Famine and Al-Shabaab
Transcript of Famine and Al-Shabaab
Gail Sasse
African Politics
SSSGAI001
October 11, 2011
Famine and Al-Shabaab: Challenges to peace in Somalia
Summary
In the past few weeks, an African terrorist group has captured the world stage as a result
of actions taken by the group to the humanitarian crisis created from the drought in East
Africa. Al-Shabaab is recognized by several names: Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin,
the Youth, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahedeen Youth Movement, Mujahidin
Youth Movement. The group has been branded as a terrorist organization by the US,
UK, and several other countries, with the claim that they are linked to Al-Qaeda and thus
are participants that need to be stopped in the ‘War on Terror’. While this accusation is
troubling enough for the regional and international community, the situation in Somalia
has been exacerbated by the drought of 2011, followed by what some debate is a man
made famine. Somali’s are fleeing en mass to refugee camps in Kenya, Djibouti, and
Ethiopia. The majority of the Somali population and the international community blame
this escalation of tragedy caused by the drought on Al-Shabaab, who have recanted their
approval of foreign aid groups and the UN World Food Program (WFP) from providing
assistance to the suffering population. This action by Al-Shabaab, in addition to the
recent kidnappings of tourists in Kenya and aid workers with Doctors Without Borders
from the refugee camp, Dadaab, located 80 km from the Kenya/Somalia border, and the
continued practice of piracy along the coastline are just some of the activities by Al-
Shabaab that have further alarmed Africa and the international community.
In this paper I will examine the difficult path that Somalia has led since the collapse of
the country’s government in 1991, the factors that have allowed Al-Shabaab to come into
existence and claim a competing authority to the western-backed Somali Government, the
different interventions and roles of the US, African Union (AU), and United Nations
(UN) against Al-Shabaab, and finally what options are left for the country to fill the
political vacuum for power. Unfortunately there is not a shared conscience of how to
proceed in Somalia and how to approach the issue posed by the Islamic extremist group.
Now, with the situation in Somalia deteriorating even further as a result of the famine,
there seems to be a possibility that Al-Shabaab has been weakened and is clinging to its
own self-suicidal existence. One important aspect that must remain prevalent in all
debates and decisions regarding the situation in Somalia is that the Somali people
maintain a triple identity: clan, religious, and national. This characteristic can be both
harmful and beneficial toward understanding, abating, and formulating a solution to
counter Al-Shabaab. The suggestion as to what route to take in ending the crisis on
Somalia and allowing the Somali people to take hold of their own destiny, is that of a
single identity based on moderate Islam, and which is accepted by the AU, which at times
makes contradictory statements as to the involvement of the international community,
especially the US, from interfering in the future of the country and whether or not Al-
Shabaab can be quelled after recent events relating to the famine, piracy, and guerrilla
warfare that is now being spread outside of the country and into the East African region.
However, a shared religious identity based on moderate Islam appears to be the best
option for Somalia in the future, at least in the short-term.
Introduction to Somalia:
In 2010, Stated President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed stated in an article with the UK
newspaper, the Guardian that “for twenty years, Somalia has been synonymous with war
and displacement. Now terrorism and piracy have been added to this list-and they
threaten death and destruction beyond our borders.”1 The President goes on to proclaim
that Somalia, despite what is thought of by the international community, is not a failed
state and that the people of Somalia yearn for peace.
Somalia is unique in that Somalia consists of a fairly homogenous population in terms of
religion, culture, and language, with the exception of some Arabs, Bavarans, and Bantu
groups. The Scholar IM Lewis “recognizes the fluid nature of the clan identity system,
1 AMISOM Bulletin issue 2, 15 March 2010
saying that a man is a member of lineage only in opposition to another.”2 This is due
mainly to the fact that each clan holds authority over certain resources. In addition to clan
identity, there are two other viable identities for Somalis: Islamic and national identity. In
this respect, it would be assumed that the population and governing powers would unite
under at least one identity to form a cohesive nation-state. However, from 1969 until
1991, President Siyad Barrre’s political strategy of creating clear divisions between the
clans created inter-clan hostility. Out of a vast array of clans, only three benefited under
the President’s policy of nepotism. The remaining clans were marginalised and as a
result, a great migration occurred during Barre’s reign. In addition to the Migration, there
was a lot of fighting between clans, even though these clans held very small differences.
