Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammonia service Michael K. Budinski

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Case study Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammonia service Michael K. Budinski * National Transportation Safety Board, 490 L’Enfant Plaza East, SW, Washington, DC 20594, United States 1. Introduction On July 15, 2009, a transfer hose ruptured while transferring anhydrous ammonia from a cargo tank truck to a storage tank at a distribution and processing facility in Swansea, South Carolina, USA. A white cloud of toxic anhydrous ammonia gas traveled from the facility across a highway. A motorist traveling on the highway at the time drove into the ammonia cloud, exited the vehicle, and was killed as a result of inhaling the gas. Additionally, seven people were hospitalized for respiratory issues [1]. The 18-foot-long ruptured transfer hose was manufactured by Durodyne, Inc., 1 in 2005 and was marked for use with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as product number DD-G-220. The hose was intended for the conveyance of LPG products in production or delivery. The hose is constructed of nitrile rubber reinforced with textile braids and covered with perforated chloroprene rubber. The nominal inner diameter of the hose is 2.00 in. and the nominal outer diameter is 2.74 in. It was rated for use between À40 8F and 180 8F. The hose was Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated (UL) approved and was certified to meet the UL 21 standard for LPG hose [2,3]. The maximum allowable operating pressure of the hose was 350 psig and the minimum hydrostatic burst strength was 1750 psig, in accordance with UL 21. From 2006 until mid-May 2009, the ruptured hose was used to transfer LPG an unknown number of times. From mid-May 2009 until the rupture on July 15, 2009, the operator estimated that the hose transferred anhydrous ammonia 2–12 times. Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1 (2013) 156–164 A R T I C L E I N F O Article history: Received 1 November 2012 Accepted 18 April 2013 Available online 26 April 2013 Keywords: Ammonia Hose Ammonolysis Polyethylene terephthalate * Tel.: +1 202 596 0437. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected]. 1 The ruptured hose was manufactured by Durodyne Corporation. In August 1999, Durodyne was purchased by Argo Tech, Costa Mesa, CA. In 2007, Eaton Corporation, Cleveland, OH, purchased Argo Tech, including the Durodyne unit. Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis jou r nal h o mep age: w ww.els evier .co m/lo c ate/c sef a 2213-2902 Published by Elsevier Ltd. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csefa.2013.04.009 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.

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Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammoniaserviceMichael K. Budinski

Transcript of Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammonia service Michael K. Budinski

Page 1: Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammonia service Michael K. Budinski

Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1 (2013) 156–164

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis

jou r nal h o mep age: w ww.els evier . co m/lo c ate /c sef a

Case study

Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammonia

service

Michael K. Budinski *

National Transportation Safety Board, 490 L’Enfant Plaza East, SW, Washington, DC 20594, United States

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Received 1 November 2012

Accepted 18 April 2013

Available online 26 April 2013

Keywords:

Ammonia

Hose

Ammonolysis

Polyethylene terephthalate

1. Introduction

On July 15, 2009, a transfer hose ruptured while transferring anhydrous ammonia from a cargo tank truck to a storagetank at a distribution and processing facility in Swansea, South Carolina, USA. A white cloud of toxic anhydrous ammonia gastraveled from the facility across a highway. A motorist traveling on the highway at the time drove into the ammonia cloud,exited the vehicle, and was killed as a result of inhaling the gas. Additionally, seven people were hospitalized for respiratoryissues [1].

The 18-foot-long ruptured transfer hose was manufactured by Durodyne, Inc.,1 in 2005 and was marked for use withliquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as product number DD-G-220. The hose was intended for the conveyance of LPG products inproduction or delivery. The hose is constructed of nitrile rubber reinforced with textile braids and covered with perforatedchloroprene rubber. The nominal inner diameter of the hose is 2.00 in. and the nominal outer diameter is 2.74 in. It was ratedfor use between �40 8F and 180 8F. The hose was Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated (UL) approved and was certified tomeet the UL 21 standard for LPG hose [2,3]. The maximum allowable operating pressure of the hose was 350 psig and theminimum hydrostatic burst strength was 1750 psig, in accordance with UL 21.

From 2006 until mid-May 2009, the ruptured hose was used to transfer LPG an unknown number of times. From mid-May2009 until the rupture on July 15, 2009, the operator estimated that the hose transferred anhydrous ammonia 2–12 times.

* Tel.: +1 202 596 0437.

