Failure of Nonviolence in Libya

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FAILURE OF NONVIOLENCE IN LIBYA

Introduction

During spring 2011 waves of revolutionary demonstrations and protest occurred

in the Arab World in what is now called the Arab Spring. The uprisings in the Arab world

were motivated by a number of factors such as discontent with dictatorship, extreme

poverty, unemployment, human rights violations, government corruption and a call for

changing the regimes. As of December 2011, the uprisings have succeeded in

overthrowing three heads of state: President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, President

Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. Still, there are major

ongoing struggles and protests, particularly in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.

Most of the resistance struggles during the Arab Spring started as popular

nonviolent protests. However, some of the struggles have turned violent. For example,

in Egypt and Tunisia the resistance movements succeeded in toppling their head of

state through nonviolent techniques, while the majority of the uprising in Libya became

violent shortly after its start. The different approaches that the resistance struggles in

the Arab world have taken on to achieve their goals raise important questions regarding

the successes and failures of nonviolence in the Arab spring.

The traditional realist perspective signifies that peace through force is the most

effective intervention in overthrowing suppressing regimes. However, a recent study

shows that nonviolent resistance statistically is more effective than violent struggles 1.

Moreover, the study affirms that if a regime shift was caused by a nonviolent campaign

1 According to Chenoweth major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time,compared with 26 percent for violent resistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008) .


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the emerging state is more likely to develop democracy and less prone to relapse into

civil war than if the former regime was overthrown by violent means 2. Consequently

there should generally be strong incentives for the civil society to use nonviolent means

to achieve its goals.

Libya is a country where the nonviolent campaign failed to bring change, while

the violent response brought down the regime. Therefore Libya is an excellent case

study in examining the shortcomings of a nonviolent campaign in a country where

change was possible. This paper therefore aims to examine why nonviolence failed in

Libya. The main findings presented in the paper are that nonviolence failed to overthrow

the regime in Libya because the civil society did not mobilize enough participants in its

nonviolent activities. Moreover, a nonviolent campaign would have had limited chances

of success because of the regimes uncompromising position and lack of dependency on

the Libyan people.

Despite the fact that nonviolence has been used as a tool to bring about social

change for decades, there is still limited research on why nonviolence fails and how to

conduct an effective nonviolent intervention. By studying the reasons for the successes

and failure of nonviolence, we can understand how peace can be achieved through

nonviolence. Furthermore, we can examine which factors are needed to be present in

order to have an effective and successful nonviolent intervention and how to facilitate a

nonviolent intervention, rather than a violent one.

A nonviolent campaign can fail for many reasons and its failure may simply be

2 Chenoweth (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 213-215


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connected with local conditions rather than with general principles. By studying the

failure of nonviolence in Libya, we can learn more about the local conditions in Libya

and how they affected the outcome of the nonviolent activities.

Background on the nonviolent campaign in Libya

From February 15th news agencies reported about the first nonviolent protests

in Libya similar to those in other parts of the Arab world 3. The protests were demanding

that Muammar Qaddafi, the official ruler in Libya would step down. According to the

reports, there were a few days of spontaneous and uncoordinated protest in different

cities in Libya, but the mass response was violent activities by riotous mobs that

overwhelmed and killed a few members of Qaddafis security forces 4.

Qaddafi answered by repressing the civilians and killing unarmed protesters.

Within days, the rebellion turned violent and comprised almost exclusively of armed

military defectors that turned their guns on Qaddafi 5. In this environment, most

unarmed civilians would be likely to just stay safe at home to avoid being caught in

crossfire. Foreign journalists were denied entry to Libya and those who entered risked

being arrested 6. Therefore only a limited number of records of events are available and

information about events is hard to verify 7. News agencies did report about military

defections and spontaneous protests, but not as a part of an organized campaign. All in

all, there is no support that there ever was an organized nonviolent resistance in Libya.

