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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTSt

by

Robert Keninedy

1 November 1983

DIST3IUM1N STATEMENT:APPWOd furpubi mkorm

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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and donot reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofDefense or the US Government.

Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Ms.Shirley A. Shearer.

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Strategic arm reduction talks; START; strategic arm limitation talks;SALT; strategic arm control, deterrence; nuclear weapons balance; verification.

Despite an apparent Vashington-Noscow harmony of interests-forged ofImperatives which mandate that each seek to reduce the other's incentives andcapabilities to Initiate a strategic nuclear exchange-negotiations on limitingStrategic veapons have been difficult and a mutually acceptable follow-onagreement to the SALT I accord remains elusive. Differing strategic per-spectives, strategies, and doctrine; different approaches to deterrence;dissimilar force structures, weapons characteristics and capabilities; and

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different historical, goegraphical, and political/bureaucratic factors haveimpeded the establishment of an equitable balance of nuclear capabilitiesthrough strategic arms negotiations.

Nevertheless, many of the same factors that gave impetus to strategic armscontrol efforts in the late 1960's and early 1970's remain. Thus, there isreason for guarded optimism concerning the possibility of another superpowerstrategic arms agreement. Whether such an agreement will, in fact, contributesignificantly to a curbing of the arms race and improved strategic stability,however, will depend on whether the positions taken by the United States andthe Soviet Union in dealing with the problems are framed from a coherent setof guidelines which attempts to address short-term concerns in the -ontextof the long-term objectives of balance and stability.

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FOREWORD

T his memorandum examines origins of SALT and thecomplexities of the strategic arms control process. It focuses onsuch problems as those that arise from dissimilar perceptions ofthreat, differing force structures, growing vulnerabilities, rapidtechnological change, and the imperatives of verification. Theauthor concludes that many of the same factors that gave impetusto Strategic arms control efforts in the late 1960's and early 1970'sremain. Thus, despite the chilling of relations between Washingtonand Moscow as a result of such events as those in Afghanistan,Poland, and Grenada, the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines 007and missile deployments in Europe, there is reason for guardedoptimism concerning the possibility of another superpowerstrategic arms control agreement.f

The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda program of theStrategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides ameans for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are notnecessarily constrained by format or conformity with institutionalpolicy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of currentimportance in areas related to the authors' professional work orinterests.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of :national security research and stud As such, it does not reflect theofficial view of the College, the ment of the Army, or theDepartment of Defense.

THOMAS F. HEALY4Major General, USAVCommandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETrCH OF THE AUTHOR

ROBERT KENNEDY, Ph.D., is currently the Professor of Military Strategy in theDepartment of National Security at the US Army War College. A graduate of theUS Air Force Academy, Dr. Kennedy completed his graduate work in politicalscience at Georgetown University. Dr. Kennedy served on active duty briefly withthe Army and then with the Air Force from 1958 to 1971 and is currently a reserveofficer. Prior to his present position, he was a senior researcher at the StrategicStudies Institute.

iv

SUMMARY

Arms control has been a means of achieving US foreign policyobjectives since the earliest days of the Republic. The advent of thenuclear weapon, however, has added a new dimension to modernwarfare and has increased the urgency of efforts designed toregulate and control arms. As a result, in recent years the mostvisible, and perhaps most important arms control efforts have beenaimed at stabilizing the strategic military relationships between thesuperpowers. Despite an apparent Washington-Moscow harmonyof interests-forged of imperatives which mandate that each seekto reduce the other's incentives and capabilities to initiate astrategic nuclear exchange-negotiations on limiting strategicweapons have been difficult and at times strained, and a mutuallyacceptable follow-on agreement to the SALT I accord remainselusive. Differing strategic perspectives, strategies, and doctrine;different approaches to deterrence; dissimilar force structures,weapons characteristics and capabilities; and different historical,geographical, and political/bureaucratic factors have impeded theestablishment of an equitable balance of nuclear capabilitiesthrough strategic arms negotiations.

Nevertheless, many of the same factors that gave impetus tostrategic arms control efforts in the late 1960's and early 1970'sremain. Thus, despite the late 1970's and early 1980's chill inrelations between Washington and Moscow, there is reason forguarded optimism concerning the possibility of anothersuperpower strategic arms agreement. Whether such an agreementwill, in fact, contribute significantly to a curbing of the arms raceand improved strategic stability, however, will depend not only onhow well each of the difficult problems confronting thenegotiations is dealt with, but also on whether the positions takenIby the United States and the Soviet Union in dealing with theproblems are framed from a coherent set of guidelines whichfattempts to address short-term concerns in the context of the long-term objectives of balance and stability.

V

START: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Arms control has been a means of achieving US foreign policyobjectives since the earliest days of the Republic. In 1817, theUnited States and Great Britain signed the Rush-Bagot agreementregulating naval forces on the Great Lakes. That agreement wasone of the first freely negotiated arms control agreements and it isone of the oldest still in existence. Since that time, the UnitedStates, responding to an increasingly complex and interdependentworld, has been actively engaged in seeking the regulation ofarmaments.

The advent of the nuclear weapon, ho,% -ver, has added a newdimension to modemn warfare and has increased the urgency ofefforts designed to regulate and control armaments. Total war nolonger simply represents a threat to the survival of a particularstate. Rather, the existence of civilization as we know it is nowthreatened by an awesome capacity for mass destruction which isnow in the hands of mankind. In recognition of this fundamentaltruth, the United States has undertaken a series of internationalnegotiations aimed at limiting the further expansion andprofileration of nuclear capabilities.

The most visible and perhaps most important arm controlefforts, however, have been aimed at stabilizing the strategic

military relationships between those nations most capable of massdestruction, the superpowers. To this end, the United States andthe Soviet Union have engaged in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks(SALT) I and 11, and are now engaged in a new round of strategicarms reduction talks (START).

THE BEGINNINGS

The origins of SALT can be traced to increasing concerns inWashington during the mid-1960's over growing Soviet strategicmight.'I Two impulses were set in motion by the expansion of Sovietstrategic offensive and defensive power which followed in the wakeof the Cuban missile crisis. One was to hedge against future Sovietand Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities by expanding UScapabilities. The other was to seek to limit the further expansion ofthe strategic forces of the superpowers. Both impulses existedsimultaneously and, indeed, the implicatons of the first impulsemay have increased interest in the second in both Washington andMoscow.

In 1964, the United States took its first hesitant steps towardcontrolling strategic arms by formally proposing that an equalnumber of Soviet and American long-range bombers be removedfrom operational inventories. Later that same year, in what hasoften been considered a rhetorical effort, Washington proposed a"freeze" on the number and characteristics of nuclear offensiveand defensive vehicles. The proposal, which also called for on-siteinspection as a means of verifying compliance, was rejected byMoscow. Nevertheless, by late 1966 and early 1967 many in thedefense community were becoming involved, in one way oranother, in crafting or responding to initiatives designed to seeklimits on strategic forces.

After a series of interchanges between Washington and Moscowin direct response to US initiatives by President Johnson during his1967 Glassboro meeting with Alexei Kosygin, First Deputy ForeignMinister V. V. Kuznetsov announced at the United Nations on May20, 1968, that the Soviet Union was "ready to reach an agreementon practical steps for the limitation and subsequent reduction ofthe strategic means for delivering nuclear weapons.'" The Sovietinvasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the change of USadministrations in 1969 resuted in a postponement of the actual

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negotiations until late 1969. The SALT process, nonetheless, hadbeen set in motion.

WHY SALT?

The answer to the question: Why did the Soviet Union and theUnited States engage in SALT? remains yet incomplete. JohnNe'whouse in Cold Dawn noted that SALT I was a political processconcerned with finding an equilibrium in which the great powersfelt secure .3 One might go further and argue that the Soviet-American strategic arms control process, in an abstract sense, wasthe natural outgrowth of an attempt by the superpowers not only tostabilize their potentially threatening nuclear relationship, but alsoto orchestrate their continued dominance over the other countriesin the international system. In this sense, SALT could be viewed as(1) a means of achieving strategic stability at weapons levelssufficiently high to mark clearly the superpower status of both theSoviet Union and the United States; and (2) a process by whichboth powers maintained that status through mutually agreed uponincreases in their capabilities during the successive stages of SALT.Certain other arms control initiatives, then, could be viewed as partof a complementary pattern. While the task of SALT might be seenas regulating the upper limits of superpower strategic nuclearcapabilities (always insuring a safe margin of superiority over lessernuclear powers), the nonproliferation treaty, the Latin Americannuclear free zone, and other such agreements could be viewed as anattempt by the superpowers to prohibit others from entering thenuclear competition.

