Factors of Soldier Load

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THE FACTORS OF SOLDIER'S LOAD

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, MAJOR. USAB.S., North Georgia College, Dahlonega, Georgia, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1994

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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ABSTRACT

THE FACTORS OF SOLDIER'S LOAD by Major Stephen J. Townsend,USA, i l l pages.This study examines the factors that cause or contribute tothe overloading of dismounted combat soldiers in the Armyof the 1990's. This examination considers the body ofliterature on the subject, primarily post-World War Two, toidentify what factors cause soldier's to carry too muchweight into battle.The goals of the study are to identify the causativefactors and increase leader understanding of the problem.From the research, the study identifies twelve factors thatcause or contribute to soldier's overload: Lack ofappreciation of the problem, fear and fatigue, the fear ofrisk, the fire load, the drag of orthodoxy, failures ofdiscipline and the enforcement of standards, myths ofpeacetime training, the nature of the soldier, lack oftransport, the effects of technology, terrain and weather,and physical conditioning.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my family who kept me sane and my morale high bytheir well-timed interruptions. To my committee for theiradvice, patience, and application of "academic rigor." Tomany fellow Infantrymen who contributed ideas and advice.To the following organizations for their help andcontributions:

Combined Arms CommandCenter for Army Lessons LearnedCombined Arms Research Library

Joint Readiness Training CenterNational Training CenterUnited States Army Infantry School

Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab~irectorate f Combat DevelopmentsDonovan Technical Library

U.S. Army Natick Research. Development, andEngineering Center

25th Infantry Division (Light)Ranger Training Brigade


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE......................... ............... i iABSTRACT............................................. i i iACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................... .. i vLIST OF FIGURES.................................... . . v iCHAPTERS

ONE. INTRODUCTION.................. ............... 1TWO. REVIEW OF LITERATURE.................... ..... 14THREE. RESEARCH DESIGN........................ . . . . 43FOUR. RESEARCH ANALYSIS.............. ............. 5FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............. 87

APPENDIX. SOLDIER'S LOAD FACTORS OUTLINE............ 105BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 107INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................ 1 1 1


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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page1 . Research Methodolgy .............................. 442 Source-Factor Matrix ............................. 523 Refined List of Factors .......................... 93


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CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION

We all knew we were carrying too much weight. I twas pinning us down when the situation called for us tobound forward. The equipment had some of us whippedbefore we started.'PFC Hugo DeSantisCo. E, 16th InfantryOmaha Beach, 1944

We attacked to secure the airhead. We were I'keslow moving turtles. My ruck weighed 120 pounds.hAmerican Airborne SoldierGrenada, 1983

One of the tenets of Army doctrine in Field Manual100-5 Overations is agility. This quality, as much mentalas physical, gives us the ability to react more quickly thanthe enemy and to seize the initiative. For dismountedsoldiers, agility is defined a s a coinbination of strength.speed, react ion time, and e n d ~ r a n c e . ~ gi i ty enables oursoldiers to decide, move, and fight faster than the enemy.4However, the comments of the two soldiers quoted above seemto indicate that we have not made much progress with regardsto tactical agility in the forty years between Omaha Beachand Grenada.


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This study examines a crucial component of agility,the soldier's load. Specifically this is a study of thedynamics of a soldier's load--What factors cause orcontribute to the burden of our infantrymen? Why do ourinfantrymen carry too much weight? Is it the fault ofuneducated, inexperienced, or uncaring leaders? Is itbecause "we have to follow Standard Operating Procedure(SOP)" or "everyone must be uniform?" What are the impactsof doctrine and advanced technology?

Today the U.S. Army's published soldier's loaddoctrine is found as an annex or appendix to several manualson other subjects. Chief among these are Field Manual (FM)21-18, ~ootmarches~nd FM 7-10, the Infantry RifleCompany .= Mention of soldier/s load guidance and planningis also made in numerous other field manuals andpublications. If the Army's doctrine or guidance onsoldier's load is so readily available, then why is it thatwe still routinely see, ten years and two wars afterGrenada, soldiers carrying excessive loads during trainingexercises and operations? Do military leaders, specificallyleaders of light infantry, understand the historical causesof soldier overloading? Are there any new factorscontributing to this problem?


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Historical BackaroundHistorically, armies have always been interested in

the loads their soldiers carried into battle. It has beengenerally accepted through the ages that the heavier theload on the soldier's back, the less effective he is.German historians note that the Legions of Rome took painsto lighten the burden of their infantry. Great captains ofhistory, such as Frederick the Great, Napoleon, andScharnhorst, all found it necessary to give personalguidance as to the packing 1 ists of their troop^.^ Others,such as Phillip of Macedonia and Stonewall Jackson, wereknown for their use of light-traveling infantry.

One of the early studies of the soldier's load wasconducted in the late 1800s by the German Frederick WilhelmInstitute. The tests measured the ability of soldiers tocarry various loads in differing temperature ranges.9Another study was undertaken by the British Royal HygieneAdvisory Committee which surveyed soldier's burdens throughhistory and published its findings in 1922.1 The AmericanSoldier-Author Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall studiedthe problem for the U.S. Army as he conducted after-actionreviews and interviews with soldiers and Marines duringWor d War Two. 1

The American Army's study of the Soldier's Load hascontinued into more modern times. Between 1954 and 1990 the


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study examined the possible applications and pitfalls ofadvanced technology programs in reducing the soldier'sburden.16

FocusThe purpose of this study is to identify the fac

causing soldier overload today. The goal is to increaseleader understanding of the problem and offer some practrecommendations, deduced from the research, towards solvit.

With the modernization and considerable

ors

cal

mechanization of our Army, few soldiers actually carry anysignificant weight on their backs into training or battle.The soldiers still doing so often are the Lightfighters ofthe Light Divisions, the Paratroops of the 82d Airborne, TheAir Assault troops of the lOlst Airborne, the Rangers, andSpecial Forces. However, based on mission requirements, anyof our soldiers could find himself in a dismounted combatsituation.

The phenomena of the "human pack mule" is limitedalmost exclusively to battalion level and below. Those athigher levels, in most cases, operate primarily from fixedsites or move about the battlefield by vehicle. Normallyaccompanying our infantryman you will find the small butsturdy groups of hardened combat support soldiers thatassist our light infantry--the forward observers, thesappers, Stinger teams, and the combat medics who are

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equal ly, if not more heavi y, burdened. l7 A1 of thesesoldiers comprise the group defined as Dismounted CombatSoldiers by the U.S. Army Infantry School. 8

Quest ionsThe primary question of this study is: What are the

factors that cause soldiers to be overburdened on today'sbattlefield? In answering this question this study willanswer several others as well.

First, what causative factors have emerged fromhistory and previous study? This study examines these knownfactors to determine which among them are still valid andrelevant to today's army. A second question to be anmeredis what new factors have emerged in more recent times?

p a ~ u m ~ tongBefore engaging in this study a few assumptions are

essential to assist in establishing the boundaries of theanalysis. First, the results of previous documented studieson the negative impact of excessive soldier's loads arevalid. This discussion does not attempt to derive new dataon these effects.

Secondly, the load planning guidance espoused inthese studies, and as official U.S. Army doctrine, isaccurate and valid. This study will not attempt todiscredit or suggest alternatives to this data.


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DefinitionsEssential to the common understanding of the

problem, the following terms and definitions serve as acommon departure point for all further discussion of thistopic.

A ~ ~ r o a c harch Load. This is the load carried bythe soldier in addition to his fighting load. It consistsof the remainder of his variable items. In almost allcases, it is carried in an assault pack or rucksack and isnormally dropped before or upon contact with the enemy.

Combat Load. The fighting load plus the approachmarch load. This is the load the soldier normally has withhim during combat operations and with it he can sustainhimself for protracted periods between resupplies.

Common Items. Those items carried or worn by allsoldiers regardless of threat, enviroment or mission (i.e.,Battle Dress Uniform with boots>.

Continaencv Load. Those items of personal and unitequipment not required for the current operations. Normallyconsolidated and stored at a higher level. This load mightinclude spare uniforms, cold weather gear during the warmmonths, or anti-armor weapons when the enemy has no armored

19vehicles.Dutv load. Weaponry, ammunition, and other

equipment associated with a particular duty position andrequired to properly accomplish the duties of that position


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to or carried by the unit when required for a specificmission


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Over the years different units have establishedvarious Standard (or Standing depending on your training)Operating Procedures (SOPS) to simplify and standardizeroutine unit functions. These exist in most units forset-up and wear of equipment, issuance of ammunition basicload, and prescribed packing or load lists for rucksacks andduffel bags.