The fighting ensues mainly because in the clan system of Somalia, Clans are further
broken down into sub clans and sub-sub clans, so you have a multitude of differing
factions fighting over limited resources and power over territory.
This fighting indicates that clan identity surmounts the other two identities, but why?
There are four reasons suggested by scholars. First, because clan identity is the only
differentiating factor among Somalis as all Somalis are Muslim, clan identity is necessary
to distinguish themselves as the Holy Koran mentions that “we made you into nations and
tribes so you recognize each other”3 Secondly, it can be argued that individual identity is
a basic human need needed to establish individual identity. Thirdly, clanship is a way to
bring people together, for celebratory and traditional occasions. It is a unifying source.
Lastly, clan identity is used by politicians, especially when manipulated, solely for the
purpose of aggression. “Siyad Barre used nepotism an he gave significant political and
economic opportunities to the people who were closely related to him clan-wise. He also
used the central government’s institutions such as the military and police against clans in
order to punish them. He committed gross injustices in the name of clan identity.”4 The
President allowed warlords to become prominent members of his government. This factor
encouraged clans to enforce their own laws and to use clan identity as an insurance policy
when Somali’s fled to different regions and had to co-habitat with other clans. This
2 Understanding the Somalia Conflageration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, Pg. 303 Koran, Surah 49:114 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, Pg. 34
continued even after the fall of the government in 1991. One of the drawbacks to the final
issue is that the clans tend to participate in collective punishment and revenge when it
comes to protecting its people and resources.
So is identity a root cause or a contributing source to the Somali conflict? The answer can
be viewed as it being a source for the fighting because of divisions between clans or as a
mobilizing factor to reach a specific goal. Yet the identity of a clan does not remain
stagnant but it has always been a sense of conflict in Somalia. Conflicts usually arise
when the basic human needs of the mass are not met. One can consider identity as a basic
human need.
Clan identity is indigenous identity which can be used in peace-building, a term defined
by the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali as “the process that
facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of
violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation,
institution building and building and political as well as economic transformation.”5
What is Al-Shabaab?
In addition to a multitude of clans that seem to be in constant conflict, Al-Shabaab, or
‘the Youth’ has brought Somalia into international headlines. Al Shabaab is a Wahhabi-
based organization that grew out of the Islamic Courts Union, a temporary Islamist power
source that fell in 2006. The reason Al-Shabaab has been able to maneuverer through
Somalia is because the country has not had a central government since 1991 and many
clan leaders are willing to cooperate with the group, despite the fact that most of the
members of Al-Shabaab come from the Hawiye clan. Al-Shabaab, similar to the Taliban
in Afghanistan, offered security when there was no government in place. Additionally,
forced recruitment has been implemented as part of Al-Shabaab's strategy to build
strength and support.
5 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi. Pg. 36
Similar to a clan itself, Al-Shabaab does not possess the ability to impose universal
application of rules throughout the country. The organization, as a whole, controls most
of southern Somalia except for the capital, Mogadishu. Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar
Abdirahman, ‘Abu Zubeyr’, leads Al-Shabaab but the organization is divided into
geographical areas, with several different leaders in each region. Each leader operates
independently, and as is similar to the relationships amongst clans, there is friction.
