Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation - Michaelle Browers

Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanonâ€™s Last Najafi Generation

Michaelle Browers

Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, Winter 2012, pp.25-46 (Article)

Published by ICAS PressDOI: 10.1353/isl.2012.0022

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Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1

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Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon’s

Last Najafi Generation

M I C H A E L L E B R O W E R S

Dept. of Political Science, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA

[email protected]

ABSTRACT: This article reflects on what Muhammad Husayn

Fadlallah represented during his lifetime and the significance of his

death for Lebanese politics and society. I argue that Fadlallah’s

death signals the passing of a generation of uniquely independent

and authoritative Shi‘i cleric-intellectuals trained in Najaf.

Fadlallah’s ability to think independently was not only revealed in

the realm of politics (where his typically subtle stance on wilayat al-

faqih was but one example), but also in his role as a modern

mujtahid and the broader societal role he often played. Further, it is

the second and third aspects – rather than any of the explicitly

political stances Fadlallah took – that were so key in Fadlallah’s

continuing relevance and significance for Shi‘i and Lebanese

politics.

KEYWORDS: Lebanon; Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn;

Hizbullah; Arab Shi‘a; wilayat al-faqih.

شيء يسدها ال ثلمة اإلسالم في لمث الفقيه المؤمن مات إذا

The death of a faithful scholar causes a void in Islam that

nothing can fill.1

The death of Lebanon’s most prominent Shi‘i cleric, Muhammad

Husayn Fadlallah on 4 July 2010 was mourned not only by his

followers and admirers. Various analysts of Lebanese politics also

articulated a sense that something had been lost with this figure’s

passing. According to the Economist,

Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers

26

No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullah’s

claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to

Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali

Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the

world’s Shias. (Economist 2010)

Departing from the common media trope of Fadlallah as Hizbullah’s

‘spiritual guide’, David Schenker (2010) of the Washington Institute for

Near East Policy declared that, as the ‘the most credible moral, political,

and theological alternative to Hezbollah’, Fadlallah ‘stood as the last

bulwark against near total Iranian hegemony in Lebanon’. While one

must question whether Hizbullah has ever been able to claim to

represent all of Lebanon’s Shi‘a or whether Khamenei ever had the

stature to substantiate the claim to lead all the Shi‘a – or even whether

he has attempted to do so for many years – it is striking to hear voices,

even from those corners which had maligned Fadlallah as the oracle of

terror during his life, declaring the moment ‘bittersweet’.

The notion of a now unchecked Iranian hegemony is belied by the

fact that there is not one but a plurality of potential alternatives to

Fadlallah. It does seem to be the case that the two most prominent

jurisprudential references remaining after Fadlallah’s death are

Khamenei and ‘Ali Sistani, which would seem to offer very different

choices for Lebanon’s Shi‘a. The former would seem to carry with it an

affirmation of wilayat al-faqih and Iran’s hand in Lebanon; the latter

would involve emulating a cleric who has not only shown limited

political engagement but who has declined to speak about the wide

range of modern issues undertaken by Fadlallah. Khamenei and Sistani

are perhaps the most prominent Shi‘i maraji ‘ but not the only

possibilities being discussed. As Hilal Khashan (2010: 438) noted,

‘Fadlallah’s passing away leaves Lebanese Shi‘as without an indigenous

marja‘ ’. Other Lebanese clerics’ names have been mentioned as

‘successors’ of sorts, including two of Fadlallah’s former students,

Husayn Khashan and ‘Afif Nabulsi, the latter of whom is on good

terms with Hizbullah. However, neither of these figures yet has the

necessary religious credentials to be considered a marja‘. Inquiries to

Fadlallah’s office have led to two other suggestions from outside

Lebanon: Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, the second most senior cleric in

Iraq after Sistani, and Muhammad Ibrahim JannÁti, an Iranian

ayatollah who overlapped with Fadlallah in Najaf, where they were both

students. Fadlallah’s passing also leaves behind more practical questions


27

regarding who would carry on this figure’s vast networks in Lebanon

and elsewhere. Two of Fadlallah’s sons, ‘Ali and Ja‘far, have taken over

much of the responsibility for Fadlallah’s office and charities

(Fadlallah’s brother, Muhammad Baqir Fadlallah, is general director of

Mabarrat), but both are yet young and neither has sufficiently

progressed in their studies to hold much socio-religious authority. ‘Ali

is currently giving the Friday sermons at the Hasanayn mosque where

his father used to preach (and where he often filled in when his father

was ill). Bayynat.org, the official website created by Fadlallah’s office in

1997, continues to circulate sermons and fatwas from the late cleric and

now includes statements by, and reports on, the activities of ‘Ali

Fadlallah; email inquiries sent through the website are still answered,

usually through reiteration of one of the late cleric’s past statements or

rulings.

It may well be an indication of both the singularity of Fadlallah and

the lack of available clerics in the Lebanese sphere capable of fulfilling a

comparable role that, shortly after Fadlallah’s death, his office

announced on their website that it was permissible for those who

emulated Fadlallah to continue to do so as long as a living religious

authority deemed it permissible. A subsequent statement on 9 July 2010

(bayynat.org) affirmed that it is also permissible for those who have

never emulated Fadlallah during his lifetime to start emulating him

under the same circumstances. In response to inquiries as to whether or

how Fadlallah is to be followed when new issues arise, the office

clarified that new issues must be referred to a living religious authority

while at the same time affirming that Fadlallah comprehensively

covered modern issues so that, at least in the short term, his opinions

might suffice (see ‘Inquiries on Emulation’).