These SOPS have both positive and negative effectson the soldier's load. They streamline troop leadingprocedures, speed routine and recurring actions, and insureeveryone has a common start point for reference. However,when the results are soldier's carrying equipment they willnot use so all "look uniformu or when leaders direct apacking list because the "SOP says so," then they impact thesoldier's load in a negative way. I will examine thisproblem in more detail.

As mentioned previously, one significant problem allstudies of soldier's load face is that there is littleagreement about what can be deleted from the soldier's loadto make it lighter. Summing this up perfectly is this quotefrom the British commission reporting in "The Load Carriedby the Soldier" :

Everyone agrees that equipment must be lightened.But when it comes to saying what equipment can be dis-pensed with, the e is endless variety of opinion. Aye,there's the rub.51


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Most infantrymen have strong opinions on thissubject based on their training and experiences. Gettingmore than two to agree to any specific recommendation is adaunting task. For this reason, the primary goal of thisstudy is to re-examine the dynamics of soldier's load andto increase leader understanding of the subject. The actualtask of making specific adjustments to SOPS, unit basicloads, and packing lists is better left to officers andNCOs leading our units in the field. Field Manual 7-10states, "There is no standard solution to the problem ofoverloading soldiers." I t remains a commander'sresponsibility to apply the doctrinal guidelines to lightenhis soldier's load.22


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IS. L. A. Marshall,' The Soldier's Load and theNobility of a Nation. (Quantico, Virginia: Reprinted byThe Marine Corps Association, 1980), p. 43.2 ~ a j o r . M. Dubik and Major T. D. Fullerton,"Soldier Overloading in Grenada," Military Review (January

1987): p. 39.3 ~ i e l d anual 100-5, O~eration s, (Department ofthe Army: June 1993) pp. 2-6, 2-7.4 ~ r m y evelopment and Employment Agency briefingpacket "Lightening the Soldier's Load: A Systems Approach:

1986 and 1987 versions.5 ~i el Manual 21-18, Footmarches, (Department ofthe Army: June 1990) pp. 5-1 through 5-23.6 ~ i e l d anual 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Com~ an v,(Department of the Army: December 1990) pp. 8-8 through8-11.

12~ajor . W. Lothian, RAMC, "The Load Carried bythe Soldier." Reprinted by U.S. Quartermaster General,Research and Development Branch, (n.p., 1954). U.S. ArmyInfantry Combat Developments Agency, "A Study to Reduce theLoad of the Infantry Combat Soldier." (Fort Benning, Ga.:1962). U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, "A Study toConserve the Energy of the Combat Infantryman." (FortBelvoir. Va.: February 1964). U.S. Army NatickLaboratories, "The Carrying of Loads within an InfantryCompany," (Natick. Mass: May 1973). U.S. Army NatickResearch, Development, and Engineering Center, "TechnologyDemonstration for Lightening the Soldier's Load," (Natick,Mass: February 1988).

1 3 u s ~ C ~ C ,A Study to Conserve.


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CHAPTER TWOREVIEW OF LITERATURE

... hat we want is not a light battalion but a lightarmy...such mobility is only to be obtained when thearmy is formed of sturdy men, well practiced in peace,well fed in the field, and carrying as regards allarms a really practical equipment. An army whichmarches light will also maneuver freely.Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter forms the basis for the thesis andintroduces the reader to the literature examined. Thereview was mainly limited to those works that impact on thetopic of the modern U.S. soldier's load since World WarTwo. In the case of the exceptions to this limitation,sources were used that, in the opinion of the author, wereapplicable to the purpose and had significant informationto offer.

From the current. literature in the subject aninitial list of factors can be identified. This list,found at Figure 2, is examined in depth in Chapter Four.

Current U.S. Armv Load DoctrineThe primary consideration is not how much asoldier can carry, but how much he can carry withoutimpaired combat effectiveness-- mentally or phy-sical y.2


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Anchoring the research of the problem of soldier'sload is the current U.S. Army doctrine designed to trainand guide the Army's leaders. This doctrine is contained .in three basic documents, all of them updated since 1990;FM 7-8, Infantrv..Rifle,M 7-10,In tfan,nd FM 21-18, F o o t M a r c h e s .

The three manuals are up-t.o-date and we1 -synchronized, providing complementary subject informationpertinent to their larger purpose. All three address thefactors of soldier's load, load management techniques, andload training. A basic understanding of this doctrine isnecessary to provide a foundation in the search for thecauses of soldier overload.

First, a soldier can carry approximately 30% of hisbody weight and still retain a significant percentage ofhis fighting ability (strength, agility, alertness.stamina). This equates to approximately 48 pounds based onolder data showing the average U.S. soldier weighed 160pounds. The 1988 Anthropometric survey of U.S. Armypersonnel showed that the average U.S. soldier weighed171.27 pounds3 and recent data from JRTC shows that theaverage infantryman training there weighs about 173~ o u n d s . ~hese figures suggest that 30% for the averageinfantryman means somewhere between 48-52 pounds. For eachten pounds carried over 30%, the soldier loses aproportional amount (approximately 15%)-of his agility


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(a combination of strength, speed, reaction time andendurance). 5

Secondly, if a load exceeds 45 percent of asoldier's body weight (approximately 72-78 pounds), then heloses fighting ability significantly and is at greater riskfor injury. Thirdly, vigorous load training can onlyimprove a soldier's ability to carry weight by between tenand twenty percent of the maximum he could carry before anyload training. Beyond this increase, there is noimprovement in load carrying capacity, only in risk ofinjury.6

Finally, a soldier can be required to carryemergency loads of 100 to 150 pounds for short distances,up to 20 kilometers in a day, for several days. However,commanders must take precautions to keep the troops awayfrom possible contact with the enemy; to rest the troopsbefore committing them to an action; and to be aware thatthey are significantly more susceptible to injury withthese loads.7

Field Manual 21-18 outlines other points of oursoldier's load doctrine. First, the stress of combatweakens soldiers and can cause exhaustion. Soldiers shouldbe conditioned with heavy loads in training but sent intobattle as lightly loaded as possible.

Secondly, commanders must not expect their men tocarry equipment to cover every contingency or possible


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particularly hand grenades. The available helicopters willenable the commander to conserve the energy of his troopsduring movement and to resupply them as they fight.

In contrast, a unit tasked to conduct a search andattack to find a guerilla enemy in a thicketed swamp willprobably require much less ammunition but will be forced toconduct much of its movement on foot.

Enemv ThreatWhat enemy capabilities will the unit face enroute

to and at the objective? Is there an armor threatrequiring anti-armor weapons? An air threat requiringman-portable air defense weapons? Does the threat of enemynuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) use require us tocarry or wear protective gear? Should we carry radioencryption equipment if the enemy has no capability tointercept or monitor our transmissions?

Probably more than any other factor of METT-T, theestimate of the enemy's capabilities require the commanderto accept risk if he is to fight light. In almost everycase there will be more potential threats than the unit canprotect itself against. The commander must determine whichthreats he is most likely to face.

In order to leave behind heavy items that are notlikely to be used, the commander must be satisfied that hisenemy is unlikely to employ a capability that he may


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possess. If he does not take this risk, the combat powerof his unit will suffer.

Terrain and WeatherWhat terrain must be negotiated by the unit enroute

to, at, or upon leaving the objective? What elements ofthe weather will the unit have to endure?

A unit required to negotiate a mountainous area infreezing conditions might require special equipment such asropes and snaplinks and sweaters or parkas for protectionfrom the elements. These requirements will differ markedlyfrom the unit defending a key installation in a tropicalregion.

These two factors, like enemy threat, require thecommander to accept risk to stay light. In a desertregion, the commander may choose to rely on aerial resupplyrather than force his unit to carry additional canteens.By doing so, he risks going without water if the resupplydoes not materialize. In a cold-weather enviroment, acommander may elect to carry only one sleeping bag forevery other man instead of each man carrying his own.

T ~ O O D SThe commander must estimate the abilities of his

own unit to meet the challenges of the mission ahead. Whatis their level of physical conditioning? How much has


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their condition been degraded by previous operations? Howmuch rest and food have they had recently?

Load carrying causes fatigue. Fatigue and theweight of the burden itself reduce the ability of thesoldier to react to the enemy and place him at adisadvantage when clear thinking and swift action isrequired. o

Before combat, commanders can prepare the unit forthe effects of fatigue and fear through tough physicalconditioning with heavy loads, and instilling good unitmorale, discipline, and teamwork. During combat,commanders can only reduce these negative effects throughstrong leadership and by fighting light. 1

Time AvailableHow much time is available to prepare for the

mission? An operation that must be launched immediatelywill reduce the unit's ability to properly tailor thesoldier's load. This can result in overloaded soldiers.This problem can be mitigated by the use of good unit SOPs(although unit SOPs can be a double-edged sword as we willexplore in more detail later).