E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] The ruptured hose was manufactured by Durodyne Corporation. In August 1999, Durodyne was purchased by Argo Tech, Costa Mesa, CA. In 2007, Eaton

Corporation, Cleveland, OH, purchased Argo Tech, including the Durodyne unit.

2213-2902 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csefa.2013.04.009

Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.

Page 2: Failure analysis of a rubber hose in anhydrous ammonia service Michael K. Budinski

M.K. Budinski / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1 (2013) 156–164 157

The typical anhydrous ammonia transfer pressure is about 160 psig, which is well below the burst strength and maximumallowable operating pressure of the hose. When not in use, the operator stored the hose in a sealed tubular vestibule in thetruck.

2. Investigation

The ruptured hose is shown in Fig. 1. The cable protruding from the rupture is part of the breakaway coupling valvesystem, and a stainless steel static dissipation wire can be seen just above the cable.

The outer surface of the ruptured hose has pinpricks, which are intended by the hose manufacturer to relieve gasmolecules that permeate through the hose. Under a 5� to 50� stereo microscope, the pinprick pattern on the ruptured hoseappears very similar to that of an exemplar hose.

The exterior surface of the hose exhibited superficial abrasions less than 0.04 in. deep, which are consistent with typicalindustrial use. These abrasions were most prevalent in the center of the hose, spanning a length 69 in. from end A to 42 in.from end B. No gouges, slices, or other injurious defects were noted on the surface of the hose, including the areas adjacentand abutting the rupture.

To enable detailed microscopy of the fracture, the ruptured portion was cut from the hose. In Fig. 2, the ruptured portion isheld open to reveal fine yarn reinforcing fibers on the inside surface of the hose.

Fig. 1. Ruptured hose with inset image showing details of the rupture.

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Fig. 2. Ruptured section cut from the failed hose. The rupture opened to reveal the inside surfaces of the hose as well as details of the fractured wall of the

hose.

Fig. 3. Ruptured section of the failed hose after cutting to reveal the fracture surfaces. The areas identified with dashed lines indicate cuts made in the

laboratory to open up the hose section. For references purposes, the point of fracture origin is identified.

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2.1. Fractographic analysis

To fully reveal the fracture faces, the ruptured portion in Fig. 2 is cut open as shown in Fig. 3. The fracture origin is labeledin the figure. Higher magnification digital microscope views of the internal surface of the ruptured section reveal secondarycracks as shown in the figure. These secondary cracks are close to the fracture origin. The interior elastomer surface and theelastomer layers within the hose do not appear to be degraded due to anhydrous ammonia exposure.

Higher magnification views of the fracture surfaces are shown in Fig. 4a–d. Examination of both halves of the fracturesurface along the entire length of the rupture reveals that the fibers in the first and second braid layers (the two innermostlayers, respectively) have fragmented into rod-like particles about 0.005 in. or shorter in length. Fig. 4b and c shows regionswhere the first and second braid layer fibers are degraded. In Fig. 4c, the fibers are clumped and appear to be encased in asalt.

The fracture origin of the ruptured hose is about midway along the length of the rupture region. As shown in Fig. 4a, b andd, the fracture initiated at the inside wall of the hose (in the inner tube layer) and propagated toward the outside wall andlongitudinally along the hose. The fracture origin region in Fig. 4d is comprised of an area of mist hackle closest to the origin,which is consistent with slow crack growth, and then transitions to crack branching with increasing crack propagation intothe inner tube layer. No foreign particles or anomalous features are seen at the fracture origin. Fig. 4d shows river-patternfractographic features, which are consistent with crack propagation along the inner tube layer of the hose. As the crackprogresses outward though the other layers of the hose, the distinct river pattern dissipates and crack direction could not beascertained by fractographic features.

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Fig. 4. View (a) shows the fracture surface of Section 1 (see Fig. 3) and the fracture origin. Views (b) and (c) are higher magnification macrographs showing

examples of the fiber degradation in the first and second braids. View (d) is a higher magnification macrograph of the fracture origin.

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2.2. Microstructural analysis

Fig. 5 is a longitudinal cross section of an exemplar Durodyne LPG transfer hose that shows its construction by layer. Forcomparison, Table 1 lists the composition of each layer for the exemplar Durodyne LPG hose and a typical anhydrousammonia transfer hose made by Eaton (Eaton purchased Durodyne after the hose was purchased by the owner).

