and Security Forms) a) FBI Data Base Access (Access Ee and Security Forms)


•••S

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b) FBI Computer Security Training (InfoSec, etc)

8) Biographic Sheet (Bio-Sheet) (May be required) a) Obtain form from Coordinator b) Complete form and return 3 copies to Coordinator

9) JTTF Vehicles & Gas Cards (See Coordinator)

10) Equipment Issue (FD-281 FBI Hand Receipt) (Issued equipment varies by Division) a) Vehicle/Gas Card (see 9 above) b) Pager c) Vest d) Hand-held Radio e) Cell Phone f) Car Radio Packet g) Portable Police Emergency Lights h) Blackberry

11) Radio Frequencies/Call Signs — See JTTF Coordinator or appropriate POC

12) TFO's Chain of Command at their agency a) Provide Information to Coordinator

13) TURK (Time Utilization Record Keeping) a) Forms are maintained by Administrative Assistant b) Complete form weekly

14) Electronic Equipment Security Form a) Obtain forms from Coordinator b) Read and sign Acknowledgment Form c) Fill out Electronic Equipment Registration Form and return to Coordinator

15) Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) a) Obtain form from Coordinator b) Complete form and obtain appropriate signature from your supervisor c) Return form to LEO Coordinator

16) Internet Access a) Obtain form from Coordinator b) Complete form and return to Coordinator

17) Airport/Transportation Infrastructure Access badge and Briefing (where applicable)

18) Request for military base access pass (where applicable)


ACLURM005499

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b) FBI Computer Security Training (InfoSec, etc)

8) Biographic Sheet (Bio-Sheet) (May be required) a) Obtain form from Coordinator b) Complete form and return 3 copies to Coordinator

9) JTTF Vehicles & Gas Cards (See Coordinator)

10) Equipment Issue (FD-28I FBI Hand Receipt) (Issued equipment varies by Division) a) Vehicle/Gas Card (see 9 above) b) Pager c) Vest d) Hand-held Radio e) Cell Phone f) Car Radio Packet g) Portable Police Emergency Lights h) Blackberry

11) Radio Frequencies/Call Signs - See JTTF Coordinator or appropriate POC

12) TFO's Chain of Command at their agency a) Provide Information to Coordinator

13) TURK (Time Utilization Record Keeping) a) Forms are maintained by Administrative Assistant b) Complete form weekly

·14) Electronic Equipment Security Form a) Obtain forms from Coordinator b) Read and sign Acknowledgment Form c) Fill out Electronic Equipment Registration Form and return to Coordinator

15)Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) a) Obtain form from Coordinator b) Complete form and obtain appropriate signature from your supervisor c) Return form to LEO Coordinator

16) Internet Access a) Obtain form from Coordinator b) Complete form and return to Coordinator

17) AirportlTransportation Infrastructure Access badge and Briefing (where applicable)

18) Request for military base access pass (where applicable)



19) Personnel Security Polygraph Program a) All personnel detailed to the FBI JTTF are required to submit to a polygraph

examination prior to obtaining a security clearance.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

Background: On October 31, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 12333, which set forth the most current procedures for dealing with classified information, including:

> Safeguarding National Security Information > Levels of Classification > Declassification

DEFINITIONS

Information: Any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the U.S. Government.

Classification: That process used by an Original Classification Authority to determine what information should be classified and at what level.

Classified National Security Information: Information that has been determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.

National Security Information: Information, which if disclosed, would cause harm to the National Security or foreign relations of the United States.

CLASSIFICATION

There are three levels of Classifications:

1. MNVH3131s7 Unauthorized disClosure may cause DAMAGE to National Security.

: Unauthorized disclosure may cause SERIOUS DAMAGE to National Security.

3. WEP:Stre: Unauthorized disclosure may cause EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE to National Security.

Terms such as "For Official Use Only"

Or "Law Enforcement Sensitive"

Do not refer to Levels of Classification


SM

OS

SIIIIIIII

IIS

SO

SS

OS

OS

SO

OS

OO

SS

OOM

OS

SO

SS

IIM

ACLURM005500

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


19) Personnel Security Polygraph Program a) All personnel detailed to the FBI JTTF are required to submit to a polygraph

examination prior to obtaining a security clearance.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

Background: On October 31,2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 12333, which set forth the most current procedures for dealing with classified information, including:

~ Safeguarding National Security Information· ~ Levels of Classification ~ Declassification

DEFINITIONS

Information: Any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the U.S. Government.

Classification: That process used by an Original Classification Authority to determine what information should be classified and at what level.

Classified National Security Information: Information that has been determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form~

National Security Information: Information, which if disclosed, would cause harm to the National Security or foreign relations of the United States.

CLASSIFICATION

There are three levels of Classifications:

1. :gJ4I¥prrru;> Unauthorized disClosure may cause DAMAGE to National Security.

2.~:_unaUthOrized disclosure may caus~ SERIOUS DAMAGE to National Security. .

3. .....:::=-.=:.=.:==

Terms such as "For Official Use Only"

or "Law Enforcement Sensitive"

Do not refer to Levels of Classification


RESTRICTIVE HANDLING CAVEATS AND CONTROL MARKINGS

❖ ORCON - Originator Cohtrolled; Dissemination and Extraction of Intelligence information is controlled by the Originator of the Information

❖ NOFORN - Not releasable to Foreign Nationals

SAFEGUARDING Protection of Classified Information from

Unauthorized Disclosure

> Access > Marking > Transmission > Storage

a

• • a

a • a a • a

• a. a

is


"For Official Use Only" is a caveat regarding the dissemination of intelligence information. For Official Use Only information can only be disseminated to other official US government agencies that have a need to know.

"Law Enforcement Sensitive" is another caveat regarding the dissemination of intelligence information. Law Enforcement Sensitive information can only be disseminated to other local, state or federal law enforcement agencies.

ED > CLEARANCE + NEED TO KNOW = ACCESS

a

> OVERALL DOCUMENT MARKING - A document's overall classification is determined by the HIGHEST classification level of information contained on any page of that document.

• a a a

a


a

ACLURM005501

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • i. • • • • • • •


''For Official Use Only" is a caveat regarding the dissemination of intelligence information. For Official Use Only information can only be disseminated to other official US government agencies that have a need to know.

"Law EnforcementSensitive" is another caveat regarding the dissemination of intelligence information. Law Enforcement Sensitive illformation can only be disseminated to other local, state or federal law enforcement agencies.

RESTRICTIVE HANDLING CAVEATS AND CONTROL MARKINGS

vORCON -.Originator Controlledj Dissemination and Extraction of Intelligence information is controlled by the Originator of the Information

V NOFORN - Not releasable to Foreign Nationals

SAFEGUARDING Protection of Classified Information from

Unauthorized Disclosure

>- Access >-Marking >- Transmission >- Storage

>- CLEARANCE + NEED TO KNOW = ACCESS

>- OVERALL DOCUMENT MARKING - A document's overall classification is determined by the HIGHEST classification level of information contained on any page of that document.


--------~=====----------------


tpile‘L If a document contains more than

one page, place the overall classification marking

conspicuously at the top and bottom of the front cover, on all documents pages, and at the top and bottom of the outside of

the back cover.

PORTION MARKINGS Indicate classification level of each portion of the document. > Subject > Title > Paragraphs D Graphics

PORTION MARKING PART II Indicate classification level (including caveats) in ( ) immediately preceding or following the portion to which it applies.

Top S (S) Se

onfident (U) Unclassified


ID

•

• S

• S S

S

• S

• S

S

S

• • S

S

• S

• • S

S

S

• S

• S

S

• S

•

ACLURM005502

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


~ If a document contains more than

one page, place the overall classification marking

conspicuously at the top and bottom of the front cover, on

all documents pages, and at the top and bottom of the outside of

the back cover.

PORTION MARKINGS Indicate classification level of each portion of the document.

~ Subject ~ Title ~ Paragraphs ~ Graphics

PORTION MARKING PART II Indicate classification level (including caveats) in ( ) immediately preceding or following the portion to which it applies.

Unclassified


•11

1111

1111

111

MO

SS

IIII

IIII

MII

III

IIII

IIII

SS

110

1111

1111

119

1111

1111

1111

11

UNCLASSIKE,DHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

METHODS OF TRANSMISSION

A. U.S. Postal Service

> Contracted Service

> Authorized DOJ, DOD, DOS, or component courier service/system

A Cleared and designated government employee

A Authorized cryptographic system Preparation of Material for Transmission

✓ Envelopes or containers

✓ When classified information is transmitted, it will be enclosed in two opaque, sealed envelopes, wrappings, or containers, durable enough to properly protect the material from accidental exposure and to ease in detecting tampering.

Addressing

✓ The outer envelope or container for classified material will be addressed to an official government activity or to a DOD contractor with a facility clearance and appropriate storage capability. It will show the complete return address of the sender. The outer envelope will not be addressed to an individual. Office codes or phrases such as "Attention: SA Smith may be used.

✓ The inner envelope or container will show the address of the receiving activity, the address of the sender and the highest classification of the contents.

✓ The outer envelope or single container will not bear a classification marking or any other unusual marks that might invite special attention to the fact that the contents are classified.


ACLURM005503

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


METHODS OF TRANSMISSION

~ U.S. Postal Service

~ Contracted Service

~ Authorized DOJ, DOD, DOS, or component courier service/system

~ Cleared and designatedgovemment employee

~ Authori~ed cryptographic system Preparation of Material for Transmission

./ Envelopes or containers

./ When classified information is transmitted, it will be enclosed in two opaque, sealed envelopes, wrappings, or containers, durable enough to properly protect the material from accidental exposure and to ease in detecting tampering.

Addressing

./ The out~r envelope or container for classified material will be addressed to an official government activity or to a DOD contractor with a facility clearance and· appropnate storage capability. It will show the complete return address of the sender. The outer envelope will not be addressed to an individual. Office codes or phrases such as "Attention: SA Smith may be used.

./ The inner envelope or container will show the address of the receiving activity, the address of the sender and the highest classification of the contents.

./ The outer envelope or single container will not bear a classification marking or any other unusual marks that might invite special attention to the fact that the contents are clllssified.


Attorney General 12333 Pennsylvania Ave Washington, D.C.

Austin FBI 9420 Research Blvd Austin, TX

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFHCIAL USE ONLY


Austin FBI 9420 Research Blvd Austin, TX

Outer opaque wrapping/cover

Transporting

Inner opaque wrapping

✓ When being hand carried outside an activity, a locked briefcase or

so

locked bag may serve as the outer wrapper, but not when hand carried aboard a commercial airline.

• S • • S • S

S

• • • • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 0

•

ACLURM005504

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I:

UNCLASSIFJED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Austin FBI ·9420 Research Blvd Austin, TX

Outer opaque wrapping/cover

Transporting


Austin FBI 9420 Research Blvd A\Jstin, TX

Inner opaque wrapping

./ When being hand carried outside an activity, a locked briefcase or locked bag may serve as the outer wrapper, but not when hand carried aboard a commercial airline.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY· 20

140''&-d.kilifi —flee

glakT-AOPri•A• coaiimiowor• . •

Ili qtaLtri-aroligeare

rt _Clas f cation Ifos'AcE.O.Jaarrrio akT.,00n .

44r. ttin

JO a I C 41E1

4. SCI Control Systems/Subsystems HCS (HCS) COMINT (SI)

-GAMMA (-GI (Requires ORCON) -ECI [3-letter designator]

TALENT KEYHOLE (TK)

5. Special Access Program SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED-[program identifier] (SAR-BP)

6. Foreign Government Information Example: Canadian Secret Information Banner line: //FGI CAN Portion. Marking: (//CAN S). Use FGI and classification level ONLY (//FGI S) when origin country must be concealed.

7. Dissemination Controls FOUO (FOUO) ORCON (OC) IMCON (IMC) NOFORN (NF) PROPIN (PR) Authorized for Release to... (REL TO) RELIDO (new marking) (RELIDO) DEA Sensitive (DSEN) FISA (FISA) Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) (NOTE: In classified documents, LES is not included in the banner line. See http://www.intelink.sgov.govisites/ssc/cap co/marking_rets/Marking%20References% 20Documents/LES%20Interim%20IC%20M arking%20Guidance.doc for IC Guidance.)

- —

8. Non-Intelligence Community Markings Special Category (SC) Sensitive Information (SINFO) Limited Distribution (DS) Exclusive Distribution (XD) No Distribution (ND) Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) SBU-NOFORN

40-611(.0 )11Xte1061).0.1!95iq 1•Jitto*,-,4417ifteiiic.40#;9v4Itoli#60#00/04',.

itytl 6}100(00r

141 11gr;i!§ NOT ALL 0§kb,

111111111111111111111111100111111111111111111•1111111111111111111 1111111111111 1111 11 1111111 118

Desk Reference ;,.„\'`'

http://www.intelink.sgov.govisites/seckapco/marking_refsiMarking%20References%20Documents/CAPC0%20Implementation %20Manual_2.1_5%20January%202009.pdf (This URL is on the FBINet system.)

The Intelligence Community fOrmat for marking classified information requires a banner line and portion markings on every page, and a classification authority block on the face of each document or media. The format for banner lines and portion markings consists of eight categories (as described in gray box below). The IC format also specifies how to separate the categories andseries of markings within them. The categories must be listed in the order shown in the Authorized Classification and Control Markings Register. Use only categories and markings required to protect the information. The banner line below' (see yellow arrow) is an example of the formatting and ordering of the most frequently used cate ories and r .uired •unctuation. It is not intended to re.resent a correct overall classification markin

Intelligence Community Classification Markings

UN

CL

AS

SIF

IED

//FO

R O

FF

ICIA

L U

SE O

NL

Y

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.

SCI CONTROL SYSTEMS/SAP. Identify the SCI control systems and subsystems. Use a single slash (no space) to separate SCI control systems. SCI subsystems. Use a hyphen (no space) between the SCI control system identifier (e.g., COMINT) and the SCI subsystem (e.g. GAMMA). SI and COMINT are synonymous; may use SI or COMINT in banner, but must use SI in portion markings.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION. Identify source of FG.t in a US-originated document. In banner line, use FGI o. trigraph country code in alphabetical order, separated by a single space; e.g.: FGI GBR. In portion markings, use trigraph e portion marking for classification level; e.g (//GBR S).

I In the REL TO marking, always list USA first, followed by other countries' ISO 3166 trigraphs

• listed in alphabetical order by country name. Then list Annex A tetragraphs in alphabetical order. Separate trigraphs/tetragraphs with a comma and a space. The word "and" has been eliminated.

4.561 Control System

5. Special Access Program

5. Foreign GOVORMIent Intonation

7. Dissemination Controls

8. Nontintelligence Community Maikmos

i&EP)S6410414M 48■5Pieit - OIA2Mi fil40.811 l'AVR

Peratoa.ITINErEcvaaalevociirlecol onogim•ca. 4,1004-iaa'6,1

(ROM (.&n.,•-irticoceOlt Wft,,q=c110). crica...reasWatieworole

,cgq -ricoxcetne . • orl 30-ocralOCPOrVelnlid, q.100.1X11-4r,eoracn-alsob:w Gr.,A..*.zuaL,ANoareqouty• .

When using multiple markings, separate them with a single slash. List in order shown in Markings Register.

TOP SECRETHHCS/COMINT-GAMMA/TIV/FGI CAN GSRRORCON/PROPIN/REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY

FEII/SecD/SPCAU Updated Jul 2009/hma

ACLURM005505

• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Desk Reference

Intelligence Community Classification Markings http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/siteslssc:Jcapco/marking_refsiMarking%20References%20DocumentslCAPCO%20Implementation

%20Manual_2.1_5%20January"l0202009.pdf (This URL Is on the FBI Net system.) . The Community format for marking classified inlormation requires a banner line and portion markings on every p~ge, and a classilication authority block on the lace 01 each document or media. The format for banner lines and portion markings consisls of eight calegories (as described in gray box below). The Ie format also specifies how to separate the categories 'and series of markings within them. The categories musl be listed in Ihe order shown in the Authorized Classification and Control Markings Register. Use only categories and markings required to protect the inlormation. The banner line below' (see yellow arrow) is an example of the formatling and ordering of the most frequently

DUI1CIIJa[lilon. I I not inlended to a correct I I ·ft r k' . DISSEMINATION CONTROLS. When using multiple

1

----- --

markings, separate them with 1 a single slash. LIst in order shown In Markings Register_

,. -----

,------- ~-- -- --\ In the REL TO marking, always list USA first, I followed by other countries' ISO 3166 trigraphs I listed in alphabetical order by country name. Then : list Annex A tetrasraphs in alphabetical order

I Separate tngraphsltetragraphs with a comma and a

\ spac~ The wo~ :and" has been el~~I~ated. _

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION. Identify aource of FGl in a US-originated document. In banner line, use FGI + trigraph country code in alphabetical order, separated by a single space; e.g.:

4 SCI Control System 5 Special Access Program

FGI GBR. In portion markings, use trigraph -to portion marking for. classtncation level; e.g:: VIGBR S).

S. Foreign Government Information Example: Canadian Secret InformaUon Banner line: flFGI CAN Portion Marking: (/JCAN S). Use FGI and claSSification level ONLY (IIFGI S) when origin country must ba concealed.

F8VSecD/5PCAU Updated Jul 2009lhma

6. Foreign Govemmanllnformallon

! 7. OlsS~mlnatl~ Controls

8 Non.lntellgence Communitv foAarklngs

)


SECURITY AWARENESS BRIEFING FOR FBI •

EMPLOYEES AND TASK FORCE OFFICERS a

if I •

All FBI employees are expected to abide by the standards of conduct set forth in Title 5, CFR, Section 2635, as supplemented by DOJ regulations, and by the rules and regulations of the FBI pursuant to authorization set forth in Title 28, CFR, Section 0.137.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

1) Must uphold values of reliability, trustworthiness, honesty, and integrity. 2) Must be entirely frank and cooperative in answering inquiries of an administrative

nature. 3) Must not falsify information and/or documents for purposes of fraud or personal

gain. 4) Must not engage in illegal activities, criminal conduct, dishonest conduct, or

insubordination. 5) Must report to the FBI any occurrence or activity which might reflect adversely

on the FBI or bring discredit to the Bureau. 6) You are proscribed from managing any business or sales activity inside FBI space

that you might have in connection with any other employment(s) in which you might be involved.

7) It is improper to engage in any illegal gambling activities. You should not participate in lotteries, pools, betting, bookmaking, etc., while in official duty status or government property occupied by the Bureau.

8) You are accountable for your on/off duty alcohol-related misconduct whether or not you are specifically charged with an alcohol-related offense. Never cause yourself to be unfit for duty due to excessive alcohol consumption. A first DUI infraction, whether established by a conviction in court or as the result of an

• administrative inquiry, will cause you to be suspended from duty without pay for a a period of not less than 30 calendar days. If aggravating circumstances exist, you

may be terminated from employment. 9) You may not solicit or collect contributions for any purpose while in Bureau

a space without prior FBI approval. 10) Gifts, discounts, benefits, reduced memberships, etc., are prohibited if it was

offered as a result of your employment. Such gratuities might be acceptable if they are offered to all FBI employees, not just you. These gratuities may not be accepted if offered by a "prohibited source" or if a conflict of interest exists.

el 11) You may give employment recommendations or act as a character reference for

a Bureau personnel so long as your response is not based on FBI files or on any information or data that you acquired by virtue of your federal employment. Do not use Bureau stationary, letters with the FBI seal, or your official title or position in your response. Your response is your personal opinion and not the opinion of the FBI.

a • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 22

a

ACLURM005506

• • • • • • • • • • )\,. !. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'

SECURITY AWARENESS BRIEFING FOR FBI EMPLOYEES AND TASK FORCE OFFICERS

All FBI employees are expected to abide by the standards of «onduct set forth in Title 5, CFR, Section 2635, as supplemented by DO] regulations, and by the rules and regulations of the FBI pursuant to authorization set forth in Title 28, CFR, Section 0.137.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

1) Must uphold values of reliability, trustworthiness, honesty, and integrity. 2) Must be entirely frank and cooperative in answering inquiries of an administrative

nature. 3) Must not falsify information andlor documents for purposes of fraud or personal

gain. 4) Must not engage in illegal activities, criminal conduct, dishonest conduct, or

insubordination. 5) Must report to the FBI any occurrence or activity which might reflect adversely

on the FBI or bring discredit to the Bureau. 6) You are proscribed from managing any business or sales activity inside FBI space

that you might have in connection with any other employment(s) in which you might be involved.

7) It is improper to engage in any illegal gambling activities. You should not participate in lotteries, pools, betting, bookmaking, etc., while in official duty status or government property occupied by the Bureau.

8) You are accountable for your on/off duty alcohol-related misconduct whether or not you are specifically charged with an alcohol-related offense. Never cause yourself to be unfit for duty due to excessive alcohol consumption. A first D UI infraction, whether established by a conviction in court or as the result of an administrative inquiry, will cause you to be suspended from duty without payfor a period of not l~ss than 30 calendar days. If aggravating circumstances exist, you may be terminated from employment.

9) You may not solicit or collect contributions for any purpose while in Bureau space without prior FBI approval.

10) Gifts, discounts, benefits, reduced memberships, etc., are prohibited if it was offered as a result of your employment. Such gratuities might be acceptable if they are offered to all FBI employees, not just you. These gratuities may not be accepted if offered by a "prohibited source" or if a conflict of interest exists.

11) You may give employment recommendations or act as a character reference for Bureau personnel so long as your response is not based on FBI files or on any information or data that you acquired by virtue of your federal employment. Do not use Bureau stationary, letters with the FBI seal, Or your official title or posidon in your response. Your response is your personal opinion and not the opinion of the FBL


• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• 12) You are expected to maintain a satisfactory credit repUtation and promptly pay all

of your debts. 13) It is incumbent upon you to stay current on any court-ordered obligations, such as

child support, alimony, etc.

14) The following must be reported to your Division Security Officer: a) Requests to engage in outside employment. You may not accept any other

employment without prior SAC/FBIHQ approval. b) Requests to have a roommate (a non-family member residing with you for

more than 30 days) c) Marriages: 60 days prior to the marriage date; d) All types of arrests and civil litigations (i.e., divorce, separation, annulment,

etc.); • e) Aggravated traffic violations;

f) If you become a subject/suspect in a criminal matter; g) Financial problems:

i) Filing for bankruptcy SI ii) Accounts placed for collection

iii) Property repossessed

el iv) Liens placed against you, including wage garnishments v) Civil judgments vi) Foreclosures

h) Foreign travel: 30 days prior to your travel (this includes official/unofficial • foreign travel and any short excursions or day trips to other countries);

i) All contact with foreign nationals residing abroad or in the United States; j) Gifts received from a foreign government.

lb 15) An EAP counselor is available for consultation and guidance should you

ID experience emotional stress, personal problems, etc. • 16) If you have been issued a Government Credit Card, it is for official use only.

Personal use to obtain goods, services, cash, etc., and nonpayment for undisputed balances may be cause for suspension and/or revocation of your security

• clearance. • 17) ALL FBI-owned, rented, or leased vehicles are to be used for official business

only. 18) No family members are permitted in any vehicle utilized by the Bureau without

SAC approval. 19) The loss or destruction of certain Bureau property has security ramifications and

must be vigilantly avoided. Any loss of Bureau property must be immediately reported to your supervisor and to the Division Security Officer. Any loss of personal property within Bureau space should also be reported to the SO.

FACILITY SECURITY

1) Do not permit your Security Access Control System (SACS) badge to be photographed or photocopied at any time.

2) Safeguard your SACS badge at all times and do not leave it unattended.

• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 23

•

ACLURM005507

• • • • • • • i. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12) You are expected to maintain a satisfactory credit reputation and promptly pay all of your debts.

13) It is incumbent upon you to stay current on any court-ordered obligations, such as child support, alimony, etc.

14) The following must be reported to your Oi vision Security Officer: a) Requests to engage in outside employment. You may not accept any other

employment without prior SACIFBIHQ approvaL b) Requests to have a roommate (a non-family member residing with you for

more than 30 days) c) Marriages: 60 days prior to the marriage date; d) All types of arrests and civ!llitigations (i.e., divorce, separation, annulment,

etc.); e) Aggravated traffic violations; f) If you become a subject/suspect in a criminal matter; g) Financial problems:

i) Filing for bankruptcy ii) Accounts placed for collection iii) Property repossessed iv) Liens placed against you, including wage garnisbments v) Civil judgments vi) Foreclosures

h) Foreign travel: 30 days prior to your travel (this includes official/unofficial foreign travel and any short excursions or day trips to other countries);

i) All contact with foreign nationals residing abroad or in the United states; j) Gifts received from a foreign government.

15) An EAP counselor is available for consultation and guidance should you experience emotional stress, personal problems, etc.

16) If you have been issued a Government Credit Card, it is for official use only. Personal use to obtain goods, services, cash, etc., and nonpayment for' undisputed balances may be cause for suspension andlor revocation of your security clearance.

17) ALL FBI-owned, rented, or leased vehicles are to be used for official business only.

18) No family members are permitted in any vehicle utilized by the Bureau without SAC approval.

19) The loss or destruction of certain Bureau property has security ramifications and must be vigilantly avoided. Any loss of Bureau property must be immediately reported to your supervisor and to the Division Security Officer. Any loss of personal property within Bureau space should also be reported to the SO.

FACILITY SECURITY

1) Do not permit your Security Access Control System (SACS) badge to be photographed or photocopied at any time.

2) Safeguard your SACS badge at all times and do not leave it unattended.

UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 23


3) Immediately notify the Division Security Officer if your SACS badge is lost, stolen, or misplaced.

4) Your SACS badge is to be visibly worn at all times while in FBI space; do not openly display it in public areas.

5) Employees have the right, and responsibility, to challenge (ID) anyone in FBI space who is not properly identified.

6) Do not share yourSACS badge or access code number with any other person (not even another FBI employee).

7) Door Code: Do not share it with anyone. If you do, your door code will be deleted, and you will not have electronic access to FBI space until after you have met with your Division Security Officer.

8) Become familiar with the various tvnes of had PPS'

a) b)

c) d)

9) When entering FBI space, take notice of those around you as a precautionary method in preventing unauthorized persons from entering FBI space. If you do not know an individual attempting to enter FBI space, ID them. Make sure the door closes behind you, thus preventing someone from gaining unauthorized access to FBI space.

10) Visitors mist be escorted at all times while in Bureau space and wear an appropriate

11) The last employee to leave a work area at the close-of-business must ensure the area is secure and classified material is appropriately stored.

INFORMATION SECURITY/COMPUTERS

All FBI employees have aZgrra3t.security clearance; but not all FBI employees have a need-to-know what you are working on. An appropriately cleared individual may have a legitimate need-to-know if they require information you possess in order to perform their official duties. You have the authority and are empowered to grant or deny others access to information you possess. It is your responsibility to confirm the requestor's official Bureau need to obtain information about your case in order to accomplish his/her job. Inquire about the other person's request for information. If he/she cannot convince you of the official Bureau need for access, you should deny the request. Curiosity is not a valid justification for any attempt to gain access to Bureau information or space. Do not disclose information to other persons who do not have a need-to-know (this includes even your closest relatives and friends).

2)

A tapo3t,t_security clearance does not automatically grant you access to all FBI office space and to all FBI information.

UNCLASSII-IED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 4

119

1111

1111

1111

•111

1•S

OO

SIIM

OS

,OS

SOM

SO

OO

SII

IIII

III

IIM

S

1)

b7E

b7E

ACLURM005508

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFlEDllFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3) Immediately notify the Division Security Officer if your SACS badge is lost, stolen, or misplaced.

4) your SACS badge is to be visibly worn at all times while in FBI space; do not openly display it in public areas.

5) Employees have the right, and responsibility, to challenge (ill) anyone in FBI space who is not properly identi,fied.

6) Do not share-your SACS badge or access code number with any other person (not even another FBI employee), '

7) Door Code: Do not share it with anyone. If you do, your door code will be deleted, and you will not have electronic access to FBI space until after you have met with your Division Security Officer.

8) B " a) b)

