Famine, Finance and Political Power: Crop Failure and Land-Tax Exemptions in Late Eighteenth-Century...

Famine, Finance and Political Power: Crop Failure and Land-Tax Exemptions in LateEighteenth-Century Chosôn KoreaAuthor(s): Anders KarlssonSource: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2005), pp.552-592Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25165120 .

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FAMINE, FINANCE AND POLITICAL POWER: CROP FAILURE AND LAND-TAX EXEMPTIONS IN LATE

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHOS?N KOREA

BY

ANDERS KARLSSON*

Abstract

This study analyses Chos?n (1392-1910) state responses to protracted and severe crop fail ure in the late eighteenth century. Confucian ideology and an elaborate relief system made it

difficult for the state to let its present tax needs override concerns for rural communities, and

steadily increasing tax exemptions severely strained state finances. However, these exemp tions were still far from sufficient, and this period saw constantly increasing numbers of

starving people. This study argues that political considerations and socio-economic interests

influenced the tax exemption process and that the resulting unequal allocation exacerbated the

famine problem in the provinces disadvantaged by the system.

Cette ?tude fait l'analyse des r?ponses du gouvernement Chos?n en vue de la faillite s?v?re et prolong?e des moissons pendant plusieurs ann?es vers la fin du dix-huiti?me si?cle. L'id?ologie confuc?enne, ainsi qu'un syst?me d'all?gements trop ?labor?, rendait difficile pour l'?tat de

donner la priorit? ? ses propres besoins fiscales au-dessus de son ?gard pour les besoins de

la communaut? campagnarde, si bien que les dispenses d'imp?ts allaient toujours en crois

sance, grevant s?v?rement les ressources de l'Etat. Toutefois, ces dispenses ne suffisaient

jamais aux besoins, tant bien qu'? cette ?poque le nombre de personnes affam?es montait tou

jours. La pr?sente ?tude pr?tend que les int?r?ts politiques et socio-?conomiques influen?aient le proc?d? des dispenses d'imp?ts, et qu'en cons?quence l'allocation in?gale aggravait le

probl?me de la famine dans les provinces d?savantag?es par ce syst?me.

Keywords: Late Chos?n agriculture, crop failure, tax exemptions, corruption, famine

1. Introduction

Compared with the problem-ridden nineteenth century, the eighteenth century is

often regarded as a renaissance period for the Chos?n dynasty (1392-1910), with two strong and able kings, Y?ngjo (r. 1724-1776) and Ch?ngjo (r. 1776

* Anders Karlsson, Department of the Languages and Cultures of Japan and Korea, School of Oriental and African Studies, Thornhaugh Street, London WC1H OXG, UK, [email protected]. The research for this article was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Also available online - www.brill.nl

JESHO 48,4



FAMINE, FINANCE AND POLITICAL POWER 553

1800), leading the country through a period of substantial socio-economic

change. This period saw progress in scholarship, science, technology, trade and

handicraft, and it has been argued that developments in the agricultural sector

were the main "generator" of change.1 The increased productivity of Late Chos?n agriculture was mainly the result

of improved fertilisers and the more widespread use of paddy-fields. The

increased use of wet-field agriculture is considered to have been particularly crucial for the socio-economic changes of the period. On the one hand it

increased productivity, which sustained an increasing population and enabled a

diversification of the economy, but on the other hand it also made agriculture more vulnerable to weather conditions, resulting in a higher frequency of crop failure and concomitant famines.2

Although the total annual rainfall on the peninsula was sufficient for wet-field

agriculture, the rainy season came late in the cycle (in the seventh or eighth month) and droughts in the sowing period (third through fifth months) fre

quently spoilt the whole year's crop in many areas.3 With an increasing popu lation such crop failures and concomitant famines emerged as a substantial

social problem, reflected in the development of a more elaborate relief aid sys tem from the late seventeenth century through the eighteenth century.4

So in parallel with the positive trends of the period the eighteenth century was also plagued by crop failure and famine.5 Towards the end of the century the most severe famines occurred in 1784, 1787, 1793, and 1795, with rice

prices soaring due to the previous year's crop failure and large numbers of peo

ple becoming dependent on state-led famine relief. Handing out free food was

1 The foundation for these arguments was laid by the pioneering work of Kim Yongs?p on Late Chos?n agricultural history. See Kim Yongs?p, Chos?n hugi nong?psa y?ngu, I MI,

[Studies in the Agricultural History of Late Chos?n, I&II]. For a later advocate of these ideas

see Lee Hochol, "Agriculture as a Generator of Change in Late Choson Korea," in Anthony Reid ed., The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies.

2 Yi Hoch'?l, Nong?p ky?ngjesa y?n gu [Economic History of Korean Agriculture], pp. 363-4, 371-2.

3 Mun Chungyang, Chos?n hugi surihak kwa suri tamnon [Hydrography and the Discourse on Irrigation in Late Chos?n], p. 60.

4 For a treatment of these changes see Mun Yongsik, Chos?n hugi chinch?ng kwa hwan'

gok uny?ng [Relief Administration and Grain-Loan Management in Late Chos?n]. The sys tem as it developed in many aspects resembled the system in eighteenth-century Qing China as described by Pierre Etienne Will in Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China.

5 Aside from the period under consideration here, the 1730s was also a period of severe

crop failure and famine with the years 1731/32, 1732/33, 1737/38 and 1738/39 most severely afflicted.



554 ANDERS KARLSSON

not the only way in which the state tried to relieve destitute peasants; the aim

of the Ever-Normal Granaries (sangp'y?ngch'ang) was to stabilize rice prices in

times of crop failure, although at best they were only able to slightly reduce the

highest peaks, and the state had also developed an elaborate system of tax

exemption.

Given its predominantly agricultural economy the Chos?n dynasty was heav

ily dependent on tax revenues from agricultural production, and when faced

with large-scale crop failure it had to compromise between securing the needed tax revenues for the year in question and securing rural social order and future

tax incomes by relieving peasants of some of the tax burden.

This study looks at late eighteenth-century tax exemption patterns, and

through a temporal analysis argues that the heightened risk of crop failure

caused by the spread of wet rice agriculture, due to complex, generous govern ment regulations for tax exemptions and famine relief, greatly diminished the

kingdom's tax revenues, and that although the central government attempted to

preserve its tax base by reducing initial awards of tax exemptions, it was unable

to do so due to structural weaknesses in the taxation system and the Confucian

ideology of the state. In fact, this period saw a constant increase in tax exemp tions and famine relief.

Furthermore, these tax exemptions would be based on an estimation of the

situation both as calculated by the central government and reported from the

provinces, and it is possible that political considerations and socio-economic

interests influenced the process, bringing in the question of entitlement.6 That is,

given the extent of damage on a certain piece of land it might be entitled to tax

exemptions, but to what extent did factors other than the actual crop damage influence the estimation upon which later tax exemptions were given? By com

paring tax exemption patterns in different provinces of the dynasty, this study argues that the allocation of tax exemptions was indeed influenced by political considerations and socio-economic interests and that this exacerbated the famine

problem in those provinces that were disadvantaged by the system. However, this study also shows that in times of extremely severe crop failure this imbal ance became less noticeable, showing that concerns for social order and the

maintenance of rural life at such times to a certain extent mitigated these

effects, although not enough to alleviate the wide-spread famine.

Tax exemptions caused by crop failure were a yearly phenomenon and their fluctuations in Late Chos?n can be tracked in the Survey of Taxes and Tributes

6 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation.




(Takchi ch?nbugo) compiled by the Ministry of Taxation.7 Corrupt practices in

this system were a recognized problem discussed at the time, and Ch?ng

Yagyong (1762-1836), the renowned social commentator on the period, gave this vivid picture in his Essays from the Heart on Ruling the People (Mongmin sirnso):

At harvest time in autumn the clerks go out to tour the fields. The wealthy inhabitants of the villages, whose fields are ripening in abundance with grain,. . . give the clerks

eight yang . .. and all of their land is given calamity-land status. Although the clerks

feel guilty and look nervously around they use the same method wherever they go. However, when it comes to the land of a poor peasant the situation is very different.

Even though it might have been possible to transplant the rice plants on this land,

maybe they did not come into ears, or even if they did come into ears they might not

have ripened, and the peasant points at his land and asks with tears in his eyes: "Please

put my land on the list of calamity land." But the clerks will answer: "Well, you do

have a bad harvest, but the plants make a sound if I beat them with my stick (by which he means that the plants have grown and even if they haven't ripened there is still

something hitting his stick) so I can not give your fields full calamity status" and then

they only lists one tenth of the peasant's land as calamity land.8

Also much modern academic attention on problems with this system has

focused on how wealthy landlords in the year-to-year tax exemptions were able to withhold their land from taxation and how the tax-burden increasingly came

to be carried by poor peasants.9 This study will address two aspects of Late Chos?n tax exemptions that have

been overlooked in previous research. First, despite the rich quantitative material

that exists on taxation for the period, when dealing with corruption and prob lems within this system the analysis has predominantly been qualitative, draw

ing conclusions from statements made by contemporary observers, preferably critical scholars such as Ch?ng Yagyong. While not questioning the accuracy of

7 Takchi ch?nbugo are records of Ministry of Taxation revenues and related issues. The

Kyujanggak holds five books (5470, 5173, 12208, 2939, 2940) that together cover the period 1744 to 1863. This study has used the facsimile edition in two volumes published in 1986

by Y?gang ch'ulp'ansa. 8 Ch?ng Yagyong, Mongmin sims? [Essays from the Heart on Governing the People],

p. 209. 9 Representative works on the land tax in Late Chos?n are Kim Okk?n, Chos?n wangjo

chaej?ngsa y?n'gu [Studies in the Financial History of the Chos?n Dynasty]; Ch?ng S?nnam,

"18, 19 segi ch?n'gy?lse ?i such'wi chedo wa k? uny?ng" [Land-Tax Collection and its

Management in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries], Hanguksaron 22 (1990); and Yi

Ch'?ls?ng, 17, 18 segi ch?nj?ng uny?ngnon kwa ch?nse chedo y?n'gu [Studies in Theories on Land Adminstration and the System of Land Taxation in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries].



