FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

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ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310 Features Departments 5 Police Practice Fast Track Application Process Major Case Management By Brian P. Carroll Community Mobilization By Recheal Stewart-Brown Veterans Affairs Police and Security Service By Ralph C. Kennedy Indian Tribal Sovereignty By Michael J. Bulzomi 1 June 2001 Volume 70 Number 6 United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC 20535-0001 Louis J. Freeh Director Contributors' opinions and statements should not be considered an endorsement by the FBI for any policy, program, or service. The Attorney General has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135. Editor John E. Ott Associate Editors Glen Bartolomei Cynthia L. Lewis Bunny S. Morris Art Director Denise Bennett Smith Staff Assistant Linda W. Szumilo This publication is produced by members of the Law Enforcement Communication Unit, William T. Guyton, Chief. Internet Address [email protected] Cover Photo © George Godoy Send article submissions to Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135. The San Diego, California, Police Department has created a neighborhood alliance that takes community policing to the next level. The methods in which police managers handle their responsibilities ultimately impact the overall success or failure of a case. 18 The Veterans Affairs Police and Security Service preserve the peaceful environment requisite to the successful operation of medical programs for America’s military veterans. 9 24 Indian tribal sovereignty has a signifi- cant impact on criminal jurisdiction and procedure, both in and out of Indian country. 8 Snap Shots Tornado

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Features 1 Major Case Management By Brian P. Carroll The methods in which police managers handle their responsibilities ultimately impact the overall success or failure of a case. 9 Community Mobilization By Recheal Stewart-Brown The San Diego, California, Police Department has created a neighborhood alliance that takes community policing to the next level. 18 Veterans Affairs Police and Security ServiceBy Ralph C. Kennedy The Veterans Affairs Police and Security Service preserve the peaceful environment requisite to the successful operation of medical programs for America’s military veterans. 24 Indian Tribal Sovereignty By Michael J. Bulzomi Indian tribal sovereignty has a significant impact on criminal jurisdiction and procedure, both in and out of Indian country.

Transcript of FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

Page 1: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

5 Police PracticeFast Track Application Process

Major Case Management By Brian P. Carroll

Community Mobilization By Recheal Stewart-Brown

Veterans Affairs Policeand Security Service

By Ralph C. Kennedy

Indian Tribal SovereigntyBy Michael J. Bulzomi

1

June 2001Volume 70Number 6

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, DC 20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

Contributors' opinions and statementsshould not be considered an

endorsement by the FBI for any policy,program, or service.

The Attorney General has determinedthat the publication of this periodical is

necessary in the transaction of thepublic business required by law. Useof funds for printing this periodical hasbeen approved by the Director of theOffice of Management and Budget.

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin(ISSN-0014-5688) is published

monthly by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 935 PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paidat Washington, D.C., and additionalmailing offices. Postmaster: Sendaddress changes to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,

Madison Building, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

EditorJohn E. Ott

Associate EditorsGlen BartolomeiCynthia L. LewisBunny S. Morris

Art DirectorDenise Bennett Smith

Staff AssistantLinda W. Szumilo

This publication is produced bymembers of the Law Enforcement

Communication Unit,William T. Guyton, Chief.

Internet Address [email protected]

Cover Photo© George Godoy

Send article submissions to Editor,FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBIAcademy, Madison Building, Room

209, Quantico, VA 22135.

The San Diego, California, PoliceDepartment has created a neighborhoodalliance that takes community policingto the next level.

The methods in which police managershandle their responsibilities ultimatelyimpact the overall success or failureof a case.

18The Veterans Affairs Police andSecurity Service preserve the peacefulenvironment requisite to the successfuloperation of medical programs forAmerica’s military veterans.

9

24Indian tribal sovereignty has a signifi-cant impact on criminal jurisdiction andprocedure, both in and out of Indiancountry.

8 Snap ShotsTornado

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June 2001 / 1

ewspaper headlines, suchas “Midtown Rapist Still atLarge,” and “One YearN

and Authorities Yet to Solve Celeb-rity Murder,” call attention to majorlaw enforcement cases, and similarheadlines have become commonin many communities across thenation. Because of the different dy-namics involved, the way authori-ties manage a major case contrib-utes to a wide range of areas thatcan have positive or negative conse-quences for an agency. Major caseinvestigations provide opportuni-ties for law enforcement managersbeyond case solution. Although ma-jor cases eventually will end andfade from the headlines, the agencyalways will remain under publicscrutiny. Therefore, major casemanagers should strive for particu-larly strong organization at the endof the investigation.

THE MAJOR CASE

Major cases have no bound-aries within the various investiga-tive responsibilities of law en-forcement agencies. Regardless ofthe specific type of crime, most ma-jor cases share the following com-mon elements: length in duration,similar types of criminal activity,multiagency involvement, impacton personnel and resources, anda great deal of media attention atthe outset or conclusion.1 Whilelaw enforcement agencies should

generally investigate major casesmuch like any other case (i.e.,according to existing protocols),they should manage them differ-ently than regular cases.

At some point, most law en-forcement agencies will have a ma-jor case to investigate. During nor-mal operations, the public mayperceive an agency as very effectivein its responsibilities, affordinglittle review of its efforts; however,during a major case investigation,the agency can expect additionalattention and scrutiny. The publicexpects the police to solve the case,and failure to do so may result in

damage to the agency’s image andcredibility.

Major cases do not end with thesolution of the case. Major casemanagers who monitor the needsof the various elements of thecase contribute to the solution ofthe case, as well as to the over-all positive development of theorganization.

INFLUENCING FACTORS

Researchers have identifiedfive significant elements that caninfluence the outcome of majorcases—the mission statement, therole of each participant, the identity

Major Case ManagementKey ComponentsBy BRIAN P. CARROLL, M.S.

© Mark C. Ide

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of the stakeholders, the perceptionof the stakeholders, and the atten-tion given to the long-term impactof the case.2 By using these fiveelements as a guide, managers canincrease the chances of a successfulcase outcome.

The Mission Statement

Managers must develop a mis-sion statement and ensure all indi-viduals involved in the investiga-tive effort understand it at the outsetof the case. The mission statementshould define the organization’spurpose and incorporate the neces-sities for case solution, as well asthe enduring responsibilities ex-pected beyond case solution.3 Aneffective mission establishes at-tainable goals and objectives,which help investigators trackprogress by providing precise tar-gets and immediate feedback.Also, they help define what the or-ganization seeks to accomplishthrough its ongoing, long-term op-erations.4 For example, in a serialrapist case, the mission would be toidentify and arrest the rapist. In ad-dition, the mission can incorporate

such objectives as meeting theneeds for prosecution, allaying pub-lic fears, identifying related crimes,and disrupting the perpetrators’ fu-ture criminal activity.

Often, major case investiga-tions involve multiagencies. In suchjoint task forces, the mission state-ment can incorporate an objectiveof meeting the individual needs ofparticipating agencies. If the sameindividual commits crimes in mul-tiple jurisdictions, then each agencyshould consider other victims’needs as well. The mission wouldinclude gathering evidence to solveall of the crimes committed by thesuspect, and goals within the mis-sion can include gathering evidenceto solve the individual rapes. Aftermanagers specify the mission andgoals of the case, they must placethem into action through an operat-ing strategy—a broad plan of actionfor pursuing and achieving thegoals and satisfying the mission.5

The Role of Participants

Case managers must identifyparticipants and define their rolewithin the major case team. This

remains particularly importantwhen those involved in the casehave not worked together previ-ously. If management and others in-volved do not understand or agreeto their roles, conflict may arise,especially when investigators fromother agencies participate. Manag-ers of major cases can prevent suchconflicts by delineating responsi-bilities at the onset and fully ex-plaining their expectations, whichshould answer questions, such as—

• who is part of the decision-making group;

• will the team use a partici-pant’s particular expertise;

• what is the specific role ofprosecutors in controlling thedirection of the investigation;

• how will hostage negotiatorsparticipate in the commander’sadvisory team;

• which agency will takethe lead in multiagencyinvestigations; and

• can the media spokespersontalk to the media withoutdirection?

Several problems can arise inthis area that may decrease agroup’s effectiveness.6 First, roleconflict, or the incompatibility be-tween a role’s requirements and anindividual’s own beliefs, attitudes,or expectations. Second, role ambi-guity, where the role recipients donot understand their specific ac-tions or responsibilities in the caseor an individual’s actual behavioralrequirements are not clear. Studiesof roles in the work environmenthave identified that the negative re-lationship of role ambiguity androle conflict remains stronger

Case managersmust identify

participants anddefine their rolewithin the major

case team.

”Mr. Carroll, a retired FBI special agent, now headsa private security firm in Ft. Collins, Colorado.

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among individuals who report ahigher need for clarity in the worksetting. The same individuals placethis area of clarity above control oftheir environment or assignment.7

The pressures on major case man-agers for solution may cause themto place excessive demands on theirstaff by assigning additional inves-tigative or administrative tasks thatthey may not be suited for. In do-ing so, the case manager contributesto another factor that may decreasea group’s effectiveness—role over-load, where an individual be-comes overwhelmed by the job’srequirements.

By identifying personnel anddefining and explaining their roles,managers can minimize conflictsthat will affect the ability to meetthe mission of the major case team.Case managers should not assumethat individuals understand theirrole and must make the effort toassure that all participants knowwhat they expect of them.

The Stakeholders Identity

Successful case strategies con-sider the implications of both inter-nal and external stakeholders.Stakeholders who believe that theprocess recognizes their interestsand rights and can compare themwith those of other stakeholderswill develop trust in the mission ofthe organization.8

Case managers should considerwho and what the case impacts.Once managers identify the stake-holders, they should consider theneeds of the individual stakeholdersand if they will affect the achieve-ment of the mission.

In the example involvingthe serial rapist, the victims and

investigators are the internal stake-holders. Initially, the external stake-holders are the families of vic-tims and the communities where thecrimes occurred; however, as thecase progresses, additional exter-nal stakeholders may appear, suchas the media, public officials,medical personnel, or additionalcommunities.

The Perception of Stakeholders

Perception refers to a processwhere individuals receive, orga-nize, and interpret information fromtheir environment.9 How individu-als judge another person or event isinfluenced by their ability to re-trieve relevant information, howeasily they can retrieve the informa-tion, and the visibility of the eventor behavior.

Perceptions of stakeholders inmajor cases affect how they partici-pate in strategy implementation.10

Because people can hold differentviews on the same situation, the in-terpretation of the meaning of a par-ticular event determines how theseindividuals will react.11 Researchhas shown, due to influence ofpast experiences and socialization,people from varying cultural envi-ronments can perceive similar

events quite differently.12 Whenstakeholders perceive something,they essentially attempt to fit thatevent into a preestablished frame ofreference.13 As a result, managersmust remain conscientious of howothers perceive their actions, com-ments, or reputation.14

The information individualsexpect to see or hear also caninfluence perception. Oftentimes,people hear what they expect tohear, rather than what a person actu-ally said.15 Individuals use a systemthat filters out some messages whilepaying more attention to others.When people receive informationthat conflicts with what they be-lieve, they tend to ignore it or distortit to make it conform to their be-liefs, which can reduce the effec-tiveness of communication.16 Thisremains important when dealingwith external stakeholders becausethey often hold perceptions of au-thorities based on their previous ex-periences that may not match real-ity. For example, if major casemanagers develop a decision pro-cess that solicits input from stake-holders, and previous experiencesof the stakeholders did not involve acollaborative approach, they maynot recognize it as such.

Negative publicity about theagency, unrelated to the case, mayinfluence how stakeholders developtheir frame of reference.17 Ulti-mately, when individuals perceivebehavior of other individuals differ-ently from the way it was intended,a limited effective working rela-tionship will result.18

If the public perceives police ascapable of performing their job,then it remains easier to persuadethe public to have confidence in

Major casesdo not end withthe solution of

the case.“

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their abilities. If the media per-ceives the police as candid andtruthful in their comments, they willlikely have fewer questions on theinvestigative efforts.

By remembering that differentindividuals can perceive the organi-zation and its mission in variousways, whether factual or distorted,managers can become more effec-tive in dealing with stakeholders.Experts believe that even whenindividuals only perceive a situa-tion as real, it often results in realconsequences.19

The Long-term Solution

Case managers should not fo-cus only on the short-term solutionof the case but the long-term impactof the investigative effort on futureorganizational endeavors. Burden-ing investigators with making deci-sions with long-term impact can de-tract from their immediate efforts atcase solution. Managers need toconsider the implications of the in-vestigative effort on such areas asorganizational credibility, budget,stakeholder acceptance of organiza-tional initiatives, development ofpersonnel, ability to provide ex-pected services, and developingconfidence in organizational capa-bilities from public officials whoimpact on agency operations.