However, to argue that SALT was simply the result of aMachiavellian attempt by the superpowers to orchestrate theircontinued dominance over the internatonal system is, of course, an

* oversimplification of the complex factors which drew Washingtonand Moscow to the conference table. Such an approach can also befaulted in that it attributes to the superpowers a greater degree of

* long-range thinking and planning than the historical record wouldsupport. Indeed, evidence suggests that SALT was founded onmore concrete objectives sought by the leadership elites in both theUnited States and the Soviet Union. To be sure, bureaucratic,institutional, economic, as well as strategic factors played a role inpopelling both Washington and Moscow to the conference table.

3

In Washington, bureaucratic and institutional factorssurrounding the debate over whether the United States shoulddeploy an antiballistic missile (ABM) system served as animmediate impetus to negotiation.d In a larger sense, however, thenagging fear of nuclear holocaust coupled with the continuedexpansion of Soviet nuclear capabilities and prospects of a two-sided nuclear exchange provided ample impetus for negotiationsaimed at controlling and restricting the growth of strategic forces,especially at a time when increasing demands were being placed onthe federal dollar and competition for funds was tight within theDepartment of Defense itself.

By 1967, the growth in US intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forceshad reached its peak, while the number of US strategic bomberscontinued to decline. In the winter of 1967 and in 1968, theintelligence community was reporting that the Soviet Union wasnearing parity with the United States in land-based ICBMs and wasbelieved to be deploying its first solid fueled missiles. In hisJanuary 1968 defense posture statement, Secretary of DefenseMcNamara told Congress that the Soviet Union had more thandoubled its ICBM force-from 340 to 720-in the space of a year.'ITo many in the Washington community, negotiations with theSoviet Union on limiting strategic armaments suggested a means ofcapping the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities. T(, be sure, afew saw SALT as a process through which the United States mightpreserve a margin of strategic superiority while avoiding the costof a full-scale strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. However,many proponents of arms negotiations believed that Moscow hadcome to share Washington's concern over the dangers of nuclearwar and that with an impending, if not extant, parity at thestrategic level, the time was ripe for an agreement limiting US andSoviet strategic arsenals. Thus, through SALT the Soviet strategicthreat might be fixed. US strategic weapons procurement planningcould then take place against a more predictable backdrop ofSALT-constrained Soviet capabilities. The invulnerability of theUS strategic retaliatory forces could be preserved. The generalstrategic relationship between the United States and the SovietUnion might be stabilized. Mechanisms for crisis management andconflict avoidance needed to prevent the occurrence of accidentalor unintended wars might be developed; tensions might be reduced;

4

and, a costly arms race might be avoided. As a result, defenseplanning might come to be dominated by a measure of rationalityas the need to hedge against the "greater-than-expected" threatreceded.'

In February 1970, three months after the opening of the SALTtalks in Helsinki, President Nixon emphasized the importance ofthe SALT process. Underscoring the precarious nature of themilitary balance between the United States and the Soviet Unionand the potential for violence and devastation should deterrencefail, he stated:

There is no area in which we and the Soviet Union. have a greatercommon interest than in reaching agreement with regard to arms control.'I

Like Washington, Moscow was driven to the conference table inresponse to a number of strategic and domestic economic,bureaucratic and institutional factors. While it remains impossibleto determine with any degree of certainty the specific factors thatled to the final decision of the leadership in Moscow to travel theSALT path, several concerns probably affected Moscow's decisionto enter into negotiations.

First, by the late 1960's the Soviet Union had deployed a sizeablestrategic arsenal. Nevertheless, the USSR still fell short of theUnited States in overall strategic nuclear capabilities and, indeed,in most other measures of national power. From a Soviet point ofrview, the initiation of SALT and the existence of strategic nuclearparity suggested by the talks themselves were likely to have afavorable impact on third party perceptions of the position of theSoviet Union in the world community of nations. Thus, Sovietleaders could reason that SALT confirmed the great power statusof the USSR and promised to be psychologically advantageous toMoscow in the Soviet-American competition for world influence.

Second, despite its improved strategic nuclear capabilities, Sovietleadership remained concerned over the strategic military positionof the USSR vis-a-vis the United States. The Kremlin had investedheavily in the early and mid- 1960's to improve its strategic position.Soviet leaders were clearly concerned over the implications of USdevelopments in the field of missile warheads, specifically themultiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), and inthe field of ABM defense. MIRV threatened to multiply US

capabilities many fold while ABM represented a potential forlimiting the effectiveness of Soviet straegic forces. In combination,such developments might, once again, yield psychologicaladvantage to the West at Soviet expense. Soviet leaders were alsoconcerned that when President Johnson left office in January of1969, he might be replaced by someone less committed to armscontrol.'

Third, Soviet domestic economic pressures, no doubt, played arole in the Kremlin's move toward SALT. Lawrence Caldwell, aprominent observer of the Soviet system, writing in 1971, notedthat those in the Soviet bureaucracy who were concerned withmodernizaton had "sensed that the Soviet economy had entered aqualitatively new stage of its development-one dictated by theelevation of science and technology to the status of directproductive forces.'" This new stage of development demanded thatthe bureaucracy provide additional resources if furtherdevelopment was to be expected not only in heavy industry, butespecially in lighter technologically intensive electronics andchemical industries, and in the consumer sectors, all of which hadbecome more capital-intensive. To secure these resources, the so-called modernists, according to Caldwell, favored a tighter reign onmilitary spending.'0

Finally, by the 1950's, some Soviet leaders had come to share amore generalized concern over the effects of nuclear war. In 1954,Malenkov wrote that nuclear warfare could result in the mutualdestruction of both capitalist and communist societies." ForMalenkov, the awesome destructive potential of a cataclysmicconflict between communist and capitalist camps had apparentlywarranted serious reconsideraton of the Leninist conception of waras a precursor of world revolution. Khrushchev, initially opposedto Malenkov's unorthodox views, came to hold similar viewsconcerning the dangers of nuclear conflict. By the mid-1950's,Khrushchev was espousing the idea of "peaceful coexistence" asthe safest and most reliable form of class warfare in theinternational arena. In 1961, Khrushchev warned that "within 60days of an atomic attack 500 million to 750 million people couldperish" and concluded that "sober calculation of the inevitableconsequence of nuclear war is an indispensable requirement forpursuing a consistent policy of preventing war." 12 Since then, anumber of Soviet civilian and military analysts have spoken of

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nuclear war between the superpowers as "a great danger for allmankind," the "extreme catastrophic threat" which would be"suicidal for both" and would bring "unprecedented calamities toall mankind.", 3 Similarly, Leonid Brezhnev cautioned that nuclearwar could result in "hundreds of millions of deaths," in the "massannihilation of peoples," and spoke of the need to eliminate "thethreat of thermonuclear catastrophy."Il Such themes werereiterated in the prepared statement presented at the first businessmeeting of the two SALT delegations in Helsinki in November1969.'"

In sum, for the Soviet leadership, the idea of limiting orcontrolling nuclear arsenals through strategic arms controlnegotiations was consonant not only with their desire to projectand maintain an image of strategic parity with the United States,their interests in precluding threatening weapons developments bythe United States, and their attempts to secure resources foreconomic development and expansion, but also with their generalconcerns over nuclear war. Moreover, SALT had an appeal withinthe context of detente or "peaceful coexistence." At a time whenSoviet leadership had become increasingly concerned with thedecided anti-Soviet character of an emerging China, the idea ofpursuing detente and arms negotiations with the West, no doubt,was considered a promising means of avoiding hostileconfrontation on all fronts.

