FACILITATING A BASIS FOR A

“UNITY OF PURPOSE” BETWEEN THE VANGUARDS OF THE BANGSAMORO PEOPLE IN

THE MINDANAO PEACE PROCESSES

An Initiative of:

Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC PAGE NO Background of the Proposal 1 The Solidarity Initiative 7 The Consolidated and Validated Outputs Constituting the Proposal to Enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity

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Bangsamoro Multi-Sectoral Declaration for Solidarity 15 Annexes 20

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BACKGROUND OF THE PROPOSAL

INTRODUCTION An amir’ul mujahideen once said, “Only people with the same goal and mission in life and who see things from the same lens can work together.” In respect to revolution he further said, “Only those who have strong commitment, steadfast and are willing to sacrifice will sustain the work of jihad, while those with vacillating tendencies and easily cowed will drop like falling leaves.”

Another Moro revolutionary leader commented, “The process of revolution teaches a revolutionary to live a simple life and moulds him the right attitudes, exemplifying the ideal. Thus revolution is in itself a change agent.” He continued, “Revolutionaries, even if they share the same mission, may at some point in time stop to continue to work together strategically for some reasons, but nothing can stop them from engaging tactically for a common cause.”

The words from these leaders inspire us in the civil society to untiringly call for solidarity, if not unity, among the Bangsamoro leaders, especially the revolutionary leaders as the key to pursue a united solution to the Mindanao problem. It offers us to see possibilities of bringing together the leaders of the Bangsamoro fronts so that they consolidate their stand in light of the on-going peace process in Southern Philippines.

The history of splits within the Philippine revolutionaries is not uncommon. During the Philippine colonial period, splits in the Filipino revolution already existed, as in the case of the Aguinaldo group which bolted from Bonifacio’s. This is also true in the contemporary revolutions in other parts of the world: in Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, etc.. Sometimes a multi-split happens in a revolutionary group. It can divide itself several times, as in the case of the CPP-NDF and similarly that of the MNLF. In the early 70’s the CPP-NDF once served as a single revolutionary group fighting for national democracy and reform in the Philippines. Now, there is a faction, the so-called rejectionist group which bolted from the main NDF-CPP and also divided into several groupings. The Monolithic MNLF bannering freedom and independence of the Bangsamoro survived as a single and united Bangsamoro liberation front in the early 70s. The Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), the armed wing of the MNLF sustained its armed struggle from its inception up to the time of the signing of the now infamous 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Four years later, the split in the united MNLF started to occur. In 1980 the short-lived MNLF-Reformist group and the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) separated from the mainstream MNLF. Their leaders later on either joined the government or retired completely. In 1984, the now MILF also bolted from the MNLF. Later on, the so-called ICC command, the Alvarez wing MNLF came into their own existence. It is also common knowledge that some of the leaders of the so-called Abu Sayyaf were former combatants of the MNLF. The “Executive council of 15” (EC) which took over leadership from the “ousted” Nur Misuari and made the latter chairman emeritus also became a big

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issue. More recently, a “new” MNLF “chairman” was elected that had “replaced” the then incarcerated and now bailed-out MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari. The gathering in Davao city and other parts of Mindanao attended by thousands of MNLF leaders and their sympathizers from different parts of Mindanao, proved that the MNLF-led Misuari is still a force to reckon with. The on-going tripartite review of the 1996 Peace Accord in Africa attended by the Misuari-led MNLF also shows that indeed, after all, the MNLF led by Misuari is not the breakaway group. Be it as it may, the break-ups within in the MNLF is real. Taking into account the given situation of splits both in the case of the NDF-CPP experience and the Moro fronts, the basic question however remains whether the split serves the cause of revolution better, or is it counter-productive. To what extend does a split in a revolutionary organization adversely affect the advancement of the cause they promote? What factors could have caused the split and the lack of cooperation among the Bangsamoro Fronts? Is it still possible for the fronts to re-unite or at least work tactically for a common cause? Is the split a blessing or a disaster to the Bangsamoro? Will this divergence lead to the achievement of self-determination or self-destruction? These are some of the questions that an ordinary Bangsamoro asks which the fronts need to answer. THE SPLIT OF THE MORO FRONTS The split in the Moro fronts on one hand, and the possibility of working tactically or strategically on the other hand, can be best analyzed through understanding their mission, their mandate and legitimacy, their strategic options, leadership style and their organizational culture, among others. To some extent, the role of international communities in the dynamics of the fronts can also be an important input. Firstly, let it be admitted that all the Moro fronts share the same goal and mission. That is “To liberate the Bangsamoro from national oppression and the vision to establish a society where the words of Allah are supreme….” “One People, One Objective” says a streamer hanging in some strategic places in Cotabato city. They also share the same revolutionary option of “armed struggle” as an approach to achieving this mission, although all of them are now talking peace with the government. The Tausogs summarize the bases of the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination as a struggle in defence of “Bangsa, Hulah, Agama” (Land/Territory, People/Nation and Religion/Identity). This is also interpreted as the struggle for ancestral domain. This commonality is seen as binding rather than a dividing factor. Secondly, the Moro fronts get their mandate and legitimacy from the Bangsamoro. The fronts, by assuming the role of being duty-bearers, also act as vanguards, representatives and guardians of the Bangsamoro. As duty-bearers, the fronts draw their legitimacy from the right-holders – the Bangsamoro. By this inference, the fronts are morally obliged to listen to the Bangsamoro and abide by what they feel should be the right thing to do. This

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position and obligation shall make the fronts even more conscious of genuinely consulting the masses of the Bangsamoro as the one who gave them the mandate that legitimizes their actions. Thirdly, the long existence of the fronts has been made possible through the support of the people whose interests the former had sworn to defend, protect and safeguard. The Bangsamoro provides moral, human and financial support to the fronts. Simply stated, the strength of the fronts emanates from the Bangsamoro. It is the same Bangsamoro the MNLFs and the MILF serve. From the above, we see clearly that the fronts are one in their mission, sources of legitimacy and support. It is the Bangsamoro who gave them the mandate. Hence, they are responsible to the people. Is the basic difference among the fronts found in their strategic political options and the means of achieving them? Or, is it in their way of managing their organizations and ways of resolving contradictions within?