556 ANDERS KARLSSON

these observations, it is the opinion of this study that they need to be corrobo

rated by quantitative analysis. Second, as has often been the case with studies on the socio-economic history of Late Chos?n, not enough attention has been

given to regional characteristics.

To facilitate a quantitative and comparative approach this study is based on

a compilation of basic data sheets (see Appendix) for each of the eight provinces detailing how the crop situation was evaluated, the size of the tax

exemptions given, the number of people registered as starving, the amount of

grain handed out as famine relief, etc. The source for this information is the

Survey of Taxes and Tributes, together with provincial crop evaluation reports (chaesil pundung changgye) and famine relief end-reports (p'ilchin) contained in

government chronicles such as the Veritable Records of the Chos?n Dynasty (Chos?n wangjo sillok), the Records of Daily Reflections (Ilsongnok), and the

Records of the Border Defense Command (Piby?nsa t?ngnok). Given the endemic problem of crop failure during this period, this study

works under the assumption that state concerns relating to taxation were differ

ent in years of "ordinary" and years of severe crop failure. Its aim is to see how

these tax exemptions interacted with the larger aspects of state administration

when issues such as social order and securing future agricultural production also

had to be taken into consideration. So the data taken from general government chronicles will be supplemented by information from the Survey of Benevolent

Administration (Hyej?ng yoram), a compilation of national relief measures employed in times of severe crop failure during the reign of King Ch?ngjo, covering the

period from 1776 to 1796.10

2. BACKGROUND

Institutional and socio-economic characteristics of Late Chos?n

By the fifteenth century the Chos?n dynasty had established its northern border

along the Yalu and Turnen Rivers so that the kingdom held what today consti

tutes the territory of North and South Korea. Covering 221,000 square kilome

tres, about eighty percent of the Korean peninsula is mountainous, with a

slightly larger expanse of flat terrain in the south. Including Cheju Island off the south coast the territory stretches between the forty-third and thirty-third

10 Hyej?ng yoram is held in the Kyujanggak (4723). This study has used the facsimile edi

tion published in 1980 by P?pchech'?.




parallels, with temperatures ranging from over thirty degrees Celsius in the sum

mer to between minus ten and minus twenty in the winter. The rainy season

arrives in July or August when approximately sixty percent of the yearly rain

fall comes.

Chos?n was divided into eight provinces; the two northern border provinces of P'y?ngan and Hamgy?ng, south of them Hwanghae and Kangw?n, the cen

tral province of Ky?nggi surrounding the capital, and the "three southern provinces" (samnam) of Ch'ungch'ong, Cholla and Ky?ngsang. Each province was headed

by a governor, who was a high-ranking official dispatched from the capital. The

provinces, in turn, were divided into counties, and the total number of counties

during the Chos?n dynasty was around 330. These were headed by magistrates, who were also officials sent out from the capital. Tenure was 1800 days except for those unaccompanied by their families, for whom it was 900 days, but in

reality the magistrates were very seldom in office for the whole period of

tenure.11

Staying only for short periods and supervising the work of county offices that were staffed by local clerks, and also having to negotiate with the interests of

the local elites represented in the Local Bureaus (Yuhyangso/Hyangch'?ng), the

magistrates' control over county affairs was in fact limited, and Ch?ng Yagyong described them as "guests" at the mercy of the real "masters," the local clerks.12

The administration of the lower levels of the bureaucratic structure?sub-coun

ties and villages?was further delegated to members of the local communities.

The government chronicles of the Chos?n dynasty contain population figures, and for the period under consideration these are given every third year. These

figures, however, were culled from the hoj?k registers kept for tax purposes, and

they do not give a correct picture of the actual population (although they are

significant in that they were the basis for both tax liabilities and various forms of relief measures). In the late eighteenth century approximately seven million

people were entered in these registers, but it has been estimated that the actual

population might have reached eighteen million.13 The three provinces with the

largest populations entered on the tax registers were Ky?ngsang, P'y?ngan, and

Cholla, between them accounting for fifty-six percent of the total registered pop ulation, followed by Ch'ungch'ong and Ky?nggi.

11 Yi Chonh?i, Chos?n sidae chibang haengj?ng chedo y?n gu [Studies in the Provincial

Administrative System of the Chos?n Period], pp. 144-6. 12

Ch?ng Yagyong, Hyangniron [A Treatise on Local Clerks]. 13 Kw?n T'aehwan and Sin Yongha, "Chos?n wangjo sidae in'gu ch'uj?ng e kwanhan il

siron" [An Essay on the Estimates of Chos?n Dynasty Population].



558 ANDERS KARLSSON

The economy of the Chos?n dynasty was predominantly agricultural although the latter part saw considerable diversification and developments in trade and

handicraft. The south has traditionally been the "rice bowl" of Korea with

somewhat greater rainfall, a warmer climate, and a slightly larger expanse of

flat terrain than the north. In the north other grain such as millet was common, and all over the peninsula barley was produced in the spring to maintain liveli

hood until the rice harvest. Late Chos?n also saw the spread of commercial

crops such as cotton and tobacco.

In rural areas trade was performed at local markets on a five-day rotating basis creating commercial networks centring on larger market towns, and towns

such as P'y?ngan and Taegu grew into large commercial centres.14 International

trade was severely restricted by the government, allowing for only regulated trade in connection with embassies to Qing and at the Japan House at the south east tip of the peninsula. The lucrative trade with Qing China in particular

spurred the development of commerce in P'y?ngan Province.15

Chos?n society was characterised by a strict hierarchical social order based on status groups. Traditionally constituting around ten percent of the population, the yangban aristocracy monopolized political power and education, while com

moners and unfree labourers worked the land.16 Members of yangban were exempted from taxes levied on individuals, and Late Chos?n saw an increase in the num

ber of people claiming this status.

The system of land tax exemptions

The taxation system of Late Chos?n was complex and in addition to the land tax it included important sources of revenue such as the Taedong-tax, the mil

itary tax and the grain-loan system, all three levied on individuals rather than

14 Kim Taegil, Chos?n hugi changsi y?n'gu [A Study on Late Chos?n Markets]. 15 For a detailed study of the role of the Japan House in the economy of Ky?ngsang see

James B. Lewis, Frontier Contact between Choson Korea and Tokugawa Japan. For a thor

ough treatment of trade with Qing China see Yi Ch'?ls?ng, Chos?n hugi tae Ch'?ng muy?ksa y?n'gu [Studies in Late Chos?n Trade with Qing]. 16 This unfree labour, nobi, could either live with their masters (solg? nob?), or work their

land in other areas (oeg? nobi), in which case it is said that their lives more resembled that of tenants. They are often referred to as slaves in Western scholarship, but it has to be remembered that they themselves could own property, and even other nobi, and that although they were property they were also tax paying citizens of the state. Kim K?nt'ae has thus

argued that they in character were different from slaves. See Kim K?nt'ae, "Chos?n hugi sanobi p'aak pangsik" [The Method of Grasping Late Chos?n Private Nobi].




landholding.17 Even though it is difficult to weigh the relative importance of

each form of taxation in state finances, the land tax was considered to be the basis as it was levied on tangible, relatively unchanging land, and the processes for calculating land tax liabilities and exemptions also formed the basis for

other types of taxation. With the exception of a very small number of counties

the land tax was to be paid in grain. The three southern provinces of Ch'ungch'?ng, Cholla and Ky?ngsang were

the main agricultural producers and between them accounted for sixty-five per cent of registered land tax liabilities. The two northern border provinces of P'y?ngan and Hamgyong were treated separately in the taxation system due to the high

military service burden on their inhabitants. The tax-rate there was just two

thirds of that for the rest of the country, they were exempted from various

surtaxes, and the grain collected was not sent to the capital but kept in the

provinces as provisions for the military, and in P'y?ngan to support the embas sies to and from China.

The unit of land taxation in Chos?n was called ky?l, a fixed yield-value. The area that made up one ky?l would vary according to the quality of the land.

The early land-tax system, as stipulated in the oldest extant law-code, the Great

Code for Governing the Country (Ky?ngguk taej?n) of 1471/85, was flexible

and levied the tax each year according to nine grades, based on a yearly yield evaluation per ky?l that had ten levels. Thus, if the yearly yield was regarded to be only one tenth or less of the fixed yield-value, the land was exempted from tax.