c)

~~~~-=~--~~~--~------.--------~----~ 9) When entering FBI space, take notice of those around you as a precautionary method in preventing unauthorized persons from entering FBI space, If you do not know an individual attempting to enter FBI space, ill them. Make sure the door closes behind you, thus preventing someone from gaining unauthorized access to FBI space .

10) Visitors m,st be escorted at aJl times while in Bureau space and wear an appropriat~ I

11) The last employee to leave a work area at the close-of-business must ensure the area is secure and classified material is appropriately stored.

INFORMATION SECURITY/COMPUTERS

1) All FBI employees have a~p EM_security clearance; but not all FBI employees have a need-to-know what you are working on. An appropriately cleared individual may have a legitimate need-to-know if they require information you possess in order to perform their official duties. You have the authority and are empowered to grant or deny others access to information you possess. It is your responsibility to conflfm the requestor's official Bureau need to obtain information about your case in order to accomplish his/her job. Inquire about the other person's request for information. If he/she cannot convince you of the official Bureau need for access, you should deny the request. Curiosity is not a valid justification for any attempt to gain access to Bureau information or space. Do not disclose information to other persons who do not have a need-to-know thi 'nc ..

2)~ __________________________ ~ ____ ~ ______ ~~

-.::::::=-::::: ecurity clearance does not automatically grant you access to all

FBI office space and to all FBI information.

UNCLASSIFlEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 24

b7E

b7E


•

a a a a

• a

a • a a a

a a • • a a • a a a a a

THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY a • 1) The possibility exists that you could become a target of recruitment from various

groups/entities who seek information from the FBI. Why are you a target? a) Your employment with the FBI;

fib b) You are perceived as having access to an intelligence agency; and • c) You have access to a law enforcement agency.

a a a

3) The security of FBI space and information, the nature of FBI work, and the security of FBI personnel and their Bureau-issued property are min nature and should not be discussed with individuals who do not have a need-to-know.

4) Employees should not needlessly identify themselves as FBI employees, particularly in restaurants and other public spaces where they might easily be within earshot of representatives of Foreign Intelligence Services or other criminal organizations. Neither should employees discuss Bureau work at luncheons, in car pools, or in other areas outside the working space, even with a social group consisting solely of Bureau employees.

5) Do not allow unauthorized persons to use Bureau computers. 6) Do not leave your work area if you are still logged onto the computer. Exit all

programs (especially FBINET) before you leave your computer unattended. 7) Computer password: do not leave it on a post-it where people can see it, i.e., on

the computer, under your desk, etc. Do not share it with others. 8) All FBI information is categorized as Classified or Unclassified but Sensitive (the

latter being equivalent to Law Enforcement Sensitive). 9) From 1985 to 1999, seventy-five federal employees were convicted of espionage.

Only two of the 75 employees sought employment with the sole intent to commit espionage. Also, approximately 80% of espionage is committed by insiders. In almost every case, these insiders gained access to information not pertinent to their jobs by circumventing the need-to-know principle. They were able to do so because their co-workers failed to properly restrict access to classified and/or law enforcement sensitive information under their control.

10) Working copies of official Bureau documents are for official business and not for personal use.

11) Unsolicited telephone inquiries for FBI information should not be disclosed if the identity of the caller is unknown and/or if the caller does not have a need-to-know. Classified information cannot be discussed over non-secure telephone lines.

12) Official, unclassified Bureau trash must be disposed of via the use of white-rimmed wastebaskets. These wastebaskets are to be emptied each day at the close-of-business.

13) Whenever Bureau mail of any type is carried on elevators, in corridors, or in other public spaces, the material should be covered.

14) Bureau work should not be taken into restrooms or lounges at any time. 15) You are not allowed to take home investigative files or serials.


ACLURM005509

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • II

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


3) The security of FBI space and information, the nature of FBI work, and the security of FBI personnel and their Bureau-issued property are ~aSDl....in nature and should not be discussed with individuals who do not have a need-to-know.

4) Employees should not needlessly identify themselves as FBI employees, particularly in restaurants and other public spaces where they might easily be within earshot of representati ves of Foreign Intelligence Services or other criminal organizations. Neither should employees discuss Bureau work at luncheons, in car pools, or in Qther areas outside the working space, even with a social group consisting solely of Bureau employees.

5) Do not allow unauthorized persons to use Bureau computers. 6) Do not leave your work area if you are still logged onto the computer. Exit all

programs (especially FBINET) before you leave your computer unattended. 7) Computer password: do not leave it on a post-it where people can see it, i.e., on

the computer, under your desk, etc. Do not share it with others. 8) All FBI information is categorized as Classified or Unclassified but Sensitive (the

latter being equivalent to Law Enforcement Sensitive). 9) From 1985 to 1999, seventy-five federal employees were convicted of espionage.

Only two of the 75 employees sought employment with the sole intent to commit espionage. Also, approximately 80% of espionage is conurutted by insiders. In almost every case, these insiders gained access to information not pertinent to their jobs by circumventing the need-to-know principle. They were able to do so because their co-workers failed to properly restrict access to classified· and/or law enforcement sensitive information under their control. .

10) Working copies of official Bureau documents are for official business and not for personal use.

11) Unsolicited telephone inquiries for FBI information should not be disclosed if the identity of the caller is unknown and/or if the caller does not have a need-to-know. Classified information cannot be discussed over non-secure telephone lines.

12) Official, unclassified Bureau trash must be disposed of via the use of white-rimmed wastebaskets. These wastebaskets are to be emptied each day at the close-of-business.

13) Whenever Bureau mail of any type is carried on elevators, in corridors, or in other public spaces, the material should be covered.

14) Bureau work should not be taken into restrooms or lounges at any time. 15) You are not allowed to take home investigative files or serials.

THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

1) The possibility exists that you could become a target of recruitment from various groups/entities who seek information from the FBI. Why are you a target? a) Your employment with the FBI; b) You are perceived as having access to an intelligence agency; and c) You have access to a law enforcement agency.



2) Who may target you? a) Organized drug rings b) Gangs c) Mafia organizations d) Individual drug dealers e) -White collar criminals f) International and domestic terrorist groups g) Radical militant groups h) Foreign intelligence services

3) How could you be targeted? a) Recruitment: Your cooperation can be actively solicited by any of the

aforementioned groups; b) Volunteer: Your willingness to provide information, of your own volition,

motivated by factors such as greed, discontentment, dissatisfaction, revenge, etc.

c) Coercion: Using extortion tactics to exert pressure on you as a means to force you to cooperate;

d) Compromise: Attempts to put you in a situation that could jeopardize your affiliation with the FBI if you do not cooperate with them, such as sex, drugs, prostitution, criminal acts, etc.

4) You have an affirmative obligation to notify the Bureau in writing if you become a target, or suspect that you may have become a target.

GO 5) If you observe something contrary to good security, contact the Division Security Officer.

• 6) If you are experiencing financial difficulty, emotional stress, personal problems, etc., contact your EAP Counselor and/or seek professional counseling.

7) If you have any questions, call the Division Security Officer

• TELEPHONE AND FACSIMILE MACHINE

1) Telephones are not considered secure. Any classified conversation should be

in conducted on a STU or STE telephone.

2) Facsimile machines are not considered secure and should not be used for 0 classified information. Classified documents should be faxed on secure fax

O machines and those clearly marked for the transmittal of classified information.

O SCI information may only be sent from and received in an approved SCIF by an authorized person maintaining the appropriate accesses. SOF locations vary, but .

the presence of FBI personnel does not necessarily indicate the presence of a O SCIF.

• SECURITY INCIDENT PROGRAM

• 1) The goal of the Security Incident Program (SIP) is to reduce the number of security incidents on the part of FBI personnel and associates (JTTF, contractor, vendor, detailee). This can largely be accomplished through education of the FBI population, which will lead to committed vigilance to protect FBI and IC equities.


•

•

ACLURM005510

• • • • • • • • • • • II.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIF1ED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2) Who may target you? a) Organized drug rings b) Gangs c) Mafia organizations d) Individual drug dealers

. e) -White collar criminals f) International and domestic terrorist groups g) Radical militant groups h) Foreign intelligence serviCes

3) How could you be targeted? a) Recruitment: Your cooperation can be actively solicited by any of the

aforementioned groups; b) Volunteer: Your willingness to provide information, of your own volition,

motivated by factors such as greed, discontentment, dissatisfaction, revenge, etc.

c) Coercion: Using extortion tactics to exert pressure on you as a means to force you to cooperate;

d) Compromise: Attempts to put you in a situation that could jeopardize your affiliation with the FBI if you do not cqoperate with them, such as sex, drugs, prostitution, criminal acts, etc.

4) You have an affirmative obligation to notify the Bureau in writing if you become a target, or suspect that you may have become a target.

5) If you observe something contrary to good security, contact the Division Security Officer.

6) If you are experiencing financial difficulty, emotional stress, personal problems, etc., contact your EAP Counselor and/or seek professional counseling.

7) . If you have any questions, call the Division Security Officer

TELEPHONE AND FACSIMILE MACHINE

1) Telephones are not considered secure. Any classified conversation should be conducted on a STU or STE telephone.

2) Facsimile machines are not considered secure and should not be used for classified information. Classified documents should be faxed on secure fax machines and those clearly marked for the transmittal of classified information. SCI information may only be sent from and received in an approved SCIF by an authorized person maintaining the appropriate accesses. SCIF locations vary, but the presence of FBI personnel does not necessarily indicate the presence of a SCIF.

SECURITY INCIDENT PROGRAM

1) The goa! of the Security Incident Program (SIP) is to reduce the number of security incidents on the part of FBI personnel and associates (JTTF, contractor, vendor, detailee). This can largely be accomplished through education ofthe FBI population, whiCh will lead to committed vigilance to protect FBI and IC equities.

UNCLASSIFIEDflFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26

• a

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • a 2) A security incident is a failure to safeguard FBI material in accordance with FBI • policies and other IC directives and is categorized as a violation or an infraction.

• A security violation is any incident that results in the actual loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified national security information or unclassified information. For example, if an employee transmits a classified document over an unclassified facsimile machine, the incident would be determined to be a security violation, due to the real possibility for electronic interception and transcription of the classified document. A security infraction

a is any other incident that is not in the best interest of security and that does • not involve the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified

ID national security information. For example, at the end of a workday, an employee leaves a security container unlocked and unattended, containing classified information, in an area approved for storage of classified information.

• No unauthorized entry took place. This incident would be determined to be a

• security infraction because Bureau policy requires that classified material be secured properly after hours, even though no actual compromise occurred in this case.

3) When a security incident occurs, swift and efficient attention' must be afforded to ensure the minimization of any possible damage through notification to the

ID appropriate authorities. Security incidents should be reported immediately utilizing the SIP form located on the Security Division Website. Instructions are .

included with the form, which is prompting, based on the information provided by a the reporting individual.

a

PROPER HANDLING OF FEDERAL TAXPAYER INFORMATION (FTI) • Internal Revenue Code (IRC) prescribes felony penalties for Federal employees who make illegal disclosures of Federal Tax returns and return information. IRC makes unauthorized inspection of FTI by a Federal employee a misdemeanor offense, plus discharge from federal employment. IRC prescribes civil damages for unauthorized inspection or disclosure of FTI. The FBI is authorized to receive FTI but must have adequate programs in place to protect the information received.

Oversight of the safeguarding of FTI is delegated to the Security Compliance Unit, Security Operations Section, Security Division, and FBIHQ. Each field office must establish and maintain uniform safeguard standards consistent with IRS guidelines. A Taxpayer's Information field has been established in ACS, therefore, all FTI entered should be appropriately marked. FBI is required to establish a permanent system of standardized records of requests made, by or to them, for disclosure of FTI, including requestS among employees, as well as from outside agencies. Authorized employees must be responsible for securing magnetic tapes/cartridges containing FTI before, during and after processing. FBI is required to restrict access to FTI only to persons whose duties or responsibilities require access on a need-to-know basis. FTI should be clearly

a UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 7

a

•

1) •

el 2)

a

4111 3)

a

4)

ACLURM005511

• • • • • ;e I: • • • • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


2) A security incident is a failure to safeguard FBI material in <l;ccordance with FBI policies and other IC directives and is categorized as a violation or an infraction. A security violation is any incident that results in the actual loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified national security information or unclassified information. For example, if an employee transmits a classified document over an unclassified facsimile machine, the incident would be determined to be a security violation, due to the real possibility for electronic interception and transcription of the classified document. A security infraction is any other incident that is not in the best interest of security and that does not involve the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified national security information. For example, at the end of a workday, an

, employee leaves a security container unlocked and unattended, containing classified information, in an area approved for storage of classified information. No unauthorized entry took place. This incident would be determined to be a security infraction because Bureau policy requires that classified material be secured properly after hours, even though no actual compromise occurred in this case.

3) When a security incident occurs, swift and efficient attention' must be afforded to ensure the minimization of any possible damage through notification to the appropriate authorities. Security incidents should be reported immediately utilizing the SIP form located on the Security Division Website. Instructions are included with the form, which is prompting, based on the information provided by the reporting individual.

PROPER HANDLING OF FEDERAL TAXPAYER INFORMATION (FTI)

1) Internal Revenue Code (IRC) prescribes felony penalties for Federal employees who make illegal disclosures of Federal Tax returns and return information. IRC makes unauthorized inspection of FTI by a Federal employee a misdemeanor offense, plus discharge from federal employment. IRC prescribes civil damages for unauthorized inspection or disclosure of FT1. The FBI is authorized t~ receive FTI but must have adequate programs in place to protect the information received.

2) Oversight of the safeguarding of FTI is delegated to the Security Compliance Unit, Security Operations Section, Security Division, and FBIHQ. Each field office must establish and maintain uniform safeguard standards consistent with IRS guidelines. A Taxpayer's Information field has been established in ACS, therefore, all FTI entered should be appropriately marked.

3) FBI is required to establish a permanent system of standardized records of requests made, by or to them, for disclosure of FTI, including requests among employees, as well as from outside agencies. Authorized employees must be responsible for securing magnetic tapes/cartridges containing FTI before, during and after processing.

4) FBI is required to restrict access to FTI only to persons whose duties or responsibilities require access on a need-to-know basis. FTI should be clearly

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR oFFICIAL USE ONLY 27


marked "Federal Taxpayer Information." It is recommended that FTI be kept separate from other information to avoid inadvertent disclosure. In cases where the information may not be physically separated, the file should be clearly labeled to indicate that FTI is contained in the file.

5) FTI will be furnished by the IRS to state tax agencies only for administration purposes. Further disclosure by authorized receiving state agency is not permitted.

6) Granting an employee access to FTI should be preceded by certifying each employee understands the FBI's policy and procedures for safeguarding FTI.

7) FTI, including any copies made, must be returned to the IRS or render the information "un-Disclosable." If information is returned to IRS, use a receipt process and rnaintainD3rfoicrif4X4Lof information. Otherwise, FTI should be destroyed by burning, mulching, pulping, shredding or disintegrating.

SECURITY AWARENESS CERTIFICATION

I acknowledge that I have been afforded a Security Awareness Briefing regarding my responsibilities as an employee of the FBI. My signature below asserts that I fully comprehend my security related duties/responsibilities and affirms my commitment to the FBI's security policies, regulations, and procedures

(Do not sign. This is an example only) (Individual Briefed / Print Name) (Signature)

(Date)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 8

ACLURM005512

• • • • • • • • ' .• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

marked "Federal Taxpayer Information." It is recommended that FTI be kept separate from other information to avoid inadvertent disclosure. In cases where the information may not be physically separated. the file should be clearly labeled to indicate that FTI is contained in the file.

5) FTI will be furnished by the IRS to state tax agencies only for administration purposes. Further disclosure by authorized receiving state agency is not permitted.

6) Granting an employee access to FTI should be preceded by certifying each employee understands the FBI's.policyand procedures for safeguarding FTI.

7) FTI,including any copies made, must be returned to the IRS or render the information "un-Disclosable." If information is returned to IRS, use a receipt process and maintain'IlJAftdcI~of information. Otherwise, ErI should be destroyed by burning, mulching. pulping, shredding or diSintegrating.

SECURITY AWARENESS CERTIFICATION

I acknowledge that I have been afforded a Security Awareness Briefing regarding my responsibilities as an employee of the FBI. My signature below asserts that I fully comprehend my security related duties/responsibilities and affirms my commitment to the FBI's security policies, regulations. and procedures

__________________ ~(D~o~n=o~t~sl=gn~.~T.h~I~s~~~an~ex~a~m~p~l~e~o~n~ly~) __________________ _ (Individual Briefed / Print Name) (Signature) (Date)


11 II II

II II

II II II II

II II

II II•II II 11

•II 11

II II

II II

II I I

II I I II

II 1

1 1 1

11 II 1

1 I I•1

1 I I

II

ACLURM005513

OS

S11

1111

1111

1111

1111

SO

OS

SO

SS

OS

SOI

SS

OS

SIB

OO

SS

IIIIM

I111

1111


CRIMINALIZING TERRORISM1

The United States Constitution recognizes the inviolable right to free expression

and free association, and the right to be free from deprivations of liberty or property

without "due process of law." As interpreted by American courts, persons in the United

States cannot be prosecuted for their thoughts alone, nor can the United States criminalize

conduct protected by the First Amendment. As a result, our criminal jurisprudence

stresses definable acts, rather than thoughts or speech unattached to particular conduct.

The structure of terrorism crimes prosecuted in the United States follows this

tradition. There is no crime of "being a terrorist" or "thinking terrorist thoughts." While

the United States Code defines the "federal crime of terrorism". (Title 18, United States

Code, Section 2332b (g)(5)), as an offense that is calculated to influence or affect the

conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government

conduct; and it then simply lists all the terrorism-related crimes for ease of reference.

Persons cannot be convicted of the "federal crime of terrorism," because there is no such

crime. Title 18 does define "international terrorism" and "domestic terrorism" in section

2331. Both pertain to activities that involve acts that are dangerous to human life, that

are a violation of federal or state criminal law, that appear to be intended to intimidate or

coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or

coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or

kidnapping. The major distinction is that international terrorism occurs primarily outside

'Counterterrorism Enforcement: A Lawyer's Guide by Jeff Breinholt, Office of Legal Education, U. S. Department of Justice, May 2004.


ACLURM005514

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


CRIMINALIZING TERRORISM 1

The United States Constitution recognizes the inviolable right to free expression

. and free association, and the right to be free from deprivations of liberty or property

without "due process of law." As interpreted by American courts, persons in the United

States cannot be prosecuted for their thoughts alone, nor can the United States criminalize

conduct protected by the First Amendment. As a result, our criminal jurisprudence

stresses definable acts, rather than thoughts or speech unattached to particular conduct.

The structure of terrorism crimes prosecuted in the United States follows this

tradition. There is no crime of "being a terrorist" or "thinking terrorist thoughts." While

the United States Code defines the "federal crime of terrorism". (Title 18, United States

Code, Section 2332b (g)(5)), as an offense that is calculated to influence or affect the

conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government

conduct; and it then simply lists all the terrorism-related crimes for ease of reference.

Persons cannot be convicted of the "federal crime of terrorism," because there is no such

crime. Title 18 does define "international terrorism" and "domestic terrorism" in section

2331. Both pertain to activities that involve acts that are dangerous to human life, that

are a violation of federal or state criminal law, that appear to be intended to intimidate or

coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or

coer~ion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, Or

kidnapping. The major distinction is that international terrorism occurs primarily outside

lCounterterrorism Enforcement: A Lawyer's Guide by Jeff Breinholt, Office of L.egal Education, u. S. Department of Justice, May 2004.



the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and domestic terrorism occurs primarily

within the United States.

Terrorism crimes have developed in the same manner as other law enforcement

areas. Policymakers determine what negative results should be prevented, and then craft

criminal laws that take into account how such results are generally achieved. On

occasion, acts that are criminalized are not ones that should necessarily be discouraged, if

committed by persons not otherwise involved in the offensive conduct sought to be

prevented. In such cases, laws are crafted to criminalize such conduct only when

committed in particular circumstances. A good example is title 31 U.S.C. §5324,

Structuring Currency Transactions. Congress .crafted this statute to target persons who

make large sums of cash by illegal means; drug dealers, fences, etc. The law prohibits

conduct that is not inherently offensive (making several large cash deposits in a single

day) in those circumstances that separate the innocent from the guilty. A legitimate cash

businessman has no problem filing the required report while the criminal attempts to

avoid the report to keep from coming to the attention of authorities.

Some of the various crimes that may be utilized in investigating "terrorism" are

listed below. In line with our legal tradition, these crimes are based on the recognition of

how terrorists behave, rather than what they believe and who they are as the emphasis is

SO

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SS

OS

OS

SO

CIS

SID

OO

SS

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SIM

INIS

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1111

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on acts rather than status or beliefs. An asterisk (*) next to the title of the offense denotes

that it is listed as a "Federal crime of terrorism" within 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (g) (5). These

offenses apply to "international terrorism" or "domestic terrorism" cases or to both. Not

all of the following statutes come within the jurisdiction of the FBI but may be applicable

to other agencies associated with the JTTF, nor is the list inclusive.


ACLURM005515

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and domestic terrorism occurs primarily

within the United States.

Terrorism crimes have developed in the same manner as other law enforcement

areas. Policyrnakers determine what negative results should be prevented, and then craft

criminal laws that take into account how such results are generally achieved. On

occasion, acts that are criminalized are not ones that sho~ld necessarily be discouraged, if

committed by persons not otherwise involved in th'e offensive conduct sought to be

prevented. In such cases, laws are crafted to criminalize such conduct only when

committed in particular circumstances. A good example is title 31 U.S.C. §5324,

Structuring Currency Transactions. Congress .crafted this statute to target persons who . - . . "'-"," " ~ ".-.-~. -.....

make large sums of cash by illegal means; drug dealers,fences, etc. The law prohibits

conduct that is not inherently offensive (making several large cash deposits in a single

day) in those circumstances that separate the innocent from the guilty. A legitimate cash

businessman, has no problem filing the required report while the criminal attempts to

avoid the report to keep from coming to the attention of authorities.

Some of the various crimes that may be utilized in investigating "terrorism" are

listed below. In line with our legal tradition, these crimes are based on the recognition of

. how terrorists behave, rather than what they believe and who they are as the emphasis is

on acts rather than status or beliefs. An asterisk (*) next to the title of the offense denotes

that it is listed as a "Federal crime of terrorism" within 18 U.S.c. § 2332b (g) (5). These

offenses apply to "international terrorism" or "domestic terrorism"cases or to both. Not

. . all of the following statutes c0II!-e within the jurisdiction of the FBI but may be applicable

to other agencies .associated with the JTTF, nor is the list inclusive. . .


UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STATUTES

• Title 8

• § 1324 Alien smuggling

GI § 1325 Illegal entry by an alien

§ 1326 Unlawful reentry of a deported alien

§ 1328 Importation of aliens for immoral purposes

Title 18

32 Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities*

37 Violence at international airports*

43 Animal enterprise terrorism

81 Arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction*

112 Assaults of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons

113 Assaults within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

175 Prohibitions with respect to biological weapons*

175b Possession by restricted persons*

229 Prohibited activities (relating to chemical weapons)*

• § 231 Civil disorders

§ 232 Definitions

§ 351 Congressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, kidnapping and assault*

a § 373 Solicitation to a crime of violence

§ 831 Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials*

§ 842 Unlawful acts (relating to explosives)*

S

• A UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 31

•

§

ID §

§

411 §

• §

§

flb a

§

§

§ S

ACLURM005516

• • • • • • • -• • I-• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

STATUTES

Title 8

§ 1324

§ 1325

§ 1326

§ 1328

Title 18

§ 32

§ 37

§ 43

§ 81

§ 112

§ 113

§ 175

§ 175b

§ 229

§ 231

§ 232

§ 351

§ 373

§ 831

§ 842


Alien smuggling .

megal entry by an aiien

Unlawful reentry of a deported alien

Importation of aliens for immoral purposes

Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities*

Violence at international airports*

Animal enterprise terrorism

Arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction*

Assaults of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons

Assaults within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

Prohibitions with respect to biological weapons*

Possession by restricted persons*

Prohibited activities (relating to chemical weapons)*

Civil disorders

Definitions

Congressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, kidnapping and assault*

Solicitation to a crime of violence

Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials*

Unlawful acts (relating to explosives)*

UNCLASSIFlEDJIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 31

• • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• • § 844 Penalties (regarding to arson and bombing)*

• § 878 Threats and extortion against foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons •

• § 922 Unlawful possession of a firearm

§ 930 Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in federal facilities* • • § 951 et seq Neutrality violations

• § 956 Conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad*

• § 960 Expedition against a friendly nation

• § 1028A Aggravated identity theft • • § 1030 Fraud and related activity in connection with computers* • • § 1038 False information and hoaxes

• § 1114 Protection of officers and employees of the United States* • • § 1116 Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or • internationally protected persons*

• § 1201 Kidnapping of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected • persons

419 § 1203 Hostage taking*

• § 1362 Communication lines, stations or systems*

§ 1363 Buildings or property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction*

§ 1365 Tampering with consumer products

• • § 1366 Destruction of an energy facility*

• § 1751 Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnapping, and assault*

• • § 1956 Money laundering

• § 1957 Unlawful monetary transaction a

§ 1960 Operating an unlicensed money transmitting business

• • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 32

•

ACLURM005517

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I. !i. \-•


§844 Penalties (regarding to arson and bombing)*

§ 878 Threats and extortion against foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons .

§ 922 Unlawful possession of a firearm

§ 930 Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in federal facilities*

§ 951 et seq Neutrality violations

§ 956

§ 960

§ 1028A

§ 1030

§ 1038

§ 1114

§ 1116

§ 1201

§ 1203

§ 1362

§ 1363

§ 1365

§ 1366

§ 1751

§ 1956

§ 1957·

§ 1960

Conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad*

Expedition against a friendly nation

Aggravated identity theft

Fraud and related activity in connection with computers*

False information and hoaxes

Protection of officers and employees of the United States*

Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons*

Kidnapping of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons

Hostage taking*

Communication lines, stations or systems*

Buildings or property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction*

Tampering with consumer products

Destruction of an energy facility*

Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnapping, and assault*

Money laundering

Unlawful monetary transaction

Operating an unlicensed money transmitting business



1958

Murder for hire

1992

Wrecking trains*

1993 Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems*

§ 2101 Riots

§ 2102 Definitions

§ 2155 Destruction of national-defense materials, national-defense premises, or national-defense utilities*

§ 2280 Violence against maritime navigation*

§ 2281 Violence against maritime fixed platforms*

§ 2331 Terrorism definitions

• § 2332 Terrorism criminal penalties*

• § 2332a Use of certain weapons of mass destruction*

§ 2332b Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries* •

§ 2332d Financial transactions

§ 2332f Bombings of places of public use, Government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities*

§ 2339 Harboring terrorists*

§ 2339A Providing material support to terrorists*

§ 2339B Material support to terrorist organization*

§ 2339C Relating to financing terrorism*

§ 2340A Torture*

§ 2384 Seditious conspiracy

§ 2381 Treason


lb §

§ 11 ID §

S

S

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so • S

S S S S • S S S S

S

•

ACLURM005518

• • • UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• • • § 1958 Murder for hire

• § 1992 Wrecking trains* • • § 1993 Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation

• systems*

• § 2101 Riots

• • § 2102 Definitions

• § 2155 Destruction of national-defense materials, national-defense premises, or • national-defense utilities*·

• § 2280 Violence against maritime navigation* • • § 2281 Violence against maritime fixed platforms*

• • § 2331 Terrorism definitions

• § 2332 Terrorism criminal penalties* • • § 2332a Use of certain weapons of mass destruction*

• § 2332b Acts of terrorism transcen.ding national boundaries *. • • § 2332d Financial transactions

• § 2332f Bombings of places of public use, Government facilities, public • transportation systems and infrastructure facilities*

• • § 2339 Harboring terrorists*

• § 2339A Providing material support to terrorists* • • § 2339B Material support to terrorist organization*

• • § 2339C Relating to financing terrorism*

• § 2340A Torture*

• § 2384 Seditious conspiracy • • § 2381 Treason

• • • UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 33

• •

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••••


Title 31

§ 5324(a) (3) Structuring transaction to evade reporting requirements

Title 42

§ 2284 Sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel*

Title 49

§ 46502 Aircraft piracy*

§ 46504 Interference with flight crew members and attendants*

§ 46505 Carrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft*

§ 46506 Application of certain criminal laws to acts on aircraft*

§ 46507 False information and threats

§ 60123 Destruction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility*

Title 50

§ 1701 Illegal transactions with prohibited groups or individuals

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES

The United States Attorney General has established Guidelines to have a

consistent policy in the specified matters and to enable agents to perform their duties with

greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness, and assure the American public that the

FBI is acting properly under the law. Two separate and distinct Guidelines have been

established. One, "The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering

Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations" govern the circumstances under

which general criminal and criminal intelligence investigations are conducted by the FBI.

The investigations pursuant to these Guidelines are applicable to Domestic Terrorism


ACLURM005519

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


Title 31

§ 5324(a) (3) Structuring transaction to evade reporting requirements

Title 42

§ 22~4

Title 49

§ 46502

§ 46504

§ 46505

§ 46506

§ 46507

§ 60123

Title 50

§ 1701

Sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel*

Aircraft piracy*

Interference with flight crew members and attendants*

Carrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft*

Application of certain crimi?allaws to acts on aircraft*

False information and threats

Destruction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility*

illegal transactions with prohibited groups or individuals

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES

The United States Attorney General has established Guidelines to have a

consistent policy in the specified matters and to enable agents to perform their duties with

greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness, and assure the American public that the

FBI is acting properly under the law. Two separate and distinct Guidelines have been

established. One, "The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering

Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations" govern the circumstances under

which general criminal and criminal intelligence investigations are conducted by the FBI.

The investigations pursuant to these Guidelines are applicable to Domestic Terrorism



a

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a S

S

S

S

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S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S S

S

S S

(DT) investigations using the "Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (TEI)" section and are

worked by the JTTF

In their general structure, both Guidelines provide graduated levels of

investigative activity, allowing the FBI the necessary flexibility to act well in advance of

the commission of planned terrorist acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of

investigative activity are: (1) Threat Assessment (TA), the prompt and extremely limited

checking of initial leads, (2) Preliminary Investigation (PI), and (3) Full Field

Investigation (FFI). The conduct of investigations authorized under the Guidelines may

preSent choices between the use of information collection methods that are more or less

intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and potential

damage to reputation. As Executive Order 12333 § 2.4 provides, "the least intrusive

collection techniques feasible" are to be used in such situations. It is recognized,

however, that the choice of techniques is a matter of judgment. The FBI must comply

with all requirements for use of a technique set by statute, Department regulations and

policies, and Attorney General Guidelines. The following general descriptions of

investigations apply to both DT and IT investigations.

The applicable .137E

guideline provides specific authority for the investigations and should be reviewed and


ACLURM005520

• • • I" I· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


(DT) investigations using the "Terrorism Enterprise InvestigatIons (TEl)" section and are

worked by the JITF

b7E

In their general structure, both Guidelines provide graduated levels of

investigative activity, allowing the FBI the necessary flexibility to act well in advance of

the commission of planned terrorist acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of

investigative activity are: (1) Threat Assessment (TA), the prompt and extremely limited

checking of initial leads, (2) Preliminary Investigation (PI), and (3) Full Field

Investigation (FFI). The conduct of investigations authorized under the Guidelines may

present choices between the use of information collection methods that are more or less

intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and potential

damage to reputation. As Executive Order 12333 § 2.4 provides, "the least intrusive

collection techniques feasible" are to be used in such situations. It is recognized,

however, that the choice of techniques is a matter of judgment. The FBI must comply

with all requirements for use of a technique set by statute, Department regulations and

policies, and Attorney General Guidelines. The following general descriptions of

investigations apply to both DT and IT investigations.

'The applicable b7E

guideline provides specific authority for the investigations and should be reviewed and


• a


relied upon. These general descriptions are provided to assist a new task force member

4111 upon initial assignment to the JTTF.

• Assessments:

ED The lowest level of investigative activity is the "prompt and extremely limited

checking out of initial leads," which should be undertaken whenever information is

a received of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of criminal activity is

• warranted. This limited activity should be conducted with an eye toward promptly

fib determining whether further investigation (either a Preliminary Investigation or Full Field

a Investigation) should be conducted. • ID Preliminary Investigation (PI):

The next level of investigation is the Preliminary Investigation. A PI is short of a

Full Field Investigation and the government to respond in a measured way to

• ambiguous or incomplete information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation ID

permit. Such inquiries are carried out to obtain the information necessary to make an

a ID

informed judgment as to whether a Full Field Investigation is warranted. A PI is not a

required step. When facts or circumstances reasonably indicating criminal activity are • already available, a Full Field Investigation can be immediately opened. Where a PI fails

to disclose sufficient information to justify a Full Field Investigation, the FBI shall a

terminate the investigation and make a record of the closing.

• All lawful investigative techniques maybe used in a PI except mail openings, • • non-consensual electronic surveillance or any other investigative technique covered in

Title 18, United States Code, '§§2510-2552. (See the current DIOG, and "Use and • Approvals for Investigative Techniques" in Tab 6). • •

O UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 6

a

ACLURM005521

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


relied upon. These general descriptions are provided to assist a new task force member

upon initial assignment to the JTTF.

Assessments:

The lowest level of investigative activity is the "prompt and extremely limited

checking out of initial leads," which should be undertaken whenever information is

received of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of criminal activity is

warranted. This limited activity should be conducted with an eye toward prompt:ly

determining whether further investigation (either a Preliminary Investigation or Full Field

Investigation) should be conducted.

Preliminary Investigation ePD:

The next level of investigation is the Preliminary Investigation. A PI is short of a

Full Field Investigation and,.allows the government to respond in a measured way to

ambiguous or incomplete information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation

permit. Such inquiries are carried out to obtain the information necessary to make an

informed judgment as to whether a Full Field Investigation is warranted. A PI is not a

required step. When facts or circumstances reasonably indicating criminal activity are

already available, a Full Field Investigation can be immediately opened. Where a PI fails

to disclose sufficient information to justify a Full Field Investigation, the FBI shall

terminate the investigation and make a record of the closing.

All lawful investigative techniques may'be used in a PI except mail openings,

non-consensual electronic surveillance or any other investigative technique covered in

Title 18, United States Code, §§2510-2552. (See the current DIOG, and "Use and

Approvals for Investigative Techniques" in Tab 6).



Full Field Investigation (FFI):

There are several types of Full Field Investigations conducted by the FBI.

b7E

They, of course will be available once the

TFO has his clearance. For DT investigations two, general crimes investigations (FBI

Classification 266) and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (FBI Classification 100), will

be discussed. The choice of the type of investigation depends on the information and

investigative focus. A general crimes investigation may be initiated where facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be

committed. Preventing future criminal activity, as well as solving and prosecuting crimes

that have already occurred, is an explicitly authorized objective of general crimes

investigations. The "reasonable indication" threshold for undertaking such an

investigation is substantially lower than probable cause.

A TEI is the second type of FFI in a DT investigation and is a criminal

intelligence investigation. The focus of criminal intelligence investigations is the group

or enterprise, rather than just individual participants and specific acts. The immediate

purpose of such an investigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and

structure of the enterprise—including information relating to the group's membership,

finances, geographical dimensions, past and future activities, and goals—with a view

toward detecting, preventing, and prosecuting the enterprise's criminal activities.

Criminal intelligence investigations, usually of a long-term nature, may provide vital

intelligence to help prevent terrorist acts. The threshold is the same as for general crimes,

"reasonable indication".


••••

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••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

ACLURM005522

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIEDJIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Full Field Investigation (FFI):

There are several types of Full Field Investigations conducted by ~he FBI.

b7E

! L ________________ ..... !They, of course will be available once the

TFO has his clearance. For DT investigations two, general crimes investigations (FBI

Classification 266) and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (FBI Classification 100), will

be discussed. The choice of the type of investigation depends on the information and

investigative focus. A general crimes investigation may be initiated where facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be

committed. Preventing future criminal activity, as well as solving and prosecuting crimes

that have already occurred, is an explicitly authorized objective of general crimes

investigations. The "reasonable indication" threshold for undertaking such an

investigation is substantially lower than probable cause.

A TEl is the second type of FFI in a DT investigation and is a criminal

intelligence investigation. The focus of criminal intelligence investigations is the group

or enterprise, rather than just individual participants and specific acts. The immediate

purpose of such an investigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and

structure of the enterprise-including information relating to the group's membership,

finances, geographical dimensions, past and future activities, and goals-with a view

toward detecting, preventing, and prosecuting the enterprise's criminal activities.

Criminal intelligence investigations, usually of a long-term nature, may provide vital

intelligence to help prevent terrorist acts. The threshold is the same as for general crimes,

"reasonable indication".

UNCLASSIFIEDJIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 37

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

•®••

••••

S•••

••••


All lawful investigative techniques may be used in a FFI including, among others,

use of confidential informants, undercover activities and operations, interviews and

pretext interviews of the subject and others, mail covers, physical, photographic, and

video surveillance, polygraph examination, grand jury subpoenas, nonconsensual

electronic surveillance, pen registers and trap and trace devices, accessing stored wire and

electronic communications and transactional records, consensual electronic monitoring,

and searches and seizures. All requirements for the use of such methods under the

Constitution, applicable statutes, and Department regulations or polices must; of course,

be observed. (See "Use and Approvals for Investigative Techniques" in Tab 6).

CONCLUSION

The United States counterterrorism enforcement mission was permanently altered

on September 11, 2001. One of the most significant changes was the role of the federal

prosecutor and the enforcement of federal laws relating to terrorism. Immediately after

the 9/11 attacks, the Attorney General announced that the primary task of the Department

of Justice would be preventing future terrorist attacks before they occur.

This was not necessarily a new concept, as federal prosecutors have long been

involved in the early stages of criminal investigations. The true significance of this

position stems from the urgency of the mission, the clarity of the mandate, and other

systemic changes that followed the Attorney General's announcement. The new priority

is on prevention of attacks rather than investigation and prosecution after an attack.

Criminal prosecution is just one of the many tools available to realize the mission of

identifying, preventing, and deterring acts of terrorism within the United States.


ACLURM005523

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


All lawful investigative techniques may be used in a FFI including, among. others,

use of confidential informants, undercover activities and operations, interviews and

pretext interviews of the subject and others, mail covers, physical, photographic, and

video surveillance, polygraph examination, grand jury subpoenas, nonconsensual

electronic surveillance, pen registers and trap and trace devices, accessing stored wire and

electronic communications and transactional records, consensual electronic monitoring,

and searches and seizures. All requirements for the use of such methods under the

Constitution, applicable statutes, and Department regulations or polices must; of course,

be observed. (See " Use and Approvals for Investigative Techniques" in Tab 6).

CONCLUSION

The United States counterterrorism enforcement mission was permanently altered

on September 11, 2001. One of the most significant changes was the role of the federal

prosecutor and the enforcement of federal laws relating to terrorism. Immediately after

the 9111 attacks, the Attorney General announced that the primary task of the Department

of Justice would be preventing future terrorist attacks before they occur.

This was not necessarily a new concept, as federal prosecutors have long been

involved in the early stages of criminal investigations. The true significance of this

position stems from the urgency of the mission, the clarity of the mandate, and other

systemic changes that followed the Attorney General's announcement. The new priority

is on prevention of attacks rather than investigation and prosecution after an attack.

Criminal prosecution is just one of the many tools available to realize the mission of

identifying, preventing, and deterring acts of terrorism within the United States.


S S • S

S

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

ACLURM005524

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

4

• (11 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION

> Opening-an Assessment

• ✓ Open a Guardian Assessment

ID > Closing an Assessment • v Closing EC

lb > Converting an Assessment to a Preliminary Investigation or Full Field Investigation

V (same as Opening Preliminary Investigation or Full Field Investigation above)

• > Opening a Preliminary Investigation

1 EC (Includes Opening information, Notification of Initiation and VGTOF entry)

• ✓ Opening LHM (enclosed as an attachment) V VGTOF Form/FD-930

• > Closing a Preliminary Investigation 411 v Closing EC *Must include justification for closing case

• V Closing LHM (enclosed as an attachment) ✓ VGTOF Removal Form (FD-930)

ID V Notification to Department of Justice (FD-320) • *Only if case is opened by United States Attorney's Office

el > Extending a Preliminary Investigation 411 .4 Extension EC

ID ID > Converting a Preliminary Investigation to a Full Field Investigation

411 v Conversion EC ✓ LHM

> Opening a Full Field Investigation N7 EC (Includes Opening information, Notification of Initiation and VGTOF

entry) 411 ✓ Opening LHM (enclosed as an attachment)

✓ VGTOF Form/FD-930

411 > Closing a Full Field Investigation

V Closing EC *Must include justification for closing case • V Closing LHM (enclosed as an attachment)

✓ VGTOF Removal Form (FD-930)

411 v Notification to Department of Justice (FD-320) *Only if case is opened by United States Attorney's Office

411 •

• UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 9

111

ACLURM005525

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION

» Opening"an Assessment ./ Open a Guardian Assessment

» Closing an Assessment ./ Closing EC

, » Converting an Assessment to a Preliminary Investigation or Full Field Investigation

./ (same as Opening Preliminary Investigation or Full Field Investigation above)

» Opening a Preliminary Investigation ./ EC (Includes Opening information, Notification of Initiation and VGrOF

entry) ./ Opening LHM (enclosed as an attachment) './ VGrOF FormIFD-930

» Closing a Preliminary Investigation ./ Closing EC *Must include justification for closing case ./ Closing LHM (enclosed a~ an attachment) ./ VGrOF Removal Form (FD-930) ./ Notification to Department of Justice (FD-320)

*Only if case is opened by United States Attorney's Office

» Extending a Preliminary Investigation ./ Extension EC

» Converting a Preliminary Investigation to a Full Field Investigation ./ Conversion BC ./LHM

» Opening a Full Field Investigation ./ EC (Includes Opening information, Notification of Initiation and VGrOF

entry) ./ Opening LHM (enclosed as an attachment) ./ VGrOF FormJFD-930

» Closing a Full Field Investigation ./ Closing BC *Must include justification for closing case . ./ Closing LHM (enclosed as an attachment) ./ VGrOF Removal Form (FD-930) ./ Notification to Department of Justice (FD-320)

*Only if case is opened by United States Attorney's Office


> Serving National Security Letter Return ✓ FD-542 (Serving NSL)

> Requesting Surveillance by SSG ✓ Surveillance Request Form ✓ FD-542 (Requesting Surveillance)

b7E

• • •


• • > Extending a Full Field Investigation • v" Extension EC

• •

•

• > Issuing a Grand Jury Subpoena ✓ Subpoena Request Form

FD-302

• > Reporting Grand Jury Subpoena Return • • • > Issuing a National Security Letter

NSL (LHM) ✓ NSL EC (Created within FISAMS)

• •

•

•

• • • •

• > Reporting Surveillance Conducted by SSG FD-542 (Surveillance Conducted)

• • > Reporting Surveillance Conducted by JTTF

✓ FD-302 or Surveillance Log

FD-878 • ✓ Training Request Form (TRF)

• > Reporting an Interview FD-302

• > Reporting a Trash Cover FD-302 FD-542 (to document analysis of and claim statistical accomplishment)

• • • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 40

•

•

> Annual Summary for a Full Field Investigation ✓ Annual Summary EC ✓ Annual Summary LHM

' ✓ FD-302

• • > Request Training

ACLURM005526

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


~ Extending a Full Field Investigation if Extension EC

~ Annual Summary for a Full Field Investigation if Annual Summary EC if Annual Summary LHM

~ Issuing a Grand Jury Subpoena if Subpoena Request Form if FD-302

~ Reporting Grand Jury Subpoena Return . if FD-302

~ Issuing a National Security Letter if NSL(LHM) if NSL EC (Created within FISAMS) ./ ED 542

~ Serving National Security Letter Return if FD-S42 (Serving NSL)

~ Requesting Surveillance by SSG if Surveillance Request Ponn if FD-S42 (Requesting Surveillance)

~ Reporting Surveillance Conducted by SSG if FD-542 (Surveillance Conducted)

~ Reporting Surveillance Conducted by JTTF if FD-302 or Surveillance Log

~ Request Training if FD-878 if Training Request Form (TRF)

~ Reporting an Interview if FD-302

~ Reporting a Trash Cover if FD-302 if FD-S42 (to document analysis of and claim statistical accomplishment)


b7E


1110

0•9

1111

118

••••••

••11

11•9

110S

OS

S11

1111

1111

1111

1111

11•

118

11

> Reporting a Collision ✓ Collision EC ✓ SF-91 ✓ ST-3 (Completed by Police Officer on scene) ✓ Police Report (Completed by Police Officer on scene) ✓ An FBI Agent must respond to scene as he/she will need to complete

EC/302. > Submitting General Evidence

✓ FD-302 ✓ FD-597 (Evidence Log) ✓ FD-192 (Evidence Submission Form) ✓ Chain of Custody

> Submitting Film for Processing ✓ FD-523 (AIRTEL) ✓ (See contact list or JTTF Coordinator for applicable contact)

> Submitting Electronic Evidence to be Analyzed ✓ FD-302 (if not already documented on evidence/surveillance logs, etc) ✓ FD-597 (Evidence Log) ✓ FD-192 (Evidence Submission Form) ✓ Chain of Custody ✓ EC to'the Computer Analysis Response Team Requesting Analysis

> Submitting Toll Records to be entered into Telephone Apps. ✓ Enclose in FD-340 (1A) and send to (See contact list or JTTF Coordinator

for applicable contact)

Investigative Reports

EC (Electronic Communication):

The purpose of the Electronic Communication (EC) is to communicate information within the FBI.

EC applications: (examples) > Open and close cases > Document results of a lead > To report the status of your investigation > Document investigative activity > To request investigative assistance (SSG, SOG, etc...). > To request action to be taken > Sending information to your file

**Can not claim a statistical Accomplishment**


ACLURM005527

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIEDlfFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

):> Reporting a Collision v" Collision EC v'" SF-91 v" ST-3 (Completed by Police Officer on scene) v" Police Report (Completed by Police Officer on scene) v" An FBI Agent must respond to scene as he/she will need to complete

EC/302. . ):> Submitting General Evidence

v" FD-302 v" FD-597 (Evidence Log) v" FD-l92 (Evidence Submission Form) v" Chain of Custody

):> Submitting Film for Processing v" FD-523 (AIRTEL) v" (See contact list or JTTF Coor~inator for applicable contact)

):> Submitting Electronic Evidence to be Analyzed v" FD-302 (if not already documented on evidence/surveillance logs, etc) v" FD-597 (Evidence Log) v" FD-192 (Evidence Submission Form) v" Chain of Custody v" EC tothe Computer Analysis Response Team Requesting Analysis

):> Submitting Toll Records to be entered into Telephone Apps. v" Enclose in FD-340 (lA) and send to (See contact list or JTTF Coordinator

for applicable contact)

Investigative Reports

EC (Electronic Communication):

The purpose of the Electronic Communication (EC) is to communicate information within the FBI.

EC applications: (examples) ):> Open and close cases ):> Document results of a lead ):> To report the status of your investigation ):> Document investigative activity ):> To request investigative assistance (SSG, SOG, etc ... ). ):> To request action to be taken ):> Sending information to your file

**Can not claim a statistical Accomplishment**

UNCLASSIFIED/fFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 41

(F..0131-203)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date:' 03/31/200S

Counterterrorism. Attn: SSA

Attn: SFO Houstonn Attn: SA ane oe

From: San Antonio Squad 11/CTIJITFlAnetin Pecident Agency

Contact: TFO

Approved By:

Drafted By: I

Case ID S: I

It 1n

((Pending) *S.

Title: IT THREAT ASSESSMENT

Synopsis: To provide infornation in reference to interview of captioned subject.


When an EC is communicating information outside of the originating division, two components are necessary. First, your EC must contain a "TO:" line, indicating the division(s) receiving the EC. It is important to remember that if more than one division is listed, they must appear in alphabetical order (with Headquarters divisions listed first). *see Example I

Example 1

The second requirement is a "Lead" section. Setting a Lead is a function of the EC macro and if selected, the Lead will automatically be placed at the end of your EC. It is important to remember that if more than one division is receiving the EC, a separate lead must be set for each division, and they also must appear in alphabetical order (with Headquarters divisions listed first). *see Example 2

*NOTE: The "To:" section must correspond with the "Lead" section. That is to say that for every Division listed as a receiving division, a corresponding Lead must be set for that division.

Following are the three approved Lead types:

1) "Action Required" - This type of lead will be used if the sending office requires the receiving office to do some action (interview victim, locate person, etc.).

2) "Discretionary Action" - This type of lead will be used if the sending office has some information that may be of importance to the receiving office. It may or may not require action by the recipient and the recipient will decide what, if any,


42

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ACLURM005528

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


When an EC is communicating information outside of the originating division, two components are necessary. First, your EC must contain a "TO:" line, indicating the division(s) receiving the EC. It is important to remember that if more than one division is listed, they must appear in alphabetical order (with Headquarters divisions listed first). * see Example 1

Example 1

(F".GIJI.1D3)

FEDERAl. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Preced~.ce: ROUTI HE nate: . 03/3112005

, ~..,: Counterterroris1L. Atlanta Hou.ton

Attn: STFSOA I Att.: . itt.: SA .l::an:::: • ..."Drn:oe~---I

Froa: San An tenie Squad fl/CTIJITFrAnstjp. Re 5id ent Agencv Co. tact: TFO ! I

¢;; lppraved BV: :=1 ====~ Drafted BV: , 'tlD Case ID I: .... , -'======r,..I(pendin9)

~ Title: IT TIIREAT ASSESSHENT

~ Synopsis: To pro9ilie informatioll 1D reference to iDter~iev of captioned subject.

The second requirement is a "Leac/' section. Setting a Lead is a function of the EC macro and if selected, the Lead will automatically be placed at the end of your EC. It is important to remember that if more than one division is receiving the EC, a separate lead must be set for each division, and they also must appear in alphabetical order (with Headquarters divisions listed first). *see Example 2

*NOTE: The "To:" section must correspond with the "Lead" section. That is to say that/or every Division listed as a receiving division, a corresponding Lead must be set/or that division.

Following are the three approved Lead types:

1) "Action Required" - This type of lead will be used if the sending office requires the receiving office to do some action (interview victim, locate person, etc.).

2) "Discretionary Action 11 - This type of lead will be used if the sending office has SOme information that may be of importance to the receiving office. It mayor may not require action by the recipient and the recipient will decide what, if any,


b6 b7C b7E

To. From: San Antonio Re: L 03r31/2005

IEAD(s):

'Set Lend 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORIS4

AT UASHINGTON. DC

Read and clear.

iSet Lead 2: (Discretionary)

ATLANTA

AT ATLANTA GA

For vhatevor action deemed necessary.

'Set lend 3: (Action)

HOUSTON

.AT HOUSTON TX

Locate and intervicv Joe Terrorist. residing at 123 Hain Street, Houston, TX: and report results of interviev to Austin.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY •

action to take. For example: Tampa receives some information regarding a crime that allegedly happened in San Francisco. Tampa forwards the information to San Francisco to take any action deemed appropriate.

3) "Information Only" - This type of lead will be used for information only and no specific action is required or necessary (administrative type matters, change in leave policy, etc.).

Example 2

EC Copy Count: 2 (*unless one of the following: Attachments, Enclosures or covering a Lead outside of our Division.)

First copy (Original) *see Example 3 ✓ Red Ink Check mark by the "From: Your Division" ✓ Red Ink Check mark by the "Case ID:" ✓ Initial in Black Ink by your name next to "Drafted by:"

**The Typed initials next to your name indicate who actually typed the document, in some cases this may be different from the person who drafted it**


ACLURM005529

.-.-. --------------------------------:---------------, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


action to take. For example: Tampa receives some information regarding a crime that allegedly happened in San FranCisco. Tampa forwards the information to San Francisco to take a~y action deemed appropriate.

3) "Information Only" - This type of lead will be used for information only and no specific action is required or necessary (administrative type matters, change in leave policy, etc.).

Example 2

To: cry'Ptnrt,rrorier Fro.: San Antonio Re: I .03/31/2005

I.E.IoD( .. ):

ISe~ Lead 1: (Info)

CQUNTERTERRORISH

AT VASHIMGTOH DC

Read and clear.

ISet ~cad 2: (DiscxetionGrY)

AT ATI.AnTA vA

For vh.o.tevelzo oct ion deeaed neeO~\3a%'y.

ISet Lead 3: (~etion)

AT HOUSTON IX

Locate and int~~vi=v Jee Te~rori~t. rc~iding at 123 , Main St:reet. Houston. TX; and repo:rt :results of interviev to

.Aust.in.

••

EC Copy Count: 2 (*unless one of the following: Attachments, Enclosures or covering a Lead outside of our Division.)

First copy (Original) *see Example 3 ./ Red Ink Check mark by the "From: Your Division" ./ Red Ink Check mark by the "Case ID;" ./ Initial in Black Ink by your name next to "Drafted by:"

**The Typed initials next to your name indicate who actually typed the document, in some cases this may be different from the person who drafted it**


b7E

Mar.0111.7='


Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/08/2005

of To: San Antonio

Prom: 115:n Antonio Squad 11/C Agency

Contact: TFO

aM Approved By:

Drafted By:

as Case ID 1:

4Z .Title: IT CASE SAMPLE EC

4,3 Synopsis: This is a sample EC.

dofl Details: On 02/08/2005, writer completed a sample EC to be usec for training purposes. The following person is fictional and been created for -the purpose of demonstrating how to 'Index" information so that it may be searchable in the FBI databse.

m Wg-IT1

(Pending)

a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a •

b6 b7C b7E

Example 3


FD-542 (Statistical Accomplishment):

• The purpose of the FD-542 is to communicate information within the FBI and

ID claim a statistical accomplishment. **An FD-542 can be substituted for an EC in situations where you are communicating information and claiming a statistical accomplishment at the same time**

a ***IMPORTANT*** lb Your classification should be the only Case ID listed on the FD-542. If a non-

e valid classification (for example, administrative or criminal classification) is listed in addition to the valid classification, this would prevent the FD-542 from being uploaded.

FD-542 applications: (examples) > Dissemination of information

• > Participating in Command Post/Major Case/Special Event > Participating as a Member of a WMD Working Group/Task Force > Participation in WMD exercise > WMD Assistance Provided to State/Local/Federal Agency

• > Request Surveillance (SSG only)

a a UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 44

a a

a a

ACLURM005530

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .-• • • • • • I. I. • • • • • • •

Example 3

. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY

(R.e\r. 0 I· J 1·2003)

IFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: San Antonio

From: vCn Antonio

Date: 02/08/2005

Squad 11/CTVTTTv . D.' t Agenoy Contaot: TFO I I

. Approved By: I _ I Drafted By: II--------...,rrrm J~ Case ID It: ,, _______ ..... 1 (Pending)

~:!! . Title: IT GASE: SAMPLE EC

~ Synopsis: This is a sample EG.

~~r Details: On 02/08/2005, writer completed a sample llC to be use< for training purposes. The following person is fiotional and been created for·the purpose of demonstrating how to "Index" information so that it may be searohable in the FBI databse.

FD-542 (Statistical Accomplishment):

The purpose of the FD-S42 is to communicate information within the FBI and claim a statistical accomplishment. **An FD~S42 can be substituted for an BC in situations where you are communicating information and claiming a statistical accomplishment at the same time**

***IMPORTANT*** Your classification should be the only Case ID listed on the FD-S42. If a nonvalid classification (for example, administrative or criminal classification) is listed in addition to the valid classification, this would prevent the FD-S42 from being uploaded.

FD-S42 applications: (examples) ~ Dissemination of information ~ Participating in Command Post/Major Case/Special Event ~ Participating as a Member of a WMD Working GrouplTask Force ~ Participation in WMD exercise ~ WMD Assistance Provided to StateILocallFederal Agency ~ Request Surveillance (SSG only)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY 44

b6 b7C b7E


D Conducting Surveillance (SSG only) D Creating/Issuing a National Security Letter D Serving a National Security Letter

The "Accomplishment Information" section on an FD-542 is a function of the macro. If the FD-542 is selected, the "Accomplishment Information" will automatically be placed on the last page of the document and consists of; the number of accomplishments claimed, type of accomplishment, investigative technique used, and information on the person claiming the accomplishment(s).

FD-542 Copy Count: (Same as EC above) *Note: Document type on an FD-542 is ".542"

Example 4

To: San Antonio From: San Antonio 3000-SA-CS0782, 04/18/2005

qa Accomplishment Information:

Humber: I 'Type: POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI) ITU: LIAISON BITE OTHER AGENCY Claimed By:

5,5H: 123456789

OMMEM1101Hans; Squad: an

108j1402.AM 4+

FD-71 (Complaint Form):

The purpose of the FD 71 is to document complaints received via: D Telephone D Walk-in

. D Letters D Faxes D E-mail D Other agencies

***IT/DT complaints are handled through the Guardian system.


••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••/•

••••

••••

S•••

••••

b6 b7C

ACLURM005531

I: • • • • • • • • • • • • it • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


;. Conducting Surveillance (SSG only) ;. CreatingiIssuing a National Security Letter ;. Serving a National Security Letter

The "Accomplishment Information" section on an FD-542 is a function of the macro. If the FD-542 is selected, the "Accomplishment Information" will automatically be placed on the last page of the document and consists of; the number of accomplishments claimed, type of accomplishment, investigative technique used, and information on the person claiming the accomplishment(s).

FD~542 Copy Count: (Same as EC above) *Note: Document type on an FD-542 is ".542"

Example 4

To: San A.nton'io From.: San.An tonic R~: 300C-SA-C50792. 04/19/2005

G>~ 'AccoIplish.ent Inforaation:

RUl!\ber: 1 'Tvpe: POSITIVE INTEllIGENCE (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI) ITU: IIA I SON 9ITH OTS ER AGENCY Claimed By:

~~~: j21mm ~ Squa.d: ~lnrT!------I

lOBi 1 i(02 "I!tb +.

FD-71 (Complaint Form):

The purpose of the FD 71 is to document complaints received via: ;. Telephone ;. Walk-in

,;. Letters ;. Faxes ;. E-mail ;. Other agencies

***ITIDT complaints are handled through the Guardian system.


b6 b7C


FD-71 Copy Count: 1 (Same as EC above) FD-302 (Report Discoverable Information):

• The purpose of the FD-302 is to document discoverable information (i.e. information that you may have to testify to in court)

IR FD-302 applications: (examples)

011 > Documenting when accepting or providing evidence > Documenting interviews

fib > Documenting results of surveillance > Documenting subpoena results > Document results of trash runs > Document arrest

• 411 FD-302 Copy Count: 2

• First copy (same as EC above)-

indexing)

FD-320 (Notification to DOJ): •

The purpose of the FD-320 is to notify the Department of Justice of a case closure. It is completed after approval from the JTTF Supervisor and consultation with the

ID Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case. ID

FD-320 Copy Count: 3

First copy V" White paper: Clean with no markings (i.e. no initials or copy count)

This copy is for the U.S. Attorney's Office

• It can be mailed to: U.S. Attorney's Office Atm: AUSA XMVXXXX

Address:

• It can also be given to your JTTF AUSA

Second copy (Original) ✓ This copy must be on Yellow paper with *copy count on lower

left corner. ✓ Put Check mark in Red Ink next to the Case ID ✓ Initialed in Black Ink next to your typed initials.


lb Second copy (clean! i.e. No initials, No Red marks, No Julian date, No

•

go

a •

•

•

go

a• S

ACLURM005532

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY

FD-7l Copy Count: 1 (Same as BC above) FD-302 (Report Discoverable Information):

The purpose of the FD-302 is to document discoverable information (i.e. information that you may have to testify to in court)

FD-302 applications: (examples) ~ Documenting when accepting or providing evidence ~ Documenting interviews ~ Documenting results of surveillance ~ Documenting subpoena results ~ Document results of trash runs ~ Document arrest


First copy (same as BC above)-

Second copy (clean! i.e. No initials, No Red marks, No Julian date, No indexing)

FD-320 (Notification to DOl):

The purpose of the FD-320 is to notify the Department of Justice of a case closure. It is completed after approval from the JTTF Supervisor and consultation with the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case.


First copy ./' White paper: Clean with no markings (i.e. no initials or copy count)

This copy is for the U.S. Attorney's Office

• It can be mailed to:

Address:

U.S. Attorney ~ Office Attn: AUSA XXXXXXX

• It can also be given to your JTTF AUSA

Second copy (Original) ./' This copy must be on Yellow paper with *copy count on lower

left corner. ./' Put Check mark in Red Ink next to the Case ID ./' Initialed in Black Ink next to your typed initials.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY 46

a


Third copy (Your Serialized Copy) V This copy must be on Yellow paper with *copy count on lower

4111 left corner. ✓ Same as Serialized Copy on EC, FD-542, Etc. above

VI (*copy count includes your Case ID, your typed initials and the number of copies.)

Example copy count: 266F-NY-55619 PAH:pah (use your initials) (3)

FD-515 (Statistical Accomplishment)

The purpose of the FD-515 is to claim what is referred to as a "hard stat."

4111 **The FD-515 MUST be completed within 30 days of the event**

• FD-515 applications:

• > Complaint/Information/Indictment > Arrest ➢ Conviction > Sentencing

• > Asset seizure > Other

ID FD-515 Copy Count: 1 4111

FD-930 (Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File)

• The purpose of the FD-930 is to nominate a subject of International or Domestic Terrorism for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch-list.

411 FD-930 applications: • > Nominate a subject for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch-List. • > Remove a previously nominated subject from the Terrorist Watch-list.

FD-930 Procedures: • ✓ Complete FD-930 e-form (*See 'Tips for completing the FD-930 e-form' • below) • ✓ After completion, validate the FD-930 e-form by clicking on the

"Validate Form" button at the top of the screen. *If the form was completed with valid data and all required fields have

41 been populated, the red 'NOT VALID' indicator will turn to a green 'VALID' indicator. If the form was not completed with valid data and/or

411 all required fields have not been populated, the red 'NOT VALID'

a UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 47

a a

ACLURM005533

------------------• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


Third copy (Your Serialized Copy) ./ This copy must be on Yellow paper with *copy count on lower

left corneL ./ Same as Serialized Copy on EC, FD-542, Etc. above

(*copy count includes your Case ID, your typed initials and the number of copies.)

Example copy count: 266F-NY-55619

- FD-SIS (Statistical Accomplishment)

PAH:pah (use your initials) (3)

The purpose of the FD-515 is to claim what is referred to as a "hard stat. " **The FD-515 MUST be completed within 30 days of the event**

FD-515 applications: ~ ComplaintlInformationlIndictment ~ Arrest ~ Conviction ~ Sentencing ~ Asset seizure ~ Other

FD-515 Copy Count: I

FD-930 (Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File)

The purpose of the PD-930 is to nominate a subject of International or Domestic Terrorism for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch-list.

FD-930 applications: ~ Nominate a subject for inclusion on the Terrorist Watch-List ~ Remove a previously nominated subject from the Terrorist Watch-list.

FD-930 Procedures: ./ Complete FD-930 e-form (*See 'Tips for completing the FD-930 e-fonn'

below) . ./ After completion, validate the FD-930 e-fonn by clicking on the

"Validate Form" button at the top of the screen.-*If the form was completed with valid data and all required fields have

been populated, the red 'NOT VALID' indicator will tum to a green 'VALID' indicator. If the form was not completed with valid data and/or allrequired fields havenot been populated, the red 'NOT VALID'

UNCLASSIFIEDlfFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 47

s1

1,

S1H

1S

111

11

11/U

/1

1®

11/111

1/1111

11S

111.1

S


indicator will remain and a window will appear listing all invalid data and/or omitted fields that need to be addressed by the Case Agent before the form is submitted to the TREX Unit. Field Offices should not upload either 'VALID' or 'NOT VALID' FD-930s into ACS. The TREX Unit will be responsible for function.

✓ Save the completed FD-930 to a file/folder of your choice. ✓ Prepare an e-mail to HQ_DIV13_TREX, with the subject line of the e-

mail being your substantive investigative case file number, and attach the completed FD-930 e-form. Based on the 'Type of Request', the following documents must be sent as attachments to the e-mail submitted to HQ_DIV13_TREX:

■ If the 'Type of Request' is 'Initial Submission': FD-930 and opening case EC and NOI or LHM.

■ If the 'Type of Request' is 'Remove Individual from ALL Watch- listing and Supported Systems': FD-930 and closing case EC.

■ If the Type of Request' is 'Add Data to Existing Record' or 'Modify or Delete Data From Existing Record': FD-930 and EC clearly stating what is to be added to, deleted from or modified in the existing record.

✓ TREX Unit will review the nbmination for thoroughness and accuracy, reconcile all conflicting issues, and make appropriate notifications (TSC, NCTC, etc.). The TREX Unit will then send an e-mail to the Case Agent containing a copy of the completed FD-930 that has been uploaded to the substantive investigative case file, and the serial number of that document.

✓ Print one (1) hard copy of the e-mail for uploading/serializing into the substantive case file.

✓ Print two (2) copies of the FD-930, one (1) for the substantive case file and one (1) for the VGTOF control file.

Tips for completing the e-form FD-930: > Mandatory fields are highlighted by red asterisks or red borders. Some

fields become mandatory when a condition is created, i.e., when the 'Type of Request' is 'Initial Submission' or based on the subject's U.S. Person status.

> Holding the cursor over some fields will display a window with tips for properly completing the field.

> Drop-down menus/pick-lists may be accessed by clicking on the downward arrow located on the right side of the field. (The first line in all drop-down menus is blank and should be selected if the field is inadvertently populated. This will depopulate the field.)

> Add Additional...' lines are directly below base fields for any biographical data element for which multiple entries are accepted. i.e., date of birth, social security account number, scars/marks/tattoos/other characteristics, etc. By single clicking on the 'Add Additional...' line another field will appear and allow for additional data elements to be entered.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OH-'ICIAL USE ONLY 48

ACLURM005534

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


indicator will remain and a window will appear listing all invalid data and/or omitted fields that need to be addressed by the Case Agent before ,the form is submitted to the TREX Unit. Field Offices should not upload either 'VALID' or 'NOT VALID' FD-930s into ACS. The TREX Unit will be responsible for function .

./ Save the completed FD-930 to a file/folder of your choice.

./ Prepare an e-mail to HQ_DIV13_TREX, with the subject line of the email being your substantive investigative case file number, and attach the completed FD-930 e-form. Based on the 'Type of Request', the following documents must be sent as attachments to the e-mail submitted to HCLDIV13_TREX: .

• If the 'Type of Request' is 'Initial Submission': FD-930 and opening case EC and NO! or LHM.

• If the 'Type of Request' is 'Remove Individual from ALL Watchlisting .and Supported Systems': FD-930 and closing case Ee.

• If the 'Type of Request' is 'Add Data to Existing Record' or 'Modify or Delete Data From Existing Record': FD-930 and EC clearly stating what is to be added to, deleted from or modified in the existing record.

./ TREX Unit will review the nbmination for thoroughness and accuracy, reconcile all conflicting issues, and make appropriate notifications (TSC, NCTC, etc.). The TREXUnit will then send an e-mail to the Case Agent containing a copy of the completed FD-930 that has been uploaded to the substantive investigative case file, and the serial number of that document.

'/Print one (1) hard copy of the e-mail for uploading/serializing into the substantive case file. -

./ Print two (2) copies of the FD-930, one (1) for the substantive case file and one (1) for the VGTOF control file.

Tips for completing the e-form FD-930: ~ Mandatory fields are highlighted by red asterisks or red borders. Some

fields become mandatory when a condition is created, i.e., when the 'Type of Request' is 'Initial Submission' or based on the subject's U.S. Person status.

~ Holding the cursor over some fields will display a window with tips for properly completing the field.

~ Drop-down menus/pick-lists may be accessed by clicking on the downward arrow located on the right side of the field .. (The first line in all drop-down menus is blank and should be selected if the field is inadvertently populated. This will depopulate the field.)

~ Add AdditionaL' lines are directly below base fields for any biographical data element for which multiple entries are accepted. i.e., date of birth, social security account number, scars/marks/tattoos/other characteristics, etc. By single clicking on the 'Add Additional .. : line another field will appear and allow for additional data elements to be entered.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL Y 48

MI UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

When certain conditions are created on the form, pop-up windows will • appear advising the Case Agent of a conflict. For example: If a subject

has been determined to be Armed and Dangerous and the Armed and fib Dangerous caveat is entered as a Caution and Medical Condition, the • subject may not be issued a Silent Hit Handling Code. Law enforcement

officer safety is paramount; therefore, initial eligibility criteria for an individual to be issued a Silent Hit Handling Code is that the individual may not pose a safety or violence threat to law enforcement.

• Policy and procedural ECs cited on the form may be directly accessed by • clicking on the communication's reference link.

•

The purpose of the LHM is to notify various departments, including the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and FBIHQ, of your intent to open an intelligence case. The initial LHM must be accompanied by an Opening EC.

LHM Copy Count: 2

First Copy V White paper: clean! (i.e. No initials, No Red marks, No Julian date,

No indexing) For the file attached to the EC.

Second Copy (with attached EC to FBIHQ substantive desk SSA) ✓ Initialed in Black Ink next to your typed initials.

LHM (Letterhead Memorandum)

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • UNCLASSIFTEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 49

ACLURM005535

• • • .• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -• • • • • • • •


~ When certain conditions are created on the form, pop-up windows will appear advising the Case Agent of a conflict. For example: If a subject has been determined to be Armed and Dangerous and the Armed and Dangerous caveat is entered as a Caution and Medical Condition, the subject may not be issued a Silent Hit Handling Code. Law enforcement officer safety is paramount; therefore, initial eligibility criteria for an individual to be issued a Silent Hit Handling Code is that the individual may not pose a safety or violence threat to law enforcement. Policy and procedural ECs cited on the form may be directly accessed by clicking on the communication's reference link.

LHM (Letterhead Memorandum)

The purpose of the LHM is to notify various departments, including the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and FBIHQ, of your intent to open an intelligence case. The initial LHM must be accompanied by an Opening Ee.

LHM Copy Count: 2

First Copy ./ White paper: clean! (i.e. No initials, No Red marks, No Julian date,

No indexing) For the file attached to the Ee.

Second Copy (with attached EC to FBIHQ substantive desk SSA) ./ Initialed in Black Ink next to your typed initials.

uNCLASSIFIEDllFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 49

~--"""--"--

ACLURM005536

:----------.............. 111111

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

\

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

INVESTIGATIVE PLAN:

ALL INVESTIGATIONS MUST BE APPROVED / ASSIGNED BY THE SQUAD SUPERVISOR AND

CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES.

1. RECEIVE COMPLAINT: Complaints can come from many sources including, but not limited to:

> FD-71 > Electronic Communication / Lead ➢ Telephone call > E-mail > Local Police Department Report > Guardian > *Assessment

(*An Assessment is a proactive collection of information concerning threats to National Security, including information on individuals, groups and organizations of possible investigative interest)

A complaint is marked based on the deadline by which it must be completed: ❖ Immediate — 24 hours ❖ Priority — 72 hours ❖ Routine — 60 days

2. CREATE A WORKING FOLDER: As you begin conducting an investigation the volume of information can be overwhelming. A good working folder is vital to maintaining and organizing this information as it comes in. Although there are no rules on what can be'maintained in a working folder, some examples of information that should be included are:

> Results of Data-Base Searches ➢ Photos ➢ Copies of all Documentation (EC's, FD-542's, FD-302's, Surveillance

Logs) > Copies of all Subpoenas / National Security Letters > Information on Related Cases


ACLURM005537

• '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


INVESTIGATIVE PLAN:

ALL INVESTIGATIONS MUST BE APPROVED I ASSIGNED BY THE SQUAD SUPERVISOR AND

CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES.

1. RECEIVE COMPLAINT: Complaints can come from many sources including, but not limited to:

~ FD-71 ~ Electronic Communication I Lead ~ Telephone call ~ E-mail ~ Local Police Department Report ~ Guardian ~ * Assessment

(*An Assessment is a proactive collection of information concerning threats to National Security, including infimnatiolJ. on individuals, groups and organizations of possible investigative interest)

A complaint is marked based on the deadline by which it must be completed: .:. Immediate - 24 hours .:. Priority - 72 hours .:. Routine - 60 days

2. CREATE A WORKING FOLDER: As you begin conducting an investigation the volume of information can be overwhelming. A good working folder is vital to maintaining and organizing this information as it comes in. Although there are no rules on what can be'maintained in a working folder, some examples of information that should be included are:

~ Results of Data-Base Searches ~ Photos ~ Copies of all Documentation (EC's, FD-542's, FD-302's, Surveillance

Logs) ~ Copies of all Subpoenas I National Security Letters ~ Information on Related Cases



11111

111

1111

119

10

1111

11M

OII

SS

OO

SO

OS

SO

OO

SM

O11

11111

11

3. CONTACT COMPLAINANT: (if appropriate) Although the original complaint should contain all necessary information, the reality is that this may not always be the case. If the original complaint is lacking necessary or sufficient information, now is the time to re-contact the complainant and "fill in the blanks". Examples of relevant information that may not have been included in the original complaint are:

> Subject's Full Name > Physical Description > Identifying Numbers (Social Security, Drivers License, Passport) D Telephone Numbers D Complete Address D Other Relevant Details of the Specific Incident

4. CONDUCT DATABASE CHECKS: (See your JITF's Investigative Check List, if applicable) A Standard of Investigation is required to ensure that each and every complaint is properly investigated. The Standard of Investigation will vary, but may include approximately 25 investigative databases, and every Investigator should utilize each and every database when applicable.

It should also be noted that this checklist (if applicable) is not all inclusive and should be considered a minimum. Investigators should feel free to incorporate other relevant database checks that may not be included on their JTTF Investigative Check List.

Important Considerations when Conducting Database Checks:

> Investigators should seek the assistance of other Task Force Officers, Special Agents, Intel Research Specialists (IRS), Investigative Assistants (IA), and/or Intelligence Analysts (IA) to run these checks.

> When checking Local Law Enforcement involvement, Investigators are reminded to also run checks with the Agency that has jurisdiction where the subject resides, to include past or historical residences.

> Include both positive and negative results within your working folder.

5. DISCUSS COMPLAINT STATUS WITH SENIOR TFO/AGENT: Although you may already have a good idea of the complaints case potential at this point, you should discuss the results of the database checks with a Senior TFO/Agent. This will provide an outside perspective, which can be invaluable, but will also insure that you have not overlooked a tool or technique that could or should have been utilized.


ACLURM005538

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


3. CONTACT COMPLAINANT: (if appropriate) Although the original complaint should contain all necessary information, the reality is that this may not always ·be the case. If the original complaint is lacking necessary or sufficient information, now is the time to re-contact the complainant and "fill in the blanks". Examples of relevant information that may not have been included in the original complaint are:

~ Subject's Full Name ~ Physical Description ~ Identifying Numbers (Social Security, Drivers License, Passport) ~ Telephone Numbers ~ Complete Address ~ Other Relevant Details of the Specific Incident

4. CONDUCT DATABASE CHECKS: (See your lTTF's Investigative Check List, if applicable) A Standard of Investigation is required to ensure that each and every complaint is properly investigated. The Standard of Investigation will vary, but may include approximately 25 investigative databases, and every Investigator should utilize each and every database when applicable.

It should also be noted that this checklist (if applicable) is not all inclusive and should be considered a minimum. Investigators should feel free to incorporate other relevant database checks that may not be included on their JTTF Investigative Check List.

Important Considerations when Conducting Database Checks:

~ Investigators should seek the assistance of other Task Force Officers, Special Agents, Intel Research Specialists (IRS), Investigative Assistants (IA), and/or Intelligence ~nalysts (IA) to run these checks.

~ When checking Local Law Enforcement involvement, Investigators are reminded to also run checks with the Agency that has jurisdiction where the subject resides, to include past or historical residences.

~ Include both positive and negative results within your working folder.

5. DISCUSS COMPLAINT STATUS WITH SENIOR TFO/AGENT: Although you may already have a good idea of the complaints case potential at this point, you should discuss the results of the database checks with a Senior TFOI Agent. This will provide an outside perspective, which can be invaluable, but will also insure that you have not overlooked a tool or technique that could or should have been utilized.


0 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Important Considerations when Discussing Complaint Status:

> Determine the validity of the complaint > Discuss additional tools or techniques that could be utilized at this stage

a) ➢ Determine if the Subject of the complaint should be contacted and interviewed

> Determine if the Lead or complaint is sufficiently covered > Determine if a Preliminary Investigation or Full Field Investigation should

a) be initiated

• *If it is determined that the Guardian lead is sufficiently covered, it can be closed, within Guardian.

*If it is determined that the Guardian lead is not sufficiently covered and that further investigation is warranted, continue with "INVESTIGATIVE PLAN", step 6, below.

6. INITIATE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OR FULL FIELD INVESTIGATION: Before opening a case, you must first determine whether a

• *Preliminary Investigation (PI) or *Full Field Investigation (FFI) is warranted. • Once the case level is determined, complete the appropriate paperwork as outlined

under "REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION" in Tab 4". 0

Important Considerations when Opening a PI or FFI:

> You must obtain approval from your Supervisor to open a case • > Determine if a Co-Case Agent should be assigned

> Begin to develop a detailed investigative plan, based on the Criminal

• Activity suspected

> Assign support duties and responsibilities when needed (i.e. assistance 0 completing opening paper-work, issuing subpoenas/NSLs, sending Leads • to other field offices, Surveillance requests/planning/conduction, etc.) • > Make necessary changes to your working folder. (Your complaint

working folder may not be sufficient for the volume of information 4B associated with a PI or FFI) • > Periodically, during the course of the investigation, brief your Supervisor

ED regarding the case status and direction.

•

•

0

0

0 0

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52

0 0

ACLURM005539

• •• • • • • • • • • • • II-I -I-I· i-I--• • • • • • • -• • • -• • • -• • • -• • • -

UNCLASSIFIED/!FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Important Considerations when Discussing Complaint Status:

» Detennine the validity of the complaint » Discuss additional tools or techniques that could be utilized at this stage » Detennine if the Subject of the complaint should be contacted arid

interviewed . » Determine if the Lead or complaint is sufficiently covered » Detennine if a Preliminary Investigation or Full Field Investigation should

be initiated

*If it is determined that the Guardian lead is sufficiently covered, it cari be closed, within Guardian.

*Ifit is determined that the Guardian lead is not sufficiently covered and that further investigation is warranted, continue with "INVESTIGATIVE PLAN", step 6, below.

6. INITIATE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OR FULL FIELD INVESTIGATION: Before opening a case, you must first determine whether a *Preliminary Investigation (PI) or *Full Field Investigation (FFI) is warranted. Once the case level is determined, complete the appropriate paperwork as outlined under "REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION" in Tab 4 ".

Important Considerations when Opening a PI or FFI:

» You must obtain approval from your Supervisor to open a case » Determine if a Co-Case Agent should be assigned . » Begin to develop a detailed investigative plan, based on the Criminal

Activity suspected » Assign support duties and responsibilities when needed (i.e. assistance

completing opening paper-work, issuing subpoenaslNSLs, sending Leads to other field offices, Surveillance requests/planning/conduction, etc.)

» Make necessary changes to your working folder. (Your complaint· working folder may not be sufficient for the volume of information associated with a PI or FFl)

» Periodically, during the course of the investigation, brief your Supervisor regarding the case status and direction.

UNCLASSIFIED/!FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 52

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*Preliminary Investigation:

Standard - There is information or an allegation indicating that a threat to National Security may exist.

Authorized Techniques - A general summary is provided in Tab 3-"Legal Application". (See Attorney General Guidelines for complete authorization) Duration - Six months (with extensions granted under certain circumstances) Approval Authority - SSA grants initial opening . SAC may grant an extension for an additional six months. Extensions in excess of one year require FBI HQ approval.

*Full Field Investigation:

Standard - There are spec* and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to National Security may exist. Authorized Techniques - A general summary is provided in Tab 3-"Legal Application". (See DIOG reference slides below, or full DIOG on FBInet) Duration - Indefinite, with a required Annual Letter Head Memorandum (LHM). Approval Authority - SAC is the approval authority.

For study materials related to the Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide, see the following link:

http://horne.fbinetibi/forms/fd1028/DIOG/DIOGTraining/Trainee%20Materials/Forms/AILItems.aspx


ACLURM005540

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• '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


*Preliminary Investigation:

Standard - There is information or an allegation indicating that a threat to National Security may exist.

Authorized Techniques - A general summary is provided in Tab 3- "Legal Application". (See Attorney General Guidelinesfor complete authorization) Duration - Six months (with extensions granted under certain circumstances) Approval Authority - SSA grants initial opening. SAC may grant an extension for an additional six months. Extensions in excess of one year require FBI HQ approval.

* Full Field investigation:

Standard - There are specific and articulablefacts giving reason to believe that a threat to National Security may exist. Authorized Techniques - A general summary is provided in Tab 3- "Legal Application". (See DIOG reference slides below, or full DIOG on FBInet) Duration - Indefinite, with a required Annual Letter Head Memorandum (LHM). Approval Authority - SAC is the approval authority.

For study materials related to the Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide, see the following link:

http://home.fbinet.fbilfonns/fdl028IDIOGIDIOGTrainingrTrainee%20Materiais/Fonns/AIIItems.aspx


••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

•

ACLURM005541

• • • UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

•

USE AND APPROVALS FOR • INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES • • • A. Polygraph Matters: Authority granted by the ASAC, unless unusual or special

II circumstances exist, i.e. a request to polygraph a minor, etc, for which approval would be granted by the SAC.. For your Division polygrapher(s) see your contact

• list or JTTF Coordinator • • B. Consensual (telephonic) Monitoring: Approval granted by ASAC. If sensitive

circumstances exist, as defined on from FD-759, approval will be granted by the ID SAC. • 1. Consenting party must sign FD-472

• 2. Obtain concurrence from your AUSA that recording is legal and no

• entrapment issues exist. Document same on an FD-320 (for CW's obtain the authority prior to opening and gain concurrence for the duration of the

• investigation) • 3. Draft FD-759 (now a macro) and forward to ASAC for authority. In the • event that consensual recording needs to take place immediately contact,

SSA and ask that he/she call the ASAC for verbal authority. Once verbal • authority is granted, document same on the original FD-759. • 4. Two Agents or an Agent and a TFO/TFA must be present during the • recording.