The hose is comprised of an inner tube layer of nitrile rubber, three layers of chloroprene rubber (tie gum) and yarn braids,and an outer layer of chloroprene rubber. The yarn braids, used to mechanically reinforce the hose, are comprised ofpoly(ethylene terephthalate) (PET) fibers. The fibers are about 20 mm in diameter.

The ruptured hose was cross-sectioned by using a single-edge razor blade. This section was taken from a 1-in. ringcut from the hose about 6 in. from the rupture toward the B end of the hose. Fig. 6a shows a micrograph of the crosssection of the hose. The cross section was cut at a 458 angle to the long direction to reveal transverse and longitudinalsections of the yarn braids. The circular yarn cross sections are transverse cross sections of the braids and the long yarnsections are longitudinal cross sections of the braid. According to Eaton, the first braid of its anhydrous ammoniatransfer hose has four ends and the second and third braids have three ends. The ruptured hose appears to meet thissame reinforcement design.

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Fig. 5. Longitudinal cross section of the exemplar LPG transfer hose showing the identification of each layer.

Table 1

Composition of Durodyne LPG and Eaton anhydrous ammonia hoses.

Layer Durodyne LPG hose Eaton anhydrous ammonia hose

Inner surface

Inner tube layer Nitrile EPDMa

Insulating layer Nitrile –

1st braid 64/3 PET yarn 64/4 Nylon

Insulating layer Chloroprene-styrene butadiene rubber blend EPDM

2nd braid 64/3 PET yarn 64/4 Nylon

Insulating layer Chloroprene –

3rd braid 62/2 PET yarn –

Static wire Stainless steel wire –

Cover layer Chloroprene EPDM

ID transfer tape Polypropylene Polypropylene

Outer surfacea Ethylene propylene diene monomer.

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Table 2

Predominant infrared absorption frequencies of spectra from fibers removed from the first, second, and third braid layers of the exemplar hose.

Wave number range (cm�1) Bond Functional group or compound

3100–3000 C–H (stretch) Aromatic ring

2960–2850 C–H (stretch) Alkane

1760–1670 C O (stretch) Carboxylic acid

1500–1400

1400–1300

1000–800

C–H (bending) Glycol conformers

(trans and gauche)

M.K. Budinski / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1 (2013) 156–164 161

To evaluate the condition of the fibers in the yarn, a dental pick was used to gently probe the fibers in the three braid layercross sections in Fig. 6a while viewing under a 5� to 50� stereo zoom microscope. In the first and second braid layers, thefibers readily fragmented as shown in Fig. 6b. The fibers in the third braid did not fragment. Such fragmentation in the firstand second braids of the ruptured hose is consistent with mechanical degradation of the polymer fibers. Comparatively,when probed, none of the fibers fragmented in an exemplar Durodyne LPG hose.

3. Infrared spectroscopy analysis of hose reinforcing fibers

Fibers removed from each braid layer in the exemplar and ruptured hoses were analyzed by Fourier transform infrared(FTIR) spectroscopy [4] using a Mattson–Garvin Galaxy GL5020 FTIR Spectrophotometer with microscope attachment(micro-FTIR). For the exemplar hose, the fibers were removed from each braid layer by imaging a razor-cut cross section ofthe hose under a stereo microscope and collecting fibers from a specific braid layer using fine tweezers. For the rupturedhose, the fibers were removed from the ruptured region as identified in Fig. 4c. The fiber samples for a given braid layer wereplaced on a zinc selenide crystal window for imaging and analysis by micro-FTIR.

4. Infrared analysis of the exemplar hose

As outlined in Table 2, the infrared spectra for the fibers from the first, second, and third braid layers of the exemplar hoseshows peaks for carboxylic acid stretch, C–H stretch for alkane and ring structures, and glycol trans and gaucheconformations. Such peaks are consistent with spectra for PET. When overlaid, the spectra from each braid layer of theexemplar hose appeared to have predominant peak alignment below about 2800 cm�1. Above about 2800 cm�1, thespectrum (peaks and peak positions) of the third braid layer fibers appears to deviate from the spectra of the first and secondbraid layer fibers, suggesting differences in composition, degree of crystallinity, internal stress, or other factors. Computerspectra library search indicates that the spectra from the exemplar hose fibers from the first, second, and third braid layershave good spectral matches to terephthalic acid-based organic compounds, such as PET.