Furthermore, peasants whose land had suffered natural calamities or laid waste were to report this to the local agricultural official (Kw?nnonggwan) who

investigated these claims and then reported the situation to the county magis trate at least one month before the tax liability for the area was calculated. Peasants whose land were completely laid waste were fully exempted from tax, and if more than half was afflicted, exemptions were given on between sixty and ninety percent of the land, according to the severity of the situation.18

Both tax liability and tax exemptions were first estimated by the magis trate, and then confirmed by the governor who reported it to the throne. After

17 The Taedong-tax was introduced in the seventeenth century to replace the tribute tax.

Regional goods were no longer collected as tax and sent to the capital. The Taedong-tax was

instead collected in rice, cloth or money, and middlemen were used to purchase the needed

goods. The grain-loan system had initially been a system to help peasants, but after interest was introduced it gradually turned into a form of taxation.

18 Ky?ngguk taej?n, p. 627.



560 ANDERS KARLSSON

discussions at the State Council and the six ministries, the king would make the

final decision on tax liability and exemptions before collection commenced.19

The problem with this system was of course that tax revenues would be pre

cariously dependent on agricultural fluctuations, and that locally powerful landown ers could evade tax as the estimation was delegated to the local authorities. So

Late Chos?n saw continuous efforts to create a system that would guarantee sta

ble tax revenues.

The first step towards this can be seen in the law code of 1746, the

Supplemented Great Code (Soktaej?n). According to this system the Ministry of

Taxation would first judge whether it was a good or a bad year and then pro vide each province with yearly tax quota edicts (y?nbun samok). Only if the

year was considered to be bad would the quota edict contain tax reductions by certain given damage classifications, and to give reductions for any other rea

son would be punishable. The exception to this was if the land holding was

completely laid waste, in which case tax exemption would be given even if it

was not a year of general crop failure. Furthermore, the central government would no longer rely only on local reports. After the magistrates had reported the situation and the governor had confirmed it, inspectors were sent out from

the capital to investigate the situation.20

This system was still not successful in securing tax revenues, though, and the

trend was for central government to rather decide before the harvest how much

could be given in tax reductions that year, after the general outlook for that year had been taken into consideration. As described in the Survey of Taxe s and Tributes:

According to the old system the court would send out inspectors to each province to

make observations on the agricultural conditions of that year. They would make the

final decision on the quota for that year after a thorough investigation and report it to

the throne. Or sometimes tax exemptions would be given after the Ministry of Taxation made a comparative estimate. But since 1760 inspectors are not sent out any more and the system of comparative estimates is used straight away. In autumn each year, in the

eighth month, the blessings of rain and the agricultural conditions of each province and each village are consulted, and by comparing this to a similar year, after thorough con

sideration, the fixed quota is settled, the amount of land to be exempted and the amount

to be taxed differentiated, and edicts issued . . . These edicts are distributed to the

provincial authorities whose duty it is to allocate the tax exemptions. If these should be

insufficient the governors should give a detailed report and make a request [for more]. The court will then give it thorough consideration and supply additional exemptions.21

19 Ibid. 20

Soktaej?n hoj?n, pp. 157-8. 21 T'akchi ch?nbugo, vol. 1, p. 6.




This was the Comparative-Quota System (pich'ongb?p) later contained in the

law code of 1786, the Comprehensive Edition of the Great Code (Taej?n t'ong

p'y?n). It became the norm in 1760, but it had become standard practice ear

lier.22 Accordingly the Ministry of Taxation would consider the original total

ky?l amount (w?nch' ong) registered for the different provinces, the actual ky?l on which tax was paid (silch'ong), and the ky?l for which exemptions were

given (chaech' ong) in years of similar character (in terms of favourable or

unfavourable weather conditions), and based on that decide the quotas for that

year.

Subsequently it would be the task of the governor to allocate these tax bur

dens and the given tax exemption quotas (these initial exemption quotas were

called samokchae) among the counties of the province, based on a post-harvest

investigation of the crop situation in each. If this investigation revealed that the

initial tax exemption quota was insufficient the governor could request more

(these additional exemption quotas were called kach'?ngjae). The system of investigating the situation and classifying counties for these

tax exemptions (pund?ng) followed a three-scale division: the most severely hit

counties were classified as "extremely severe" (usim), followed by "secondary" (chich'a), and lastly "some yield" (ch'osil) for the least afflicted counties. Even

though not legally stipulated, it seems that the practice was that a county where

only twenty-five percent of the land could give yield would be classified as

"extremely severe," the next grade being for counties where this figure was fifty percent, and the lowest level of classification for those counties where seventy five percent of the land could give yield.23

The legally defined Comparative-Quota System left open the question of how

the situation in each county was to be investigated. An early nineteenth-century practical handbook for relief aid, "Hwangj?ng taegae" ("An Outline of Famine

Relief), also attests to the fact that there existed no specific rules on how to

perform this task. As for the first step of "grasping the calamity" (chipchae), the handbook tells us, some magistrates left it to the village elders and local

22 Yi Ch'?ls?ng, looking at the stated name of the system for tax exemptions, has shown

that it became standard in the 1730s. Yi Ch'?ls?ng, "18 segi ch?nse pich'ongje ?i silsi wa

k? s?nggy?k" [Implementation and Character of the Eighteenth-Century Comparative-Quota

System], 81; By looking at the emergence of separate recording of initial and additional quo tas in T'akchi ch?nbugo, Ch?ng S?nnam, on the other hand, has argued that it started to be

used in mid-1690s and became standard after 1700. Ch?ng S?nnam, "18, 19 segi ch?n'gy?lse," 199-200.

23 Yi Ch'?ls?ng, "18 segi ch?nse pich'ongje," 86.



562 ANDERS KARLSSON

elite to discuss and present a communal agreement; others would send clerks

and military officers from the county office to investigate the situation; and still

others would leave it to the sub-county administrative staff.24

After the magistrate had gathered all the information he reported the situa

tion to the governor who reported to the throne, and, if needed, asked for addi

tional exemptions. The final amount of tax reductions arrived at had to be

divided among the counties. As it was the limitations of state finances, rather

than the extent of the crop failure that would decide how much land could be

exempted from tax, this often was less than the actual extent of damage. This

made the allocation of tax exemptions a question of negotiation, not only between the magistrates and the governor, but also between the governor and

the Ministry of Taxation.

The central government considered this three-scale classification system of

great importance in cutting down on state expenses and securing fair and equal taxation.25 But the actual execution of this system was not without corruption. These problems were discussed at court in 1782, a year of extensive damage as

we will see, and in an instruction to the governor of Ky?nggi to supervise the

magistrates properly, the king said:

Due to the classification reports sent in from Kangw?n and Hwanghae I have recently had cause to issue many instructions. The administrative work of preparing for crop fail ure disasters bears the utmost relevance for the suffering of the people. But as it is now, land that shouldn't be taxed is, and land that should be taxed isn't, and this is all depen dent on whether the governor and magistrate are close or not, and the fact the magis trates blindly listen to the words of corrupt local clerks.26

Two issues are raised. First, as we have seen, the allocation of tax exemptions was a question of negotiation between the governor and the magistrates, and

whether or not a magistrate was close to the governor could thus influence how

much his county would receive rather than the actual situation.27 Second, as the

investigation was extremely time-consuming it was mostly delegated to local clerks, and this opened the process up for corruption.28 As "Hwangj?ng taegae"

24 "Hwangj?ng taegae," pp. 34-5.

25 Piby?nsa t?ngnok, vol. 16, p. 33.

26 Ch?ngjo sillok, entry 06/10/06; see also 23/05/07.

27 Ku Wanhoe has stressed the crucial role magistrates had in securing tax exemptions for

their counties and that their closeness to the governor was an influential factor. Ku Wanhoe, "Chos?n hugi ?i chinhyul haengj?ng kwa kunhy?n chibae: Sury?ng ?i y?khal ?l chungsim ?ro" [Relief Administration of Late Chos?n and County Control: Centring on the Role of

Magistrates], 73-5. 28 The statesmen of China had similar concerns. See Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy and

Famine in Eighteenth-Century China, pp. 86-96.




warned, if the investigation was delegated to the sub-county staff there was

great risk of corruption in the form of exaggeration as they would try to secure

tax exemptions for their own areas, and if handled by county office clerks and

officers there was always the risk that they would try to use their intermediary

position for private gain.29 In fact, the Comparative-Quota System in itself contained elements that

worked against one of its main purposes, that is, to keep down the level of tax

exemptions. As each province received a certain fixed quota of not only tax

exemption but also tax liabilities, it was in the interest of both the governor and

the magistrates, to whose counties these duties were allocated, to receive tax

exemptions that were as large as possible, as they would be responsible for any eventual failure in filling up the tax-liability quota. Furthermore, although

applying a fixed quota of tax prior to the harvest would often lead to over-tax

ation, if in fact a county were to be under-taxed, it could keep the surplus to

prop up local finances or alleviate the situation for its population.30 This was

also another incentive for local authorities to try to secure tax exemptions as

large as possible. To sum up, the land tax system of Late Chos?n contained structural prob

lems which obstructed the smooth running of the system. First of all, the admin

istrative geography of Chos?n opened a wide gap between the county seat (the lowest level of official administration) and the rice fields, leaving the magistrate

dependent on clerks and other sub-administrative officials whose local ties conflicted

with the interests of the royal government. Secondly, since officials were held

accountable for the collection of their assigned tax quotas, they stood to benefit

from underreporting the harvest yields in their counties and provinces, and from

over reporting crop failure. Finally, officials themselves (and their extended

family) held large amounts of land in the provinces, and many appear to have

placed their private gain above government interests. Also, when discussing tax

exemptions it must be kept in mind that eventual exemptions awarded had to

depend not on the reports (or on actual damage), but on government resources.