5. Record a preamble on the tape (date, time, witnesses, number called and name of the subject called)

• 6. Record a post amble at the conclusion (time call ended, call not • answered/answered/ answering machine, etc)

GI 7. Label the tape 8. Must submit tape to ELSUR within 10 days. Use the FD-504(b) evidence

• envelope (1D evidence), fill it out and submit it to your ELSUR contact. If a CW is utilized to place the call, his/her true name is listed on the subject

• intercepted line along with the intended interceptee. 9. Document the consensual call on an FD-302. The FD-302 will essentially lb be your debrief of the CW following the call (briefly include the pertinent

• content), document that the call was a consensual recording and the tape • submitted into evidence. Remember that the tape is the evidence and the

transcript is your guide for the jury to follow the conversation word for word.

• C. Consensual (non-telephonic) Monitoring: ASAC will approve authority via

• FD-759 for routine monitoring and for emergency monitoring (sensitive • circumstances) when a designated DOJ official cannot be reached for approval.

• When sensitive circumstances exist, routine non-telephonic authority is granted by DOJ seven days prior to the monitoring.

• • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 54

• •

ACLURM005542

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A.

B.

c.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE OfU. Y

USE AND APPROVALS FOR INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES

Polygraph Matters: Authority granted by the ASAC, unless unusual or special circumstances exist, i.e. a request to polygraph a minor, etc, for which approval would be granted by the SAC.' For your Division polygrapher(s) see your contact list or JTTF Coordinator

Consensual (telephonic) Monitoring: Approval granted by ASAC. If sensitive circumstances exist, as defined on from FD-759, approval will be granted· by the SAC.

1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

Consenting party must sign FD-472 Obtain concurrence from your AUSA that recording is legal and no entrapment issues exist. Document same on an FD-320 (for CW's obtain the authority prior to opening and gain concurrence for the duration of the investigation) Draft FD-759 (now a macro) and forward to ASAC for authority. In the event that consensual recording needs to take place immediately contact, SSA and ask that he/she call the ASACfor verbal authority. Once verbal authority is granted, document same on the original FD-759. Two Agents or an Agent and a TFOITFA must be present during the recording. Record a preamble on the tape (date, time, witnesses, number called and name of the subject called) . Record a post amble at the conclusion (time call ended, call not answered!answered! answering machine, etc) Label the tape Must submit tapeto ELSUR within 10 days. Use the FD-504(b) evidence envelope (ID evidence), fill it out and submit it to your ELSUR contact. If a CW is utilized to place the call, hislher true name is listed on the subject intercepted line along with the intended interceptee. Document the consensual calion an FD-302. The FD-302 will essentially be your debrief of the CW following the call (briefly include the pertinent content), document that the call was a consensual recording and the tape submitted into evidence. Remember that the tape is the evidence and the transcript is your guide for the jury to follow the conversation word for word.

Consensual (non-telephonic) Monitoring: ASAC will approve authority via FD-759 for routine monitoring and for emergency m09-itoring (sensitive circumstances) when a designated DOl official cannot be reached for approval.

When sensitive circumstances exist, routine non-telephonic authority is granted by DOJ seven days prior to the monitoring. .

UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 'j.-

54

a


Consensual monitoring outside of your division may be conducted only after prior notification to and concurrence obtained from the SAC of each division where monitoring will occur. You must document the concurrence. An AUSA advisement that the monitoring is legal and appropriate is necessary only in the judicial district which encompasses the office of origin of the investigative case.

ID 1. Consenting party must sign FD-473 2. Obtain concurrence from your AUSA that recording is legal and no

entrapment issues exist. Document same on an FD-320 (for CW's obtain • the authority prior to opening and gain concurrence for the duration of the a investigation)

• 3. Draft FD-759 (now a macro) and forward to ASAC for authority. In the event that consensual recording needs to take place immediately contact SSA and ask that he/she call the ASAC for verbal authority. Once verbal

• authority is granted, document same on the original FD-759. 4. Two Agents or an Agent and a TFO/TFA must be present during the

ID recording.

5. Record a preamble on the tape/digital recording device-F-bird, Eagle- a (date, time, witnesses, number called and name of the subject being a recorded)

ID 6. Record a post amble at the conclusion (time recording ended, etc) 7. Label the tape at the conclusion. If using a digital recording device

ID download the recording onto a CD-ROM. II 8. Must submit tape and/or CD-ROM to ELSUR within 10 days. Use the

a FD-504 evidence envelope (1D evidence), fill it out and submit it to your ELSUR contact. If a CW is a recorded party, use his/her true name on the

ID subject intercepted line along with the intended interceptee. a 9. Document the consensual recording on an FD-302. The FD-302 will

a essentially be your debrief of the CW following the recording (brief,

a include the pertinent content; who, when, where, what was discussed), document that the call was a consensual recording and the tape/CD-ROM

• submitted into evidence. Remember that the tape/CD-ROM is the ID evidence and the transcript is your guide for the jury to follow the

ID conversation word for word.

a D. Taping of Interviews and/or Confessions: Approval to tape interviews and or ID confessions may be granted by the ASAC. If taping will be done without the

a consent of the interviewed party, authorization must be documented on an FD-759,

a with the interviewing agent being the consenting party.

E. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV): All consensual CCTV authorization (FD- 759) will be approved by the ASAC. Follow the procedure listed above in #2 and #3 for handling the evidence and documenting the recording.

• F. Public Area Viewing/Pole Cameras: Authorization (FD-677) in which a court order is not required will be approved by the SAC or the Acting SAC.

a 1. An FD-871 must be submitted for the assignment of a Technically Trained

ID UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 55

a •

ACLURM005543

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

D.

E.

F.


Consensual monito~ing outside of your division may be conducted only after prior notification to and concurrence obtained from the SAC of each division where monitoring will occur. You must document the concurrence. An AUSA advisement that the monitoring is legal and appropriate is necessary only in the judicial district which encompasses the office of origin of the investigative case.

1. Consenting party must sign FD-473 . 2. Obtain conCUrrence from your AUSA that recording is legal and no

entrapment issues exist. Document same on an FD-320 (for CW's obtain the authority prior to opening and gain conCUrrence for the duration of the investigation) .

3. Draft FD-759 (now a macro) and forward to ASAC for authority. In the event that consensual recording needs to take place immediately contact SSA and ask that he/she call the ASAC for verbal authority. Once verbal authority is granted, document same on the original FD-759.

4. Two Agents or an Agent and a TForrFA must be present during the recording.

5. Record a preamble on the tape/digital recording device-F-bird, Eagle(date, time, witnesses, number called and name of the subject being recorded)

6. Record a post amble at the conclusion (time recording ended, etc) 7. Label the tape at the conclusion. If using a digital recording device

download the recording onto a CD-ROM. 8. Must submit tape andlor CD-ROM to ELSUR within 10 days. Use the

FD-504 evidence envelope (lD evidence), fill it out and submit it to your ELSUR contact. If a CW is a recorded party, use hislher true name on the subject intercepted line along with the intended interceptee.

9. Document the consensual recording on an FD-302. The FD-302 will essentially be your debrief of the CW following the recording (brief, include the pertinent content; who, when, where, what was discussed), dQcument that the call was a consensual recording and the tape/CD-ROM submitted into evidence. Remember that the tape/CD-ROM is the evidence and the transcript is your guide for the jury to follow the conversation word for word.

Taping of Interviews and/or Confessions: Approval to tape interviews and or confessions may be granted by the ASAC. If taping will be done without the consent of the interviewed party, authorization must be documented on an FD-759, with the interviewing agent being the consenting party.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV): All consensual CCTV authorization (FD-759) will be approved by the ASAC. Follow the procedure listed above in #2 and #3 for handling the evidence and documenting the recording.

Public Area ViewingIPole Cameras: Authorization (FD-677) in which a court order is not required will be approved by the SAC or the Acting SAC.

1. An FD-871 must be submitted for the assignment of a Technically Trained

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFEICIAL USE ONLY 55


Agent. See your contact list or JTTF Coordinator regarding these submissions. After you complete the request, the form will automatically be generated and forwarded the tech agents so they can make their preparations. Route the original to the CDC and SAC for signature (noted on the bottom of the FD-871). Retain a copy for your file.

2. Do a site survey for the Tech Agents. Relay any safety issues and counter-surveillance concerns associated with your subject.

G. Group II UCO: Will be reviewed by the Division Undercover Review Committee and signed by the Division UC Coordinator, CDC, and the appropriate ASAC prior to submission to the SAC for approval.

H. Group I UCO: Will be reviewed by the Divisions Undercover Review Committee and submitted to the SAC with recommended action (Group I UCOs submitted to the SAC should include U.S. Attorney approval letter)

I. Purchase of Drug Evidence: Approval granted by the ASAC via EC. 1. Fill out FD-794 requesting "drug purchase funds" and forward with

approval EC. 2.

b7E

• • • • a

• a • • • • a a a a • a • • • • • • • a a a a a a a a a a • a a

3.

Document this in your FD-302--In ad= Document this in your FD-

302). Following the transaction, the receipt must be returned and filed (consult your JTTF Coordinator or SSA for division-specific procedures). Keep a copy of the receipt for your records.

J. Administrative Subpoenas (Title 21 Investigations ONLY--Drug Cases): Authority to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses, and require records production relevant to controlled substance investigations may be granted by your SSRA, OC/DP SSA, or ASAC.

K. Mail Cover: Approval is with the SAC or in his/her absence, the Acting SAC. (Review Ponies for Mail Cover)

L. Pen Registers/Trap and Trace: Approval granted by the ASAC (Court order or consent of user is required).

1. Identify the subscriber prior to seeking approval (if possible) via Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) Subpoena, Administrative Subpoena or National Security Letter (NSL).

2. Draft Approval EC (See pony) 3. Tech Request FD-871, follow procedure in #6, sub a


ACLURM005544

• • • • • • • • • • 1\: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

G.

H.

1.

J.

K.

L.


Agent. See your contact list or JTTF Coordinator regarding these submissions. After you complete the request, the form will automatically be generated and forwarded the tech agents so they can make their preparations. Route the original to the CDC and SAC for signature (noted on the bottom of the FD-871). Retain a copy for your file.

2. Do a site survey for the Tech Agents. Relay any safety issues and counter-surveillance concerns associated with your sUbject.

Group II UCO: Will be reviewed by the Division Undercover Review Committee and Signed by the Division UC Coordinator, CDC, and the appropriate ASAC prior to submission to the SAC for approval.

Group I UCO: Will be reviewed by the Divisions Undercover Review Committee and submitted to the SAC with reconunended action (Group I UCOs submitted to the SAC should inClude U.S. Attorney approval letter)

Purchase of Drug Evidence: Approval granted by the ASAC via Ee. 1. Fill out FD-794 requesting "drug purchase funds" and forward with

a rovalEC. 2.

r....".=-----------------' Document this in your FD-302).

3. Following the transaction, the receipt must be returned and filed (consult your JTTF Coordinator or SSA for division-specific procedures). Keep a copy of the receipt for your records.

Administrative Subpoenas (Title 21 Investigations ONLY--Drug Cases): Authority to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses, and require records production relevant to controlled substance investigations may be granted by your SSRA, OCIDP SSA, or ASAC.

Mail Cover: Approval is with the SAC or in hislher absence, the Acting SAC. (Review Ponies for Mail Cover)

Pen Registers/Trap and Trace: Approval granted by the ASAC (Court order or consent of user is required).

1. Identify the subscriber prior to seeking approval (if possible) via Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) Subpoena, Administrative Subpoena or National Security Letter (NSL).

2. Draft Approval EC (See pony) 3. Tech Request FD-871, follow procedure in #6, sub a


b7E

ID


• 4. Draft Application and Order (See pony). Allow AUSA to review, have

0 Orders signed by Magistrate Judge. File with the Clerk of Courts 5. Copy to substantive case sub-file (will be opened by your rotor). ID 6. Copy to Tech Agent--will be faxed to service provider

0 7. Additional copies, as applicable, along with a signed copy of approval EC.

ii The appropriate personnel receiving these copies should upload your call

ID data into Telephone Applications and send you a hard copy of the pen raw data.

• 8. Open a sub-file for your raw data. Name it "Rawdata 1", or something ID along those lines.

9. 1 I

IM ak e sure the data is captured by your pen . 1

register and document same in an FD-302.

M. Title III Electronic Surveillance (Non-Sensitive): Approval will be granted by the SAC (via EC) or in his/her absence, the Acting SAC. The authority cannot be delegated lower that an ASAC serving as Acting SAC.

1. Pen Register(s) should be up and running unless you are requesting emergency authority. Analyze the raw data routinely; use the

information to identify individuals possibly involved in the specified illegal activity.

2. Before you draft an Affidavit, make sure that you have exhausted all other investigative techniques and have specific examples of why a Title Ill is the only technique that will meet your investigative goals. Make a copy of an FD-699 (Title IlI Checklist)

3. Draft EC seeking approval from your SAC (See pony). 4. Draft Affidavit (See pony). Make sure that your AUSA is on board and

• the United States Attorney's Office supports the technique.

5. Tech Request (FD-871). Follow the same procedure for getting the request form to the Tech Agent..

6. EC requesting Pre Title III ELSUR checks (See pony). Make sure that all target telephone numbers, target subscriber addresses, ESN'S, etc., as well as Named Interceptees are checked through the databases. Remember that the ELSUR checks are only good for 45 days. Do not do them too early in the process and do not do them to late, DEA and BICE have a 5 day window to conduct the searches.

7. When your Affidavit is complete, provide a copy to your SSA, the CDC and your AUSA for review. Make appropriate changes, additions and/or , deletions as needed to your Affidavit. The AUSA will draft the Application and Order (send copies of the drafts to your CDC, for ELSUR

ID. purposes). 8. When the Affidavit, Application, and Order have been reviewed and

approved by the CDC and AUSA, they will be forwarded to 0E0 for the next approval. When approved, an Action Memo will be drafted and approval granted. Make sure your Tech Agent knows where you are in the


57

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ACLURM005545

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M.

4.


Draft Application and Order (See pony). Allow AUSA to review, have Orders signed by Magistrate Judge. File with the Clerk of Courts Copy to substantive case sub-file (will be opened by your rotor). 5.

6. 7.

Copy to Tech Agent--will be faxed to service provider Additional copies, as applicable, along with a signed copy of approval EC. The appropriate personnel receiving these copies should upload your call data into Telephone Applications and send you a hard copy of the pen raw data.

8. Open a sub-file for your raw data. Name it "Rawdata 1", Or something along those ljnes

9. I . . I I IMake sure the data is captured by your pen

register and document same in an FD-302.

Title III Electronic Surveillance (Non-Sensitive): Approval will be granted by the SAC (via EC) or in hislher absence, the Acting SAC. The authority cannot be delegated lower that an ASAC serving as Acting SAC.

1. Pen Register(s) should be up and running unless you are requesting emergency authority. Analyze the raw data routinely; use the

information to identify individuals possibly involved in the specified illegal activity. .

2. Before you draft an Affidavit, make sure that you have exhausted all other investigative techniques and have specific examples of why a Title ill is the only technique that will meet your investigative goals. Make a copy of an FD-699 (Title ill Checklist)

3. Draft EC seeking approval from your SAC (See pony). 4. Draft Affidavit (See pony). Make sure that your AUSA is on board and

the United States Attorney's Office supports the technique. 5. Tech Request (FD-871). Follow the same procedure for getting the

request form to the Tech Agent.. . 6. EC requesting Pre Title ill ELSUR checks (See pony). Make sure that all

target telephone numbers, target subscriber addresses, ESN'S, etc., as well as Named Interceptees are checked through the databases. Remember that the ELSUR checks are only good for 45 days. Do not do them too early in the process and do not do them to late, DEA and BICE have a 5 day window to conduct the searches.

7. When your Affidavit is complete, provide a copy to your SSA, the CDC and your AUSA for review. Make appropriate changes, additions andlor. deletions as needed to your Affidavit. The AUSA will draft the Application and Order (send copies of the drafts to your CDC, for ELSUR purposes) .

8. When the Affidavit, Application, and Order have been reviewed and approved by the CDC and AUSA, they will be forwarded to OEO for the next approval. When approved, an Action Memo will be drafted and approval granted. Make sure your Tech Agent knows where you are in the


b7E


process and the appropriate equipment has been installed before you have the Order signed by the Judge.

9. Draft an EC requesting that appropriate subfiles are opened.

a. -ELA---ELSUR Administrative b. EL1----ELSUR Original Log c. EL1A--ELSUR Copies of Log d. EL1B--ELSUR Transcripts

10. AUSA will draft Minimization Instructions. Set up a meeting with all monitors, AUSA, SSRA/SSA, and Case Agent. Everyone must read the Affidavit, Application and Order. Go over minimization instructions and everyone will sign a copy of a log documenting same.

11. Application, Order, Affidavit to Federal-Judge for signature. Make sure copies make their way to the substantive file, Tech Agents, ELSUR, etc.

12. Seal tapes/CD's at the conclusion of Title DI AUSA will draft a Sealing Order and you, the AUSA, and the original tapes/CDs will go to the Judge for sealing of the evidence. Make sure the original evidence is submitted to ELSUR within 10 days. Make sure a copy of the Sealing Order makes its way to the appropriate sub-file.

N. Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas: Open a case predicated upon allegations of criminal activity. Fill in a FGJ request form (See Pony) and forward to your AUSA or his/her secretary.

1. Sign your 6e letter (drafted by the USAO) and return. Maintain a copy for your records.

2. Serve the subpoena. Fill out the back of the subpoena that is to returned to the USA() and get it there. Maintain a copy for your file (GJ subfile in your case--will be opened by your rotor).

3. Pick up the requested documents and/or information and document the receipt via FD-302.

4. Make your returns through the USAO. 5. If the records will be reviewed by other TFOs, TFA, or Agents, make sure

that everyone has signed a 6e letter. Send the original to the USA() and copies of the letters to your GJ sub-file.

6. Some service providers will accept FGJ Subpoenas via fax. If not, set a lead for the appropriate division to serve the subpoena.

National Neenritv T,ettgar.i

1. Draft NSL and EC through (Acting SAC cannot sign an NSL).

b7E

2. Populate pertinent Storm information t SL. 3 EC and NSL will be automatically generated b d routed to

your SSA, ASAC, CDC, and SAC for review and approval.. 4. Type an FD-542 claiming statistical accomplishments for drafting and

approval of NSL.


011

11•1

10

116

011

1111

118

11S

OM

OS

SO

1111

1101

1118

1111-

118S

OO

SS

110

1111

0

l Approval authority granted by SAC

ACLURM005546

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N.

O.

UNCLASSIFlEDllFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

process and the appropriate equipment has been installed before you have the Order signed by the Judge.

9. Draft an EC requesting that appropriate subfiles are ope.ned.

a. . ELA---ELSUR Administrative b. ELl----ELSUR Original Log c. ELlA--ELSUR Copies of Log d. ELlB~-ELSUR Transcripts

10. AUSA will draft Minimization Instructions. Set up a meeting with all monitors, AUSA, SSRAISSA, and Case Agent. Everyone must read the Affidavit, Application and Order. Go over minimization instructions and everyone will sign a copy of a log documenting same.

11. Application, Order, Mfidavit to Federal.Judge for signature. Make sure copies make their way to the substantive file, Tech Agents, ELSUR, etc.

12. Seal tapes/CD's at the conclusion of Title m. AUSA will draft a Sealing Order and you, the AUSA, and the original tapes/CDs will go to the Judge for sealing of the evidence. Make sure the original evidence is submitted to ELSUR within 10 days. Make sure a copy of the Sealing Order makes its way to the appropriate sub-file.

Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas: Open a case predicated upon allegations of criminal activity. Fill in a FGJ request form (See Pony) and forward to your AUSA or hislher secretary. .

1. Sign your 6e letter (drafted by the USAO) and return. Maintain a copy for your records. .

2. Serve the SUbpoena. Fill out the back of the subpoena that is to returned to the USAO and get it there. Maintain a copy for your file (GJ subfile in your case--will be opened by your rotor).

3. Pick up the requested documents and/or information and document the receipt via FD-302.

4. Make your returns through the USAO. 5. If the records will be reviewed by other TFOs. TFA, or Agents, make sure

" that everyone has signed a 6e letter. Send the original to the USAO and copies of the letters to your GJ sub-file.

6. Some service providers will accept FGJ Subpoenas via fax. If not, set a lead for the appropriate division to serve the subpoena.

Natjonal Securjty letter"

IL." -:-:--:-:----;~:::---~-::--___;_=_;__-..... I Approval authority granted by SAC

2. Populate pertinen orm m orma on .'jA~"'-~ 3. EC and NSL will be automatically generated b d routed to

your SSA, ASAC, CDC, and SAC for review and approval .. 4. Type an FD-S42 claiming statistical accomplishments for drafting and

approval of NSL.

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P. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) procedures: Download a FISA Request Form from the OGC/1-1SA Unit webpage in FBInet (business records, Pen Register/Trap and Trace, Full FISA). The request form must be downloaded and completed. (Tel

1. Initiate the FISA process through th4 'During this process, you may expect the following tasks:

a. b. c. d. e.

*Expect a two or more month lead-time in the completion of these steps.

THE FBI FISA PROCESS: FFI INITIATION APPLICATION PACKAGE FISC REVIEW HEARING COURT ORDER

2. When the Application and Order make it through the gauntlet, fill out a Woods Form. When the appropriate checks have been conducted secure fax the document to FBIHQ.

*In addition to the existing "Sub FISA" created for each investigation, a sub-file containing the materials relied upon to verify the items on the "Woods" checklist must also be created and maintained by the case agent. This sub-file must be created for each FISA application submitted and named "Sub Woods Checks". It will contain the results of all material relied upon in the "Woods" verification procedures.

**Application prepared by OIPR and signed by the AG **Declaration sworn to by FBI agent from FBIHQ substantive unit **Certification signed by the FBI Director. **Electronic surveillance order **Supplemental order to service provider **Supplemental minimization procedures (rare)


5.

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ACLURM005547

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

P.


r

5.

6.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) procedures: Download a FISA Request Form from the OGCIFISA Unit webpage in FBlnet (business records, Pen Registerffrap and. Trace Full FISA . The re uest form must be downloaded and comoleted. (Nrte: I . ~------------------------~

1. Initiate the FISA process through the!L.. _____ ....IIDuring this process, you rna ex eet .

a. b. c. d. e.

*Expect a two or more month lead-time in the completion of these steps. \ .

THE FBI FISA PROCESS: FFI INITIATION APPLICATION PACKAGE FISC REVIEW HEARING COURT ORDER

2. When the Application and Order make it through the gauntlet, fill out a Woods Form. When the appropriate checks have been conducted secure fax the document to FBIHQ.

*In addition to the existing "Sub FISA" created for each investigation, a sub-file containing the materials relied upon to verify the items on the "Woods" checklist must also be created and maintained by the.case agent. This sub-file must be created for each FISA application submitted and named "Sub Woods Checks". It will contain the results of all material relied upon in the "Woods" verification procedures.

**Application prepared by OIPR and signed by the AG **Declaration sworn to by FBI agent from FBIHQ substantive unit **Certification signed by the FBI Director. **Electronic surveillance order **Supplemental order to service provider **Supplemental minimization procedures (rare)


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3. 1-BIHQ will usually send supplemental orders to the division where the service provider is located. Make sure that copies make it to the substantive file and your Tech Agent. The Tech Agent should ensure that the appropriate personnel get an unclassified document requesting that they upload the raw data into Telephone Applications.

4. Open a subfile for your pen register raw data (See the Pen Register summary).

a. FISA RENEWAL REQUESTS i) Draft a request form, type in the Docket Number from your

original order and check the renewal box. Provide information that you have developed during the 90 days of operating (PRTT analysis, surveillance, etc) in the body.

ii) The signature authority needed for the FISA Request Form.

iii) Upload your request into the FISA Management System on the Intranet.


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a a S a S a a a• •

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ACLURM005548

• • • • • • • • • • I~.: '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

3,

4.


FBllIQ will usually send supplemental orders to the division where the' service provider is located. Make sure that copies make it to the substantive file and your Tech Agent. The Tech Agent should ensure that the appropriate personnel get an unclassified document requesting that they upload the raw data into Telephone Applications.

Open a subfile for your pen register raw data (See the Pen Register summary).

a. FISA RENEWAL REQUESTS i) Draft a request form, type in the Docket Number from your

original order and check the renewal box. Provide information that you have developed during the 90 days of operating (pRIT analysis, surveillance, etc) in the body.

ii) The signature authority needed for the,FISA Request Form.

iii) Upload your request into the FISA Management System on the Intranet.


o

S S S

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S • S S S S S S S S S

ACLURM005549

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .' • • • • • • • • •

7

Department of Slate

oN Central IntelOgences

Agency • Defense Intelligence

Agency

An

:Cit,:no.rtiTont

rpepoement pith° Ir Treasury

• ' fcckessi knew of

nvensfeation

Director of Central

Intelligent* (DCI) . .

DOCl/ naknol Community !mergence

Monager Coma rhea

Intelligence

Mtn7 Infelliganas

/Nizeonol / rmagner

/ond nieppmg Agcncy

'" Naaenci cconnaissonce

Offko

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Ir

Ah Force lenslagence

Marino Coeps

Intol4gonto O

UNCLASSIFIED/5'0R OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Intelligence Community

c.,tepeedentAgeek,

PURPOSE

As a result of 09/11/2001, the FBI has massively intensified its intelligence dissemination effort. The FBI has historically limited its intelligence sharing through established Intelligence Information Reporting channels normally used by the 15-member United States Intelligence Community (USIC). As the leading domestic criminal, counterintelligence and counterterrorism agency, the FBI has adapted its reporting to facilitate the rapid dissemination of its raw intelligence. The Intelligence Information Report (IIR) is the primary vehicle for this dissemination.

The IIR is the standard through which all "raw" or unevaluated intelligence information is shared with national policy makers, the USIC and law enforcement community in support of national intelligence priorities and the needs of law enforcement consumers. These reports are primarily used by analysts and agents, along with other available sources, to identify threats or trends, and produce finished intelligence products for consumers. As a result of this reporting and eventual analysis, national strategies and action may be affected.

A significant benefit to analysts and agents using the IIR as a dissemination tool is the ability to protect the source of the information while providing essential raw intelligence. This information sharing will also enhance the FBI's collection efforts and support the war on terrorism in accordance with national directives:


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ACLURM005550

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Intelligence Community

PURPOSE

As a result of 09/1112001, the FBI has massively intensified its intelligence dissemination effort. The FBI has historically limited its intelligence sharing through established Intelligence Information Reporting channels normally used by the IS-member United States Intelligence Community (USIC). As the leading domestic criminal, counterintelligence and counterterrorism agency, the FBI has adapted its reporting to facilitate the rapid dissemination of its raw intelligence. The Intelligence Information Report (IIR) is the primary vehicle for this dissemination.

The IIR is the standard through which all"raw" or unevaluated intelligence information is shared with national policy makers, the USIC and law enforcement community in support of national intelligence priorities and the needs of law enforcement consumers. These reports are primarily used by analysts and agents, along with other available sources, to identify threats or trends, and produce finished intelligence products for consumers. As a result of this reporting and eventual analysis, national strategies and action may be affected.

A significant benefit to analysts and agents using the IIR as a dissemination tool is the ability to protect the source of the information while providing essential raw intelligence. This infonnation sharing will also enhance the FBI's collection efforts and support the war on terrorism in accordance with national directives:

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USEONL Y 61

• • • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • • It is the responsibility of the FBI. to share terrorism intelligence and it is • • Act, the Homeland mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, the USA Patriot

• Security Act of 2002, and the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security • Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection. • Historically, counterintelligence and counterterrorism asset reporting primarily • fueled the IIR process. However, criminal and cyber source reporting is now being • incorporated to broadly share information across all FBI investigative program lines. • Intelligence harvested through investigative techniques such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Title III overhears, consensual monitoring, physical • surveillance, as well as other sophisticated techniques, can also be the basis for raw • intelligence disseminated through IIRs. •

Intelligence collection is the responsibility of all personnel who investigate or • support investigations. These include agents, task force members, language specialists, • -Intelligence Analysts (IA's), financial analysts and surveillance group members. To • facilitate the IIR process, these personnel must become familiar with the National Humint • Collection Directives (NHCD's) and the FBI's Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR's) pertinent to the programs and countries they are working. The NHCD's list the • exact issues of interest to. the USIC and establish parameters for positive or foreign • intelligence reporting. The ICR's focus the FBI's intelligence collection efforts and fill • intelligence gaps. The aforementioned investigative personnel must be vigilant and identify relevant intelligence derived from asset reporting, intercepts, surveillance • observations and information uncovered from other sophisticated technique collection • platforms. •

Task force members who produce IIRs based on information available to them • through their task force assignment should follow the below protocol to process their IIRs. • These IIRs need to go through FBI channels with a notation made on the administrative • "tickler" page giving the task force member and their respective agency credit. • Additionally, task force members should coordinate with their agency to ensure their efforts are credited within their organization. •

•

Ynur • • • • To further facilitate the timely entry and dissemination of information deemed • • suitable for IIR dissemination, Senior Reports Officer positions have been established

within field offices. These Intelligence Analysts have the capability to bypass approving • officials at HQ and directly disseminate timely IIRs. All agents or Task Force • • • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .62

ACLURM005551

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I. • • • • • • • • • '. •


It is the responsibility of the FBI to share terrorism intelligence and it is mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, the USA Patriot Act, the Homeland

Security Act of 2002, and the Attorney General's Guidelines for FB1 National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection.

r Historically, counterintelligence and counterterrorism asset reporting primarily fueled the IIR process. However, criminal and cyber source reporting is now being incorporated to broadly share information across all FBI investigative program lines. Intelligence harvested through investigative techniques such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Title III overhears, consensual monitoring, physical

. surveillance, as well as other sophisticated techniques, can also be the basis for raw intelligence disseminated through IIRs.

Intelligence collection is the responsibility of all personnel who investigate or support investigations. These include agents, task force members, language specialists, -Intelligence Analysts (lA's), financial analysts and surveillance group members. To facilitate the IIR process, these personnel must become familiar with the National Humint Collection Directives (NHCD's) and the FBI's Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR's) pertinent to the programs and countries they are working. The NHCD's list the exact issues of interest to. the USIC and establish parameters for positive or foreign intelligence reporting. The ICR's focus the FBI's intelligence collection efforts and fill intelligence gaps. The aforementioned investigative personnel must be vigilant and identify relevant intelligence derived from asset reporting, intercepts, surveillance observations and information uncovered from other sophisticated technique collection platforms.

Task force members who produce IIRs based on information available to them through their task force assignment should follow the below protocol to process their IIRs. These IIRs need to go through FBI channels with a notation made on the administrative "tickler" page giving the task force member and their respective agency credit. Additionally, task force members should coordinate with their agency to ensure their efforts are credited within their organization.

To further facilitate the timely entry and dissemination of information deemed suitable for IIR dissemination, Senior Reports Officer positions have been established within field offices. These Intelligence Analysts have the capability to bypass approving officials at HQ and directly disseminate timely IIRs. All agents or Task Force

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .62

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lb

ID


Officers identifying information suitable for IIR dissemination should follow the below listed protocol.

PROTOCOL

13,1 1. All agents should review every document 1 roduce for intelligence value and consider submitting the information to the for review.

2. All agents should forward documents (E -71s, FD 302s, FD 542s) they believe have IIR potential to their divisio4 r JTTF IA.

3. The IIR Manager or thl .upervisor must be contacted by phone if the data contains specific threat information which must be reported within two hours (IMMEDIATE IIR). If the information contains specific threat data, both the reporting agent and their supervisor must remain available until the report has been received at FBIHQ and then either published or rejected by FBIHQ.

4. While theIjwill prepare IIRs, assessments and bulletins using the intelligence you provide, each agent and supervisor is still responsible for preparing Urgent Reports (if necessary) and contacting other divisions, squads, Legats, or agencies to alert appropriate personnel regarding the information.

5. The IIR Manager will review the HR material and determine which program it addresses (CT, FCI, CRIM, or Cyber). The IIR will then be assigned to an Intelligence Analyst (IA) for action in accordance with division protocols.

6. The. IA will draft an IIR on-line, using the FBI Intelligence Information Report Dissemination System (FIDs) and examine the IIR for content, format, and

ID compliance with FBIHQ procedures. The IA will also redact names of US Persons, ensure sources and methods are protected, and correlate the reported

ID information with the FBI's Intelligence Requirements.

• 7. The IA will e-mail a PDF version of the Draft IIR to the agent and the squad supervisor, with the following message:

ID "Attached is your draft IIR for review and approval."

ID 8. As part of the review and approval process, it is the agent's responsibility to: a. Ensure that information in the IIR will not jeopardize any sources or

methods or adversely affect an ongoing case. b. Have his supervisor review and approve the IIR, or recommend changes.

ID 9. The agent can either accept the draft or request changes. Any changes to the IIR must be coordinated with the squad supervisor. Corrections should be addressed


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ACLURM005552

• • • • • • • • • • • I)· • • • • • • • '. • '. • • • • • I. • • • I. • • • • • • • • • • • •


Officers identifying information suitable for IIR dissemination should follow the below listed protocol.

PROTOCOL

1. All agents should review every document ~roducefor intelligence value and· consider submitting th~ information to the LJfor review.

2. All agents should forward documents (E<fs-E11-71s, FD 302s, FD 542s) they believe have IIR potential to their divisi0rL...Pr JTTF IA.

3. The IIR Manager or thLJupervisor must be contacted by phone if the data contains specific threat information which must be reported within two hours (IMMEDIATE IIR). If the information contains specific threat data, both the reporting agent and their supervisor must remain available until the report has been received at FBIHQ and then either published or rejected by FBIHQ.

4. While thUm prepare IIRs, assessments and bulletins using the intelligence you provide, each agent and supervisor is still responsible for preparing Urgent Reports (if necessary) and contacting other divisions, squads, Legats, or agencies to alert appropriate persorinel regarding the information;

5. The IIR Manager will review the IIR material and determine which program it addresses (CT, FCI, CRIM, or Cyber). The IIR will then be assigned to an Intelligence Analyst(IA) for action in accordance with division protocols.

6. The IA will draft an IIR on-line, using the FBI Intelligence Information Report Dissemination System (FIDs) and examine the IIR for content, format, and compliance with FBIHQ procedures. The IA will also redact names of US Persons, ensure sources and methods are protected, and correlate the reported information with the FBI's !ntelligence Requirements.

7. The IA will e-mail a PDF version of the Draft IIR to the agent and the squad supervisor, with the following message:

"Attached is your draft IIR for review and approval." .

8. As part of the review and approval process, it is the agent's responsibility to: a. Ensure that information in the IIR will not jeopardize any sources or

methods or adversely affect an ongoing case. b. Have his supervisor review and approve the IIR, or recommend changes.

9. The agent can either accept the draft or request changes~ Any changes to the IIR must be coordinated with the squad supervisor. Corrections should be addressed


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in an e-mail format to the IA. If no corrections are needed, paragraph 11 applies.

10. If corrections are requested, the IA will make the corrections and e-mail a

ID corrected copy of the IIR to the agent and supervisor for approval.

lb 11. The agent and squad supervisor should e-mail the IA once the IIR is approved. An IIR will not be submitted to FBIHQ without the agent's and supervisor's approval. In exigent circumstances, verbal approvals are acceptable, but must be followed up with a confirmation e-mail.

• 12. Through FIDS, the IA will forward the approved copy to thcl 'supervisor, who b7E

will be the final approval authority in the Division for ROUTINE and PRIORITY IIRs. IMMEDIATE IIRs must be approved by an ASAC.

SI 13. The IIR will then be transmitted to the appropriate FBIHQ component, using FIDS. After forwarding the IIR for approval in FIDS, the IA will e-mail the agent

a the final copy of the IIR, in a text format for uploading into ACS.

14. The agent should then save the renamed text version final IIR to his draft folder.

a 15. The agent will print copies (one copy for each file referenced in the admin portion

of the IIR, and one copy for indexing of the IIR), have his supervisor initial the bottom of the IIR, and forward the IIR to his SST for uploading.

16. If an IIR was produced with information provided by a source or asset, one copy of the IIR should be blind copied to the source or asset main file only, not the sub-

.. A. A copy of the IIR should also be e-mailed to either the blue or green file.

17. The agent should claim a Statistical Accomplishment using the FD-542, and FD-209 if the information within the IIR was obtained by a Source.

lb * * * Further guidance on the production and dissemination of IIRs can be found by

• searching the Directorate of Intelligence—> Domain and Collection Management Branch—* Reports Section on FBInet, or by consulting your FIG.

a *If an agent elects to disseminate a hard copy of the IIR to a local agency with

• appropriate clearance, the administrative section of the IIR must be removed.

• a • a • •

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • 64

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a

ACLURM005553

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in an e-maiTfo~~t to the IA. If no corrections are needed, paragraph 11 applies.

10. If corrections are requested, the IA will make the corrections and e-mail a corrected copy of t.he IIR to the agent and supervisor for approval.

11. The agent and squad supervisor should e-mail the IA once the IIR is approved. An IIR will not be submitted to FBIHQ without the agent's and supervisor's approval. In exigent circumstances, verbal approvals are acceptable, but must be followed up with a confirmation e-mail.

