Failure of steel structures: Rethinking some of the aftermaths

Construcţii Failure of steel structures: Rethinking someof the aftermaths • A. Anastasiadis

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FAILURE OF STEEL STRUCTURES: RETHINKING SOME OFTHE AFTERMATHS

Anthimos ANASTASIADISDr. EurIng, ASAnastasiadis & Associates, e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. Steel structures are the most ductile systems; however they areprone to instability phenomena due to their inherent slenderness.Looking at the real events of over 50 years, it was observed that steelstructures, when they are subjected to seismic actions, respond, relatively,in an acceptable way, avoiding a global collapse. In case of quasi-staticloads, such as snow, overloading, due to earth infill in case of green roofs,or indirect actions, coming from geometrical imperfections or lack ofbracing, fail under a sudden way. A failure should be approached by anytype of combination of cumulated errors in design, construction,operation and maintenance. The paper is focused on failures, in quasi-static loads, of the first stage in the design and construction phase of aproject. It attempts through a technical classification and presentation ofcase studies to unveil relevant causes of collapses. From the engineeringpoint of view, the lack of redundancy, robustness and ductility are themain factors of structural collapse. Indeed, the human nature representsthe central core for any structural failure, and this is attributed to acoupling of the lack of knowledge, as well as management andorganizational inefficiencies.

Key words: collapse, lack of knowledge, management, ultimate state, casestudies.

1. IntroductionGenerally, structures are uniqueproducts, each one with distinctivecharacteristics. Hence, they are notsuch as other technological products,(e.g. machines), where high grade ofindustrialization and QC & QA (qualitycontrol and quality assurance), policiescould be applied. Certainly, currentEuropean Norms prescribe someclauses for the quality management aswell as the management of structuralreliability (Gulvenesian et al., 2002;Marek et al., 1999); it is a substantialeffort in order to mitigate the

probability of failure. Nevertheless, thecontent of any procedure is based onthe level of the knowledge ofstakeholders for both technical andmanagerial issues, and one way is tolearn from past failures (Petroski,1994). The trial-and-error method,widely used by engineers, is thesimplest example. Moreover, failure isan excellent learning experience,providing the vulnerability of astructural system, while successprovides the capacity/demand ratio ofa structural system, when is subjectedto corresponding external actions.

• Urbanism. Arhitectură. Construcţii • Vol. 12 • Nr. 2 • 2021

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Focused on steel structures, one canobserve the following two aspects:1. Steel is a material with high quality

control as compared with other basicconstruction materials (e.g. theconcrete).

2. Steel components (e.g. beams, columns,bracings), are realized, partly, asprefabricated elements where qualitycontrol could be developed.

A steel structure, as a final product, isdictated not only by the material andcomponents, but by the design,fabrication, erection, operation andmaintenance. It is a complex processwhich requires technical, organizationaland management awareness. Evidently,the construction of steel structures is alsoconnected with the human factor, and assuch the human error plays a central roleto any kind of structural failure. It isinteresting to present the opinion ofPetroski (2006), where ’’Structural failuresoccur in part because the design process issubject to all the flaws and failings of humanintelligence and human nature.’’

Concentrating on the root causes of astructural failure we remark thataccording to Kletz (1992), an ’’Accidentinvestigation is like peeling an onion. Beneatheach layer of causes and recommendations lieother layers. The outer layers deal with theimmediate technical causes, the middle layerswith ways of avoiding the hazards and theinner layers with the underlying weaknessesin the management system.’’ In addition,Turner (1978), investigating the nature ofthe disaster, stated that ’’There is anaccumulation over a period of time of anumber of events which are at odds with thepicture of the world and its hazardsrepresented by existing norms and beliefs. ’’.Therefore, there is period of incubationuntil an uncontrolled cause, whichfinally, will trigger the failure.

Generally, steel structures have adequatestrength and ductility. This meritprovides earthquake-resistant steelstructures, as demonstrated by strongseismic actions like Northridge (1994,USA), Kobe (1995, Japan) andChristchurch (2010, 2011, NZ).Practically, this behavior influenced thestructural engineering community ofNew Zealand, where different steelstructural systems are mostly applied forthe post-earthquake reconstruction ofChristchurch (Bruneau and McRae, 2019).

