Fault Tree Analysis

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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (KAS3501) Semester II 2014/2015 Group 10 Presentation date : 8 April 2015 NAME UK NUMBER MUHAMMAD ARRAZI B. MUHSIN UK29548 NURUL ASWANIS BT. AHMAD UK29528 FATMA SYAHIRAH BT. MOHAMMAD UK29532 SITI NURWANI BT. BADRULHISHAM UK29533 NOR ATIERA NABILA BT. ISMAIL UK29522

Transcript of Fault Tree Analysis

Page 1: Fault Tree Analysis

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (KAS3501)

Semester II 2014/2015Group 10

Presentation date : 8 April 2015NAME UK NUMBER

MUHAMMAD ARRAZI B. MUHSIN UK29548

NURUL ASWANIS BT. AHMAD UK29528

FATMA SYAHIRAH BT. MOHAMMAD UK29532

SITI NURWANI BT. BADRULHISHAM UK29533

NOR ATIERA NABILA BT. ISMAIL UK29522

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WHAT IS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)?

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• Is a systematic method of System Analysis

• Examines System from Top Down

• Provides graphical symbols for ease of understanding

• Incorporates mathematical tools to focus on critical areas

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HISTORY

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• FTA was first used by Bell Telephone Laboratories in connection with the safety analysis of the Minuteman missile launch control system in 1962

• Technique improved by Boeing Company

• Extensively used and extended during the Reactor safety study (WASH 1400)

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Fault Tree Analysis: a Systematic andStylized Deductive Process

An undesired event is defined

The event is resolved into its immediate causes

This resolution of events continues until basic causes are identified

A logical diagram called a fault tree is constructed

showing the logical event relationships

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WHY FTA IS CARRIED OUT?

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• FTA is a deductive analysis approach for resolvingan undesired event into its causes

• FTA is a backward looking analysis, lookingbackward at the causes of a given event

• Specific stepwise logic is used in the process

• Specific logic symbols are used to illustrate theevent relationships

• A logic diagram is constructed showing the eventrelationships.

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ELEMENT OF FAULT TREE

ANALYSIS (FTA)

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• To exhaustively identify the causes of a failure

• To identify weaknesses in a system

• To assess a proposed design for its reliability or safety

• To identify effects of human errors

• To prioritize contributors to failure

• To identify effective upgrades to a system

• To quantify the failure probability and contributors

• To optimize tests and maintenances

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ROLE OF FTA IN SYSTEM ANALYSIS

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• FTA is used to resolve the causes of system failure

• FTA is used to quantify system failure probability

• FTA is used to evaluate potential upgrades to a system

• FTA is used to optimize resources in assuring systemSafety

• FTA is used to resolve causes of an incident

• FTA is used to model system failures in riskassessments

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FAULT TREE

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• FTA produces a Fault Tree

• The fault tree is the logical model of the relationship of theundesired event to more basic events.

• The top event of the fault tree is the undesired event.

• The middle events are intermediate events.

• The bottom of the fault tree is the causal basic events orprimary events.

• The logical relationships of the events are shown bylogical symbols or gates.

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BASIC FAULT TREE STRUCTURE

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CONSIDERATION BEFORE DRAWING A FT

Define

Top event

Existing event

Unallowed event (not

under consideration)

Physical bounds of process

Equipment configuration

Level of resolution

12

3

45

6

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CONSIDERATION BEFORE DRAWING A FT

Requirement Description

1. Defining top event • Eg. Damage due to over pressure• AVOID vague event such as

‘Explosion of Reactor’

2. Defining the existing event • What conditions are sure to be present when top event occurs?

• Eg. ‘High pressure process’

3. Defining unallowed events that are unlikely or are not considered at the present

• E.g. Wiring failures, lightning strike, tornadoes, hurricanes etc.

4. Defining physical bounds of the process

• What components are to be considered in the fault tree?