At this point in time, what are the inclinations and tendencies of the different fronts on a strategic political option? One group of the MNLF feels that the tripartite meeting, which is aimed at resolving the controversial 1996 Peace Accord is being overtaken by events and an alternative option in pursuing the strategic development of the Bangsamoro is through the installation of a federal structure of governance in the country. This is premised in some reports that the MNLF is no longer interested in the ARMM. The other MNLF wing on the other hand aims at tactically working with the government in improving delivery of services and good governance in the ARMM. The MILF, in the other equation, is pursuing the attainment of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), which covers a larger geographical area, more political authority, and a substantial control of resources. Clearly these respective positions of the fronts are not contradictory. They are in progression. At the best, they are reconcilable. One continues from where the other ends. So, where does the contradiction lie? Organizational centralism and handling of internal contradiction There is no safe way of analyzing how the fronts conduct their internal affairs. Whether or not they manage their respective organization consultatively, democratically or dictatorially cannot be determined by outsiders. The dynamics within an organization is the way how that certain organization manages its internal affairs. This involves participation of members, culture of doing things and democratic consultations, fund and conflict management, and regular summing up, etc. How democratic the decision-making process is within the organization is only known to them. But the culture of an organization, even revolutionary fronts, also takes into consideration how they relate with the people they ought to serve, defend and protect in the conduct of their affairs. When and how they consult the people is a very important question because this is one barometer of the respect of the people’s mandate, without which it only suggests

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that the fronts are operated like private organizations as in cooperatives or corporations that only serve its members. What is the role of personality in the split? Has ethnicity something to contribute in the split? If the fundamental contradiction and difference among the fronts is neither in their mission and mandate nor in their political strategy or organizational culture, is it in the difference of the personality of their leaders that divide them? Is it the one which holds them from working tactically or strategically? If indeed it is, is personality thicker than the cause of freedom and self-determination? Clearly, sharing the same mission and resources and serving the same people is a potential reason for the fronts to collaborate and cooperate either tactically or strategically. The areas on strategy in achieving their mission, while they differ, cannot stop them from working together. The complementation of one’s strategy with that of the other can help the organizations reach their goal. Complementation should not be looked at as an imposition but an important means of bridging gaps. COMMON THREAT While the fronts are on their individual struggle, the government is making all attempts to defeat them both politically and militarily. Politically, the MNLF is now completely deprived and eased out from the ARMM which they once served. The ARMM is the “sweat and blood” of the Bangsamoro mujahideen as the famous line goes. Without control of the ARMM, the demand for downloading what the government had not delivered yet in the 1996 FPA does not make sense. Thus, the review of the 1996 Peace Agreement does not serve its purpose without the MNLF at the helm of the ARMM. The MILF on the other hand found a dead-end when the government at the end of their 11-year old peace talks and after all “consensus points” had been agreed upon, insisted that only through a constitutional process can the MILF attain self-governance in some parts of Mindanao. As a form of warning, the government is ready to use force should the MILF insist on self-governance outside of the constitutional process. This is clearly a negotiation on the basis of strength. As part of the three-point government strategy, the military is always ready to take action should pacification campaigns and peace talks fail. Forum Shopping The divide and rule tactic being employed against the fronts is becoming effective only because they allowed them to be. The strength of the enemy is always measured against the weakness of the fronts. The vulnerability of the fronts to be divided and its susceptibility to outside influence are among its weaknesses. Added to this, the government enjoys “forum shopping” on which group to support and the only criterion is “lowest bidder”. This happens because the fronts have not come out with a common agenda/demand.

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The irony is that the fronts are talking to the government but they are not talking to each other. While the fronts listen to foreign advice, as in the case of an MNLF-MILF unity effort a few years ago and unsustained for whatever reasons, and the latest efforts at bringing together the MNLFs in Tripoli Libya, they hardly lend an ear to their own people who are incessantly calling for a working solidarity. At the expense of giving what can be best to their people, they continue to snub efforts to put their acts together by the same people who have given them their mandate and legitimacy.

The best way to keep them divided, or at least prevent them from working together, is by giving attention to one front and set aside the other. Being divided, one can be a spoiler to the other at given circumstances. This will prevent the fronts from working against a common threat.

This state of affairs should be considered as a common threat by the fronts in pursuit of a compromised peace.

So, what are the fundamental differences that prevent them from joining hands? Are these differences irreconcilable? Are not the leaders of the fronts good Muslims? THE URGENT CALL

Indeed, it is to the greater interest of the Bangsamoro that the fronts work together, even tactically, if not strategically. This is easier said than done, but divided fronts beget a divided people and a divided people are always vulnerable to defeat.

If and when the fronts put their act together and face the government in a negotiating table pushing for a common agenda, it will make a difference. The government cannot do “forum shopping” and snub a common demand of a united Bangsamoro. As the diplomatic process becomes imperative in the pursuit for self-governance, the only option left for the Bangsamoro is to come up with a common demand and this will only happen when they start to talk using shura as an instrument for decision-making. Without this, the struggle for freedom is nearing its end. And unless a new “band” of Muslims will come out to rescue the fate of the Bangsamoro, self-determination shall only remain as a state of mind.

Solidarity and unity does not become an empty rhetoric when the fronts talk and push for a common agenda. They need not merge their organizations, but they can organize a solidarity front to carry their demands. After all, they share the same vision and Goal: “THE LIBERATION OF THE BANGSAMORO AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MUSLIM SOCIETY GOVERNED BY THE SHARIA’H.” The Bangsamoro Solidarity for Freedom and Self-determination (Bangsa Moro-Solidarity) The Bangsa Moro Solidarity (BMS) is a concrete expression of the solidarity and unity of the Bangsamoro in advancing the cause of self-determination through the peace process.

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Through this common platform and tactical alliance, which will provide an opportunity for consensus building among the major stakeholders, the BM shall be able to put forward a unified and mutually agreed position in the peace process. This alliance neither dissolves the existing fronts, nor merges them into one. Their respective positions vis-à-vis the on-going peace process shall be consolidated and made into one position to be submitted to the government for consideration. The BMS will define areas of cooperation, collaboration and coordination. They come to terms on how they deal with each other even without physically coming together. Its urgent task is to consolidate their stance and come up with a consensually agreed position that embodies the ideals of a Bangsamoro society. With the common mission and vision of the BM leaders, the BMS will be able to surmount obstacles on its way, thus paving the way towards the attainment of its avowed goal. We, the CBCS will exert our utmost effort to make the Bangsamoro, their leaders, and the fronts understand that only in solidarity and in a unity of purpose will Allah’s help be forthcoming. This is our urgent task. We will celebrate that time when the leaders of the Bangsamoro will come together for the sake of the Bangsamoro and work together for our general good.