‘Enough Project’ Somali expert Ken Menkhaus states that Al-Shabaab faces multiple
internal divisions over clanship, leadership, tactics, and ideology. Each of these divisions
is led by an individual who must apply his religious fervour with social identity as a clan
member. These divisions could be manipulated and exploited by a new government to
convince parts of Al-Shabaab to abandon their cause and to slowly re-incorporate them
back into Somali society by weeding out Islamist hardliners
Al-Shabaab has waged Jihad against the western-backed Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and has sparred with its neighbours in the region: the Ethiopians
since 2006, the Ugandan and Burundi African Union (AU) peacekeepers that are part of
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and now Kenya. To compound the
situation, since 2007 Al-Shabaab has claimed ties to Al-Qaeda. Senior leaders have been
trained with Al-Qaeda, so yes there is a link but the link is actually weak, as the only
sharing between the two is their ideology. There is also some questioning as to whether
forces outside of Al-Qaeda have also trained the group, such as former freedom fighters
from Yemen and Afghanistan. In 2008 an Al-Shabaab leader released a video-pledging
adherence to Al-Qaeda. In this video he also called for the young Somali diaspora to
come fight. As a tit-for-tat exchange in Feb 2009 Al Qaeda commander Ayman al-
Zawahiri released a video congratulating Al-Shabaab on some of their progress in their
jihad. He said the group “will engage in Jihad against the American–made government in
the same way they engaged in Jihad against the Ethiopians and the warlords before
them.”6 In 2008 the US put Al-Shabaab on its terrorists list as part of its ‘War on Terror’
In 2010 during the World Cup, 70 + civilians were blown up in two separate attacks in
6 Al-Shabaab, Council on Foreign Relations, Stephanie Hanson, 2011
Uganda. This was a turning point for the organization as it demonstrated that it was
willing to wage attacks outside of its borders.
Like any terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab’s murderous attempts to maintain power have
evolved over time, as technology has changed, new players enter the field, and support
dwindles. The tactics of al Shabaab have evolved over times due to the financial support
they gained from the Arab world, the militia training they received from countries
harbouring other terrorist groups such as Afghanistan, the weapon trade that exists in
Africa, observing other tactics used by similar forces, and the recruiting of foreign
fighters from the Somali diaspora in the US and UK. In 2006, when Ethiopia stormed the
country, Al-Shabaab used tactics such as guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, gunfire,
and assassinations. During this period, most of the warfare occurred in the capital,
Mogadishu, and forced an exodus of 400,000 Somalis to leave.
Since the departure of Ethiopian forces, Al-Shabaab’s tactics have changed track and
now employ a humanitarian facade by handing out food and money to the poor.
Additionally they took on a campaign of politics and justice with mobile Sharia courts for
swift trials. Before they would take on these new tactics they would meet with local clan
leaders as way of showing that they could be trusted and only had good intentions. The
group knows that radicalism will only alienate the Somali people further. With the
departure of Ethiopian troops, thus removing the group’s primary instigator, they
continued their guerrilla tactics against the AU Peacekeepers, as well as citizens in
Uganda as a retaliatory reaction to that country's participation as peacekeepers of the AU
Mission in Somalia. Within the country of Somalia, the tactics only aggravated the
tension between Somalis and Al-Shabaab. In 2009 orthodox Sunni Muslims from all over
Somalia tried to form a unified defence against Al-Shabaab. Clan Militias also took part
in more rural areas to defend against Al-Shabaab. The Somali population was beginning
to denounce Al-Shabaab as they saw Piracy as un-Islamic and un-Somali.
How is the strength of Al-Shabaab evaluated? Four factors can be used as indicators of
the power status of the organization:
1. Can they reclaim Mogadishu and how far can their influence spread outwards from the
capital?
2. Will the business community support Al-Shabaab, as taxes enforced by the
organization are essential to its continued survival?
3. Is the diaspora willing to continuing funding a “terrorist organization” especially
during a trying time such as famine and how will they fund it with the banking
mechanisms now shut down by the US?
4. Is the TFG willing to engage in negotiations with the group?
Somalia lost an already dysfunctional government in 1991, which allowed rival militias
to vie for control of the country. This dysfunction that continues today threatens the
global peace because of piracy, which costs the global community 7 billion to 12 billion
per year for extra security and ransom payments over the past 5 years. Al-Shabaab has
denied access from western aid workers because of fear of them being informants to the
US and believes the scale of the famine has been exaggerated. Now in 2011, the United
Nations (UN) has declared a famine in southern Somalia, the portion of the country that
Al-Shabaab control. This announcement has weakened the group and its defectors and
opponents blame the group because of the ban that they imposed on foreign aid groups,
particularly the WFP in 2009. It appeared that in July 2011, Al-Shabaab may have had a
change of heart and they reversed this mandate but within a few days they reinforced its
former position. In addition to this ban, it is already difficult to provide aid because Al-
Shabaab takes 10-15% of the aid as profit and charges a registration fee of $4000 to
$10,000 and a project fee of 20% for digging a borehole or establishing an aid centre.