How long will the operation last? I f adequateresources for resupply cannot be obtained, the soldier'sload will increase with the duration of the mission.12

The application of the commander's estimateprovides the foundation upon which all mission planning and

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preparation, to include the soldier's load, is based. FM101-5, Staff Oraanization and O~erationg, ndicates that 'other factors, in addition to METT-T, are a part of theestimate. These factors include the estimates of the staffand the commander's personal experience and knowledge.

Having reviewed the current doctrinal framework,Chapter Four will examine other factors that impact onsoldier's load that are not addressed or fully explained indoctrine.

Previous StudvSince the soldier's load has been of interest to

military leaders throughout history, especially in thenineteenth and twentieth centuries, there is a good body ofwritten knowledge available. However except for specificstudies of the topic by research institutes, there are fewbooks devoted specifically to the topic; most worksaddress the issue only as i t relates to other larger topicssuch as infantry operations or mobility.

S. L. A . MarshallOne significant exception and a major work in this

area, is Brigadier General S. L. A . Marshall's IlgSoldier's Load and the Mobilitv of a Nation. Firstprinted in 1949 in various military journals in the UnitedStates and abroad under the title "The Mobility of One


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Man." it was published for the first time in 1950 and isdevoted entirely tb the subject of soldier's load.13

This quick-reading book is based on Marshall's study ofprevious research and his own interviews of combatinfantrymen during World War Two and the Korean Conflict.While Marshall's methods and conclusions in other researchendeavors have been the subject of some disagreement, thisparticular work has enjoyed wide critical acclaim inmilitary circles and is considered by many to be thedefinitive source on the subject.

Marsha.11 examined the historical problem of soldieroverloading and compares it to the similar problem faced bysoldiers during World War Two. Using graphic examples fromunits engaged in both the European and Pacific theaters ofwar, Marshall addressed the causes of overloading andsuggested ways at solving the problem. He went on to placethe problem of individual soldier mobility into a largercontext 'of the mobility of an entire nation.

General Marshall addressed a complete spectrum ofcauses of soldier overloading. Probably his strongesttheme is the lack of appreciation, by tactical leaders, ofthe debilitating effects of stress and fear on the averagesoldier and its resulting effect on his ability to carry aload.14

Other factors explored by Marshall and examined inChapter Four are: Ignorance of the problem; the failure of


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leadership to establish and enforce load guidance; theconsequences of burdening soldiers with excessive loads ofammunition (he referred to them as "fire loads"); a fear ofrisk-taking on the part of commanders and their staffs; thenature of the soldier himself; the effects of weather;improper lessons learned from training during peacetime (hecalled these the "myths of peacetime training"); theinfluences of technological innovation; and the negativeimpacts of the conservative and traditional nature of muchmilitary thought and procedure (he called this the "drag oforthodoxy" . 5

S.L.A. Marshall's work provides the reader andstudent of soldier's load with an excellent study of thesubject. His is a comprehensive treatment that is almoststill wholely applicable 45 years later. Marshall'sconclusions provide us an excellent point of departure inour task of identifying the factors affecting the soldier'sload in the '90's.

Commissioned Military StudiesThe soldier's load has been the subject of regular

and relatively intense study by the various militaries ofthe world. A sampling of some of these works was studiedfor the purposes of this thesis


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Ma.ior Loth an. RAMCIn his 1922 study, "The Load Carried by the

Soldier," author Major N. W. Lothian of the Royal ArmyMedical Corps analyzed historical examples to examinenumerous dynamics of soldier physical performance. Thesefactors included load weight, load compositphysiological limitations, equipment designand rate of march.16

Lothian reached the conclusion that

ion,and management,

throughouthistory the soldier's load "...peaks when equipment hasbecome so cumbersome as to reduce mobility to vanishingpoint" and falls again when a "wise commander" intervenesby lightening the load, "...restoring mobility, and soensuring success.'' He noted that this pattern repeatsitself as the load rises again during periods of peace.

Lothian attributed this increase to the falseassumptions that the soldier could support the increasedweight in battle; would be better off for having the newitems he was issued; and if the load was too heavy, someform of "auxiliary transport to carry this equipment on themarch" would be available.17

Armv Combat Developments StudiesIn 1962 the U.S. Army Infantry Combat DevelopmentsAgency undertook a study entitled, "A Study to Reduce the

Load of the Individual Combat Soldier." Its primarypurpose was to determine the equipment the infantryman

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needed to perform his mission in tropic and temperatezones. The study, following the Army's experience inKorea, was obviously heavily influenced by the writings ofMarshall and says little to contradict his findings.

Some of the major causes of overloading includedcommander's and staff's lack of awareness of the problemand the associated lessons of history (the studyrecommended soldier's load instruction for all levels ofmilitary education up to and including the War College);excessive quality and durability requirements for newequipment; and the impact of tradition and resistance tochange. Other factors noted were inadequate SOPS; poorutilization of available transportation assets; greentroops who carry more than they need when they deploy; thetrade-offs between killing power (mobility and firepower)versus troop protection; the often poor utilization ofavailable transport assets; and finally the fact someweapon systems, by their construction and organization.automatical1.y overload their crews. 18

The U.S. Army Combat Developments Command performeda follow-up study in 1964 entitled " A Study to Conserve theEnergy of the Combat Infantryman." Due to apparentinaction on the recommendations of the 1962 study, the 1964version sought to re-energize the system with the specificpurposes of: determine how the infantryman's loadcould be lightened; determine the period of time the


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infantryman should be self-suffi ient; determine whichspecific items of clothing and equipment were in need ofimprovement; and determine how the battalion supply systemcould be made more responsive to the soldier.19

The study considered the effects of durability andfunctional requirements on item weight. I t recognized thatitems often had durability ratings often much longer thantheir expected combat lifespan. The study also recognizedthat the standard practice of equipping the entire armywith uniforms and basic equipment designed for the infantrymay be counterproductive, resulting in increased cost andweight .20

The 1964 study included an excellent .discussion ofthe tradeoffs and risks between protection and weight. I trecognized that technology was at a crossroads wherereplacement items could be developed that would have asimilar or slightly improved protective factor for a greatweight savings or the protective factor could be vastlyimproved for a similar item weight.21

Other outcomes of the study were: formalization ofthe concepts of fighting load and existence load; arecommendation to pursue the development of a l ight (onepound) expendable protective mask to kept with the soldierat all times, allowing his M i 7 mask to be kept at the unittrains and brought forward when needed; and recommendationsto pursue development of a new helmet and body armor using


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lightweight composite fiber technology (this recommendationeventually developed into the Kevlar helmet and jacket worntoday) 22

Natick Research. Develo~ment. nd Ensineerins CenterIn 1973 the then U.S. Army Natick Laboratories

(hereafter referred to as Natick) published "The Carryingof Loads within an Infantry Company." The purposes of thestudy were to study the capacity of available load carryingequipment, examine the current weight of the soldier'sload, the carrying of equipment by duty positions, and howthe load could best be distributed and carried.23

The study made several interesting observations,among them were: the advent of nylon material, in lieu ofcotton web, in the construction of load bearing equipmentreduced the soldier's load by an average of 36% when dry--even more when wet; reductions in weight in one part ofthe load tend to be offset by gains in another part(especially by adding more ammunition); inexperiencedsoldiers initially tend to carry too much when left todecide for themselves; and finally that peacetime maneuverscannot replicate the energy drain that fear creates incombat -24

The 1973 study uses anthropometric data from the1966 survey (indicating that the average soldier weighed156 pounds) but goes further to state that basing loadplanning on this figure is inadequate because up to 50% of

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short, the "average soldier" concept is an over-simplification and good load planning must take soldierbody size into account.25

In 1988 Dr. James B. Sampson of Natick published anreport entitled "Technology Demonstration for Lighteningthe Soldier's Load." In light of the Army's recentinitiatives with the Light Infantry Division concept thereport re-examined the problems of soldier's load and drewsome conclusions on the ability of technology to help.

Some of the reasons cited for soldier overloadwere, "commander's orders to pack certain items,insufficient information about the mission and weather,lack of confidence in the supply trains, and the desire tobe ready for any contingency." The study concludes thattechnology often contributed to, rather than reduced, theload. This is attributed to a need for increasingprotection, more lethal weapons, more complexcommunications and night vision equipment, and increasingattempts to integrate items and make them multi-functionalwhich actually decreases their flexibility.

Another interesting technology factor is that manyresearchers and developers do not understand the nature andorigins of the problem and, more importantly, the way it isresolved in the field. A recent example of false loadsavings attributable to this disconnect is the replacementof the M60 machinegun by the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon


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(SAW) at platoon level. I t was assumed that this would"save" 26.5 pounds from overall lighter weight of the SAWand the deletion of the M60 tripod and spare barrel. Thisprojected savings was incorrect because the platoon-levelSAW was intended to be fired, with a spare barrel, from thetripod like the M60--not bipod mounted like the squad-levelSAW.