3 See (Sapienza, 2011) and ("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011) 4 ("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011) 5 (Ditz, 2011) 6 (Halliday, 2011) 7 (Halliday, 2011)


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Theoretical framework

The theory of nonviolence was introduced to a global audience by Mohandas K.

Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who used nonviolence in their civil resistance

work because they saw it as a morally superior form of resistance, but also an effective

method to end injustice 8. Strategic nonviolence differs from the morally based approach

in that it looks at the effectiveness of nonviolence as a means to achieve its goals. To

examine why nonviolence in Libya failed, this paper will look at nonviolence through the

lens of strategic nonviolence. Seminal work has been developed by a long line of

scholars, most notably Gene Sharp, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler,

Ackerman and Jack DuVall, Stephen Zunes and Kurt Schock.

Sharp defines nonviolence as [a] general technique of conducting protest,

resistance and intervention without physical violence 9 . This action can be conducted as

an act for omission, acts of commission or a combination of both 10 . He presents a

number of activities11

and groups them in three main classes: Nonviolent protests and

persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention 12 .

There are several ways of measuring the effectiveness of nonviolence and the

different scholars focus on various factors to explain the success of nonviolent

campaigns. This paper will draw from different theories to provide explanations for why

nonviolence in Libya was unsuccessful.

In Why Civil Resistance Works Erika Chenoweth and Maria Stephan approach

8 (Cortright, 2010) 9 (Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page 54710 (Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page 4111 (Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page chapter 412 (Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page 41


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the question of strategic nonviolence in a systematic manner and present the results of

a study of 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns which all had the goal to overthrow

their regimes 13 . They tested a number of factors effect on the success rate, particularly

size, security force defections, international sanctions and violent regime repression of

nonviolent campaigns. Based on their findings, Chenoweth & Stephan offer possible

explanations to why nonviolent campaigns statistically have been more successful than

violent ones and reasons for the successes and failures of both types of campaigns 14 .

Chenoweth & Stephan found that the size of the campaign was the most

significant factor for success, and that as the number of participants increased, the

probability of success for the campaign would also increase 15 . The highest number of

participants during peak events in the campaign is used to measure the size. However,

Chenoweth & Stephan found that great numbers were insufficient to guarantee

success 16 and that the quality of participation may be as important as the quantity 17

in order to create sufficient leverage over the regime. According to their study the

campaigns that were able to cause defections in the security forces would also have a

significantly higher probability of success 18 .

Kurt Schock has a more methodological approach in Unarmed Insurrections

where he attempts to explain the dynamics of a nonviolent struggle and identifies

challenges for nonviolent campaigns. In his opinion a campaign must meet two basic

13 According to Chenoweth major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time,compared with 26 percent for violent resistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008) .14 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 10.15 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 3916 (Chenoweth, 2011b) page 3917 (Chenoweth, 2011b) page 3918 (Chenoweth, 2011b) page 48


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conditions to bring change: withstand repression and undermine regime power 19 . He

notes that campaigns that challenge nondemocratic regimes should expect and prepare

for repression by building their organizational structure and channels for communication

accordingly to survive the repression 20 . Moreover, by disrupting the regimes

dependence on third parties the campaign can gain leverage and challenge the regime.

Similarly, Ackerman has identified three qualities that a nonviolent campaign

should seek to develop in order to be successful: unity, planning and nonviolent

discipline 21 . He argues that a united nonviolent campaign will have a stronger impact

because it stands together in ends and means, the organization is unified and they are

able to mobilize supporters from different parts of the society. Moreover, planning is

essential for the campaign to train members and implement nonviolent policies while

nonviolent discipline facilitate conversion by third parties and even members of the

regime 22 .

Chenoweth & Stephan present the first systematic and extensive study of civil

society campaigns and examine probability for success based on their statistical data.

Hence, their framework will provide a solid basis for studying reasons for the success

and failure of a nonviolent campaign and examination of quantitative and qualitative

factors will therefore be the starting point in this analysis of why nonviolence failed in

Libya. Drawing from the methods of the mentioned scholars this paper will also discuss

these factors: loyalty, tactical diversity and innovation, discipline, planning and training.