However, steel structures due to theirinherent slenderness and lack of stiffnessin the absence of proper bracing, arevulnerable to instability phenomena,becoming prone to failure at the erectionphase or, in many cases, due to snowloads.

New construction technologies, such asgreen roofs with earth infill, when theyare not well defined, may triggerunexpected failures. Moreover, newconstruction processes, such as erectiontechniques and technologies, maydevelop conditions to cause collapse.

Taking into account all theaforementioned, the present study isfocused on failures coming from quasi-static loads, which are directly connectedwith the statements of Kletz (1992) andTurner (1978). Firstly, in order to set inexplicit way the combined technical andmanagerial goals, at the incipient phase,the paper attempts to point out andclassify the structural failure. Secondly,through some case histories, it is unveiledthat managerial errors along with anincubation period stand behind a largenumber of failures, even in the case thatseems to be that when failures areprovided from other types of errors like,for instance, the inefficient design.


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2. Classification of failure focused onsteel structures

Classical studies in the field of structuralsafety classify the structural failure asfollows (Pugsley, 1951; Blokley, 1980;Turner, 1978):· Due to errors in design, or construction.· Due to unforeseen high values of

loading.· Due to poor understating of how to use

the existing materials, and constructionor other type of technologies.

· Due to improper understanding of thestructural behavior of a system.

· Due to improper use of a structure.· Due to improper handling of

information among the stakeholders.· Due to violation of procedures,

specifications and/or codes.

All the above depicts the generalframework of failure causes, which arevalid for all types of structures. On theother hand, one can observe that theprojects of the steel structures aresomewhat different as compared with thereinforced concrete structures; this isrelated to fabrication and erection process.The first one is connected with a series ofactivities like: surface cleaning, cutting,bending, rolling, straightening, drilling,punching, welding, fitting, coat finishingand transporting. The second one isassociated with the lifting of steelcomponents into a position, (althoughwithout full connection, only temporarilyholding in position), suitable bracingensuring stability until the full connectionof the system, bolting and welding on site,alignment, final installing and permanentjoining of the steel components,application of the final coat, on site, andattachment of the cladding. Thefabrication procedure is a constructionphase where quality control, QC, isapplied. Certainly, QC is developed andimplemented by human beings; therefore,

under such circumstances, the humanerror would occur. The erection activities,due to their nature, they do not alwaysrespect any quality control and qualityassurance. They represent a decisiveexecution stage, for the following reasons:· The whole stability of the structural

system would be ensured.· The health and safety of the

stakeholders present on site would beensured.

2.1. Failure based on the construction lifecycle

Briefly, from structural point of view, wecan distinguish three main stages of aconstruction life cycle: the design, theconstruction and the operation phase aswell. Towards this conceptualization, foreach phase, there is a possibility thatstructural failure occurs (Table 1).

Table 1. Failure due to construction life cycle.Failure type Cause

Designers incompetenceStructural design code inefficiency

Load code inefficiencyFailure dueto design

Computer-aided designincompetency

Fabrication (e.g. defective process,improper workmanship)Failure due

toconstruction (execution)

Erection (e.g. lack of bracing,inefficient joining/assembling of

elements)Quasi-static loads (e.g. dead or

live load, snow)Failure dueto service

loads Dynamic loads (e.g. fatigue,seismic actions)

Failure dueto operation

Lack of inspection andmaintenance (e.g. corrosion,

accumulation of dust adding extraload)

In this paper the demolition phase or anytype of rehabilitation are not considered,because they are not make part ofcommon structural failure definition.

Definitely, all the aforementioned typesof failure, presented in Table 1, provide


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the external cause. Therefore, when theexternal cause interacts with the grosshuman error along with managementinefficiency in design, construction,inspection and maintenance, then astructural failure would appear (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Schematic view of interaction factors.