Finally, the report shows some planned weightsavings that never came to pass, primarily due to funding.such as small lightweight binoculars, lightweight chemicalsuits, lighter rations (the meal-ready-to-eat CMREI, whichwas much lighter than the canned C-ration, has actuallygotten heavier in the last five years), and smallerflash1 i g h t ~ . ~ ~

Also published by Natick in 1988 was a newanthropometric survey that showed the median male soldierto weigh 171.27 pounds. A significant increase over the1970's figure of approximately 165 pounds.27

Modern CombatThe Falklands War. 1982

The Battle for the Falklands written by LondonEvenina Standard reporters Max Hastings and Simon Jenkinsfollows the war over these South Atlantic Islands betweenArgentina and t re at Britain. Thiswar, unlike mostpreconceptions of modern conflict, was fought almost


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entirely by dismounted light infantrymen. They marchedlong distances with heavy loads and little in the way ofair, fire, or logistical support.

Hastings' and Jenkins' work is mainly a treatmentof the war as a whole but author Hastings accompanied theleading infantry units as they advanced across the islandsand he makes many observations on their conditions andoperations.

He writes that the heavy burdens of the BritishLnfantry units were due to an unfortunate combination ofseveral factors: Extremely long lines of communication;the need to deploy rapidly while suffering from a lack ofstrategic lift; the vagaries of some of the worst terrainand weather on earth; problems arising from a lack of theappropriate physical conditioning in some units; and themore nebulous problem of insufficient logistical challengesbuilt into most peacetime training exercises. 8

British Major General (retired) Julian Thompson,former commander of 3d Commando Brigade during theFalklands campaign, considers the aspects of logistics inarmed conflict in his 1991 book The Lifeblood of War. Heexamines the support of campaigns past, present, and futureand recounts the lessons of the Falklands in a section onamphibious logistics.

Though primarily oriented at higherlogistics, included among what Thompson cal

levels ofIs the "fa


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lessons of peacetime training" are some lessons that,nonetheless, bear on the burden of the individual soldier .Among these is the lesson that small wars and mostexercises, emphasizing maneuver forcesnot adequately test or prepare the logiRarely are commanders forced to chooseor supplies. In war, i f transport is I

and operations, dostics system.between moving menimited, men will

march carrying some of their supplies and the availabletransport will be busy moving the rest.29

The Grenada Intervention. 1983On October 25th, 1983 American Rangers, Marines,

Paratroopers, and Special Operations Forces invaded theCarribean island of Grenada in the United States' firstmajor ground, ombat action since the end of the Vietnam Wara decade earlier. Many of the soldier's load lessonslearned by Americans in WWII and Korea and recorded byS.L.A. Marshall were revisited in the tropical heat ofGrenada. A participant in the operation, Major Mark Adkin,recorded some of these lessons in his book Uraent Furv: TheBattle for Grenada.

Though his work is a treatment of the eventsleading up to and the actual operation itself, his summaryof problems plaguing U.S. forces during the initialinvasion included "overburdened infantry.' Some of thefactors he indicated caused this problem were: u.ncertaintyon the part of commanders, planners, and soldiers; an

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overall lack of combat experience in the force; scarcity ofstrategic lift; a critical need for rapid deployment;limited reception capabilities at arrival airfield; a lackof supporting vehicles; rugged hilly terrain; and stiflingtropical heat .30

In 1987 Hilitarv Review published an article byMajors J.M. Dubik and T.D. Fullerton. They examined theresults of psychological studies that Walter Reed ArmyMedical Center conducted following the invasion of Grenada.Using the Marshall-pioneered technique of interviewing theparticipants of the fighting, they explored the effects ofthe soldier's load among other topics.

The essential conclusion Dubik and Fullertonreached was that "uncertainty" was a factor that causedsolider overloading in Grenada. Uncertainty caused by alack of operational information, rapidly changinginformation, lack of common training and SOP'S between someunits, and a lack of trust in the capabilities of otherunits or of the "system" to provide for needs. Thisuncertainty caused the initial units to pack for theworst. 3

The Panama Intervention. 1989-90In their 1991 book O~e ra ti on ust Cause: The

Storminq of Panama, authors Baker, Donnelly, and Rothreconstruct the events of the United States' armedintervention in Panama in December 1989. The book is a

32


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standards; unit SOP'S often do not address soldier's loadconcerns; although pre-combat inspections (PCI) arecritical, leaders routinely faii to inspect their soldier'srucks; uncertainty over the threat, nature, and durationof missions has caused soldiers to deploy with twice asmuch ammunition as was needed and with unnecessary comfortitems; leaders must evaluate and accept or refuse risk withregards to protective armor versus agility and heat stress;many unit physical fitness programs fail to train to loadcarrying; lack of support vehicles increases the load; andoften we do not task the logisticians to assist ourtactical commanders in getting their loads forward.33

Combat Training CentersOur combat training centers (CTC's) provide our

maneuver units with the most intense and realistic trainingexperience short of actual combat. The Joint ReadinessTraining Center (JRTC) in particular is focused on light,dismounted soldiers. The National Training Center (NTC)and the the Combat Maneuer Training Center (CMTC) areoriented primarily on heavy forces.

The JRTC records soldier's loads throughout unitseach rotation. The weights and records of the items foundupon inventory of the rucks are analyzed and feedback isgiven to the player units. These reports, also forwardedto CALL, yield some telling lessons on soldier's load.


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In a recent review of 10 units rotations, six units did anexcellent job of monitoring the soldier's load by tailoring1oads, cross-l eve1 ing equipment, leader's inspect ions, andby consolidating or cacheing rucks while on operations inan area of operations.

Almost as common however were reports of units that"talk" soldiers load up and down the chain of command. Butwhen the troops cross the line of departure, the averagerifleman's load weighs 100.72 pounds. The chain of commandoften does not take personal action to review or inspectthe packing list--often simply referring to the unit's SOPand making no effort to eliminate unessential items orcross-level equipment based on mission needs.

Other comments by the observer/controllers CO/C's)include that often units do not attempt to adjust.cross-level, or cache equipment once in their area ofoperations even after noting undue fatigue early on themarch and correctly attributing it to the heavy loads.Units also do not fully understand the real impact ofactual basic loads of ammunition because they rarely trainwith them at home station. Even at the CTC's, which do areasonable job of simulating mines, anti-tank, mortar andother rounds, it is not unusual to see soldiers crossingthe start line with only three of seven magazines filled ora machinegun team with only 3-400 rounds.


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On a positive note, the O/C's report that mostunits improve their load management as they progi-essthrough the rotation from search-and-attack operations tothe deliberate attack. However, another explanation ispossible, the search-and-attack is characterized byuncertainty over enemy strength, locations, and intentionsand by decentralized and dispersed small-unit operations;conditions leading to difficulty in resupply and heavyrucks. In contrast, the later deliberate attack istypically conducted with good intelligence on the enemy andsignificant unit preparation and rehearsal; conditions

load tailoring. What would the soldier'sif another search-and-attack were requirediberate attack?34

favorableload be 1after the

forikede

U.S. Army Infantry SchoolThe U.S. Army's Infantry School (USAIS) is the

center of gravity for all matters concerning infantry andother ground troops. This responsibility includes thesoldier's load and USAIS has several units, departments,and agencies that work the issue, among them: theDirectorate of Combat Developments, the Ranger TrainingBrigade, and the new Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab(DBBL).

USAIS maintains oversight on the soldier's loadthrough the recently established Land Warrior Project. One


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of the project's functions is to monitor all systems thatare developed or modernized as part of the Army's SoldierModernization Program (SMP). SMP is a program that treatsthe dismounted soldier as a fighting system and everythinghe wears, carries, uses, or consumes is a component of thatsystem. A primary role of the project is to integrate allcomponents and monitor the weight of all new items toinsure weight reductions occur over time.35

A 1991 executive review of SMP concluded that themodern infantry soldier was overloaded and that effectiveloads could only be achieved through the use oftransportation assets to move portions of the load. SMPseeks to save weight through the use of integrated hightechnology in future developments and has had some successin achieving this goal.36

Problems blocking more significant progress in thisendeavor include funding cuts, the inclination of somedecision makers to opt for increased capability over weightsavings, and the acceptance of item weights that slightlyexceed the limit expressed in the operational requirement.These gains are easier to accept if the item meets allother requirements or i f they are compensated by weightsavings on other items.37


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PeriodicalsThe U.S. Army's keen interest in this subject

resulted in Marshall's investigations and in numerousafter-action reports and interviews from soldiers andcommanders from every U.S. action since World War Two.Many of these interviews are available or have beensummarized in articles in various military journals. Manyof these journals contain regular articles addressing thesoldiers l odd, most notably Infantrv magaz ine38, and wereuseful in providing information for this study.