When major cases occur, pres-sures exist from internal and exter-nal stakeholders to solve the case.20

These pressures often causemanagers to lose sight of the long-range implications of the investiga-tive efforts. The enhanced scrutinyof major cases brings additionalpressure for solution and also cancontribute to adding resources oth-erwise not available, enhancing the

professional reputation of the orga-nization, developing positive per-ceptions of the organization, andproviding experiences that will im-prove future major case responses.

Managers who have an ex-panded focus during a major casecontribute to the overall organiza-tional goals, not just the goals of thecase. For example, if an agencyplans to participate in future taskforces, they can contribute to thesefuture experiences by developingpositive experiences with otheragencies involved in the ongoingmajor case, resulting in the en-hancement of the department’sreputation and a positive perceptionfrom individuals involved.

coupled with effective manage-ment will equate to success. Majorcases demand more than solution—they bring with them expectationsof a management effort that en-compasses more than an investiga-tive focus. By identifying and fo-cusing on key elements of majorcases, managers can contribute tothe entire process of major casemanagement.

Endnotes1 “Major Case Management,” FBI

Management Quarterly 6, no. 2 (Spring1986): 1.

2 The author has identified these elementsthrough discussions with investigators and lawenforcement executives and reviews of forums,such as FBI-sponsored seminars in lawenforcement executive development, major casemanagement for police managers, and trainingfor foreign police executives in major casemanagement.

3 J. P. Ivancevich, P. Lorenzi, S. J. Skinner,and P. B. Crosby, Management - Quality and

Competitiveness, 2nd ed., (Chicago, IL: Irwin,1997), 195.

4 Ibid., 197-198.5 Ibid., 184.6 Ibid., 300.7 Michael P. O’Driscoll and Terry A. Beehr,

“Moderating Effects of Perceived Control andNeed for Clarity on the Relationship BetweenRole Stressors and Employee AffectiveReactions,” The Journal of Social Psychology,April 2000, 151.

8 Supra note 3, 200.9 James L. Bowditch and Anthony F.

Buono, A Primer on Organizational Behavior,(New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1994),124.

10 Supra note 1.11 Supra note 9, 104.12 Supra note 9, 108.13 Supra note 9, 106.14 Supra note 1.15 Supra note 9, 111.16 Supra note 3, 381.17 Supra note 3, 381.18 Supra note 9, 127.19 Supra note 9, 127.20 Supra note 1.

CONCLUSION

Anecdotal evidence shows thatmethods in which managers handletheir responsibilities ultimately im-pacts the overall success or failureof the case. Although the solutionof a case may not always requiredirect influence or involvementfrom management, individuals sub-sequently reviewing a case maynot gauge the success of its man-agement on the solution, but ratheron the impact the investigation hadon different elements involved inthe case. Effective investigation

Case managersshould consider

who and what thecase impacts.

“”

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Police Practice

oday’s fierce competitive climate demands thatlaw enforcement agencies move quickly to

“In today’s labor market, the best-qualified candidatesare not willing to wait months for your selectionprocess to run its course. Public safety organizationsmust develop valid selection approaches that are alsotimely. Otherwise, by the time the selection processhas run its course, the best-qualified candidates mayhave found other jobs.”1

Tidentify and hire qualified applicants in the shortesttime possible. If they do not, quicker, more aggressiveemployers will hire these scarce qualified applicantsand place an even greater burden on departmentstrying to acquire and retain adequate staffs to servethe communities they protect. What can agencies doto speed the hiring process?

POLK COUNTY’S EXPERIENCE

One of the 10 largest police agencies in Florida,the Polk County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO) employs1,430 full-time employees. Sworn officers comprise36.2 percent of the total; detention officers represent29.8 percent; and nonofficer support, or civilian,employees make up the remaining 34 percent.2

Polk County is located in central Florida aboutmidway between the metropolitan areas of Tampa andOrlando. Better starting salaries in those areas enticemany PCSO officer applicants, as well as currentsworn personnel attracted to the higher wages.Compounding this difficulty, large corporations inthe area often lure civilian employees, adverselyimpacting PCSO’s efforts to attract and retain 911operators, computer programmers, clerical workers,and other support personnel. Such circumstancescontributed to the agency’s 9.5 percent annual attri-tion rate in 1999.

Besides offering higher salaries, private sectoremployers can make job offers to applicants in amuch shorter time than law enforcement agencies,sometimes hiring applicants the day that they apply.Such speed is possible because the employers usuallydo not require extensive background investigations,nor do they normally use polygraph examinations orother assessment tools essential to the law enforce-ment hiring process. Moreover, Polk County, witha population rapidly approaching one-half million,faces its lowest unemployment rates in history,averaging less than 5 percent annually. While thisrepresents a fortunate economic reversal, it furtherreduces the shrinking pool of qualified applicantsseeking careers in law enforcement.

Examining the Problem

PCSO began the year 2000 with the challengeof fully staffing a new detention facility, designedto hold over 1,000 individuals, while dealing withnormal attrition and lengthy applicant processingtimes. To obtain sufficient personnel to meet theseneeds, PCSO’s Human Resources Division calculatedthat it must hire 304 applicants during the fiscal year.Because only about 24 percent of applicants succeedin gaining employment, the division estimated thatthis hiring goal would require processing more than1,400 applications. The division based this figure onprevious experience. For example, during fiscal year1998-99, the division received 612 applications. Ofthis total, 24.3 percent of the candidates applied forcivilian positions, 43.1 percent for officer positions,and 32.5 percent for detention officer positions.

Individuals seeking these positions submittedapplications by a variety of methods. Some brought

Fast Track ApplicationProcess Speeds HiringBy Floyd S. Hulsey, M.P.A., and Maureen Goodwin

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their applications in person; some had friends,relatives, or agency members submit them; and otherssent the material through the mail or via the agency’sWeb site. Many of these applications arrived withoutthe required documentation or complete information.This caused the agency to make time-consumingadditional contacts with applicants prior to processingthe application or resulted in theapplication remaining dormantwhile awaiting further action,sometimes for months.

Once the agency obtained allof the required information, itconducted a full backgroundinvestigation, which includedchecking police records andverifying employment references,prior to conducting an oral inter-view. PCSO then issued a condi-tional offer of employment tothose applicants completing thisstage of the hiring process.

Following the conditionaloffer, applicants for support positions had to undergoa polygraph examination and urinalysis prior tohiring. In addition to these preemployment require-ments, officer and detention officer applicants alsohad to pass a physical examination, physical agilitytest, and psychological evaluation.

Finding the Solution

Recognizing its processing times as unacceptable,the agency enlisted the Graduate Studies Division ofthe University of South Florida in Tampa to analyzeits application and hiring procedure. A review of 20deputy sheriff applications processed during the first6 months of the 1998-99 fiscal year revealed that theaverage processing time took more than 256 days. Ananalysis of 12 detention officer applications showedan average of 200 days to hire. The fastest processingtime stood at 72 days, while the most lengthy took367 days. Scheduling a personal interview involvedthe longest waiting time for applicants.

Twenty civilian applications processed during thesame period required an average of 85 days from thesubmission of the application to the hiring date. Theshorter processing time reflected the fewer tests

(psychological, physical, and physical agility exami-nations) required of nonofficer applicants.

Later that fiscal year, PCSO analyzed 91 appli-cants hired during a 6-month period. An average of62 days elapsed from the time of application untilthe individuals joined the agency. Hiring an officerrequired an average of 72 days. Longer times often

were required if difficulties arosewith completing the backgroundinvestigation or if the applicant didnot complete final testing in atimely manner.

Alarmingly, the agency dis-covered that 24.2 percent of itstotal applicants withdrew from theprocess prior to PCSO making ahiring decision. Presumably, theseapplicants received offers of otheremployment opportunities prior tocompletion of the PCSO’s lengthyapplication process. The agencyhired only 18.2 percent of officerapplicants, while it employed

24.3 percent of the total applicants. Clearly, PCSOneeded to overhaul its application and hiring process.Consequently, in January 2000, the agency imple-mented its Fast Track Hiring Process and establishedambitious goals to make a hiring decision withinan average of 30 working days after receiving anapplication.

Implementing Fast Track

The first step in implementing the Fast Trackprocess involved accepting only complete applica-tions submitted personally by the applicant directlyto the PCSO’s Human Resources Division.3 If anapplicant submits an incomplete application, humanresources personnel instruct the individual to com-plete the application, then telephone them for aninterview appointment. The in-person requirement,even for applicants from another state, initially raisedthe objection of being less “customer friendly.”However, the sheriff felt that the new process actuallywould prove more customer friendly by enablingPCSO personnel to interview candidates the same daythat they submit applications and inform them imme-diately of their eligibility for employment.

““

...private sectoremployers can make

job offers toapplicants in a muchshorter time than law

enforcementagencies....

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June 2001 / 7

Once applicants submit a completed applicationto the Human Resources Division, a staffing specialistimmediately completes preliminary qualifying checkswhile the applicant waits. Preliminary checks includedriving, credit, and criminal histories, all conductedelectronically. Applicants not meeting establishedstandards receive immediate notification.

Applicants who meet the hiring standards onthese preliminary checks are interviewed during theirinitial visit by a ranking officer or by a civiliansupervisor if applying for a support position. PCSOinitiated this step because the University of SouthFlorida study reported long delays in the amount oftime required for the agency to complete preliminaryand background investigations prior to interviewingapplicants. The study further revealed that suchdelays probably contributedgreatly to the loss of nearly 25percent of applicants who with-drew from the process prior tobeing hired.

The Human Resources directorschedules ranking officers tointerview applicants on a rotatingbasis. These officers receivetraining in the interview processand use manuals prepared by theHuman Resource Division toensure that they conduct struc-tured, standardized interviews thatestablish a numerical score.Applicants receiving a passing score on the personalinterview receive a letter at that time advising themthat they passed the interview. The letter givesapplicants tangible evidence that the agency isconsidering hiring them. It also informs them thatthey must pass additional qualifying steps, includinga background investigation.

PCSO initiates the background investigationimmediately. It also limits employment referencesto the past 10 years, unless applicants worked for acriminal justice agency before that time. The agencyhas found that private sector employers rarely main-tain employment records more than 3 years after anemployee leaves the company, usually making effortsto obtain references over 10 years old fruitless.

Empowering Human Resources

Upon completion of the background investigation,the Human Resources director reviews the applicationpackage for compliance with eligibility requirements,hiring standards, and employment laws. Prior to theFast Track process, three ranking officers (a captain,major, and colonel) reviewed all applications, whichproved time consuming and slowed the approvalprocess unnecessarily.

Elevated to the equivalent rank of a sworn major,the Human Resource director now has the authority toissue a conditional offer of employment, eliminatingtime-consuming reviews by other command levels.The conditional offer details the final testing require-ments. The applicant must complete all final testing

within 10 days, or the agency maywithdraw the offer.

Decreasing Hiring Time

With the Fast Tack process,the time elapsed from issuance of aconditional offer to final hire hasdecreased 45 percent. Although thefinal hiring decision still rests withthe commander of the respectivedepartment that has the availableposition, Fast Track has stream-lined the initial phases of theapplication process significantly.For example, an analysis of 697applications submitted during the

first 12 months of the new process revealed an overalldecrease of 40 percent in the average number of daysrequired to complete the procedure. Specifically,officer applications decreased 17 percent, from 72 to60 days; detention officer applications declined 37percent, from 60 to 38 days; and civilian processingdropped 49 percent, from 49 to 25 days.

Actual completion time of 50 percent of theapplicants hired were processed in 30 days or less.Civilian hires, of course, scored the greatest reduc-tions, with 76 percent completed within 30 days.Encouragingly, the agency experienced a 19 percentdecrease in the number of applicant withdrawalsduring the initial 12 months. Moreover, the averagenumber of hires remained steady at 24.2 percent,

With the Fast Trackprocess, the time

elapsed from issuanceof a conditional offer

to final hire hasdecreased 45 percent.

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indicating that hiring standards have not suffered witha speedier process.