We look at these sayings as a source of our strength:

“Is personality thicker than the mission for freedom and independence?”

“It is good to be alone (divided?) than in the company of the evils, it is an evil to be away from the company of good doers.” “A band of few people will come out to save you from oppression and exploitation….” Which group may this be? “Hold unto the rope of Allah all together and don’t be divided……” “Self-determination or Self-destruction?” “Allah’s help will come to a united people who want to help themselves.”

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THE SOLIDARITY INITIATIVE OVERVIEW This intra-solidarity campaign for the Bangsamoro exclusively focuses on enumerating and legitimizing a set of issues and concerns that directly affect the greater Bangsamoro people in relation to their struggle to regain their Right to Self-Determination. In particular, this initiative sought to facilitate the identification of areas of “cooperation, coordination and collaboration” (CCC) that the MNLF and MILF may work on. These areas of CCC were culled from the various perspectives of key personalities representing the different sectors and groups that comprise the whole Bangsamoro spectrum and were consolidated into a proposal that may serve as guide or framework for a more concrete “solidarity of work” between the two fronts as they separately engage with the GRP. REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLIES In developing this “solidarity of work framework”, a series of “consultative assemblies” were conducted. This utilized a data gathering process. A total of thirty-five (35) representatives from the different communities, sectors and leaders from each of the eight (8) regions of CBCS coming from the whole Bangsamoro spectrum were invited and asked certain questions. These questions focused on observable and/or known issues, concerns, problems and recommendations directly affecting the Bangsamoro people in terms of their struggle to regain their RSD, which they believe the MNLF and the MILF can work together on as a mutual or common stand in their separate peace processes with the GRP. The gathered data were collated and consolidated into a draft “Proposal to Enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity”. Objectives In general, the Regional Consultation Assemblies aim to come up with a set of issues that would protect and uphold the identity, security, community, and vitality of the Bangsamoro people, which the MNLF and MILF leadership and membership may agree on to collaborate and work on commonly vis-à-vis their respective peace negotiations with the GRP. This will be taken out from the thoughts, views, insights and recommendations of relevant sectors of the Bangsamoro society.

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Specifically, this series of consultation-assemblies aims to:

1. Provide a perspective on the history of the Bangsamoro struggle to regain its right to self-determination, highlighting the experiences of the MNLF and MILF in their separate peace processes with the GRP;

2. Discuss the relevance, importance and urgency of a “unity of purpose” or a “solidarity in work” between and among the Bangsamoro in relation to attaining its RSD using as reference pertinent Qur’anic verses; and

3. Gather insights, views, perspective and recommendations that would enhance a commonality of position among the two fronts that would continue to uphold the greater interest of the Bangsamoro mass base in the peace negotiations with the GRP.

Area of Coverage The eight (8) Regional Consultation Assemblies were conducted in the following areas:

Region Area Covered Date

1. Dabaw Region Davao City, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostella Valley, and Davao Oriental

January 22

2. Kutawato Region Cotabato City, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Shariff Kabunsuan

January 26

3. Ranaw Region Marawi City, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and Lanao del Sur

January 28

4. Sibugay Region Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay (eastern half), and Zamboanga del Norte (eastern half)

January 29

5. Samboangan Region Zamboanga City, Zamboanga Sibugay (western half), and Zamboanga del Norte (western half)

February 1

6. Basilan Region Isabela City, Lamitan City, and Basilan February 3

7. Lupah Sug Region Jolo and Sulu February 5

8. Rajah Buayan Region Gen. Santos City, Sarangani, South Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat

February 8

Issues and Concerns Clarified and Resolved

1. A Solidarity Summit cum Validation Workshop will be conducted to finalize what

would be the draft “Proposal on Enhancing Bangsamoro Solidarity”. 2. The data gathered will be treated with utmost confidentiality on the part of CBCS

and shall be deliberated whether parts of the outputs can be considered for public dissemination.

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3. Five (5) key delegates from each region who had actively participated in the regional consultative assemblies will be invited to the Solidarity Summit cum Validation Workshop for the finalization of the “Proposal on Enhancing Bangsamoro Solidarity”.

4. From among the five (5) one (1) or two (2) will be invited again to be part of the

official delegation that would deliver the Finalized “Proposal on Enhancing Bangsamoro Solidarity”.

Challenges Encountered

1. Reluctance of some invited participants to attend in the Regional Consultative Assemblies due to their misconception that the overall impression was that CBCS was “presuming to advise the MNLF and MILF on what to do in the peace process.”

2. Reluctance of some participants in the Sulu and Basilan region who are leaning or

sympathetic to the MNLF to attend the Regional Consultative Assemblies due to their misconceptions that CBCS was leaning or sympathetic to the MILF.

Measures Initiated

1. Due effort was made on the part of CBCS and the TWG to clarify to those participants who carried the misconception that this initiative was tantamount to CBCS wanting to “advise” the MNLF and MILF on what to do in the peace process that this was simply not the case. In this particular endeavor, CBCS was a mere facilitator, collecting and consolidating what was culled from the key representatives of the Bangsamoro spectrum and packaging this for transmittal to the respective leaderships of the MNLFs and the MILF. In this role, no imposition or undue influence can be made by CBCS at the risk of damaging its credibility.

2. The same amount of effort was made by CBCS and the TWG in clarifying to the

participants who thought that CBCS was leaning towards the MILF that CBCS “came from the Bangsamoro, is made by the Bangsamoro, and is for the Bangsamoro”, regardless of whether one is pro-MNLF, pro-MILF, non-aligned, or whatever.

BANGSAMORO SOLIDARITY SUMMIT AND VALIDATION WORKSHOP After the Consultative Assemblies were conducted, the gathered data were collated and consolidated into a draft “Proposal to Enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity”. Then a Solidarity Summit cum Validation Workshop was conducted, which was participated by key and select participants from the consultative assemblies. The participants validated the consolidated outputs/ collated data from all the consultative assemblies and finalized the draft proposal.

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Objectives In general, this Bangsamoro Solidarity Summit and Validation Workshop aims to validate the set of issues that have been deemed requisites to protect and uphold the identity, security, community, and vitality of the Bangsamoro people, which the MNLF and MILF leadership and membership may agree to collaborate and work on commonly vis-à-vis their respective peace negotiations with the GRP.