12. Through FIDS, the IA will forward the approved copy to thDsupervisor, who will be the final approval authority in the Division for ROUTINE and PRIORITY IIRs. IMMEDIATE IIRs must be approved by an ASAC.

13. The IIR will then be transmitted to the appropriate FBIHQ component, using FIDS. After forwarding the IIR for approval in FIDS, the IA will e-mail the agent the final copy of the IIR, in a text format for uploading into ACS.

14. The agent should then save the renamed text version final IIR to his draft folder.

15. The agent will print copies (one copy for each file referenced in the admin portion of the HR, and one copy for indexing of the IIR), have his supervisor initial the bottom of the IIR, and forward the IIR to his SST for uploading.

16. If an IIR was produced with information provided by a source or asset, one copy of the IIR should be blind copied to the source or asset main file only, not the subA. A copy of the IIR should also be e~mailed to either the blue or green file.

17. The agent should claim a Statistical Accomplishment using the FD-542, and FD-209 if the information within the IIR was obtained by a Source.

*** Further guidance on the production and dissemination ofIIRs can be found by searching the Directorate oflntelligence~ Domain and Collection Management Branch~ Reports Section on FBInet, or by consulting your FIG.

*If an agent elects to disseminate a hard copy of the IIR to a local agency with appropriate clearance, the administrative section of the IIR must be removed.

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY' 64

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ACLURM005554

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8


PONIES, FORMS, and EXTRAS

• The Following 'Ponies' and 'Resources' are lists of documents you may need in the course of your duties. Field Division-specific ponies may be found on your office's share drive. You can also search for particular ponies at:

ID • Production Services Unit (PSU)- Includes guidance on understanding and producing intelligence products. http://homeibinet.fbi/NSB/DJJabifips/PSU/Pages/Default.aspx

• International Terrorism Operations Section I (ITOS I)- Includes numerous ponies for the most common CT documents. http://homeibinet.fbi/NSB/CTD/ITOSUPages/OPtemplates.aspx

...or by doing an Intranet search for "ponies".

*IMPORTANT: Please do not alter original Ponies or Resource documents, contained in the common (S:) drive, as this will make them unusable to other personnel. Before making any changes, you must first re-save the document to your personal folder, under a different name.

EC (Electronic Communications):

Preliminary Investigation ➢ Opening Preliminary Investigation ➢ Opening Preliminary Investigation (TEI) ➢ Extension of a Preliminary Investigation ➢ Convert Preliminary Investigation to Full Field Investigation

ID ➢ Closing Preliminary Investigation

Full Field Investigation Opening full Field Investigation

➢ Closing Full Field Investigation ➢ Annual Summary

i Criminal Case

➢ Opening Criminal Case ➢ Closing Criminal Case

Leads ➢ Reporting Lead Covered ➢ Sending Lead Outside Your Division

Evidence ➢ Destruction of Evidence ➢ Explanation for Late Submission of Evidence ➢ Return of Evidence

411 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 65

•

ACLURM005555

• • • • • • • • • • • )1. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


PONIES, FORMS, and EXTRAS

The -Following 'Ponies' and 'Resources' are lists of documents you may need in the course of your duties. Field Division-specific ponies may be found on your office's share drive. You can also search for particular ponies at:

• Production Services Unit (PSU)- Includes guidance on underStanding and producing intelligence products. http://home.tbinet.tbiINSBIDllab/fipsIPSUlPagesIDefault.aspx

• International Terrorism Operations Section I (ITOS I)- Includes immerous ponies for the most common CT documents. http://home.tbinet.tbiINSB/CTD/ITOSlIPages/OPtemplates.aspx

... or by doing an Intranet search for "ponies".

*IMPORTANT: Please do not alter original Ponies or Resource documents, contained in the common (S:) drive, as this will make them unusable to other personnel. Before making any changes, you must first re-save the document to your personal folder, under a different name.

EC (Electronic Communications):

Preliminary Investigation ~ Opening Preliminary Investigation ~ Opening Preliminary Investigation (TEl) ~ Extension of a Preliminary Investigation ~ Convert Preliminary Investigation to Full Field Investigation .~ Closing Preliminary Investigation

Full Field Investigation ~ Opening full Field Investigation ~ Closing Full Field Investigation ~ Annual Summary

Criminal Case ~ Opening Criminal Case ~ Closing Criminal Case

~ Reporting Lead Covered ~ Sending Lead Outside Your Division

Evidence ~ Destruction of Evidence ~ Explanation for Late Submission of Evidence ~ Return of Evidence


• •


• • • Title III • ➢ Title III Approval

➢ Title Ill Authority ➢ Title III-ELSUR Checks

• • Request Assistance

➢ Request CART Assistance • ➢ Request Communication Analysis Unit Assistance • ➢ Request for Information from NSA

➢ Request IRS Information ➢ Request Laboratory Assistance ➢ Request Polygrapher

• Asset • ➢ Approval

➢ Cover • ➢ JTTF-TFO Authorization • ➢ Opening • ➢ Undisclosed Participation

• Miscellaneous • ➢ After Action Report • ➢ Change Title/Case ID • ➢ Mail Cover

➢ Opening a Sub-File

II• ➢ Operational Plans ➢ PRTT Authority

• ➢ Reporting Accident ➢ Sending Documents to the File

• ➢ Source Canvas • ➢ Submitting Letter-Head Memorandum • ➢ Transfer a Case to Another Agent/TFO • ➢ Travel Outside Division

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National Security Letter ➢ Preparation and Approval of a National Security Letter ➢ Serving a National Security Letter

• • • • UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 66

• •

➢ VGTOF Entry • • FD-542:

Surveillance ➢ Request Surveillanc

Conducting Surveillanc

ACLURM005556

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Title ill >- Title ill Approval >- Title ill Authority >- Title ill-ELSUR Checks

Request Assistance >- Request CART Assistance >- Request Communication Analysis Unit Assistance >- Request for Information from NSA >- Request IRS Information >- Request Laboratory Assistance >- Request Polygrapher

>- Approval >- Cover >- ITTF-TFO Authorization >- Opening >- Undisclosed Participation

Miscellaneous

FD-542:

>- After Action Report >- Change Title/Case ID >- Mail Cover >- Opening a Sub-File >- Operational Plans >- PRTT Authority >- Reporting Accident >- Sending Documents to the File >- Source Canvas >- Submitting Letter-Head Memorandum >- Transfer a Case to Another AgentITFO >- Travel Outside Division >- VGTOF Entry

Surveillance >- Request Surveillancq I

>- Conducting Surveill~L.. ___ "'"

National Security Letter >- Preparation and Approval of a National Security Letter >- Serving a National Security Letter


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1111

1111

110

1111

11111

118

SS

OS

IOS

SO

OS

OS

OIM

MO

OS

OM

MO

IIII


Participating in an Event D Participating in Command Post/Major Case/Special Event ➢ Participating as 'a Member of a WMD Working Group/Task Force

Miscellaneous ➢ Dissemination of information ➢ LEA Liaison

FD-302: Miscellaneous

> Receiving Evidence > Receiving Subpoena Results ➢ Conducting Interview ➢ Conducting Surveillance ➢ Conducting Trash Cover ➢ Making an Arrest ➢ Arrest Log

LHM (Letter-Head Memorandum): Asset

> LHM > Notification LHM

Miscellaneous > Annual Summary D IRS Information Request D Opening an Asset D Opening Full/Preliminary Investigation > Request for Access > Request Information > Subpoena Service

NSL (National Security Letter):

Request for Emergency Disclosure of Information ECPA E-mail Subscriber

> ECPA Checklist > E-mail EC > E-mail NSL

ECPA E-mail Transactional Records > ECAP Checklist > Transactional EC > Transactional NSL


ACLURM005557

I .

I-I---• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -• • • • • • • -• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


Participating in an Event ~ Participating in Command Post/Major Case/Special Event ~ Participating as 'a Member of a WMD Working Grouprrask Force

Miscellaneous ~ Dissemination of information ~ LEA Liaison

FD-302:

-

Miscellaneous ~ Receiving Evidence ~ Receiving Subpoena Results ~ Conducting Interview ~ Conducting Surveillance ~ Conducting Trash Cover ~ Making an Arrest ~ ArrestLog

LHM (Letter-Head Memorandum): Asset

~ LHM ~ Notification LHM

Miscellaneous ~ Annual Summary ~ IRS Information Request ~ Opening an Asset ~ Opening FulllPreliminary Investigation ~ Request for Access ~ Request Information ~ Subpoena Service

NSL (National Security Letter):

Request for Emergency Disclosure of Information ECPA E-mail Subscriber

~ ECPA Checklist ~ E-mailEC ~ E-mail NSL

ECPA E-mail Transactional Records ~ ECAP Checklist ~ Transactional EC ~ Transactional NSL


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.111111111111

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ECPA Telephone Subscriber > ECPA Checklist > Subscriber EC ➢ Subscriber NSL

ECPA Toll Billing > ECPA Checklist ➢ Toll EC > Toll NSL

FCRA Consumer Identifying and Financial Institutions Info. ➢ FCRA Checklist > Combination Credit EC > Combination Credit NSL ➢ Experian EC

FCRA Consumer Identifying Information ➢ FCRA Checklist .

> Credit (b) EC > Credit (b) NSL ➢ Experian EC ➢ Experian NSL

FCRA Financial Institutions ➢ FCRA Checklist > Credit (a) EC > Credit (a) NSL > Experian EC > Experian NSL

FCRA Full Credit Report > Credit Report Checklist > Credit Report EC ➢ Credit Report NSL > Credit Report Instruction EC

RFPA Financial Records > RFPA Checklist ➢ Bank EC > Bank NSL

Miscellaneous Forms:

Search Warrant > Search Warrant Cover

UNCLASSll-qh.DHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 68

ACLURM005558

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNCLASSlFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ECPA Telephone Subscriber » ECP A Checklist » Subscriber EC » Subscriber NSL

ECP A Toll Billing » ECP A Checklist » Toll EC » Toll NSL

FCRA Consumer Identifying and Financial Institutions Info. » FCRA Checklist » Combination Credit EC » Combination Credit NSL » Experian EC

FCRA Consumer Identifying Information » FCRA Checklist . » Credit (b) EC » Credit (b) NSL » Experian EC » Experian NSL

FCRA Financial Institutions » FCRA Checklist » Credit (a) EC » Credit (a) NSL » Experian Ee » Experian NSL

FCRA Full Credit Report » Credit Report Checklist » Credit Report EC » Credit Report NSL » Credit Report Instruction EC

RFP A Financial Records » RFPA Checklist » BankEC » BankNSL

Miscellaneous Forms:

Search Warrant » Search Warrant Cover



Search Warrant Affidavit

lb > Search Warrant Application

Seizure Warrant ➢ Seizure Warrant Cover D Seizure Warrant Affidavit D Seizure Warrant Application

Surveillance > SOG Request Form

0 > Surveillance Log

I FISA

FISA Request Form PRTT > FISA Request Form

Title IR ➢ ECTIII Approval ➢ TM Affidavit

• • • •

Miscellaneous ➢ ECPRTT Authority

a ➢ Case Status Form (FD-320) > Case Update Example A Notification of Authority to use Monitoring Equipment (FD-759) A Tax Return Application > Technical Request Form (FD-871) > NCIC Initial Entry (FD-65) ➢ Non-Compulsory Letter ➢ Pen-Trap Application and Order ➢ Urgent Report-Guidelines & Format

I/ > Arrest Plan

41

•

Arrest Warrant > Attestation of Authenticity of Foreign Public Documents a

•

Attestation with Respect to Seized Articles ➢ Certificate of Authenticity of Business Records A Complaint Affidavit A Criminal Complaint > Evidence Description ➢ Evidence Records Access Sign In/Out Log > FD-930/Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (e-form) • FISA Request Form PRTT > FISA Request Form > Investigative Support Specialist Information Request Form ➢ Request for Emergency Disclosure of Information • Room Access Sign In/Out Sheet

0 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 69

0

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a a •

ACLURM005559

• • • • • • • -• • ;. :. ie :. ie

• !. i:. I !. • • • • • • • • • I. e • • • • • e • • • • • • •


~ Search Warrant Affidavit ~ Search Warrant Application

Seizure Warrant ~ Seizure Warrant Cover ~ Seizure Warrant Affidavit ~ Seizure Warrant Application

Surveillance ~ SOG Request Form ~ Surveillance Log

FISA .. ,., .. ~ FISA Request Form PRTT ~ FISA Request Form

Title ill ~ ECTill Approval ~ Till Affidavit

Miscellaneous ~ ECPRTT Authority ~ Case Status Form (FD-320) ~ Case Update Example ~ Notification of Authority to use MOnitoring Equipment (FD-7S9) ~ Tax Return Application ~ Technical Request Form (FD-871) ~ NCIC Initial Entry (FD-65) ~ Non-Compulsory Letter ~ Pen-Trap Application and Order ~ Urgent Report-Guidelines & Format ~ Arrest Plan ~ Arrest Warrant ~ Attestation of Authenticity of Foreign Public Documents ~ Attestation with Respect to Seized Articles ~ Certificate of Authenticity of Business Records ~ Complaint Affidavit ~ Criininal Complaint ~ Evidence Description ~ Evidence Records Access Sign IniOut Log ~ FD-930Niolent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (e-form) ~ FISA Request Form PRTT ~ FISA Request Form ~ Investigative Support Specialist Information Request Form ~ Request for Emergency Disclosure of Information ~ Room Access Sign InI0ut Sheet

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . 69


➢ Translation Request Form (TRF) Woods form •

Subpoenas ➢ Airlines ➢ Automobile Dealerships ➢ Bail Bond companies ➢ Bank ACcount Information ➢ Bank Comprehensive ➢ Bank Financial Records

• ➢ Bank General Records ➢ Casinos ➢ Corporation-Detailed ➢ Corporation General ➢ Credit Bureau ➢ Credit Card Records-Detailed ➢ Credit Card Records ➢ Electronic Records Request-General ➢ Escrow Company ➢ Hotel Records ➢ Insurance Companies ➢ Lawyer Fee Records ➢ Real Estate Broker ➢ Retail Stores • ➢ Securities Broker ➢ Telephone Company-Cellular ➢ Telephone Company-General ➢ Telephone Long Distance Provider ➢ Travel Agency

•

•

• •

•

•

• •

•

• 0 •


•

•

ACLURM005560

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


~ Translation Request Form (IRF) ~ Woods form

Subpoenas ~ Airlines ~ Automobile Dealerships ~ Bail Bond companies .~ Bank AG'count Information ~ Bank Comprehensive ~ Bank Financial Records ~ Bank General Records ~ Casinos ~ Corporation-Detailed

- ~ COrporation General ~ Credit Bureau ~ Credit Card Records-Detailed ~ Credit Card Records ~ Electronic Records Request-General ~ Escrow Company ~ Hotel Records ~ Insurance Companies ~ Lawyer Fee Records ~ Real Estate Broker ~ Retail Stores . ~ Securities Broker ~ Telephone Company-Cellular ~ Telephone Company-General ~ Telephone Long Distance Provider ~ Travel Agency



ED ID • • • a • • a

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TERRORISM STATUTES THAT GRANT INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION TO THE FBI1 A broad, comprehensive list was favored over a more restrictive,

narrow one. It is hoped that such an approach will benefit agents working these matters. 18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 113, 114, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1201, 1363, 2111

CRIMES COMMITTED WITHIN THE SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES

18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 351,1114, & 1751

CRIMES AGAINST SELECTED UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 878,1116, & 1201(a)(4)

CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS

. . 18 U.S.C. § 32 AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE

18 U.S.C. § 33 DESTRUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES OR MOTOR VEHICLES FACILITIES

18 U.S.C. § 35 IMPARTING OR CONVEYING FALSE INFORMATION

18 U.S.C. § 37 VIOLENCE AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS

18 U.S.C. § 43 ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM

18 U.S.C. § 115 CRIMES AGAINST FAMILY MEMBERS OF A FEDERAL OFFICIAL

18 U.S.C. § 175 -178 PROHIBITION WITH RESPECT TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

18 U.S.C. § 229 et seq. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 21012 CIVIL DISORDERS; RIOTS

18 U.S.C. § 2413 CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACIES

18 U.S.C. § 2454 FEDERALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES

18 U.S.C. § 2475 DAMAGE TO RELIGIOUS PROPERTY

18 U.S.C. § 2486 FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES

18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 372 CONSPIRACY

18 U.S.C. § 373 SOLICITATION TO COMMIT A CRIME OF VIOLENCE

The statutes listed are those involving crimes frequently committed by terrorists.

2 Attorney General approval is required to conduct investigations under these violations, see MIOG, Part I, section 157 et seq.

•3 Although a violation of this statute is generally investigated as a civil rights crime, if the group committing the offense does so to intimidate or coerce the government or civilian population in furtherance

4111 of political or social objectives, the violation may be considered an act of terrorism.

• 4 Id.

a • 5 Id.

6 Id

a a UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 71

a • ACLURM005561

• • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


TERRORISM STATUTES THAT GRANT INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION TO THE FBIl A broad, comprehensive list was favored over a more restrictive,

narrow one. It is ho ed that such an approach will benefit agents working these matters. 18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 113, 114, CRIMES COMMITTED WlTHlN THE SPECIAL MARITIME AND 1111, 1112, 1113, 1201, 1363, TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2111 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 351, 1114, & CRIMES AGAINST SELECTED UNITED STATES OFFICIALS 1751 18 U.S.C. §§ 112,878, 1116, & CRIMES AGAINST lNTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS 1201(a)(4) 18 U.S.C. § 32 AIRCRAFf SABOTAGE

..

18 U.S.C. § 33 DESTRUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES OR MOTOR VEHICLES FACILITIES

18 U.S.C. § 35 IMPARTING ORCONVEYING FALSE INFORMATION

18 U.S.C. § 37 VIOLENCE AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS

18 U.S.C. § 43 ANllv:lAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM

18 U.S.C. § 115 CRIMES AGAINST FAMILY MEMBERS OF A FEDERAL OFFICIAL

18 U.S.C. § 175· 178 PROHIBITION WITH RESPECT TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

18 U.S.C. § 229 et seq. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 210l' CIVIL DISORDERS; RIOTS

18 U.S.C. § 241' \

CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACIES \

18 U.S.C. § 2454 FEDERALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES

18 U.S.C. § 247' DAMAGE TO RELIGIOUS PROPERTY

18 U.S.C. § 248fi FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES

18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 372 CONSPIRACY

18 U.S.C. § 373 SOLICITATION TO COMMIT A CRIME OF VIOLENCE

1 The statutes listed are those involving crimes frequently committed by terrorists.

2 Attorney General approval is required to conduct investigations under these violations, see MIOG, Part I, section 157 et seq.

3 Although a violation of this statute is generally investigated as a civil rights crime, if the group committing the offense does so to intimidate or coerce the government or civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives, the violation may be considered an act of terrorism.

4 [d.

5 [d.

6 [d.


OS

OS

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1111

011

11•8

911

•111

•11

0111

1111

1•11

1111•••••••

961

1111

1.9

11 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

18 U.S.C. § 513 SECURIIMS OF THE STATE AND PRIVATE ENTITIES

18 U.S.C. § 514 FICTITIOUS OBLIGATIONS

18 U.S.C. § 6417 EMBEZZLE, STEAL, SELL OR CONVERT PUBLIC MONEY, PROPERTY OR RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

18 U.S.C. § 831 PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING NUCLEAR MATERIALS

18 U.S.C. § 832 PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

18 U.S.C. § 842(p) TEACHING, DEMONSTRATING, OR DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION RELATIVE TO EXPLOSIVES, DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

18 U.S.C. § 8449 EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

18 U.S.C. §§ 872 - 880 EXTORTION AND THREATS

18 U.S.C. §§ 921 - 93010 UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY: FIREARMS

18 U.S.C. §§ 952 - 970 NEUTRALITY

18 U.S.C. § 1001 FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS

18 U.S.C. § 1014 LOAN AND CREDIT APPLICATIONS GENERALLY; RENEWALS AND DISCOUNTS; CROP INSURANCE

18 U.S.C. § 102811 FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

7See e.g., United States v. Alberico 604 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendant was a United States Army Captain, who stole large quantities of plastic explosives from an Army arsenal, sold them to individuals he believed to be criminals, and would use these explosives in acts of terrorism).

This criminal violation was enacted by the Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).

9 Although the FBI has concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms and the Postal Inspection Service under this section, by virtue of Jurisdictional Guidelines - published in the United States Attorney's Bulletin on April 13, 1973 for the FBI, ATF, and Postal Inspection Service which became effective March 1, 1973 (commonly referred to as the April 13, 1973 MOU) - the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals. The FBI also is given primary jurisdiction over several other 844 violations even without a terrorism nexus, e.g., offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States; alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities; and alleged offenses against colleges and universities.

H3 See 20 U.S. Op. OLC 242, Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF SUBTITLE E OF "ITILE 26 OR 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 921-930, June 21, 1996 (finding where the FBI has a reasonable expectation that if an investigation involves a crime of terrorism over which a statute or Presidential Decision Directive 39 [issued June 21, 1995, but has since been superseded by a National Security Presidential Directive] has granted primary responsibility to the'FBI, the FBI's lead role may be extended to cover crimes as to which lead responsibility would otherwise reside elsewhere).

II Under the FRAID Statute (18, USC, § 1028), jurisdiction has been divided by the DOJ between the FBI, U.S. Secret Service or the defrauded or investigating Federal agency, if said agency has civilian criminal investigative authority or a Statutory Inspector General, see MIOG Part I, sections 253-2.3 & 253-2.4 or MOU between FBI and U.S. Secret Service Pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, dated September 15, 1989.


ACLURM005562

i· I. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


18 U.S.C. § 513 SECURITIES OF THE STATE AND PRIVATE ENTITIES

18 U.S.C. § 514 FICTITIOUS OBLIGATIONS

18 U.S.C. § 6417 EMBEZZLE. STEAL. SELL OR CONVERT PUBLIC MONEY, PROPERTY OR RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

18 U.S.C. § 831 PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS lNVOL VING NUCLEAR MATERIALS

18 U.S.C. § 8328 PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

18 U.S.C. § 842(p) TEACHING, DEMONSTRATING, OR DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION RELATIVE TO EXPLOSNES, DESTRUCfNE DEVICES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

18 U.S.C. § 8449 EXPLOSNE MATERIALS

18 U.S.C. §§ 872 - 880 EXTORTION AND THREATS

18 U.S.C. §§ 921 _ 93010 UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY; FIREARMS

18 U.S.C. §§ 952 - 970 NEUTRALITY

18 U.S.c. § 1001 FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS

18 U.S.C. § 1014 LOAN AND CREDIT APPLICATIONS GENERALLY; RENEWALS AND DISCOUNTS; CROP INSURANCE

18 U.S.C. § 102811 FRAUD AND RELATED ACTNITY IN CONNECTION WITH IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

7See e.g., United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315 (lOth Cir. 1979) (defendant was a United States Army Captain, who stole large quantities of plastic explosives from an Army arsenal, sold them to individuals he believed to be crimin~ls, and would use these explosives in acts of terrorism).

8 This criminal violation was enacted by the Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108·458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).

9 Although the FBI has concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms and the Postal Inspection Service under this section, by virtue of Jurisdictional Guidelines· published in the United States Attorney's Bulletin on April 13, 1973 for the FBI. AU, and Postal Inspection Service which became effective March 1, 1973 (commonly referred to as the April 13, 1973 MOU) - the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over aIJ alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals. The FBI also is given primary jurisdiction over several other 844 violations even without a terrorism nexus, e.g., offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased. used, etc., by the United States; aIJeged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities; and alleged offenses against colleges and universities.

10 See 20 U.S. Op. OLC 242. Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. FBI AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF SUBTITLE E OF TITLE 26 OR 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 921-930, June 21, 1996 (finding where the FBI has a reasonable expectation that if an investigation involves a crime of terrorism over which a statute or Presidential Decision Directive 39 [issued June 21, 1995, but has since been superseded by a National Security Presidential Directive] has granted primary responsibility to the'FBI, the FBI's lead role may be extended to cover crimes as to which lead responsibility would otherwise reside elsewhere).

II Under the FRAID Statute (18, USC, § I028),j~risdiction has been divided by the DOJ between the FBI, U.S. Secret Service or the defrauded or investigating Federal agency, if said agency has civilian criminal investigative authority or a Statutory Inspector General, see MlOG Part I, sections 253-2.3 & 253-2.4 Q! MOU between FBI and U.S. Secret Service Pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, dated September 15, 1989.



18 U.S.C. § 102912 FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH ACCESS DEVICES

18 U.S.C. § 103013 FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS

18 U.S.C. § 103814 FALSE INFORMATION AND HOAXES

18 U.S.C. § 1074 FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGING OR DESTROYING ANY BUILDING OR OTHER REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY

18 U.S.C. § 109115 GENOCIDE

18 U.S.C. § 1117 CONSPIRACY TO MURDER

18 U.S.C. § 1119 FOREIGN MURDER OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS

18 U.S.C. § 1201 KIDNAPPING

18 U.S.C. § 120316 ACT FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF HOSTAGE TAKING

18 U.S.C. § 1341 MAIL FRAUD

18 U.S.C. § 1343 FRAUD BY WIRE, RADIO, OR TELEVISION

18 U.S.C. § 1344 BANK FRAUD

18 U.S.C. § 1361 GOVERNMENT PROPERTYOR CONTRACTS

18 U.S.C. § 1362 COMMUNICATION LINES, STATIONS OR SYSTEMS

18 U.S.C. § 1363 BUILDINGS OR PROPERTY WITHIN SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

18 U.S.C. § 1364 INTERFERENCE WITH FOREIGN COMMERCE BY VIOLENCE

18 U.S.C: § 1365 TAMPERING WITH CONSUMER PRODUCTS

18 U.S.C. § 1366 DESTRUCTION OF AN ENERGY FACILITY

18 U.S.C. § 1367 INTERFERENCE WITH THE OPERATION OF A SATELLITE

18 U.S.C. § 1521 RETALIATING AGAINST A FEDERAL RIDGE OR FEDERAL LAW PINTMRCFMFMT (IPPIT'PR RV FAT cP CT ATM np CT ANTIPP Or TTTT P

12 See MOU between FBI and U.S. Secret Service Pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, dated September 15, 1989, or MIOG, Part I, section 258 -1 et seq., for investigative jurisdiction relating to this statute.

13 See MOU between FBI and U.S. Secret Service Pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, dated September 15, 1989, for investigative jurisdiction relating to this statute.

14 This criminal violation was enacted by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).

13 The United States Attorneys' Manual, 9-2.136, Investigative and Prosecutive Policy for International Terrorism Matters (September 1997 Edition), recognizes genocide as an international terrorism offense.

16 See also National Security Presidential Directive - 12, UNITED STATES CITIZENS TAKEN HOSTAGE ABROAD, dated February 18, 2002, which outlines the FBI's responsibilities..


7 3

1111•

11S

SM

0S

SIP

OO

SIM

0S

SS

IS

SIII

IIIIM

00

SS

O0

SS

OO

1111

111

ACLURM005563

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,. • • • • • • • • • • • • •


18 U.S.C. § 102912 FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH ACCESS DEVICES

18 U.s.C. § 10301~ FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS

18 U.S.C. § 1038" FALSE INFORMATION AND HOAXES

18 U.S.C. § 1074 FLIGHT TO A VOID PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGING OR DESTROYING ANY BUILDING OR OTHER REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY

18 U.S.C. § 109115 GENOCIDE

18 U.S.C. § 1117 CONSPIRACY TO MURDER

18 U.S.C. § 1119 FOREIGN MURDER OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS

18 U.S.C. § 1201 KIDNAPPING

18 U.S.C. § 120316 ACT FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF HOSTAGE TAKING

18 U.S.C. § 1341 MAIL FRAUD

18 U.S.C. § 1343 FRAUD BY WIRE, RADIO, OR TELEVISION

18 U.S.C. § 1344 BANK FRAUD !

18 U;S.C. § 1361 GOVERNMENT PROPERTY'OR CONTRACTS

18 U.S.C. § 1362 COMMUNICATION LINES, STATIONS OR SYSTEMS

18 U.S.C. § 1363 BUILDINGS OR PROPERTY WITHIN SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

. 18U.S.C. § 1364 INTERFERENCE WITH FOREIGN COMMERCE BY VIOLENCE

18 U.S.C, § 1365 TAMPERING WITH CONSUMER PRODUCTS

18 U.S.C. § 1366 DESTRUCTION OF AN ENERGY FACILITY

18 U.S.C. § 1367 INTERFERENCE WITH THE OPERATION OF A SATELLITE

18 U.S.C. § 1521 RETALIATING AGAINST A FEDERAL JUDGE OR FEDERAL LAW ..,.,,..,""' RV ~ I!>. T <::~ rT I!>. Tl\iI ()P <::T I!>. NTYPP ()j:; TITT j:;

12 See MOU between FBI and U.S. Secret Service Pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, dated September 15, 1989, Q! MIOG, Part I, section 258 -1 et seq., for investigative jurisdiction relating t() this statute.

13 See MOU between FBI and U.S. Secret Service Pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, dated September 15, 1989, for investigative jurisdiction relating to this statute.

14 This criminal violation was enacted by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preventi()n Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).

IS The United States Attorneys' Manual, 9-2.136, Investigative and Prosecutive Policy for International Terrorism Matters (September 1997 Edition), recognizes genocide as an international terrorism offense.

16 See also National Security Presidential Directive - 12, UNITED STATES CITIZENS TAKEN HOSTAGE ABROAD, dated February 18,2002, which outlines the FBI's responsibilities ..



18 U.S.C. §§ 1541 - 1546 CRIMES BASED UPON IMPROPER ACQUISITION OR MISUSES OF PASSPORT, VISA, OR ENTRY DOCUMENTS

18 U.S.C. §§ 1651 - 1661 PIRACY AND PRIVATEERING

18 U.S.C. § 1951 INTERFERENCE WITH COMMERCE BY THREATS OF VIOLENCE

18 U.S.C. § 1952 ' INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL OR TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES

18 U.S.C. § 1956 MONEY LAUNDERING AS IT RELATES TO TERRORISM OFFENSES

18 U.S.C. § 1957 ENGAGING IN MONETARY TRANSACTIONS IN PROPERTY DERIVED FROM SPECIFIED UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

18 U.S.C. § 1959 VIOLENT CRIMES IN AID OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

18 U.S.C. § 1960 PROHIBMON OF ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSMITTING BUSINESSES

18 U.S.C. § 1962 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES RELATING TO RICO

18 U.S.C. § 1991 ENTERING TRAIN TO COMMIT A CRIME

18 U.S.C. § 1992 TERRORIST ATTACKS AND OTHER VIOLENCE AGAINST MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS ON LAND, ON WATER, OR THROUGH THE AIR

18 U.S.C. §§ 2151 et seq. SABOTAGE

18 U.S.C. § 2237 CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO HEAVE TO, OBSTRUCTION OF BOARDING, OR PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION

18 U.S.C. § 2261A INTERSTATE STALKING

18 U.S.C. §§ 2271 - 2282B DESTRUCTION OF VESSELS; VIOLENCE AGAINST MARITIME NAVIGATION

18 U.S.C. § 2283 TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR RADIOACTIVE OR NUCLEAR MATERIALS

18 U.S.C. § 2284 TRANSPORTATION OF TERRORISTS

18 U.S.C. § 2291 DESTRUCTION OF VESSEL OR MARITIME FACILITY


18 U.S.C. §§ 2332 TERRORIST ACTS ABROAD AGAINST UNITED STATES NATIONALS

18 U.S.C. § 2332a USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

18 U.S.C. §, 2332b ACTS OF TERRORISM TRANSCENDING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

18 U.S.C. § 2332d17 FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

18 U.S.C. § 2332f'5 BOMBINGS OF PLACES OF PUBLIC USE, GOVERNMENT FACILITIES, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES

18 U.S.C. § 2332g" MISSILE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT

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17 The FBI has concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Treasury, and Customs, see United States Attorneys' Manual, 9-4.000 - Statutes Assigned by Citation.

IgSee supra note 14.


ACLURM005564

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


18 U.S.C. §§ 1541 - 1546 CRIMES BASED UPON IMPROPER ACQUISITION OR MISUSES OF PASSPORT, VISA, OR ENTRY DOCUMENTS

18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661 PIRACY AND PRIV A TEERING

18 U.S.C. § 1951 INTERFERENCE WITH COMMERCE BY THREATS OF VIOLENCE

18 U.S.C. § 1952 . INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL OR TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES

18 U.S.C. § 1956 MONEY LAUNDERING AS IT RELATES TO TERRORISM OFFENSES

18 U.S.C. § 1957 ENGAGING IN MONETARY TRANSACTIONS IN PROPERTY DERIVED FROM SPECIFIED UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

18 U.S.C. § 1959 VIOLENT CRIMES IN AID OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

18 U.s.C. § 1960 PROHIBITION OF ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSMITTING BUSlNESSES

18 U.S.C. § 1962 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES RELATING TO RICO

18 U.S.C. § 1991 ENTERING TRAIN TO COMMIT A CRIME

18 U.S.C. § 1992 TERRORIST ATIACKS AND OTHER VIOLENCE AGAINST MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS ON LAND,ON WATER, OR THROUGH THE AIR

18 U.S.C. §§ 2151 et seq. SABOTAGE

18 U.S.C. § 2237 CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO HEAVE TO, OBSTRUCTION OF BOARDING, OR PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION

18 U.S.C. § 2261A INTERSTATE STALKING

18 U.S.C. §§ 2271 • 2282B DESTRUCTION OF VESSELS; VIOLENCE AGAINST MARITIME NAVIGATION

18 U.S.C. § 2283 TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR RADIOACTIVE OR NUCLEAR MA TERlALS

18 U.S.C. § 2284 TRANSPORTATION OF TERRORISTS

18 U.S.C. § 2291 DESTRUCTION OF VESSEL OR MARITIME FACILITY


18 U.S.C. §§ 2332 TERRORIST ACTS ABROAD AGAINST UNITED STATES NATIONALS

18 U.S.C. § 2332a USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

18U.S.C. §,2332b ACTS OF TERRORISM TRANSCENDING NATIONAL BOUNDARlES

18 U.S.C. § 2332d" FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

18 U.S.C. § 2332fl5 BOMBINGS OF PLACES OF PUBLIC USE, GOVERNMENT FACILITIES, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES

18 U.S.C. § 2332gl~ MISSll..E SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT

17 The FBI has concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Treasury, and Customs, see United States Attorneys' Manual, 9-4.000 - Statutes Assigned by Citation.

IBSeesupra note 14.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 74 ,


18 U.S.C. § 2332h2° RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES

18 U.S.C. § 233921 HARBORING OR CONCEALING TERRORISTS

18 U.S.C. § 2339A PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS

18 U.S.C. § 2339B PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT OR RESOURCES TO DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

18 U.S.C. § 2339C22 PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM

18 U.S.C. § 2339D23 RECEIVING MILITARY TYPE TRAINING FROM A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

18 U.S.C. § 2340A TORTURE

18 U.S.C. §§ 2381 et seq. TREASON, SEDITION, AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

18 U.S.C. § 2441 WAR CRIMES

18 U.S.C. § 328624 EXTENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR CERTAIN TERRORISM OFFENSES

21 U.S.C. § 846 ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY

21 U.S.C. § 863 DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

21 U.S.C. § 960a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, TERRORIST PERSONS, AND GROUPS

22 U.S.C. §§ 611 - 621 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT

22 U.S.C. § 271225 CONTROLS OVER CERTAIN TERRORISM - RELATED SERVICES

22 U.S.C. § 2778 CONTROLS OF ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (SEE 22 C.F.R., PART 127 FOR VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES)

26 U.S.C. subtit. E, ch. 5326 MACHINE GUNS, DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, AND CERTAIN OTHER FIREARMS

19This criminal violation was enacted by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004)

20 Id.

21 This criminal violation was enacted by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

22 This criminal violation was enacted by the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat. 724 (2002).

23 See supra note 18.

24 As amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title VIII, § 809(a), 115 Stat. 272, 379-380 (2001) (provided no statute of limitation for certain terrorism offenses; and expressly provided that "[t]he amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section [October 26, 2001]."

2522, U.S.C. § 2712(f)(2), which pertains to investigations, states, "Mlle Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury shall have authority to investigate violations of regulations under this section."

26See supra note 10.