2.2. Failure based on the main structuralcharacteristics

Firstly, among the structural systems,there are some that are more susceptibleto failure than others. For instance, amoment resisting frame with long span ismore prone to failure as compared withone that is braced. Moreover, a trussspace frame is more robust, as a roofcover, than a grillage of beams, and so on.Therefore, a basic factor that must beconsidered against the possibility offailure is the type of structural system. Tothis end redundancy, ductility (e.g.alternative load paths and capacity forstress redistribution), overstrength,robustness, provided by continuity andmember connectivity, and diaphragmaticaction as well, are the main factorsavoiding structural failure (Table 2).

Secondly, the primary use of a structureand the modality of operation wouldintroduce the possibility of structuralfailure. One can observe that, forexample, steel crane structures, steelbridges, steel roofs covering stadiums,

exhibition halls, auditoriums or otherindustrial facilities with long spans, aresensitive to failure due to loadingconditions (e.g. crane overloading, snowaccumulation, impact on a bridge pier).This is because of inappropriate settingsof loading restrictions and inefficientmanagement actions to control suchoverloading situations, Table 2.

Table 2. Failure due to structural characteristics.Failure type Cause

Lack of redundancyLack of robustness

Lack of overstrengthLack of continuity and

connectivity

Failure due tostructural system

deficiencyLack or incomplete

diaphragmatic actionOverloadingFailure due to use

and operation Inefficient managementmeasures

3. Case studiesFailure is an excellent way to learn (Nastarand Liu, 2019). In addition, another modeto learn is from the experience of others.However, human beings have shortmemory and forget historical or otherimportant failures. Consequently, by anymeans, it is of paramount importance, topresent the aftermaths of any type ofstructural collapse.

It is interesting to provide the dictum ofSantayana ’’that those who do not rememberthe past are condemned to reap it’’ (extractedfrom the book of Petroski, 1994).

3.1. Roof collapse at the stadium of FCTwente, Holland

On July 7th, 2011, suddenly and at thetime of construction, part of the roof atthe De Groslch Veste stadium of FCTwente, Holland, collapsed, killing twoworkers and seriously injured (nineothers). At the time of the failure, about12 workers were working above and


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below the roof, Fig. 2 and 3. The collapseoccurred in the afternoon, in an advancedphase of the works.

Work had begun in February of that yearand was an extension of the existing roof,following a previous extension that beganaround 2008. The project was undertakenby a general contractor who thenoutsourced two subcontractors; the firstone commissioned to execute thereinforced concrete works and the secondone the execution (fabrication anderection) of the structural steelwork. It isnoteworthy that the aforementionedsubcontractors had also dealt with thework carried out in 2008.

A year later, a commission was set up toinvestigate the incident, and it wasconcluded that the failure was due totechnical as well as human factors(Onderzoeksraad Voor Veiligheid/DutchSafety Board, 2012). In general, the failureis obviously due to insufficient support ofthe roof part and in particular to thefollowing technical factors:

· The temporary support measures,which consisted of metal cables, andensured the stability of the system duringconstruction / erection, were detachedbefore the installation of the permanentsupport system and the stiffening of thewhole structure.· Prior to the completion of theconstruction, the contractor allowed to setup, locally, in the subdivision of thestructural system which collapsed, theinstallation of a video wall, a suspensionservice deck and a roof cladding section.The aforementioned introduced anadditional load which would have to beundertaken from the whole and not froma part of a roof.· Structural deviations were recordedbetween the concrete elements as well as

those made of structural steelwork,resulting in the ‘forcible’ placement of thelatter, which led to the development ofadditional stresses, while at the same timereducing the margin of calculated strength.

Fig. 2. Global view of the collapsed roof(http://newcivilengineer.com/archive/engineering-errors-led-to-twente-collapse-stadium-12-07-

2012).

Regarding human factors, these can besummarized as follows:· The general contractor, withoutpermission and due to time pressurechanged the construction plan and whileinitially there was a sequential erectionand partial planning, finally all the workswere performed simultaneously.Therefore the contractor did not properlyassess the situation, by erecting theconstruction without revising the design.· Subsequently, the general contractordid not record the dimensions of theconcrete elements, in order to inform therelevant subcontractor (related to


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structural steelworks), about thetolerances. At the same time thesubcontractor of the steel constructionsfabricated the steel elements withoutchecking the concrete elements. As aresult, there was no propercommunication between the involvedparties, nor was there a clear hierarchy ofroles and responsibilities.· It is noteworthy that the lack ofcommunication, based on the findings ofthe committee, may have resulted fromthe past establishment of bonds of trustand cooperation between the partiesinvolved (general contractor andsubcontractors).