Other useful journals included Militarv Review,Armv ~o a i s t ~ i a n , ~ ~nd Marine Corps Gazette. 0 Thesearticles were too numerous to address here. Suffice i t tosay that they reinforce and do not contradict theinformation from the other literature reviewed and anysignificant points are addressed in Chapter Four.

Applications to Current StudvThe body of extant works form a useful and

necessary backgound of re evant inf ormat ion on whichbase this study. They show the validity of currentconclusions on soldier's load by discussing the resuearlier, similar studies and by historical example.

Existing works form the basis of the effort toidentify all of the factors contributing to soldier's load


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3 ~ . ~ .rmy Nat ck Research, Devel opment andEngineering Center, "1988 nthropometric Survey of U.S.Army Personnel: Methods and S umary Statistics," TR 89/044.(Natick, Mass: September 1989) p. 320.

4~ ol di er s oad Information and Data provided byU.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center, January 1994.5 ~ r m y evel opment and Employment Agency briefingpacket "Lightening the Soldier's Load: A Systems Approach,"1986 and 1987 versions.

10~bid., h. 5.

131nformation from Donovan Technical Library, U.S.Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.

l5Marsha1l, pp. x-xi, 9 , 11, 13-14, 18-19, 2-23,31, 35-36, 47-52, 58, 65-68, 83-84, 89-90, 92-93.16Lothian, "The Load Carried by the Soldier."171bid., pp. 54-55.1 8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,A Study to Reduce.. ." p. 3, 5, 12, 23,24, C-11, C-39, E-4, F-5, F-8.

'A Study to Conserve.. .' p. 1.20~bid., pp. 1, 3, 15.


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2 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,The Carrying of Loads. . p. 1.24~bid., pp. 13, 24, 26, 27.25~bid., p. 32.2 6 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,Techno1 ogy Demonstrat ion. . pp. 4-5,10-11.2 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,1988 Anthropometric Survey.. . "p. 320.28~. astings and S. Jenkins, The Battle for theFalklands. (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983), pp. 231-232,263-269, 274, 319-320.29~ajor General J. Thompson, The Lifeblood of War:Loaistics in Armed Conflict. (London: Brassey's, 1991) PP.207, 311.30~ajor . Adkin, Ursent Furv: The Battle forGrenada. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp.140, 208, 222, 254.31 ~u bik nd Fullerton, p. 39-4032~. onne1 y, M. Roth, and C. Baker, OperationJust Cause: The Stormina of Panama. (New York: LexingtonBooks, 1991>, pp. 76, 225-6, 317, 319, 332, 346-347, 359.33~enter for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. ArmyCombined Arms Command (Fort Leavenworth. Kansas) bulletins#1-88, pp. 13-19 and #90-9, pp. 1-19.3 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ata.35~nformation provided by Directorate of CombatDevelopments and Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab (DBBL),U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1994.36~ol ier Modernization PIan: Executive LevelReview, USAIS, 19 December 1991.37~nformation from DCD, DBBL, USAIS.


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38~nfantrv. U.S. Army Infantry School: FortBenning, Ga. Numerous articles reviewed, see bibliography..39~olonel D. H. Wayne and Major W. E. Burke, "DoingSomething for the Soldier Every Day." Armv Loaistician.March-April 1994, pp. 2-5.4 0~ ari ne orps Gazette. Quantico, Virginia.Numerous articles reviewed, see bibliography.


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CHAPTER THREERESEARCH DESIGN

The CSS issue that has the greatest impact onthe rifle company's tacticai operations is thesoldier's load.'FM 7-10, 1990

Methodo osyThis chapter presents the methodology used in the

study. A graphic depiction of the process is shown atFigure 1 on the next page. The available literature wasthe starting point to determine what factors cause orcontribute to soldier over-loading.

Information SourcesMuch of the research was conducted through the

Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). Additionally, theDonovan Technical Library (DTL) at Fort Benning's U.S. ArmyInfantry School (USAIS) was very helpful. This library hasa wealth of information on this subject which were madeavailable through inter-library loans arranged by CARL.

Also of great service were the Directorate ofCombat Developments and the Dismounted Battlespace BattleLab at USAIS and the Army's Natick Research. Development,


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SOLDIERS OVERLOADED?*COMMON FACTORS UNIQUE FACTORSdbHAPTER 4

I ICHAPTER 5 I -MPPLICABLE TODAY?+APPLIES UNLESS 1MISSIONENEMYTECHNOLOGYTRAINING

YES!VALUE VALUE

FIGURE 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY44


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and Engineering Center. The first two agencies haveleading roles in the Army in establishing requirements andguiding the development of concepts and equipment for theDismounted Combat Soldier. The soldier's load is a majorfocus for them on a full time basis.

Natick works closely with the agencies at USAIS inthe actual development and testing of new concepts andequipment. Natick provided a great deal of technical datato support this study.

The Army's light infantry training center--theJoint Readiness Training Center--was especially helpful.They observe an average of eight light infantry brigadesannually in very intense and dynamic simulated combatoperations. The training is as close to combat operationsas is possible in peactime and commanders are encouraged tobe innovative as they fight. The JRTC observer/controllers< O K s ) sample the weights of soldiers and their equipmentbefore a mission and this information is available to therotational unit and the rest of the Army.

The CTC observations are available to the rest ofthe Army by way of the Center for Army Lessons Learned(CALL). Part of the Combined Arms Command at FortLeavenworth, CALL is the repository of after-actioncomments and lessons learned from all major trainingexercises and combat operations. CALL publishes an update


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bulletin several times a year with the latest observationsfrom recent operations.

Information TypesFrom the sources described above, the study

examined many different information types; the mostsignificant of these are reviewed in Chapter Two. Thesesources included U.S. Army field manuals, books onsoldier's load, infantry, and modern combat actions,results of scientific studies and technology reviews,combat observation reports, records of interviews, writingsof military historians, articles in military professionaljournals, CALL bulletins, inter-agency memorandum, andvarious information, raw data, and briefing packetsprovided the information sources cited above.

Review of Information and FindingsAfter gathering source information, the next step

in the methodoloy was to review previous soldier's load'research to determine factors previously identified. Thestudy then examined information from the other types ofsources, with emphasis on examples of overloaded soldiers.to isolate the causative factors or trends.

Information from positive examples of soldier'sload, illustrations of leaders and units properly tailoring


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CriteriaThe first criterion used to determine whether a

discovered factor is applicable today is mission.Specifically, is the factor related to a mission, task, orrole that is likely to be performed by American dismountedcombat soldiers in the foreseeable future? The factor isno longer applicable if the mission, task, or role is onethat is not currently part of U.S. doctrine. The factor isvalid by this criterion if today's forces practice theparticular mission as a function of current doctrine.

The second criterion for judging applicability isthe enemy. Was previous enemy doctrine, tactics,techniques, procedures, decisions, or other influences acause for the discovered factor? Does the same or asimilar enemy exist in today's threat enviroment? Thefactor is no longer applicable unless a threat exists withsimilar capabilities, doctrine, organization, tactics.techniques, or procedures.

Thirdly, the study examines the findings in view oftechnology. The factor is no longer applicable if atechnology currently in service with dismounted soldiershas overcome or negated the situation or circumstancescreating the factor.

The last criterion used to evaluate theapplicability of the factors is train~ng. Was the factor a


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result of specific training doctrines or events or theirabscence? Have modern advances in training made the factorobsolete?

ConclusionsThe conclusions provide a current and applicable

list of factors that cause or contribute to soldieroverload. Where insufficient evidence was available topositively identify a factor, the trend in the evidence isdiscussed to aid in future study.


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CHAPTER FOURRESEARCH ANALYSIS

The number of tasks that soldiers fai toaccomplish at JRTC, to an acceptable standard, can bedirectly related to the soldier being too physicallytired or mentally unwilling to put forth the effort--Because of their excessive loads and the chain ofcommand can't break the code on how to make thesystem work.--And that's a fact!'Anonymous at JRTC

From the literature reviewed i t is possible tocompose an initial listing of soldier's load factors.Figure 2 provides a matrix which shows the major sourcesreviewed and the soldier's load factors addressed in each.

This chapter describes each factor in general termsand provides supporting examples to illustrate them. Thematrix at Figure 2 also shows which factors appearrepeatedly across a broad spectrum of source material,indicating widespread acceptance, and those that appearonce or in only a few sources, indicating a trend. Theconclusion provides an outline list of soldier's loadfactors.