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18 U.S.C. § 2332h2U RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES

18 U.S.C. § 2339~1 HARBORING OR CONCEALING TERRORISTS

18 U.S.C. § 2339A PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS

18 U.S.C. § 23398 PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT OR RESOURCES TO DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

18 U.S.C. § 2339C22 PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM

18 U.S.C. § 2339D23 RECEIVING MlLITARY TYPE TRAINING FROM A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANlZA TION

18 U.S.C. § 2340A TORTURE

18 U.s.C. §§ 2381 et seq. TREASON, SEDITION, AND SUBVERSNE ACTNITlES

18 U.S.C. § 2441 WAR CRIMES

18 U.S.C. § 3286"" . EXTENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR CERTAIN TERRORISM OFFENSES

21 U .S.C. § 846 ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY

21 U.S.C. § 863 DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

21 U.S.C. § 960a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, TERRORIST PERSONS, AND GROUPS

22 U.S.C. §§ 611 • 621 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT

22 U.S.C. § 2712~ CONTROLS OVER CERTAIN TERRORISM - RELATED SERVICES

22 U.S.C. § 2778 CONTROLS OF ARMS EXPORTS AND lMPORTS (SEE 22 C.F.R., PART 127 FOR VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES)

26 U.S.C. subtit. E, ch. 53'b MACHINE GUNS, DESTRUCTNE DEVICES, AND CERTAIN OTHER FIREARMS

19This criminal violation was enacted by the Intelligence Refonn and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,118 Stat. 3638 (2004)

20 !d.


2? This criminal violation was enacted by the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat. 724 (2002).

23. See supra note 18.

24 As amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title VIII, § 809(a). 115 Stat. 272, 379-380 (2001) (provided no statute of limitation for certain terrorism offenses; and expressly provided that "[t]he amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section [October 26, 2001]."

. 2522, U.S.C. § 2712(f)(2), which pertains to investigations, states, "[t]he Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury shaH have authority to investigate violations of regulations under this section."

26See supra note 10.



31 U.S.C. § 533227 BULK CASH SMUGGLING INTO OR OUT OF THE UNITED STATES

42 U.S.C. § 2011 - 2284 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

49 U.S.C. §§ 46501 - 46507 CRIMES ABOARD AN AIRCRAFT; FALSE INFORMATION AND THREATS

49 U.S.C. § 46314 ENTERING AIRCRAFT OR AIRPORT AREA IN VIOLATION OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

49 U.S.C. § 60123(b) DAMAGING OR DESTROYING AN INTERSTATE GAS PIPELINE OR INTERSTATE HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE FACILITY

49 U.S.C. § 80501 DAMAGE TO TRANSPORTED PROPERTY

OTHER AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE FBI'S INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION IN TERRORISM CASES 28 U.S.C. § 533 CONFERS ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BROAD GENERAL

INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSES. UNDER THIS STATUTE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL "MAY APPOINT OFFICIALS TO DETECT AND PROSECUTE CRIMES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES."

28 U.S.C. § 538 FBI IS AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE ANY VIOLATION OF 49 U.S.C. § 46314 AND VIOLATIONS OF CHAPTER 465 OF TITLE 49 U.S.C. (SPECIAL AIRCRAFT JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES).

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) THE FBI SHALL MAINTAIN NO RECORD DESCRIBING HOW ANY INDIVIDUAL EXERCISES RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNLESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE OR BY THE INDIVIDUAL ABOUT WHOM THE RECORD IS MAINTAINED OR UNLESS PERTINENT TO AND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AN AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY.

12 U.S.C. § 3414(5)(A)28 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. SHALL COMPLY WITH FBI REQUEST FOR A CUSTOMER'S OR ENTITY'S FINANCIAL RECORDS.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(4) CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING AND USING CONSUMER REPORTS FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES: EXCEPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT).

15 U.S.C. § 1681u29 DISCLOSURE TO FBI FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES (FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT)


28 As amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title III, § 358(f)(2), Title V, § 404, 115 Stat. 272, 327 (2001) (FBI Director or the Director's designee must certify in writing to the financial institution that records sought are for foreign counterintelligence purposes to protect against international terrorism or other clandestine activities). Also, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, Title III, Subtitle E, § 374, 117 Stat. 2599, 2628 (2003) significantly expanded the definition of "financial institution" for National Security Letters obtained under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, e.g., entities now include pawnbrokers, travel agencies, telegraph companies, security dealers and brokers, and commodity futures transactions.

29 The FBI Director or Director's designee must certify that written request for information is sought for the conduct of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.


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UNCLASSIFIEDlfFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

31 U.S.C. § 5332z7 BULK CASH SMUGGLING INTO OR OUT OF THE UNITED STATES

42 U.S.C. § 2011- 2284 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

49 U.S.C. §§ 46501 • 46507 CRIMES ABOARD AN AIRCRAFT; FALSE INFORMATION AND THREATS

49 U.S.C. § 46314 ENTERING AIRCRAFT OR AIRPORT AREA IN VIOLATION OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

49 U.S.C. § 60123(b) DAMAGING OR DESTROYING AN INTERSTATE GAS PIPELINE OR INTERSTATE HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE FACILITY

49 U.S.C. § 80501 DAMAGE TO TRANSPORTED PROPERTY

. OTHER AUTHORITIES RELATING TO TilE FBI's INVESTIGATIVE JURISDicnON IN TERRORISM CASES 28 U.s.C. § 533 CONFERS ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BROAD GENERAL

INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSES. UNDER TIllS STATUTE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL "MAY APPOINT OFFICIALS TO DETECT AND PROSECUTE CRIMES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES."

28 U.S.C. § 538 FBI IS AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE ANY VIOLATION OF 49 U.S.c. § 46314 AND VIOLATIONS OF CHAPTER 465 OF TITLE 49 U.S.c. (SPECIAL AIRCRAFT JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES).

5 U.S.c. § 552a(e)(7) THE FBI SHALL MAINTAIN NO RECORD DESCRIBING HOW ANY INDIVIDUAL EXERCISES RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNLESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE OR BY THE INDIVIDUAL ABOUT WHOM THE RECORD IS MAINTAINED OR UNLESS PERTINENT TO AND WITIDN THE SCOPE OF AN AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY.

12 U.S.C. § 3414(S)(A)U FlNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. SHALL COMPLY WITH FBI REQUEST FOR A CUSTOMER'S OR ENTITY'S FlNANCIAL RECORDS.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(4) CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING AND USING CONSUMER REPORTS FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES: EXCEPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT).

15 U.S.C.§ 1681u29 DISCLOSURE TO FBI FOR COUNTERlNTELLIGENCE PURPOSES (FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT)

27 This criminal violation was enacted by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (2001).

28 As amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title III, § 35&(f)(2), Title V, § 404, 115 Stat. 272, 327. (2001) (FBI Director or the Director's designee must certify in writing to the financial institution that records sought are for foreign counterintelligence purposes to protect against international terrorism or other clandestine activities). Also, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No.1 08-177, Title III, Subtitle E, § 374, 117 Stat. 2599, 2628 (2003) significantly expanded the definition of "financial institution" for National Security Letters obtained under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, e.g., entities now include pawnbrokers, travel agencies, telegraph companies, security dealers and brokers, and commodity futures transactions.

29 The FBI Director or Director's designee must certify that written request for information is sought for the cbnduct of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.



15 U.S.C. § 1681v3° DISCLOSURES TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM PURPOSES (FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT)

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) DISCLOSURE OF RETURN INFORMATION OTHER THAN TAXPAYER RETURN INFORMATION FOR USE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(3) DISCLOSURE OF RETURN INFORMATION TO APPRISE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF CRIMINAL OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(7) DISCLOSURE UPON REQUEST OF INFORMATION RELATING TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

28 U.S.C. § 530C(a)(5) .

APPROPRIATIONS RE "ATTORNEY GENERAL EXEMPTION" PROVISION FOR UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE FB1310ctober 6, 1992, 106 Stat.1.838, as incorporated by Public Law 104-132, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Title VIII, § 815(d), April 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1315, as amended, which is set out as a note under 28 U.S.C. § 533.

31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(4)(B)

.

SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S DESIGNEE SHALL REFER ANY REPORT OF A SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION TO ANY APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT, SUPERVISORY AGENCY, OR UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR USE IN THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING ANALYSIS, TO PROTECT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

42 U.S.C. § 5197g

'

FBI IS AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE ACTS PURSUANT TO TITLE 49, U.S.C., CHAPTER 68 (DISASTER RELIEF), SUBCHAPTER IV-B (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS). .

50 U.S.C. § 402a32 THE FBI MAY INVESTIGATE TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF AN UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY INVOLVED.

50 U.S.C. § 403-5a33 ASSISTANCE TO UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

30 As amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title III, § 358(g)(1)(B), 115 Stat. 272, 327-328 (2001).

31The "Attorney General exemption" in subsection (a)(5), means section 102(b) of Public Law 102-395, Department of Justice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,

32 This statute requires that the head of each department or agency within the executive branch to advise the FBI immediately of any information which indicates that classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign agent or an agent of a foreign power.

33 Elements of the intelligence community may, upon request of a United States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States about individuals who are not United States persons. Such elements may collect such information notwithstanding that law enforcement agency intends to use the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation. Authority for DoD assistance is restricted to (1) the National Security Agency; (2) the National Reconnaissance Office; (3) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and (4) the Defense Intelligence Agency. Assistance provided under this section by elements of DoD may not include direct participation of a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in an arrest or similar activity.

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15 U.S.C. § 1681Vlo DISCLOSURES TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM PURPOSES (FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT)

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) DISCLOSURE OF RETURN INFORMATION OTHER THAN TAXPAYER RETURN INFORMATION FOR USE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

26 U.S.C. § 6t03(i)(3) DISCLOSURE OF RETURN INFORMATION TO APPRISE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF CRIMINAL OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(7) DISCLOSURE UPON REQUEST OF INFORMATION RELATING TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

.28 U.S.C. § 530C(a)(S) APPROPRIATIONS RE "ATIORNEY GENERAL EXEMPTION" PROVISION FOR UNDERCOVER OPERA TIQNS CONDUCTED BY THE FBI310ctober 6, 1992, 10C5 Stat. ·1838, as incorporated by Public Law 104-132, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Title VIII,§ 815(d). April 24. 1996. 110 Stat. 1315. as amended, which is set out as a note under 28 U.S.C. § 533.

31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(4)(B) SECRETARY OF TREASURY'S DESIGNEE SHALL REFER ANY REPORT OF A SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION TO ANY APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT, SUPERVISORY AGENCY, OR UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR USE IN THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING ANALYSIS. TO PROTECT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

42 U.S.C. § 5197g FBI IS AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE ACTS PURSUANT TO TITLE 49. U.S. C., CHAPTER 68 (DISASTER RELIEF), SUBCHAPTER IV-B (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS).

50 U.S.C. § 402a3Z THE FBI MAY INVESTIGATE TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF AN UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY INVOLVED.

50 U.S.C. § 403-5a~~ ASSISTANCE TO UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

30 As amended by the usA PATRIOT Act. Pub. L. No. 107·56. Title III, § 358(g)(l)(B). 115 Stat. 272, 327·328 (2001). .

31The "Attorney General exemption" in subsection (a)(5). means section 102(b) of Public Law 102-395, Department of Justice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.

32 This statute requires that the head of each department or agency within the executive branch to advise the FBI . immediately of any information which indicates that classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign agent or an agent of a foreign power.

33 Elements of the intelligence community may. upon request of a United States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States about individuals who are not United States persons. Such elements may collect such information notwithstanding that law enforcement agency intends to use the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation. Authority for DoD assistance is restricted to (1) the National Security Agency; (2) the National Reconnalssance Office; (3) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and (4) the Defense Intelligence Agency. Assistance provided under this section by elements of DoD may not include direct participation of a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in an arrest or similar activity. .


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50 U.S.C. § 43634 REQUESTS BY AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES FOR FINANCIAL RECORDS OR CONSUMER REPORTS

50 U.S.C. § 1802 AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

50 U.S.C. § 1822 AUTHORIZATION OF PHYSICAL SEARCHES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. SEE ALSO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12949, DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1995.

50 U.S.C. § 1842 INSTALLATION AND USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS: BASED ON ATTORNEY GENERAL APPROVAL OR DESIGNATED ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT FOR FBI TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS UNDER SUCH GUIDELINES AS THE AG APPROVES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, OR A SUCCESSOR ORDER.

50 U.S.C. § 1861 ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

50 U.S.C. § 1881a PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES PERSONS

50 U.S.C. § 1881b CERTAIN ACQUISITIONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

50 U.S.C. § 1881c OTHER ACQUISITIONS TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

50 U.S.C. § 1881d JOINT APPLICATIONS AND CONCURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS

10 U.S.C. § 371 note MILITARY JOINT TASK FORCES HAVE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONDUCTING COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

10 U.S.C. § 38235 EMERGENCY SITUATIONS INVOLVING CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (MILITARY ASSISTANCE)

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10 U.S.C. § 256436 PROVISION OF SUPPORT FOR CERTAIN SPORTING EVENTS (MILITARY ASSISTANCE)

"4 Any authorized investigative agency may request from any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, or from any consumer reporting agency, such financial records, other financial information, and consumer reports as may be necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination.

35 This statute provides that "[Ole Secretary of Defense, upon request of the Attorney General, may provide assistance in support of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of section 175 [biological weapons] and [229 et seq., chemical weapons] of title 18 during an emergency situation involving a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction."

36 This statute provides that "(alt the request of a Federal, State, or local government agency responsible for providing law enforcement services, security services, or safety services, the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a military installation or other facility of the Department of Defense or the commander of a specified or unified combatant command to provide assistance for the World Cup Soccer Games, the Goodwill Games, the Olympics, and any other civilian sporting event in support of essential security and safety at such event, but only if the Attorney General certifies that such assistance is necessary to meet essential security and safety needs." See also MOU Between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense Concerning Support for Security for Civilian Sporting Events (dated February 10, 199 8 ) , and DoD Directive 2000.15, "Support to Special Events," dated November 21, 1994.


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so U.S.C. § 43634 REQUESTS BY AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES FOR FINANCIAL RECORDS OR CONSUMER REPORTS

SO U.S.C. § 1802 AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

SO U.S.C. § 1822 AUTHORIZATION OF PHYSICAL SEARCHES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. SEE ALSO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12949, DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1995.

SO U.S.C. § 1842 INSTALLATION AND USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS: BASED ON ATTORNEY GENERAL APPROVAL OR DESIGNATED ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT FOR FBI TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS UNDER SUCH GUIDELINES AS THE AG APPROVES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, OR A SUCCESSOR ORDER.

SO U.S.C. § 1861 ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

SO U.S.C. § 1881a PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES PERSONS

SO U.S.C. § 1881b CERTAIN ACQUISITIONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

50 U.S.C. § 188Ie OTHER ACQUISITIONS TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

SO U.S.C. § 1881d JOINT APPLICATIONS AND CONCURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS

10 U.S.C. § 371 note MILITARY JOINT TASK FORCES HAVE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONDUCTING COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

10 U.S.C. § 38235 EMERGENCY SITUATIONS INVOLVING CHgMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (MILITARY ASSISTANCE)

\

10 U.S.C. § 2564J6 PROVISION OF SUPPORT FOR CERTAIN SPORTING EVENTS (MILITARY ASSISTANCE)

" Any authorized investigative agency may request from any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, or from any consumer reporting agency. such financial records. other financial infonnation. and COnsumer reports as may be necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement investigation. counterintelligence inquiry. or security determination.

,S This stalute provides thaI "[l]he Secretary of Defense. upon request of the Attorney General, may provide assistance in support of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of section 175 [biological weapons) and [229 et seq .• chemical weapons) of title 18 during an emergency situation involving a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction."

36 This statute provides that "[a)t the request of a Federal. State. or local government agency responsible for providing law enforcement services, security services. or safety services. the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a military installation or other facility of the Department of Defense or the commander of a specified or unified combatant command to provide assistance for the World Cup Soccer Games. the Goodwill Games. the Olympics. and any other civilian sporting event in support of essential security and safely at such event. bUlonly if the Attorney General certifies thaI such assistance is necessary to meet essential security and safety needs." See also MOU Between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense Concerning Support for Security for Civilian Sporting Events (dated February 10, 199B), and DoD Directive 2000.15, "Support to Special Events,· dated November 21, 1994.



32 C.F.R. § 623.2(6) LOAN POLICIES OF THE ARMY RELATING TO REQUESTS BY FBI DIRECTOR OR SENIOR FBI OFFICIAL FOR MILITARY RESOURCES NEEDED FOR TERRORISM RELATED MATTERS

18 U.S.C. §§ 175a, 229E, 831(d) & (e)(1) & 2332e

REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENFORCE PROHIBITION IN CERTAIN EMERGENCIES

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G) & (H)37

CIVIL FORFEITURE

28 C.F.R. § 8.238 DESIGNATION OF FBI OFFICIALS HAVING. SEIZURE AUTHORITY IN FORFEITURE MATTERS

18 U.S.C. § 2516

•

AUTHORIZATION (BY ATTORNEY GENERAL OR DESIGNATED DOJ OFFICIAL) FOR FBI INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS THAT MAY PROVIDE OR HAS PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS OF E.G., SECTION 175 (RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS); SECTION 229 (RELATING TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS); OR SECTIONS 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2339A, 2339B, or 2339C of TITLE 18 (RELATING TO TERRORISM)

18 U.S.C. § 2709 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACCESS TO TELEPHONE TOLL AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS THAT ARE ''RELEVANT TO AN AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATION TO PROTECT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OR CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES."

20 U.S.C. § 1232g DISCLOSURE OF EDUCATIONAL RECORDS RELATING TO INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORISM ("BUCKLEY AMENDMENT")

28 C.F.R. § 0.85 UNDER THIS REGULATION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS DELEGATED INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE FBI FOR ALL CRIMES NOT OTHERWISE ASSIGNED BY CONGRESS TO ANOTHER AGENCY. IT ALSO PROVIDES THAT THE FBI SHOULD "EXERCISE LEAD AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES IN INVESTIGATING ALL CRIMES FOR WHICH IT HAS PRIMARY OR CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND WHICH INVOLVE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE STATUTORY JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES."

28 C.F.R. § 0.89 THE FBI DIRECTOR IS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY RELATING TO THE SEIZURE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS OF WAR, AND OTHER ARTICLES AS WELL AS SEIZING AND DETAINING ANY VESSEL, VEHICLE, OR AIRCRAFT CONTAINING SUCH ITEMS PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. § 401 (ILLEGAL EXPORTATION OF WAR MATERIALS).

37 These statutory sections provide civil forfeiture authority relevant to acts of domestic or international terrorism.

38The FBI is authorized to seize property subject to seizure pursuant to statutes identified in § 8.1, e.g. 22 U.S.C. § 401, Illegal Exportation of War Materials.


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32 C.F.R. § 623.2(6) LOAN POLICIES OF THE ARMY RELATING TO REQUESTS BY FBI DIRECTOR OR SENIOR FBI OFFICIAL FOR MILITARY RESOURCES NEEDED FOR TERRORlSM RELATED MATTERS

18 U.S.C. §§ 175a, 229E, REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENFORCE PROHIBITION IN 831(d) & (e)(l) & 2332e CERTAIN EMERGENCIES

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(I)(G) & CIVIL FORFEITURE (H)37

28 C.F.R. § 8.23S DESIGNATION OF FBI OFFICIALS HAVING SEIZURE AUTIIORlTY IN FORFEITURE MATTERS

18 U.S.C;. § 2516 AUTHORIZATION (BY ATTORNEY GENERAL OR DESIGNATED DOJ OFFICIAL) FOR FBI INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS THAT MAY PROVIDE OR HAS PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS OF E.G., SECTION 175 (RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS); SECTION 229 (RELATING TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS); OR SECTIONS 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2339A, 2339B, or 2339C of TITLE 18 (RELATING TO TERRORISM)

18 U.S.C. § 2709 COUNTERlNTELLIGENCE ACCESS TO TELEPHONE TOLL AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS THAT ARE "RELEVANT TO AN AUTHORlZED INVESTIGATION TO PROTECT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORlSM OR CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES."

20 U.S.C. § 1232g DISCLOSURE OF EDUCATIONAL RECORDS RELATING TO INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORlSM ("BUCKLEY AMENDMENT")

28 C.F.R. § 0.85 UNDER THIS REGULATION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS DELEGATED INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORlTY TO THE FBI FOR ALL CR1MES NOT OTHERWISE ASSIGNED BY CONGRESS TO ANOTHER AGENCY. IT ALSO PROVIDES THAT THE FBI SHOULD "EXERCISE LEAD AGENCY RESPONSmILITIES IN INVESTIGATING ALL CRlMES FOR WHICH IT HAS PRIMARY OR CONCURRENT JURlSDICTION AND WHICH INVOLVE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHiN THE STATUTORY JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES."

28 C.F.R. § 0.89 THE FBI DIRECTOR IS AUTHORlZED TO EXERCISE AUTHORlTY RELATING TO THE SEIZURE OF ARMS AND·MUNITIONS OF WAR, AND OTHER ARTICLES AS WELL AS SEIZING AND DETAINING ANY VESSEL, VEHICLE, OR AIRCRAFT CONTAINING SUCH ITEMS PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. § 401 (ILLEGAL EXPORTATION OF WAR MATERIALS).

37 These statutory sections provide civil forfeiture authority relevant to acts of domestic or international terrorism.

38The FBI is authorized to seize property subject to seizure pursuant to statutes identified in § 8.I,e.g. 22 U.S.C. § 401, Illegal Exportation of War Materials. .



31 C.F.R. § 103.10039 INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INVESTIGATING TERRORIST ACTIVITY OR MONEY LAUNDERING MAY REQUEST THAT FinCEN SOLICIT, ON THE INVESTIGATING AGENCY'S BEHALF, CERTAIN INFORMATION FROM A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION OR A GROUP OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTIVITY OR MONEY LAUNDERING.

33 C.F.R. § 233.3 CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR OF US POSTAL SERVICE MAY ORDER A MAIL COVER UPON WRITTEN REQUEST FROM THE HEAD OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SPECIFYING REASONABLE GROUNDS THAT DEMONSTRATE THE MAIL COVER IS NECESSARY TO "PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES" (E.G., ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO OUR SECURITY; AN ATTACK OR OTHER GRAVE HOSTILE ACT; SABOTAGE OR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; AND CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES).

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(2) USES AND DISCLOSURES OF HEALTH INFORMATION FOR SPECIALIZED GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: AUTHORIZING STATUTE TITLE 42, U.S.C., § 1320d-2 NOTE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ORDER 1900.5B4°

(3) Responding to specific requests from senior government officials and agencies for FBI information related to foreign counterintelligence and domestic security matters.

NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND RESPONSIBILITIES (SEPTEMBER 12, 2003). THE FBI'S RESPONSIBILITIES ARE LISTED IN THIS ORDER

•

39See Title 31, U.S.C., § 5311 note, pursuant to USA PATRIOT Act, October 26, 2001, the Secretary of Treasury is required to "adopt regulations to encourage further cooperation among financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and law enforcement authorities, with the specific purpose of encouraging regulatory authorities and law enforcement authorities to share with financial institutions information regarding individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in, or reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in, terrorist acts or money laundering activities."

40 According to this Order, the FBI is responsible for providing a response to foreign counterintelligence and domestic security and terrorism threats. This includes:

(1) Directing and coordinating, as circumstances allow, urgent and expanded efforts required by Congressional enactments and executive branch directives to detect and deter hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign or domestic elements;

(2) Disseminating information, to the extent that conditions permit, concerning hostile intentions and activities toward government officials and agencies; and


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31 C.F.R. § 103.100J~ INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INVESTIGATING TERRORIST ACTIVITY OR MONEY LAUNDERING MAY REQUEST THAT FinCEN SOLICIT, ON THE INVESTIGATING AGENCY'S BEHALF, CERTAIN INFORMATION FROM A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION OR A .. GROUP OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BASED ON CREDmr:.EEVIDENCE CONCERNING

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TERRORIST ACTNITY OR MONEY LAUNDERING. """<' .. ' . ..

33 C.F.R. § 233.3 CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR OF US POSTAL SERVICE MAY ORDER A MAIL COVER UPON WRITTEN REQUEST FROM THE HEAD OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SPECIFYING REASONABLE GROUNDS THAT DEMONSTRATE THE MAIL COVER IS NECESSARY TO "PROTECT THE

, NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE uNITED STATES" (E.G., ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO OUR SECURITY; AN ATTACK OR OTHER GRAVE HOSTILE ACT; SABOTAGE OR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; AND CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES).

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(2) USES AND DISCLOSURES OF HEALTH INFORMATION FOR SPECIALIZED GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: AUTHORIZING STATUTE TITLE 42, U.S.c., § J320d-2 NOTE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND JUSTICE ORDER RESPONSIBILITIES (SEPTEMBER 12, 2003). THE FBI'S 1900.5B4o RESPONSIBILITIES ARE OSTED IN THIS ORDER

(3) Responding to specific requests from senior government officials and agencies for FBI information related to foreign counterinu~lligence and domestic security matters.

39See Title 31, U.S.c., § 5311 note, pursuant to USA PATRIOT Act, October 26,2001, the Secretary of Treasury is required to "adopt regulations to encourage further cooperation among financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and law enforcement authorities, with the specific purpose of encouraging regulatory authorities and law enforcement authorities to share with financial institutions information regarding individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in, or reasonably suspected based on credible evidence .of engaging in, terrorist acts or money laundering activities."

40 According to this Order, the FBI is responsible for providing a response to foreign counterintelligence and domestic security and terrorism threats: This includes:

(1) Directing and coordinating, as circumstances allow, urgent and expanded efforts required by Congressional enactments and executive branch directives to detect and deter hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign or domestic elements;

(2) Disseminating information, to the extent that conditions permit, concerning hostile intentions and activities toward government officials and agencies; and



ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDER NO. 2954-200841

DELEGATION TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI CERTAIN AUTHORITY RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDER NO; 2857-2007

......

DELEGATION TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI OF AUTHORITY TO GRANT REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTS (18 U.S.C. §§ 3071-77). THE FBI DIRECTOR IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO DELEGATE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROPRIATE FBI OFFICIALS. .. _


DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO AUGMENT THE FBI'S JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES42


DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT SECURITY CHECKS AND TO TAKE OTHER ACTIONS PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT OF 200243(specifie sections codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262a, 7 U.S.C. § 8401, and 7 U.S.C. § 8411), to receive names and other identifying information submitted by individuals requesting access to specified agents or toxins; utilize electronic databases and other sources of information to conduct background checks and security risk assessments of such individuals; and consult with appropriate officials of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture as to whether certain individuals specified in the above cited statutory provisions should be denied access to or granted limited access to specified agents.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12139 (Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance)

PURSUANT TO THE FISA, DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FBI ARE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY SECTION 104(a)(6) OF THE ACT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS TO CONDUCT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12949 (Foreign Intelligence Physical Searches)

PURSUANT TO THE FISA, DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FBI ARE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY SECTION 303(a)(6) OF THE ACT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS TO CONDUCT PHYSICAL SEARCHES

41This order sets forth, that, the Director of the FBI is delegated the authority to provide reasonable assistance to foreign national security agencies cooperating with the FBI in the execution of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence duties, and federal, state, local or foreign law enforcement agencies, to assist any such agency in the lawful execution of any authorized function.

42 This Order provides that pursuant to Attorney General procedures which will be put into place when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks, the JTTFs can call upon all Department law enforcement resources for assistance, including agents and other resources of the FBI, DEA, ATF, and USMS. The Director of the FBI and the FBI Special Agents in Charge (SAC) or Assistant Directors in Charge (ADIC) serve as heads of the It tFs.

411 43This Order delegates to the FBI Director the Attorney General's authority and responsibilities under sections 201, 212, and 221 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002)

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ATTORNEY GENERAL DELEGATION TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI CERTAIN AUTHORITY ORDER NO. 2954-200841 RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO

FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

ATTORNEY GENERAL DELEGATION TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI OF AUTHORITY TO ORDER NO: 2857-2007 GRANT REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTS _ ... .. (18 U.S.C. §§ 3071-77). THE FBI DIRECTOR IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO

DELEGATE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROPRIATE FBI OFFICIALS. ~.:.... . ';'--.. ...... ' .. .- . . ... .• '

ATTORNEY GENERAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO AUGMENT THE FBI'S ORDER NO. 2737-2004 JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES42

ATTORNEY GENERAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT SECURITY CHECKS AND ORDER NO. 2654-2003 TO TAKE OTHER ~CTIONS PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH

SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT OF 200243(specific sections codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262a, 7 U.S.C. § 8401. and 7 U.S.C. § 8411), to receive names and other identifying information submitted by individuals requesting access to specified agents or toxins; utilize electronic databases and other sources of information to conduct background checks and security risk assessments of such individuals; and consult with appropriate officials of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture as to whether cenain individuals specified in the above cited statutory provisions should be denied access to or granted limited access to specified agents.

EXECUTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO THE FISA, DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE 12139 (Foreign Intelligence FBI ARE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY Electronic Surveillance) SECTION 104(a)(6) OF THE ACT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS TO

CONDUCT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

EXECUTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO THE FISA, DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE 12949 (Foreign Intelligence FBI ARE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY Physical Searches) SECTION 303(a)(6) OF THE ACT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS TO

CONDUCT PHYSICAL SEARCHES

41This order sets fonh, that, the Director of the FBI is delegated the authority to provide reasonable assistance to foreign national security agenCies cooperating with the FBI in the execution of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence duties, and federal, state, local or foreign law enforcement agencies, to assist any such agency in the lawful execution of any authorized function.

42 This Order provides that pursuant to Attorney General procedures which will be put into place when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks, the JTTFs can call upon all Depanment law enforcement resources for assistance, including agents and other resources of the FBI, DEA, ATF, and USMS. The Director of the FBI and the FBI Special Agents in Charge (SAC) or Assistant Directors in Charge (ADIC) serve as heads of the JTTFs.

43This Order delegates to the FBI Director the Attorney General's authority and responsibilities under sections 201, 212, and 221 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat.594 (2002) .


~""


EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 as amended (United States Intelligence Activities)"

Additionally, Title 50, USC, § 401a, defines "counterintelligence" as "information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf or foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international

SECTION 1.3(b)(20)(A) - DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

THIS SUBSECTION STATES THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI SHALL COORDINATE CLANDESTINE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED THROUGH HUMAN SOURCES OR THROUGH HUMAN-ENABLED MEANS AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

SECTION 1.7(g) - INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS, FBI THIS SUBSECTION AUTHORIZES THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS

OF THE FBI TO (1) COLLECT (INCLUDING THROUGH CLANDESTINE MEANS), ANALYZE, PRODUCE, AND DISSEMINATE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL AND DEPARTMENTAL MISSIONS; (2) CONDUCT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; AND (3) CONDUCT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

SECTION 1.13, THE FBI - AUTHORIZES THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES.

terrorist activities."

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656 (ASSIGNMENT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESPONSIBILITIES)

AMONG ITS LEAD AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES, DOJ SHALL COORDINATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12947 (PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORISTS WHO THREATEN TO DISRUPT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS)

ANY INVESTIGATION EMANATING FROM A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE FBI, AND ANY MATTER INVOLVING EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL VIOLATION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE FBI.

k..At.c.Ai Mfg Otu)Ek 13128 (IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT)45

All i UN V.CSIIGAIIUN blVIANALINU 1'x0m APuSatiLr. VIOLA ituN Or THIS ORDER INVOLVING OR REVEALING A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF 18, U.S.C., § 229 SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE FBI.

44Title 50, USC, § 401a, defines "foreign intelligence" as "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities."

45See generally, Title 22, USC, § 6711 (Designation of United States National Authority Pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention).


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EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 as amended (United States Intelligence Activities )44

Additionally, Title 50, USC, § 401a, defines "counterintelligence" as "information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against'espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf or foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities."

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656 (ASSIGNMENT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESPONSIBILITIES) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12947 (PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORISTS WHO THREATEN TO DISRUPT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS)

J~~YJ!,

13128 (IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT)45

SECTION 1.3(b)(20)(A) • DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

THIS SUBSECTION STATES THE DIRECTOR OF TIlE FBI SHALL COORDINATE CLANDESTINE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED THROUGH HUMAN SOURCES OR THROUGH HUMAN-ENABLED MEANS AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

SECTION 1.7(g). INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS, FBI THIS SUBSECTION AUTHORIZES THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS

OF THE FBI TO (1) COLLECT (INCLUDING THROUGH CLANDESTINE MEANS), ANALYZE, PRODUCE, AND DISSEMINATE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL AND DEPARTMENTAL MISSIONS; (2) CONDUCT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; AND (3) CONDUCT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LWSON RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

SECTION 1.13, THE FBI· AUTHORIZES THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES.

AMONG ITS LEAD AGENCY RESPONSmILITIES, DOJ SHALL COORDINATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

ANY INVESTIGATION EMANATING FROM A POSSmLE VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE FBI, AND ANY MATIERINVOLVING EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL VIOLATION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE FBI.

f'U".l 11' V.l:.,;).1. d11~\J' r KVIV.1 ft v .1VJ...ft HV1~ vr THIS ORDER INVOLVING OR REVEALING A POSSmLE VIOLATION OF 18, U.S.c., § 229 SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE FBI.

44Title 50, USC, § 401a, defines "foreign intelligence" as "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations. or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities."

45See generally, Title 22, USC, § 6711 (Desig~ation of United States National Authority Pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention).



EXECUTIVE ORDER STATES THAT THE HEAD OF EACH AGENCY THAT POSSESSES OR 13388 (FURTHER ACQUIRES TERRORISM INFORMATION SHALL PROMPTLY GIVE STRENGTHENING THE ACCESS TO THE TERRORISM INFORMATION TO THE HEAD OF EACH SHARING OF OTHER AGENCY THAT HAS COUNTERTERRORISM FUNCTIONS. TERRORISM ' INFORMATION)" EXECUTIVE ORDER SECTION 3, "STANDARDS AND PRACTICE FOR INTERROGATION OF 13491 (ENSURING INDIVIDUALS IN THE CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES LAWFUL IN ARMED CONFLICTS" INTERROGATIONS)

(b) INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND INTERROGATION-RELATED TREATMENt'See H.R. Rep. No. 111-89, 111th Cong., 1" Sess. 2009, "Resolution of Inquiry Requesting that the President and Directing that the Attorney General Transmit to the House of Representatives All Information in Their Possession Relating to Specific Communications Regarding Detainees and Foreign Persons Suspected of Terrorism," June 26, 2009.

46Note that this EO refers to section 1016(a)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 for the definition of "terrorism information." This section of the Act is codified in Title 6, USC, section 485, Information sharing.

47Section 3(b) of this EO states that nothing in this section shall preclude the FBI, or other Federal law enforcement agencies, from continuing to use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of force, threats, or promises.

Note that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, Div. A, Title X, § 1004, Dec. 30, 2005, 119 Stat. 2740, codified at Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1(a) (Protection of United States Government personnel Engaged in Authorized Interrogations) provides that:

in any civil or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States Government who is a United States person, arising out of the officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent's engaging in specific operational practices, that involve detention and interrogation of aliens who the President or his designees have determined are believed to be engaged in or associated with international terrorist activity that poses a serious threat to the United States, its interests, or its allies, and that were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they were conducted it shall be a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know that the practices were unlawful.

Also note that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, Title X, § 1040 (No Miranda Warnings for Al Qaeda Terrorists), October 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454, codified at Title 10 U.S.C. § 801 note, provides that:

Absent a court order requiring the reading of such statements, no member of the Armed Forces and no official of the Department of Defense or component of the intelligence community (other than the Department of Justice) may read to a foreign national who is captured or detained outside the United States as an enemy belligerent and is in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or otherwise under detention in a Department of Defense facility the statement required by Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), or otherwise inform such an individual of any rights that the individual may or may not have to counsel or remain silent consistent with Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966)).

Regarding the practice of Mirandizing terrorist suspects overseas, in a June 12, 2009 letter from FBI Director Robert Mueller to U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf, Director Mueller confirmed that "there has been no policy change and no blanket instruction issued for FBI agents to Mirandize detainees overseas." Furthermore, the Director noted in his letter, that FBI agents have occasionally given Miranda warnings to persons captured overseas, at Bagram Air Base (Afghanistan) and elsewhere, but only when "a determination was made that a prosecution in an Article III court may be in the interest of national security and that providing Miranda warnings ... was ... desirable to maximize the likelihood that any resulting statements would be admissible at trial."


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EXECUTIVE ORI,lER STATES THAT THE HEAD OF EACH AGENCY THAT POSSESSES OR 13388 (FURTHER ACQUIRES TERRORISM INFORMATION SHALL PROMPTLY GIVE STRENGTHENING THE ACCESS TO THE TERRORISM INFORMATION TO THE HEAD OF EACH SHARING OF OTHER AGENCY THAT HAS COUNTERTERRORISM FUNCTIONS. TERRORISM INFORMATIONt6

EXECUTIVE ORDER SECTION 3, "STANDARDS AND PRACTICE FOR INTERROGATION OF 13491 (ENSURING INDIVIDUALS IN THE CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES LAWFUL IN ARMED CONFLICTS" INTERROGATIONS)

(b) INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND INTERROGATION-RELATED TREATMEN"r7See H.R. Rep. No. 111-89, 111'" Cong., I" Sess. 2009, "Resolution of Inquiry Requesting that the President and Directing that the Attorney General Transmit to the House of Representatives All Infonnation in Their Possession Relating to Specific Communications Regarding Detainees and Foreign Persons Suspected of Terrorisrn," June 26,2009.