Fig. 3. Local view of the collapsed roof(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-

14063640).

It is obvious that during the constructionof such structures the erection planshould exist and rigorously implemented,without modifications, while for possiblechanges, the stakeholders and therespective construction managers shouldbe informed. At the same time, thecontrol and communication between allparties must be governed by specificprocedures and implemented to theletter, even if all the partners worktogether for many years. Moreover, asuggestion for the designers is to develophighly redundant and robust structural

systems, through continuity of elementsand use of bracings. In addition,construction tolerances, even from theinitial design, are necessary, because thefabrication and erection are not perfect.

3.1. Roof collapse at Maxima supermarket,Zolitude, Latvia

The Maxima supermarket, in Zolitude, acity near Riga, Latvia, was a buildingcompleted and delivered for use onNovember 3, 2011. It had an area of about4,750 m2. The main structural system forthe roof, bridging a span of 16.0 m, wasmade by steel trusses, connected betweenthem with prefabricated perforated slabs(hollow core prefab slabs). On its roof theconstruction of a "green roof" cladding ofabout 20-30 cm thick was under execution.However, on 21 November 2013, the roofof the Maxima store collapsed, while themarket was in operation killing 54 people,Fig. 4, and Fig. 5. In addition, this disasterled to the fall of the Latvian government.

The duration of the legal process waslong. Finally on February 18, 2020, eightfrom nine defendants (the architect, theconstruction manager, the constructionsupervisor, the project constructionexpert, three officials from the Rigabuilding and construction inspectorateand an employee of Maxima as well),were acquitted, and only the responsiblebuilding civil engineer was accused of’’making gross errors in the structuralcalculations, which directly led to the collapse’’(https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/crime/verdicts-delivered-in-zolitude-tragedy-case.a348764/).

The legal opinion it is not alwaystechnically sound, when facing a fatalconstruction failure.

For instance, one can observe that theconstruction history of the corresponding


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building was really very complex.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolit%C5%ABde_shopping_centre_roof_collapse#cite_note-51). Generally, in such cases,not only the design error but also acombination of causes coming from thepressure on the construction budget,relationships between the investmentpartners, the maintenance and themanagement, as well, are responsible fora catastrophic failure in construction.

Fig. 4. Global view of the Maxima collapsed roof(http://dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2511652-

Latvia-supermarket-roof-collapse-kills-37-Riga.html).

According to Gusta (2015), the Maximadisaster was due to error in design, errorsin construction and inspection process,failure to manage an emergency situationas well as the lowest construction cost,which finally led to the lowest quality ofconstruction. In other words the privateprofit was over the public safety. Thisattitude is ethically unacceptable.Certainly, the authorities must

discourage such actions, through peerreviewing in case of building facilitieswith crowd accumulation.

Fig. 5. Local view of the Maxima collapsed roof(https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-22/latvia-supermarket-roof-collapse-kills-

dozens/5112572).

Concerning this failure case, an importanttechnical remark would be made relatedto the change of a classic roof to a ’’greenroof’’. For the Maxima supermarket itseems that such loads was not taken intoaccount or not computed correctly (loadsin the order of 400-600 kgr/m2, due to thefact that previously there was relativerainfall which clearly worsened the loadcondition of the roof; case of wet soil).Also, the possible unilateral overload ledto the failure in combination with theprevious ones. This is because theconstruction of the green roof was inprogress, thus changing the intensivesituation that probably could not havebeen foreseen as a distinct constructionphase. Therefore, the overload, and the


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position of the load during the execution,caused by such a cladding, must be takeninto account. Moreover, the improperconnection between the trusses (lack ofpurlins, bracing ties, and a horizontalbracing system), created a system withreduced redundancy, not allowing theformation of a 3D effect of a spacestructure, which allows forceredistribution. For the Maximasupermarket the aforementionedstructural solution was not the properoption, possibly for purposes of reducingthe construction cost. Therefore, onceagain it should be pointed out that theredundancy develops alternative loadpaths, the ductility allows for the forceredistribution, and finally, the robustnessensures the integrity of the system. Thesestructural properties save lives andproperties as well.