However, the aim of this article is more to examine the nature of the

‘vacuum’ Fadlallah leaves behind than to speculate over what might fill

that space – that is, to examine the wider significance of the loss of this

public intellectual for Lebanese politics and society. This requires

assessing what Fadlallah represented and contributed during his

lifetime, as well as attempting to delineate the complex matter of

Fadlallah’s relationship to Hizbullah. Rather than viewing Fadlallah as

a lost bulwark against Iranian hegemony, I argue more broadly that

Fadlallah’s death marks the passing of a generation of independent Shi‘i

cleric-intellectuals that he so well represented. Fadlallah’s ability to

think independently was not only revealed on occasion in the realm of

politics (where his typically subtle stance against wilayat al-faqih, which


28

places Lebanese Shi‘a under the authority of Iran, was but one example),

but also apparent in his role as a modern mujtahid (a religious authority

who was able to generate a large and rich body of rulings, which

demonstrated clarity of language, pragmatism, and adaptability to the

conditions of modern society) and the broader societal role he often

played (e.g., his ability to transcend the realm of Shi‘ism, which allowed

him to facilitate dialogue and champion coexistence among Lebanon’s

sects). Further, it is the second and third aspects – rather than any of

the explicitly political stances Fadlallah took – that were so key in

Fadlallah’s continuing relevance and significance for Shi‘i and Lebanese

politics.

‘Spiritual Guide’ or ‘Bulwark’?

Fadlallah is all too commonly characterized in the Western media and

by many Western academic analyses as the ‘spiritual guide’, ‘spiritual

leader’, or even ‘spokesperson’ for Hizbullah.2

While it is undeniable

that Fadlallah has been an important figure, even a direct teacher, and

likely even the marja‘ taqlid for many members of Hizbullah, Fadlallah

has long denied that he has had any operational or official role in the

group and is explicit about his desire to remain independent and above

the organizational framework of any party. An issue of al-‘Ahd dated 10

Muharram 1405 (6 October 1984) offers perhaps the first of what would

become many occasions upon which Fadlallah would be quoted as

denying he is a leader of Hizbullah or any other group. Certainly,

distance from the existing political party affiliation allows him to draw

from a wider range of followers, including those who do not subscribe

to the policies of Hizbullah or ‘Amal. Fadlallah has further denied that

Islam has any such thing as a ‘murshid ruhi’.

At the same time, Fadlallah’s writings and sermons have inspired,

added substance to, and justified many of the actions and policies of

Hizbullah, particularly throughout the 1980s when he was a regular

contributor to Hizbullah’s official mouthpiece, the same weekly

newspaper in which he offered that early denial of affiliation: al-‘Ahd.3

However, the oft-repeated trope of Fadlallah as spiritual guide of

Hizbullah both oversimplifies and misunderstands the cleric’s complex

relationship with that organization.

First of all, Hizbullah officially advocates emulation of another

religious authority. The organization adheres to the institution of

wilayat al-faqih, as defined by the Ruhollah Khomeini. Hizbullah


29

recognized Khomeini as the official marja‘ al-taqlid (religious-legal

authority of emulation) of the Islamic Republic. As such, from the

beginning Hizbullah paid homage and allegiance to Khomeini.

Hizbullah’s 1985 ‘Open Letter’ proclaims: ‘Our behavior is dictated to

us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political

conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih)’ and ‘We obey

the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih who

fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini.’ After

Khomeini’s death, the same allegiance and respect was accorded to ‘Ali

Khamenei, his officially chosen successor.4

Hizbullah’s deputy secretary

general, Naim Qassem (2005: 51), notes in his recent book that ‘the

decision of Jihad is tied to al-wali al-faqih…who determines the rules

and restrictions of confrontation (qarar al-jihad murtabit bil-wali l-

faqih…alladhi yuhaddid qawa‘id al-muwajaha wa dawabitaha)’. However,

Qassem distinguishes between referring to (or consulting with) the

marja‘ and emulating him, in order to suggest that in terms of the

private matters of ‘ibadat (ritual practices) and mu‘amalat (daily

dealings) members of Hizbullah may refer to or consult with another

marja‘ – and many members of Hizbullah certainly do look to

Fadlallah on various issues. However, when it comes to the public

domain of political matters, Qassem is clear that the only marja‘ to

emulate is Khamenei, who determines political and legal obligations.

Further, while Fadlallah has remained widely respected and was the

highest ranking Shi‘i religious figure in Lebanon until his death, his

relations with Hizbullah have often been strained. The rift widened

after Fadlallah objected to Hizbullah’s decision to support ‘Ali

Khamenei to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini as Iran’s Supreme Leader in

1989. However, it would be a mistake to interpret Fadlallah’s

independence from both Iran and Hizbullah as hostility to either. Most

of his agreements with both entities have been quiet and subtle, and his

sermons and statements regularly praise and defend the Islamic

Republic. So, on some occasions it is apparent that Fadlallah is able to

provide a sort of direct check upon the policies and positions of

Hizbullah, while on other occasions he seems to lend support to or

provide justification for Hizbullah’s actions and opinions. More

typically, however, Fadlallah seems to have positioned himself outside

(or above) the sphere of Hizbullah politics in order to play an entirely

different role in Lebanese society. Fadlallah has always cultivated a sense

that he was ‘above’ party and politics. In his own words:


30

Regarding Hezbollah, it is known that the generation that

represents Hezbollah, is a generation that has been brought

up on my thoughts before the eighties, whether in Lebanon

or in Iraq, as it is the case with respect to Hezb Addaa’wah Al-

Islamia as well as other parties in Iraq. That is because I was

born in Iraq and I lived there for many years, and thus many

Iraqi Muslims benefited from my books and thoughts. The

Lebanese Muslim youths have also benefited from my

knowledge before Hezbollah was founded. And when

Hezbollah was founded I was not a part of it and I used to

tell them: ‚I am not a part of you because I do not engage in

party politics. But, when you ask my opinion on some

positions, I support them if I agree with them, otherwise I do

not support them‛. (Fadlallah 2007)

Several examples of Fadlallah acting independently of, and in ways

that countered, Hizbullah’s decisions and stances are analyzed below.

However, I first want to draw attention to something that Fadlallah

subtly identifies as two features that distinguish his thinking from that

of Hizbullah: generational difference and the difference made by his

experience in Najaf.

The Najafi Generation

Certainly, Fadlallah emerges from a political generation5

distinct from

that of the current Hizbullah generation. Fadlallah’s generation was

formed in the hawza of Najaf, in a period marked a confrontation

between the ‘ulama of Najaf, with its traditional education and strict

hierarchical structure, and communists, whose call was prevailing

throughout the Middle East. Fadlallah describes a kind of intellectual

terrorism (irhab) in this period toward anything Islamic (in Sharaf al-

Din 1996: 110). It was against this trend that Muhammad Mahdi Shams

al-Din (1935-2001), who went on to head Lebanon’s Higher Islamic Shi‘i

Council after Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance, began to insist that the very

purpose of ijtihad (independent reasoning) is to apply Islamic theory to

all spheres of human life (1990: 49). It was also against this trend that

Fadlallah began to preach that the jurist who removes himself from

contemporary politics risks losing his function as a marja‘ (authority)

in other realms of life (Hasani 1993: 103), and that inspiration could be

drawn from Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1963-1980) and his engagement


31

with social, economic, and political philosophy. This generation’s most

prominent figures graduated from the reformist schools set up by

Muntada al-Nashr (Bahadili 1993) and were present in Iraq during the

formation of the first revolutionary Shi‘i Islamist party, Hizb al-Da‘wah

al-Islamiyyah (around 1957 or 1958). Fadlallah, as well as Shams al-Din,

was born in Najaf and they remained there until the ages of 31 and 33,

respectively. Mallat (1993) has captured the ‘Shi‘i internationalism’ of

this moment between the mid-1940s and the 1970s, when Najaf stood as

the most respected center of learning for Shi‘a. These generations are

discussed and compared at greater length in Browers 2011. Suffice it to

say here that there are important differences between the generation of

Fadlallah, Shams al-Din, Sadr and others and that of the generation

created along with Hizbullah. Although the past and present secretary

generals of Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Abbas al-Musawi (1952-1992) and

Hasan Nasrallah (b. 1960), each studied in Najaf, their time at the

hawzah was cut short by Iraqi government repression.6

Despite their

role in creating the Da‘wah party, the Najafi generation’s first concern

was always with the task of formulating a Shi‘i Islamist worldview

against competing (secular) ideologies and to make this ideology

relevant to the exigencies of modern society. Whereas Shams al-Din and

Fadlallah were still studying at the hawzah of Najaf in their early

thirties, Nasrallah seems to have entered into party work immediately

upon his return from Najaf, first with ‘Amal and then with Hizbullah

after it was established. By the age of 32 Nasrallah had been elected

secretary general of Hizbullah. The generation which emerged with the

creation of Hizbullah has always displayed a preference for direct

action over intellectual work and more of a penchant for pragmatic,

even strategic, political thinking.

Despite the shrinking pool of intellectual-activist clerics from

Fadlallah’s generation and Hizbullah’s seeming domination of Shi‘i

politics in Lebanon, the country has always contained multiple points

of reference for Shi‘i religious authority, or marja‘iyyah (a marja‘ is a

senior religious authority with a following, and his office is known as

the marja‘iyyah). As Rula Jurdi Abisaab (2009: 218) has noted, ‘the

power of the ‘ulama relies on how many followers they can attract and,

in turn, how much economic power they can generate’. Fadlallah

certainly wielded great authority by virtue of his close association with

Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, who he represented in Lebanon for

twenty-five years; his ability to offer modern interpretations on a wide

range of issues of concern to people’s daily lives; and his extensive


32

network of charitable, educational, and other services.7

However, the

emulators of a marja‘ (muqallidun) – that is lay the Shi‘a citizens of

Lebanon – possess some power as well by virtue of their ability to give

or withhold support. Of course, that power of the latter is diminished

when the field of alternative sources of authority shrinks – that is, with

the loss of Fadlallah.8

The remainder of this essay will provide various

examples meant to illustrate both the independence and singularity of

this thinker as he contributed toward the plurality of religious

authority in Lebanon’s religious, social and political spheres.

Fadlallah as a Point of Reference for al-Sahat al-Islamiyyah

The unique character of Fadlallah was clarified for me on 7 May 2009,

when I attended a live webcast discussion on ‘End of Life Issues in

Medical Care’ featuring Fadlallah and sponsored by the Medical Faculty

and Biomedical Ethics program of the American University of Beirut.