4~ote that this EO refers to section 1016(a)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 for the definition of "terrorism information." This section of the Act is codified in Title 6, USC, section 485, Information sharing ..

47Section 3(b) of this EO states that nothing in this section shall preclude the FBI, or other Federal law enforcement agencies, from continuing to use authorized, non-coercive teChniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of force, threats, or promises.

Note that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, Div. A, Title X, § 1004, Dec. 30, 2005, 119 Stat. 2740, codified at Title 42 U.S.c. § 2000dd-1 (a) (Protection of United States Government personnel Engaged in Authorized Interrogations) provides that:

in any civil or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States Government who is a United States person, arising out of the officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent's engaging in specific operational practices. that involve detention and interrogation of aliens who the President or his designees have determined are believed to be engaged in or associated with international terrcrist activity that poses a serious threat to the United States, its interests, or its allies, and that were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they were conducted, it shall be a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or o~her agent did not know that the practices were uruawful.

Also note that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. 1. 111-84, Title X, § 1040 (No Miranda Warnings for Al Qaeda Terrorists), October 28.2009,123 Stat. 2190,2454, codified at Title 10 U.S.c. § 801 note, provides that: '

Absent a court order requiring the reading of such statements, no member of the Armed Forces and no official of the Department of Defense or component of the intelligence community (other than the Department of Justice) may read to a foreign national who is captured or detained outside the United States as an enemy belligerent and is in the custody or under the effecti ve control of the Department of Defense or otherwise under detention in a Department of Defense facility the statement required by Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), or otherwise inform such an individual of any rights that the Individual mayor may not have to counselor remain silent consistent with Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966)).

Regarding the practice of Mirandizing terrorist suspects overseas, in a June 12, 2009 letter from FBI Director Robert Mueller to U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf, Director Mueller confirmed that "there has been no policy change and no blanket instruction issued for FBI agents to Mirandize detainees overseas." Furthermore, the Director noted in his letter, that FBI agents have occasionally given Miranda warnings to persons captured overseas, at Bagram Air Base (Afghanistan) and elsewhere, but only when "a determination was made that a prosecution in an Article III court may be in the interest of national security and that providing Miranda warnings .. ' was ... desirable to maximize the likelihood that any resulting statements would be admissible at trial."



NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (NSPD) -12

ASSIGNS THE FBI LEAD AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS TAKEN HOSTAGE ABROAD.

NSPD 28 ADDRESSES FBI'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL, SAFETY, AND SECURITY.

NSPD 46/HSPD-15 ANNEX 1148

Additionally, see e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel opinion, FBI AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF SUBTITLE E OF TITLE 26 OR 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 921-930, June 21, 1996 (the FBI has lead investigative responsibility over crimes of terrorism pursuant to statutes or Presidential Decision Directive 39 that have granted authority to the FBI in these matters). Note that PDD 39 was superseded by a National Security Presidential Directive.

OUTLINES THE FBI'S LEAD JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN. RELATION TO TERRORISM.

MARITIME STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY: MARITIME OPERATIONAL THREAT RESPONSE (MOTR)

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD, WHERE SUCH ACTS ARE WITHIN THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF THE U.S.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

48By way of historical background, National Security Decision Directive Number 30, MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS, dated April 10, 1982, and National Security Decision Directive Number 207, THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM, dated January 20, 1986, were the first Presidential national security directives to grant the FBI lead agency authority to investigate terrorism matters.

As the lead agency to investigate terrorism incidents, the FBI also has authority to investigate terrorism incidents on US Capitol grounds. See Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for Theodore M. Cooperstein, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General Re: FBI Investigative Jurisdiction, dated June 7, 2004.


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NATIONAL SECURITY ASSIGNS THE FBI LEAD AGENCY RESPONSmILITIES RELATING TO PRESIDENTIAL UNITED STATES CITIZENS TAKEN HOSTAGE ABROAD. DIRECTIVE (NSPD) - 12 NSPD 28 ADDRESSES FBI'S PRIMARY RESPONSmILlTY CONCERNING UNITED

STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL, SAFETY, AND SECURITY.

NSPD 46fHSPD-IS OUTLINES THE FBI'S LEAD JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSmn..ITlES IN ANNEXn48 RELATION TO TERRORISM.

Additionally, see "

e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel opinion, FBI AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF SUBTITLE E OF TITLE 26 OR 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 921-930, June 21, 1996 (the FBI has lead investigative responsibility over crimes of terrorism pursuant to statutes or Presidential Decision Directive 39 that have granted authority to the FBI in these matters). Note that PDD 39 was superseded by a National Security Presidential Directive. MARITIME STRATEGY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE FOR MARITIME LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR SECURITY: MARITIME TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE OPERATIONAL UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS THREAT RESPONSE ABROAD, WHERE SUCH ACTS ARE WITHIN THE FEDERAL (MOTR) JURISDICTION OF THE U.S.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

48By way of historical background, National Security Decision Directive Number 30, MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS, dated April 10, 1982, and National Security Decision Directive Number 207, THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM, dated January 20, 1986, were the first Presidential national security directives to grant the FBI lead agency authority to investigate terrorism matters.

As the lead agency to investigate terrorism incidents, the FBI also has authority to investigate terrorism incidents on US Capitol grounds. See Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for Theodore M. Cooperstein, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General Re: FBI Investigative Jurisdiction, dated June 7, 2004.


UNCLASSIHED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS, SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY, APRIL 2008, APPENDIX A - U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED' AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD, WHERE SUCH ACTS ARE WITHIN THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF THE U.S.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITEDSTATES.- . ‘: - - - " ---

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACTING THRU THE FBI, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR: (1) INVESTIGATING TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD; AND (2) INVESTIGATE CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THAT OCCUR IN THE AIR DOMAIN.

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE•

THE FBI HAS THE LEAD ROLE TO INVESTIGATE CYBERCRIME

NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY)

THE NRF IS A GUIDE TO HOW THE NATION CONDUCTS ALL-HAZARDS RESPONSE. .

CHAPTER 1: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT:

- THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, HAS THE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR (1) CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD; AND (2) COORDINATING ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY TO DETECT, PREVENT, AND DISRUPT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (HSPD) 5

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY IS THE PRINCIPAL FEDERAL OFFICIAL FOR COORDINATING DOMESTIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD.

THE FBI HAS LEAD ROLE FOR COORDINATING THE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY TO DETECT, PREVENT, PREEMPT, AND DISRUPT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. **ANNEX II TO NSPD-46/HSPD- 15 (U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON TERROR) CLARIFIES THE FBI ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

HSPD 749 FBI RESPONSIBLE FOR REDUCING DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREATS, AND INVESTIGATING ACTUAL OR ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACKS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES.

49This Directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 of May 22, 1998 ("Critical Infrastructure"), and any Presidential directives issued prior to this directive to the extent of any inconsistency.

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DHS, SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY, APRIL 2008, APPENDIX A - U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE . NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITy)

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (HSPD) 5

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MOTR AGENCY FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED-AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD, WHERE SUCH ACTS ARE WITHIN THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF THE U.S.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, IS THE LEAD MQTR AGEtiCY FOR INTELUGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED'SiATES::--"" . THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACTING THRU THE FBI, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR: (1) INVESTIGATING TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE 1HE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED ATU.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD; AND (2) INVESTIGATE CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THAT OCCUR IN THE AIR DOMAIN. THE FBI HAS THE LEAD ROLE TO INVESTIGATE CYBERCRIME

THE NRF IS AGUIDE TO HOW THE NATION CONDUCTS ALL-HAZARDS RESPONSE.

CHAPTER 1: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT:

- THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACTING THROUGH THE FBI, HAS THE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR (1) CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR TERRORIST 1HREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD; AND (2) COORDINATING ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY TO DETECT, PREVENT. AND DISRUPT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY IS THE PRINCIPAL FEDERAL OFFICIAL FOR COORDINATING DOMESTIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS LEAD RESPONSIDILITY FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR THREATS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES, OR DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTITUTIONS ABROAD.

THE FBI HAS LEAD ROLE FOR COORDINATING THE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY TO DETECT, PREVENT, PREEMPT. AND DISRUPT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. **ANNEX II TO NSPD-46IHSPD-I5 (U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON TERROR) CLARIFIES THE FBI ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. FBI RESPONSIDLE FOR REDUCING DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREATS, AND INVESTIGATING ACTUAL OR ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACKS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES.

49This Directive supersedes Presidential Decision DirectivelNSC-63 of May 22,1998 ("Critical Infrastructure"), and any Presidential directives issued prior to this directive to the extent of any

. inconsistency.

UNCLASSIFIEDffFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 85


ATTORNEY'S THESE GUIDELINES APPLY TO INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES GENERAL'S CONDUCTED BY THE FBI WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR OUTSIDE GUIDELINES FOR THE TERRITORIES OF ALL COUNTRIES. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO DOMESTIC FBI INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE FBI IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, OPERATIONS WHICH ARE GOVERNED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERALS GUIDELINES

FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL FBI OPERATIONS.

**NOTE THESE GUIDELINES WENT INTO EFFECT DECEMBER 1, 2008.

MEMORANDUM OF DESIGNATES THAT THE FBI WILL LEAD TERRORIST FINANCING AGREEMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS USING NATIONAL JOINT BETWEEN THE DOJ TERRORISM TASK FORCE (NJTTF) AND JOINT TERRORISM TASK AND DHS CONCERNING FORCES (1TTF). TERRORIST FINANCING INVESTIGATIONS, SIGNED MAY 13, 2003

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ATTORNEY'S GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DOJ AND DHS CONCERNING TERRORIST FINANCING INVESTIGATIONS, SIGNED MAY 13 2003

THESE GUIDELINES APPLY TO INVESTIGATNE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY THE FBI WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIES OF ALL COUNTRIES. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO INVESTIGATNE ACTNITIES OF THE FBI IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, WHICH ARE GOVERNED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL FBI OPERATIONS.

**NOTE THESE GUIDELINES WENT INTO EFFECT DECEMBER I, 2008.

DESIGNATES THAT THE FBI WILL LEAD TERRORIST FINANCING INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS USING NATIONAL JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (NJTTF) AND JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES (JTTF).



COMMON FBI ACRONYMS A/SAC Acting SAC

NV AudioNideo

AA Ankara

AAG Assistant Attorney General

AAR After Action Report

ACD Automatic Call Distribution

ACS Automated Case Support

AD Assistant Director

ADA Americans with Disabilities Act

ADC Associate Division Counsel

ADIC Assistant Director in Charge

ADNET Antidrug Network

ADP Automated Data Processing

ADPT Automated Data Processing and Telecommunications

ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

AFB Air Force Base

AFGE American Federation of Government Employees

AFID Alias/False Identification

AFIS Automated Fingerprint Identification System

AFO Assault on a Federal Officer

AFOR Annual Field Office Report

AFOSI Air Force Office of. Special Investigations

AG Attorney General

AGG Attorney General Guidelines

AH Athens

Al Assistant Inspector or Artificial Intelligence

AIAI AI-Ittihad al-Islami aka Islamic Union (Somalia)

AID Agency for International Development

AIIP Assistant Inspector in Place

AKA Alias or Also-Known-As

AL Albany Field Office or Alabama or Annual Leave

ALAT Assistant Legal Attache


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AlSAC

AN

AA

AAG

AAR

ACD

ACS

AD

ADA

ADC

ADIC

ADNET

ADP

ADPT

ADR

AFB

AFGE

AFID

AFIS

AFO

AFOR

AFOSI

AG

AGG

AH

AI

AlAI

AID

AIIP

AKA

AL

ALAT

I UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMON FBI ACRONYMS Acting SAC

, AudioNideo

Ankara

Assistant Attorney General

After Action Report

Automatic Call Distribution

Automated Case Support

Assistant Director

Americans with Disabilities Act

Associate Division Counsel

Assistant Director in Charge

Antidrug Network

Automated Data Processing

Automated Data Processing and Telecommunications Alternative Dispute Resolution

Air Force Base

American Federation of Government EIT!~loyees Alias/False Identification

Automated Fingerprint Identification System Assault on a Federal Officer

Annual Field Office Report

Air Force Office of. Special Investigations Attorney General

Attorney General Guidelines

Athens

Assistant Inspector or Artificial Intelliflence AI-Ittihad al-Islami aka Islamic Union

lSomalia) Agency for International Development

Assistant Inspector in Place

Alias or Also-Known-As

Albany Field Office or Alabama or Annual Leave Assistant Legal Attache

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . 87

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ALF Animal Liberation Front

ALU Administrative Law Unit (OGC)

AM Amman

AN Anchorage Field Office

ANSIR, Awareness of National Security Issues and Response

AO Administrative Officer or Auxiliary Office

AOAC Administrative Officers Advisory Committee

AOB Average on Board

AOL America Online (Internet Service Provider)

AOT Act of Terrorism

AP Applicant Program

AQ Albuquerque Field Office

ARC American Red Cross

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge

A-SAC Associate SAC

ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchanse

ASD Administrative Services Division

ASG Abu Sayyat Group (Philippines)

ASOS Aviation and Surveillance Operations Section (CIRG)

AT Atlanta Field Office

ATCC Air Traffic Control Center

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode or Automated Teller Machine

AUC United Self Defense Forces of Colombia/Autodefensas Unidos de Colombia, a foreign terrorist organization

AUSA Assistant United States Attorney

AVITU AudioNideo Investigative Technology Unit (1TD)

AVP Availability Pay

AWOL Absent Without Official Leave

AY Almaty


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ANSIR

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AOAC

AOB

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AOT

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ARC

ASAC

A-SAC

ASCII

ASD

ASG

ASOS

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ATCC

ATF

ATM

AUC

AUSA

AVITU

AVP

AWOL

AY


Animal Liberation Front

Administrative Law Unit (OGG)

Amman

Anchorage Field Office

Awareness of National Security Issues and Res onse Administrative Officer or Auxiliary Office Administrative Officers Advisory Committee Average on Board

America Online (Internet Service Provider Act of Terrorism

Applicant Program

Albuquerque Field Office

American Red Cross

Assistant Special Agent in Charge

Associate SAC

American Standard Code for Information Interchanqe Administrative Services Division

Abu Sayyat Group (Philippines)

Aviation and Surveillance Operations Section (CIRG) Atlanta Field Office

Air Traffic Control Center

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Asynchronous Transfer Mode or Automated Teller Machine

United SEllf Defense Forces of ColombiaiAutodefensas Unidos de Colombia, a foreign terrorist organization Assistant United States Attorney

AudioNideo Investigative Technology Unit (lTD) . Availability Pay

Absent Without Official Leave

Almaty


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BA Baltimore Field Office

BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

BAU Behavioral Analysis Unit (CIRG)

BB Bridgetown

BC BICS Administration Group

BD Budapest ILEA

BDC Bomb Data Center (LAB)

BE Buenos Aires

BF Buffalo Field Office

BG Bogata

BH Birmingham Field Office

BI Brasilia

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs (Interior Department)

BICE Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement

BICS Background Investigation Contract Service

BK Bangkok

BL Brussels

BN Berlin

BO Bucharest

BOLO Be On the Lookout

BOP Bureau of Prisons

BPMS Bureau Personnel Management System.

BR Bern

BS Boston Field Office

BUDED Bureau Deadline

BW Biological Warfare '

BZ Beijing

C ,

Confidential

C/PTDs Convictions/Pretrial Diversions

CAC Crimes Against Children

CACU Crimes Against Children Unit

CAFRA Civil Asset Forfeiture and Reform Act of 2000

CALEA Communications Assistance to Law


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BATF

BAU

BB

BC

BD

BDC

BE

BF

BG

BH

BI

BIA

BICE

BICS

BK

BL

BN

BO

BOLO

BOP

BPMS

BR

BS

BUDED

BW

BZ

C

C/PTDs

CAC

CACU

CAFRA·

CALEA


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Baltimore Field Office

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Behavioral Analysis Unit (CIRG)

Bridgetown

BICS Administration Group

Budapest ILEA

Bomb Data Center (LAB)

Buenos Aires

Buffalo Field Office

Bogata

Birmingham Field Office

Brasilia

Bureau of Indian Affairs (Interior D~artmen!l Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement Background Investigation Contract Service Bangkok

Brussels

Berlin

Bucharest

Be On the Lookout

Bureau of Prisons

Bureau Personnel Management ~stem.

Bern

Boston Field Office

Bureau Deadline

Biological Warfare

Beijing

Confidential

Convictions/P retrial Diversions

Crimes Against Children

Crimes Against Children Unit

Civil Asset Forfeiture and Reform Act of 2000 Communications Assistance to Law



Enforcement Act

CAPWIN Capital Wireless Integrated Network

CART Computer Analysis and Response Team (ITD)

CASMIRC Child Abduction and Serial Murder Investigative Resource Center

CAT Crisis Action Team

CATS Consolidated Asset Tracking System

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CBR Can Be Reached

CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare

CCP Cyber Crime Program

CCR Computerized Criminal Record

CCTV Closed Circuit TV

CD Counterintelligence Division or Compact Disc

CDC Chief Division Counsel or Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CDL Commercial Driver's License

CDMA Code Division Multiple Access (wireless technology standard)

CDPD Cellular Digital Package Data

CE Charlotte Field Office or Critical Element

CEAU Cryptographic and Electronic Analysis Unit (ITD)

CEI Criminal Enterprise Investigations

CEIP Criminal Enterprise Investigations Program

CFC Combined Federal Campaign

CFG, Confidential Funding Guide

CFR Confidential File Room or Code of Federal Regulations

CG Chicago Field Office

CGR Crime on Government Reservations

CH Copenhagen

CI Cincinnati Field Office or Confidential Informant

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIC Counterintelligence Center (CIA)

CID Criminal Investigative Division (FBI)


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CAPWIN

CART

CASMIRC

CAT

CATS

CBP

CBR

CBW

CCP

CCR

CCTV

CD

CDC

COL

COMA

CDPD

CE

CEAU

CEI

CEIP

CFC

CFG

CFR

CG

CGR

CH

CI

CIA

CIC

CID


Enforcement Act

Capital Wireless Integrated Network

Computer Analysis and Response Team (ITO) Child Abduction and Serial Murder Investigative Resource Center

Crisis Action Team

Consolidated Asset Tracking System

Customs and Border Protection

Can Be Reached

Chemical and Biological Warfare

Cyber Crime Program

Computerized Criminal Record

Closed Circuit TV

Counterintelligence Division or Compact Disc Chief Division Counselor Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Commercial Driver's License

Code Division Multiple Access (wireless technology standard)

Cellular Digital Package Data

Charlotte Field Office or Critical ., Element Cryptographic and Electronic Analysis Unit (ITO) Criminal Enterprise Investigations

Criminal Enterprise Investigations ProQram Combined Federal Campaign

Confidential Funding Guide

Confidential File Room or Code of Federal Regulations Chicago Field Office

Crime on Government Reservations

Copenhagen

Cincinnati Field Office or Confidential Informant Central Intelligence Agency

Counterintelligence Center (CIA)

Criminal Investigative Division (FBI)



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CIITAC Computer Investigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center

CIMS Criminal Informant Management System

CIO Chief Information Officer

CIP Criminal Informant Program

CIPA Classified Information Protection Act

CIRG Critical Incident Response Group

CISP Criminal Intelligence Support Program

CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services Division

CLEA Criminal Law Enforcement Application

CLEIG Combined Law Enforcement Intelligence Group

CMU Crisis Management Unit (CIRG)

CN Canberra

CNC DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

CNN Cable News Network

CNU Crisis Negotiations Unit (CIRG)

CO Columbia Field Office

COB Close 'of Business

COBB Carry Over Briefing Book

COG Continuity of Government

COL Color of Law

COMSAT Communications Satellite

COMSEC , Communications Security

CONOP(S) Concept of Operation(s)

CONUS Continental United States

COOP Continuity of Operations Plan

COP Chief of Police or Community Outreach Program

COPS Community Oriented Policing Services (Dal)

COS Chief of Station (CIA)

COTR Contract Officer's Technical Representative

COTS Commercial off-the-shelf (software)

CP Command Post

CPU Central Processing Unit


91

ACLURM005581

;e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • •

CIITAC

CIMS

CIO

CIP

CIPA

CIRG

CISP

CJIS

CLEA

CLEIG

CMU

CN

CNC

CNN

CNU

CO

COB

COBB

COG

COL

COMSAT

COMSEC \

CONOP(S)

CONUS

COOP

COP

COPS

COS

COTR

COTS

CP

CPU

UNCLASSIFrEDllFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Computer Investigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center Crimil"!al Informant Management S stem Chief Information Officer

Criminal Informant Program

Classified Information Protection Act

Critical Incident Response Group

Criminal Intelligence Support Program·

Criminal Justice Information Services Division Criminal Law Enforcement Application

Combined Law Enforcement Intelligence Group Crisis Management Unit (CIRG)

Canberra

DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

Cable News Network

Crisis Negotiations Unit (CIRG)

Columbia Field Office

Close 'of Business

Carry Over Briefing Book

Continuity of Government

Color of Law

Communications Satellite

Communications Security

Concept of Operation(s)

Continental United States

Continuity of Operations Plan

Chief of Police or Community Outreach Program Community Oriented Policing Services (DOJ) Chief of Station (CIA)

Contract Officer's Technical Representative Commercial off-the-shelf (software)

Command Post

Central Processing Unit



CR Caracas or Civil Rights

CRP Civil Rights Program

CRT Cathode Ray Tube (Terminal) or Crisis Response Team

CRU Crisis Response Unit (ITD)

CS Computer Specialist or Confidential Source

CSRS Civil Service Retirement System

CT Counterterrorism

CTAWU Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit

CTC Counter Terrorist Center (CIA)

CTD Counterterrorism Division (FBI)

CTI Computer Telephony Integration

CTS Cyber Technology Section (ITD)

CV Cleveland Field Office

CW Chemical Warfare or Cooperative Witness

CYD Cybercrime Division

CZ Cairo

D1 Division One - CJIS

D10 Inspection Division (INSD)

D11 Security Division

D12 Finance Division (FD)

D13 Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

D14 Investigative Services Division (defunct)

D16 Cybercrime Division (CYD)

D17 Records Management Division (RMD)

D18 Investigative Technology Division (ITD)

D2 Training Division (TD)

D3 Administrative Services Division (ASD)

D4 Information Resources Division (IRD)

D5 Counterintelligence Division (CD)

D6 • Criminal Investigative Division (CID)

D7 Laboratory Division (LAB)


92

a

a • • a a

a

• a

• • a • a

a • a •

•

• • • a • • a a

a a

•

ACLURM005582

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • ,. • :. • • •

CR

CRP

CRT

CRU

CS

CSRS

CT

CTAWU

CTC

CTD

CTI

_CTS

CV

CW

CYD

CZ

D1

D10

D11

D12

D13

D14

D16

D17

D18

D2

D3

D4

D5

D6

D7


Caracas or Civil Rights

Civil Rights Program

Cathode Ray Tube (Terminal) or Crisis Response Team Crisis Response Unit (lTD)

Computer Specialist or C0!lfidential Source Civil Service Retirement System

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit Counter Terrorist Center (CIA)

Counterterrorism Division (FBI)

Computer Telephony Integration

Cyber Technology Section (lTD)

Cleveland Field Office

Chemical Warfare or Cooperative Witness Cybercrime Division

Cairo

Division One - CJIS

Inspection Division (INSD)

Security Division

Finance Division (FD)

Counte~errorism Division (CTD)

Investigative Services Division (defunct) Cybercrime Division (CYD)

Records Management Division (RMD) Investigative Technology Division (lTD) Training Division (TD)

Administrative Services Division (ASD) Information Resources Division (IRD) Counterintelligence Division (CD)

Criminal Investigative Division (CID) Laboratory Division (LAB)


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • S

S

S

S • S

S

S

S S

D9 Office of the General Counsel (OGC)

DAD Deputy Assistant Director

DAG Deputy Attorney General

DAP Deliberate Assault Plan

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAWY Direct Agent Workyear

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive

DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service

DD Deputy Director

DDN Defense Data Network

DDO Deputy Director of Operations (CIA)

DE Detroit Field Office

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration.

DES Data Encryption Standard

DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DI Directorate of Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIDO Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official

DINSUM Defense Intelligence Summary

D1SA Defense Information Systems Agency

DISC Defense Intelligence Summary Cable

DISCO Defense InduStrial Security Contracting Office

DISN Defense Information Systems Network

DISSEM Dissemination

DITU Data Intercept Technology Unit (ITD)

DJ Security Division

DK Records Management Division (RMD)


93

ACLURM005583

• • • • • • • • • • • .' • • • • • j. !. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

D9

DAD

DAG

DAP

DARPA

DAWY

DCI

DCID

DCIS

DD

DDN

DDO

DE

DEA

DES

DEST

DHS

DI

DIA

DIDO

DINSUM

DISA

DISC

DISCO

DISN

DISSEM

DITU

DJ

DK


Office of the General Counsel , (OGC)

Deputy Assistant Director

Deputy Attorney General

Deliberate Assault Plan

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Direct Agent Workyear

Director of Central Intelligence

Director of Central Intelligence Directive Defense Criminal Investigative Service Deputy Director

Defense Data Network

Deputy Director of Operations (CIA) Detroit Field Office

Drug Enforcement Administration

Data Encryption Standard

, Domestic Emergency Support Team Department of Homeland Security Directorate of Intelligence

Defense Intelligence Agency

Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official Defense Intelligence Summary

Defense Information Systems Agency Defense Intelligence Summary Cable Defense Industrial Security Contracting_Office Defense Information Systems Network Dissemination

Data Intercept Technology Unit (lTDl Security Division

Records Management Division (RMQ)



DL

I Dallas Field Office

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DLAT Deputy Legal Attache or Defense Language Aptitude Test

DM ,, Cybercrimes Division (CYD)

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DMV Department of Motor Vehicles

DN Denver Field Office

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DO Director's Office

DOB Date of Birth

DOC Department of Commerce •

DOCX Document Exploitation

DOD Department of Defense

'DOE Department of Energy

DOEd Department of Education

DOI Department of the Interior

DOJ Department of Justice

DOL Department of Labor

DOMTERR Domestic Terrorism

DOS Department of State

DOT Date of Theft or Department of Transportation

DP Investigative Technology Division (ITD)

DPOB Date, Place of Birth DRSN Defense Red Switch Network

DS&T Directorate of Science & Technology (CIA)

DSN Defense Switched Network

DSNET Defense Integrated Secure Network

DSS Diplomatic Security Service (USDS) or Defense Security Service (DOD)

DST c Daylight Savings Time

DT Domestic Terrorism

DTG Date-Time Group

DTO • Drug Trafficking Organization

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTSA Defense Technology Security Administration


94

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••••••••••••••••••••••••••i•

••••

ACLURM005584

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ." • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • '. • • • • • • • • • • • •

DLA

DLAT

DM

DMA

DMV

DN

DNA

DO

DOB

DOC

DOCX

DOD

'DOE

DOEd

DOl

DOJ

DOL

DOMTERR

DOS

DOT

DP

DPOB

DRSN

DS&T

DSN

DSNET

DSS

DST ("

DT

DTG

DTO

DTRA

DTSA


I Dallas Field Office

Defense Logistics Agency

Deputy Legal Attache or Defense Language Aptitude Test

, \ Cybercrimes Division (CYD)

Defense Mapping Agency

Department of Motor Vehicles

Denver Field Office

Deoxyribonucleic Acid

Di rector's Office

Date of Birth

Department of Commerce

Document Exploitation

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of Education

Department of the Interior

Department of Justice

Department of Labor

Domestic Terrorism

Department of State

Date of Theft or Department of Transportation Investigative Technology Division (lTD)

Date, Place of Birth

Defense Red Switch Network

Directorate of Science & Technology (CIA) Defense Switched Network

Defense Integrated Secure Network

Diplomatic Security Service (USDS) or Defense Security Service (DOD)

Daylight Savings Time

Domestic Terrorism

Date-Time Group

Drug Trafficking Organization

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Defense Technology Security Administration


a

• • a S

• a

a

a • S a a S a S

• a

S

S

a • • S

S

S

a

a

S

S

a

a

• a

S • S a a S


E-mail Electronic mail EAD Executive Assistant Director

EAP Employee Assistance Program or Emergency Assault Plan

EARS ELSUR Automated Records System

EAS Emergency Action Specialist

EBR Executive Briefing Room (SIOC)

EC Electronic Communication ECF Electronic Case File

ECR Executive Conference Room (SIOC)

EDI Executive Development Institute

EDSP Executive Development and Selection Program

EEl Essential Elements of Information

EEO Equal Employment Opportunity

EFT Electronic Funds Transfer

ELF Earth Liberation Front

ELN Colombian National Liberation Army

ELSUR Electronic Surveillance EM Executive Management

EO Executive Order

EOC Eurasian Organized Crime

EOD . Entry on Duty or Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EOP Executive Office of the President

EOUSA Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (Dal)

EP El Paso Field Office

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center

ERF Engineering Research Facility - Quantico

ERL Electronic Reference Library

ERT Emergency Response Team ERTU Emergency Response Team Unit (LAB)

ET Electronics Technicians

ETA Estimated Time of Arrival or Basque Fatherland and Liberty, aka Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna


95

ACLURM005585

• .l • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

E-mail

EAD

EAP

EARS

EAS

EBR

EC

ECF

ECR

EDI

EDSP

EEl

EEO

EFT

ELF

ELN

ELSUR

EM

EO

EOC

EOD

EOP

EOUSA

EP

EPA

EPIC

ERF

ERL

ERT

ERTU

ET <- <

ETA


Electronic mail

Executive Assistant Director

Employee Assistance Program or Emergency Assault Plan

ELSUR Automated Records System

Emergency Action Specialist

Executive Briefing Room (SIOC)

Electronic Communication

Electronic Case File

Executive Conference Room (SlOG)

Executive Development Institute

Executive Development and Selection Program Essential Elements of Information

Equal Employment Opportunity

Electronic Funds Transfer

Earth Liberation Front

Colombian National Liberation Army

Electronic Surveillance

Executive Management

Executive Order

Eurasian Organized Crime

Entry on Duty or Explosive Ordnance Disposal Executive Office of the President

Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (DOJ) EI Paso Field Office

Environmental Protection Agency

EI Paso Intelligence Center

Engineering Research Facility -Quantico Electronic Reference Library

Emergency Response Team

Emergency Response Team Unit (LAB)

Electronics Technicians

Estimated Time of Arrival or Basque Fatherland and Liberty, aka Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna



EU European Union

EVP Evidence Program

FA Financial Analyst or Financial Assistant

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAG Fraud Against the Government

FAM Federal Air Marshal

FAMA Federal Air Marshal Association

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FAST Forfeiture and Asset Seizure Team

FBIHQ FBI Headquarters

FBIRA FBI Recreation Association

FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FCI Foreign Counterintelligence

FD Finance Division

FDA Food and Drug Administration

Fed Federal Reserve System

FEDS Front End Distribution System

FEDSIM Federal Computer Performance Evaluation and Simulation Center

FEGLI Federal Employees Government Life Insurance

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FERS Federal Employees Retirement System

FEST Foreign Emergency Support Team

FGI Foreign Government Information

Fl Full Investigation

FIF Financial Institution Fraud

FIS Foreign Intelligence Service

FISA ' Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance


96

1111

111

1111

11111

01

1110

1111

1111

11M

OS

SIP

OS

SOM

MO

SS

IS

MO

SS

O

7E

ACLURM005586

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • :. I: • • • • • • • • • • • • •

EU

EVP

FA

FAA

FAG

FAM

FAMA

FAR

FARC

FAST

FBIHQ

FBIRA

FBIS

FCC

FCI

FD

FDA

Fed

FEDS

FEDSIM

FEGLI

FEMA

FERC

FERS

FEST

FGI

FI

FIF

FIS

FISA

FISC


European Union

Evidence Program

Financial Analyst or Financial Assistant

Federal Aviation Administration

Fraud Against the Government

Federal Air Marshal

Federal Air Marshal Association

Federal Acquisition Regulations

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Forfeiture and Asset Seizure Team

FBI Headquarters

FBI Recreation Association

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Federal Communications Commission

Foreign Counterintelligence

Finance Division

Food and Drug Administration

Federal Reserve System

Front End Distribution System

Federal Computer Performance Evaluation and Simulation Center

Federal Employees Government Life Insurance

Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Employees Retirement System Foreign Emergency Support Team Foreign Government Information

Full Investigation

Financial Institution Fraud

[ 87E

Foreign Intelligence Service

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Foreign Intelligence Surveillance



• • • • •

S •

• • a • S

S

a

a • S • • • a

S

S • • S

S

• S a •

Court

FISUR Physical Surveillance

FM Financial Manager

FMU Facility Management Unit (ASD)

FNU First Name Unknown

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

FOIPA Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts

FOUO For Official Use Only

FSL Funded Staffing Level

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization

FTS Federal Telephone System

FTTTF Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

FTX Field Training Exercise

FUG Fugitive

FY Fiscal Year

FYI For Your Information

GAO General Accounting Office

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (UN)

GF Government Fraud

GIA Global Index Application

GITMO USMC Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

GIWG Global Intelligence Working Group

GMT Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu)

GOU Global Operations Unit

GPO Government Printing Office

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

GPS Global Positioning System

GRC Government Reservation Crimes

GS General Schedule

GSA General Services Administration

HAMAS Islamic Resistance Movement

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HC Hate Crime

HCF Health Care Fraud


97

ACLURM005587

• • • • • • • • • • • :. '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

FISUR

FM

FMU

FNU

FOIA

FOIPA

FOUO

FSL

FTO

FTS

FTTTF

FTX

FUG

FY

FYI

GAO

GATT

GF

GIA

GITMO

GIWG

GMT

GOU

GPO

GPRA

GPS

GRC

GS

GSA

HAMAS

HAZMAT

HC

HCF


Court

Physical Surveillance

Financial Manager I Facility Management Unit (ASD) .

First Name Unknown

Freedom of Information Act

Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts For Official Use Only

Funded Staffing Level

Foreign Terrorist Organization

Federal Telephone System

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force Field Training Exercise

Fugitive

Fiscal Year

For Your Information

General Accounting Office

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -(UN) Government Fraud

Global Index Application

USMC Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Global Intelligence Working Group Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu)

Global Operations Unit

Government Printing Office

Government Performance and Results Act Global POSitioning System

Government Reservation Crimes

General Schedule

General Services Administration

Islamic Resistance Movement

Hazardous Materials

Hate Crime

Health Care Fraud



S • S S S

S S

S

S

• S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

NEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air Filters

HHS Health and Human Services

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HK Hong Kong

HMRT Hazardous Materials Response Team

HMRU Hazardous Materials Response Unit (LAB)

HN Honolulu Field Office

HO Houston Field Office

HR Human Resources

HRMS Human Resources Management Section

HRT Hostage Rescue Team

HTML Hypertext Markup Language

HUD Housing and Urban Development

HUMINT Human Resources Intelligence

HZ Hermosillo, Mexico

IA Investigative Assistant or Investigative Analyst

IAATI International Association of Auto Theft Investigators

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

IAD Dulles International Airport

!AFC , International Association of Fire Chiefs

IAFIS •

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System

IB Intelligence Base

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System

IC Indian Country or Intelligence Community or Internet Cafe

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)

ICM Investigative Case Management

I-CON Information Control b-

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IG Inspector General


98

ACLURM005588

• • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

HEPA

HHS

HIDTA

HK

HMRT

HMRU

HN

HO

HR

HRMS

HRT

HTML

HUD

HUMINT

HZ

IA

IAATI

IACP

lAD

IAFC

IAFIS

IB

IBIS

IC

ICBM

ICE

ICM

I-CON

I lED

IG


,

High Efficiency Particulate Air Filters

Health and Human Services

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

Hong Kong

Hazardous Materials Response Team

Hazardous Materials Response Unit (LAB) Honolulu Field Office

Houston Field Office

Human Resources

Human Resources Management Section Hostage Rescue Team

Hypertext Markup Language

Housing and Urban Development

Human Resources Intelligence

Hermosillo, Mexico

Investigative Assistant or Investigative Analyst International Association of Auto Theft Investigators International Association of Chiefs of Police Dulles International Airport

International Association of Fire Chiefs

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System Intelligence Base

Interagency Border Inspection System

Indian Country or Intelligence Community or Internet Cafe Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS) Investigative Case Management

Information Control

r Improvised Explosive DeVice

Inspector General


b7 E


111A Integrated Intelligence Information Application

IINI Innocent Images National Initiative • IIP Inspector in Place IIR -- Intelligence Information Report ILEA International Law Enforcement

Academy, Budapest IM Instant Messaging IMA Information Management Assistant !MINT Imagery Intelligence IN Interpol INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite INS Immigration and Naturalization Service INSD Inspection Division INTERPOL International Criminal Police

Organization INTERR International Terrorism INTSUM Intelligence Summary

10 Intelligence Officer 10B Intelligence Oversight Board IOS Intelligence Operations Specialist IP Indianapolis Field Office or Internet

Protocol IR , CIRG IRD Information Resources Division IRS intelligence Research Specialist or

Internal Revenue Service IS Islamabad ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network -

capacity is 128 kbps ISP Internet Service Provider ISRAA Integrated Statistical Reporting and

Analysis Application IT Information Technology or Interstate

Theft or International Terrorism ITC Information Technology Center ITD Investigative Technology. Division ITL Internet Tip Line ITM Information Technologies Manager


99

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•

ACLURM005589

• • • :. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

IliA

IINI

liP

IIR

ILEA

1M

IMA

IMINT

IN

INMARSAT

INS

INSD

INTERPOL

INTERR

INTSUM

10

lOB

lOS

IP

IR \

IRD

IRS

IS

ISDN

ISP

ISRAA

IT

ITC

lTD

ITL

ITM


Integrated Intelligence Information Application Innocent Images National Initiative

Inspector in Place -- Intelligence Information Report

International Law Enforcement Academy. Budapest Instant Messaging

Information Management Assistant

Imagery Intelligence

Interpol

International Maritime Satellite

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Inspection Division

International Criminal Police Organization International Terrorism

Intelligence Summary

Int~lIigence Officer

Intelligence Oversight Board

Intelligence Operations Specialist

Indianapolis Field Office or Internet Protocol CIRG

Information Resources Division

Intelligence Research Specialist or Internal Revenue Service

Islamabad

Integrated Services Digital Network-capacity is 128 kbps Internet Service Provider

Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application Information Technology or Interstate Theft or International Terrorism

Information Technology Center

Investigative Technology Division

Internet Tip Line

Information Technologies Manager


ITOS International Terrorism Operations Section

1TSMV Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles

ITSP Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property

IVR Interactive Voice Response

JCS ., Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDIG Joint Drug Intelligence Group

JEH J. Edgar Hoover Building

JEM - Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed) (Pakistan)

JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport

JI . Jemaah Islamiya (Southeast Asia)

JK Jacksonville Field Office

JN Jackson Field Office

JOC Joint Operations Center

JSOC .