REACHING AGREEMENT

Despite, however, an apparent Washington-Moscow harmony ofinterests-forged of imperatives which mandate that each seek toreduce the other's incentives and capability to initiate a strategicnuclear exchange-negotiations on limiting strategic armamentshave been difficult and at times strained, and a mutually acceptablefollow-on agreement to the SALT I accord remains elusive. LikeSALT 1, SALT 11 was criticized in the United States from both theleft and the right. Some liberal critics registered their disapprovalover the failure of SALT II to restrain the arms race. Even beforethe sinng of SALT Il at Vienna, Senators Mark Hatfield, GeorgeMcGovern, and William Proxmire, in a letter to President Carter,announced that they found the SALT 11 treaty "very difficult, ifnot impossible" to support. They criticized the treaty for not being

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"a true step toward arms reductions.'"' According to SenatorProxmire what was needed were "real reductions in the land-basedmissiles on both sides."' 7

On the other hand, in testimony before the Senate Committee onForeign Relations, Paul Nitze, a leading opponent of SALT IIargued:

Despite the superficial appearance of equality, the agreements are unequal .. they put no effective limit on Soviet offensive capabilities. Rather thanforcing a reduction, there will be a continuous and large increase in Sovietcapabilities during the term of the treaty... [and in net terms, the strategicbalance will move from a position not far from parity to one of Sovietstrategic superiority."

Similarly, Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, after serving as theJoint Chiefs of Staff representative to the SALT II negotiations,testified that SALT II:

... is not in our interest since it is inequitable, unverifiable, underminesdeterrence, contributes to instability and could adversely affect NATOsecurity and allied coherence."

One critic even suggested that SALT II was "Devoid of merit,"that "the West needs the MX ICBM, and it needs cruise missiles..•, and that SALT II and particularly the future negotiations on aSALT III can only hinder rational Western defense planning...."" While the reasons offered by critics of both SALT I and SALT

II have been many and varied, their objections have underscoredthe complexities of achieving a strategic arms limitations agreementperceived as equitable by both sides.

Like the three presidents before him, President Reagan hascommitted his administration to a continued dialogue with theSoviet Union on nuclear weapons reductions. Early in February1981, shortly after taking office, President Reagan indicated hiswillingness to meet with the Soviet leadership to discuss legitimatereductions in nuclear weapons.21 Mindful of the criticisms of bothSALT I and II, however, he ordered an in-depth review of US armscontrol policy. The objectives of the review were to examine thelessons of previous SALT negotiations and to explore alternativesolutions to the problem of reducing strategic nuclear forces. OnMay 9, 1982, at Eureka College, the President announced his intent

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to depart from what he considered the past course of events.According to Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State forEuropean Affairs, instead of seeking an agreement which would dono more than codify and marginally restrict the growth of strategicforces, the President was determined to seek an equitable andveifiable arms agreement that would actually reduce the levels ofnuclear weapons on both sides and make a meaningful contributionto securing a stable nuclear balance."

Despite the President's interest in achieving a stable US-Sovietnuclear balance, differing strategic perspectives, strategies, anddoctrine; different approaches to deterrence; dissimilar forcestructures, weapon systems characteristics and capabilities; anddifferent historical, geographical, and political/bureaucraticfactors impede the establishment of an equitable balance of nuclearcapabilities through strategic arms control negotiations.

THE PROBLEMS OF START

7Tmt Com&abilWy. The first major difficulty confrontingSoviet and American negotiators is the problem resulting fromdissimilar perceptions of threat. The problem of threatcomparability focuses on the question of whose forces should becounted in threat calculations and why. It addresses the questionsof who are the potential adversaries and what is an equitable armscontrol solution. Thus, the problem of threat comparability adds toa two-sided negotiation, a multidimensional aspect which furthercomplicates equitability calculations.

The principal threat to US security, the security of US allies, andUS worldwide interests is the Soviet Union. Thus, for the UnitedStates, one primary objective throughout the strategic arms controlprocess has been to establish and maintain a balance of US andSoviet strategic capabilities. In his report to Congress in 1972,President Nixon spoke of the need to establish an equivalence ofUS-Soviet capabilities that would yield "no unilateral advantageand would contribute to a more stable strategic environment.""Concerned that the SALT I agreement had conceded somenumerical advantages to the Soviet Union, both houses ofCongress, in their approval of the SALT I treaty, sigualed theircommitntto nothin less than a balance of US-Soviet strategicarms by urging the President to "seek a future tret that ...

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would not limit the United States to levels of Inrotinnustrategic forces inferior to limits provided for the Soviet Union.""0

During the SALT 11 process, then Secretary of Defense HaroldBrown defind what he meant by balance, or "essentialequivalence" as he called it, and unesoed the importance ofUS-Soviet equivalence as an objective. He said that by "essentialequivalence" he meant:

... amy aM"~ag lIn fOre. cbractWlude ~pyd by theSovietare offsetbyothe US aivaiaqes Althoug we mes avoid a reor to om-forom.atwhia of buivlduu ladle of eability, ow ur etwuu mlm pasturmuoso a be, aid manl met ume to be, Inferior in perfonnme to thecapabit Of the Soviet Uiom.

He went on to note that equivalence serves several major politicaland military Purposes:

It ho to cure tha podel psreptom are in accod wit adilituyrealk~s, and It minan~m the probability tha opposon mtats*i farm wilbe mMm to u=k diploatic advastag over u. It red-ut, the eham d tandim or the 0th. wI beome vulneal to churus of a bomber or mdleVand embte therey to strategic stabiit. It abmu stabiliy hea crimby aencm honemau for ithi side to strik fks t rpremt

Similarly, President Reagan has spoken of the need to acideve astabilifin balance with the Soviet Union."1 Indeed, the belief thatit is essential that the United States accept nothing les then paritywith the Soviet Union has been a central tenet of US straegi armscontrol policy.

The Soviet Union, on the other land, has neve sought throuhthe SALT process an "essential eqialne or a specific"'balance"" with the United States. Rather, Moscow has stressed theneed to achieve "4equal security" through an agrement whichinsures that neither side, "directly or indirectly" is afforded a"one-sided advantage.""' This theme has been stressed by theUSSR throughout the SALT/START process and has become acentral issue in the negotiations on limiting Intermediate-angenuclear forces (INF) in Geneva. It is rooted in a perception ofthret which differs substntially from that held by the UnitedStates. From the Soviet point of view, of the five powers whichpossess 6 strategic" nuclea weapons, four must be consideredpotentially hostil. Thus, in the Soviet planner' view the stratesic

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forces of Britain, France, and China, as well as those of the UnitedStates, must be considered in calculations concerning balance, ifthe Soviet Union is to achieve a sense of security equal to that of theUnited States.

While the nuclear capabilities of Britain, France, and China aredwarfed by the strategic might of the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates, the composite of those capabilities is sufficient to destroyevery city and town in the Soviet Union with a population greaterthan 100,000.11 Thus, while Washington has been compelled toseek an agreement with the Soviet Union that prohibits Moscowfrom achieving a real or perceived superiority of strategic forces,Soviet leaders have been concerned that they not be placed at anoverall strategic disadvantage as a result of capabilities which theysee as potentially additive to US strategic might.

At the close of the SALT I negotiatons, the Soviet Unionregistered its apprehensions over non-US strategic forces. In aunilateral statement issued on May 2.4, 1972 and repeated on May26 (the day of the signing of the US-Soviet "Interim Agreement"),the Soviet Union declared that for the period of the agreementshould US allies in NATO increase the number of their modernballistic missile submarines, which they had operational or underconstruction at that time, the Soviet Union had the right to acorresponding increase in ballistic missile submarines. The UnitedStates rejected this attempt by the Soviet Union to include theforces of third parties in bilateral strategic arms controlagreements.3 0 Undoubtedly, the US rejection was founded on itsown perceived need to maintain nothing less than a balance withthe Soviet Union for military as well as psycho-political reasons.Almost certainly, the rejection was also based on two other factors.First, the nuclear forces of the British and French as well as thoseof the Chinese were already offset by Soviet immediate- andmedium-range nuclear capabilities. And, second, no long-termeffort to control and limit strategic armaments could be sustained ifparties to the negotiations demanded to have strategic forces equalto those of all possible combinations of potential opponents.

During the later stages of SALT II, Moscow again demonstratedan evident concern over non-US strategic forces, especially as theUnited States and China moved toward rapprochement. No doubt,the Kremlin continues to have misgivings about the status ofBritish, French, and Chinese forces; witness Soviet efforts toinclude British and French forces in the current INF negotiations.

No long-term solution, however, to the treatment of third partystrategic nuclear forces has yet been found. Thus, the problem ofthreat comparability remains, as the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates seek an equitable balance of strategic armaments througharms control negotiations.