Fadlallah has given considerable attention to issues related to religion

and medicine/science in his writings, sermons, and fatwas. On this

occasion, Fadlallah maintained that, in general, doctors, patients, and

family members, do not have a right to end a human life, since no

person (only God) ‘owns’ a human life (la yamliku insan hayatu).

However, he argued that, in particular cases, the withholding or

removal of life support may be justified, for example, when a person is

brain-dead and the machine is the only thing keeping the body going.

The most interesting aspect of this discussion was hearing medical

students and faculty ask Fadlallah not only about general issues (on the

relationship between religion and medicine, for example), but also

about specific cases (if patient x is terminal . . . .). His answers sought to

join scientific principles (a faith in scientific progress and the

possibility of new discoveries) and religious principles (a faith in God’s

will being done) which resulted in a call for individuals to exercise

individual judgment while taking responsibility for ‘refraining from

harm’. There was very little in Fadlallah’s remarks that struck one as

particular to Islam (as opposed to Christianity) and nothing that struck

one as particularly Shi‘i (as opposed to Sunni). Rather, Fadlallah’s use

of generically religious, occasionally generically Islamic, language meant

that he came across as something akin to a religious humanist.9

Surprised by the fact that in such a sectarian country a prominent

religious figure (who is so clearly associated with one confessional

grouping) would be called on to address this difficult issue before such


33

a diverse audience, I asked several attending medical faculty and

students what they thought of the discussion and what they thought of

the decision to invite Fadlallah to hold forth on this topic. The

response was generally positive: no one in the room was protesting this

invitation and all questions seemed to indicate a real desire to hear

Fadlallah’s perspective. One man stated that it was entirely natural that

Fadlallah would be asked to do this, since he writes widely on these

issues and draws from a variety of sources in formulating a very

modern and rational approach to these questions. When I asked

whether there might be a subsequent discussion with Sunni or

Christian thinkers, the man stated firmly that the medical school

invited Fadlallah as someone who has written much about the topic

from an ethical perspective, not as a representative of a sect.10

Rather than a ‘spiritual guide’ for one Islamic party, Fadlallah’s

influence expands over a wider Islamic arena (al-sahat al-islamiyyah) and,

as the above example attests, he has occasionally been sought out as an

ethical thinker, regardless of sect or religion. Although Fadlallah is

often attributed with playing a central role in the conceptualization of

the Islamic situation (al-halat al-Islamiyyah) associated with Hizbullah’s

society of resistance (mujtama‘ al-muqawamah),11

which viewed the state

of the Shi‘a community as a problematic to be overcome through the

establishment of a religious-political solidarity among Lebanon’s Shi‘a

in a way that both gives meaning to the individual and binds that

individual into responsibility for carrying out a collective project, he

also contributes toward the creation of an Islamic milieu that

transcends the narrow identity frames of Lebanese politics. This is

apparent in an August 2009 interview Joseph Alagha (2011: 246)

conducted with Fadlallah, when the cleric maintained that Lebanese

society was transforming from al-halat al-Islamiyyah to al-sahat al-

Islamiyyah and voiced his advocacy of latter.12

Fadlallah characterized

the former as ‘a transitory stage that has served its purpose’. In the first

stage, the aim was to unify the Shi‘a community and activists in the

wake of the Iranian revolution under the banner of an overarching

Islamic ideology through a top-down revolutionary process. In the early

1990s, Hizbullah shifted toward a more bottom-up strategy that

involved participation in the democratic system. According to

Fadlallah, this shift in strategy carried with it a different political ethic,

based on greater openness toward other communities. Alagha recounts

that Fadlallah explained that the concept of al-halat al-Islamiyyah,


34

was mainly concerned with establishing an Islamic state

where minorities, such as Christians and Jews, were treated as

ahl al-dhimma, that is, residents with limited rights and

required to pay a tax in lieu of alms giving (zakat). Ayatullah

Fadlallah clarified that in al-saha al-Islamiyya notions such as

the Islamic state and ahl al-dhimma are bygone ideological

constructs that do not exist anymore. According to him, al-

saha al-Islamiyya is a pluralistic Islamic cultural sphere where

the concept of citizenship (muwatana) reigns, where all

people have equal rights and duties, and where coexistence

and mutual respect is the main norm. (Alagha 2011: 246)

In fact, Fadlallah has long presented himself as the Shi‘i leader most

capable of facilitating dialogue among competing Shi‘i factions and of

leading the Shi‘i community into dialogue with other sects in Lebanon.

Fadlallah advocates taqrib (the mitigation of inter-Muslim differences)

and tawhid (in this case, meaning the unification of all Muslim

believers in the Islamic ummah). In the name of unity, Fadlallah has

deemed Islamic infighting sacrilegious and ardently called for dialogue

among competing Shi‘i factions and among Sunnis and Shi‘a. He has

championed cooperation and dialogue between Muslims and

Christians, attuned to points of convergence and common grounds

upon which all parties agree. He has further championed dialogue and

cooperation between Islamist and secular currents in Lebanon as well as

elsewhere (e.g., he authorized such cooperation within the Iraqi

opposition). Fadlallah argues there are ‘no taboos in dialogue’. Muslims

should follow the example of the Prophet in engaging in civil dialogue

even with polytheists, atheists and those who deny resurrection and/or

prophecy (Fadlallah 1996). Fadlallah sometimes even goes so far as

dropping the adjectives of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ to speak of

unification of mankind in a universal community. He has often

asserted that he stands with every project that seeks to change reality ‘to

the benefit of Islam’ and stands on the side of oppressed people (al-

mustadafin) everywhere (see e.g. Fadlallah 1990).