19 (Schock, 2005) page 4920 (Schock, 2005) page 49-5221 (Ackerman, 2006) 22 (Ackerman, 2006)


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Some critics of nonviolence have raised the issue whether nonviolence works

against ruthless tyrants 23 and rentier states 24 . Therefore these concerns will also be

discussed in this paper.

Quantity of participants

As demonstrated by Chenoweth & Stephan the numbers of participants are the

most significant factor for the success of a nonviolent struggle 25 . Chenoweth & Stephan

illustrate how the probability of success increases proportionally with the number of

participants during the peak events of the nonviolent activity. If the numbers for

participation in the nonviolent campaign in Libya were low, it would also have an equally

low probability of success.

The reports from news agencies and international nongovernmental

organizations (NGO) indicate that the nonviolent struggle had few participants. Al-

Jazeera reported that the first major protests started on February 15th in Benghazi, the

second biggest city in Libya26

and that hundreds gathered outside the police station.

According to Libyan bloggers the numbers of protesters gathered in the demonstration

in Benghazi were around 200 people 27 . Human Rights Watch (HRW) uses similar

numbers and affirms that hundreds of peaceful protesters took to the streets on

February 17th in Baida, Benghazi, Zenten, Derna and Adjabiya 28 .

The most distinct numbers are from Benghazi. There are no public numbers for

23 (Summy, 1993) 24 (Zunes, 2011b) 25 Chenoweth attributes the decline in mobilization to the failure of the nonviolent campaign in Burma(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008) .26 ("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011) 27 (Hussaini, 2011) 28 Human Rights Watch ("Security Forces Fire on 'Day of Anger' Demonstrations," 2011)


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inhabitants in Benghazi, but the population is estimated to 1,087.000 people (2010

estimates) 29 . If the numbers for the protesters are even remotely correct, not even 1%

of the population in Benghazi participated in the protests. These numbers therefore

indicate that the numbers of protesters were very low and moreover, that the

mobilization failed.

The strong emphasis on numbers of participants during the peak activity has its

limitations. As mentioned, international news agencies were not allowed into Libya

during the beginning of the uprising, and there are few reported numbers of protesters

that are verifiable. Moreover, concerns have been raised regarding the numbers used by

Western media 30 . Consequently, these numbers have limited relevance.

However, there are other numbers that can indicate a lack of mobilization of the

civil society. Despite his suppressing regime, Qaddafi still had a major basis of

supporters as illustrated by the demonstrations and rallies in his favor in Tripoli. BBC

broadcasts a movie clip from one of these demonstrations claiming that tens of

thousands participated 31 . Considering the fact that the population in Tripoli is estimated

to 1,191,047 people 32 the numbers of participation in Tripoli are also small, but they can

still illustrate a lack of mobilization for a nonviolent uprising. Based on Chenoweth &

Stephans findings about the importance of numbers for a campaigns success, t he

failure to mobilize a larger part of the Libyan population is likely to have been an

important factor in the failure of nonviolent uprising in Libya.

29 ("Census numbers Benghazi," 2010) 30 International Crisis Group ("Making Sense of Libya," 2011) page 431 ("Libya crisis: Thousands at Tripoli pro-Gaddafi rally ", 2011) . See also ("Tripoli: a stronghold by day, abattleground at night," 2011) .32 ("Census numbers Tripoli," 2000)


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Chenoweth & Stephan put a lot of significance in the number of participants, but

do not directly address why movements are unable to mobilize more participants.

However, they explain lacking numbers with a campaigns qualitative properties and

regime type.

Quality of Campaign

Loyalty Shifts

Even campaigns that have started with few supporters in the first place have

been able to mobilize and therefore have more leverage against the regime. The reason

is how nonviolent campaigns tend to attract support from third parties including

bystanders, supporter bases of the regime and even the regime itself 33 . Moreover,

empirical evidence shows that repression has a tendency to backfire and cause loyalty

shifts in the supporter base of the regime 34 .