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FACTORS CAUSING SOLDIER'S OVERLOAD

FACTORS LACK OF EFFECTS OF FEARAPPRECIA- F EAR AND OF

.SLAM: SOLDIERS X.BAKER. DONNELLY.L?ROTH: OPERATIONJUST CAUSE. .HASTING ANDJENKINS: BATTLE X IOR FALKLANDS.CALLDUSlK ANDFULLERTON:

N OVERLOADIN xGRENADA.ADKIN: URGENT FURY.THOMPSON:.I IFEBLOOD OF WAR.-NATICK (73 '88).JRTC. . . X-USAlS (DCO, DD BL)

..USACDC '64 X. . .-INFANTRY MAGAZINE

.............- .I OF SOURCES

H E THE DRAG OF DISCIPLINE NATURE LACK MYTHS OF EFFECTS TERRAIN PHYSICAL:IRE ORTHODOXY ANDT HE OFT HE OF PEACE- OF TECH- AND CONDITION-.OAD ENFORCE- SOLDIER TRANS- TIME NOLOGY WEATHER INGMENT OF PORT TRAININGSTANDARDS

FIGURE 2: SOURCE-FACTOR MATRIX


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Appreciation for the ProblemThe factor of appreciation for the problem has two

different components. First, a basic awareness of soldieroverload, what causes overloading, and the problems i tcreates. Secondly, an understanding of the methodsavailable to avoid, correct, or reduce the scope of theprob em.

Many leaders are aware of the hazards of soldieroverload and understand the doctrinal methods to helpcontrol the problem. But, due to the outcome of theircommand estimate, they sometimes make the consciousdecision to exceed the doctrinal load guidelines. Thissection addresses the problems that result when leadersdon't have this base-line appreciation.

Lack of AwarenessMarshall referred to this as "ignorance of the

problem." He discusses the leader who is ignorant of, orindifferent to, the effects over-loading has on soldiersand tactical operations. One of the sources of leadereducation and development is familiarity with servicedoctrine and it is noted that at the time of Marshall'swritings, 1 ittle written or formalized e ~ i s t e d . ~

Some of the conclusions from the Infantry CombatDevelopments Agency study conducted in 1962 were that the


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major causes of overloading included commander's andstaff's lack of awareness of the problem and inability toheed the lessons of history (the study recommendedsoldier's load instruction for all levels of militaryeducation up to and including the War Col lege).3

One of the tasks of USAIS is to train and educateall U.S. infantry soldiers, non-commissioned officers, andofficers. According to a recent inquiry made of theDirectorate of Training, there are presently no scheduledprimary training hours on soldier's load in the programs ofinstruction for either the Infantry basic or advanced NCOand Officer courses. Similarly none of the primarytraining includes soldier's load as a planned discussionitem on the lesson outline. Soldier's load considerationsare discussed only as secondary points to other blocks ofinstruction such as patrolling or movement techniques.

Inability to ResolveOnce a leader understands the facets of the

problem, he must then demonstrate the ability andwillingness to act on his knowledge; Operationalobservations by the JRTC's O/C's note that often units donot attempt to adjust, cross-level, or cache equipment oncein their area of operations; even after noting unduefatigue early in a movement and correctly attributing it to


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heavy loads.= The 1962 USAIS study noted that somecommanders who were effective in reducing soldier's loadsfor an attack were prone to ignore the excess weight duringthe approach march to the objective and the attendant lossof energy required for the attacke6

The Effects of Fear. Fatiaue. and UncertaintvPerhaps Marshall's strongest message is the lack of

appreciation, by tactical leaders, for the debilitatingeffects of stress and fear on the average soldier and itsresulting effect on his ability to carry a load.Recognized by our Army and incorporated into its soldier'sload doctrine is Marshall's conclusion that the soldier'sload causes fatigue which reduces his ability to deal withthe stress caused by normal battlefield fear. In turn,this fear induced stress rapidly tires the soldier, sappinghis strength, and reduces his ability to carry his load.This viscious fatigue-fear-fatigue cycle, rarely observablein training exercises, can debilitate even the best-trainedand well-led soldiers and must be considered by thecommander entering battle. 'Marshall sums it up this way,

Tired men take fright more easily. Frightened menswiftly tire.7Sergeant Bruce Heisley, Co. E, 16th Infantry, attackingOmaha Beach expressed the phenomena well:


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... I didn't know my strength was gone until I hit(the) beach. I was carrying part of a machinegun.~ormally. I could run with it. I wanted to do sonow bu t- I found I couldn't even walk with it. I couldbarely lift it. So I crawled across the sand draggingit with me. I felt ashamed of my own weakness.

Although Marshall focused on the simple fear ofdeath or wounding, others have expanded this discussion toinclude the more subtle effects that uncertainty plays.This factor of uncertainty--a fear causing leaders c . ~soldiers to take extra items--is, closely related to but,subtly differently from the fear of risk which preventssoldiers from leaving items behind.

An after-action summary of problems plaguing U.S.forces during the 1983 invasion of Grenada included"overburdened infantry." One reason for this problem wasthe tremendous level of uncertainty facing the invaders dueto an incredible dearth of credible information on thenumbers, capabilities, and intentions of the Grenadian andCuban enemy. This uncertainty, combined with a lack ofcombat experience at the tactical level in the Americanranks, caused commanders, planners, and soldiers to hedgetheir preparations--packing extra ammunition and grenades.9

In a Grenada study performed by Walter Reed ArmyMedical Center, Majors Dubik and Fullerton reached theconclusion that "uncertainty" was a factor that caused


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soldier over.loading in Grenada. Uncertainty caused by alack of operational information, rapidly changinginformation, lack of common training and SOP'S between someunits, and a lack of trust in the capabilities of otherunits or of the "system" to provide for needs. Thisuncertainty caused the initial units to pack for theworst. 10

The factor of uncertainty also played a role inincreasing the soldier's load in Panama. Fear of theunknown and concerns about resupply caused soldiers to makesecond trips to the ammo issue point. One brigade of the7th Light Infantry Division was forced to carry more thani t would have liked and even forage locally due to theoccasional uncertainty about resupply. 1 1n it's post-3ustCause bulletins, CALL stated that uncertainty over thethreat, nature, and duration of missions has causedsoldiers to deploy with twice as much ammunition as wasneeded and with unnecessary comfort items.12

Fear of RiskIn the military, "risk' is often defined a; the

voluntary exposure to danger. Military leaders must takerisks everyday to accomplish tasks with insufficientresources. However, these same leaders are often unwillingto take risks to insure that their soldier's fight light.


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The very essence of this risk-taking is thedecision to leave certain items of equipment and suppliesbehind so the soldier's load is tolerable. As Marshallpointed out, the leader cannot equip his troops for everypossible contingency. Based on his assessment of METT-T,the commander must be willing to pack only what isabsolutely required and leave the rest for transport byother means. The risk is that he will leave something hissoldiers will need; the consequences are that his unit mayfail to accomplish its task or his soldiers may suffer.Because of these consequences many commanders, and theirstaffs, are unwilling to accept the risk and thus sendtheir soldiers into battle overloaded.13

Marshall called this phenomena the "fears of thestaff." This fear took many forms and is often accompaniedby the thoughts that "nothing is too good for our men" anda "rule of safety' should be observed. That is to say,"our soldiers might so, to prevent this, theyshould ca'rr:y ." (The commander or staff officerinserts the appropriate words to justify an addition to thepacking list: e.g., "g o hungry, extra rations" or "getcold, extra blankets."

These "fears of the staff" are obvious whencommanders and their staffs feel that their judgment willbe called into question if a soldier should complain abouthunger due to a missed meal or should suffer frost nip from


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a cold night spent without a blanket. The overstaff finds that a simple and "risk-free" solutespecially during training, is to require everycarry all that he might need for his comfort!

ly-concernedion,soldier to

Marshall noted that this line of thinking causesoverloaded soldiers in combat because these actions,pre-conditioned by training, cannot be overcome by the factthat the unit is now in battle (in modern jargon, we willfight as we have trained). He went further to say that amore proper "rule of safety" would be observed i fcommanders and staff officers would recognize that incombat they are safer to equip their soldiers to fight withagility and accept the risk that they may get cold or missa meal because of it. He concluded this point by notingthat soldiers that are well-trained and led, and thatunderstand the reasons for their temporary hardships willnot complain unduly and, in fact, bond as a unit even moretightly because of it.14

Some more recent examples include a mention of riskanalysis in the 1962 USAIS study. The study made theinteresting observation that killing power should haveprimacy over troop protection requiring commanders toconsider risk to prevent the latter from degrading theforrner . 5Interviews with Rangers who parachuted into Panamanote that task analysis plays a key role in determining the


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equipment needed for a mission and thus, risk. Identifyingspecific tasks to be performed during an operation permitsa determination of the specific number or amount ofequipment to be taken. One Ranger recalled that he carrieda chain saw to cut down a fence on his objective. The factthat he was a large man showed proper consideration of therelationship between body weight and load carryingcapacity. However, the fact that he was also amachinegunner showed a lack of consideration of the weightof his weapon and ammo in determining who would carry thesaw. The soldier related how his heavy load and hardlanding left him somewhat disoriented after touchdown.16

Commenting on the dilemma over the decision whetheror not to wear body armor on operations, CALL bulletinsnote that leaders must evaluate and accept or refuse riskwith regards to protective armor versus agility and heatstress.17

The Fire LoadThis factor address the predictable occurrence that

soldiers will often go into battle overloaded with a greatdeal more ammunition than they will need. General Marshallexplored the problem of soldiers overloaded with ammunition(he called it the "fire load"), noting two main reasons forthis phenomena. The first is the false belief that givingthe soldier heavy loads of ammunition is good


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for his morale. The second reason is the notion thatshortages of ammunition regularly lead to tactical defeaton the modern battlefield.