3.3. Girder collapse of the Groat Road Bridge,Edmonton, Canada

The failure was occurred during theexecution phase (at the erection stage), andit is related to four girders of weldeddouble-T cross section with a height ofabout 4.20m in a bridge with a span ofaround 100.00m. In Figure 6 the aerial viewof the bridge, after failure, is presented(https://edmonton.ctvnews.ca/damaged-girders-on-102-ave-bridge-repaired-to-be-reinstalled-1.2375088).

A web camera system was put in place inorder to monitor the execution process ofthe project. By the virtue of the abovementioned system, the failure wasrecorded in real time. According to that,we distinguished the following stages.

The girders were erected by the steelfabricator on March 15, 2015. Around thefirst morning time and at 2:00 a.m.(March 16, 2015), as recorded by the webcameras in the project, there was no any

sign of failure (Fig. 7). The beams are stillstraight.

Fig. 6. Aerial view of the beams under a failedposition (https://edmonton.ctvnews.ca/

damaged-girders-on-102-ave-bridge-repaired-to-be-reinstalled-1.2375088).

A quarter later at 2:15 a.m. four of the beamsare buckled. There were no casualties orinjuries but only financial losses (Fig. 8).

This was a typical failure of flexuraltorsional buckling, which is acharacteristic type of failure for bridgegirders of such height and span, whenthey stay unrestrained (EdmontonJournal, 2015; Zhao et al., 2009) (Fig. 9).


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Fig. 7. Beams are straight at 2.00 a.m., on 16March 2015 (https://globalnews.ca/news/

1887233/groat-road-to-remain-closed-for-three-weeks-for-curvy-girder-repairs/).

Fig. 8. Beams failed at 2.15 a.m., on 16 March 2015(https://globalnews.ca/news/1887233/groat-

road-to-remain-closed-for-three-weeks-for-curvy-girder-repairs/).

Given the fact that the correspondingphenomenon is of primary concern at theerection stage and a well-known cause offailure, in this case it was found that atthe design stage, as well as at theconstruction stage, the correct measureswere not implemented. Moreover, theconstruction manager had not taken theproper measures, leaving the crane ropesto stabilize the beams, without any typeof temporary or/and permanent bracing.Thus, errors in design, erection andmanagement in construction occurred.

Fig. 9. Flexural torsional buckling of the maingirders (the 4th, 5th, 6th)

(https://globalnews.ca/news/1887233/groat-road-to-remain-closed-for-three-weeks-for-curvy-

girder-repairs/).

An in depth qualitative analysis revealsthe following results:· In the failure area in question, e.g.between the 4th-5th-6th beam, thetransverse support system (permanent ortemporary for construction purposes)was not fully installed after thecompletion of the construction works onMarch 15.· The 6th and penultimate beam of thesystem, out of the total of 7 beams of thebridge, remained incomplete and alsounilaterally supported, after thecompletion of construction works.· All the of the failed beams showdeformations in the same direction.Therefore in the following hours, after theend of the work, due to the incompletesupport of the girders the compressedside, probably under the dead weight of

12

34 5 6 7


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the beam and /or secondary effects thatdeveloped after the end of theconstruction works (e.g. from geometriceccentricities, some type of a gust of windstriking surface of this girder), caused thedeflection of the 6th and last installedbeam which in turn diverted the othertwo, in a domino-type failure.· Furthermore, it can be seen that duringthe construction, the transverse jointswere not fully placed on the beams thatfailed, as respectively they seem to havebeen placed and exist between the 1st-2nd

and 3rd girder. Certainly, the improperplacement and connection of the bracingsystem contributed to the failure, even inthe assumption that the study envisagedunilateral beam support, however withthe complete installation of the transversebracing system for the prevention of out-of-plane translational and especiallytorsional deformations.