CONCLUSION

To remain competitive in the recruiting marketfor qualified employees, law enforcement agenciesmust develop new ways to speed the hiring process.Failure to do so will result in the law enforcementprofession losing highly skilled potential employeesto other occupations.

In the past 2 years, the Polk County, Florida,Sheriff’s Office realized that time represented itsmain enemy when hiring both officers and civilians.Since implementing its Fast Track Hiring Process,however, the agency, in only 12 months, decreasedapplication processing times an average of 40 percent.Primarily, the agency accomplished this by streamlin-ing its process, interviewing applicants early, provid-ing applicants with an initial acceptance letter imme-diately, and reducing processing time. Over time, thePolk County Sheriff’s Office expects hiring rates to

Ms. Goodwin serves as a career development specialistwith the Polk County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office.

Mr. Hulsey directs the Human Resources Division of thePolk County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office.

improve even more as it refines its new hiringmethod. This will enhance the agency’s ability toattract and retain competent, motivated law enforce-ment employees who can ably serve and protect thecitizens of their community.

Endnotes1 Richard Solie, “The Human Race: Speeding the Hiring Process,”

APCO911 Magazine, July 2000, 20-24.2 Due to rounding, some percentages in this article may not total 100

percent.3 According to the University of South Florida analysis of the agency’s

hiring process, the Human Resources Division should not track applicantprocessing time until it receives all of the required documentation tocomplete the application. Incomplete applications extend the time it takesto complete the selection process, making the hiring process appear lessefficient.

”Tornado

© Pat Whitlock

Submitted by Sergeant Kelly J. Leben

ornadoes struck late in Bismarck and BurleighCounty, North Dakota, in November 2000. AtT

least five tornadoes were reported in Bismarck andthe surrounding area during that time; 42 homeswere damaged, and one person was hospitalizedwith injuries. A volunteer for Skywarn took thisphotograph as Burleigh County deputies blockedthe highway to stop the traffic from driving into thepath of the tornado. Approximately 140 miles to thewest of Burleigh County, snowplows were workinghard to keep the interstate open as snow was fallingquickly and making travel very difficult.

Snap Shots

8 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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hat is neighborhood po-licing? Does the law en-forcement community

rates and by the frequency of prob-lems in an area. Community resi-dents now, in part, identify priori-ties and express them to thedepartment in community and po-lice forums. The department thentargets these problems for resolu-tion and receives feedback re-garding resident satisfaction andconcerns.

Targeting crimes and quality-of-life problems identified byresidents has proven effective insatisfying many of the needs ofcommunity residents. However,has the San Diego Police Depart-ment employed the conceptof neighborhood policing to itspotential? What about forming

partnerships with community resi-dents and working with them tosolve problems? After all, these in-dividuals live among, experience,and commit the crimes the depart-ment tries to solve. While improv-ing the quality of life represents partof the department’s vision, it provesvery difficult to achieve. The prob-lem seems to involve the executionof this vision. Many programs andagencies work in seclusion, dupli-cating efforts and underusing oneof the most powerful and knowl-edgeable resources—communityresidents.

The resistance of law enforce-ment to embrace community mem-bers as a resource to solve crime

Wbelieve in it? Or, is it just a flashyname to suggest a new approach?Neighborhood policing, as it cur-rently exists at the San Diego, Cali-fornia, Police Department, looksvery similar to the traditional styleof policing—police at the forefrontof solving community problems. Sowhat has changed with this newstyle of policing? The obviouschange has occurred in the processof identifying crime and quality-of-life problems that are prioritiesfor police response. Before neigh-borhood policing, the departmentestablished these priorities by crime

Community MobilizationThe Foundation for Community PolicingBy RECHEAL STEWART-BROWN

© Mark C. Ide

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problems may originate fromuniversal, unwarranted stereotypesabout inner-city residents. The SanDiego Police Department chal-lenged these perceptions and myths,such as community residents are in-capable, uneducated, and apathetic.Certainly, the department had toovercome some hardships in work-ing with community residents; how-ever, these individuals provedamazingly effective as an integralpart of the problem-solving processin the department’s mobilizationproject, the City Heights Neighbor-hood Alliance.

BACKGROUND

Located within San Diego’sMid-City Police Division, CityHeights has a population of over60,000. Culturally, this area is verydiverse, with 26 languages spokenand large ethnic communities ofHispanics, Asians, and African-Americans. The median incomestands at less than $20,000, with 30

percent of the population belowpoverty standards. Violent crime ismore than double the citywide aver-age, and San Diego police serve ap-proximately one-third of all searchwarrants in City Heights.

Identifying Problems

Residents identified drug-relat-ed crimes and juvenile delinquencyas their primary concerns. Suchproblems seriously impact theirquality of life as they deal with traf-fic and litter from narcotic activitiesand prostitution, abandoned prop-erty, absent landlords, graffiti, andloud noise.

To decrease crime in CityHeights, residents identified theirtop priorities as home ownership,economic development, childcare,youth activities, and decreased nar-cotic operations. Other priorities in-cluded increasing trust amongneighbors, improving communityand police relations, and enhancingopportunities for education.

Although the residents of CityHeights expressed their desire forpositive changes, few actively par-ticipated in creating that change. Anextensive survey conducted in thearea revealed lack of trust betweenneighbors and with the police. Also,fear of retaliation and urban depor-tation reigned, which influenced si-lence, submission, and acceptanceof community crime and decay.Further, the added difficulty of lan-guage barriers, clash of cultures,and lack of knowledge regardingcommunity resources and problem-solving techniques created addi-tional complications.

Identifying Solutions

Decreasing crime and proactivecommunity problem solving consti-tute the impetus for the City HeightsNeighborhood Alliance. The SanDiego Police Department believedthat it could approach crime from aproblem-resolution focus instead ofa reactive mode. To effectively em-ploy the problem-resolution ap-proach, community resident in-volvement proved imperative.1 Thisinvolvement contributed the timeand human resources necessary forefficient solutions to communitydifficulties. For example, identify-ing the problem; analyzing anddocumenting the extent of theproblem; and contacting landlords,tenants, community members, codeenforcement authorities, the police,and other city/government officialsrepresent the time-consuming ac-tivities residents can do to enhancethe efforts of law enforcement.Residents also bring the advantageof applying political pressureto solving problems by calling and

Decreasing crime andproactive community

problem solvingconstitute the impetus

for the City HeightsNeighborhood

Alliance.

”Ms. Stewart-Brown, a licensed clinical socialworker, serves as a community organizer forthe San Diego, California, Police Department.

Page 12: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

June 2001 / 11

petitioning their local governmentmembers, organizing rallies orpickets, and involving the media.

Another important aspect of in-volving community residents in thealliance included training them inhow to solve quality-of-life issuesfor which they typically call the po-lice. Once trained, residents couldexperience an increased sense ofpower and control as they took anactive role in solving their neigh-borhood problems. In 1999, for ex-ample, 2,300 calls for service inCity Heights West were related toquality-of-life issues, includingloud noise, loitering, youth distur-bances, vandalism, and abandonedvehicles. These calls resulted in 621hours of out-of-service time for po-lice officers. Overall, if communityresidents had the knowledge andskills to solve problems, their activeinvolvement could create a commu-nity where people would feel safeand want to live.

CITY HEIGHTSNEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE

The City Heights Neighbor-hood Alliance, comprised of a teamof police officers and civiliancommunity organizers, set out tosolve drug-related crimes in part-nership with community residentsand to provide residents with theknowledge and skills to solve theirown neighborhood quality-of-lifeproblems. If the alliance couldaccomplish this, it would resolveproblem locations in the communityusing a variety of resources otherthan law enforcement. This wouldresult in a decrease in out-of-servicetime by law enforcement to solvequality-of-life problems.

Mission, Goals, and Funding

To reduce crime and increasesafety to residents through a crimeresolution strategy that involves thepolice and community working to-gether denotes the alliance’smission. Its goals include mobiliz-ing residents from each block inCity Heights to participate in solv-ing the problems of their ownneighborhood; training communitymembers to identify, analyze, andsolve the conditions that affect

project internally and has ultimateresponsibility for program activitiesand direction. Area lieutenants pro-vide police leadership and directionand set the policing priority andoversee and assist the program ser-geant and the community relationsofficers. The project coordinatordevelops the community mobiliza-tion strategies, ensures that theprogram goals are accomplished,oversees the program budget, pro-vides supervision to the communityorganizers, and acts as a liaison forthe community and law enforce-ment, city, and other governmentagencies.

The program sergeant consultswith and encourages officers,divisionwide, to work with commu-nity groups in collaborative prob-lem solving; oversees problem-ori-ented policing projects in theservice area; and evaluates theprogress and effectiveness of theprogram, making regular updates tothe Mid-City captain and SanDiego’s chief of police. Communityorganizers mobilize communityresidents to participate in neighbor-hood problem-solving efforts, fa-cilitate community meetings, pro-vide specialized training in problemsolving, and, most important, men-tor and train a team of leaders tosustain the mobilization efforts.Problem-solving experts providebeginning and advanced training inproblem solving, work closely withcommunity residents to strengthentrusting relationships, facilitatecommunity meetings along with acommunity resident, target and pa-trol problem locations identified bythe community, and, most impor-tant, develop trust with area youth

neighborhood safety and quality oflife; improving collaboration be-tween the members of the commu-nity, police, government, and com-munity institutions; and developinga self-sustaining approach to neigh-borhood organization and manage-ment. The alliance received a 2-yeargrant from a private, nonprofit orga-nization. The grant covered ex-penses related to training (includingtravel), office supplies, communitycomputer equipment, salaries, andbenefits.

Personnel

The captain of San Diego’sMid-City Police Division directs,oversees, reviews, and guides the

“Residents identifieddrug-related crimes

and juveniledelinquency as theirprimary concerns.

Page 13: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

and mentor them in communityinvolvement.

The police neighborhood abate-ment officer works together withcommunity residents, landlords,and homeowners on problemlocations needing mitigation.

The officer’s immediate attentionand action establishes the expecta-tion of aggressive problem solving.Crime analysts provide crime statis-tics, research, and analysis to policepersonnel and community resi-dents. This information helps

in identifying the extent of prob-lems brought forth from residents,noting successes, and documentingoverall efforts. The narcotics tacti-cal team of police officers readilyresponds to narcotic crimes in theCity Heights area. They alsopay special attention to narcoticlocations identified by police andcommunity residents as part of theproject.

Program Design

Based on extensive research ofeffective community-oriented inter-ventions, the alliance chose threetop theories to provide the basis forprogram design. These theories in-clude neighborhood collective effi-cacy, social learning, and socialcontrol.

NeighborhoodCollective Efficacy

This theory defines neighbor-hood collective efficacy as adynamic that occurs when peopledevelop a mutual trust betweenneighbors combined with a willing-ness to intervene for the commongood of others.2 Because CityHeights has a low percentage ofhomeowners, a high percentage ofcultural and language diversity, andlow collective efficacy, neighborsare not acquainted and have littlemutual trust. They also fear eachother, place negative stereotypes onthe different cultures and practices,and have the attitude of “mind yourown business.”

The City Heights Neighbor-hood Alliance believes collectiveefficacy makes sense and is similarto techniques used in other success-ful community mobilization efforts.

These two examples highlight successful problem solvingby community residents.

• At a City Heights apartment complex, problems includednarcotic activities, prostitution, soliciting neighbors, sex-ual harassment of minors, and daily calls for emergencyservices. The community residents documented the prob-lems and met three times with the owner. They discussedtheir concerns and held the owner responsible for makingagreed changes. When the owner failed to follow throughwith improvements, community residents worked withthe police, providing information that resulted in policeaction. The police made arrests and referred the case tostate licensing authorities who cited the business for vio-lating license standards and fined the owner. New manag-ers took over, evicted the problem residents, completelyremodeled the complex, and began renting to families.

• An area market had a history of narcotic activities, prosti-tution, and loitering. Community residents identified theproblems and documented the extent of them. They wrotea letter to the owner, detailing the problems and includedsuggestions for improvements. Then, they invited theowner to a community meeting, and after receiving noresponse, they had petitions signed to support their re-quest. After continuing to receive no response, communityresidents threatened to hold a protest in front of the store.This resulted in an immediate owner response. Addition-ally, the police increased patrols, made arrests, andaccompanied the community residents when talking to theowners. Subsquently, the owner increased his presence onthe property and improved security. He also installed afence to stop graffiti, painted and cleaned the building, andhired community residents to help keep the property ingood condition.