Specifically, this series of consultation-assemblies aims to:

1. To provide a perspective on the history of the Bangsamoro struggle to regain its right to self-determination, highlighting the experiences of the MNLF and MILF in their separate peace processes with the GRP;

2. To discuss the relevance, importance and urgency of a “unity of purpose” or a “solidarity in work” between and among the Bangsamoro in relation to attaining its RSD using as reference pertinent Qur’anic verses; and

3. To gather insights, views, perspective and recommendations that would enhance a commonality of position among the two fronts that would continue to uphold the greater interest of the Bangsamoro mass base in the peace negotiations with the GRP.

After this has been done, a delegation that have equal representation from each of the consultations were formed. This delegation will present to the respective leadership of the MNLF and the MILF the finalized solidarity proposal for reactions, comments and/or advice. Finally, for purposes of transparency, the reactions and/or advices of each leadership will be presented to the other leaderships for consideration.

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THE CONSOLIDATED AND VALIDATED OUTPUTS CONSTITUTING THE PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE BANGSAMORO SOLIDARITY

CHALLENGES TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE BANGSAMORO RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION On Education on Bangsamoro History and Right to Self-Determination

Poor education on Bangsamoro history and right to self-determination o Filipinos o Moros, especially the youth o International community

Stereotypes o Media bias against the Moros o Filipino bias against the Moros

Misconceptions/ misunderstanding o Bangsamoro as native inhabitants of Mindanao o Bangsamoro as a people and a nation

On Information-Education-Campaign on the Peace Processes

Government Strategies/ Shortcomings: o Divisive peace (simultaneous, etc.) talks by Government of the Republic of

the Philippines (GRP) to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

o Counter-insurgency projects o Offering of incentives (money, position) o Invoking of constitutional framework o Assimilation of the Bangsamoro to the Filipino body-politic (e.g. Filipinization

through the mainstream educational system and teaching Makabayan subject in government-funded Madaris)

o GRP’s use of MNLF integrees in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in its war against the MILF

o None full-implementation of the GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 by the GRP

o GRP’s backing out of the GRP-MILF Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain

o Lack of government comprehensive peace program in dealing with rebels

Lack of support/ participation o Many sectors o Key/ influential Moro leaders/figures

Misinformation/ disinformation/ intrigues/ hearsays

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On Initiatives for MNLF and MILF Solidarity

Differences in goal and perspectives

Attitudinal or un-Islamic mentality: o Judgmental o Subjective o False pride o Personal vested interest o Un-Islamic leadership o Betrayals o Lack of mutual trust o Respect o Understanding

Perceived assumption of non-recognition of past gains in the Bangsamoro struggle for the attainment of RSD (individuals/ fronts/ issues)

o Intrigues o Misconception o Hearsays

Divisive factors o Tribalism o Regionalism o Factionalism o Difference in expressions of ideological principles o Power struggle o Disunification

On Initiatives for Moro Mass Base Solidarity

Attitudes: o Judgmental o Subjective o False pride o Personal vested interest o Betrayal o Power struggle/ craving for power/authority o Crab mentality o Destructive criticism o Lack of trust o Dishonestly o Greediness o Competition

Moro vs. Moro stereotypes

“Hard core” support to one front, instead of emphasis to the overall Bangsamoro goal to attain right to self-determination

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POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED IN ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES On Education on Bangsamoro History and Right to Self-Determination

Da’wah on Islam

Bangsamoro history

Bangsamoro identity (as people & nation)

Bangsamoro right to self-determination

Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines On Information-Education-Campaign on the Peace Processes

Highlighting previous agreements with the Philippine Government (Tripoli Agreement, Jeddah Accord, etc)

GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996

GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, Bangsamoro Juridical Entity)

Recognition of the gains achieved by the two fronts in the pushing for Bangsamoro right to self-determination

Documentation of breaches in agreements, lessons learned, etc.

Strengthening of conflict resolution, justice system, reconciliation, human rights watch, advocacy & education

Community-based advocacies

Internationalization/ continuous international guarantee of the peace process

Organizing or sustaining mobilizations of multi-sectoral groups

Conduct of conferences or seminars On Initiatives for MNLF and MILF Solidarity

Advocacy for o Tactical alliance between the two fronts o Communication/ dialogue o Fora/ conference o Consultations o Discipline among the fronts' rank and file o Revisiting the fronts’ original goal for the Bangsamoro

Formation of a body to facilitate the solidarity process, if possible On Initiatives for Moro Mass Base Solidarity

Da’wah or Islamization

Strengthening conflict resolution and justice system

Inter-ethnic or intercultural exchange initiatives

All-out support to the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination

Education about Bangsamoro history and right to self-determination

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ROLES THAT THE MORO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS CAN PLAY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVER-ALL GOAL OF ACHIEVING THE BANGSAMORO RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION On Education on Bangsamoro History and Right to Self-Determination

Bangsamoro history

Bangsamoro identity (as people & nation)

Bangsamoro right to self-determination

Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines

Da’wah on Islam

Anchoring their Vision, Mission, Goals and Objectives (VMGO) on the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination

Assessment or evaluation of the present status of the Bangsamoro struggle for the attainment of its right to self-determination

On Information-Education-Campaign on the Peace Processes

Campaign for the completion of the review and full implementation of GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996

Popularization of the GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, BJE)

Activities to elicit the support of: o Many sectors o Prominent/ influential figures/ leaders

Documentations of lessons learned, breaches in agreements, etc

Wide peace consultations and advocacy

Initiatives for MNLF-MILF solidarity or unity of purpose

Popularization of the peace processes in all levels of society On Initiatives for MNLF and MILF Solidarity

Serve as bridge/ convener/facilitator/mediator between the two groups

Documenter

“Never quits till mission is accomplish.” On Initiatives for Moro Mass Base Solidarity

Education and Da’wah

Unity of Bangsamoro Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s)

Alliance/ networking/ partnership

Strengthening conflict resolution and justice system

Capability training

Strengthening and sustaining solidarity of Bangsamoro leaders

Strengthening of the ulama towards contextualization of their role and mobilizing them in the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination

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BANGSAMORO MULTI-SECTOR DECLARATION FOR SOLIDARITY

Prior to the coming of the foreign colonizers, the Bangsamoro have been acclaimed as the “First Nation” in Asia who had been freely exercising and enjoying their inalienable right to self-determination as sovereign people and nation. With the vast resources of their ancestral homeland, the Bangsamoro had been living with prosperity, dignity and honor and are historically known as a peace-loving people in the far east. However, with the incursion of foreign colonialism, this prosperous and happy life was shattered by war and terrorism. Pushed against the wall to defend themselves and their homeland, the Bangsamoro became a freedom fighter. Our ancestors and forefathers fought a gallant stand for many centuries to resist colonialism and preserve their way of life. Because of superior firepower of the enemy, they may have been colonized, but they were never subjugated. This struggle was carried on until the present generation. First, the struggle was re-echoed by the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) and later rekindled by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Aware, that the ongoing struggle of the Bangsamoro people to restore its inalienable right to self-determination is being hampered by divide and rule tactics of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP); Cognizant, that the MNLF at present is being confronted by difficult internal dynamics that challenge its solidarity and integrity as a vanguard of the Bangsamoro that have caused adverse effect to the entire Bangsamoro, especially to the ordinary people; Recognizing, that the GRP has no sincerity and no political will to address the Moro issue; Realizing, that the gravity of the problem of continuing pacification and mainstreaming of the Bangsamoro highlights the urgent need to consolidate the Bangsamoro and strengthen the unity of our Fronts to move forward until victory is at hand; Reaffirming, that the MNLF and the MILF have the prior mandate of the Bangsamoro people to spearhead the struggle to restore their inalienable right to self-determination, as well as to engage with the GRP on their behalf in the peace process; Reaffirming further, the vital role of the Moro civil society organizations to intertwine with other social groupings with similar or identical agenda for the Bangsamoro;

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For and in consideration of the above, we, the undersigned representatives of various sectors of the Bangsamoro spectrum from Dabaw Region, Rajah Buayan Region, Kutawato Region, Ranaw Region, Sibugay Region, Samboangan Region, Basilan Region, and Lupah Sug Region, have resolved to participate in a series of facts-and-perceptions-gathering regional consultative assemblies towards “Developing a proposal to enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity” to identify issues and areas for more effective coordination, collaboration and cooperation that would be contributory to the struggle for RSD and which would redound to the greater benefit of the Bangsamoro people. NOW THEREFORE, based on the outputs culled from the regional consultative assemblies and the solidarity summit and validation workshop, we hereby make the following declarations: We express deep concern over several perceived DIVERGENCES among us that may threaten our common struggle to restore our right to self-determination from being attained. These include, but are not limited to:

1. Among the Bangsamoro people at large: factionalism, ethnocentrism/ tribalism, regionalism, lingual differences, different principles, ideological differences, clan conflict/ family feud, political alignment/ affiliation.

2. Between the MNLF and the MILF: Association of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement to

the MNLF only and the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain to the MILF only, when in fact both documents redound to the benefit of all the Bangsamoro, whether MNLF, MILF or otherwise.

3. The unbecoming conduct of some Mujahideen of the rank and file of the two Fronts.

4. There is poor or lack of information, or education and there is disinformation

campaign about the Bangsamoro History, Bangsamoro identity/nationality, Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination as expressed through the GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 (Review) and the GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, BJE), and about the Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines.

5. The GRP has consistently institutionalized various strategies that effectively prevent

and deny the Bangsamoro from restoring their right to self-determination, such as: divisive peace talks with the MNLF and the MILF, counter-insurgency projects, offering of incentives (money and position), invoking of constitutional framework, assimilation (Filipinization through the mainstream educational system and the introduction of the subject Makabayan in government-funded Madaris), the use of MNLF integrees in the AFP in the war against the MILF, the none full-implementation of the FPA by the GRP and their backing out of the MOA-AD, and the lack of consistent and comprehensive peace policy in dealing with revolutionary groups.

6. There is a lack of support and participation from different sectors and key influential

Moro leaders or figures.

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7. There is stereotyping among the Moro tribes (e.g. tribal chauvinism), as well as between Moro and non-Moro (e.g. branding the Moros as terrorists).

8. There are prevailing attitudes that do not conform to Islam, such as: being

judgmental, subjective, have false pride (distorted maratabat), personal vested interest, betrayal, power struggle, crab mentality, destructive criticism, lack of trust, dishonesty, greed and competition.

In response to the perceived divergences, we present the following recommendations that would contribute to a more meaningful SOLIDARITY WORK towards attaining our common struggle to restore our right to self-determination to the two Fronts for consideration. These include, but are not limited to:

1. Information-Education-Communication/ popularization in all levels of the following: Bangsamoro History, Bangsamoro identity/nationality, Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination, GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 (Review), GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, BJE), Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines;

2. Recognizing, valuing, honoring and treasuring the gains made by the two Fronts in

pushing for Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination;

3. Initiatives for unity of purpose of the Fronts, which may include: opening of and continuing constant communication between the two Fronts, the conduct of fora and consultations and conference on issues that relate to the struggle and to the peace process, the forming of a tactical alliance in both struggle for RSD and in the peace process;

4. Promotion and practice of discipline among the rank and file Mujahideens of the two

Fronts;

5. Continuous da’wah or Islamization that would promote Islamic values and practices, to promote inter-ethnic and inter-cultural exchanges; strengthening conflict resolution, justice system, human rights watch and advocacies.

It is fervently hoped and prayed that the above-mentioned declarations be considered and reflected on by the two Bangsamoro Fronts for any possible action that would contribute to the enhancement of Bangsamoro solidarity, with the end goal of strengthening the overall struggle to restore our inalienable right to self-determination. Let this be our common slogan and continuing reminder: “One Bangsamoro, One Belief, and One Qiblah!” Adopted this 26th day of April, 2009, during the BANGSAMORO SOLIDARITY SUMMIT and VALIDATION WORKSHOP, held at Hotel Camila, Pagadian City.