Definition. The problem of definition is related to the questionof threat comparability in that it affects both Soviet and Americanperceptions of what constitutes "equal security" or "balance" atthe strategic level. The problem of definition focuses on whichforces of the two superpowers should be considerd in strategic armscontrol negotiations and why.

Are forces "strategic" because they are of a range sufficient tostrike targets at great distances? Or are they "strategic" becausethey can strike the territory of the other superpower? The SALTLexicon, produced by the US Arms Control and DisrmamentAgency, defines "strategic" broadly, contending that strategic"relates to a nation's military, economic, and/or political powerand its ability to control the course of military/political events."3

The Lexicon, however, fails to define strategic forces. Are strategicforces those that can strike strategic targets? Is an attack onWashington, whether it be by ICBMs stationed at distant points inthe Soviet heartland, by sea-launched cruise missiles SLCMsstationed on ships 200 or 300 miles off shore, or by aircraftforward-based in Cuba, a strategic attack? If so, should all suchweapon systems be considered strategic and, hence, included innegotiations on strategic armaments? Or are certain armamentsmore threatening or potentially more destabilizing in crisissituations and thus, more strategic in some sense than otherarmaments? While both previous SALT agreements frequentlyhave relied on range as qualifying criterion for inclusion of aweapon system under the agreement, 2 the issue is far from settled.

On November 26, 1969, shortly after the opening of SALT I,Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semenov, head of the Sovietdelegation, raised what perhaps has proven to be the thorniest ofissues-the forward-based systems (FBS) question. Agreementsbased on equal security, he asserted, has to cover all nucleardelivery systems which could hit targets in the other countryreadless of whether their owners called them strategic or tactical.The US response to this attempt to define strategic armaments sobroadly was that to do so would "ensarl the conference In

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extraneous political and military problems that would block anySALT agreement."" Thus, from the US perspective, the exigenciesof attempting to achieve some form of agreement, which wouldconstrain the growth of strategic forces, however limited theagreement might be, played a role in determining what forcesshould be considered "strategic" for SALT negotiating purposes.Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued to raise the FBS issuethroughout the SALT I negotiations.

According to Ambassador Gerard Smith, the head of the USdelegation to SALT I, the failure to settle the FBS question blockeda comprehensive SALT I treaty limiting offensive arms. Even theinterim offensive freeze of 1972-a device Smith contends was usedto get around the FBS issue-to some extent, apparently reflectedFBS considerations. Indeed, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon'sNational Security Advisor and architect of the freeze, justifiedpermitting the Soviet Union a superior number of missilelaunchers, in part, by emphasizing the US advantage in FBS.According to Smith, in a briefing to congressional leaders on theSALT I agreements Kissinger said:

It was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers and so-called forward-based systens. To exclude, that is, the weapons in which this country holdsan advantage .... We urge the Congress to keep this fact in mind whenassessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensivefreeze."

The FBS issue continued to figure prominently during the SALTII process. The Soviet Union dropped its demands that FBS beincluded in strategic force calculations at the Vladivostok meetingbetween President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev in November 1974in exchange for US concessions to include heavy bombers in theSALT II ceiling on strategic forces and not to pursue a cutback inSoviet heavy missiles." However, when President Carter's newproposal for deep cuts was presented by Secretary of State Vance inMoscow in March 1977, Brezhnev once again sounded the FBSalarm. Already irritated over the Carter human rights campaign,the stagnation of SALT, and the apparent rejection of theVladivostok accord by the Carter Administration, Brezhnev,categorically, rejected the US proposal. He argued, among other

pthin, that all the US talk about the Triad was, in a way,deceptivr, the United States had a fourth threat to use against the

13

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Soviet Union-its forward-based forces in Western Europe."Thus, the FBS issue was never far from the surface in SALT II.When the aggregate levels of strategic ICBM, SLBM, and bomberforces being proposed fell below a certain threshold, the Sovietnegotiators would then argue that they would be vulnerable to USFBS. Similarly, when the United States pressed to exemptconventionally armed cruise missiles (believed by some US andWestern Europeans to be needed to bolster conventional defensesin Europe) from consideration under the Protocol, Sovietnegotiators made it clear that if the United States persisted in itsattempt to use SALT to bolster NATO's theater forces, theKremlin would dredge up the FBS question."

With the opening of the INF negotiations in Geneva inNovember 1981, the forum for negotiations on FBS shiftedsomewhat. Nonetheless, the problem of definition remains. At theINF talks, the US proposals have focused on intermediate-rangeSoviet and US forward-based missiles-a category of weaponry itconsiders completely out of balance in the European theater today.The Soviet Union has attempted to include US forward-basedaircraft-a category of weaponry in which it could be argued thatbalance already exists."8 At the START negotiations, the UnitedStates, in addition to seeking significant reductions in missiles andwarheads, has called for an equal ceiling on heavy bombers belowthe US level in SALT II and certain constraints on cruise missiles.The Soviet proposal has also called for limitations on missiles andbombers as well as cruise missiles. Yet, the question of whatconstitutes a strategic bomber or strategic cruise missile remains tobe settled.

SALT II limited the long-range Soviet Bear and Bison aircraftand US B-52 and B-I aircraft. Thus, unrefueled range appears tohave been a major factor in determining which bombers were to beconsidered strategic. But does unrefueled range really matter?Today, with aerial refueling, forward staging and/or recovery atforward bases, a number of aircraft with less range which arecurrently in the superpower inventories would be capable ofconducting intercontinental missions. These have been majorpoints made by those who argue that the Soviet Backfire bombershould be considered as a strategic system. Rather than rangeperhaps the assigned mission of the aircraft should be thecontrolling factor. The Soviet Bears and Bisons and US D-52s have

14

recognized intercontinental missions. This is also the case with theus B-1. On the other hand, Soviet leaders have argued thatBackfire bombers are assigned theater not intercontinentalmissions and that the current basing of these aircraft supports this

contention. But missions can change and aircraft can be moved toforward staging bases. Should that be taken into account? And ifso, how?

Similarly, the question of what constitutes a strategic cruisemissile will continue to plague strategic negotiations. Should cruisemissiles on submarines or surface ships, or aircraft be consideredstrategic? Should they only be considered strategic if they haveranges in excess of some set distance? What should the distance be?Why? What underlying rationale should be selected?

Force Comparability. The problem of force comparabilityfocuses on what strategic capabilities should be constrained andhow. It addresses the issues of how "balance" or essentially equalforce aggregates can be achieved when the forces of the twosuperpowers are dissimilar in compositon and upon whichmeasures of capabilities agreements should be based. Should onlythe most threatening forces, such as quick reacting ICBM andSLBM forces, be counted and should bombers be included? Shouldagreements be based on the total number of missile launchers andbombers? Or should the throw-weights9 or numbers of warheads amissile can carry be considered, as well as the size of the bomb loadof bombers? Or are the real concerns (and therefore factors thatneed to be constrained if balance is to be achieved) such things asaggregate deliverable megatonnage, equivalent megatonnage(EMT) or hard target kill capability?40

Because of differences in geography, technology, militarystrategy, and historic experience, the strategic forces of the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union have evolved in distinct ways. With itsgreat land mass, restricted access to the seas, and few bomberrecovery bases on the periphery of the United States, the SovietUnion has generally placed a relatively greater emphasis on thedevelopment of its land-based missile forces. Today, the SovietUnion has 350 more ICBM launchers than does the United States.Its ICBM forces also have a greater throw-weight than do those ofthe United States. Furthermore, Soviet "cold launch" techniquespermit the rapid reloading of many of Moscow's ICBM silos."1 TheSoviet Union also has a greater number of SLBM launchers than

does the United States (950+ to 568).41 However, despite Sovietmodernization of its sea-based ballistic missile forces, relatively fewSoviet SLBMs include MIRV and Soviet nuclear missile carryingsubmarines are reported currently to have lower operational in-commission rates and to be noisier than those of the United States.

On the other hand, the United States has fewer ICBMs, and lessthrow-weight, but its ICBMs are generally held in a higher state ofreadiness. The United States also has MIRVs on all its SLBMs, isdeveloping a family of sea- and air-launched cruise missilespotentially capable of high accuracy, and has more intercontinentalbombers than the USSR.' 3 Moreover, bombers constitute areusable force which, theoretically, can be recycled for follow-onretaliatory strikes after the missiles of both sides have beenexpended. Such differences of Soviet and American capabilities hasled one observer to remark that "to compare American andRussian systems... is to talk apples and oranges.""