Case Studies

12 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Page 14: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

June 2001 / 13

The alliance attempted to employthis concept by bringing neighborstogether and facilitating relation-ship building. It encouraged resi-dents to present neighborhoodproblems that concerned them,prioritize these problems, and workon them in a conjoined effort withthe police.

Social Learning

“Differential association positsthat criminal behavior is learned thesame way as any other behavior,through intimate social settings.”3

This theory brings to focus theproblems faced in City Heights withthe failure of collective communityinvolvement. Few social settingsoccurred that taught the importanceof community activism. Instead,neighbors remained estranged fromeach other and the community atlarge. Also, they tolerated criminalbehavior and some residents evenengaged in unlawful activities as ameans of survival. Further, they re-lied on the police for solvingcrimes. Such behavior transmits so-cial messages and expectations,which prove conducive to criminalbehavior and the acceptance ofcrime.

Creating a tight-knit com-munity, with collective residentconcern and involvement, focusedthe alliance in its effort to achieve amore functional foundation for so-cial learning. The alliance wouldattempt to build social relationshipsby bringing together residents of theculturally diverse community for acommon cause. Then together, theresidents would achieve a commongoal and celebrate their success.

Social Control

Fear of social consequences de-ters people from committing crimesbecause they do not want to risk theloss of social bonds through theembarrassment and humiliationthat becoming a social outcastcauses.4 The lack of social relation-ships and social supports within theCity Heights area contributed to thelack of social control. Community

Mobilization Techniques

The City Heights Neighbor-hood Alliance employed three mainmobilization techniques: door-to-door outreach, crisis theory, andcommunity meetings. Organizersconducted all of these techniquesin four languages, and the combinedeffect received the attention of com-munity residents and provedeffective at drawing the masses.

Door-to-door Outreach

Two community organizersmobilized residents within a 12-block area of City Heights. Theywent to every home and apartmentwith the purpose of actively engag-ing residents in a partnership withpolice to solve crime and quality-of-life problems. They collectednames, addresses, and telephonenumbers from each home forfuture mobilization and statisticalreferences.

The organizers based the tech-niques employed to mobilize theseresidents on the theory that the bestway to mobilize people is throughalready established connections.5

These connections provide the trustand familiarity needed to motivatethe participation of others, alongwith the motivating factor of notwanting to disappoint the personwith whom one has a connection.

Although labor intensive, com-munity organizers spent a great dealof time going door-to-door, talkingwith residents, and learning theirviews of community problems.They also obtained personal infor-mation, including strengths andweaknesses, that later could benefittheir mobilization work.

residents did not hold their neigh-bors accountable for their unlawfuland disorderly behavior. Overall,few social consequences, coupledwith low expectations, resulted inlittle social control.

Now, through community andpolice problem solving, the resi-dents of City Heights have begun tohold their neighbors accountablefor their unlawful and disorderlybehaviors. As neighbor relationsand problem-solving efforts in-crease, the expectations communitymembers have of each other alsowill increase.

“Targeting crimesand quality-of-life

problems...hasproven effective

in satisfyingmany of the needs

of communityresidents.

Page 15: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

14 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

• Measure success by quality, not quantity.Involved residents, regardless of the number,effectively solving problems, no matter howmany, result in success.

• Identify and address the core needs ofresidents. City Heights’ residents facedunemployment, poverty, language barriers,lack of education, and lack of childcare. Suchneeds make it difficult for residents toemploy energy toward community problemswhen they feel unable to improve their ownsituations. In these cases, a program solutionmay simply involve educating residents aboutcommunity resources, or require a more com-plicated action, such as providing a programincentive that addresses their needs.

• Make people feel important and useful. Allresidents should have tasks, no matter howsmall, to complete prior to each meeting sothey feel compelled to attend future meetings.

• Reflect the ethnic diversity of the community.Similarities between residents and commu-nity organizers prove helpful in establishingthe trust needed to have residents open theirdoors, listen, and accept an invitation toattend a community meeting.

• Involve law enforcement in the process. Thepresence of law enforcement transmits amessage to residents that they are importantand that their concerns are a priority.

• Prepare organized, productive, and goal-oriented meetings, limited to 1 hour. At theend of the hour, ensure that the meeting hasaccomplished something and has resulted inas many people as possible having a task dueat the next meeting. For ease in scheduling,hold meetings on designated days of themonth.

• Build resident relationships. When the groupsize allows, break the larger group intosmaller subgroups. This enables people toget acquainted and experience a sense of

Lessons Learned

belonging. It also makes everyone feelinvolved and part of the process.

• Spend time in the community. High visibilitytransmits sincerity and affects resident trust.Use this time to assess problem locationstogether with residents, identify new problemlocations, or meet and educate other resi-dents about the program.

• Train community residents to organize andproblem solve.

• Understand cultural diversity and residents’fear of community involvement. Someresidents may fear deportation, while othershave experienced only corrupt governmentand law enforcement in their native lands.Often, the lack of resident involvement is notdue to uncaring attitudes, but to fear. Ad-dress these issues by using culturally diversecommunity organizers.

• Educate residents about the limitations oflaw enforcement as it impacts communityproblems. Many times, community problemsarise that residents want the police to handlein a particular manner. When the police donot handle the situation to the residents’expectations, anger and mistrust result. Withknowledge of law enforcement limitations,residents can work collaboratively withpolice to get the needed outcome.

• Involve young people. Youth represent thekey to adult involvement and programlongevity. In City Heights, youths attendedcommunity meetings and other programevents in larger numbers than adults. Theywere consistent, willing, and excited aboutthe task at hand, and their involvementattracted more adult participation.

• Create partnerships. Solving problems in acommunity requires effort from all affectedagencies. This teamwork increases resourcesand decreases the chances of duplicatingefforts.

Page 16: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

June 2001 / 15

The effort made to go door-to-door established connections andfamiliarity with otherwise strang-ers. It also drew upon the commoninterest of crime and brought out theneighborhood quality-of-life prob-lems. In all, the relationships devel-oped by going door-to-door andthrough continued contacts, such asphone calls and community visibil-ity, represented the foundation formobilization efforts.

Crisis Theory

Community members coalesceunder two conditions: when thepolice are inept, or when there isa crisis.6 Community organizersapplied this crisis theory. Theycompiled police statistics, as wellas intelligence regarding resident-identified crime and problem loca-tions. With this information, theydeveloped flyers to educate com-munity residents to the severity andextent of crime in their area. Over-all, the flyers served two purposes:they depicted the state of crisis inthe area and invited residents to acommunity meeting to address theirconcerns.

Community Meetings

Organizers distributed flyersregarding the community meeting aweek before the actual event, andthen, 3 days prior to the meeting,placed reminder phone calls to allcommunity residents. The day ofthe meeting organizers knockedon doors and a police officerdrove through the area announcingthe meeting over a public addresssystem.

A police officer and a com-munity organizer facilitated the

meeting, keeping it organized andlimited to 1 hour. This techniqueproved effective and seemed tomatch what community residentsneeded. They wanted to see thepolice involved in facilitating com-munity meetings as security thattheir concerns were being heardand attended to on a law enforce-ment level. The communityorganizer provided community resi-dents with the familiarity andconnectedness needed for trustbuilding and continuity.

neighborhood problems. And fi-nally, the residents shadowed acommunity organizer to learn a va-riety of skills needed to mobilizetheir neighborhood.

The program trained over 200residents in basic organization andproblem-solving skills and then fo-cused on eight residents who be-came neighborhood leaders. Theseleaders received personalizedtraining and approximately 100hours of additional one-to-onementorship. They also receivedcomputer training and all of thenecessary letters and forms. Last,they attended professional meetingswhere they met community leadersand city and government officialswho could help with their mobiliza-tion efforts.

Program Accomplishments

Mutual trust: Surveys con-ducted both before and after theprogram, regarding the level of trustbetween neighbors in City Heights,revealed that prior to the commu-nity mobilization efforts, 41.7 per-cent of community residents saidthat they trusted their neighbors.After the efforts, 68.5 percent ofcommunity residents stated thatthey trusted their neighbors. Thistrust increased tolerance and under-standing of diverse cultures and thenumber of problems that residentscould resolve without law enforce-ment involvement.

Trust in police: Prior to mobili-zation efforts, community residentscriticized the slow, or lack of,police response to their complaints.They also felt that the police wereunfriendly and not as visiblewithin the problem areas of their

“...the relationshipsdeveloped...

through continuedcontacts...respresented

the foundation formobilization efforts.

”Resident Training

To have community residentsactive in mobilizing their ownneighborhoods to solve crime repre-sented the long-term plan of theCity Heights Neighborhood Alli-ance. To accomplish this task, resi-dents received training in problemsolving and community organiza-tion skills.

Police problem-solving expertsand community organizers facili-tated several training sessions basedon actual case vignettes of areacrime problems. Each resident re-ceived a notebook reviewing all re-sources available to solve most

Page 17: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

16 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

neighborhood. These complaintssignificantly decreased with themobilization efforts. In fact, resi-dents have become more confidentthat police hear their concernsand feel a sense of pride andempowerment as they interact morewith the police.

Mobilization techniques: Thealliance mobilized a 4-square milearea in City Heights. Participantsknocked on over 500 residentialdoors and over 500 residents at-tended community meetings. Resi-dent involvement increased fromzero to an established group of 15 to24 involved residents who meettwice a month to identify and solvecommunity crime and quality-of-life problems.

Leadership: Community resi-dents elected among themselves forthe position of president, secretary,three community organizers, andthree youth leaders. These leadersassumed the roles previously heldby alliance team members and arenow self-sufficient in organizingtheir neighborhood to solve crimeand disorder problems.

Youth involvement: The alli-ance offered three forms of trainingand leadership to the youths whoattended the community meetings.First, for children ages 2 through12, the youth leaders (communityresidents who regularly attend com-munity meetings) prepared educa-tional activities that related to com-munity involvement and problemresolution. Second, youth, ages 13through 17, rode bicycles with po-lice officers after school to identifyand solve youth crimes. They alsoidentified other community-basedproblems, learned the skills to solve

them, and received weeklymentoring on a variety of self-im-provement topics. Third, youth,ages 13 through 17, who were citedfor placing graffiti on public prop-erty attended voluntary focusgroups. The youth learned why theyengaged in this activity, gainedtools to help them stop, and discov-ered positive ways to give back totheir community. For example,three of these youth discontinuedtheir graffiti activity, involvedthemselves in positive school ac-tivities, and gave back to the com-munity by painting murals at loca-tions heavily targeted by graffiti.

toward community cleanups. Com-munity agencies, such as religiousorganizations, community youthservices, established culturalgroups, and a drug recovery home,provided grant funding for theyouth bicycle team, mentoring ser-vices, community meeting space,and translation services, while theirvolunteers spent 1,000 hoursgoing door-to-door and callingcommunity residents. Once effortsbecame known, the entire commu-nity provided assistance and de-veloped means for a collaborativerelationship.

Problem-solving efforts: Resi-dents solved several communitydrug problems in 10 months. Theyemployed the successful techniqueof holding community meetings infront of the problem properties.They contacted property owners;told them about neighborhood com-plaints, as well as crime statisticsand other documented problems; in-vited them to the meetings; and fur-ther informed the owners that thepolice would be involved. Othertechniques included writing lettersto property owners; signing peti-tions; bringing in resources, such ascode compliance authorities andother officials; and threatening topicket or file a lawsuit.

Community cleanups: The alli-ance held three community clean-ups. Residents and communityagencies donated 600 hours and dis-posed of 2 tons of garbage. Thecleanups resulted in trash fromcriminal behavior (e.g., prostitu-tion, loitering, and drug use) inareas heavily littered with mat-tresses, couches, and debris steadilydecreasing over time.

Diversity: Prior to the alliancein City Heights, the police hadlimited success in reaching ethni-cally diverse communities. The mo-bilization efforts successfully in-volved representatives from theVietnamese, Somali, Cambodian,African, African-American, andHispanic communities due, in part,to providing translators.

Communitywide collaboration:Several community agenciesand businesses collaborated withthe alliance team. Fifteen busi-nesses donated a total of $4,000in food, supplies, and equipment

“...community agenciesand businesses

collaborated withthe alliance team.