5. Infrared analysis of the ruptured hose

As outlined in Table 3 and Fig. 7, the infrared spectra for the fibers from the first, second, and third braid layers of theruptured hose shows peaks for carboxylic acid stretch, C–H stretch for alkane and ring structures, and glycol trans andgauche conformations, all consistent with spectra for PET similar to fiber spectra from the exemplar hose. However, as shownin Fig. 7, additional peaks centered about 3200–3100 cm�1 and 1650–1580 cm�1 indicate the presence of N–H compounds,such as amines, in the fiber spectrum of the ruptured hose that are not present in the fiber spectrum of the exemplar hose.

Computerized library spectra searches indicate that the spectrum from the first braid layer of the ruptured hose has peaksthat closely match the spectrum for ammonium acetate and diammonium phthalic acid salt. The presence of N–Hcompounds in the accident hose braid layers and the spectral match of the braid layers to ammonium-containing weakorganic acid compounds, such as ammonium acetate and diammonium phthalic acid salt, suggest that the accident hosefibers have undergone chemical changes such as ammonolysis to form an ammonium terephthalic acid compound.

Table 3

Predominant infrared absorption frequencies of spectra from fibers removed from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd braid layers of the ruptured hose.

Wave number range (cm�1) Bond Functional group or compound

3100–3000 C–H (stretch) Aromatic ring

2960–2850 C–H (stretch) Alkane

1760–1670 C O (stretch) Carboxylic acid

1500–1400

1400–1300

1000–800

C–H (bending) Glycol conformers

(trans and gauche)

1650–1580 N–H (bending2) Amine

3500–3000 N–H (stretch2) Amine

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Fig. 6. Micrograph (a) is a transverse cross section of the ruptured hose. Micrograph (b) is the same cross section as shown in (a) after the fiber bundles are

gently probed with a dental pick.

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6. Discussion

The ruptured hose is comprised of an inner tube layer of nitrile rubber, three layers of chloroprene rubber (tie gum) andyarn braids, and an outer layer of chloroprene rubber. The yarn braids used to mechanically reinforce the hose are comprisedof PET fibers. The fibers are about 20 mm in diameter. Laboratory analysis indicates that the reinforcing yarn fibers in the firstand second braid layers in the hose are degraded such that they are brittle and easily fragment when the hose is mechanicallystrained. Infrared spectroscopy of fibers from the first and second braid layers reveals the presence of ammoniumterephthalic acid compounds. Based on the above observations, the hose ruptured because it was not chemically compatiblewith anhydrous ammonia, resulting in chemical degradation and loss of mechanical strength of the reinforcing yarn fiberswhich caused the hose to rupture during a pressurized chemical transfer.

The PET used for the yarn fibers is manufactured from ethylene glycol (EG) and terephthalic acid (TPA) by a condensationpolymerization reaction. Such reactions, known as polyesterification, are equilibrium processes. Hence, polymers of thistype may be depolymerized by a simple reversal of the formulation process. As a consequence, PET is not resistant tononpolar bases such as ammonia (NH3), hydrazine (N2H4), and simple aliphatic amines [4]. Exposure of PET to suchenvironments causes depolymerization by ammonolysis. In the case of the ruptured hose, adsorbed and dissolved moisturein the hose readily converts some ammonia into ammonium hydroxide. Many studies have documented the degradationreactions of PET in the presence of ammonia or ammonium hydroxide (ammonolysis) [5–12].

Typically, commercial ammonolysis reactions of PET are carried out at elevated temperatures (320 8F or hotter) toenhance production rates. However, no literature reference provides PET ammonolysis reaction rate kinetic data as afunction of temperature. Research shows that when PET reacts with ammonium hydroxide, the polymer degrades to formethylene glycol and mono or di salts of ammonium terephthalate [10]. Fig. 8 depicts a proposed chemical reaction of PET with

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Fig. 7. Comparison of the FTIR spectrum from fibers from the first braid layer of the exemplar hose with the FTIR spectrum from salt crystals removed from

the first braid layer of the ruptured hose.

H – O – CH –

=

O

– CH – O – CH2 – CH2 – O – H

=

O

+ NH4 OHn

NH3 + H2O

H – O – CH –

=

O

– CH – O – NH2 – H

=

O

HO – CH2 – CH2 – OH+n

Pol y(et hyle ne terephthalate) PET

Mono ammoni um terep hthalic acid Ethyl ene gl ycol

Ammonium hydroxide

Ammonia + water

Fig. 8. Proposed reaction for the ammonolysis of PET.