Achieving comparability in force aggregates is also complicatedby the scenario dependence of comparability calculations. Forexample, advantages in day-to-day alert and in-commission ratesare less relevant if conflict occurs after both sides have madeextensive preparations. Similarly, advantages in accuracy andthrow-weight are more relevant in a no warning attack on ICBMsilos in which the defender fails to launch-on-warning (LOW) orlaunch-through-attack (LTA). If the defender decides to launch-on-warning or launch-through-attack, most of the attackers highlyaccurate missiles will fall on empty silos.

In order to avoid the difficult tasks of deciding what constitutesequivalent capabilities in each general category of strategicweaponry, the "freedom-to-mix" concept has frequently guidedpast negotiations. Thus, to some extent each side has been allowedto choose for itself what systems provide balance at the strategiclevel. This concept was first set forth in the early days of SALT Iwhen the American delegation tabled, as a series of talking points,an agreed aggregate number of launchers for fixed or mobile land-based ICBMs and for sea-based strategic offensive ballisticmissiles, with the freedom for each side to vary the combination ofthese types of launchers as it chose. S The concept was embodied insubsequent proposals and was included, in one form or another, inthe final SALT I and II agreements."

16

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The problem of force comparability, however, has not beenresolved by such an approach. Differences in force compositionhave continued to spark long and heated debates in Washington,Geneva, and, most probably, Moscow over what forces should beconstrained and how. For its part, the United States remainsconcerned that the Soviet advantage in heavy throw-weight ICBMswith MIR~s, which when coupled with improvements in accuracy,now provide Moscow with, as a minimum, the theoreticalcapability to destory a significant portion of the US land-basedstrategic retaliatory force. From the US perspective, failure toachieve limits at START on such forces would permit a dangerous,and potentially destabilizing, asymmetry in the US-Soviet strategicrelationship. Hence, the United States seeks specific subceilings onwhat it considers to be the most threatening class of Soviet missiles:SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs. The United States also seeks to setlimits on the total number of strategic nuclear warheads each side ispermitted, the number of warheads that can be mounted onindividual missiles, and the total number of heavy bombers andcruise missiles that can be carried by bombers.'

Moscow, on the other hand, seems less inclined to restrictions onthrow-weight and, thus, on their large ICBMs which they contendwould force them to restructure their strategic forces. The SovietUnion, however, is seeking limits on the total number of systemswith MIRVs, including bombers, as well as limits on the aggregatenumber of nuclear charges (by which they mean missile warheadsand bomber weapons). They are also seeking to limit cruise missilesand a ban on cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600kilometers."

Despite what would appear to be areas of agreement between theUnited States and the USSR, however, American and Sovietnegotiators are likely to have to labor long and hard before abalance of essentially dissimilar strategic structures can be achievedthrough START.

Vulnerabilities. The problem of vulnerabilities is linked directlyto calculations of force comparability. It focuses on the queston ofwhich side is more vulnerable to first and follow-on strikes andwhat kinds, if any, of qualitative and quantitative adjustmentsshould be permitted in arms agreements in order to assure theexistence Of "balance" or " equal security."

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In this regard, the United States has only a limited air defensecapability. It has only a relatively limited capability to protect itscivilian populace from nuclear attack through civil defensemeasures. Furthermore, the United States currently has noprogram for the protection or relocation of key industries." Manyof the US Urban, industrial, and communication centers are locatednear the coasts and, hence, are vulnerable to attack by SLBMs orsea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which offer little warningtime when used for attack on coastal targets. Furthermore, theopen nature of US society makes it almost impossible to guardagainst well-orchestrated attacks on the communication nodes usedfor strategic command and control during nuclear war.' However,the education and training of its people, multiple redundancies ofcommunication and transportation capabilities, and a strongresources base may make the United States more capable oforganizing and conducting local and national efforts in a post-attack environment.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has a well-developed andhighly regarded air defense network. It has undertaken extensivecivil defense efforts to protect party and government leadership,workers, and essential industrial installations in the event ofnuclear war."I Its economic system, however, is not nearly as strongor likely to be as resilient as that of the United States. The Soviettransportation system is woefully inadequate. As a result, basicsupplies and food stuffs are likely to be in short supply for aconsiderable length of time following any strategic nuclearexchange. Furthermore, centrifugal ethnic and national forceswithin the Soviet Union may hinder Soviet recovery effortsfollowing a nuclear war with the United States.' 2

How should such asymmetries be reconciled? Should the UnitedStates be permitted some additional number of bombers as offsetSoviet air defense capabilities? Should certain strategic forceimbalances be permitted in order to account for Sovietvulnerabilities? Or, are these vulnerabilities offset by a morefavorable civil defense posture? Are such asymmetries too complexto judge and, thus, do they only serve to make an arms agreementimpossible to achieve if such factors were considered?

Technological Change. One of the "banes" of the strategic armsnegotiations, as Strobe Talbott noted in his analysis of SALT II,

has been that new technologies frequently render arms controlmeasures obsolete or inadequate. I

The problem of technological change focuses on the potentialimpact of future changes in capabilities which are likely to occur asa result of technological advances. Such issues arise as: what are theprobable effects on strategic stability and on the balance ofintercontinental forces of advances in missile guidancetechnologies-not only in a theoretical sense, but in terms of actualoperational capabilities should strategic war occur? What kinds ofmissile guidance improvements can be anticipated over the courseof the agreement? Is there an upper limit on the operationalaccuracies likely to be obtained by inertial guidance systemsbecause of inherent systemic errors? Will terminal or stellarguidance technologies overcome or reduce systemic errors? Whatwill be the impact on cruise missile capabilities of continuedimprovements in component miniaturization, in small enginetechnologies, in heavy hydrocarbon fuels, or in terrain mapping orradar correlation techniques? Will there be a breakthrough insubmarine detection and tracking or in antimissile defense? Withinwhat timeframe are such advances likely? And what specificprovisions should be included in arms control proposals to limit thepotentially adverse impacts of such advances?

Both SALT I and SALT II attempted to impede the advance oftechnology. SALT I, however, is of course best known for itsfailure to constrain the advance of MIRV technologies. This failurehas contributed to a marked increase in the strategic capabilitiesand vulnerabilities of both superpowers-not only by permitting adramatic increase in the numbers of warheads that Soviet andAmerican missiles can deliver, but also by providing either side theopportunity to strike the other's missile forces with a relativelysmall number of its own strategic missiles. Nevertheless, SALT Idid constrain the advance of antiballistic missile (ABM) and, to amuch lesser extent, ICBM technologies."' However, the "InterimAgreement" on strategic offensive forces can perhaps better beunderstood in terms of the reluctance of either party to constrainitself in areas where technological advance seemed to offer somepotential for future improvements in capabilities. On the otherhand, SALT II did attempt to constrain a variety of technologiesthrough prohibitions in development and testing. For example,both the United States and the USSR were prohibited from

19

developing, testing, or deploying: (1) systems for the rapid reloadof ICBM launchers; (2) ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excessof 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other thansubmarines; (3) fixed ballistic or cruise missiles for employment onthe ocean floor, on the seabed and so forth; and (4) mobilelaunchers for heavy ICBMs.

The problem of technological change was perhaps best summedup by Christoph Bertram, the former director of the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies.

The trouble is that, because of technological cane... it has become almostimpossible for arms-control negotiators to produce treaties which will beunequivocally fair and equitable. A bargain struck on the basis of thetechnological characteristics of specific weapons existing at the time ofagreement will become inequitable as one side or the other introducesqualitative improvements which have not been ruled out, or deploysalternative weapons systems which bypass the restrictions agreed upon."

Verification. Perhaps no other strategic arms control issue hasbeen so widely and heatedly discussed as has been the verificationissue. Gerard Smith wrote that the first question that came to mindwhen SALT I limitations were considered was: "Can it beverified? "

Verificaton is the process of identifying compliance ornoncompliance with the provisions of the agreement. Once defenseplanners have determined what forces should be compared andhow, and what limitations meet the requirements for balance andessential equivalence, they must then address the issue of howcompliance with such force limitations can be verified. This is, ofcourse, frequently an interactive process in which the ability toverify compliance ultimately affects which forces are to beconstained and how. Thus, the question of what forces should belimited to improve crisis stability and cap the arms race frequentlyyields to the question of what limitations can be verified. Thisdeference to verification, however, is also grounded in a desire forstability. For if an arms agreement cannot be verified, then neitherparty can be certain that the other is adhering to its terms. As aminimum. confidence in one's security might well erode withconsequent adverse impact on the political relations between theparties to the negotiation. Ultimately, the very objective of armsrace and crisis stability may be threatened as each side attempts to

2D

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hedge against what they may suspect may be covert attempts by theother side to improve its relative strategic position.