As seen above the nonviolent movement in Libya was quite small and did not

develop. The chances for loyalty shifts were therefore equally limited. Considering the

lack of numbers of participants, it would be nearly impossible to determine if such

loyalty shifts happened and moreover, if they were produced by nonviolent activities.

However, there are indications that the repression did cause loyalty shifts in the

form of security force defections. As mentioned Chenoweth & Stephan found that if

defections in security forces much more probable that will succeed. Also, the probability

of security forces defections is influenced by the number of participants. According to

Chenoweth & Stephan the probability for producing security defections was about 60 %

33 (Cortright, 2010) page 13634 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 46


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for the largest nonviolent campaigns. Moreover, the campaigns of this size were more

50 % more likely to produce defections than the smallest nonviolent campaign 35 .

Chenoweths studies show s that the chance for security forces defections increases

proportionally with the number of participants.

Already in February news agencies reported about massive defections 36 .

Accordingly, senior regime figures, Libyan diplomats and key military commanders

resigned then, and further defections were reported later 37 . A statement in May from Ali

al-Essawi, the former Libyan ambassador to India, is particularly interesting in relation

to the reasons for the defections. He claimed that Qaddafi was using foreign

mercenaries to repress the uprising in Libya and maintained that the troops [could] not

see foreigners killing Libyans so they moved beside the people 38 . It can not be

established if it was the nonviolent activity that caused Even though Al- Essawis

statements do not contain any references to the nonviolent activity they illustrate the

sympathy effect that nonviolence can have on third parties.

However, in general the security forces have not hesitated to strike down on

protesters. There are numerous reports of security forces cracking down on protesters

from news agencies and international NGOs 39 . It is not clear how many mercenaries

were employed or how big part of the forces they constituted. However, the notion that

35 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 48.36 (Black, 2011) 37 ("'Scores defect' from Gaddafi's army," 2011) 38 (Foy, 2011) 39 See ("Making Sense of Libya," 2011; "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigateall alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," 2011) , ("The battlefor Libya - Killings, disappearances and torture," 2011) and ("Report of the International Commission ofInquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan ArabJamahiriya," 2011)


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Qaddafi used foreign mercenaries can indicate why the nonviolent movement did not

have sufficient leverage over the security forces. Foreign mercenaries would not have

the same qualms of killing people based on a common national identity.

Tactical Diversity and Innovation

Another factor that illustrates the quality of the nonviolent activity is tactical

diversity and innovation. In order for a nonviolent campaign to be successful and

effective, it must be able to survive repression from the regime. Kurt Schock 40 argues

that the use of diverse tactics and methods makes it easier for the campaign to

withstand repression in that it becomes a less tangible target and therefore harder to

attack. According to Schock nonviolent campaigns should utilize different forms of

nonviolent methods and actions for example methods of concentration such as

demonstrations and sit- ins and methods of dispersion for example walk slows, stay -

aways, strikes or boycotts 41 . If the movement is met by repression the need to shift to

methods that makes the campaign a harder target become even more important.

Except from reports about some house occupations 42 , it seems that nonviolent

dissidents have mainly used methods of concentration, more specific rallies and protests.

Following Schocks arguments , it became easy for the regime to crack down on the

protesters because it could easily see in which form the attack was coming from. As

pointed about by Stephen Zunes the dissidents could have utilized strikes, sit-ins, stay-

aways and boycotts that could have increased the pressure on the regime 43 .

40 (Schock, 2005) page 51-5241 A more extensive list of nonviolent actions can be found in (Sharp & Paulson, 2005) 42 International Crisis Group ("Making Sense of Libya," 2011) page 343 (Zunes, 2011a)


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A nonviolent campaigns lack of diversity is most likely connected with the

number of people that are involved in the nonviolent activities. Chenoweth & Stephan

suggest that a large number of people are more likely to produce more diverse and

creative ideas than as small group. The low number of participants in nonviolent activity

in Libya can therefore explain why the group did not use more diverse forms of

nonviolent activities.