In any case, it is very interesting to presentthe results of the remediation works. It wasestimated that the replacement of thegirders and the completion of the projectwould cause a delay of 9 to 12 months.However due to the requirements of theproject clauses (approximately $15,000/day) the girders were not replacedbut repaired on site, after being dismantledby the bridge under construction, byapplying heat straightening methods andcold procedures at the construction site(Fig 10). Such methods are widely appliedin bridge construction (Avent and Brakke,1996; Avent and Mukai, 2001). It is known,of course, that hot straightening,depending on how it was applied incombination of the quality of the steel,alters the mechanical properties of thematerial and can cause a number ofproblems, such as accumulation of stresses,reduction of the modulus of elasticity,increase of the yield limit state by about20%, a relatively smaller increase in tensile

strength, decrease of about one third ofductility, decrease of fatigue limit, decreaseof fracture toughness (Avent et al., 2000).

Fig. 10. State of the girders before and after repair(https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/

groat-road-bridge-twister-bender-or-bucky-edmontonians-suggest-names-1.3079412).

The contractors of the project guaranteedthe quality execution of the repair, so atthe end they proceeded with the repairdespite any initial disagreements andvoices to the contrary.

Overall, the following observations wereidentified:(a) In any project, even from the designphase, the thorough examination of theconstruction stages is of paramountimportance. The designer must take intoaccount the real on-site conditions of theproject, as well as the appliedconstruction practices and technologies.(b) The importance of the elaboration ofthe erection plans, especially for


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structures with long span and slendersteel elements.(c) The rigorous implementation by theconstruction team of the constructionplans and described procedures.(d) The knowledge, by the constructionmanager, of the behavior of steelstructures. This deals with thefundamental instability phenomena,especially with the lateral torsionalbuckling. The redundancy androbustness, through the application of Xor V type bracings, are of paramountimportance. Furthermore, it is veryimportant the well tightening of thebolted connections, ensuring continuityof the key-stability elements.(e) The possibilities for real-timecommunication between the design teamand the construction team, via web cameras.(f) Structural monitoring, at theconstruction stage, as well, via webcameras.

4. The nature of failure in practiceFrom a structural point of view, thestiffness, strength and ductility are themechanical properties ensuring thesystem capacity. From the other side,redundancy, robustness and ductility arethe main structural characteristics thatprovide the collapse resistance. Certainly,the progressive collapse should beavoided (Starossek, 2007). This isachieved with proper bracing (lateralbracing and torsional bracing).

However, failures present an excellentway to learn from the experience of others,and especially from some historicalstructural failures (Morin and Fischer,2006; Martin and Delatte, 2006; Biegus andRykaluk, 2009; Wojnowski et al, 2002; Hao,2009). A method to approach engineeringproblems is to use the trial-and-errormethod or the back-analysis procedure.For both the aforementioned methods, the

past failure experience represents thebenchmark point in order to ensure thestructural safety.

Unfortunately, in civil and architecturalengineering education there is a lack of acourse aimed to inform students,systematically, about the historicaldisasters and failures of different structuralsystems. There are proposals to implementsuch a curriculum in the universityeducation (Delatte, 1997; Delatte and Rens,2002; May and Deckker, 2009); neverthelessthe large majority of faculties had notintroduced similar courses.

For practitioners there is the Structural-Safety organization (www.structural-safety.org), with two entities, namely, theStanding Committee of Structural Safety,SCOSS, and the Confidential Reporting ofStructural Safety, CROSS; it is anexcellent effort, however with limitedinternational impact.

Definitely, after a failure, the collection ofindependent information and data is verydifficult due to confidential nature of anyprocess (Brady, 2014). Despite this, notonly quantitative, but also qualitativeobservations and remarks are ofparamount importance. There are manyoccasions in which legal decisions areinfluenced by parameters other than thetechnical investigation or any other rootcause analyses reports. As a function ofthe catastrophic effects of a disaster, it ispossible that political and social pressurelead to deviations from the real technicalcauses. Hence, any type of documentedinformation is welcome in theengineering community.