Marshall also wrote about the belief of somecommanders and staffs that soldiers must be prepared forevery possible eventuality in order to "protect" them.This factor applies to the problems associated with issuingtoo much ammunition as well as requiring other items ofequipment.18

An example he used to illustrate the problem is thedistribution and use of hand grenades during World War Two.Many units reduced the soldier's load of rifle ammunition,a1 though not for the purpose of l ightening his burden, inorder to permit him to carry more grenades. Marshall'sinterviews showed that although most men were issuedbetween five and eight grenades, less than six percent ofthe soldiers ever threw them.19

Although Marshall's conclusions on fighting andfire have drawn the most criticism from his detractors, itis not difficult'to argue that the issuance of grenades was

onased more on the prevailing conventional wisdom thanmission requirements or usage rates.

The commander of the 82d Airborne Division'sbattalion to relieve the Rangers on Grenada directedhis soldiers draw a double basic load of ammunition.

1 eadthatHe


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regretted this decision later as he watched the menstaggering with their rucks to the aircraft .20

These experiences have pointed out the necessity toestablish and enforce a strict Standard Operating Procedure(SO P) for the amount of ammunition a soldier should carry.The authors recount interviews with members of twodifferent companies from one of the battalions of the 75thRanger Regiment.

One company, whose commander had participated inOperation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, andobserved the problems of overloaded soldiers in combat,insured that his soldiers took only their prescribed basicload. A sister company allowed the soldiers to return,after the basic issue, to the huge pallets of ammo liningthe airfield and draw additional ammo and grenades as theydesired. A sergeant in this company later estimated thathis ruck weighed 80 pounds and he needed assistancecarrying it to the plane. 21

The Draa of OrthodoxvThis factor is rooted in the conservative and

tradition-minded military culture that tends to regulateand sto th

tandardize many routine procedures. Marshais tendency as the "drag of orthodoxy." Th

1 1 referredis factor


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has two components. The first of these is conservativemind-set of the military leader.

Marshall explored the effects that traditionalthinking and resistance to change have on the soldier'sload. The military, as a conservative institution, is slowby nature to adopt change even after lessons learned inbattle point out a deficiency. He also noted that militaryleaders are inclined to heed the dictums of successfulleaders that preceeded them, especially if thesepronouncements come from the Great Captains of history.This difficulty to challenge accepted maxims exists even inlight of an "ever-broadening human experience.22

One example is the proverbial last resort of theinfantry--the bayonet. Marshall blamed the continuedexistence of the bayonet on tradition and the superstitionthat its possession makes troops more "fierce andaudacious.' Acknowledging some usefulness in physical andmental conditioning, Marshall stated that the Army neededto re-evaluate the utility of the bayonet from a purelyutilitarian and analytical point of view without sentimentwhatsoever. His bottom line--the bayonet is two poundsthat the soldier can do without!23

Similar thinking was displayed in the 1962 USAISstudy that noted tradition and resistance to change werekeeping the soldier overloaded and used the bayonet as an


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example of an item's tactical value failing to justify itsweight. 4

The second component to the drag of orthodoxy isthe "tyranny of the SOP." This exists when a leader citesan existing SOP or packing list without applying thevariables of METT-T in his planning to determine if theloads are appropriate for that operation. The SOP isdesigned to facilitate routine packing of the soldier'sload but must always be reviewed each mission. The factthat many unit SOP'S are written for the worst-casescenario or to facilitate field training only exacerbatesthe problem. 25

An example of this factor is seen in some of thesix battalions of the 82d Airborne deploying to Grenada in1983. It was near1 November at Fort Bragg and thedivision was packed in accordance with its standard winterpacking list. When units began deploying for the tropicalcombat zone, some thinking commanders dramatically tailoredtheir loads. However, other units deployed "by the book"and it was not unusual to see piles of sweaters, longunderwear, and even sleeping bags at Pope A ir Force Baseand around the airhead at Point Salines. 6

The chain of command often does not take personalaction to review or inspect the packing list--often simplyreferring to the unit's SOP and making no effort toeliminate unessential items or cross-level equipment based


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on mission loads. The results: Soldiers carrying 10 MREsbecause the unit's first planned resupply is three daysaway; machinegunners, among the most heavily laden,carrying additional medical kits because they happen to bethe qualified combat lifesaver; spare uniforms in case asoldier tears his clothing or he gets wet; soldiers withtwo rainsuits (the obsolete-yet-still-issued rubberizedsuit they are required to have to be "uniform" and thesuperior, Army-authorized but personal ly-purchased, goretexparka that many units won't permit the soldier to wearbecause "everyone doesn't have one"). 27

Discipline and the Enforcement of StandardsAt the opposite end of the spectrum from the

previous factor is the failure of leaders to determine whatweight their soldiers should carry, provide clear guidancein the form of a mission-designed packing list, and toenforce that packing list through rigorous inspection.

Marshall found that units that did establish apacking list frequently caused more harm than good bydirecting the packing of items that were neither requiredby the soldier or the mission. In illustration, Marshallrecounted the story of the 153rd Infantry Regiment'sassault on the Aleutian island of Kiska. The unit's longpacking list included a "Book of Battle


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Our modern army still has the same problem. CALLbulletins have irlcluded similar entries in recent years.Among these were: some commanders do not understand theimportance of their role in establishing and enforcingsoldier's load standards; unit SOP'S often do not addresssoldier's load concerns; although pre-combat inspections(PCI) are critical, leaders routinely fail to inspect theirsoldier's rucks. 9

Common at the JRTC are units that "talk soldiersload" up and down the chain of command. But when thetroops cross the line of departure, the average rifleman'sload still weighs 100.72 pounds. The observer/controller'sinspections reveal rucks laden with extra fatigue uniforms,galoshes, candy, paperback books, playing cards, cameras,extra food (several days worth of MRE's or civilian food inaddition to their Army rations), multiple rainsuits andflashlights, and troops carrying multiple weapons (Thepistol is not a MILES-capable weapon. At JRTC, soldiersarmed with pistols by T08E often carry an Mi6 rifle aswell).30

Nature o f the SoldierAnother factor to consider is the nature of the

soldier. This factor has two aspects. The first of these


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is the tendency of the inexperienced soldier to collect,hoard, and carry everything he finds of interest, isissued, or is directed to take. Marshall suggests thatthis is caused by the simple fact that soldiers are"packrats" by nature and, until they become moreexperienced, are also concerned they will meet disciplinaryaction if they should lose or fail to carry some item. 1 A1973 study done by Natick Labs validates the conclusionthat inexperienced soldiers initially tend to carry toomuch when left to decide for themselves. 2

The corollary is that when the soldier faces thereal-life challenge to carry his load or die, he quicklygains the experience to discern between what is necessaryand what isn't. If the chain-of-command fails to tailorthe soldier's load, the soldier.wil1 do it himself, on thebattlefield, by discarding what he feels he must. Theobvious problem here is that the soldier is making thechoices and the items chosen may include essentialequipment or supplies. The only way the leader caneffectively control this is to insure his soldiers carryonly the absolute essentials and that any discarding ofequipment must be control led by the 1 eaders.33


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vital stores on their organic vehicles were naw forced todeploy and fight without them. The paratroopers were'frequently grossly overloadedu greatly reducing theirmobility. Some innovative commanders corrected thisproblem by commandeering civilian vehicles and usingcaptured enemy trucks.35

After-action comments from Panama show how anoverall lack of sufficient lift assets placed greaterburdens on units and ultimately on the soldier. Due tospace, operational security, and time constraints unitssuffered from a lack of adequate strategic and theaterlift, helicopters, and trucks to provide lo gi st ~c s ndmobility as units and training procedures were designed.Instead, units were continually forced to "make do" withwhat was available and the end result was almost always aheavy rucksack on the soldier's back.36

These trends continue in our training exercises tothis day. In an era of aircraft shortages and fiscalconstaints, units must often choose between deploying thecommand and control and fighting vehicles, that maneuverduring the exercise, or the support trucks. Recent CALLreports note that a lack of support vehicles increases theload; and often we do not task the logisticians to assistour tactical com ander s in getting their 1 odds f~ r w a r d . ~ ~