Page 18: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

Residents as community orga-nizers: After several months oftraining and mentoring, communityresidents began to take over themobilization efforts previouslydone by the City Heights Neigh-borhood Alliance. They beganfacilitating community meetingsand guiding their neighbors andpeers through the problem-solvingprocess.

Arrests: The police narcoticsteam was an excellent resource andbenefit to the community mobiliza-tion efforts. When residents identi-fied a drug location and needed po-lice assistance, this team moved inwith force. Due to their support,over 320 drug dealers were arrestedand jailed.

CONCLUSION

The more traditional forms ofneighborhood policing focus oncommunication but no interactiveproblem solving. Usually, residentsidentify community problems thatthey see as a priority. Then, lawenforcement targets these problemsfor resolution. Although this strat-egy of policing has been effective inappeasing community residents andsolving some crime and quality-of-life problems, it remains similar tothe old style of policing—it puts thebulk of responsibility for problemresolution on law enforcement.

The City Heights Neighbor-hood Alliance in San Diego, Cali-fornia, has taken the concept ofcommunity policing to the nextlevel. It promotes a wrap-around,problem-solving approach wherepolice and community residentswork in a true partnership to solvecrime and quality-of-life issues.

This nontraditional neighborhoodpolicing strategy promotes residentaction. It empowers communityresidents with the knowledge, tools,and guidance to solve crimes andquality-of-life problems. By active-ly involving the individuals wholive among, experience, andcommit the crimes, the San DiegoPolice Department has created aneffective and efficient alliance thatcan solve many of the problems thatonce required law enforcementintervention.

Endnotes

1 Law enforcement has long recognized thebenefits of working with community residentsthrough such programs as Neighborhood Watchand community advisory boards. However,some communities have experienced problemswith these programs. The San Diego PoliceDepartment studied the strengths andweaknesses of both programs in the develop-ment of the alliance. The department alsoemployed the SARA (scanning, analysis,response, and assessment) model of problemsolving in its community mobilization efforts.

2 Robert J. Sampson, Ph.D., Professor ofSociology at the University of Chicago,published an abstract based on his multilevelstudy of collective efficacy in neighborhoodswhere there was substantial violent crime. Healso stated his belief in collective efficacy beingthe strongest indicator of a healthy neighbor-hood with reduced crime.

3 Edwin H. Sutherland introduced theconcept of differential association in hislearning theory of crime causation.

4 Travis Hirischi, Department of Justice,National Institute of Justice Research BriefNeighborhoods and Violent Crime (Washing-ton, DC, July 1998).

5 Robert Wuthnow, Loose Connections:

Joining Together In America’s Fragmented

Communities, (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1998).

6 The theory of Dr. John E. Eck, a notedauthor and researcher. See, John E. Eck andDavid Weisburd eds., Crime and Place

(Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press; andWashington, DC: The Police ExecutiveResearch Forum, 1995).

June 2001 / 17

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Art Director, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

Page 19: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

he words spoken byAbraham Lincoln duringhis second inaugural ad-

Veterans Affairs Policeand Security ServiceSafeguarding America’sMilitary HeritageBy RALPH C. KENNEDY, M.Ed.

Tdress reflect the philosophy andprinciples that guide the U.S. De-partment of Veterans Affairs (VA).Title 38, Section 301(b) of the U.S.Code states that the mission of theVA is “to administer the laws pro-viding benefits and other services toveterans and their dependents andthe beneficiaries of veterans.” Tothis end, the VA exists to givemeaning, purpose, and reality toAmerica’s commitment to veteransof military service.

The VA comprises one of thelargest departments in the federal

government. Its budget for fiscalyear 2000 totaled over $43.6 bil-lion. The department employs morethan 240,000 individuals, with al-most 98 percent of the staff as-signed to provide direct services toveterans and their families. The VAhas facilities in all 50 states, theDistrict of Columbia, Puerto Rico,the U.S. Virgin Islands, and thePhilippines. The agency deliversveterans’ services through 172medical centers, 551 ambulatoryand community-based outpatientclinics, 57 regional benefit offices,and 115 national cemeteries.

To assist in performing theseservices, the VA Police and

"To care for him who shall haveborne the battle and for hiswidow and his orphan."

—Abraham Lincoln

18 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

VA firearms training (left)

VA defensive tactics training (above)

Page 20: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

June 2001 / 19

Security Service protects patients,visitors, employees, and propertyat VA medical centers and supportfacilities. The efforts of these offi-cers, along with all other VA em-ployees, to preserve the peacefulenvironment requisite to the oper-ation of medical programs provevital to the mission of deliveringquality healthcare to America’s vet-erans. Across the nation, approxi-mately 2,200 VA police officersare assigned to Police and SecurityService units in each individualVA medical center. Organization-ally, the Police and Security Serviceconstitutes one of three main sec-tions of the Office of Security andLaw Enforcement (OS&LE), whichprovides guidance, consultation,and investigative and direct opera-tional support for all elements of theVA. The deputy assistant secretaryfor security and law enforcementheads the OS&LE and oversees anddevelops policy and procedures re-lated to VA facility security and lawenforcement operations, as well asVA police officer training.

THE ROLE OF THE VAPOLICE AND SECURITYSERVICE

Statutory Authority

Title 38, Chapter 9, U.S. Codecontains the statutory authority ofthe VA Police and Security Service.This statutory provision, subject toa duty of prior consultation with theU.S. Attorney General, enables theissuance of regulations governingconduct on property under thecharge and control of the VA andpenalties for their violation. Thestatute also authorizes VA policeofficers to enforce these regulations

Dealing withsituations involvingpatients constitutes

one of the uniquechallenges of a VApolice officer’s job.

Mr. Kennedy, a retired U.S. Secret Service special agent,serves as the deputy director of the Veterans Affairs Law

Enforcement Training Center in North Little Rock, Arkansas.

and to arrest persons committingviolations of these regulations andany federal laws while on VAproperty.

In addition, the legislation thatcreated the VA Police and SecurityService intended it to go well be-yond the concept of traditional lawenforcement to address the specialneeds of the veterans seeking treat-ment at VA medical facilities. Notonly does the statute prescribe train-ing of the scope and duration neces-sary for VA police officers in theproper exercise of their law en-forcement and arrest authority, italso prescribes “training with par-ticular emphasis on dealing withsituations involving patients.” Thestatutory reference to the serviceand treatment function clearly sig-nals the unique role and expectationof the VA police officer in relationto America’s military veterans.

VA Policy

VA policy more explicitly de-fines the unique service role of theVA Police and Security Service.

The policy states that to fully servethe VA mission while accomplish-ing specific protective duties, VApolice officers must render courte-ous assistance to patients, visitors,and employees at all times andavoid the use of arrest procedures asmuch as possible. Moreover, VApolice officers must handle personswith mental or emotional illnesseswith a minimum of force to preventtheir committing a violent act whileawaiting professional medical as-sistance or advice.

Service-Related Activities

Dealing with situations involv-ing patients constitutes one of theunique challenges of a VA policeofficer’s job. This nontraditionallaw enforcement role requires VApolice officers, in certain situations,to become active members of a“treatment team” for veteransseeking care at VA facilities. Inthis role, VA police officers assume“standby” or “take charge” status insituations where a patient’s level ofviolence approaches or exceeds the

Page 21: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

ability of the medical staff. In “takecharge” situations, VA police offi-cers must assume management ofthe situation until they can returncontrol safely to the medical staff tocontinue treatment. For example, atone VA medical facility, officerswere dispatched to the emergencyroom in a standby capacity whilethe medical staff attempted to treat aveteran. Upon arrival at the emer-gency room, the officers observed amale standing at the door of thetreatment room talking to himself ina loud voice. The medical staff sub-sequently told the man that theywould admit him to the hospital un-der a physician emergency certifi-cate. He refused, argued with themedical staff, and finally attemptedto leave. The officers stopped himat the exit door. At this point, theman became physically combativewith them. He swung wildly at theofficers with his fists and kickedone in the groin. The officers even-tually used pepper spray to subduehim and placed him in restraints. Atthis point, the medical staff tookcharge and administered medica-tion to assist in calming the man.Subsequently, medical personnelevaluated him, treated him for ex-posure to the pepper spray, and ad-mitted him to the hospital. Neitherofficer sustained serious injuries.

Service-related activities ac-count for the majority of a VA po-lice officer’s time with only a smallportion of time spent on crime-re-lated work. However, in both in-stances, the guiding principle of theVA Police and Security Service re-mains preventing crimes and of-fenses through effective physicalsecurity and visible deterrence. VApolice officers accomplish this

...the LETC standsas a national

leader...in the federalsystem for law

enforcement trainingin a healthcareenvironment....

specialized mission through theconcept and practice of situationallaw enforcement that emphasizescorrecting improper behavior,rather than arbitrarily taking en-forcement action for minoroffenses.

Generally, VA police officersconsider law enforcement actiononly after they have employed rea-sonable efforts to obtain voluntarycompliance for petty offenses; how-ever, this practice does not apply tofelonies or serious misdemeanors

committed by unimpaired individu-als. The VA Police and SecurityService judges the effectiveness ofits police units and individual offi-cers through the amount of com-petence, enthusiasm, and pride inproviding services to the needy; aneffective level of physical security;and a quality of law enforcementthat fully respects individual rights.It does not measure success by thenumber of arrests made or citationsissued.

The VA Police and SecurityService mission requires officers tohave knowledge of general law en-forcement methods and techniques.

In addition, due to special missionrequirements, VA police officersalso must possess an array of spe-cial skills and abilities necessary tode-escalate volatile situations com-mon in a healthcare environment.The special mission and role of theVA police officer presents a uniquechallenge in training. To this end,the VA created the Law Enforce-ment Training Center (LETC) in1972 and charged it with adminis-tering a national training programthat reflected the special missionperformed by the VA Police andSecurity Service.

VA LAW ENFORCEMENTTRAINING CENTER

Mission

To provide duly appointed VApolice officers with a specializedorientation to agency law enforce-ment policies and procedures, totrain these officers in the proper ex-ercise of statutory law enforcementauthority, and to teach them tohandle situations that involve pa-tients or persons of diminished ca-pacity constitute the mission of theVA LETC. Conceptually, thecourse provides police officers withthe knowledge, skills, and abilitiesnecessary to blend their duties aslaw enforcement officers with thespecial needs of the public that theyserve. The unique, service-orientedlaw enforcement training providedby the LETC also proves consistentwith the training needs of manyother special mission or limited ju-risdiction federal police agencies.1

History

Early in 1971, the Office of Per-sonnel Management converted VA

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guard service officers to policeofficers, which required new policetraining methods. At the request ofthe VA, the FBI’s Washington,D.C., field office developed andconducted a 1-week VA Police andSecurity Service orientation at theVA Medical Center in Washington,D.C.

Later in 1971, the VA Policeand Security Service training opera-tion moved to historic Fort Roots, aformer U.S. Army post dating backto the 1880s, in North Little Rock,Arkansas. The VA selected the siteprimarily because of its central lo-cation and because it offered amedical center setting where VApolice officers could study andlearn in the same environment thatthey worked.

Since its inception, the LETChas moved forward in concept, de-sign, and duration. Reviews by theDepartment of Justice and the VAOffice of Inspector General and theOS&LE have resulted in significantchanges and increased profession-alism at the LETC. For example, thebasic police officer training coursehas expanded from 64 hours in 1987to its current length of 160 hours.

Today

Currently, the LETC stands as anational leader and sole-source pro-vider in the federal system for lawenforcement training in a healthcareenvironment and other federal spe-cial mission or limited jurisdictionsettings. The LETC conducts a ba-sic law enforcement training pro-gram, along with in-services andspecialized courses, for more than2,200 VA police officers that serveat VA medical centers and otherfacilities throughout the nation. The

plans include a new administrationbuilding, an indoor pistol range, andadditional dormitory space.

Currently, a director, a deputydirector, six full-time instructors,and four administrative personnelstaff the LETC. Instructors comefrom within and outside the ranks ofthe VA Police and Security Service;however, all instructors have sig-nificant general or specialized lawenforcement experience. An ad-junct instructor detached from theVA Regional Counsel’s Office pro-vides legal training, and the localVA medical center psychologicalservices staff members provide be-havioral science training support. Inaddition to training, the LETC coor-dinates national programs for VAPolice and Security Service back-ground investigations and badgeissuance.