5. Defining equipment configuration. • What valves are open or closed?• What are the liquid level?• Is this normal operation state?

6. Defining the level of resolution • Will the analysis consider just a valve or will it be necessary to consider the valve components?

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THE FOUR NECESSARY STEPS TOBEGIN A FAULT TREE

1. Define the undesired event to be analyzed (the focusof the FTA)

2. Define the boundary of the system (the scope of theFTA)

3. Define the basic causal events to be considered (theresolution of the FTA)

4. Define the initial state of the system

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ILLUSTRATION OF THE STEPS OF A FTA

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BASIC EVENTS OF A FAULT TREE

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BASIC GATES OF A FAULT TREE

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DRAWING A FAULT TREE1. Place top event at the top of the page (in

a rectangle box and label as top event)

2. Determine the events that contribute to the top event.

3. Determine whether these events are intermediate or basic.

4. If the events are related in parallel, they must be connected by an AND gate

5. If these events are related in series, they must be connected by an OR gate

6. Focus to one of the immediate events

7. Determine the events that contribute to this immediate event.

8. Repeat 3-6 for all the intermediate events.

9. Continue developing the fault tree to expand any intermediate events until all

branches have been terminated by basic, undeveloped or external events.

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FLAT TIRE Top Event

OR

Tire Failure Road Debris

Worn TireDefective

Tire

A fault tree describing the various events contributing to a flat tire

OR

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BENEFITS OF CONSTRUCTING A FAULT TREE The fault tree explicitly shows all the different

relationships that are necessary to result in the top event

In constructing the fault tree, a thorough understanding is obtained of the logic and basic causes leading to the top event

The fault tree is a tangible record of the systematic analysis of the logic and basic causes leading to the top event

The fault tree provides a framework for thorough qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the top event

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MINIMAL CUT SETSMinimal cut set gives the various sets of events that could lead to the top event.

Useful for determining the various failure modes in which a top event could occur.

The failure probabilities are likely to be different among the minimal cut sets.

The higher failure probabilities sets are examined carefully to determine for requirement for additional safety systems.

The minimal cut sets are determined using procedure by Fussell and Vesely (see next example) or Boolean Rules

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PUMP FAIL

PUMP A FAILS

PUMP B FAILS

Failure of Power Supply

Pump A Mechanica

l Failure

Failure of Power Supply

Pump B Mechanica

l Failure

MW

M Z

Example problem: Minimal Cut Set

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TOP EVENT

Example

D E

A B

C D E C

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Boolean Algebra & Minimal Cut Set

Boolean RulesIndempotent LawA+A=AA.A=AAbsorption LawA+A.B=AA.(A+B)=A

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Therefore, minimal cut sets are A.C, A.D.E, B.C and B.D.E.

)()()()(

)(

)(

)()(

)()(

)())()(()(

EDBCBEDACA

EDCBA

EDEDCBA

EDCDECCCBA

EDCDEDCCECBA

EDCEDCBA

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ADVANTAGE OF FAULT TREE

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• User could select the top event to be specific to the failure of interest.

• The minimal cut sets provide enormous inside into the various failure modes for top event to occur.

• Minimal cut sets with a product of 4 or more independent failure will increase the reliability of the system.

• Provide a qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis.

• Software are available to construct fault tree, to determine cut sets and to calculate the failure probabilities.

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DISADVANTAGE OF FAULT TREE

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• Can be enormous (thousands gate and intermediate events)

• Not necessarily all failure modes are considered.

• Need experienced engineers

• Assume hardware not to fail partially (such the possibility of valve leak is not considered).

• Assume failure of one component does not put stress on the other components (that could change component failure probabilities).

• External events not correctly treated.

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APPLICATION Used in the field of safety engineering and reliability

engineering to determine the probability of a safety accident or particular system level failure.

Aerospace engineering.

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REFERENCES “Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications’, Version

1.1, NASA Publication, August 2002. http://www.conceptdraw.com/examples/fta