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(Sgd.) Ligaya C. Abubacar Bangsamoro Women for Peace Davao City (Sgd.) Abdulmutalib S. Esmael SUBATAGEN General Santos City (Sgd.) Mistiri D. Tarami Bantey Basilan Basilan (Sgd.) Arthur D. Baul CBCS Basilan Basilan (Sgd.) Ismael M. Gonzales LIDA Inc. San Isidro, Bunawan, Davao City (Sgd.) Hazar Muarip-Ahmad Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women Baas, Lamitan, Basilan (Sgd.) Hanah M. Ahmad Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women Basilan (Sgd.) Nahan B. Insung Yakan Intergrated Dev’t Foundation Inc. Lamitan, Basilan (Sgd.) Bayan M. Marwin BUSC- Basilan Tipo-tipo Basilan (Sgd.) Ma. Emily A. Trumata CBCS Basilan

(Sgd.) Ishaq G. Daud Al-Ihsan Foundation Cotabato City (Sgd.) Assib M. Ibrahim MAP-Southphil-Agrimarines Indusries Maguindanao (Sgd.) Tu Alid Alfonso United Youth for Peace and Development Cotabato City (Sgd.) Badjolon M. Barotoc Salam Davao Davao City (Sgd.) Sami M. Buat CBCS Davao (Sgd.) Mike G. Kulat CBCS Central Office Cotabato City (Sgd.) Ferrer T. Marcaban Ummah Fi Salam Pagadian City (Sgd.) Abdulmutalib S. Esmael SUBATAGEN General Santos City (Sgd.) Ebrahim D. Sandigan HICCI General Santos City (Sgd.) Oscar A. Sulaiman MAGMOFFI Kiamba, Sarangani Province

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(Sgd.) Isnira A. Baginda PMDS/ SUBATAGEN General Santos City (Sgd.) Almisri F. Kunting Islamic Foundation for Development Tetuan Highway, Zamboanga City (Sgd.) Fatima A. Salih Women’s Federation Campo Muslim, Zamboanga City Ben-Omar J. Jadjaie Lundang Panun Zamboanga City (Sgd.) Amir Abdulla H. Maing ZNUCI/ SAEDI/ IP’ Sirawai, Zamboanga del Norte (Sgd.) Jumda S. Saba-ani MURID Jolo, Sulu (Sgd.) Maimona K. Muan Partabangan a Kasambuhansin Raayat (PKR) Jolo, Sulu (Sgd.) Sitti Alhada U. Abayan BAGGUT, Lundan Panun Patikul, Sulu (Sgd.) Raisah C. Cayoga IMERGG Ranaw Marawi City (Sgd.) Bainari S. Cali Kalimudan Foundation Inc. Marawi City

(Sgd.) Estella R. Natingga Phil Foundation Resources for Mgt. (PFRM) Marawi City (Sgd.) Janimah S. Datu ALGADAI Marawi City (Sgd.) Elias I. Macarandas Jr. Philippine Muslim Welfare Society Marawi City (Sgd.) Dipunudun Marohom CBCS Ranaw Marawi City (Sgd.) Salem C. Demis LKCMFI Davao City (Sgd.) Mohamad Omar CBCS Central Office Cotabato City (Sgd.) Danilo Mocsin CBCS Central Office Cotabato City (Sgd.) Ahmed Harris Pangcoga CBCS Central Office Cotabato City (Sgd.) Sammy Maulana CBCS Central Office (Sgd.) Sultan Maguid Maruhom Ummah Fi Salam Pagadian City

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ANNEXES

1

QUESTION # 1:

What concrete expressions of solidarity work do you observe and see that would enhance the Bangsamoro struggle to regain its right to self-determination?

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Dabaw Region

• BM History & situation in the Philippines (for inclusion in the Madaris curriculum)

• Fronts to revisit their original goal • Lessons learned from failures and successes on the ongoing Bangsamoro

struggle • Fronts to banner the real Bangsamoro interest only • BM solidarity/linkaging (familiarization & strengthening of relationships; family

reunions) • Islamization: Empowerment of Islamic institutions/ upliftment of Islamic moral

values, customs and traditions. • Fronts Harmonious relationship: Open communication /consultations/ no barrier

or factionalism / good understanding • Focus on the main course of the VMGO of org (inspired by the Bangsamoro RSD

& Islamic principles for the Muslims) • Forums/ seminar related to enhancing the Bangsamoro RSD • Active participation in the Peace Process (updates/ monitoring) • “Reflections” (individual/group) • Enhancement and empowerment of skills of the Bangsamoro • Unification/ harmonization of Ulama interpretation, re: BM struggle for RSD

Kutawato Region

• Performing religious obligations (salah, zakah, etc.) • Islamic education/ Da’awah/ religious advocacy works (teaching what is right &

forbidding what is prohibited) • Strengthening conflict resolution/ justice system/ reconciliation • Continuous dialogue of fronts (operationally; caucus of fronts' senior leaders to

arrive a point of agreement; understanding the bangsamoro benefits) • Community based advocacies • Active participation in the PP (EIC/Education on MOA-AD, BM History, History of

the Prophet & Da’awah) Ranaw Region

• Faith in Islam (Islam as a uniting force) • Moro nationality (nationalism) • IEC on BM History vis-à-vis BM RSD- the original petition of BM forefathers to

America to exclude Mindanao from RP when RP was granted independence (Dansalan Declaration, etc. be highlighted in BM history)

• Financial & moral support to the BM struggle (rooted on the question whether there is a mass base support for the fronts)

• Organization of multi-sectoral groups in support to the SD goal

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• Holding peace rallies/ demonstrations in support to the BM struggle • Bangsamoro solidarity (pushing for unity) • Conference must be strengthened and sustained • Focus: BM History/RSD- Moro struggle for SD since time immemorial • Importance of MNLF’s support- The MNLF will give way to the MILF-GRP peace

negotiation • Presence of unity of purpose- The MILF &MNLF including the Civil Society

claimed and have taken pride in fighting for the attainment of Bangsamoro RSD for the cause of Islam

• Recognition of achievements and roles • International guarantees (internationalization) • Unity in preservation of Muslim culture in RP as pursued in RP Congress ever

since • MILF’s resolve - The MILF is firm on its resolve not to negotiate again

government unless they sign the MOA-AD Sibugay Region

• Islam as a unifying force (Qur’an & Sunnah)- inclusive of peace and mercy for all; no discrimination and oppression among different ethno-liguistic groups

• Massive consultation/dialogue/transparency/ communication- involve the Bangsamoro masses

• Cooperation-enhancing initiatives (to promote initiatives to attain cooperation among BM sectors; initiatives to sustain BM sectors’ cooperation)

• BM people’s education on their RSD • Unity & support to the fronts for a common cause by the BM masses • Participation of all BM sectors for the attainment of RSD • Inter-front talks: consultation/ dialogue among leaders • Recognition (gains achieved by the fronts) • Brotherhood (faith & nationality) • Awareness on/ avoiding “divide and rule tactics” • Open communication among the ranks and files- Close contacts with the fronts • Two-pronged approach/fair play- by waiting and giving way to whom the

government concentrated on IEC • Active participation • GRP’s insincerity • Push for upholding the gains of the peace process (signing of MOA-AD/ review of