Prior to attending the 160-hourresidence basic police officer train-ing course, each VA police officeralso must complete approximately

LETC, a division of OS&LE, is ahighly successful fee-for-serviceVA Enterprise Center pilot.2

The Enterprise Center conceptgives the LETC the flexibility toextend services to and partner withother federal agencies. Annually,the LETC provides law enforce-ment training to about 500 policeofficers in residence programs andto hundreds of other nonlaw en-forcement (VA and nonVA) cus-tomers nationwide in specializedprograms. Since 1996, the LETChas entered into training agree-ments with the Walter Reed ArmyHospital, National Guard Bureau,Indian Hospital Service, NationalGallery of Art, Department of Jus-tice, and National InteragencyCounterdrug Institute.

The facilities at the LETC con-sist of an administration buildingand an adjacent three-story facilitythat contains a 30-room (single oc-cupancy) dormitory and two largestate-of-the-art classrooms. Future

June 2001 / 21

VA police studentconsults withan instructor.

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2 weeks of preparatory training.This training consists of a limitedamount of formal instruction, self-study, and on-the-job training to in-troduce new VA police officers toduty-station-specific rules, regula-tions, policies, and procedures, aswell as the basic concepts andunique aspects of policing in ahealthcare environment.

Courses Offered

The 160-hour basic police of-ficer training course represents thecore training offered at the LETC.This course trains VA police offi-cers in all pertinent aspects of basiclaw enforcement with particularemphasis on specialized aspects ofsecurity and law enforcement in thehealthcare environment. It also pro-vides VA police officers with theknowledge and skills to success-fully manage situations involvingpatients, including assaultive pa-tients and persons of diminishedcapacity.

All VA police officers mustcomplete the prescribed course dur-ing the first 90 days of employmentto maintain their law enforcementstatus and arrest authority. The ma-jor subject matter areas of the basiccourse include behavioral sciences,police operations, preliminary in-vestigation matters, administrativeissues, and physical training, whichincludes baton usage, defensive tac-tics, and arrest techniques. In addi-tion, the LETC offers several 40-hour specialized and advancedcourses, such as a baton instructorcourse, a detective course, a semi-automatic pistol course, and a su-pervisory police officer course.It also offers a 96-hour firearmsinstructor course, a 20-hour

administrative investigation course,and seminars on self-protection andviolence in the workplace.3

In-service Training

The OS&LE and the LETC rec-ognize that continuing educationand training prove essential to aneffective police operation. Each VApolice officer receives a minimumof 40 hours of training annually.Mandatory subjects include suchcourses as baton recertification, le-gal issues, and officer safety andawareness. In addition, at thebeginning of the calendar year, VA

VA police officersmust render

courteous assistanceto patients, visitors,

and employeesat all times....

training course. Over the years,various experts in the field ofcriminal justice academics, includ-ing past and present FBI officialsand graduate-level professors, havereviewed the course. In addition,the University of Arkansas at LittleRock grants 6 hours of undergradu-ate criminal justice college creditsfor successful completion of the160-hour basic police officer train-ing course.

CONCLUSION

Many veterans of the U.S. mili-tary who have made sacrifices in theservice of their country requiremedical intervention and other as-sistance. The Department of Veter-ans Affairs, along with its Policeand Security Service, administerssuch aid to many American veter-ans, who have sustained physical,mental, or emotional injuries whileperforming their duties, and to theirfamilies and beneficiaries.

The primary role of the VA po-lice officer is to provide the peace-ful environment requisite to treat-ment initiatives at VA medicalcenters. Officers accomplish thisfunction by conducting highly vis-ible and inquisitive patrol activitiesto deter criminal activity while re-maining alert to provide directionand assistance to veterans and theirfamilies. The role of the VA policeofficer proves unique in the law en-forcement profession in that theclinical treatment of the veteran re-mains paramount while law en-forcement action is initiated only asa last resort.

The VA Law EnforcementTraining Center provides the neces-sary law enforcement trainingfor VA police officers. Since its

Police and Security Service unitsmust develop annual training plansand often incorporate different de-livery methods. For example, theycan use a monthly in-service train-ing film provided by the LETC tofulfill 12 hours of the annual in-service requirement.

Program Review

To ensure that the training re-mains of the highest quality andmeets the needs of the VA, theOS&LE and the LETC have soughtperiodic, independent outside re-view of the basic police officer

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inception in 1972, the LETC hasmade great strides in its efforts toadequately and effectively train VApolice officers for the rigors of theirprofession. Today, the LETC is astate-of-the-art police training facil-ity and a highly successful VA En-terprise Center pilot that provides acomprehensive program of basic,in-service, and specialized policetraining for the VA Police and Se-curity Service, along with a limitednumber of other special missionfederal police agencies. As withPresident Lincoln’s desire to helpwounded Civil War veterans, theirfamilies, and the survivors of fallen

combatants, the VA and its policeofficers have developed a deepcommitment to honor and assist allmilitary veterans and their familiesand ensure that these individualsobtain the level of care and respectthat they so richly deserve.

Endnotes

1 For additional information, access theOffice of Security and Law Enforcement’s Website at http://vaww.va.gov/osle, or contact theLaw Enforcement Training Center at 2200 FortRoots Drive, Building 104, North Little Rock,AR 72114; telephone: 501-257-4160 (office)and 501-257-4145 (fax).

2 The Government Management Reform Actof 1994 authorized federal agencies to establish

a new type of revolving fund (Franchise Fund)on a pilot basis to provide common administra-tive services. Unlike other governmentrevolving funds, Franchise Funds are requiredto price products at full cost and compete forcustomers. The VA saw this as an opportunityto improve the quality and reduce the unit costsassociated with such services. For additionalinformation, access the VA Enterprise Center’sWeb site at http://www.va.gov/fund.

3 Firearms training is a recent addition to theLETC annual course schedule. Prior to 1996,the VA Police and Security Services maintaineda long tradition of not having its officers carryfirearms and armed them, instead, with onlypepper spray and a side-handle baton. However,between 1985 and 1996, five VA police officerswere shot and killed in the line of duty. As aresult, in 1996, the VA drafted a stringent planfor gradually training and arming all of itspolice officers.

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Legal Digest

he relationship between In-dian tribes and the U.S.government has changed

sovereignty was diluted over time,and they were treated as dependantsovereigns, retaining limited con-trol of their internal affairs. Thischanging and uneasy relationshipset the stage for many battles, bothin the field and in the courts, regard-ing the status of Indian tribes inmodern America.

This article briefly examinesthe judicial history of tribal sover-eignty in American courts. It thenreviews the major federal legisla-tion impacting criminal jurisdictionon tribal land and discusses the im-pact of the federal Constitution onthe tribes.

THE QUESTIONOF SOVEREIGNTY

In the 1830s, the U.S. SupremeCourt decided two cases collec-tively known as the Cherokee cases:Cherokee Nation v. Georgia1 andWorcester v. Georgia.2 In CherokeeNation v. Georgia, the Cherokeetribe sued to overturn certain lawsof the state of Georgia that it feltinterfered with its internal affairs.In order to bring the suit, the tribehad to qualify as a “foreign nation”under the U.S. Constitution.3 TheCourt decided the tribe was nota foreign nation and dismissedthe suit. However, the Court did

Criminal Jurisdiction and ProcedureBy MICHAEL J. BULZOMI, J.D.

Tdramatically over the last 200 years.During the British colonial period,Indian tribes were considered for-eign nations by the British crownand were dealt with by treaty. Thisrelationship worked so well that themajority of the tribes allied with theBritish during the RevolutionaryWar. The relationship between thetribes and the American colonistswas never as strong. At first, thecolonists treated the tribes as theywere treated by the British, as in-dependent sovereigns, but their

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characterize the tribe as a “domesticdependent nation.”4 The followingyear, the Court decided the case ofWorcester v. Georgia. In this case,Georgia had passed a law requiringa state permit for any non-Indianto live on the Cherokee reservation.Worcester, a missionary, broke thelaw and was arrested. The SupremeCourt decided that the laws of thestate of Georgia had no force onthe Cherokee reservation. TheCourt said that Indian reserva-tions are “distinct political com-munities, having territorial bound-aries, within which their authority isexclusive....”5

The Cherokee cases clearly es-tablished that the tribes were sepa-rate political entities with authorityover their internal affairs and be-yond the reach of the authority ofthe individual states. However,their relationship with the federalgovernment was much different. Asnoted previously, in Cherokee Na-tion v. Georgia, the Supreme Courtcharacterized the tribes as depen-dent nations, meaning dependentupon the authority of the federalgovernment. The Court describedthe relationship as that of a “ward tohis guardian.”6 The Court inter-preted this trust relationship tomean that the federal government,specifically Congress, could exer-cise extensive authority over thetribes.7 In 1903, the Court recog-nized that Congress has plenarypower over Indian affairs “by rea-son of its exercise of guardianshipover their interests.”8 Over theyears, Congress has used thatplenary power to apportion crim-inal jurisdiction on Indian landsamong federal, state, and Indiangovernments.

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

The Federal Enclaves Act

In 1817, Congress passed TheFederal Enclaves Act,9 assertingfederal criminal jurisdiction overnon-Indians for crimes they commitin Indian country and over Indiansfor some crimes they commitagainst non-Indians. Under the act,“the general laws of the UnitedStates as to the punishment of of-fenses committed in any placewithin the sole and exclusive juris-diction of the United States...[extend] to the Indian country.”10

Consequently, for jurisdictionalpurposes, Indian land is treatedtoday as a “federal enclave,” similarto a federal building, park, prison,or military base. The act has threeimportant exceptions: it does notapply to crimes by Indians againstIndians; to crimes by Indians thathave been punished by the tribe; norto crimes over which a treaty gives

exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe.The act appears to cover “victim-less” crimes committed by Indians,but the Supreme Court, in UnitedStates v. Quiver,11 held that the fed-eral government lacked jurisdictionin such cases where both parties areIndian.

The act imports the entire bodyof federal criminal law into Indiancountry. Federal enclave laws adoptor define traditional state lawcrimes, such as arson, murder, androbbery, and apply them to federalenclaves by making the site of thecrime one of its elements. Thus, onecan violate an enclave law only bycommitting a certain act in an en-clave. However, the federal crimi-nal code applied to federal enclavesis by no means complete. Congressrecognized that there were criminalacts being committed within fed-eral enclaves that were goingunpunished because there wereno specific federal criminal laws

...there are threedistinct sovereigns,state, federal, and

tribal, interacting withone another in what is

best described as apatchwork of criminal

jurisidiction.

Special Agent Bulzomi is a legalinstructor at the FBI Academy.

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prohibiting them and because statecriminal law had no force withinthese enclaves, including Indiancountry.

Congress addressed this over-sight in 1825 by enacting the As-similative Crimes Act.12 That actreads in part:

Whoever within or upon any[federal enclave] is guilty ofany act or omission which,although not made punishableby any enactment of Congress,would be punishable if com-mitted or omitted within thejurisdiction of the State,Territory, Possession, orDistrict in which such place issituated, by the laws thereof inforce at the time of such act oromission, shall be guilty of alike offense and subject to alike punishment.13

This provision makes statecriminal law applicable to any of-fense, not otherwise specifically ad-dressed by a separate federal stat-ute, when committed on a federalenclave. Because the definition offederal enclave includes Indian res-ervations, this provision is appli-cable to Indian country through theFederal Enclaves Act.

An important question left openby the Federal Enclaves Act waswhich sovereign has jurisdictionover crimes on Indian land whenboth the defendant and victim arenon-Indians. The U.S. SupremeCourt dealt with that issue in 1881in United States v. McBratney.14

The case involved the murder ofa non-Indian by another non-Indianon the Ute Indian reservation inColorado. The defendant was tried

and found guilty of murder in fed-eral court. The defendant appealedhis conviction on the ground thatthere was no federal jurisdiction totry his case. The Supreme Courtruled in favor of the defendant find-ing that when a crime is committedon an Indian reservation by a non-Indian against a non-Indian, thestate in which the reservation islocated has criminal jurisdiction.The Court reasoned that unlessthe enabling act admitting a stateinto the Union excluded state juris-diction over crimes committed onan Indian reservation involvingonly non-Indian parties, state courtsare vested with jurisdiction overnon-Indians who commit crimes onIndian lands.15

On August 5, 1881, Crow Dogshot and killed Chief Spotted Tail.Both individuals were Brule Sioux,and Brule law required that CrowDog make reparations to SpottedTail’s family. When the press re-ported the resolution of this tribalcase, restitution in the form of $600,eight horses, and one blanket, acry for federal intervention arose.Chief Spotted Tail was well likedby white settlers and federal gov-ernment officials, who believed thata matter such as this should be re-solved in federal court. Crow Dogwas arrested and tried by a federalterritorial court and sentenced tohang for murder. On appeal, the Su-preme Court ruled that Indian of-fenders committing crimes on thereservation were not subject to fed-eral jurisdiction and reversed theconviction.16 The Court explainedthat by treaty, the United States hadallowed the tribe to retain its sover-eignty. Any new criminal jurisdic-tion policy on the part of the U.S.government would require “a clearexpression…of Congress.”17 Thepublic demanded action, causingCongress to enact the Major CrimesAct.