Bayynat.org is full of statements and sermons from Fadlallah calling

for dialogue in the face of every conflict as well as accounts of his own

engagements in dialogue with religiously, politically, and ideologically

diverse actors. What is less clear is whether the role Fadlallah played in

regard to dialogue among Lebanese sects and factions was such that his

death will have a detrimental impact on Lebanese politics. While


35

Hizbullah has also advocated taqrib and dialogue on many occasions, it

is certainly the case that Fadlallah and others of his generation (e.g.

Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din) give the call for dialogue across

divides and without limits and with greater emphasis in their writings

and speeches than those of Nasrallah’s generation. At least part of the

reason must lie in the fact that the latter is more directly embedded in

the everyday workings of a political and military struggle with sectarian

dimensions. For example, Nasrallah succeeded in aligning his party

with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement with a 2006

Memorandum of Understanding (that has endured until now) and in

2008 managed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Tripoli’s

Salafis (which was abrogated by the Salafis the next day). But his calls

for dialogue tend to be at the level of the party, not at a broader societal

level: as secretary general of Hizbullah, he hardly has the ability to rise

above political-strategic concerns such as defending his party and its

interests.

Further, Schaery-Eisenlohr (2008: 155) has astutely noted that

Fadlallah’s claim to transcend sect not only facilitates dialogue and

coexistence, but also ‘aims to break the hegemony and ownership other

sectarian groups, in particular Christians and Sunnis, have held’ over

public space in Lebanon. At the same time, it is also apparent that

Fadlallah’s redefinition of the very terms of coexistence involves the

rather radical reconfiguring of the meaning of Shi‘ism and its relation

to other religions and groups. He does this not only by challenging the

monopoly on power other groups might claim and not only by

supporting taqrib among Lebanon’s sects and challenging relations of

power among the groups, but also by, on occasion, overcoming and

reinterpreting various provocative and exclusionary aspects of Shi‘ism

itself.

In World of Our Youth, Fadlallah calls on young people to engage in

politics, counselling that when they find themselves inspired to play a

role in politics they must,

study the intellectual, political, and functional manifeso of

the party or the movement in question, with respect, on the

one hand, to determine the youth’s affiliation and

intellectual and doctrinal beliefs; and, on the other hand, to

his concern and involvement in the affairs of the ummah, on

the level where it realizes its main goals in staying the proper

course. (Fadlallah 1998b: 164-5)


36

Fadlallah calls on youth to judge carefully and to avoid affiliating out

of fear. But also interesting is what he does not at any point call for:

their joining of any particular party or group – or even specification

that the group or party they join need be Islamist in character.

A Critic of Wilayat al-Faqih

While Fadlallah supported Khomeini and the Islamic revolution in

Iran, he has never accepted Khamenei as the wali al-faqih or marja‘ for

all Shi‘a and his relationship to the concept wilayat al-faqih has always

contained tensions, particularly in light of his consistent insistence

upon the independence of clerical thinking (e.g., in J. Fadlallah, 1997:

35-37) and upon the plurality of guardian jurists (e.g., Fadlallah 2009a:

31–37). Fadlallah’s independence of the institution is apparent in the

fact that he personally followed Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, who was already

an established marja‘ with widespread social institutions when

Khomeini declared himself a marja‘. He also served as Khu’i ’s

representative in Lebanon until that cleric’s death in 1992. According to

Khashan (2010: 429), Fadlallah then briefly followed the teachings of

Muhammad Rida Gulpaygani until his death in December 1993. Not

approving of Tehran’s appointment of Muhsin Araki after Khomeini’s

death, Khashan maintains that Fadlallah then followed ‘Ali Sistani.13

After Araki died in December 1994, the Islamic Republic named

Khamenei the supreme leader, which again did not meet with

Fadlallah’s approval. Part of the issue lay in his disagreement with the

idea that the supreme guide could only be Iranian. Fadlallah

maintained that qualifications, without regard to nationality, should be

the determining factor in selecting a marja‘ (Hasani 2003: 153). Thus, in

1994, Fadlallah decided to claim marja‘ status for himself, despite the

exhortation of Ahmad Jannati, who flew to Beirut as Khamenei’s

personal envoy with the task of dissuading Fadlallah from declaring his

marja‘iyyah. As the highest ranking Arab marja‘, Fadlallah cultivates a

considerable following throughout the region. Many Shi‘a in Lebanon,

Syria and various Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Iraq, view him

and not Khamenei as the model for emulation (marja‘ al-taqlid). He has

offices in Syria, Iran, the U.K, Germany and the Ivory Coast (Maktab

Fadlallah 2003).