This is ironic because the Al-Shabaab humanitarian office imposes these payments.
Efforts to control Al-Shabaab by West (Primarily USA)
Twice foreign military action has tried to stabilise Somalia. The US tried in 2002 as
dictated in the film, “Black Hawk Down” and Ethiopia in 2006, for which Somalia
gained an ally from Eritrea due to the country’s conflict with Ethiopia. In 2007 and 2008
the US launched aerial attacks on Al-Shabaab in Somalia due to the assumption that
Somalia was harbouring members of Al-Qaeda. “Somalia is still far from secure. The
treat from Islamist terrorists has not receded, while the determination of the US and
Ethiopian forces to rid Somalia of terrorists remain as strong as possible. This scenario is
set up prolong the conflict between terrorists and Ethiopian forces and also to fuel human
insecurity in Somalia and the greater horn of Africa.”7 But what has the ‘war on
terrorism’ really achieved in Somalia?
“The trajectory of United States policy shows that its involvement in Somalia-even if by
proxy through Ethiopian troops-stems not from a genuine desire to promote human rights
and human security in this collapsed state, but from strategic concerns: fears that stateless
Somalia could become a haven for anti-American terrorists.” The sanctions on foreign
funds from the diaspora to the financial company al-Barakaat in November 2011 to
Somalia by the US government have only fuelled anti-western sentiment.
“The solution must come from Somalis themselves. They have done it once before. In
2000 Islamists formed the Union of Islamic court, a national federation of Sharia jurists,
they had at least some legitimacy and held large swathes of territory, until it was
overthrown 6 years later with foreign help.”8 But Somalia cannot proceed with the
current western backed regime still in charge. Outside influencers should encourage the
TFG to open up the political platforms to other opponents, including Islamists. The West
should help but in humanitarian methods, who unfortunately have been disallowed by Al-
Shabaab during the 2011 famine.
Western Donors have raised more than $800 million this year to help those suffering
from the famine. With this aid, the West could help local communities to gain trust of the
west again and assist in the economic development of the country once again. The AU
has asked for more international support yet the UN Special representative for Somalia,
Ahmedhou Ould-Abdallah, has urged foreign governments to stop interfering in a
statement in November 2010 ”today external political interference perpetuates
instability.”9 Yet another contradictory statement was made by Minister Gele of the TFG,
7 Human Rights and Human Security in Post-9/11 Africa, John Akokpari. Pg. 848 The Economist Oct 15, 2011-Don’t aim too high9 AMISOM Bulletin Issue 2, March 15 2010
who has asked for more international support and has visited several European countries
and other foreign officials and the Somali diaspora as an appeal for support.
Efforts to Control Al Shabaab by the AU
AMISOM declares that this is not only a domestic or regional conflict but also a global
fight against terrorism supported by Al Qaeda. The international community must
recognize this. Terrorists are hiding behind the banner of religion and do nothing but shed
blood, and repress the population. “Extremism has nothing to do with Islam and
everything to do with indiscriminate murder and carnage.”10 AMISOM came into
existence in 2007 to provide humanitarian, peacekeeping, military aid, and to lend
support to the TFG controlled by President Sheik Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. It is solely
because of the AU peacekeeping troops that the TFG is still in power. But AMISOM
recognizes that future lies in hands of Somalis, but with some assistance from the West,
mainly in the form of monetary aid. The troops that come primarily from Uganda and
Burundi have suffered major casualties or have had retaliatory attacks against their
citizens. AMISOM is under-resourced and needs more troops. The AU has appealed to
the international community to provide more contributions so that the salaries of the
peacekeepers are on par with those of UN peacekeepers. The primary role of AMISOM is
the continuous training of Somali security forces, which will help to eventually transfer
the peacekeeping and stability into the hands of the Somalis.
The EU, having recognized that Somalia has become a global threat and with the
inclusion of UK citizens joining the ranks of Al-Shabaab, have helped in training local
police and have also given monetary aid of 30 million euros, which is the first payment
from 60 million euro pledge. Ghana, Nigeria, Sierre Leone and Uganda have also
provided police training. On a whole though, most AU states have not met their
contributions as promised.