FPA) Samboangan Region

• Islam as unifying force • Reconciliation & unification of the two fronts (unity of purpose; focus on BM

RSD)

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• Inter-ethnic unity & cooperation • Research works • BM rights as a people (socio-cultural, political, economic, etc) • Consultation (for proper info dissemination) • Education on BM History • Education on BM RSD • Attitude: Sincerity, Persistence • Proper consultation to the people • Dialogue between the two fronts • Lessons learned • Firm stance • Continuation of the Peace Processes • Advocacy works/ IEC • Education about Islam • Attitude: “Sabar” • Peace advocacy • Formation of consultative body (Empowerment of peace council)

Basilan Region

• Intensive EIC/ Media advocacy works on BM History and RSD • Islamic education/ values (Shariah) • Unity of purpose by the different Moro sectors • Engage in capability trainings • Educate themselves • Open communication line • Common agenda of the revolution • Revisit or settle any differences • Reality check: genuine struggle for Bangsa and Agama • Massive EIC on FPA, BJE/ MOA-AD • Resume peace talks with GRP • Internationalization of the BM History and RSD (United Nations) • Enhance transparency by the fronts on the peace processes • Involve more sectors in the panel • Not to walk out on our RSD

Lupah Sug Region

• Religion (Islam) • Nationality (Bangsamoro identity) • History of the Bangsamoro Struggle • Human rights watch, advocacy & education • Longing for sustainable peace • Unity of purpose/ ideology

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• Tactical alliance • Continuation of the struggle for attainment of RSD • Longing for freedom • Formation of a group consisting of representatives from the two fronts for

“exploratory talks” • Massive IEC (Increased level of recognition; napapakinggan ang Bangsamoro

kumpara dati) • Peace advocacy & education • CSO representation in the peace process (Moro CSO observer status) • Support for the peace processes

Rajah Buayan Region

• Application of concrete Islamization strategies (Islamization & Da’awah with wisdom)

• Unity/ presence of ethnic groups in religious activities • Inter-ethnic cultural immersion (area visit/ participation) • Introduction of BM History and RSD in Madaris • Series of consultations • Create/expand/sustain Bangsamoro solidarity conference/orgs/ assoc • Tactical alliance between two fronts • Continue peace talks with international guarantee • Support RSD-based legal and peaceful mobilizations

6

QUESTION # 2: What concrete expressions of divergence do you observe and see that would render the Bangsamoro Struggle for RSD vulnerable to divide and rule tactics?

7

Dabaw Region

• Lack in observance of proper discipline among the fronts’ rank and file • Lack of transparency thru information drive about the peace process & the

peace negotiations • Less/lack of proper/correct info on BM RSD • Intrigues/ misconceptions/hearsays- (individuals/ fronts/ issues) • Attitudinal (un-Islamic mentality): Judgmental/ subjective/ false pride/ personal

vested interest/ un-Islamic leadership/ betrayals, lack of mutual trust, respect & understanding

• Tribalism/ regionalism/factionalism/ difference in expressions of ideological principles/ power struggle/ disunification

Kutawato Region

• Counterinsurgency (projects) efforts by INGO’s & GO’s • Over-bureaucratization of bidding of projects by INGO’s & GO’s • Family feuds • Politics/ power • Drug addiction • Culture/ beliefs (tribalism, politics, maratabat, self-interest) • Fronts’ operations: PP, FPA, MOA-AD, superiority (local/ foreign) • Lack of info on the PP & MOA-AD • PP as source of division also • Attitude: Suspicions; jealousy • Job insecurity • Division among people • Insecurities • 1996 FPA- end of BM struggle; did not end conflict; it paved the way for MNLF

demobilization (MILF still pursuing BM RSD); recognizes “RP supremacy” over BM; abandoning BM RSD

• Invoking affiliation by front as it connotes divisiveness Ranaw Region

• Personal and ethnic interest • Tribalism • Disunity among BM leaders • Group interest • Ideology differences in the process of attaining objective • Internal conflict between & among MNLF factions (middle, bottom levels) • Different approaches in the attainment of the goal • Insincerity of GRP

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• Apparent monopoly by MNLF top leadership in representing MNLF to GRP interest (More democratic representation of the organization)

• Aborted signing of MOA-AD (violent reactions by some MILF groups; the voice of the BM members to the GRP peace panel were subdued by government)

Sibugay Region

• Lack of participation of some sectors • Personal interest • Tribalism • Lack of EIC • Lack of coordination and unity • By pushing and concentrating of their own leadership • Personal interest • Perceived assumption of non-recognition of past gains in the BM struggle for the

attainment of RSD • Wait and see attitude of BM masses • Lack of support from the influential people (prominent Moros, etc.) • Constitutional process as GRP’s weapon • Divided leaders means divided mass base

Samboangan Region

• Spiritual foundation • Lack of education (RSD, History, Peace Process) • Sense of apathy by Muslim masses • Dividing factors: tribalism, regionalism, ideological differences • Improper consultation • Differences in goal and perspectives; not united in terms of goal • Un-Islamic morals: self-interest, power struggle, crab mentality • Assimilation policies of government (involving money and position)

Basilan Region

• Education on Bangsamoro History and RSD (for common understanding) • Differences in principle by the BM • “Different” vision by leaders (un-Islamic) • Superiority complex (tribal in nature) • Differences of stance/ principle by the fronts’ leaders • Disinformation campaign by media • Incentives and perks offered by GRP, thereby forgetting the common mission

and goals (self-interest/ personal aggrandizement) • Lack of dialogue/ consensus by the fronts

9

Lupah Sug Region

• Cultural and traditional differences • Tribalism/Ethnocentrism (discrimination of marginalized groups) • Clan Conflicts/ Rido • Western/Philippine educational system (Philippine-agenda-centric/carrier of

Philippine bias/ Filipinization of the Bangsamoro/ material orientation) • Weakening of faith • Media Bias (accusing the BM as terrorists) • Regionalism • Language differences • Destructive Criticism • Attitude: Absence of trust & honesty; crab mentality; greediness; politicizing;

competition; craving for power, money & authority) • Factionalism • Lack of communication, trust & recognition • Media Bias: freedom fighters vs. terrorists • GRP’s agenda (hidden yet obvious) • Lack of tactical alliance between the fronts • Difference in leadership • Rivalry • Organizational chauvinism • Presence of vast natural resources (“hot” topic in the peace talks) • Influence of business tycoons (properties) • Lack of recognition of gains achieved in struggle RSD (MNLF=FPA; MILF=MOA-