Planning and Training

According to Ackerman planning and training is essential for a successful

nonviolent campaign 44 . By assessing the vulnerabilities of the regime and form

strategies, the campaign can respond to the regime in a way that is most effective 45 .

Furthermore, training in nonviolence enables the campaign to educate the dissidents in

nonviolent strategies and tools, implement nonviolent policies and promote the

campaigns commitment to stay nonviolent 46 .

The uprising in Libya seems to have started spontaneously, and the nonviolent

activity only lasted for some days. This is illustrated by the early protests that were held

in the middle of February in 2011. There were already scheduled for a protest on

February 17th which coincided with the anniversary of anti-Qaddafi demonstrations 5

years earlier 47 . However, already on January 15-16th the protests started in Benghazi

and diverged from another established initiative 48 . Another source claims that the

protests started as a result of the arrest of dissident Fathi Terbil in Benghazi and spread

44 (Ackerman, 2006) 45 (Ackerman, 2006) 46 (Ackerman, 2006) 47 (Mahmoud, 2011) 48 (Sapienza, 2011) and (Hussaini, 2011)


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because of repression from the police 49 . This lack of coordination and organizing

indicates lack of strategies and plans. The short time it took before the uprising turned

violent also implies that the protesters were not educated in nonviolence.

The mentioned factors all indicate that the nonviolent protests started

spontaneously which again could explain the lack of diversity in the early protests.

Nonviolent Discipline

Even if a nonviolent campaign have managed to mobilize many supporters, have

used a diverse approach that has been successful in producing defections and trained

and planned for nonviolent activities, the campaign needs to stick to the nonviolent

approach despite being met with repression 50 . If the movement instead turns violent,

they risk losing the benefits of a nonviolent approach, such as the ability to mobilize and

attract support from third parties and opponent. By abandoning the nonviolent strategy,

the conflict may be more polarized, the regime and its supporters will see the struggle

as a zero-sum game and will have incentives to fight even harder51

.

As mentioned the protests in Libya started out as nonviolent and it was during

this period the protesters made most progress 52 . For example, most of the defections

and resignations from high-ranking officials happened and the protesters managed to

get control over large parts of the country 53 .

However, the uprising turned violent shortly after the first protests started 54 .

49 (Ayhan, 2011) 50 (Ackerman, 2006) 51 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 4452 (Zunes, 2011a) 53 (Zunes, 2011a) 54 (Zunes, 2011a)


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News agencies reported within a few days that the protests were getting increasingly

violent, and after some weeks there were open war between the rebels and the

regime 55 . By turning to violence, the uprising in Libya became polarized and the uprising

developed a fight between the security forces and the rebels. The lack of discipline can

also explain why the civil society was not able to mobilize and attract support for their

nonviolent activities in the first place.

The indication of lack of training and planning would offer one explanation as to

why the civil society failed to stick to nonviolent methods. Firstly, if the protesters were

not educated in the power of nonviolence, they may not have consciously opted to use

only nonviolent methods from the start. Secondly, if such a decision was made, training

and planning could provide support mechanisms for the protesters and thus contribute

to stay nonviolent.

Another reason for the change in approach can also be a consequence of

previous experiences with the regime and distrust in the effectiveness of nonviolence

against Qaddafi when faced with the hard repression that followed the uprising.

Regime Type

Several critics argue that there can still be situations where nonviolence cannot

succeed even if the nonviolent campaign fulfills all the above mentioned criteria. The

concerns that are relevant for the Libyan situation are when rallying against a ruthless

opponent and in the case of a rentier state.