10 AMISOM Bulletin Issue 2, March 15 2010
Efforts to Control Al-Shabaab by the UN
The AU, while acknowledging that change must come from Somalis, has sought the help
of the UN to take over peacekeeping efforts, but since the US's failed intervention in
1992 the UN is unwilling to send peacekeepers until the fighting stops. Additionally, the
AU Peace and Security Council has asked the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly
zone and begin a sea blockade to protect and retaliate against piracy. Since the AU sees
this as a global issue it is understandable that they believe that the UN must play a role in
securing peace in Somalia. In addition to peacekeeping support, the AU has asked for
more political and economic support of the TFG and has also raised the issue of
humanitarian offenses taking place in the country. However, the UNSC has failed to act
and the Somali people and/or with the TFG do not have the resources to provide support
and have asked for more support to the TFG.
Current Situation
Coincidentally, on September 11th of this year Al-Shabaab kidnapped 2 British tourists
and on October 1st kidnapped a French woman. Both events occurred on the coast of
Kenya near the Somali border. In the past two weeks, two female aid workers from
Doctors Without Borders near the Dadaab Refugee camp in Kenya were also abducted.
Refugees are seeking safety in Kenya, Ethiopia and Puntland. Al-Shabaab has
acknowledged that there is a drought but will not agree with the international community
that it constitutes a famine. Instead they blame Allah for the drought and have asked
people to pray for rain and to return to farming instead on relying on international aid.
Prior to the Famine it was seen that “Even though Al-Shabaab had draconian laws, they
were somewhat popular because of the stability they provided,”11 says Somali journalist
Abdirahman Aynte. However, all of this has changed as the cost of lives lost as a result of
the famine has ruined the organizations credibility because its mainly affected al-
Shabaab controlled areas of southern Somalia.
11 BBC News Africa 9 August 2011, Could Somali Famine Deal a Fatal Blow to Al-Shabaab? By Farouk Chothia
Some view the UN declaration of the famine as a mistake and a provocation for Al-
Shabaab by appearing to undermine the group. It has been suggested that the UN should
have sought to work with al Shabaab, to gain its trust, and then get aid in. The UN could
have used the divisions within Al-Shabaab that were brought on by the famine as a way
to further weaken the group. But in reality, when you look at the actually statistics, it is
conflict and not drought that is killing more Somalis. “Conflict has turned hunger into
famine and disaster into tragedy.”12 This famine, not nearly as bad as the one in 1992, has
been grossly exacerbated by the lack of international humanitarian assistance and the
downturn in the global economy, which has pushed food prices up. The famine in 1992
affected 23 million people while the famine that the country is facing today affects a
mere compared to 10 million
The TFG has offered amnesty to al Shabaab the group and has had to resort, with AU
troops, to actually force Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu. All Shabaab does not seem to
worry about this development as it claims it is just a change in its tactics against the TFG
and foreign intervention. In reality, Al-Shabaab is at its weakest point in its history.
As for the neighbouring countries, as mentioned before, Kenya has been hit the hardest
recently as a result of allowing Somalis to take refuge in aid camps near the Somali
border. Kenya is now evoking the UN Charter on the Right of Self-Defence, Chapter vii
article 51: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.
As article 51 reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”
12 BBC News 10 August 2011, Somalia Drought: Tragic History Repeats Itself by George Alagiah
The US agenda in Somalia has been focused solely on targeting Al-Qaeda and has done
nothing but further destabilize the country. The US backed Ethiopian invasion displaced
1 million and killed 15,000 innocent Somalis. IGAD and the international community,
particularly the US, then took the reigns once Ethiopia pulled out and aided in designing
the TFG. The TFG has only been able to control Mogadishu recently and this is only due
to the assistance by the AU. This sparked a new civil war and within a month the south
fell to Al-Shabaab as the ineptitude of the TFG opened up a new power vacuum for a
competing power source
Recommendations
Many scholars put identity not only at the centre of the Somali conflict but also as the key
to peace building. 4 Strategies have been proposed
1. Partitioning the country among competing clans,
2. Ignoring and/or suppressing clan identity
3. Power sharing
4. Identifying reconstruction opportunities.
Somalia’s current government is based on power sharing. The 4 Major clans are
represented and then a conglomeration of smaller clans makes up .5 of the representation.