Emphasizing the importance of verification, George Seignious,while serving as director of the US Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, said in a statement before Congress:

la SALT we don't rely on trust. Trust is not a basis for natonal survival. Weverify Soviet compliance with the provisions of the agreemnent by using ourdiverse, powerful, and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Taken togethe,these capabilities provide us with a substantial amount of detailed, accurate,up-to-date information on those Soviet forces and activities limited bySALT."

Such National Technical Means (NTM), as the vehicles ofverification have become known in both SALT I and SALT II,have been the fundamental basis upon which verification ofstrategic arms accords has rested. Article V of the SALT I "InterimAgreement" and Article XV of the SALT II accord permitted eachparty to use NTM to verify compliance consistent with therecognized principles of international law. Both SALT I and II alsoprohibited each party from interfering with the NTM of the otherparty and from using deliberate concealment measures to impedeverification by NTM. Presumably, any new strategic armsagreement, as a minimum, will include similar provisions.

Despite the SALT I and II agreements on the use of NTM forverification and the considerable capabilities available to both theUnited States and the Soviet Union to observe each other's forces,verificaton remains a major problem for stategic arms negotiators.The rapid pace of technological advance has made it necessary tomove beyond simple counts of missile launchers and bombers toachieve balance and stability at the strategic level. MIRVtechnology has multiplied the potential number of warheads amissile can carry and, thus, the number of targets it can strike.Advances in fuels technologies, small engine design, and warheadminiaturization have now made it possible to produce and deploy anew family of cruise missiles which can be used for strategic as wellas tactical purposes. Advances on missile launch facilities andguidance technologies make it possible to deploy highly accuratemobile missiles. The potential development of common warheaddesigns and strap-on missile stages suggests a future ability to alterquickly the capabilities of one's strategic missile forces by adding to

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the warheads of the missile force or by converting medium-rangesystems to strategic systems."' All such developments seriouslycompound the problem of verifying compliance with any futureagreement.

For example, if the number of missiles were limited instead of thenumber of missile launchers, as has been the case in the past, howcould one side be certain that the other side wasn't building andhiding missiles which could be emplaced rapidly in silos after thefirst wave of ICBMs had been fired? Or, if the number of warheadsto be placed on a specific family of ICBMs was limited, how couldone side be certain that the other was adhering to the limitsspecified in the agreement? For instance, could the Soviet militarybe confident about the ability of a missile to release, say, twentywarheads even if they had only tested the release of up to ten incompliance with the specifics of an agreement?

Furthermore, if an agreement were reached to limit the numberand ranges of strategic cruise missiles, how could one be certainthat cruise missiles did not exceed the ranges specified in theagreement? Since range is, in part, a function of payload, could asignatory, through advances in miniaturization or accuracy, reducethe size of the warhead and increase the amount of fuel, therebyextending the range of its cruise missile force? Perhaps moreimportantly, how would one detect the deployment of cruisemissiles and how could one determine if the missiles deployed wereconventional or nuclear? Their small size allows them to beconcealed easily aboard ships in numbers that might seriouslyaffect the balance of strategic forces. Moreover, in the absence ofintrusive inspection, would it be possible to determine if a specificfamily of cruise missiles were armed with conventional or nuclearwarheads?,

Finally, if technological advance coupled with increasingconcerns over the vulnerability of fixed-site ICBM forces is leadingboth the United States and the Soviet Union in the direction ofmobile missiles, how will either side determine if the specifics of anagreement are being observed? Mobile missiles depend for survivalon confusing the opponent as to the specific location of themissiles. But if they cannot be seen, how can they be counted? Evenif an opponent has multiple fixed sites, as was proposed under theMX multiple aim point (MAP) program, how does the other sidedetermine how many missiles are actually in the fixed sites" and

22

how can it be sure that additional missiles have not been secretedaway to be placed in position during a severe crisis?

The problem of verification has been further complicated bySoviet efforts to encode telemetric information during missile tests.US officials have long considered access to Soviet missile telemetryimportant. By monitoring the signals transmitted by Soviet missilesto ground stations in the USSR, the United States can estimate suchfeatures as the size, number, and type of warheads and, thus, keeptrack of some of the information needed to verify compliance withthe specifics of agreements. The increasing use of encodedtelemetry now threatens to reduce the value to NTM, just at a timewhen agreements are becoming more complex, and confidence inbeing able to verify compliance will require more rather than lessinformation."

Sanctions and Ambiguity. The problem of sanctions addressestwo issues: what s auld be done if a violation of an arms agreementis suspected and what should be done if one is confirmed? Thesolution to the first question is complicated by several factors.Neither side may wish to disrupt the climate of cooperation at thestrategic level by pursuing suspected violations too vigorously,especially where evidence is scanty, suspicions may proveunwarranted or violations may be unintended and minor. Also,raising an issue may compromise intelligence sources. On the otherhand, both sides are likely to wish to remain confident. thatmechanisms exist for challenging potential violations.

Perhaps one of the least publicized outcomes of the SALT Iprocess was the establishment of the Standing ConsultativeCommission (SCC).61 Article XIII of the ABM Treaty establishedthe SCC to consider, among other things, questions concerningtreaty compliance and unintended interference with NTM and toprovide information on a voluntary basis to assure confidence incompliance. The SCC has functioned as one of the principal meanof raising concerns over suspected violations of both the SALT I orSALT 11 agreements. For example, in 1973 the United Statesobserved that the Soviet Union was building silos of a differentdesign than had been seen before. If those silos were intended toserve as ICBM launchers they would constitute a violation of theSALT I Interim Agreement which prohibited construction ofadditional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972.Washington brought the question to the SCC and a bilateral review

23

panel was established. The issue was resolved when Moscowresponded that the silos were not for ICBM launchers but forhardened command and control facilities. Subsequently, thatexplanation was confirmed.' 2

Similarly, the ABM Treaty prohibited the conversion ofantiaircraft installations into antimissile defenses. In 1973 and1974, US intelligence noticed that the Soviet Union was conductingtests using air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) radars to tracktheir ballistic missiles during test flights. The Soviet leaders saidthat they were using the radars to track the navigaton system of theballistic missiles, not in an attempt to upgrade their SAMs forABM use. The issue was taken before the SCC for resolution. Ashort time after the United States raised the issue in the SCC, theSoviet Union stopped using the radars for missile tests.

The Soviet Union has also used the SCC. For example, in 1973,the Air Force installed prefabricated shelters over minuteman silosat Malmstrom Air Force Base to protect workmen from the wintersnows of Montana. The workman were hardening the silo covers sothat as the accuracy and throw-weight of Soviet missiles increased,the US missiles would stand a better chance of surviving near-directhits. The Soviet Union charged that the shelters violated Article Vof the Interim Agreement forbiding measures which deliberatelyimpede verification by NTM. The USSR contended that since theshelters were four times larger than those used during thecontruction and modernization of Minuteman silos from 1962 to1972, this was a deliberate impediment. The issue was considered asphony by some in Washington who argued that because of the opennature of US society the Soviet Union knew perfectly well that theshelters were not being used to conceal the substitution of heavyICBMs for Minuteman Ils. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of whatconstituted "deliberate" remained. Finally, the Fordadministration agreed to reduce the size of the shelters and, by1977, the Carter administration actually reduced them by one.-half." tOne observer has written:

SALT verification is charged with proving a nptive, that it, that theactivities prohibited by treaty are n t, in fact, taking place. That means thatoniderable vacttude mst be used in drafting the treaty so to removeamy doubt about what activities actuily constitute a violation."