Late eighteenth century rural conditions

The above described problems with the taxation system makes the figures on

crop failure as reported unreliable and difficult to use to get a picture of the

actual rural conditions. The information on famine, though, is more reliable.

29 "Hwangj?ng taegae," p. 17.

30 Ch?ng S?nnam, "18, 19 segi ch?n'gy?lse," 201-2.



564 ANDERS KARLSSON

Crop failure and famine were of course closely interrelated in rural society, but

in central government administration they were dealt with separately. Whereas

the issue of land tax exemptions in the wake of crop failure was dealt with by the Ministry of Taxation, it was the duty of the separate Office of Relief Aid

(Chinhyulch'?ng) to deal with matters relating to famine. Furthermore, whereas

the land tax issues were mainly discussed between the eighth and tenth months, the issue of famine relief was predominantly discussed between the twelfth and

fifth months.

The allocation of tax exemptions might have been influenced by political or

socio-economic considerations, but the fact that the issue of famine was dealt

with separately means that the figures on starving people would bear no rele vance to the issue of tax exemptions, and that these exemptions could therefore

not be bolstered by manipulating the number of starving people. To receive relief grain, people needed to be recorded by the local government

as "starving people" (kimin), and these records needed to correspond to the tax

registers. In principle free food was handed out to these "starving people" from

the beginning of the first month every tenth day up till the fourth or fifth month

depending on the severity of the situation. Through these months needy people could be added to the list, and as conditions improved people were also taken

off it. Although the number of "starving people" in these figures does not rep resent the actual number of individuals receiving aid, but rather a cumulated

figure for the number of people to whom aid was given over these repeated rounds of food distribution, these numbers represent the actual famine relief that

was handed out.31

As a response to the increased scale of famine resulting from agricultural

techniques more vulnerable to weather conditions, the famine relief system of

Chos?n saw constant institutional developments from the end of the seventeenth

century, and from the time of the reign of Ch?ngjo the activities of relief aid work were systematically recorded in so-called famine relief end-reports

31 There would be no incentive to bolster the number of "starving people" in reports to

the central government as the records clearly listed both procured and dispensed grain and

any grain that was not handed out in the end had to be returned to its source. (See for

instance P'alto chin gok kary?ng [Records on Relief Grain for the Eight Provinces] that

details famine relief between 1815 and 1842.) However, as famine relief was an important part of the evaluation that magistrates underwent it was a way for them to bolster their rep utation in the hope of advancement, which might have made them eager to perform this duty. (Ku Wanhoe) It is, however, the view of this study that this would not have greatly influenced the total scale of famine relief being performed.




(p'ilchin). Table 1 gives the number of "starving people" (kimin) listed in these

reports, as recorded in The Veritable Records of King Ch?ngjo, for the period under consideration.

Table 1. "Starving people", 1777-1796

Year Ky?nggi Ch'ung- Ch?lla Ky?ng- Kangw?n Ham- Hwang- P'y?ngan Total

ch'?ng sang gy?ng Hae

1777 # 673.484 # 673.484 1778 64.024 29.531 13.283 784 107.622 1779 39.364 12.038 741.558 10.847 83.852 5.520 893.179

1780 1781

1782 66.888 1.364.500 14.535 1.445.923

1783 550.052 418.203 629.873 1.598.128

1784 373.073 680.206 2.210.466 203.400 25.502 623.017 4.115.664

1785 1786 1787 183.171 312.534 1.879.177 1.088.287 1.603 90.531 3.555.303

1788 1789 543.520 543.520 1790 372.239 153.376 1.037.299 1.562.914

1791 1792 25.082 438.347 463.429

1793 457.348 1.238.859 2.829.596 7.509 4.533.312

1794 19.333 135.689 155.022

1795 201.194 728.949 2.313.487 1.424.008 49.575 153.462 4.870.675

1796 144.389 51.303 195.692

# no figure for number of starving but a considerable amount of grain was handed out

Table 1 shows the extent of famine caused by crop failure in the late eighteenth

century and it also reflects the government's efforts to help the starving. Famine

relief aid was given somewhere in fourteen of the twenty years under consider

ation, and we can see an increasing trend in total numbers in the most severe

years. Whether this meant that more people were starving or that the famines

lasted for longer, it indicates deteriorating rural conditions.

Figure 1 juxtaposes these numbers with figures for rice price fluctuations and

the amount of grain that was dispensed in famine relief.32 Together these figures

32 "National" trends in rice prices are unavailable given the localised nature of the market

system during Chos?n, and the figures given here are from one southern county (Ch?n

S?ngho, "18-19 segi Chos?n ?i miga ch'use, 1725-1862" [Trends in Rice Prices in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Chos?n, 1725-1862]). Acknowledging the weakness of a comparison



566 ANDERS KARLSSON

give a good picture of the unstable rural situation at the time. It also gives an

indication of how these famines affected state finances. The total amount of

grain handed out during these twenty years amounted to almost two million

sok,33 which would approximately equal seventy percent of the grain yearly col lected from nationwide taxable land, that is, on average three and a half per cent per year, the accumulated value of which would have severely affected state finances. If we look at specific cases we can of course get much higher figures. In Ky?ngsang in 1793, for instance, the grain that was handed out as

famine relief equalled almost forty percent of the taxes collected from that

province the previous year.

Figure 1. "Starving people", rice price, and famine relief grain, 1777-1796

<<? ?P <P <&<? <& <& ?P ̂ <P <&

starving people (millions)

rice price (yang/s?k)

_^_ dispensed grain (s?k, in thousands)

Source: Ch?ngjo sillok

Given this unstable situation, this study will now turn to the question of how the government evaluated the situation and adjusted the level of taxation when faced with the task of both securing the needed tax incomes for the year in

question and securing social order and future agricultural production.

between these and national trends in the number of starving and the amount of famine relief

grain, they have been added because they corroborate the picture of unstable rural conditions. 33 The value of a s?k varied between 90 and 120 litres.




3. A Temporal Analysis

Frequency, extent, and severity of crop failure in the late eighteenth century

Above we have discussed the unstable rural situation of the late eighteenth cen

tury in terms of recorded "starving people." These famines were caused by crop failures. The only way left for us now to approach these crop failures is to look

at how local governments evaluated the situation. As we have seen above, the system of estimating the extent of damage was plagued by severe prob lems, meaning that the reported evaluations might not correspond to the actual

situation.

The significance of these figures are thus less that they give a clear picture of the situation in the countryside, but rather that they show how the unstable

situation of the period drained state finances, as these evaluations were the basis

for the tax exemptions later given. The discussion below will thus inevitably be

from the viewpoint of the government. Still, even though the evaluation figures might have been manipulated, it is

difficult to imagine that provincial governors would have been able to perform such a classification if the province in fact had not been severely afflicted.

When the classification was performed it was to encompass all counties in the

province, and as such an enterprise was very cumbersome it was only per formed when there were considerable tax exemptions to be allocated. So by

looking at when and where this was performed we can get a picture of the

extent of significant crop failure.

When looking at how the situation was evaluated to get a sense of the sever

ity we need to be more cautious, though. Still, even though this system pre

sumably was tempered by political and socio-economic considerations, just as

the tax-exemptions granted were, it does give us the most detailed picture of

how the situation was perceived at the time. This study will crudely calculate

the average value of estimated crop failure as follows:

(3x+2y+z)/x+y+z

(x = number of "extremely severe" counties, y

= number of "secondary" counties, z =

number of "some yield" counties)

This average (a value over two indicating more "extremely severe" counties

than "some yield" in a province) together with the number of "extremely severe" counties will give a rough picture of the severity of crop failure on a

provincial level.



568 ANDERS KARLSSON

Table 2. Average evaluation values and number of "extremely severe" counties, 1776-1796

Year Ky?nggi Ch'ung

ch'?ng

Cholla Ky?ng sang

Kangw?n Ham

gy?ng

Hwang hae

P'y?ngan

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

1.297 (2) 2.147 (8) 2.077 (8) 2.054 (9) 2.204 (20) 1.434 (5) 1.859 (14) 1.846 (4) 2.054 (10) 2.055 (10) 1.792 (7) 2.35 (36) 2.115 (8)

1.196 (0) none 1.148 (0) 1.245 (0) 1.282 (0)

1.905 (13) 2.014 (27) 2.27 (17) 2.093 (19) 1.735 (8) 1.845 (13) 1.654 (4) 2.216 (12) 2.111 (21) 2.094 (15) 1.915 (15) 2 (9)

none 1.577 (4)

2.162 (10) 2.111 (12) 2.113 (15) 2.099 (22) 1.846 (6) 2.167 (9) 1.264 (0) 1.493 (2) 1.846 (4)

none 1.148 (0) 1.321 (0) 1.254 (0) 1.769 (4) 1.396 (0) 1.654 (2)

1.241 (0) 1.245 (0) 1.239 (0) none

2.054 (2) 2.203 (19) 2.057 (15) 2.239 (33) 1.961 (5) 1.315 (0) 1.245 (0) 1.338 (0) 1.231 (0)

2.305 (11) 2.185 (20) 2.132 (18) 2.014 (23) 1.6 (2) 1.981 (15) 1.358 (0) 1.465 (0)

2.435 (13) 1.565 (4) 2.391 (11) none

1.565 (3) 2.043 (8) 1.087 (0) 2.522 (14) 1.174 (0)