The critics of nonviolence argue that this form of resistance cannot triumph over

55 (Chenoweth, 2011a) , (Little, 2011) and ("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011)


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a regime that is determined to destroy dissidents with massive violence despite the

humanitarian consequences 56 . Qaddafis response to the uprisings in Libya shows that

he had the necessary apparatus to crack down excessively on the protesters and was

willing to use it. Earlier human rights violations also show how the civil society had

limited leverage over the regime to prevent abuse of the population. For example,

Human Rights Watch reported in 1996 that about 1200 prisoners in the Abu Salim

prison in Tripoli had been executed following an incident of revolt in the prison 57 .

Relatives of the victims of the massacre and international NGOs have called for an

investigation since then. The Libyan government has been reluctant to inspect the issue,

but reported to the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (UNHCHR) in January 2011

that an investigation was being carried out 58 . Nevertheless, the massacre and the lack

of investigation despite domestic and international demands illustrate the civil societys

limited political influence over the regime.

In The Efficacy of Nonviolence 59

Ralph Summy counters some of the criticism

against the use of nonviolence in the face of a ruthless opponent. He observes that

there have been victories even in worst cast scenarios and argues that the question is

not how ruthless the opponent is, but rather if the ruler is dependent on an external

actor based on interest or morality. If so, the nonviolent movement can use the ruler s

dependency to its advantage to get leverage over the ruler.

56 See for example (Greenfield, 2008) 57 ("Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison," 2003) 58 ("Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of internationalhuman rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," 2011; Review, 2011) 59 (Summy, 1993)


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However, Libya is considered a rentier state 60 that derives a substantial

portion of its national revenues from sale of natural resources to other states. Therefore,

Qaddafi was not dependent on the cooperation of its people to work, produce goods

and pay taxes and it would be harder for the civil society to gain leverage through non-

cooperation. Zunes argue that the use of more diverse tactics, including boycott and

strikes that effectively would have slowed down the oil industry and increased the

economic pressure on the regime 61 . However, even if the civil society mobilized for

massive noncooperation activities, Qaddafi could hire foreign workers and mercenaries

and operate on income from the oil. Because of the regime and its independence on the

Libyan people, the civil society had limited possibilities to change the situation in the

first place.

Conclusion

As acknowledged by Chenoweth & Stephan, a campaign does not succeed only

because it is nonviolent62

. The question of why nonviolence failed in Libya has many

answers and factors that all must be considered, but two of them are particularly

significant. Based on Chenoweth & Stephans framework, the number of participants

was the most significant factor in the failure of the nonviolent campaign in Libya.

Compared to the population in the cities where protesters operated, the number of

protesters was minuscule. Looking at this factor isolated, the nonviolent activity

therefore had very little potential to bring change.

However, because of lack of information, the used numbers can not be

60 (Zunes, 2011b) 61 (Zunes, 2011b) 62 (Chenoweth, 2011b)


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sufficiently verified and the estimated number of participants could therefore change as

more information is available. This is unfortunate as the number of protesters plays

such a significant role in Chenoweths framework and influence the examination of the

other factors. Future studies of this topic should therefore include more research on the

exact number of participants in the demonstrations and include other methods to

measure the size of the nonviolent activity.

The lack of numbers can further be seen in the study of the other factors. For

example, a large campaign would potentially use more diverse methods, conduct

training and planning of their activities and would therefore be able to mobilize more

people. Moreover, it is possible that the movement would have been able to mobilize

more participants if they were disciplined and stuck to the nonviolent strategy. The

increased mobilization would again have made success more probable.

Secondly, because of the regimes lack of qualms for use of massive violence

and its economic independency on the Libyan people, the civil resistance would have

had difficulties with succeeding with its campaign even if they fulfilled all the conditions

that the different nonviolent authors list as necessary for success. The limited

opportunity to succeed with nonviolent means may also be one of the reasons why the

civil society was not able to mobilize in the first place.

The influence of culture has not been discussed in this paper simply because

there is not enough available information on this topic. However, cultural behaviors and

local conflict resolution mechanisms may be a more important factor for the failure of

nonviolence in Libya and other countries than anticipated. Future studies about the


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effectiveness of nonviolence should therefore take culture into consideration.


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Failure of Nonviolence in Libya

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