In his writings on wilayat al-faqih, Fadlallah tends to diminish or

relativize the theory’s importance rather than rejecting it outright. He

diminishes its importance at the level of practicality (1990). Fadlallah


37

argues that all practicable routes toward the establishment of Islamic

government should be pursued, but the idea of governing according the

decisions of the mujutahid is not seen by him as very practical. Fadlallah

refers to wilayat al-faqih as a juridical theory (nazariyyah fiqhiyyah) not a

belief (‘aqidah). Further, in light of the fact of the silence of the faqih

and the fact of the multiplicity of fuqaha’, as well as the fact of the

inevitable contradiction of their decisions, Fadlallah deems the notion

of an absolute jurist is untenable. All jurists, no matter how wise,

remain fallible, like all other believers. While arguing in some of his

speeches and writings that Khomeini’s interpretation can be justified in

the interest of safeguarding the community (e.g. 2000b, esp. 163-5),

Fadlallah seems to prefer Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s notion of the

governance of the ummah by itself as opposed to absolute wilayah.

According to Fadlallah, the marja‘iyyah should not be tied to one

nation. He argues that that the Iranians have been monopolizing the

institution of marja‘iyyah for too long and suggests that wilayat al-faqih

should rotate among the most learned of the Shi‘a. He seems to

attribute to the faqih a role more like that of the Catholic pope, as he

argues for for strong involvement of the clergy in politics, but argues

that they should possess wide influence, not govern directly (Hasani

1993: 95-96). At the same time, he argues that while the authority of the

jurist is neither general nor absolute, in the event of a leadership

vacuum the jurist’s mandate may be imposed in the name of the public

interest (1994: 144). Thus, he at once localizes (or nationalizes) political

authority at the same time he renders the authority of the marja‘iyyah

transnational.

There have also been occasions when Fadlallah has taken the party to

task for claiming to hold a monopoly on truth. For example, Nasrallah

gave a speech prior to the 2005 election in which he declared it a taklif

al-shar‘i (an obligation based on Islamic law) for Shi‘a to vote for the

list Hizbullah endorsed.14

Fadlallah replied by using his 31 May 2005

column, ‘The Stance of the Week’, to vehemently criticize the use of

taklif shar‘i in the elections, arguing that such practices exploit Islamic

concepts for political purposes (Fadlallah 2005). According to

Fadlallah, God has granted each person an independent mind for which

we are each individually responsible. While an individual of religious

learning might be able to advise Muslims not to vote for corrupt

candidates, the individual must decide for his or herself which

candidate is corrupt and which is not.15

Here again we see a conflict between those Islamists who


38

appropriated the Iranian interpretation of the marja‘iyyah and wilayat

al-faqih and members of the Najafi school associated with the attempt

of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to offer a modern interpretation of a

politically committed marja‘iyyah, which is not confined to any single

political structure or states (such as Iran), and a wilayah that holds

political leadership within the domain of the state, such that the

existence of many wilayah within the larger Islamic ummah is

legitimated.

A Mujtahid for his Times

Fadlallah’s life is replete with examples of what Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008:

76) identifies as his tendency to set ‘himself apart from Hizbullah and

ultimately from the Iranian religious elite’. According to Shaery-

Eisenlohr, one of the main ways Fadlallah creates ‘boundaries between

his followers and those of Hizbullah’ is by justifying and practicing ‘an

approach to religious tradition and history based on scientific and

rational methods’ against what he and his followers ‘have come to

identify as traditional Iranian approach to scholarship’. Fadlallah has

been central in developing an Islamist discourse to address many

contemporary issues. He is confortable addressing complex

contemporary matters with nuance and depth, but in a language

comprehensible to the modern individual, such as the challenges and

opportunities posed by such issues as secularism, pluralism, democracy,

scientific and technological progress, and cultural Westernization. My

sense is that Fadlallah’s reconsiderations of Islam’s relationship to

political and social life challenges the applicability of the best versions

of each conception. It is clear that he emphasizes individual

responsibility and allows for flexibility in synchronizing jurisprudence

with changing social norms. One of Fadlallah’s most oft-quoted phrases

from the Quran is verse 13:11: ‘Verily God does not change what is in a

people until they change what is in themselves.’ Fadlallah interprets this

not as a call to focus only on the self and let God take care of the rest (a

flight from politics to the self) but as an activist principle that at once

overturns the ‘materialist principle’ (al-qa‘idat al-madiyyah) of ‘change

reality and you will change yourself’ to ‘change yourself and you will

change reality and history’ (1985: 174-5), at the same time it refutes the

notion that human actions are governed by ‘unalterable or

predetermined laws (al-qawanin al-hatmiyyah)’ (1998a: 28).

One example that well illustrates this: Fadlallah has long taken a


39

strictly scientific approach to determining the Islamic lunar calendar.

While most Muslim leaders – both Sunni and Shi‘i – rely upon actual

sight of the moon, Fadlallah reasoned that one could rely upon

accurate astronomical calculations to determine the beginning and end

of the lunar month (2006). As a result, he is able to announce in

advance the start and end of the month of Ramadan by consulting

observatory centres throughout the world. On at least two occasions,

1999 and 2002, Fadlallah declared the beginning of the Eid al-Fitr

celebration (marking the end of Ramadan) on a day that coincided with

that of the (Sunni) Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, but which was a day

before the declared Eid of Iran (and hence Hizbullah). This meant that

followers of Fadlallah, along with Lebanon’s Sunni’s were able to begin

feasting and celebrating a full day before the end of the month of

fasting for followers of Hizbullah. As Alagha (2011: 197, n. 36) notes,

this ‘split the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s main constituency in Beirut, between