1.913 (7) 2.043 (7) 1.355 (0) 1.260 (0) 2.043 (8) 1.739 (4) 1.913 (4) 1.608 (0)

1.714 (8) 1.143 (0) 1.929 (7) 1.5 (4) 1.190 (0)

1.19 (0) 1.548 (1) 1.167 (0)

1.958 (5) 1.783 (4) 1.405 (0) 1.913 (4) 1.167 (0)

2.292 (10) 1.696 (4) 1.619 (7) 1.958 (6) 2.348 (10) 2.167 (15) 1.667 (4) 1.739 (3)

2(6) 1.667 (0)

1.667 (3) 1.869 (6) 1.609 (6) 1.762 (5)

1.571 (0)

(Figures in brackets indicate the number of "extremely severe" counties and "none" is entered for years were the provincial reports explicitly stated that no evaluation had been performed due to a good crop.) Sources: Hyej?ng yoram, Piby?nsa t?ngnok, and Ch?ngjo sillok

Table 2 gives the calculated average damage levels for the period under con

sideration. The total number of provincial crop situations was 160 (eight

provinces over twenty years), and as many as 109 of these were considerable

failures necessitating a classification to be performed. As for the remaining

fifty-one, in five instances explicit records exist stating the fact that no

classification was performed due to a good harvest (Ky?nggi 1781/82 and

1788/89; Ch'ungch'?ng 1784/85; Kangw?n 1790/91; and Hamgy?ng 1779/80),34 and in sixteen there were either no initial quotas or they were extremely small, also indicating a good year. The above table shows how vulnerable Late

Chos?n agriculture was to weather conditions (sixty-eight percent of crop

34 See for example Piby?nsa tungnok, vol. 15, p. 777 (Hamgy?ng 1779), vol. 16, p. 496

(Ch'ungch'ong 1784), vol. 17, p. 195 (Ky?nggi 1788), vol. 18, p. 515 (Ky?nggi 1796); Ils?ngnok Ch?ngjo, entry 4/10/14 (Ky?nggi 1780), 14/9/28 (Kangw?n 1790).




situations being considerable failures). It also indicates that the state seems to have been relatively generous in recognising this situation.

This study works under the premise that the state had special considerations in times of severe crop failure as opposed to considerable failures. The outbreak of famine seems to be a good method to gauge severity, but for some of the

crop situations in Table 2 no famine relief was given even though the evalua tion values were high. As high evaluation values still indicate substantial tax

exemptions, this study will regard years when famine relief aid was given or

when the average evaluation value was above two as years of severe crop fail ure. Given the cautions raised above, these figures represent severe crop failures from the government's point of view. Table 3 shows the resulting extent of severe crop failure.

Table 3. Severe crop failure, 1776-1796

Year Ky?nggi Ch'ung- Ch?lla Ky?ng- Kangw?n Ham- Hwang- P'y?ngan ch'?ng sang gy?ng hae

1776/77 x xxx 1777/78 xx xx 1778/79 xx x x x x x 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 xx xx 1782/83 xx x 1783/84 x x x x x x 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 x x x x x x 1787/88 x 1788/89 x 1789/90 xxx 1790/91 1791/92 x x 1792/93 x x x x 1793/94 x x 1794/95 x x x x x x 1795/96 x x

Severe crop failure occurred somewhere fifteen of the twenty years under con

sideration and of the 160 provincial crop situations for the period, fifty-four, that is, thirty-four percent, were severe failures.



570 ANDERS KARLSSON

Tax exemption trends, 1776-1796

How did the state deal with this situation? How did it balance the present need

for tax incomes with the need to secure social order in countryside for future

tax-generating agricultural production? One way of approaching this problem is to look at trends in how the situation was evaluated and in the actual amount

of tax exemptions being given. Figure 2 juxtaposes the total amount of tax

exemptions with the average classification values for each agricultural year of

the period.

Figure 2. Tax exemptions and classification values, 1776-1796

total

exemption

(ky?l, in thousands)

classifications

values

Sources: Hyej?n yoram, Piby?nsa t?ngnok, Ils?ngnok

Judging by this graph the agricultural years of most widespread and severe crop failure were 1778/79, 1783/84, 1786/87, 1792/93 and 1794/95. The most con

spicuous feature is that for these peak years the evaluation values shows a

falling trend, whereas the total amount of tax exemptions eventually given, in

fact, constantly increased. For example, even though the year 1794/95 displays the highest amount of tax exemptions, the evaluation value is lower than for

the years 1778/79 and 1783/84. Furthermore, the years 1783/84 and 1792/93 have roughly the same amount of tax exemptions, but the evaluation value for

the former is considerably higher. What does this mean?




As described above, tax exemptions were given in two stages, the initial

exemptions that were based on the central government's rough estimate of the situation and given before the harvest, and the additional exemptions that were

given after local governments had investigated the actual situation. Looking at

the ratio between the former and the total amount will facilitate our under

standing of the pattern emerging in Figure 2.

Figure 3. Initial quota as a percentage of total exemptions, 1776-1795

1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795

Source: Takchi ch?nbugo

As seen in Figure 3 the initial quota constituted a constantly decreasing share of the total exemptions given. This pattern, together with the falling evaluation values in Figure 2, indicates that the central government increasingly tried to

keep down the amount of tax exemptions, that is, the present need for tax

incomes was given higher priority in state policies than concerns about rural

society and future agricultural production. On average the initial quota as a per

centage of total exemptions for Ch?lla during the reign of Ch?ngjo (1776-1800) was thirty-two percent, to be compared with seventy percent for the previous reign of Y?ngjo (1724-1776). This decreasing initial-quota trend continued into the nineteenth century and became even more conspicuous as state finances deteriorated drastically. During this period the initial quota as a percentage of total exemptions for Ch?lla was nine percent during the reign Sunjo (1800

1834), four percent during the reign of H?njong (1834-1849), and only two per cent during that of Ch'?lchong (1849-1863).35 However, returning to the late

eighteenth century, as the rural situation in fact was deteriorating, in the end

35 Yi Ch'?ls?ng, 17, 18 segi ch?nj?ng uny?ngnon, p. 119.



572 ANDERS KARLSSON

(through mechanisms that will be discussed below) the state gave an increasing amount of tax exemptions despite these efforts to keep them down.

The tax exemption system was draining state finances, and that was of course

the reason why the central government tried to keep these exemptions low.

During this twenty-year period on average between six and seven percent of the

land tax was exempted due to crop failure, and for five years the figure passed the ten percent mark?1778/79: 10.8%, 1783/84: 12%, 1786/87: 13%, 1792/93:

11.8%, and 1794/95: 14.5%.

Squeezed financially on two fronts it is not surprising that the state started

setting unrealistically low initial quotas in the 1790s. Another consequence of

this difficult financial situation was that the state started to look for alternative sources for the supplementary funds needed for famine-relief grain.36 In records

relief grain taken from central government funds was entered as "official grain"

(konggok), and funds that were raised locally by the magistrates were registered as "private grain" (sagok). The methods through which the magistrates extracted

these local relief funds were manifold, but the main source was the storehouses

of wealthy county inhabitants.37 The end reports in The Veritable Records of

King Ch?ngjo started to record the use of "private grain" from 1783, and sub

sequently this became a prominent feature for the rest of the century, indicat

ing that central government became increasingly dependent on local resources

for its famine relief aid.

To conclude, the late eighteenth century was a period of frequent and severe

crop failure draining state finances. To cope with the situation the central gov

ernment tried to keep tax exemptions low and started to rely on local resources

for its famine relief aid. What is noteworthy, however, is that tax exemptions still increased due to the significantly increasing amount of additional exemp tions. The central government might have tried to keep the initial quota down, and thus force the local governments to keep evaluation figures low, but during this period as much as ninety-seven percent of requested additional tax exemp tions were granted by the state, and there was no significant trend towards a

sterner attitude by the government; usually the governors got what they asked

for in the end. The only change discernable in the entries of the Survey of Benevolent

36 Mun Yongsik, "18 segi huban chinhyul sa?p gwa chincha hwakpoch'aek" [Famine Relief Work and The Procurement of Relief Funds during the Latter Half of the Eighteenth Century]. 37 Mun Yongsik "18 segi huban chinhyul sa?p"; Ch?ng Hy?ngji, "Chos?n hugi chincha chodalch'aek" [Policies for Procurement of Relief Funds in Late Chos?n].




Administration is that after 1782 it became more common that the governors' first request would be reduced, later to be increased after additional requests had

been made.38

This clearly indicates that the state was unable to let its present tax needs

override the demand for tax exemptions. The weakness of the system from the

government's point of view was that governors and magistrates needed to

secure tax exemptions for their counties and provinces, that they needed to get

exemptions that reflected the actual situation, or if possible, even to get a little

overhead, as in the end it would be they that were responsible for any inability to pay the tax-liability quota. Given the central role of relief policies in the

Confucian ideology of the state it would have been difficult for the central gov ernment to reject these requests from provincial governors, and this thus made

it difficult for the state to cut down on tax exemptions to ease the burden on

state finances. The role played by Confucian ideology is confirmed by the fact

that even though the statesmen actually in charge of taxation wanted to reduce

the additional demands from the governors, their recommendations were mostly

ignored by the more ideologically motivated king who eventually would grant the full amount asked for.39

4. A Comparative Analysis

Provincial patterns

Above we saw that although the state gave an increasing amount of tax exemp

tions, the number of starving people in times of severe crop failure constantly increased. On the one hand this indicates that these tax exemptions were

insufficient in dealing with severe crop failure, while on the other it raises the

question of how these exemptions were allocated. The fact that in times of

severe crop failure the state could still extract between eighty-five and ninety

percent of tax liabilities of course shows that the high number of starving peo

ple was not only the result of the crop situation, but also of state exploitation. To address the issue of allocation this study will compare the situation in the

eight provinces. To begin, Figure 4 looks at provincial differences in evaluation

figures.