24

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.Pe

Eliminating ambiguity, however, has not always been easy. Indeed,a little ambiguity has frequently been the price of agreement at thenegotiating table. For example, SALT I specifically prohibited theconversion of "light" ICBMs into heavy ICBMs. However, theSoviet Union refused to define what they mean by "heavy"' missilelaunchers. Subsequently, the USSR deployed the SS-19 missilewhich it described as a "light" missile even though it had a volume30 percent greater than the missile it was replacing. Thus, while theUnited States could detect deployment of the new missile, it was

impssble to substantiate any explicit violation of the SALT Iaccord. Nevertheless, it was argued that deployment of this missileviolated the intent of the accord and undercut unilateral USstatements concerning maximum size of allowed missiles.

More recently, the Soviet Union is reported to have tested a newmobile ICBM with ten MIRV warheads in October 1982. Whilethere is apparently some evidence to suggest that the missile testedmay be a "heavy" rather than a "light" one,65 nonetheless, ArticleIV of SALT II does permit each party to test and deploy one newtype of "light" ICBM. In February 1983 the Soviet Union isreported to have tested another "'light" ICBM which is mobile. TheSALT 11 agreement does permit each side to test modernizedversions of existing missiles. Since no existing Soviet "light"

mislsare mobile, the February 1983 test would appear to be thesecond test of a new ICBM and thus constitute a violation of theSALT II accords. Nevertheless, despite attempts to eliminateambiguity through a series of "Agreed Statements" and"Common Understandings" which are an integral part of theSALT 11 agreement, some ambiguity as to exactly what constitutes

modrniaton remains.it has also been reported that the Soviet Union is constructin a

"massive new" radar in central Siberia near several ICBM sites.The new radar is aimed at the Pacific Coast facing Alaska not atChina to the south." Some defense specialists apparently believethat the Soviet Union intends to use the radar in conjunction with amissile defense system to protect ICBMs. This, again, would be aclear violation of the ABM Treaty. Whether and how the SCCmight be used to resolve the issue has yet to be determined.However, the problem may well turn out to be one of the moredifficult issues yet confronted in the strategic arms control process.

25

,y-

Its outcome could well affect the future of arms controlagreements.

Finally, there is considerable ambiguity as to what constitutes alegitimate use of encryption of telemetry and, thus, is permitted bythe SALT 11 agreement, and what use of encryption impedesverificaton and, thus, is prohibited by the treaty. Such ambiguitiesmake it difficult to determine whether the Soviet Union is violatingthe specific provisions on encoding in the Common Understandingsof the SALT 11 agreement. They also make it difficult to verify theother provisions of the accord through observations of Soviettelemetric data.

The second question addresses the issue of what is to be done if aviolation is confirmed. Perhaps more importantly, what constitutesconfirmation? Is a deliberate violation a statement of nationalintent? Should violations of different provisions of strategic armsaccords be treated equally? Can sanctions be imposed which wouldenhance the strategic arms control process and the continuedmaintenance of strategic stability? Or should a clear violation beconsidered a unilateral abrogation on the entire treaty? Such arethe questions which strategic arms control negotiators mustconfront if sanctions are to be considered.

THE FUTURE

The aforementioned complexities suggest that no easy solutionsto the problem of achieving "balance" or "equal security" arelikely to be forthcoming. Achieving agreement on limiting strategic

armament, however, is as much a political act as it is a function ofthe many technical complexities which must be overcome. Despitethe Kremlin's decision to suspend START negotiations, as well asINF talks, in response to the NATO deployment of Pershing II andcruise missiles in Europe, a number of the concerns which drove USand Soviet leaders to sign the SALT I and SALT II accords remain.Both Washington and Moscow continue to share the nagging fearof nuclear holocaust. Both remain interested in avoiding strategicinstabilities which might lead to nuclear war. Both are likely to beconcerned over the growing vulnerability of some of their strategicsystems. Both are apparently interested in creating an equilibriumin which their countries can be secure.

26

In Moscow, there is a rene concern over d nature andextent of Washington's strategic force moderizamlo program andthe potential impact on US-Soviet strategic rlatiombips ofAmerica's technological edge If American teanology is leftunconstrained by a START agrement. Likewise, there is, nodoubt, a renewed concern over the economic l of anexpanded arms race. During his brief tenure, former SovietPresident Yuri Andropov had signaled his Interet In Improving theSoviet economy." The new Soviet leader Konstantin U. Chernenkois also known to be interested in improving the economy.According to Western estimates, however, the Soviet Union hasbeen spending between 10 and 15 percent of its Gross NaioalProduct on defense. It also channds a large portion of its siedmanpower into defense and defense related industries. Tlii tondsto restrain civil oriented tehnlgim progress. Thus, thre isreason to suspect that any arms sreemMt which appedexmpditures on strategic forces would be welcomedin somequarters In the Kremlin, especially sn more recently the LhidStates has snaled Its intent to match continued Soviet strategicforce buildups. Indeed, even Defense Minister Ustinov., whileudecori that the Soviet Union is prepared to continue thearms race and, if necessary, deploy a new class o ICMs, seems tohave indicated a preferen for a strategic arms agreement."

Another, perhaps less obvious, factor my also serve as incenmfor a strategic arms agreemm. While It is liky that the sdectimof Chrnenko had the support of the security ministries, the stayinpower of ft new Soviet lde ma wll depend not o on hisbeing able to improve the economy, but also on his At topotray himself as a world leader a man of pace and, thus,enhance t Image of the Soviet Union as a snppower. In thisregar securing a strategic am agreement with the United Satmight strengthen even further his position within the Soviethirarh among those interested in economic growth as well asthose who believe that It Is Important for the Soviet Union to besee as in the forelownt of international arms control efforts.During Andropov's long illness In lete 1963 the military appearedto be In the ascendnc. Nev~erth , the Collective SoVietleaders has long dem-onstrated a firm blid In Part domintaover t miltary. Thus, ome should not dismiss the tr h oftho who bdlv that aention be paid to a wide spectrum of

27

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concerns which includes, but is not limited to, the buildup ofmilitary forces.

Likewise, in the United States, the growing antinuclearmovement, although now somewhat muted, and public concernsover a continuing upward spiraling arms race and rising defenseexpenditures add to pressures to seek a strategic arms agreement.Moreover, election pressures may nudge US leaders in the directionof an agreement. Already there apparently has been an attempt byadvisors to the President (as two observers of the Washington scenehave put it) to "remove the Ghengis, Khan cloak draped overReagan's shoulders in the 1980 campaign and replace it with theolive branch."" Although at this writing it seems only a remotepossibility, summit politics played in mid-1984 with Reagan andChernenko at center stage and strong indications that a newstrategic accord is forthcoming would virtually guarantee PresidentReagan's reelection in November, barring, of course, anyunforeseen serious domestic economic downturn.

One is cautioned against over-optimism. The aforementionedtechnical obstacles still must be overcome. Furthermore, relationsbetween Washington and Moscow remain strained. Years ofdistrust and misapprehensions, cmpounded by more recent evetssuch as Afghanistan, Poland, Korean Airlines 007, Grenada, andmissile deployments in Europe cloud the future. Nevertheless, oneshould not be overly pessimistic concerning the possibilities ofreaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic armsreductions, if not within the next year, within the next few years.

Whether reductions in strategic forces achieved through such anagreement would, in fact, contribute significantly to a curbing ofthe arms race and improved stability at the strategic level is quiteanother question. In large measure, that will depend on how welleach of the principal problems confronting the negotiating partiesis dealt with and whether the positions taken by the United Statesand the Soviet Union in dealing with these problems are framedfrom a coherent set of guidelines which attempts to address short-term concerns in the context of the long-tem objectives of balanceand stabilit. In short, the mccess of the current negotiation inomeva depnds heavily on whether START is addressed as a

discrete evnt by the superpowes or viewed as part of a long-termstri. In this rqard, stratqoc arms control efforts, adu nota wo sum psae, In many wa , are milar to the gam of ches.

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Sw-

' ,.;- ' ' . Lk. ,

Each movement is a statement of policy to which the opponentmust respond. It is also an attempt to structure the behavior of theopponent in a small way so that the aggregate of moves secures forthe player his long-term objectives. Each move demandsreassessment of one's own as well as the opponent's capabilitiesand a reappraisal of the opponent's short- and long-termobjectives. The game, of course, must be played in constantanticipation of contingencies which may arise from themisusesmets or altered objectives of either side. However, theoutcome depends on how well the player has structured his gameplan and on how many moves in advance he is thinking when hetouches a piece. This is called strategy. It takes into considerationthe opponent's capabilities and intentions. It focuses on the nearand the far, but never loses sight of the final objectives. It is anexercise in behavioral modificaton. It is the logical link betweenone's capabilities and the objectives one hopes to secure.