The Major Crimes Act18 waspassed in 1885 and established fed-eral jurisdiction over seven crimescommitted by Indians in Indiancountry. The original seven crimescovered by the act were, murder,manslaughter, rape, assault with in-tent to kill, arson, burglary, and lar-ceny. The act has been subse-quently amended to include sevenadditional crimes: kidnaping, in-cest, assault with a dangerousweapon, assault resulting in serious

Indian tribalsovereignty

has a significantimpact on criminal

jurisdiction andprocedure....

“The Major Crimes Act

Another major limitation of theFederal Enclaves Act is that it doesnot address crimes on Indian landswhere both parties are Indians. Acrime on the Brule Sioux reserva-tion in 1881 spurred Congress toenact legislation to overcome thislimitation.

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bodily injury, assault with intent tocommit rape, robbery, and feloni-ous sexual molestation of a minor.The intent of the act was to permitfederal punishment of major crimesby Indians against Indians; how-ever, the Major Crimes Act applieswhether the victim is Indian ornon-Indian.19

Taken together, the MajorCrimes Act, the Federal EnclavesAct, and the Assimilative CrimesAct give the federal governmentexclusive jurisdiction to prosecuteoffenses committed on Indian landswhen the defendant is non-Indianand the offense is committedagainst an Indian or Indian inter-ests and when an Indian defendantcommits one of the major crimesenumerated in the Major CrimesAct. States have jurisdiction overcrimes involving non-Indian defen-dants and victims committed onIndian lands within their borders.The tribes have jurisdiction overnonmajor crimes (misdemeanors)committed on Indian lands byIndians.

The question of criminal juris-diction over misdemeanors wherethe defendant is non-Indian re-mained unanswered until theSupreme Court decided Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe.20 Inthis case, tribal police arrestedOliphant, a non-Indian living on areservation in Washington State.Oliphant was charged with resistingarrest and assault of a police officer.He was found guilty in tribal courtand appealed his conviction, claim-ing he was not subject to Indianjurisdiction because he was not anIndian. The Supreme Court upheldOliphant’s claim. The court foundthat due to the tribe’s domestic,

dependant status, it did not havejurisdiction over non-Indians unlessCongress granted such power.

The above cases illustrate thatif a non-Indian commits a crimeagainst an Indian on a reservationthen the federal government hasjurisdiction. If a crime is committedin Indian country by a non-Indianagainst a non-Indian, then thestate has jurisdiction. But what if anonmember Indian commits a crimeon a reservation?

and working on the Salt RiverPima-Maricopa Indian Reservationin Arizona. Duro appealed hismisdemeanor conviction on thegrounds that the Indian Civil RightsAct of 1968 prohibits tribes fromprosecuting non-Indians.The Su-preme Court held that the tribe hadno jurisdiction over nonmember In-dians. The Court ruled that tribesdiffered in social and cultural struc-tures and that enrollment in a tribeconstitutes consent to the authorityof that tribe but not to other tribes.Congress responded to the Durodecision by passing Public Law102-137,22 which gives tribes juris-diction in misdemeanor crimes overall Indians to include nonmemberIndians.

Public Law 280

The issue of criminal jurisdic-tion on Indian lands was furtherconfused by the passage of PublicLaw 28023 in 1953. This federal lawgrants so-called “mandatory states”all criminal and civil jurisdictionover Indian lands within their bor-ders. The states affected by the leg-islation were California, Minnesota(except for the Red Lake Reserva-tion), Nebraska, Oregon (except forthe Warm Springs Reservation),Wisconsin, and Alaska after gain-ing statehood (except for theAnnette Islands Metlakatla Indi-ans). This law effectively termi-nates all tribal criminal jurisdictionin the affected Indian countrywithin these states. Public Law 280also provides that any state (so-called “optional states”) wishing toassume jurisdiction over tribeswithin their borders may do so bystate law or by amending the stateconstitution.

In Duro v. Reina,21 the SupremeCourt defined the term “Indian” forpurposes of tribal criminal jurisdic-tion. Tribal police arrested Duro fordischarging a firearm on the SaltRiver Pima-Maricopa Indian Reser-vation, a misdemeanor charge.Duro had allegedly used the firearmto kill a 14-year-old boy from theGila River Indian tribe. (Themurder falls into the jurisdiction ofthe federal government because it isa felony). Duro was an enrolledmember of the Torres-Martinezband of the Cahuilla MissionIndians of California, but was living

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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In 1896, the Supreme Court de-cided Talton v. Mayes.24 The caseinvolved a tribe’s use of a grandjury system that did not use thenumber of jurors specified in theU.S. Constitution. The Court ruledthat Indian tribes are not bound bythe provisions of the U.S. Constitu-tion. The Court recognized that In-dian tribes are sovereign nations,whose sovereignty was establishedand recognized prior to the adoptionof the Constitution, and had not rati-fied the Constitution as the stateshad. Consequently, the tribes werenot constrained by any of the provi-sions of the federal Constitutionwhen dealing with tribal members,and tribal members could not claimany Constitutional protectionsagainst the actions of their tribes.Congress became concerned aboutthe implications of this holding andpassed the Indian Civil Rights Actof 196825 (IRCA).

The Indian CivilRights Act of 1968

The IRCA imposed most of thesubstantive restraints of the Bill ofRights upon the tribes. The mostimportant exclusions from the actare the right to appointed counsel(the acts provides a right to counselat the tribal member’s expense) andthe Grand Jury Clause of the FifthAmendment. The ICRA prohibitsthe exclusion of evidence as a rem-edy for violations of its provisions.The act also limits tribal criminaljurisdiction over Indians to misde-meanors. The maximum penaltiesin tribal court for misdemeanorsare up to 1 year in jail and $5,000in fines per count.26 The question

remains to what effect, if any, theICRA has upon states or the federalgovernment.

Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy Clause ofthe federal Constitution provides:“...nor shall any person be subjectfor the same offense to be twice putin jeopardy of life or limb.”27 Asimilar provision is found in the In-dian Civil Rights Act.28 Under theDual Sovereignty Doctrine,29 pros-ecution of a defendant under the

the Navajo Nation. He was arrestedby tribal police and pled guilty intribal court to disorderly conductand contributing to the delinquencyof a minor. He was then charged infederal court with statutory rapefor conduct arising from the sameincident. The appeal rested onWheeler’s contention that the sec-ond prosecution was barred by thedouble jeopardy clause contained inthe Fifth Amendment of the U.S.Constitution.

The Court found that the tribesretain criminal jurisdiction unless itis “withdrawn by treaty or statute,or by implication as a necessary re-sult of their dependent status....”31

Because the Navajo Nation’s crimi-nal jurisdiction over its tribal mem-bers was never divested, it retainedits criminal jurisdiction. A subse-quent federal prosecution was notdouble jeopardy because Wheeler’sfirst prosecution was by a sovereignseparate from the United States.32

This case settled the double jeop-ardy issue regarding Indians tried intribal court and then prosecuted infederal court for acts arising out ofthe same offense. But what if theIndian involved is not a member ofthe tribe prosecuting him?

In United States v. Weasel-head,33 the Eighth Circuit Court ofAppeals held that Public Law 102-137 allowed tribes to retain criminaljurisdiction over all Indians on theirreservations, whether enrolledmembers of the prosecuting tribe ornot. Therefore, because these twosovereigns, the tribe and the federalgovernment, are prosecuting on thebasis of their own inherent sover-eignty, double jeopardy is not vio-lated by dual prosecutions.

...state and federalofficials owe

Native Americansthe protectionsdefined in theBill of Rights.

“laws of separate sovereigns doesnot subject a defendant to doublejeopardy. This is based on the prin-ciple that either, or both, sovereignsmay punish such an offender for thesame offense because the defendanthas committed two separate of-fenses, one offense against eachsovereign.

In United States v. Wheeler,30

the Supreme Court was askedwhether tribal punishment and suc-cessive federal punishment amount-ed to a violation of the federaldouble jeopardy doctrine. AnthonyWheeler was an enrolled member of

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ExtraditionExtradition is “the surrender by

one nation or state to another of anindividual accused or convicted ofan offense committed within theterritorial jurisdiction of the latterauthority, which, being competentto try and to punish the offender,demands his surrender.”34 Extradi-tion between separate sovereigns isnormally established by treaty. If noextradition treaty exists betweennations, no legal duty to extraditeexists. Extradition between states isgoverned by the Extradition Clauseof the U.S. Constitution.35 How-ever, because the U.S. Constitutiondoes not bind Indian tribes, extradi-tion between states and Indiantribes must be facilitated throughsome other means, either by a treatyagreement with the federal govern-ment or an extradition agreementbetween a state and a tribe.

In Merrill v. Turtle,36 the Na-vajo tribe refused Oklahoma’s re-quest to extradite Turtle, a Chey-enne Indian, living on the Navajoreservation. The state of Oklahomaasked the state of Arizona to arrestand extradite Turtle. Officers fromArizona entered onto the Navajoreservation and arrested Turtle. TheNinth Circuit Court of Appeals de-cided that the state of Arizona hadno authority to arrest Turtle on theNavajo reservation on behalf of thestate of Oklahoma. In reaching itsdecision, the court relied on the Na-vajo Treaty of 1868, which pro-vided for extradition between thetribe and the federal government.The court also relied on a 1956 Na-vajo resolution containing extradi-tion procedures that only providedfor extradition to Arizona, New

Mexico, and Utah. The courtviewed federal approval of thisresolution as evidence that the tribewas exercising its own inherent ex-tradition authority. The court fur-ther found that the state of Arizonacould not assume the tribe’s extra-dition authority. The Turtle casewas followed by a New MexicoSupreme Court case, Benally v.Marcum,37 which held that an arrestby a nontribal officer of a tribemember on a reservation was in-valid because it did not comportwith the extradition requirements ofthe Navajo code.

reservation for an alleged offenseoccurring both on and off the reser-vation. Davis refused to waive hisextradition rights and requested ahearing before a tribal judge. Whenthe officers were informed that nojudge would be available that day,they took Davis into custody andplaced him in the county jail, de-spite the officers’ knowledge thatsuch an action was a violation of theTurtle Mountain extradition ordi-nance. Davis filed his objectionswith the state supreme court andsought a writ of habeas corpus fromthe federal courts.

The U.S. Court of Appeals forthe Eighth Circuit balanced the im-portance of tribal sovereigntyagainst the harm caused to Davis bythe illegal arrest and refused to di-vest the state courts of jurisdictionor grant habeas corpus. The courtacknowledged the duty of federalcourts to protect tribal sovereigntyfrom state interference and that thesheriff’s officers’ refusal to followextradition procedures interferedwith tribal judicial authority. How-ever, the court decided that the cir-cumstances of the illegal arrest didnot rise to a level that would violatethe Due Process Clause. The courtused the Fourteenth Amendmentstandard because it was judging theactions of state officers, not tribalofficers. The court also held that thestate had not acted in bad faith.

In both Benally and Muellar,the tribes had enacted valid extradi-tion laws. The reviewing courtsagreed that the tribal members hadbeen illegally arrested due to thestates’ failure to comply with therequirements of the tribal extradi-tion procedures. The courts made

Some subsequent cases havenot been as supportive of tribal ex-tradition requirements. For ex-ample, in Davis v. Muellar,38 Daviswas an enrolled member of theTurtle Mountain Band of ChippewaIndians living and working on thereservation at the time of his arrest.The Turtle Mountain Tribe had anextradition clause in its tribal code.With the cooperation of the tribalpolice, county sheriff officers ques-tioned and arrested Davis on the

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their decisions after an analysis ofthe harm suffered by the defendant,the egregious disregard of the extra-dition procedure, the prejudice tothe defendant in having to endurestate trial and appeals, and theoverall interference with tribalrights of self-government. Basedon these factors, the courts decidedwhether exclusion of evidence wasa sufficient sanction against thestate, or whether the release of thedefendant pending the state’s com-pliance with the extradition lawswas required.