38 See for example the Ch'ungch'?ng entries for the years 1783 and 1786, and the

Hwanghae entry for the year 1793. 39 See for example the Ky?nggi, Cholla and Hwanghae entries for the year 1783 and the

Hwanghae entry for the year 1786 in Hyej?ng y or am.



574 ANDERS KARLSSON

Figure 4. Crop failure evaluations by province, 1776-1796

2.5

1.5

0.5

riJjjddd .

1111111 1111111 1111111

<X </ .-VVV*'

overall average severe crop failure year average

Sources: Hyej?n y or am, Piby?nsa t?ngnok, Ils?ngnok

The central province of Ky?nggi had the highest damage evaluation figures (2.052/2.177), followed by Hamgyong and Ch'ungch'?ng. The former had

slightly higher values for the overall average (1.88 vs. 1.865), whereas the lat

ter had slightly higher values in times of severe crop failure (2.118 vs. 2.076). Furthermore, the above chart also shows that in times of severe crop failure the

differences were somewhat flattened out, and the two main rice producing south ern provinces of Cholla and Ky?ngsang had the largest gap between the over

all average and the average in severe famine years. That is, the differences

between the levels of these two provinces and the levels of Ky?nggi and

Ch'ungch'?ng were more significant in times when there was only a consider

able crop failure and smaller in times of severe crop failure. We will return to

the significance of this later.

What about the resulting tax exemptions? As a large percentage of recorded

land in the provinces was permanently exempted from tax, either because it was

owned by a palace, government agency, educational institution etc., or because

it was registered as "fallow land,"40 and as (in principle) only paddy-fields were

40 Kim K?nt'ae, "Ky?ngja yangj?n sigi kagy?ngj?n kwa chinj?n p'aak silt'ae: Ky?ng

sangdo Yonggunghy?n sarye" [Actual Situation of the Registration of Newly Developed




eligible for exemption, the basis for comparison in this study will be the ratio

between tax exemptions and the actual amount of paddy-field land that was tax

able that year, calculated as the sum of taxed land (silgy?l) and land exempted due to crop failure. As land tax reductions were not normally given in the

mountainous border province of Hamgy?ng, that region will be excluded from

the discussion.

Figure 5. Land tax exemptions as a percentage of taxable paddy-field land, 1776-1796

^ .v#* v ^ cT' ?car ^

*r <S?f ^

overall average

severe crop failure year average

Source: Takehi chonbugo

We can see a pattern similar to the one in Figure 4. The provinces of Hwang hae and Kangw?n show the highest percentages for the total average, and the

latter the highest in times of severe crop failure. However, as paddy-field agri culture was less wide-spread in these provinces, and as their agricultural pro duction played a minor role in the finances of the state, the important feature

of this graph is the relationship between the four central and southern provinces of Ky?nggi, Ch'ungch'ong, Ch?lla, and Ky?ngsang. Among these four,

Ch'ungch'ong received the largest percentage, both overall and in times of severe crop failure, even though, as we have seen in Figure 4, Ky?nggi

Land and Fallow Land at the Time of the 1720 Land Survey: The Case of Yonggung county in Ky?ngsang province].



576 ANDERS KARLSSON

received higher classification values. Ky?nggi, however, received considerably more than the two southern provinces, among which Cholla received the low est amount of exemptions.

As mentioned above, these tax exemptions were given in two portions, the

pre-harvest initial quotas given by the Ministry of Taxation, and the additional

quotas given after the locally performed evaluations, and as these two processes could be influenced by different socio-economic/political factors, we can get a

better understanding of the situation if we disaggregate the picture and look at

the initial quota as a percentage of taxable land, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Initial quota as a percentage of taxable paddy-field land for the four main agricul tural provinces, 1776-1796

Source: Takchi ch?nbugo

The central province of Ky?nggi, surrounding the capital, was treated more

generously by the Ministry of Taxation than the other provinces, and this ten

dency grew even stronger in times of severe crop failure. Ch'ungch'?ng also

received larger percentages than the two southern provinces, and among those two Cholla is again the province least generously treated by the state. This

shows that the large amount of total exemptions given to Ch'ungch'?ng was a

result of large additional exemptions, and as the initial quota given would

influence classification to a certain extent, the high values for Ky?nggi seen

in Figure 4 were a result of these generous initial quotas given by the central

government.

To sum up, the above comparison has shown that the two central provinces of Ky?nggi and Ch'ungch'?ng received considerably larger tax exemptions than

g overall

average

severe crop failure year average




the two southern provinces of Ch?lla and Ky?ngsang. Furthermore, whereas for

Ky?nggi this was a result of generous initial quotas given by the Ministry of

Taxation, for Ch'ungch'ong it was achieved through a large amount of addi tional exemptions.

Explaining provincial patterns

To explain the differences discerned above we can see them either as the result

of the actual crop situation, or as being influenced by political considerations or

socioeconomic factors. A thorough treatment of this will need to deal with a

very large number of variables and is outside the scope of this study. The main

purpose of this study has been to perform a statistical analysis and present the

emerging patterns. As for explaining these patterns it will only make some sug

gestions and tentative conclusions.

The first variable we need to look at to see whether these differences might have reflected the actual situation is land use. As discussed above, Late Chos?n

agriculture was characterised by the more widespread use of paddy-fields. This

both increased productivity and made agriculture more vulnerable to weather

conditions, resulting in a higher frequency of crop failure and concomitant

famines. We can thus initially make the assumption that a high percentage of

paddy-field agriculture would make a province more vulnerable to weather con

ditions and lead to a higher frequency of severe crop failures. If we look at reg istered paddy fields by province in the late eighteenth century we get the pic ture shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Late eighteenth century percentage of paddy fields

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 Ii.

s .y *y y y y Source: Takchi ch?nbugo



578 ANDERS KARLSSON

Admittedly, this is a picture of the extent of paddy-field agriculture in tax reg isters, and thus does not give a complete picture of the actual situation. But as the problem under consideration is tax exemptions, this information will suffice. The most conspicuous feature of this graph is that Cholla had the highest per centage of paddy fields, followed by Ky?nggi and Ky?ngsang, although Figure 4 shows that Cholla had low evaluation levels and Figure 5 shows that it received a low amount of tax exemptions. Among the four main provinces, Ch'ungch'?ng had the lowest percentage of paddy fields but still received the

largest amount of tax exemptions. To better understand these discrepancies we must supplement our discussion

with the factor of topographical features. If the distribution of dams and reser voirs are seen as reflecting the need for irrigation and thus a high number of such water works reflects topography less suitable for paddy-field agriculture,

we get the depiction of the situation in the early nineteenth century shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Distribution of dams and reservoirs in early nineteenth century

Year Ky?nggi Ch'ung- Ch?lla Ky?ng- Kangw?n Ham- Hwang- P'y?ngan ch'?ng sang gy?ng hae

dams 314 535 936 1765 71 24 45 5 reservoirs - 497 164 1339 61 24 71 109

Source: Yi Sangbae. "18-19 segi chay?n chaehae wa k? taech'aek e kwanhan y?n'gu" [A Study on Natural Calamities and Countermeasures in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries]. Kuksagwan nonch'ong 89 (2000)

Ky?ngsang was the province with the largest number of large-scale dams, and the difference with the other provinces is even more conspicuous for the smaller reservoirs. Ch?lla is recorded as having a large number of dams, but the num ber of reservoirs is small. As Ch?lla and Ky?ngsang had more agricultural land than the two central provinces we need to look not only at the total number of dams and reservoirs, but also at their ratio to paddy fields. As these dams and reservoirs covered varying areas any comparison will be extremely tentative, but

looking at the quantity of paddy field ky?l per dam and per dam/reservoir we

get the situation as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Paddy field ky?l per dam and per dam/reservoir in the four main rice-producing

provinces in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century

Sources: Takchi ch?nbugo and Yi Sangbae

The tentative conclusion is that paddy-field agriculture in Ky?ngsang was most

dependent on irrigation and in Ch?lla the least. These figures can explain the

differences in tax exemptions between the two southern provinces of Ch?lla and

Ky?ngsang. The former had a larger percentage of paddy-field agriculture, but

due to topographical factors the latter was more dependent on irrigation, and

was thus more afflicted by weather-related crop failures. This could explain

why Ky?ngsang received a larger amount of tax exemptions. However, the high evaluation figures and tax exemptions for Ky?nggi and Ch'ungch'ong are more

difficult to explain. They do not stand out as having exceptionally high per

centages of paddy-fields in Figure 7, and they do not seem to have been excep

tionally reliant on irrigation. Another way to judge the vulnerability of a region is to look at how severe

the famine problem was, as this was often the consequence of severe crop fail ure. Large-scale famine relief started in the beginning of the first month and was given three times per month. From the third month the number of recipi ents would decrease, but the aid would usually be given into the first half of

the fifth month.41 As explained above, the number of "starving people" regis tered in the end reports was not the actual number of starving people, but a

cumulative figure for the people to whom food was given over the successive

distributions, and these figures can thus exceed the actual figure for population in that area. So this figure indicates the severity of the famine both in terms of

scale and longevity. To see how hard the provinces were struck by famine, and

thus in an indirect way see how vulnerable they were to weather conditions,

41 "Hwangj?ng taegae," pp. 13-4.