This is called the ‘4.5 formula’. The problem with this is there are too many clans and for
this this formula you must give clans autonomy. Finally, who actually represents clan is
problematic because there may not always be agreement inside a clan, as clans are further
divided into sub clans and sub-sub clans.
I will not discuss option 1 or 2 as I see them as being unattainable and flawed.
Power sharing, and not military intervention, may be best in the short term “one way of
reconciling the contradictory dimensions of clan identity is perhaps by using political
representation and dividing seats among clans in the parliament while subordinating the
use of clan identity to the other value of competency for the cabinet, senior bureaucratic
positions and other important posts. Another way is to create a bicameral system where
one houses represents clans while the other represents the population using geographical
formulae.”13 I believe that this would be similar to the structure in place in Lebanon,
which is based on power sharing between religious groups.
The fourth strategy is to reconstruct identity, which involves identifying an inclusive
identity that all clans share. Most Somalis want this strategy. Islam resolves the divisive
clan identity. Additionally, Islam and Somali identity can at some point be used
interchangeably and eventually rely on the Somali national identity which is more
acceptable to the Islamic community and its Christian neighbours, and also calms fears
from the US and deals with the discrimination from the ‘War on Terror’. This is a long-
term solution.
President Sheikh Sharif Ahmad believes that Al-Shabaab can be defeated easily but only,
and this is once again a contradictory statement by the TFG, if the international
community actually believes that Somalia can be salvaged. Most importantly, the global
community must acknowledge that what is happening in Somalia is a threat that is not
constrained within its borders. The TFG claims to be working with the Somali diaspora
and take part in transparent political negotiations.
Conclusion:
The famine of 2011 may be the last straw for Al-Shabaab and thus a new era of hope for
Somalia. Peace is not unobtainable at the hands of the Somalis. Case in point is
Somaliland, which broke away in 1991, proves that Somalis can live in peace by their
own means. But how do we bring the Somali people, who are divided by clanship, to
come together and oppose Al-Shabaab? As mentioned prior in the paper, a common
identity must be reconstructed. In the short term, Islam can be the unifying force, but the
international community must accept this decision and not confuse this in the ‘War on
Terror.’
13 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, pg. 45
But in the long run the identity must be that of a Somali national identity in order to calm
the fears of the country’s Christian neighbour states along with the West. This national
identity can only come into being once Islamic extremism as portrayed by Al-Shabaab
has been eradicated. The AU and international community can assist in the elimination or
at least the quelling of Islamic extremism of Al-Shabaab but from there on, the future lies
in the hands of the Somali.
Bronwyn Bruton of the Council of Foreign Relations, argues in a 2010 report that “the
blessing of the TFG by the USA and other western countries has previously served to
isolate the government and at the same time, to propel cooperation among previously
served to isolate the government and, at the same time, to propel cooperation among
previously fractured and quarrelsome extremist group.” She proposes a “’constructive
disengagement’ policy that recognizes Al-Shabaab Islamist rule in Somalia as long as it
does not engage in regional violence or terrorism”14
Somali’s dealing with their own political and legal system is not a new concept, it’s just a
reinvented system. In the past, conflicts were settled by Somali traditional legal systems
within clans and between clans. This system was called Heer, which is a form of Somali
culture, and was preceded by elders and religious scholars. These members would come
together to discuss an issue and come up with an outcome despite the fact the fact that
there were no police, jails, or courts. It was purely a traditional and informal process. “If
a given member of society rejected a decision, pressure through his kin group was the
best way to convince that person to accept such a decision.”15
The global community should support the Somali people in the path they choose for the
future with a strong unified government who support them through tough times such as
droughts and famines. If the government can provide this support then the Somali people
will no longer need the group to fill the political vacuum and they have a chance to unite
against Al-Shabaab. Somalia must not be left to fend for itself but it does not need further
interference by outside forces concerned only with their on motives.
14 Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Shabaab by Stephanie Hanson Aug 10, 201115 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, pg. 32
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