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TThis factor addresses the inadequate, and sometimes

incorrect, soldier's load lessons that we routinely drawfrom our training experiences. One very real problem isthinking that a soldier or unit's capabilities in peactimeare equivalent to their expected capabilities in combat.Marshall suggests that this statement does not account forthe loss of physical strength caused by battlefield fearand is reinforced by the way in which we train. 8

The first of these training deficiencies is inpreparing our soldiers to carry heavy loads. Peacetimemaneuvers cannot replicate the energy drain that fearcreates in combat. The 1973 Natick Labs study concludesthat basing combat estimates and plans on load carryingexperience developed in peacetime is potentiallyhazardous. 9

Marshall planted the seeds of today's notion of"training heavy" but "fighting light." He advocatedtraining to the widely accepted load standard of 30% ofbody weight (or even slightly heavier is permissible) butendeavoring to fight in only 80% of the training load tocompensate for the fear-fatigue phenomena that isimpossible to rep1 icate in training.40

A second training issue is the way in which westructure exercises and the expectations this leads


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commanders to have of their soldiers in training and war.Marshall observed that trainin.g exercises are oftendeliberately sheduled to be very ambitious in theiraccomplishments. The reason is to insure that the forcegets maximum benefit from the training opportunity--"aproper workout." But when commanders, staffs, and soldiersare not warned that, in combat, their goals would be muchmore modest, a false perception is created that what ispossible on exercises is equally possible in battle. Overtime, the combat-experienced veterans grow fewer in numberand the myth of our capability, created in peacetime, isperpetuated as the expectation for battle. 1

Due to the high costs and complications of largescale field exercises, companies and battalions often t r a ~ nalone or with only a portion of their wartime augmentation.They learn to "make do' without much support because theydon't train with it. As a result, sometimes when divisionsgo to war the support resources of the division are notcoordinated to fully assist the brigades. Vehicles andservices that could assist the regiments and battalionswith their burdens may be doing other less critical tasks.Noteworthy here is the notion that load management is notjust company or battalion level business but also regimentand division level.42

Other studies have concluded that a d~ stinct ackof confidence in the ability of the supply trains to "make


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it happen" when needed resulted from problems intraining. 3 The British, making the same observationduring their operations in the Falklands, noted thatcontributdifficulttransport

ing to the soldier's burden were the logisticalies caused not only by the lack of resources andbut also by their lack of exercise in peacetime

It was observed that training exercises are normally aimedat honing the "teeth" of an army and less on preparing the"tai . " 44

Retired British General Julian Thompson calledthese the "false lessons of peacetime trainingi'--lessonsthat bear on the burden of the individual soldier. Among

the lesson that small wars and most exercises,hese isemphas zadequate

ing maneuver forces and operations, do notl y test or prepare the logistics system. Rarely

are commanders forced to choose between moving men orsupplies. In war, i f transport is limited, men will marchcarrying some of their suppl ies and the avai lab1 e transportwill be busy moving the rest. Thompso" also notes thesimilar deficiencies.noted during computer simulations orcommand post exercises designed to test procedures andcommunications. He suggests that it is much easier tocoordinate the "notional" logistics found in simulationsthan it is the actual 45


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The Effects of Techno1 oavThe role of modern technology has garnered great

publicity in the wake of Operation Desert Storm. A majorpurpose of technological advancement in our Army is to makethe organization more efficient in accomplishing itsmission in terms of cost, casualties, time, and resources.In the area of soldier's load, the goal of technology is tofind ways to reduce the burden of our already-overloadeddismounted combat soldiers.

Technological innovation has achieved somereductions in soldier's load in the past. One example isthe use of nylon in the construction of load bearingequipment as a replacement for cotton webbing. Thisresulted in a 36% reduction in weight when dry, even morewhen wet.46 Another positive example is the replacement ofthe canned "C-ration" with the much lighter Meal-Ready-to-Eat (MRE). However, more often than not, technologyworks to increase the soldier's load rather than reduce it.

One way technology increases the soldier's burdenis by creating a capability that did not exist before.Sometimes this is in response to a perceived or realthreat, sometimes it is caused by a simple breakthrough incapability. In either case, the end result is usually someitem, with some mass, that must now be carried by thesoldier.


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An example of responding to the threat is thechemical protective mask. Developed in world War One tocounteract the specte; of chemical warfare, the gas maskhas become an almost standard part of our battle uniform--at a cost of three pounds. 7 Two examples of breakthroughtechnology are night vision devices and the globalpostioning system. Both items were developed to give ourArmy a technological edge rather than respond to a specificenemy threat. They have become almost indispensable to theway we fight, and each have added between two and threepounds to the rucksacks of many soldiers. 8 In both of thepreceding examples, the technology introduced was apositive aspect but the added weight, any added weight, isbad for the already overloaded soldier.

Another example of emerging capabilities, theInfantry School's Enhanced Land Warrior project proposes togreatly increase the capabilities of the individual soldierand dismounted units by leveraging advanced technologiesfor communications and information management. However,the new equipment to make this leap ahead--miniature videocameras, helmet-mounted visual displays, thermal weaponssights, and individual soldier computers--are additionalitems, and weight, that the soldier will have to carry.49What impact will this have on mobility?


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A second way in which technology negatively impactson the soldier's load is when the load is lightened but thegain is lost to an increase in requirements. It might beargued that this is more properly a function of leaderdecision-making but these decisions are triggered bytechnological advance nonetheless. In a 1964 study, theArmy recognized that technology would allow the developmentof a composite fiber helmet and protective vest that wouldprovide the same or slightly better protection for asignificant weight savings over the current versions. Thealternative was a vastly increased level of protection forapproximately the same weight. The study concluded thatweight reduction, and thus increased agility and killingpower, should have primacy over troop protection. Thisrequired commanders to consider risk to prevent too muchprotection from degrading agility and killing power.50

This recommendation actually resulted in thepresent-day kevlar helmet, providing much greaterprotection than its steel predecessor but weighing anadditional one-third pound in its most common sizes; andthe kevlar vest, offering somewhat greater protection thanits precursor but also weighing an additional one-halfpound. 51

Related in nature, but more frustrating in theoutcome, is new but heavier technology thaexisting item, with only slight or no sign

t replaces ani f icant


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improvement in capability. An example is the Army's newwide-field-of-view, rubber-armored, European-made binocularthat replaces the older version but is more bulky and 10%heavier . 2

A less obvious way in which technology hasincreased the soldier's burden is through "load creepu--the increase of the rucksack load as a result of secondaryconsequences of other decisions system-wide.

Load-creep manifests itself in several ways. Oneof these ways is the decision to lighten not only thesoldier but the Army as a whole. A historical example isNapoleon's support of the invention of canned meat.Operationally it made his army lighter by reducing hislogistical tail and his dependence on huge herds oflivestock. Tactically, his soldier's felt the new burdenof glass and metal food containers in their haversacks.53

A more modern example is our efforts to "lightenthe force" and create a strategically mobile light infantrydivision. The lightness of the division came, in part,from its lack of supporting vehicles and aircraft. Thisstategic agility translated into heavy rucks due to thelack of tactical transport.54

Load creep can also be found in the way we developand acquire our equipment. Excessive requirements fordurability and quality usually insure that the soldier getsa piece of equipment that is more sturdily constructed


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(thus heavier) than actually required. A 1964 studyconsidered the effects of durability and functionalrequirements on item weight. It recognized that itemsoften had durability ratings much longer than theirexpected combat lifespan. This extra durability usuallymeant that the item was heavier and bulkier than i t neededto be.

A 1988 Natick study notes that many items ofsoldier equipment are developed one item at a time and inrelative isolation from other items. Thus small weightincreases are overlooked (what can a couple of ounceshurt?) especially when increased capabilities attend them.The new boot is .7 pounds heavier, the new rucksack is 1.4pounds heavier, the new gas mask is .8 pounds heavier, thenew squad radio is .7 pounds heavier, the new bayonet is .5pounds heavier, and the new rifle is .3 pounds heavier.Increases that were considered insignificant in isolationquietly added 4.4 pounds to the soldier that alreadyexceeded every weight guide1 ine pub1 ished! 5

A 1964 Army study recognized that the standardpractice of equipping the entire army with uniforms andbasic equipment designed for the infantry may becounterproductive. The study concluded that by ignoringthe combat life span of infantry items, beefing them up toan item life useful to the army as a whole, the itemsbecame heavier and more costly. It proposed that special


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items be designed, even at higher cost i f necessary, tomeet the infantry task and save wei ght ; the increased costsbeing offset by only issuing these special items to combatinfantry units. 6

A final

Factors of Soldier Load

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