580 ANDERS KARLSSON

Figure 9 shows what percentage of the population these "starving people" constituted.

Figure 9. Percentage of "starving people" by province, 1776-1796

250

200

?> .r <ry /xvv**' Source: Ch?ngjo sillok

?*

average

highest yearly record

Judging by these figures it was the two southern provinces of Ch?lla and Ky?ngsang that were most heavily afflicted by famine. This would confirm the assumption that crop failure and concomitant famine were linked to the use of paddy-fields, and it also indicates that the high figures for Ky?nggi and Ch'ungch'?ng are

difficult to explain in terms of the actual crop situation. If we turn the argu ment around, these high figures for starving people in the two southern

provinces can also be seen as a result of the fact that these two provinces were

disadvantaged in tax exemptions. It is thus possible that the high number of

starving people in the late eighteenth century was to a certain extent due to the

unequal allocation of tax exemptions. If the provincial pattern of tax-exemption allocations outlined above can not

be explained in terms of the actual crop situation, we next need to turn to the

question of central government considerations. Given the complex nature of taxation in Late Chos?n, it is possible that the central government took a larger view of the crop situation and its relation to the general level of taxation, and that the imbalances in land-tax exemptions were compensated for in the reduc tion or exemption of other taxes. However, we must remember that other forms of tax exemptions or alleviations were also decided by the classification values, which means that in provinces with high evaluation figures, most conspicuously Ky?nggi and Ch'ungch'?ng, a larger number of counties would receive these




other tax benefits. So, if the other provinces were treated more generously in

this aspect, it would be in terms of frequency. A total exemption of payments (fanggam) for other forms of taxation was

very rare, and the most frequent measure used to deal with the Taedong tax and

the grain-loan system, the two main aspects of Late Chos?n taxation apart from

the land tax, was to postpone the payments.

Figure 10. Number of times postponement of Taedong and loan-grain payments was ordered, 1776-1796

25

20

15

10

5

0

<*>y Source: Hyej?ng y or am

I I I I I ^ ^ ?r ?*

** ^ &> .?&

As shown in Figure 10, for these postponements we admittedly get a different

picture, with Ky?ngsang receiving them slightly more often than Ch'ungch'ong, and Ky?nggi, and Ch?lla falling somewhat behind. It would be difficult, how

ever, to argue in general that differences in this system compensated for the dif ferences we have seen for the land tax.

However, in certain specific cases it seems possible that the central govern ment also took other forms of taxation into consideration. We can expect cen

tral government considerations to be reflected in the initial quotas given by the

Ministry of Taxation before the harvest. As we have seen, Ky?nggi received the highest initial quotas, and one possible explanation is that the corv?e labour

duties were high in this province?as it surrounded the capital there was natu

rally a high degree of central government involvement?and that the govern ment thus wanted to compensate for this by lowering the land-tax pressure.42

A developed market system might function as a buffer in times of crop failure and famine. It can be both a place to purchase food, and a place to

This has been pointed out to me by Professor Yi Ch'?ls?ng in private conversation.



582 ANDERS KARLSSON

compensate for losses in agricultural income. This was a factor that the central

government took into consideration in times of crop failure. At times they would allow taxes to be paid in money instead (taej?n), or in some other form

of payment (taebong). Such orders would indicate that the central government

recognized the existence of a functioning market system. Figure 11 shows how

many times such alternative methods of payment were ordered in the period under consideration.

Figure 11. Number of times alternative tax payments were allowed, 1776-1796

25

20

15

10

5

0 M M J. J. J .

i taej?n

itaebong

<v# *ti& v^ <d& J?* ti& <xf ^

*/ ? ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Source: Hyej?ng y or am

These measures were most frequent in Ky?nggi and Ch'ungch'?ng, corre

sponding to the developed market systems in these two central provinces. The

existence of a market buffer indicates that the inhabitants of these two

provinces would have been less dependent on tax exemptions to avoid starva

tion, a factor exacerbating the social effects of the unequal allocation of tax

allocations shown above.

When discussing the social effects of crop failure we must pay special attention

to Ky?nggi as this province surrounded the capital and concerns about social order

there must have been substantial. Ky?nggi received higher initial quotas overall, and above we discussed the possibility that this was a measure to compensate for high corv?e labour demands. But we also saw that this trend became even

more prominent in times of severe crop failure. One possible explanation could

be that the government wanted to secure social order in the province to protect the capital. According to famine relief regulations aid was not to be given to

people coming from other areas. The only exception to this rule was the capi tal, and in times of famine it was reportedly thronged with starving people.43

43 In 1812, for instance, it was reported that after relief aid started to be given out in the




A final remark on central government considerations: in Figure 4 we saw that

provincial differences in evaluation levels flattened out in times of severe crop failure and that the two southern provinces of Ch?lla and Ky?ngsang displayed the largest gap between average values and the values in times of severe crop failure. How can we interpret this? It could be explained by the vulnerability to

weather conditions in these two provinces, resulting in exponentially increasing levels of damage. However, it also seems plausible that in times of consider

able crop failure the system might have favoured the two central provinces, but

when rural society was threatened by severe crop failure, concerns over social

order and long-term disruptions to agricultural production overrode this and the

system became more equal in distributing tax exemptions. However, as can be seen in the figures for starving people, this was certainly not enough. Whereas central government considerations predominantly would lead to

increased initial exemptions?as seen in the case of Ky?nggi?socioeconomic and local political factors would lead to increased additional tax exemptions.

Compared to the high reliance on initial quotas for substantive tax exemptions in Ky?nggi, the pattern for Ch'ungch'ong is more complex. This province received both higher initial quotas than Ch?lla and Ky?ngsang, but would in the

end receive the largest total by getting large additional quotas. What could be

the reason behind these high initial and additional quotas? In his A Treatise on

Choosing Settlements (Taengniji), the early eighteenth century scholar Yi

Chunghwan (1690-1756) gave the following general description of the province:

The agricultural produce is not on the same level as Ky?ngsang and Ch?lla provinces, but the landscape is flat and pretty, and since it is close to the southern part of the cap ital many prominent families live in this province. Furthermore, there isn't a family that

has lived for generations in the capital that hasn't bought land and property in this

province and made it the basis of their livelihood [italics added].44

The Ch'ungch'ong province is thus said to have been characterized by absentee

landlords residing in the capital, and given their central power position it is

plausible that they were able to influence the allocation of tax exemptions either

locally, leading to increased additional exemptions, or in the capital, leading to

increased initial exemptions. As it was the additional exemptions that con

tributed mostly to the high figures for this province, it seems possible to

capital and rumours of this reached the provinces, the beggar population increased from 450

to more than 3000. Ch?ng Hy?ngji, "19 segi ch?nban yumin e kwanhan y?n'gu" [A Study on Early Nineteenth Century Vagrants], 196.

44 Yi Chunghwan, Taengniji [A Treatise on Choosing Settlements], p. 263.



584 ANDERS KARLSSON

conclude that whereas Ky?nggi mainly received an unduly large amount of

exemptions due to central government considerations, Ch'ungch'?ng mainly received these due to socio-economic and local political factors.

This assumption is corroborated if we also look at permanent tax exemptions

(rnyonse) for the four main provinces. A comparison of land on which tax was

to be paid and land that was permanently exempted from tax during the reign of Ch?ngjo (1776-1800), will give us the situation shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Average amount of tax-bearing and tax-exempted land, 1776-1800 (unit: ky?l)

Ky?nggi Ch'ungch'?ng Ch?lla Ky?ngsang

Tax-bearing 52598 115952 201349 193008 Tax-exempted 53255 126898 123050 127574

Source: Yi Ch'?ls?ng, 17, 18 segi ch?nj?ng uny?ngnon kwa ch?nse chedo y?n'gu [Studies in Theories on Land Adminstration and the System of Land Taxation in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries]

In the two central provinces the amount of permanently tax exempted land was

in fact larger than the tax bearing land. Permanently tax exempted land

belonged to different categories, and in the case of Ky?nggi the large amount

was due to the widespread existence of land owned by government offices or

the court. In Ch'ungch'?ng, on the other hand, this was due to the province hav

ing the highest quantity of fields recorded as fallow, a sign of powerful land lord influence.45 Whatever the motives were behind the preferential treatment

given to these two provinces by the Ministry of Taxation, the consequence was

that the two provinces with strong central power interests received more tax

exemptions.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This study has taken the information collected in the basic data sheets and

twisted and turned it, like a kaleidoscope, to see if any interesting patterns

emerged. As the information is sometimes incomplete and some of the patterns

just vaguely discernable, the picture given is only suggestive and needs to be

corroborated by future research supplementing it with qualitative information.

Still, some conspicuous patterns did emerge.