Hizbullah’s adherents of the Iranian religious authority and Fadlallah’s

followers.’ While one might interpret this approach as a strategy to be

the first or set the tone for declaring the end of fasting (and certainly

Fadlallah’s announcements were always well publicized), it also reveals

his modernity, his desire to use science in order to facilitate regularity

and consistency. According to Fadlallah (2006), whether or not the

moon appears is based on the universal order and not human sight and

whether it is ‘possible’ to see the moon is more accurately determined

by Islamic astronomical calculations than by the naked eye of

individuals throughout the world. But the main reason a scientific

method is better, Fadlallah argues, is that it offers a way of unifying the

months and celebrations of Muslims.16

During his lifetime, Fadlallah voiced comparatively progressive

positions on the rights of women and youth, aimed in affirming their

agency. Among his many fatwas, or religious edicts, on family law, he

argued that women have the right to marry, the right to work, and even

the right to defend themselves from domestic violence. On

International Women’s Day in 2007, Fadlallah (2008a) further affirmed

women’s right to self-defence (womanhood seen as exemplifying the

oppressed and her rights entailing those of resistance).17

Fadlallah (1995)

argues for women’s right to fully participate in politics and even hold

leadership positions in an Islamic state. He also directly confronts the

view that women are deficient in comparison to men. Lara Deeb (2010)

has analyzed the ways in which Fadlallah’s jurisprudence in regard to

listening to music and temporary marriage reveals his attunement to


40

the needs of youth and has developed over time toward permitting

young people an expanded space for experimenting with different

choices.

Many of Fadlallah’s views seemed to adapt with the times. One

example that has been well researched by Morgan Clarke (2007a: 2008)

is Fadlallah’s views on issues related to reproduction, including

artificial insemination and cloning. Though Fadlallah opposed the use

of donor sperm, he has declared the permissibility of using donor eggs

for in vitro fertilization. Until recently this was on the condition that

the husband of the recipient married the egg donor, even if through the

institution of a temporary marriage. Now it seems Fadlallah has relaxed

even this requirement (2007b). This would permit anonymous

donations, as well as allow sisters to donate and receive eggs, a very

common scenario which was ruled out on the previous position as

Islamic law prohibits a man from marrying two (or more) sisters

simultaneously.

Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah’s deference to science and reason,

relatively progressive views on the rights of women and youth, calls for

pluralistic and accountable governance, and commitment to dialogue

with those of different ideologies and faiths, has at times put him at

odds with both political hardliners and the religious establishment.

However, his ability to address the interests and concerns of a wide

sector of Lebanon’s Shi‘a, including women and youth, has also made

him one of Lebanon’s most influential public intellectuals prior to his

death.

Lebanon after Fadlallah

After the summer war of 2006, there were reports of a (temporary) thaw

in relations between Hizbullah and Fadlallah. According to the

International Crisis Group (2007: 7) report, out of a desire to preserve

the resistance in the face of attacks, Fadlallah toned down his public

criticism of Hizbullah and Hizbullah began giving greater coverage to

Fadlallah’s Friday sermons on its television station, al-Manar. As the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) dealing with the 2005 assassination

of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri got closer to issuing its first

indictments and speculation grew that members of Hizbullah would be

named, sectarian tensions grew. Initially there was a sense that, in the

great Lebanese tradition of compromise, a number of minor officials

from Hizbullah would be described as ‘rogue operators’ so that


41

individuals, rather than the party, could be held to account. This offer

was allegedly made by Prime Minister Sa‘ad Hariri to Nasrallah shortly

after Fadlallah’s death. However, Nasrallah used a 9 August 2010 press

conference to attempt to implicate Israel, rather than Hizbullah, in the

assassination. By the end of October 2010, Nasrallah was warning that

‘whoever cooperates with the STL is working against the Resistance’. In

January 2011, Hizbullah members pulled out of government, thus

leading to a collapse.

One can only speculate as to whether this might have evolved

differently had Fadlallah still been alive. Many analysts have argued that

Hizbullah would probably have welcomed a negotiated solution that

left Hariri as prime minister with Lebanese government support for the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Even if indictments had been issued

against Hizbullah members, having the son of the assassinated former

leader still running a government in which Hizbullah and its allies were

participating would have at least achieved the Lebanese goal of

consensus politics. As it is, even though Hizbullah has installed a prime

minister of their choosing, so long as Sa‘ad Hariri and his Future

Movement remain excluded from government the harder it becomes for

Hizbullah to claim that it is working for the good of the republic as a

whole, rather than representing distinctly sectarian interests. The

rancour of Lebanese politics is high. In such a context one needs

leadership that champions dialogue, cooperation, and civility. Even

more essential may be the existence of voices from within Lebanon’s

Shi‘a community that can on occasion challenge Hizbullah with

Fadlallah’s unique combination of religious authority and intellectual

independence.18

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Notes

1 A hadith of Imam al-Sadiq, recorded in Muhammad ibn Ya‘qub Kulayni, al-Kafi I,

ch. ‘Loss of a Scholar’, 38, no. 2.

2 Saad-Ghorayb (2002: 6) lists numerous scholars making such claims, a compilation

which has been revised and expanded by Alagha (2006: 325, n. 122). At the same time, a

number of scholars, including Saad-Ghorayb and Alagha, challenge and complicate this

notion.

3 al-‘Ahd first appeared in 1984, but changed its name to al-Intiqad in 2001.

According to Alagha, the name change corresponded to a shift in orientation:

‘conveying a ‚secular‛ image by dropping the Qur’anic substantiation (5:56), on the

right side, and removing the portrait of Khumayni and Khamina’i, on the left side’

(2011: 197, n. 2).