It is generally preferable to fol-low tribal extradition procedures toavoid possible legal consequencesand to foster good working relation-ships with tribal governments.However, not all tribes have extra-dition procedures. For example, inState v. Spotted Horse,39 the Su-preme Court of South Dakota re-viewed the arrest of Spotted Horseon the Standing Rock Sioux Reser-vation by a city police officer for anoffense committed off the reserva-tion. The court noted that the tribehad no provision for extradition inits code. Therefore, the court foundno interference with tribal self-government, holding instead thatthe state seizure of a tribe memberon a reservation was an allowableremedy.

The Sixth AmendmentRight to Counsel

Indian tribal sovereignty andthe Sixth Amendment right to coun-sel clause of the U.S. Constitutionrecently has become an issue. TheSixth Amendment right to counselattaches when formal chargeshave been filed or when adversarial

judicial proceedings have been ini-tiated.40 This right to counsel iscrime specific—meaning that it ap-plies only to the crime to which theindividual has been formallycharged.41 Where a state and thefederal government, two separatesovereigns, intend to prosecute anindividual for crimes arising fromthe same nucleus of facts, the SixthAmendment protection afforded theindividual formally charged by onesovereign does not necessarily bindthe other sovereign who has yet toformally charge the individual.42 In-dian tribes are not only separatesovereigns but also are not bound

of knowingly engaging in sexualacts with a child. Prior to the initia-tion of any federal charges, federalagents had interrogated Dohertywhile he was incarcerated pendingfurther tribal proceedings. Dohertywaived his Fifth Amendment rightsand voluntarily gave a signed state-ment to the federal agents. Dohertyargued that the introduction of hisconfession into evidence in federalcourt violated his Sixth Amend-ment right to counsel because hehad already been arraigned for astatutory rape misdemeanor tribalcharge, arising from the same factsas the federal charges, and had re-quested an attorney at his own ex-pense in accordance with the ICRA.

The Sixth Circuit held that theICRA, not the Sixth Amendment,was the basis of Doherty’s right tocounsel in the tribal proceedings.The ICRA created a body of sub-stantive rights for Indians molded inpart on the Bill of Rights to protectIndians against excessive tribal au-thority. The ICRA, however, is notcoextensive with the Sixth Amend-ment. The court stated that the ex-istence of the attorney-client rela-tionship between Doherty and histribal court counsel did not arisefrom the Sixth Amendment. Thecourt further advised that Doherty’sinvocation of the right to counsel intribal court does not independentlytrigger the Sixth Amendment rightto counsel because only the initia-tion of federal adversarial proceed-ings triggers Sixth Amendment pro-tections. Prior to the initiation offederal proceedings Doherty had noSixth Amendment right to counsel.The court held that Doherty’s con-fession was properly admitted into

...states may executestate search warrants

on Indian reservations,providing there are notribal code proceduresin place regarding the

execution of statesearch warrants.

“by the limitations of the U.S. Con-stitution. Does the invocation of theright to counsel in tribal court bindthe other sovereign? This issue wasaddressed by the Sixth Circuit of theU.S. Court of Appeals in UnitedStates v. Doherty.43

Doherty, a member of theHannahville Indian CommunityTribal Reservation in the UpperPeninsula of Michigan, appealedhis conviction of two federal counts

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June 2001 / 31

evidence, not because federalagents were unconstrained by theSixth Amendment, but becauseDoherty’s Sixth Amendment rightto counsel had not yet matured.

It should be stressed that stateand federal officials owe NativeAmericans the protections definedin the Bill of Rights. Native Ameri-cans are citizens of the UnitedStates and the rule that tribal gov-ernments are not constrained by thelimitations of the Bill of Rights andthe Fourteenth Amendment “ofcourse, does not relieve State andFederal governments of their obli-gations to individual Indians underthese provisions.”44 However, ifcertain protections, such as theSixth Amendment right to counsel,have not been triggered, then theyare not applicable and can be disre-garded until they are appropriatelytriggered and become applicable.

STATE SEARCH WARRANTS

In Kaul v. Stephan,45 the U.S.Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-cuit held that the state of Kansashad jurisdiction to execute searchwarrants on reservations within itsboundaries. It was a proper exerciseof the state’s authority pursuant to aspecific Congressional delegationof jurisdiction over crimes commit-ted by or against Indians on Indianreservations in the state of Kansas.The U.S. Supreme Court has notaddressed the issue whether a state,lacking such a Congressional del-egation, has jurisdiction to issue awarrant for a search within Indiancountry. However, the Court hasstated that “even on reservations,state laws may be applied unlesssuch application would interfere

with reservation self-government orwould impair a right granted or re-served by federal law.”46

The Idaho Supreme Court usedthe Court’s two-part analysis inreaching its decision in Idaho v.Mathews.47 Mathews, a Nez PerceIndian, was accused of murderinghis estranged wife in Lewiston,Idaho. Mathews was living withinthe Nez Perce Indian Reservation atthe time of the murder. A Lewistonpolice officer applied for and re-ceived two state search warrants,one for the home of Mathews andthe other for the home of a relativeof Mathews, both located within theNez Perce Indian Reservation.

was not infringed because there wasno Nez Perce tribal code establish-ing a procedure regulating the ex-ecution of state search warrants incases involving Indians who hadcommitted crimes outside of thereservation. Consequently, the ex-ecution of state search warrantswithin the reservation did not in-fringe on the right of the Nez PerceTribe to govern itself.

The court then turned to thesecond prong of the analysis, re-quiring a determination of whetherthe state action is preempted by fed-eral law. The court found that therewas no federal law regarding theexecution of state search warrantson Indian reservations. Therefore,the court held, in the absence of anestablished tribal procedure, thestate court’s issuance and executionof a search warrant for a searchwithin the Nez Perce Indian Reser-vation neither unlawfully under-mines the tribe’s self-governancenor conflicts with federal law.Mathew’s motion to suppress wasdenied.

Although the U.S. SupremeCourt has not decided this issue , itappears that states may executestate search warrants on Indian res-ervations, providing there are notribal code procedures in place re-garding the execution of statesearch warrants. If a tribe has estab-lished such a procedure, statesshould follow the procedure.

CONCLUSION

Indian tribal sovereignty has asignificant impact on criminal juris-diction and procedure, both in andout of Indian country. The impact issignificant because there are three

Mathews was later convicted of themurder and appealed the validity ofthe state warrants executed in In-dian country.

The Idaho Supreme Court, us-ing the Supreme Courts’ two-prongtest, first examined the question ofwhether the execution of a statesearch warrant within the Nez PerceIndian reservation unlawfully in-fringed on tribal sovereignty. Thecourt found that tribal sovereignty

Page 33: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

distinct sovereigns, state, federal,and tribal, interacting with one an-other in what is best described as apatchwork of criminal jurisdiction.Each sovereign enjoys exclusive,partial, or no jurisdiction, depend-ing on the location of the offense,the particular crime alleged, and theethnicity of the parties involved. Todetermine which sovereign or sov-ereigns have jurisdiction, officersworking in Indian country shouldassess situations they may encoun-ter by asking the following ques-tions:

1) Did the crime occur on oroff Indian country?

2) If on, does a federal statutesuch as Public Law 280 conferexclusive criminal jurisdictionto a state?

3) If not, is the victim Indianor non-Indian?

4) Is the suspect Indian ornon-Indian?

5) Is the crime a misdemeanoror a felony?

6) Is there a tribal codeprovision regarding extraditionor state warrant execution?

7) Has something occurred totrigger Constitutional rights ofthe accused?

Due to the difficulty of deter-mining criminal jurisdiction andprocedure in Indian country, eachsituation must be judged individu-ally, and investigators are urged toconsult their legal advisors. How-ever, by asking the above questionsofficers can begin to determinecriminal jurisdiction and procedurein Indian country.

Endnotes

1 30 U.S. 1 (1831)2 31 U.S. 575 (1832).3 U.S. Const. Art. III, Sec. 2.4 Id. at 17.5 Ibid 2 at 575.6 Ibid 1 at 17.7 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.

375 (1886).8 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553

at 566 (1903).9 Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152.10 Id.11 241 U.S. 602 (1916).12 Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 13.13 Id.14 104 U.S. 621 (1881).

28 Title 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (3).29 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377

(1922). (The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine aroseout of a prohibition era case where the state ofWashington charged the defendants withmanufacturing intoxicating liquor. After thestate case was concluded, the U.S. Attorneybrought charges.)

30 435 U.S. 313 (1978).31 Id. at 323.32 See Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419

F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398U.S. 903 (1970). (The Fifth Amendment canbe invoked if a link is established between thefederal government and a tribe that wouldimpair tribal sovereignty, such as a federalgovernment imposed tribal court that is undersome federal control.)

33 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir., 1998) reh’ggranted and opinion vacated, 156 F.3d 818 onreh’g 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (en blanc)aff’d by an equally divided court 36 F.Supp.2d.908 (Neb. D.C. 1997) cert. denied 120 S. Ct.82 (1999).

34 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extradition § 1 (1989).35 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.36 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.

denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).37 553 P.2d 1270 (N.M. 1976).38 643 F.2d 521 (8th Cir., 1981), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).39 462 N.W. 2d 463 (S.D. 1990).40 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.

201(1964).41 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293

(1966). See also Texas v Cobb, ___ S. Ct. ___(2001).

42 United States v. Garey, 813 F.Supp. 1069(U.S.D.C. Vermont 1993) aff’d by 19 F.3d 8(2nd Cir. 1994). See also Texas v. Cobb, ___S. Ct. ___ (2001).

43 126 F.3d 769 (1998).44 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

U.S. 49 at 56 (1978).45 83 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir., 1996).46 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411

U.S. 145 at 148 (1973).47 986 P.2d 323 (1999).

...for jurisdictionalpurposes, Indian

land is treatedtoday as a “federalenclave,” similar toa federal building,

park, prison, ormilitary base.

“15 See also Draper v. United States, 164

U.S. 240 (1896).16 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556

(1883).17 Id at 572.18 Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153.19 United States v. Henry, 432 F.2d 114

(9th Cir. 1970), modified 434 F.2d 1283,cert. denied 400 U.S. 1011 (1971).

20 435 U.S. 191 (1978).21 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).22 Title 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4).23 Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162.24 163 U.S. 196 (1896).25 Title 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq.26 Id. (as amended in 1986).27 U.S. Const. Amend. V.

Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interested inthis article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police procedures ruledpermissible under federal constitutional laware of questionable legality under state lawor are not permitted at all.

32 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Page 34: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizetheir exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.

Sergeant Woods Deputy Brown

During the early morning hours, Michigan StateTroopers pursued a stolen vehicle into Kalkaska County,Michigan. The stolen vehicle careened out of control andstruck a cement post and caught fire. Sergeant VencentWoods and Deputy Steven Brown of the KalkaskaSheriff’s office forced their way into the burning vehicleand pulled the two suspects to safety. Their quick actionand disregard for their own safety saved the lives of thetwo individuals.

Officer Hughes

Off-duty Department of Veterans Affairs Police Officer Kyle Hughes wasvisiting the local YMCA swimming pool with his family in Grand Island,Nebraska. While there, he observed an 11-year-old girl learning to swim with theassistance of her 12-year-old friend. As the two reached the deep end of the pool,the young girl began to panic and began to pull her friend under the water in herstruggle for survival. The 12-year-old managed to break free and swim to theedge of the pool, while the young girl sank to the bottom. Office Hughes realizedthe young girl was in trouble and quickly dove into the pool, pulled the girl tosafety, administered first aid, and ensured her well being. Officer Hughes’selfless actions saved the life of this youngster.

Trooper Marasco

Trooper James J. Marasco, Jr., of the Pennsylvania State Police was onpatrol in the early morning hours when a passing motorist notified him of a rowhouse fire. Upon arriving on the scene, Trooper Marasco found the residenceengulfed in flames and the surrounding row homes in imminent danger. TrooperMarasco attempted to enter the burning building but was driven back by thesearing heat and flames. Realizing the residents in the other homes were indanger and could perish, Trooper Marasco went door-to-door to evacuate theresidents and ensure their safety.

Page 35: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - June01leb

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