Joint Special Operations Command or Joint Special Operations Center

JTF-6 Joint Task Force-6

JTFTF Joint Terrorist Financing Task Force

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

KC Kansas City Field Office

KMA Retirement-eligible, Special Agent

KSA Knowledge, Skills and Ability

KV Kiev

KX Knoxville Field Office

LA Los Angeles Field Office or Language Analyst

LAB Laboratory Division

LAN Local Area Network

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LCN La Cosa Nostra

LD Laboratory Division

LEA Law Enforcement Agency

Legat Legal Attache

LEO Law Enforcement Online


100


ACLURM005590

• • • UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONL Y

• • ITOS International Terrorism Operations

• Section lTSMV Interstate Transportation of Stolen • Motor Vehicles

• ITSP Interstate Transportation of Stolen

• Property IVR Interactive Voice Response • JCS v Joint Chiefs of Staff • JDIG Joint Drug Intelligence Group • JEH .. J, Edgar Hoover Building

• JEM . Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of

• Mohammed) (Pakistan)

• JFK John F, Kennedy International Airport

• JI Jemaah Islamiya (Southeast Asia)

• JK Jacksonville Field Office

• IN Jackson Field Office

• JOC Joint Operations Center

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command or • Joint Special Operations Center

• JTF-6 Joint Task Force-6

• JTFTF Joint Terrorist Financing Task Force

• JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

• JWICS JointWorldwide Intelligence

• Communications System

• KC Kansas City Field Office

• KMA Retirement-eligible, Special Agent

• KSA Knowledge, Skills and Ability

KV Kiev • KX Knoxville Field Office • LA Los Angeles Field Office or Language • Analyst

• LAB Laboratory Division

• LAN Local Area Network

• • LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

• LCN La Cosa Nostra

·LD Laboratory Division • LEA Law Enforcement Agency • Legat Legal Attache • LEO Law Enforcement Online • • • UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 100

• • -- ---


••s

as

ss

ss

ss

ss

ss

ss

sss

ss

ss

sss

ss

as

ss

ss

ss

ss

LES Law Enforcement Services or Law Enforcement Sensitive

LG Lagos

LHM Letterhead Memorandum

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LNO Liaison Officer

LNU Last Name Unknown

LO Liaison Office(r) or Lookout or Legat London

LR Little Rock Field Office

LS Louisville Field Office or Language Specialist

LTTE . Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)

LV .

Las Vegas Field Office

LWOP Leave Without Pay

MAOP Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures

MC - Moscow

MD Madrid

ME Memphis Field Office

MGMT Management

MH Manila

MIOG Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines

MLAT Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

MLO Military Liaison Officer

MM Miami Field Office

MO Mobile Field Office or Modus Operandi

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MP Minneapolis Field Office or Military Police

MRTA Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Peru)

Msg Message

MTTCU Major Theft/Transportation Crimes Unit

MW Milwaukee Field Office

MX Mexico City

NA FBI National Academy

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFNCIAL USE ONLY

101

ACLURM005591

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

LES

LG

LHM

LLNL

, LNO

LNU

LO

LR

LS

LTTE

LV

LWOP

MAOP

MC

MD

ME

MGMT

MH

MIOG

MLAT

MLO

MM

MO

MOA

MOU

MP

MRTA

Msg

MTTCU

MW

MX

NA


Law Enforcement Services or Law Enforcement Sensitive Lagos

Letterhead Memorandum

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Liaison Officer

Last Name Unknown

Liaison Office(r) or Lookout or Legat London Little Rock Field Office

Louisville Field Office or Language S~ecialist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) Las Vegas Field Office

Leave Without Pay .

Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures Moscow

Madrid

Memphis Field Office

Management

Manila

Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

Military Liaison Officer

Miami Field Office

Mobile Field Office or Modus Operandi

Memorandum of Agreement

Memorandum of Understanding

Minneapolis Field Office or Military Police Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Peru) Message

Major TheftlTransportation Crimes Unit

Milwaukee Field Office

Mexico City

FBI National Academy



NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

NAC New Agents Class

NALC National Association of Letter Carriers

NAS National Alert System

NATA North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO

NATU New Agent Training Unit (TD)

NCAVC National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime

NCIC National Crime Information Center

NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NCMEC National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office

NE Ft. Monmouth ITC

NEOB New Executive Office Building

NF No Foreign Dissemination or Norfolk Field Office

NFI Not Further Identified or No Further Information or National Foreign Intelligence

NFIB National Foreign Intelligence Board

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program

NGS National Gang Strategy

NH New Haven Field Office

NI Nairobi

NIBIN National Integrated Ballistic Information Network

NICB National Insurance Crime Bureau

NICS National Instant Criminal Background Check System

NIH National Institutes of Health

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center

NIPCIP National Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion Program


102

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• •••

••••

ACLURM005592

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • :.

NAACP

NAC

NALC

NAS

NATA

NATO

NATU

NCAVC

NCIC

NCIS

NCMEC

NCTC

NDIC

NDPO

NE

NEOB

NF

NFl

NFIB

NFIP

NGS

NH

NI

NIBIN

NICB

NICS

NIH

NIMA

NIPC

NIPCIP


National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

New Agents Class

National Association of Letter Carriers

National Alert System

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

New Agent Training Unit (TD)

National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime National Crime Information Center

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children National Counterterrorism Center

National Drug Intelligence Center

National Domestic Preparedness Office

Ft. Monmouth lTC

New Executive Office Building

No Foreign Dissemination or Norfolk Field Office Not Further Identified or No Further Information or National Foreign Intelligence National Foreign Intelligence Board

National Foreign Intelligence Program

National Gang Strategy

New Haven Field Office

Nairobi

National Integrated Ballistic Information Network National Insurance Crime Bureau

National Instant Criminal Background Check System . National Institutes of Health

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

National Infrastructure Protection Center National Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion Program


o •

o

o

•

S

• • S S S S S

• S

S

S

S

S

S S

• •

S


NIPRNET Unclassified But Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network

NJTTF National JTTF

NK Newark Field Office

NL New Delhi

NLETS .

National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System

NMCC National Military Command Center

NO New Orleans Field Office

NOC Negotiations Operations Center or Network Operations Center

NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NOIWON National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense -Command

NORTHCOM Northern Command, Colorado Springs, CO

NPO National Press Office, FBIHQ

NPTL National Priority Target List

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency or National Sheriff's Association

NSC National Security Council

NSLU National Security Law Unit (OGC)

NSTL National Security Threat List

NTWS National Threat Warning System

NVG Night Vision Goggles

NWS National Weather Service

NY New York City Field Office

OADR Originating Agency's Determination Required

OC/D Organized Crime/Drug

OC/DP Organized Crime/Drug Program

OCA Original Classification Authority or Office of Congressional Affairs

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

OCE Organized Criminal Enterprises


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ACLURM005593

• • • • :. ;. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

NIPRNET

NJTTF

NK

NL

NLETS

NMCC

NO

NOC

NOFORN

NOIWON

NORAD

NORTHCOM

NPO

NPTL

NRC

NRO

NSA

NSC

NSLU

NSTL

NTWS

NVG

NWS

NY

OADR

OC/D

OC/DP

OCA

OCDETF

OGE


Unclassified But Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network

National JTTF

Newark Field Office

New Delhi

National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System National Military Command Center

New Orleans Field Office

Negotiations Operations Centeror Network Operations Center

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network

North American Aerospace Defense -Command Northern Command, Colorado Springs, CO National Press Office, FBIHQ

National Priority Target List

N"uclear Regulatory Commission

National Reconnaissance Office

National Security Agency or National Sheriff's Association National Security Council

National Security Law Unit (OGC)

National Security Threat List

National Threat Warning System

Night Vision Goggles

National Weather Service

New York City Field Office

Originating Agency's Determination Required Organized Crime/Drug

Organized Crime/Drug Program

Original Classification Authority or Office of Congressional Affairs

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Organized Criminal Enterprises


a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a • a a a a a a


OCIO Office of Chief Information Officer

OCIS Organized Crime Information System

OCONUS Outside CONUS

OCR Optical Character Reader/Recognition

OEEOA Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs

0E0 Office of Enforcement Operations (DOJ)

OEOB Old Executive Office Building

OFAC Office of Foreign Asset Control (Trees)

OGA Other Government Agency

OGC Office of General Counsel

01A Office of International Affairs (DOJ)

OIG Office of Inspector General

010 Office of International Operations

OLEC Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

OM Omaha Field Office

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

00 Office of Origin

OPA Office of Public Affairs

OPM - Office of Personnel Management

OPORD Operations Order

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility

OPS Operations

OPSEC Operational Security

ORCON Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator or Originator Controlled

OSC On-Scene Commander

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSIRIS Online Searchable Integrated Reference Information System

OT Overtime

OTU Operations and Training Unit, CIRG

PA Paris or Probationary Agent or Program Analyst


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ACLURM005594

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • i. i. I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

OCIO

OCIS

OCONUS

OCR

OEEOA

OEO

OEOB

OFAC

OGA

OGC

OIA

OIG

010

OlEC

OM

OMB

ONDCP

00

OPA

OPM

OPORD

OPR

OPS

OPSEC

ORCON

OSC

OSHA

OSIRIS

OT

OTU

PA


Office of Chief Information Officer

Organized Crime Information System

Outside CONUS

Optical Character Reader/Recognition

Office of Equal Employment Opportunity_ Affairs Office of Enforcement Operations (DOJ) Old Executive Office Building

Office of Foreign Asset Control (Treas)

Other Government Agency

Office of General Counsel

Office of International Affairs (DOJ)

Office of Inspector General

Office of International Operations

Office of law Enforcement Coordination Omaha Field Office

Office of Management and Budget

Office of National Drug Control Policy

Office of Origin

Office of Public Affairs

Office of Personnel Management

Operations Order

Office of Professional Responsibility

Operations

Operational Security

Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator or Originator Controlled On-Scene Commander

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Online Searchable Integrated Reference Information System

Overtime

Operations and Training Unit, CIRG



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••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

PAC . Public Access Center (SIOC)

PAP Probationary Agent Program

PAR . Performance Appraisal Report

PAS Performance Appraisal System

PC Panama City or Public Corruption or Personal Computer

PCOR Program Coordinator

PD Portland Field Office or Police Department

PDA Personal Digital Assistant

PDD . Presidential Decision Directive

PDF Portable Document File - viewable with Adobe Acrobat software

PFI Principal Firearms Instructor

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PG Pittsburgh Field Office

PH Philadelphia Field Office

PI Preliminary Investigation

PIC Pilots in Command

PIJ Palestine Islamic Jihad

PIN Personal Identification Number

PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party (Turkey)

PLF Palestine Liberation Front

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PM Program Manager

PNG Persona Non Grata

POC Point of Contact

POE Point of Entry

POV Privately Owned Vehicle

PP Pay Period

PPMS Procurement and Property Management Section (FD)

PR Prague

PRAU Performance Recognition and Awards Unit (PRAU)

PRL Personnel Resource List

PSOBO Public Safety Officer's Benefits Office (DOJ)

PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network


ACLURM005595

I. • • • I.

I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

PAC

PAP

PAR

PAS

PC

PCOR

PO

PDA

POD

PDF

PFI

PFLP

PG

PH

PI

PIC

PIJ

PIN

PKK

PLF

PLO

PM

PNG

POC

POE

POV

PP

PPMS

PR

PRAU

PRL

PSOBO

PSTN


Public Access Center (SlOG)

Probationary A,gent Program

Performance Appraisal Report

Performance Appraisal System

Panama City or Public Corruption or Personal Computer Program Coordinator

Portland Field Office or Police Department . Personal Digital Assistant

Presidential Decision Directive

Portable Document File - viewable with Adobe Acrobat software

Principal Firearms Instructor

Popular Front for the Liberation of' Palestine Pittsburgh Field Office

Philadelphia ~ield Office

Preliminary Investigation

Pilots in Command

Palestine Islamic Jihad

Personal Identification Number

Kurdistan Workers' Party (Turkey)

Palestine Liberation Front

Palestine Liberation Organization

Program Manager

Persona Non Grata

Point of Contact

Point of Entry

Privately Owned Vehicle

Pay Period

Procurement and Property Management Section (FD) Prague

Performance Recognition and Awards Unit (PRAU) Personnel Resource List

Public Safety Officer'sBenefits Office . (DOJ)

Public Switched Telephone Network



PT Pretoria or Physical Training

PX Phoenix Field Office

QS! Quality Step Increase

RA Resident Agency

RAC Resident Agent in. Charge

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RDLU • Rapid Deployment and Logistics Unit (CIRG)

RDOC Rapid Deployment Operations Center (Aquia)

REI Racketeering Enterprise investigation

REL Releasable

RFU Radical Fundamentalist Unit (CTD)

RH ' Richmond Field Office

RICO Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization

RISS • Regional Information Sharing System

RMA Resource Management and Allocation

RMAB Resource Management and Allocation Board

RMD Records Management Division

RO Rome

ROM Read Only Memory

RSIMS Rapid Start Information Management System

RSO Regional Security Officer (U.S. Embassy)

RY Riyadh

S ZOci‹..

SA Special Agent or San Antonio Field Office

SAA Special Agent Accountant

SAAC Special Agent Advisory Committee

SABT Special Agent Bomb Technician

SAC Special Agent in Charge

SACS Secure Access Control System

SAMBA Special Agents Mutual Benefits Association

SAMMS Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection (System) or (Board)

a

a a a

a a a • a a a a a a •

• a

a a a

S

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

S

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a • S

106 UNCLASSIFIED/NOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ACLURM005596

,

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • :. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .\ .' • • • •

PT

PX QSI

RA

RAC

RCMP

RDLU

RDOC

REI

REL

RFU

RH

RICO

RISS

RMA

RMAB

RMD

RO

ROM

RSIMS

RSO

RY

S

SA

SAA

SAAC

SABT

SAC

SACS

SAMBA

SAMMS

UNCLASSIFJEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Pretoria or Physical Training

Phoenix Field Office

Quality Step Increase·

Resident Agency

Resident Agent in. Charge

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Rapid Deployment and Logistics Unit CIRG

Racketeering Enterprise Investigation

Releasable

Radical Fundamentalist Unit (CTD)

Richmond Field Office

Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Regional Information Sharing System

Resource Management and Allocation

Resource Management and Allocation Board Records Management Division

Rome

Read Only Memory

Rapid Start Information Management System Regional Security Officer (U.S. Embassy) Riyadh

~

Special Agent or San Antonio Field Office Special Agent Accountant

Special Agent Advisory Committee

Special Agent Bomb Technician

Special Agent in Charge

Secure Access Control System

Special Agents Mutual Benefits Association Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection (System) or (Board)


UNCLASSIREDHFOR 01-1-4CIAL.USE ONLY

SAMNET Secure Automated Message Network

SAR Suspicious Activity Report

SAS Supervisory Administrative Specialist

SAUSA .

Special Assistant United States Attorney

SBA Small Business Administration

SC Sacramento Field Office or Section Chief or South Carolina

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCIF SCI Facility

SCION Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network

SCOPE ( Secure Counterterrorism Operational Prototype Environment

SCS Supervisory Computer Specialist

SD San Diego Field Office or Security Division

i

SDNY Southern District of New York

SE Seattle Field Office

SEAS Supervisory EAS

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission

SEMU Special Events Management Unit (CTD)

SERL Special Events Readiness Level

SES Senior Executive Service

SF San Francisco Field Office

SG ' Singapore

SHAC Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty - an animal rights extremist group

SI Springfield Field Office

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIOC Strategic Information and Operations Center

SIPRNET 5Die-Internet Protocol Router Network

SISG SIOC Information Support Group

SITREP Situation Report

SIU Sensitive Investigation Unit

SJ San Juan Field Office


107

••••

••S

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SS

SO

S•

S

ACLURM005597

• • • • • • • '. I. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

SAMNET

SAR

SAS

SAUSA

SBA

SC

SCI

SCIF

SCION

SCOPE

SCS

SD

SDNY

SE

SEAS

SEATO

SEC

SEMU

SERL

SES

SF

SG

SHAC

SI

SIGINT

SIOC

SIPRNET

SISG

SITREP

SIU

SJ

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL·USE ONLY

Secure Automated Message Network

Suspicious Activity Report

Supervisory Administrative Specialist

Special Assistant United States Attorney Small Business Administration

Sacramento Field Office or Section Chief or South Carolina

Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCI Facility

Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network

I ..

Secure Counterterrorism Operational Prototype Environment

~ Supervisory Computer Specialist

San Diego Field Office or Security I

Division Southern District of New York

Seattle Field Office

Supervisory EAS

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Securities and Exchange Commission

Special Events Management Unit (CTD)

Special Events Readiness Level

Senior Executive Service

San Francisco Field Office

Singapore

Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty - an animal rights extremist group

Springfield Field Office

Signals Intelligence

Strategic Information and Operations Center ~Internet Protocol Router Network

SIOC Information Support Group

Situation Report

Sensitive Investigation Unit

San Juan Field Office



SL St. Louis Field Office or Sick Leave or Sendero Luminoso - aka Shining Path (Peru)

SMEAC Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command & Control

SMR SIOC Morning Report

SMTP Single Mail Transfer Protocol

SN Santiago

SO Seoul or Sheriff's Office

SOD Special Operations Division, Drug Section (CID)

SOG Special Operations Group or Surveillance Observation Group

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SRU Strategic Resources Unit (ITD)

SSA Supervisory Special Agent

SSAN Social Security Account Number

SSG Special Surveillance Group

SSGU Safe Streets and Gangs Unit (VCMOS, CID)

SSRA Supervisory Senior Resident Agent

SSS Support Services Section

SST Support Services Technician

ST Santo Domingo or State

STATE United States Department of State

STE Secure Telephone Equipment

STU Secure Telephone Unit

SU Salt Lake City Field Office

SVTS Secure Video Teleconferencing System

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

SWB Southwest Border

SWS SIOC Watch Supervisor

T&A Time and Attendance

T1 1.54 Megabits per Second Throughput (Data Line)

T3 44.3 Megabits per Second Throughput (Data Line)

TA Telephone Application

TACSAT Tactical Satellite


108

••••

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••••

••••

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••••

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S•••

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ACLURM005598

• • • UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• • SL St. Louis Field Office or Sick Leave or

• Sendero Luminoso - aka Shining Path

• (PerLJl SMEAC Situation, Mission, Execution, • Administration, Command & Control

• SMR SIOC Morning Report

• SMTP ..

Single Mail Transfer Protocol

• SN Santiago

• SO Seoul or Sheriff's Office

• SOD Special Operations Division, Drug

• Section (CID) SOG Special Operations Group or • Surveillance Observation Group

• SOP Standard Operating Procedure

• SRU Strategic Resources Unit (lTD)

• SSA Supervisory SpeCial Agent

• SSAN Social Security Account Number

• SSG Special Surveillance Group

• SSGU Safe Streets and Gangs Unit (VCMOS,

• CIDl SSRA Supervisory Senior Resident Agent • SSS Support Services Section • SST Support Services Technician • ST Santo Domingo or State • STAT!; United States Department of State • STE Secure Telephone Equipment

• STU Secure Telephone Unit

• SU Salt Lake City Field Office

• SVTS Secure Video Teleconferencing System

• SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

• SWB Southwest Border

• SWS SIOC Watch Supervisor

• T&A Time and Attendance

• T1 1.54 Megabits per Second Throughput jData Line). • • T3 44.3 Megabits per Second

• Throughput (Data Line)

• TA Telephone Application

• TACSAT Tactical Satellite

• • UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 108

• •


TB Butte ITC

TC Transportation Crimes

TCU Telecommunications Services Unit (IRD)

TD Training Division

TDD Training and Development Division

TDY Temporary Duty

TE Tel Aviv

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System

TEI Terrorist Enterprise Investigation

TFIS Theft from Interstate Shipment

TFO Task Force Officer

TFOS Terrorist Financing Operations Section

TIS Technical Information Specialist. TL Tallinn

TM Telecommunications Manager

TMU Threat Management Unit (CTD)

TO Tokyo

TOC Tactical Operations Center

TOS Technical Operations Section (ITD)

TP Tampa Field Office

TREAS Department of the Treasury

TRRS Terrorist Reports and Requirements Section

TS ... POLIt..or Savannah ITC or Telecommunications Specialist

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

TSL Targeted Staffing Level

TSP Thrift Savings Plan

TS/SCI LAN .e t/ Sensitive Compartmented Information local area network

TTA Technically Trained Agent

TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center

TTX Table Top Exercise

TTY Teletype

TU Transfer Unit (ASD)

TURK 0 Time Utilization and Record Keeping


109

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a

a a a

a a a a

a

a

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ACLURM005599

• • • • • • • • • • • • I. I. t

!. t • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

TB

TC

TCU

TO

TOO

TOY

TE

TECS

TEl

TFIS

TFO

TFOS

TIS

TL

TM

TMU

TO

TOC

TOS

TP

TREAS

TRRS

TS

TSA

TSC

TSL

TSP

TS/SCI LAN

TTA TTIC

TTX TTY TU TURK


Butte ITC

Transportation Crimes

Telecommunications Services Unit (lRD) Training Division

Training and Development Division

Temporary Duty

Tel Aviv

Treasury Enforcement Communications System Terrorist Enterprise Investigation

Theft from Interstate Shipment

Task Force Officer

Terrorist Financing Operations Section Technical Information Specialist

Tallinn

Telecommunications Manager

Threat Management Unit (CTD)

Tokyo

Tactical Operations Center

Technical Operations Section (ITO)

Tampa Field Office

Department o~ the Treasury

Terrorist Reports and Requirements Section

1--:::- nr Savannah ITC or Telecommunications Specialist

Transportation Security Administration

Terrorist Screening Center

; Targeted Staffing Level

Thrift Sa~gs Plan

I~t""""": Sensitive Compartmented Information local area network

Technically Trained Agent

Terrorist Threat Integration Center

Table Top EXercise

Teletype

Transfer Unit (ASD)

Time Utilization and Record Keeping



TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

TWWU Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit

TZ Tijuana, Mexico

U Unclassified

UACB Unless Advised to the Contrary by the Bureau

UAE United Arab Emirates

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UBLU Usama bin Laden Unit

UC Unit Chief

UCA . Undercover Agent

UCFN Universal Case File Number

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

UCO Undercover Operation

UCR Uniform Crime Report

UFAP Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution

UI Unidentified

UNI Universal Index

UNSUB Unknown Subject

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply or United Parcel Service

UR Urgent Report

URL Uniform Resource Locator.

USA United States of America or United States Attorney or United States Army

USACID United States Army Criminal Investigative Division

USAF United States Air Force

USA() United States Attorney's Office

USBP United States Border Patrol

USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCS United States Customs Service

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

USDAO United States Defense Attache Office

USDC United States District Court

USDJ United States District Judge


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ACLURM005600

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TVA

TWWU

TZ U

UACB

UAE

UAV

UBLU

UC

UCA

UCFN

UCMJ

UCO

UCR

UFAP

UI

UNI

UNSUB

UPS

UR

URL

USA

USACID

USAF

USAO

USBP

USC

USCG

USCS

USDA

USDAO

USDC

USDJ


Tennessee Valley Authority

Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit

Tijuana, Mexico

Unclassified

Unless Advised to the Contrary by the Bureau United Arab Emirates

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Usama bin Laden Unit

Unit Chief

Undercover Agent

Universal Case File Number

Uniform Code of Military Justice

Undercover Operation

Uniform Crime Report

Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution

Unidentified

Universal Index

Unknown Subject ,

Uninterruptible Power Supply or United Parcel Service Urgent Report

Uniform Resource Locator.

United States of America or United States Attorney or United States Army United States Army Criminal Investigative Division United States Air Force

United States Attorney's Office

United States Border Patrol

United States Code

United States Coast Guard

United States Customs Service

United States Department of Agriculture United States Defense Attache Office

United States District Court

United States District Judge


UNCLASSINEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USDS United States Department of State

USG United States Government

USIA United States Information Agency

USIC United States Intelligence Community

USMC United States Marine Corps

USMS • United States Marshals Service

USN United States Navy

USOU Undercover and Special Operations Unit (CID)

USPER United States Person

USPIS United States Postal Inspection Service

USPP United States Park Police

USPS United States Postal Service

USSS United States Secret Service

VA Veterans Administration

VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

VCF Virtual Case File

VCFU Violent Crimes/Fugitive Unit (CID)

VCMO Violent Crimes and Major Offenders

VCMOP Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Program

VCMOS Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Section (CID)

VCR Video Cassette Recorder

VCTF Violent Crimes Task Force

VG Violent Gangs

VGTOF Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organizations File

VIC Violent Incident Crime

VICAR Violent Criminal Apprehension Program

VIN Vehicle Identification Number

VIP Very Important Person

VLTP Voluntary Leave Transfer Program

VN Vienna

VPN Virtual Private Network

VTC Video Teleconferencing


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ACLURM005601

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USDS

USG

USIA

USIC

USMC

USMS

USN

USOU

USPER

USPIS

USPP

USPS

USSS

VA

VBIED

VCF

VCFU

VCMO

VCMOP

VCMOS

VCR

VCTF

VG

VGTOF

VIC

VICAP

VIN

VIP

VLTP

VN

VPN

VTC


United States Department of State

United States Government

United States Information Agency

United States Intelligence Community

United States Marine Corps

United States Marshals Service

United States Navy

Undercover and Special Operations Unit (CID) United States Person

United States Postal Inspection Service United States Park Police

United States Postal Service

United States Secret Service

Veterans Administration

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive· Device Virtual Case File

Violent Crimes/Fugitive Unit (CID)

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Program Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Section (CID) Video Cassette Recorder

Violent Crimes Task Force

Violent Gangs

Violent Gangs and Terrorist Ort:lanizations File Violent Incident Crime

Violent Criminal Apprehensi.on ProQram Vehicle Identification Number

Very Important Person

Voluntary Leave Transfer Program

Vienna

Virtual Private Network

Video Teleconferencing



VWAP Victim Witness Assistance Program

WAN Wide Area Network

WCC White Collar Crime

WCCP White Collar Crime Program

WE Pocatello ITC

WF Washington Field Office

WFO Washington Field Office

WHOA White House Cbmmunications Agency •

WHSR White House Situation Room

WIGI Within Grade Increase

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMDOU WMD Operations Unit (CTD)

WR Warsaw

WSP - Witness Security/Protection

WWW World Wide Web

X Exempted from Ten Year Declassification

Z Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean TiMe)

ZULU Greenwich Mean Time


111

111/1

1111

11

111

1111

111

1/1/1

1/1/1/1

1111/111

ACLURM005602

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

VWAP

WAN

WCC

WCCP

WE . WF

WFO

WHCA

WHSR

WIGI

WMD

WMDOU

WR

WSP

WWW

X

Z

ZULU


Victim Witness Assistance Program

Wide Area Network

White Collar Crime

White Collar Crime Program

Pocatello ITC

Washington Field Office

Washington Field Office

White House Communications Agency White House Situation Room

Within Grade Increase

. Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMD Operations Unit (CTD)

Warsaw

v Witness Security/Protection

World Wide Web

Exempted from Ten Year Declassification Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)

Greenwich Mean Time



• • a a • • • S

S

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• S

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NJTTF MASTER PERSONNEL ROSTER

Official Bureau Name (Last, First, Ml) Agency

Seat Assignment Secure

NJTTF Office

1S - 476

1S - 435

1S-442

1S-438

1S-408

1S - 473

is - 482

1S-465

1S - 433

1S-460

1S - 446

1S - 489

1S - 413

1S - 484

1S-456

1S - 402

1S - 430

1S-451

1S-429

1S-461

18-488

1S-487

1S - 470

1S - 471

1S - 416

1S-477

1S - 447

1S-465

1S - 448

1S-450

ACLURM005603

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NJTTF MASTER PERSONNEL ROSTER

Official Bureau Name I Seat I I NJTIF (Last, First, MIL Aqency AssifLnment Secure Office

18-476 I-

18 ·435 1-'

18·442 I-

18·438 I-

18·408 I-

18 - 473

1S·482 t-r--

18-465 t-

18 - 433 t-

18-460 r--

18·446 r-

1S-489 -18 - 413

I-

18-484 -" r-

18-456 r-

18·402 r-

18-430 t-

1S-451 -l

1S-429 -1&461

I-

18-488

1S-487

1S· 470 . 18- 471

1S·416

18-477

18 - 447

18- 465

18·448 t-

1S-450

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, 113

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••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

••••

b6 b7C

1S - 843

1S - 427

1S - 440

1S - 467

1S-408

1S - 438

1S - 410

1S- 462

1S-411

1S-409

1S - 434

1S-415

1S - 442

1S-444

1S-475

1s-430

1S - 478

1S - 481

1S-443

1S - 468

1S - 412

1S - 418

13 - 445

1S - 41

1S - 420

1S-480

1S - 458

1S - 411

1S - 479

1S-423

1S - 469

13 - 424

1S - 403

ACLURM005604

• • • • • I. I. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • •


18-843

18 - 427

18-440

18-467

18-408

18-438

18-410

18- 462

18-411

18-409

18-434

18-415

18-442

18-444

18-475

15-430

18-478

18-481

18-443

18 - 468

18-412

18-418

18 - 445

18-431

18-420

18-480

18-458

18-411

18 - 479

18-423

18-424

18-469

18-403


b6 b7C

1S-441

1S - 455

1S - 483

1S - 449

1S I- 417

1S - 414

1S - 425

1S - 466

1S - 426

1S - 428

IS - 486

1S-434

1S - 485

1S - 472

1S-452

1S - 474

1S - 437

1r


a

a

a • a • a

a

a

a

a

a

a


b6 b7C

ACLURM005605

• • • • • • • • • • • I. • • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ., • • • • • • •

UNCLASSIFIED//FOROFFICIAL USE ONLY

15-441

15 - 455

15 - 483

15- 449

-<;:~ ... _~~:~: e~ -:''1'~:40if:--··-~ .~.,. -" ... :.~ '. - . ,_.

15'- 417

15- 414

15 - 425

15 - 466

15 - 426

15-428

15 - 486

15-434

15 - 485

15·472

15-452

15-474

15·437


b6 b7C

Appendix A

116•111101111110SSIIIIIIIIISSIIIIIIS11111111111111111111911111•11111•9111111•1111

ACLURM005606

Appendix A

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

• • (Rev. 01-31-2003)

• • •

•

• •

• •

•


Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 11/24/2009

To: All Field Offices

Counterterrbrism

Attn: ADIC/SAC JTTF/CT ASACs JTTF/CT SSAs/SSRAs JTTF Coordinators

Attn: DAD Tracy A.,North DAD Virginia L. Bollinger

Force From: Counterterrorism

DT Contact: IA

Approved By: McJunkin, James W Ward, Michael B ninlinn Mark b6

b7C

Drafted By:

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•

•

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•

•

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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

• • • • • • •

Case ID #: 415A-HQ-C1432188-DR (Pending)

Title: NATIONAL JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE; DATABASE/RESOURCE SUPPORT

Synopsis: To inform Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) on the availability of National Joint Terrorism Task Force's (NJTTF) databases and resources.

Administrative: Field JTTF members are encouraged to coordinate with their local JTTF federal, state and local representatives prior to contacting the NJTTF.

Details: The NJTTF's mission is focused on providing support to other Counterterrorism Division Sections and field JTTFs. The b7E NJTTF does this thro tol I available through its plus Task Force utticers (mos) from federal, state an oca government agencies.

Supported units gain unique assistance for investigations and intelligence analysis by leveraging the NJTTF's information sharing and access to unique information related to possible threats. Supported units do this by submitting request for information to the NJTTF. The NJTTF TFOs, in answering RFIs, coordinate to provide a collaborative response that includes name checks and searches for terrorism-related information (i.e. groups and organizations associations, events,

ACLURM005607

• • • • • • • • •• • ,. I :. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

(Rev. 01-31-2003)


Precedence: ROUTINE

To: All Field Offices

Counterterrorism

Date: 11/24/2009

Attn: ADIC/SAC JTTF/CT ASACs JTTF/CT SSAs/SSRAs JTTF CoordinatOrs

Attn: DAD Tracy A./North DAD Virginia L. Bollinger

From: Counterterrorism DIATfS/. NationaJ ,roj nt Terrorj SID Task Force

I Contact: _

Approved By: McJunkin, James W Ward, Michael B Gipliano Mark

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 415A-HQ-C1432188-DR (pending)

Title: NATIONAL JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE; DATABASE/RESOURCE SUPPORT

Synopsis: To inform Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) on the availability of National Joint Terrorism Task Force's (NJTTF) databases and resources.

Administrative: FieldJTTF members are encouraged to coordinate with their local JTTF federal, state and local representatives prior to contacting the NJTTF. .

Details: The NJTTF's mission is focused on providing support.to other Counterterrorism Division Sections and field JTTFs. The NJTTF does this throllrT

: :cce~l to I I available through i tslplus 'I'ask Force ?fb.cers ('I'F'Os) from federal, state an oca government agenc~es_

Supported units gain unique assistance for investigations and intelligence analysis by leveraging the NJTTF's information sharing and access to unique information related to possible threats. Supported units do this by submitting request for information to the NJTTF. The NJTTF TFOs, in answering RFIs, coordinate to provide a collaborative response that includes name checks and searches for terrorism-related information (i.e. groups and organizations associations, events,

b6 b7c

b7E

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism Re: 415A-HQ-C1432188-DR, 11/24/2009

facilities, special interest country travel, equipment, weapons, communication, and finances).

CTD Section and Unit Chiefs as well as SACs, and ASACs are encouraged to highlight the FBI's NJTTF existence and encourage its use to enhance ongoing investigations. The NJTTF FBI website, found at http://ctd.fbinet.fbi/n-jttf/, can be accessed to provide the following information:

a. JTTFs member contact information b. NJTTF Task Force Officers' agency information c. JTTF operation policy documents

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b6 b7C b7E

2

ACLURM005608

• • • • • • • • • • • • • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

I


\

facilities, special interest country travel, equipment, weapons, communication, and finances).

CTD Section and Unit Chiefs as well as SACs, and ASACs are encouraged to highlight the FBI's NJTTF' existence and encourage its use to enhance ongoing investigations. The NJTTF FBI website, found at http://ctd.fbinet.fbi/njttf/, can be accessed to provide the following information:

a. JTTFs member contact information b. NJTTF Task Force Officers' agency information c. JTTF operation policy documents

2

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b6 b7C b7E

Appendix 8

II IP II I ••••• II • • • • • • II • II I•II • • II II II•

ACLURM005609

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••


LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Ensure the information contained in this communication is distributed to all personnel assigned to JTTF and/or Counterterrorism in their respective divisions.

46

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ACLURM005610

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •


LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Ensure the information contained in this communication is distributed to all personnel assigned to JTTF and/or Counterterrorism in their respective divisions.

(~ :

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