M.K. Budinski / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1 (2013) 156–164 163

ammonium hydroxide to form salts of monoammonium terephthalate. As shown in Fig. 8, condensation polymers such asPET are very susceptible to solvatic chain scission along the ether link. Additionally, the carboxyl end groups are amenable toreactions [13].

The degradation reaction in Fig. 8 typically causes a loss in the molecular weight of the polymer. Studies have shown thatmolecular weight loss from chemically induced hydrolysis dramatically affects PET fiber strength [14]. In one study, it wasfound that even small loses in molecular weight in PET fibers caused significant strength loss.

The pinpricks along the length of the outer layer of the ruptured hose are standard features for rubber hoses used in LPGand anhydrous ammonia service. Chemicals such as LPG and anhydrous ammonia permeate through the rubber layers andcan collect in the interstitial spaces of the fibers within the reinforcing braids. In severe cases, the hose may blister or

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delaminate due to osmotic pressure. The pinpricks release trapped gas within the hose wall. Small bubbles of gas may formon the outer surface of the hose if a hose pressurized with LPG or anhydrous ammonia is immersed in water. Hence, the rateof permeation can be significant. For example, UL 21 allows a maximum permeation rate of 171 cm3/ft/h [3]. Considering thefibers used in this hose are about 20 mm in diameter and are continuous in length, the fibers have relatively high surface areafor exposure to ammonia and ammonium hydroxide. Hence degradation by permeation of ammonia through the hose innerwall into the interstitial spaces between fibers is quite plausible.

7. Conclusions

The micro FTIR spectra confirm that the PET fibers in first and second braid layers of the ruptured hose are chemicallydegraded to ammonium salts of terephthalic acid (ammonolysis).

Optical microscopy reveals that the reinforcing fibers in the first and second braid layers are mechanically degraded suchthat they are brittle.

Optical fractography indicates that the hose rupture initiated on the inside surface of the hose and propagated toward theexterior and longitudinally along the hose.

The loss in mechanical properties of the first and second reinforcing layers reduced the maximum allowable pressure ofthe hose below the operating pressure experienced during an ammonia transfer, causing the hose to rupture.

Acknowledgment

In accordance with Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations §2635.807(b)(2), the views expressed in this article do notnecessarily represent the views of the National Transportation Safety Board or the United States.

References

[1] National Transportation Safety Board Accident Report PB2012-917002, Cargo Hose Rupture and Release of Anhydrous Ammonia During Offloading of aWerner Transportation Services Cargo Tank Motor Vehicle at the Tanner Industries Plant, Swansea, South Carolina, July 15; 2009.

[2] UL 21, LP-gas hose. tenth ed. Camas, WA: Underwriters Laboratory; 2007.[3] Specifications for anhydrous ammonia hose. seventh ed. Rubber Manufacturer’s Association (RMA) Publication IP-14; 2003.[4] ASTM E2224 Standard Guide for Forensic Analysis of Fibers by Infrared Spectroscopy. West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM, International; 2002.[5] Spychaj T, Fabrycy E, Spychaj S, Kacperski M. Aminolysis, aminoglycolysis of waste poly(ethylene terephthalate). Journal of Materials Cycles Waste

Management 2001;3(1):24–31.[6] Lorenzetti C, Manaresi P, Berti C, Barbiroli G. Chemical recovery of useful chemicals from polyester (PET) waste from resource conservation: a survey of

state of the art. Journal of Polymers and the Environment 2006;14(1):89–101.[7] Sinha V, Patel MR, Patel JV. PET waste management by chemical recycling: a review. Journal of Polymers and the Environment 2010;18(1):8–25.[8] Khaddaj M, et al. Processing of new materials using thermal and thermo-vaporous treatment of terephthalates. Journal of Physics Conference Series

2008;121.[9] R. Lamparter, et al. Process for recovering terephthalic acid from waste polyethylene terephthalate. United States Patent 4542239, September 17;

1985.[10] W. Murdoch, Production of terephthalic acid and ethylene glycol from polyethylene terephthalate by ammonolysis. United States Patent 6723873,

April 20; 2004.[11] Panasyuk GP, et al. Synthesis and characterization of ammonium terephthalates. Inorganic Materials 2002;38(4):387.[12] Kaduk J. Terephthalate salts: salts of monopositive cations. Acta Crystallographica B 2000;56(Pt 3):474–85.[13] Zimmerman J. Textile Manufacturing 1974;101:49.[14] Zimmerman J. Textile Manufacturing 1974;101:19.