A survey of experienced structuralengineers illustrated several of the abovementioned conclusions, which arepresented in the case studies in this paper


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(Klasson et al., 2018). The nature ofstructural failure is more than acalculation error; it is related to the holisticmanagement, the capacity to organize andadministrate the design, construction andmaintenance process. Thus, the humanmind, engineering culture and educationcould not be replaced by any type ofdetailed code or even by a sophisticatedcalculation (also performed by theaforementioned human mind).

The human mind, through a human errorin design, execution, use andmaintenance, provides the hazard, whilethe structural system, through itsgeometrical and mechanicalcharacteristics, provides the vulnerability.

Qualitatively, in order to minimize therisk of failure, the tools we have are theeducation, culture, ethics andprofessionalism. The engineeringjudgment, which can ’’combat’’ thestructural failure, is cultivated by the fourabove mentioned values.

Consequently, there is an urgent need toeducate students and practitioners,through universities and professionalassociations; from failure, to learn, aboutthe vulnerability of a system, and fromsuccess, to estimate the capacity of asystem.

5. Concluding remarksThe paper presented three different casestudies focused on steel structuressubjected to quasi-static loads; each onewith its adding value. For instance:1. The roof collapse at the stadium of

Twente FC, Holland, 2011, unveiledthat the inefficient communicationbetween different subcontractorswould lead to a structural failure. Thiswas due to management and on sitework organization incompetence.

Finally, beyond any technical issue, theclear definition and allocation ofresponsibilities and duties between theinvolved parties is the most importantmatter for a safe construction.

2. The roof collapse at the Maximasupermarket, Latvia, 2013, mainlyrevealed that the investor’s pressureon the construction budget, as well asdesign and management along withinspection inefficiencies would be thedecisive factors for a catastrophicfailure. Another aftermath of theMaxima roof collapse was thewarning sign of developing greenroofs to existing structures notdesigned for such loads. Soil retainswater, therefore, wet soil introducesadditional loads not foreseen creatingfailure conditions. In addition alongwith a combination of snow loads,definitely, becoming hecatomb ofdeaths. Green roofs, due toenvironmental benefits, will be usedmore frequently in existing structures,hence specific attention should bepaid in such cases with thereconsideration of the loadingconditions as a function of a type ofgreen roof (extensive, ~ 70 Kgr/m2,biodiversive, ~ 200 Kgr/ m2,intensive, more than 200Kgr/m2). Incase of a roof transformation, from theconventional one to a green roof,special attention must be paid onunilateral loading cases. Moreover, adistinct loading case considering theweight of depositing materials, on theroof, and in a concentrated area, mustalso be taken into account.

3. The girder collapse at the Groat RoadBridge, Canada, 2015, demonstratedonce again, this time during theerection stage, that the basic root causeis inefficient management. Anothercause is the lack of knowledge, fromthe construction manager, related to


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the basic behavior of the steelstructures. This is because the type offailure is most characteristic for longspan, slender steel girders, whichremain unrestrained. Consequently,for such structures the elaboration of adetailed plan of erection, associatedwith the erection drawings,methodology and sequence of erectionis imperative. Focused on the erectionsequence, the rule of thumb is to createa bracing unit, or in other words a stiffbox. Furthermore, the stabilization ofthe assembled steel components mustbe completed at the end of eachworking day, thus ensuringredundancy and robustness.

Practically, the structural failure does notoriginate from only one source. It is aprocess of cumulated causes; at a criticaland under suitable conditions, they formthe state of collapse. Furthermore, in steelconstruction industry there is a long chainof stakeholders (investors, designers,fabricators, workers, inspectors, etc); all ofthat with different interests and level ofknowledge. Thus, it is of paramountimportance to recognize what we can learnfrom past failures, and based on that toeducate, cultivate engineering judgment,ethics and professionalism in theengineering community.

Achieving the aforementioned goals,namely the technical excellence, we canfurther create management systems thatwill ’’trap’’ the human error and thenminimize the probability of failure andmaximize the structural safety.

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Received: 16 March 2021 • Revised: 15 April 2021 • Accepted: 20 April 2021

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Failure of steel structures: Rethinking some of the aftermaths

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