AD) • Disinformation campaign • Government insincerity • Stereotyping/ Cultural biases against the Bangsamoro (Filipino vs Moro; intra-

Moro) • Divided fronts; divided mass base support to peace talks

Rajah Buayan Region

• Weak/low level of Islamization • Tribalism • Personal interest • Introduction of Makabayan in government-funded Madaris • Weakening Bangsamoro nationalism • Simultaneous negotiations by GRP to the two fronts (negative: cause of

divisiveness) • Factionalism (“exclusivist attitudes” of the fronts in terms of maximizing BM

peoples participation) • Lack of tactical alliance

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• Openness to third party opportunism • GRP’s use of MNLF integrees in AFP in war against MILF • None full-implementation of the FPA by GRP • GRP’s backing out of the MOA-AD

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QUESTION # 3: What role can the Moro civil society organizations play to sustain and enhance Bangsamoro solidarity and the struggle for RSD?

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Dabaw Region

• Conduct of Information drive (seminars, etc.) on BM unity • IEC on RSD/ Media hopping (researchers for Moro dev’t; writeups) • Campaigning for Advocacy on RSD • Propose & conduct activities/ programs/ strategies that could solidify BM • Play as convener for activities/ programs on enhancing BM solidarity & struggle

for RSD • Drafting/ formulation of resolutions for lobbying, recommendations to enhance

BM struggle • Collate data/ documents that happen in the community related to BM struggle • Promote & advocate transparency on peace process & peace negotiation • Active participation in peace process • Active involvement in BM RSD IEC (Popularization of BM RSD) • Act as instruments in BM fronts unification of purpose (focus on bridging gaps,

unifying purpose, advocating harmony & transforming values towards more Islamic orientation; not necessarily structural)

Kutawato Region

• Convener/ facilitator/ mediator/ coordinator/ documenter in conflict resolutions among the BM

• Mediator/conciliator/facilitator between fronts • lessons learned • IEC/ Ventilating critical issues, esp. PP’s (MOA-AD, FPA) • Solidarity based on or highlighting BM History - “Attempt to solidarity and

unification shall be founded in the premise of the injustices committed by the Filipinos against the Bangsamoro people which is the ‘Illegal and Immoral Annexation of the Bangsamoro Homeland in the Philippines Independence.’”

• Solidarity based on Islam • “Solidarity/unification is for the good and benefit of the Bangsamoro people and

its generations. Working with full strength against the common enemy” • Lessons learned from the 2 PP’s • Highlighting GRP insincerity • Enhancement principles of “Give and Take” • Revisiting by orgs of their respective VMGO’s and be anchored on BM RSD • Slogan: “One Bangsamoro, One Belief, and One Qiblah.”

Ranaw Region

• Advocacy Campaign (forum, seminar, dialogue among Moros, conferences, rallies, etc); conducting solidarity (initiatives/activities) forum, conferences, seminar, study tour, advocacy, IEC, and sponsoring dialogue among Muslim leaders

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• International level- Sourcing seminars from international sources and local • Lessons learned- Visitation of conflict-affected areas • Documentation- Monitoring and reporting the situation • Bridging between and among the MNLF, MILF and GRP in pursuit of peace • Advocacy/ continuous IEC on the BM history/ struggle for RSD or Moro

problems; provision of right info to Moro and non-Moro • CSO’s may serve as bridge to unite Mujahideen, religious groups and politicians • Leveling off among different groups/ consultations (MASOWARA- consultative

council [for shura]; Development and Production of Modules for the series of consultations/ leveling off)

• In order for us to successfully attain our struggle for RSD for the cause of Islam, we are strongly recommending to the OIC to push for unity of MILF&MNLF, and in doing so, there is a need to create a council (majlis). The council is tasked to select from among themselves a leader of the Bangsamoro through series of consultations among different sectors of the Bangsamoro

• EIC- Agreements in PP documents Sibugay Region

• Active participation in organization (to participate in proper way to push forward the organization; to be an active if you are a member of your org)

• Giving of all-out support to the BM struggle for the attainment of RSD • Organizing of activities (da’wah; cultural preservation) • Initiatives for constant dialogue among the Mindanaoans (interfaith dialogue) • Sustained mechanism to promote RSD • Active role in the peace process: consultation, adoption, participation,

information drive, da’awah • Massive education on BM RSD • Active participation in peace and development efforts

Samboangan Region

• Education on BM history and identity as people and nation • Education on Bangsamoro RSD • Proper consultation to all stakeholders (forum, assembly) • Strengthen spiritual foundation based on Qur’an & Sunnah • Initiatives towards: the fronts’ unity of purpose, advocating tactical alliance

between the two fronts;, continuous negotiation • Education about Islam • Education on the Peace Process • Advocating • Networking, alliance, partnership in all levels

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Basilan Region

• Membership to CBCS • Massive education on RSD • Anchor their VMGO’s on BM RSD • Strategic efforts for unity in purpose of the fronts (BM RSD); • Serve as bridge/mediator between the two groups • More political education • More capability buildup trainings • Islamic education/ Islamization

Lupah Sug Region

• Massive education campaign on Bangsamoro RSD (lobbying for RSD inclusion in curriculum)

• Equipping the Bangsamoro with proper knowledge and skills • Strengthening the religious sector • Sectoral solidarity • Facilitation of reconciliation of the two fronts • Facilitation/tactical mediation of concrete alliance by the two fronts • Advancing RSD as the core of the Bangsamoro struggle • Sustain advocacy works • Pan-Moro CSO’s solidarity (fronts-leaning; working conference; planning) • Bridging leadership (bridging gaps) • Mechanisms to CSO’s involvement in working for BM solidarity • Decolonization of the Bangsamoro (culture-appropriate curriculum) • “We will never take no for an answer from the two fronts on the topic of

reconciliation” Rajah Buayan Region

• Wide peace consultations and advocacy • Pushing for upholding the gains/ full implementation of the peace agreements

(e.g. submission of resolutions to GRP & fronts) • Awareness on existence of different peace frameworks (GRP, religious groups,

academe, etc.) • Mediate/facilitate/initiate Bangsamoro solidarity activities (including the fronts) • Popularize RSD (education, mass mobilization, etc.) • Assessor/evaluator on Bangsamoro RSD (status) • Work for unified Moro CSO’s voice (Pan-Moro CSO assembly)