45 Yi Ch'?ls?ng, 17, 18 segi ch?nj?ng uny?ngnon, p. 177.




First of all, this exercise has shown the extent of crop failure in the late eight eenth century and also that the state seems to have been quite willing to recog nise the need for tax exemptions. Given that governors and magistrates had a

vested interest in securing tax exemptions for their areas, the state had difficul

ties in cutting down on tax exemptions even though they later tried to by giv

ing lower initial quotas. In the end, however, the governors got what they asked

for, and the late eighteenth century saw steadily increasing levels of tax exemp tion. In the long run this inability to control tax exemptions caused the state

financial problems. The state thus needed to look for alternative ways to pro cure relief grain, which in turn led to conflict with those social groups that had to bear the burden of this exploitation.

Even in years of severe crop failure only amounting to between ten and

fifteen percent, these tax exemptions, although generous from the central gov ernment's point of view, were not enough to prevent the outbreak of famine.

Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that unequal allocation of these

exemptions exacerbated the problem of famine. The two central provinces received unduly large exemptions?in Ky?nggi due to central government con

siderations, and in Ch'ungch'ong due to socio-economic and local political fac

tors. Consequently the two southern provinces of Ch?lla and Ky?ngsang had to

bear the brunt of taxation, resulting in large-scale famine.



586 ANDERS KARLSSON

Appendix. Basic Data Sheets

Information on tax exemptions is taken from the T'akchi ch?nbugo, in the

Y?gang ch'ulp'ansa facsimile edition of 1986. However, the dating of the entries follows Yi Ch'?ls?ng 17, 18 segi ch?nj?ng uny?ngnon kwa ch?nse chedo y?n'gu [Studies in Theories on Land Adminstration and the System of Land Taxation in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries] (Seoul: Tos? ch'ulp'an s?nin, 2003) rather than the Introduction to the facsimile edition. Information on

the number of registered starving people and the total amount of famine relief

grain given is taken from famine relief end-reports (p'ilchin) contained in

Ch?ngjo sillok. The Hyej?ng yoram contains information on damage-level esti mations for most years of severe crop failure. For other years evaluation reports (chaesil pundung changgye) contained in Ils?ngnok and Piby?nsa tungnok have been used to supplement this information.

A) Number of "extremely severe" (usim) counties

B) Number of "secondary" (chich'a) counties

C) Number of "some yield" (ch'osil) counties

D) Intitial exemption quota (samokchae) in ky?l E) Additional exemption quota (kach'?ngchae) in ky?l F) Total amount of registered land (w?njangbu) in ky?l G) Total taxable land (silgyol) in ky?l H) Number of "starving people" (kimin) I) Amount of relief grain handed out (chin'g ok) in s ok

J) Number of people recorded in tax registers (hoj?k)

Ky?nggi

Year ABCD EF G H I J

1776/77 2 7 28 1600 749 1777/78 9 21 7 4800 3200 1778/79 10 19 8 3900 1836 1779/80 0 800 1780/81 0 1198 1781/82 200 396 1782/83 17 13 7 7338 6408 1783/84 12 21 4 5823 5656 1784/85 23 1876 1785/86 67 1877 1786/87 10 23 4 2531 8600 1787/88 2005 3984 1788/89 829 1532

52816 607252 47411 64024 4225 49962 39364 3106 54838 614446 55462 54415 45813 550052 25200 628399 47270 373073 31427

110933 56762 56683 634403 47440 183171 13630 52281 55795 642069




Table (cont.)

Year

1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

11

817 1039 1890

35 0 3529 979

25 0 1443 1467

2000 1600 3018 2405 1928 5910 111125 4514 50915

55229 54760 52303 51111 53994 49503

19333 201194

1224 15729

748918

652393

Ch'ungch'ong

Year B D

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

20 10

19 21

12 9 0

19 0 20 15

23 3 5600 25 9 9000 37 7 7400

0 8 46 0

3400 21 14 9700 18 15 8000

0 0

36 6 5300 23 22 4861 8 46 1070

1076 13 41 1076

2576 27 8 5500 17 37 1070 24 10 2100 23 16 2500

255519

4130 15000 15174 820 1076 1036 12479 18673 4861 4933 20538 8054 2930 4680 1500 6210 14286 4000 26768 255578 23000

123488 108140 112231 128041 127547 124911 107715 102547 124276 124129 103258 116016 123828 122083 125129 119084 107795 121902 98035 101349

29531 12038

418203 680206

25082 457348

728949 144389

23397 8930

24653 51384

312534 19413

2249 45602

51806 7102

870817

851379

858194

862937

868219

873180

870856

Ch?lla

Year D H I

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84

5 7

0 13 8 15

12 28

13 22 23 28

36 18

40 18 22 10

6600 9700 11900 0 0 8200 10200 12200

0 4000 2430 2100 4878 11560 7380 28213

208489 1189778 201007 200757 212843 1198491 210359 196235 66888 36979 198474 1209217 175411 2210466 111340



588 ANDERS KARLSSON

Table (cont.)

Year

1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

15 0 0 0 0

15 0 18 0

314 338889 215568 0 0 3890 212176 1215259

29 9 7500 28269 180517 1879177 111471 14 39 6600 2297 207539 17 36 2100 2927 211044 1220804 21 32 2100 6587 207340 13 40 2100 5885 207768

6600 2488 207285 1161757a 26 12 6587 14179 195184 1238859 73521 13 40 2100 3763 209058 24 11 4500 39058 339713 171274 2313487 141440 1162659 19 34 700 8973 205199 51303 35123

a) 1.226.339 if Cheju island is included.

Ky?ngsang

Year D

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

14 36 0 0 27 13 15

22 2 0

33 0 23 0

33 22 12 20 18 34 35

34 31 18

17

22 24 26 33

24 13 59 51 26 24 21

15 38 53

54

16 47 22 38

4100 8000 9300 0 0 9200 10300 6800 0 0 6400 5800 2100 2100 0 6282 8382 2000 4800 1500

6146 9360 30000 5793 3862 20652 7678 8376 3787 336730 4877 25500 4200 4779 6282 3762 11026 39994 5632 31478 336950 8265

203873 196705 171877 204663 206280 181235 93353 195715 206838 205877 178751 200642 203239 202000 206078 192934 159680 199932 171771 198294

13283 9527 741558 35087

1364500 94703 629873 52670 203400 6650

1088287 83531

1568880

1571050

1581189

1585031

1590973

1582368 2829596 205756

1424008 105407 1576829




Kangw?n

Year B C D H I

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

12 6 500 14 8 300 13 5 400

0 0 400

9 13 150 8 300 3050 7 5 0

797 10 10 400 14 8 450 12 10 400 13 11 400

0 300

15 6 400 6 20 350 14? 14? 350

173

615 1059 1154 150 188 286 747 8437 1160 0 1589 499 655 635 349 572 570 0 575 0

40889

40894

10760 10396 10106 11516 11514 11080 10885 25502 10710 10977 9785 10829 10728 10742 11349 10814 10602 11230 10657 11428

5000a

784 100 10847 6548

22389

1603 994

7509 5713

340814

342804

345191

326579

332256

322161

325740

a) There is no famine relief end report for this year, but Hyej?ng yoram has records of grain being handed out.

Hamgy?ng

Year B D H I

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

13 4 11

0 14 0

10

7 3 0 5 14 0 10 2 0

0

7 3 0 8 7 1269 2 21 0 7 2 0 4 19 0

0 13 6 693

0 11 3 0 11 7 0 8 12 0

0 0 0

12 6 0 4 20 0

109556

114821

64289 64784 64342

64618 64169 64845 65249 65190 65381 65302 64630 65259 59478 62555 64750 65150 65259 65381 64630 65957

673484 47024

83852 7595

14535 13114

623017 54736

90531 2414

543520 56295 372239 30748

639148

625557

651041

661014

696275

659792

49575 11332 672172



590 ANDERS KARLSSON

Hwanghae

Year D

111 6111 Mil 11% 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

7 7 0 0 8 4 4 0

4 4 4 10 3

7 10 11 6 8 9 13 14

10 13 8 11 11

12

20 17 7 10 6 9

9 6 11 2 9

3000 2600 1800 0 0 1800 1000 1000 0 1500 1000 1420 1000 1700 1000 1000 1330 1700 800 500

1760 3000 4671 1333 1330 1200 2031 2670 1420 132874 3180 1300 1544 790 2653 2500 3653 1320 6200 3464 132891 4285

68074 67283 66505 71627 71677 70389 70277 69670 71960 68737 71143 70529 71744 69229 70101 68969 70837 65607 69262 68730

153376 6932

135689 11742

549476

555416

557847

563206

567813

568967

577091

P'y?ngan

Year

1776/77 1777/78 1778/79 1779/80 1780/81 1781/82 1782/83 1783/84 1784/85 1785/86 1786/87 1787/88 1788/89 1789/90 1790/91 1791/92 1792/93 1793/94 1794/95 1795/96

0 7 4 0

0 1 0

0 0 7 15

14 6 25 13

21 7

17 7 12 19

22

22 24

20 36 10 25 34

34 20 35

25 35 23

17

15 18

1829 131 2314 0 0 1805 222 1054 450 402 785 388 1557 3205 0 1129 977 759 933 666

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 347 0 0 0 o o

118713

119027

82873 84357 82335 84512 84652 83051 84811 84071 84765 84874 84576 85057 83977 82392 84927 82877 83016 83274 83162 83463

10030a 1274405

5520 6279

1037299 16012

438347 14182

153462 4882

1267460

1278581

1286805

1296044

1275244

1278953

a) There is no famine relief end report for this year, but Hyej?ng yoram has records of grain handed out.




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