4 However, Alagha (2010) acutely notes subtle shifts over time in Hizbullah’s

interpretation of and relationship to wilayat al-faqih.

5 By ‘generation’, I mean what sociologists refer to as a ‘political generation’. As

Braungart & Braungart (1991: 297, 299) argue: ‘an age group is transformed into a

political generation when a bond is created among its members based on their unique

growing-up experiences in society and a shared feeling that they have a mission to

perform by changing [or resisting change to] the political status quo.’ In the present

cases, age proved less significant in the formation of each political generation than it

did when the figures studied in Najaf and the circumstances under which they took up

political work.

6 Musawi seems to have arrived in Najaf from Lebanon in 1969. Nasrallah did not

arrive until 1976. However, both were expelled by 1979. See Stewart (2001) and Abisaab

(2006) for excellent discussions of the shift from Najaf to Qum as an intellectual centre

and the Lebanon’s development of its own hawzah system, respectively.

7 Fadlallah established both Jam‘iyyat Usrat al-Takhi (Society of Brethren Family) and

Jam‘iyyat al-Mabarat al-Khayriyyah (Charitable Philanthropic Society). The latter began

with funding from Khu’i and today operates not only in Lebanon but throughout the

world.

8 Abisaab (2009: 218) further argues that the muqallidun ‘far from being passive, have


45

manipulated the competition among the maraji‘ and demanded a greater involvement

of mujtahids in affairs pertaining to their livelihood and security, as well as having

resisted the imposition of one designated marja‘ by one center on all Shi‘ite emulators.’

Here, too, the ability of the emulators to do this is undermined with the loss of

Fadlallah. AMAL offers an alternative Shi‘i political reference. But the party has lost

considerable religious authority first with the death the Musa Sadr (d. 1978) and Nabih

Berri’s assumption of role as head of the party, and further with the death of

Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (d. 2001).

9 Husayni (2007) argues that Fadlallah is distinct for developing general principles

from the entire Qur’an rather than focusing only around 500 verses that deal explicitly

with jurisprudence.

10 Fadlallah’s Fiqh al-Shari‘a (2003) is a good example of the breadth and modernity

of his thinking. Fadlallah’s writings on matters such as human cloning and

reproductive issues is well covered by Clarke (2007a, 200b, 2008).

11 According to Harb & Leenders (2005: 191), ‘This hala groups the adherents

(multazimin) to two major religious references (marja‘iyyat): Fadlallah and Khamenei (or

his Lebanese delegate, Nasrallah).’

12 One must note, in this regard, that in 2001 al-Saha, a ‘traditional village’ consisting

of restaurants, cafés, terraces, shops, a wedding hall, a motel, a small museum, a library,

a children’s playground and prayer rooms, was established in Beirut’s southern suburb

of al-Dahiya, by al-Mabarrat, Fadlallah’s philanthropic organization. See Harb 2006.

13 It is hard to imagine Fadlallah’s (by then well-established) views on the centrality of

political activism would sit well with his emulation of Sistanti, who oscillates between

passive and activist positions, with a seeming preference for the former. That and the

fact that they are only separated by five years in age – along with the lack of any

corroborating evidence – leads me to question this claim.

14 The speech was broadcast on 25 May 2005, on al-Manar.

15 See also on Bayynat.org: Fadlallah’s (2008b) sermon on ‘The Independence of the

Mind in Islam’, sermon on ‘Responsibility in Islam’ (2004), and sermon on

‘Corruption on Earth is an Act of Man’ (2009b) where he states that responsibility for

political corruption ‘is on the shoulders of all those who sell their votes without even

studying the candidates’.

16 Bayynat.org has clarified that ‘the establishment of the beginnings of the lunar

months, such as the beginning of the month of Ramadan and the first day of Eid al-

Fitr, is not considered part of the new upcoming issues [which would require reference

to a living religious authority], and the emulators of His Eminence, Sayyed Fadlullah

(ra) out to follow his ruling on the issue.’ In other words, followers of Fadlallah should

continue to follow the scientific predictions of when it is ‘possible to see’ the moon

rather than worrying about whether the moon has actually been seen (‘Inquiries on

Emulation’).

17 El-Husseini (2008) demonstrates three aspects of Fadlallah’s lauding of Fatimah as

a role model distinguishes him from Iranian views. First, he views Fatima as a role

model not only for women, but for all Muslims. Second, where Khomeini praised

Fatimah for her virtue and modesty, Fadlallah emphasizes Fatimah’s actions,

particularly the way in which she ‘represents a political activist who used all available

opportunities without losing . . . any of her Muslim virtues (Fadlallah 2000a: 203). Third,

whereas women associated with Hizbullah, following the Iranian lead, tend to give


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greater emphasis to Zaynab in contemporary discourse, Fadlallah gives greater emphasis

to Fatimah (2000a: 275).

18 The author would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for this

journal for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and the National Endowment

for the Humanities, which provided the author with a fellowship during 2010-2011,

when this article was first drafted. Any views, findings, conclusions, or

recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the

National Endowment for the Humanities. The use of the word ‘last’ in the title of this

article is not meant to suggest that this author precludes in any way the possibility of

Najaf’s resurgence as the centre of intellectual activity for a future generation of clerics.

Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation - Michaelle Browers

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