Unfortunately, both SALT I and SALT II, by and large, weretreated as discrete events by the United States and possibly as suchby the Soviet Union, rather than as a continuing process to achievestrategic arms limitations. To be sure, in the minds of those inWashington and Moscow, SALT II was a natural extension ofSALT I and many of the concerns raised in SALT II were anoutgrowth of the uncertainties which remained in the wake of theSALT I experience. No doubt, negotiators and national leaders hadlonger-term objectives in mind. However, there is little evidence tosuggest that these negotiations were designed as part of a longer-term process, that the goals set for SALT I and SALT II wereframed as pan of a grand strategy aimed at security balance andstability at the strategic level-perhaps only imperfectly throughthese early negotiations, but incrementally achieving a high degreeof stability at the strategic level by say SALT X.

Indeed, the nature of the strategic arms limitations process in thepast has suggested that for both the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates; the defense planning cycle has been dominated primarily byprocurement planning considerations rather than by political-military strategies which view arms control and force structure asintegral parts of the same coherent whole carefully designed toimprove the security of each nation.

By and large, the United States has not had a dear set of well-defined lons-term objectives for strategic arms talks to serve. As a

29

'p -__ !

.rib - r . .. ... ..

result, there was no way of measuring the contribution of SALT Ior SALT 11 to the overall short- and long-term US securityinterests. Nor did US negotiators know precisely where they shouldgo following the collapse of SALT 11 if such interests were to beserved in the future. Yet, the price of indecision was borne by theAmerican citizens who continued to pay the defense bill whilereceiving little in the way of an increased sense of security.

While there was general agreement in Washington on the broadobjectives of strategic arms negotiations-preserving deterrence,increasing stability, and improving security at reduced cost-suchobjectives were too abstract to be useful. In contrast, no generalconsensus seemed to emerge on the more meaningful objectives ofstrategic arms talks. Similarly, there has been no general consensuson the direction of defense planning. What should be the long-termobjectives of strategic arms reduction efforts? How should theseobjectives relate to the other defense objectives and to the moregeneral desire to enhance deterrence and increase stability at thestrategic level?

Parity or essential equivalence had become a guiding principal ofstrategic arms talks. Yet questions remained as to whetherequivalence was desirable -and how parity was to be measured.President Reagan, like the presidents before him, has underscoredthe need for balance. Others within the defense community and inacademia frequently betray a 'certain nostalgia for the days ofunquestioned US strategic superiority. Should parity be afundamental basis for strategic arms talks and thus for defenseplanning with respect to the strategic weapons procurementprocess? Or should START and procurement planning be guidedby renewed efforts to reestablish US strategic superiority? Someanalysts have argued that the Soviet Union is already on the edge ofmobilization for war, spending 40 percent more than the UnitedStates does for arms, from a GNP roughly half that of the UnitedStates. Thus, they contend that, the Soviet Union is near itsweapons peak right now, while the United States has been restingon a lower plateau-suggesting that the United States could easilyoutpend and outarm the Soviet Union. Yet the question remains,can a meanngful strategic superiority be achieved in the nuclearage? Mc~eorge Bundy in his speech at Villars, Switzerland, at theW99 annual conarence of the International institute for StrategicStudies, note that despite the large difference in the strategic

30

capabilities of the Soviet Union and United States in the late 1930'sand early 1960's, it was his view and that of President Kennedy thatparity existed from the moment the Soviet Union possessed asignificant number of intercontinental missiles.7' Moreover, if thesuccess of American foreign policy in securing US interests abroadduring the 1960's was any indication of the political utility ofstrategic superiority, then one midght argue that it clearly was oflittle value. This suggests that even with a wide margin of superiorcapabilities the United States might not achieve a meaningfulsuperiority. However, even if superiority could be achieved, thequestion remains as to whether America's sense of security wouldbe enhanced. Or would continued attempts by the Soviet Union tomatch American capabilities lead to ever increasing levels oftensions and instabilities at the strategic level?

Perhaps the adoption of panity as a guiding principle for theSALT I and SALT 11 negotiations masked the original purpose ofstrategic arms control talks-to bring stability to the Great Powerequation. Parity or essential equivalence was originally conceivedas a negotiating objective that might form the basis for an easing oftensions and a Soviet-American understanding on measures toimprove crisis and arms race stability. However, parity conceivedin terms of quantitative limitations in weapons does not seem tohave served well in this regard. The task now confronting theUnited States is to determine just what strategic environment isdesired over the next 30 to 50 years and to fashion strategies thatjoin arms control and defense procurement in an effort to securethat environment.

We must now ask ourselves, where do we wish to go? And howare we to get there? Are we to be captive of technology? Or, cantechnology be made to serve strategy? Must we insure that strategicarms control negotiations do not interfer with US defenseprograms? Or would it be more appropriate to ask that STARTand defense programs both serve the ends of a national strategydesigned to improve deterrence and stability at the strategic level. Ifwe are increasingly concerned thet the continued improvement inSoviet quick reacting hard-target kill capability forecasts anincrease In strategic instabilities and if we are convinced thatdeterrence depends on each side having a truly survivable secondstrike capability, should we now begin to seek the eventualelimination of all forces capable of quick reaction, such as ICBMsj 31

and SLBMs? Is this a feasible long-term objective? Can it benegotiated? Must it be pursued in conjunction with efforts toreduce active and passive defenses which might make effectiveretaliation a less credible deterrent threat? Or, should we begin tomove toward truly mobile forces which could well be capable ofdefying real-time target intelligence? Can this be done in theabsence of START? The MX basing mode debate suggested thatstrategic arms control talks were the key to the survivability ofmobile systems-for without warhead limitations, the Soviet Unioncould simply multiply the number of warheads until they are able tocover the additional potential targets. Are there other systems thatmight serve better? Should the United States and Soviet UnioRmove to sea? Is President Reagan's "build-down" strategic armsproposal" the first real attempt to restructure strategic forces forsurvivability and, thus, for strategic stability? If so, will the futuresurvivability of sea forces be dependent on a further set ofagreements which set aside certain areas of the seas as sanctuaries?Are such agreements already being considered for START 11 orSTART III or IV as part of as US long-term arms control strategy?What is the probability of an imminent beakthrough in satellitereconnaissance which might furnish real-time target intelligence onsubmarine locations? Can START assist in reducing vulnerabilitiesand how? In the interim can the United States justify theacquisition of counterforce capabilities to strike certain hardenedtargets in retaliation or as part of its limited nuclear options whilechiding the Soviet Union for improvements in accuracy? These aresome of the questions which must be answered if the United Statesis to develop effective national security strategies which includestrategic arms negotiations as an integral part. Until then we willcontinue to be captive of an ill defined parity as the fundamentalguiding principal of short-term approaches and we will continue tobe disappointed with the results.

32

ENDNOTES

1. For a thorough discussion of the beginnings of SALT 1, in John Newhouse,ColdDawn, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,1973.

2, Ibid., p. 103.3. Ibid.. p. 5.4. On the ABM issue, Newhouse contends that "in a bureaucratic sense, the

ABM issue may have been the toughest McNamara ever dealt with." Almosteveryone in the Pentagon was for the ABM. The Joint Chiefs estimated that a thicksystem capable of defending US cities against Soviet missiles would cost about $10billion. McNamara believed that $40 billion would be closer. He also believed thesystem could be easily overcome by the Soviet Union. Both the State Departmentand the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) feared an ABMdeployment would increase strategic instabilities. Their views, however, wereapparently little heard and less heeded. Congressional powers dose to the President,namely Richard Russell (then chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee),Senator John Stennis, and Congressman George H. Mahan all favored deploymentof an ADM system. To avert total defeat on the ABM issue, McNamara suggested acompromise to which the President agreed. The Administration would not spend theinitial $375 million that had been restored to the budget for initial ABMprocurement. The Administration would also delay making a fnal decision onwhether the ABM system would be a thick system or a thin system capable ofprotecting against accidents and limited Chinese capabilities until the StateDepartment had explored the idea of talks on limiting strategic arms, especiallyABMs. Thus, in one sense Washington was driven to SALT by dearly bureaucraticand institutional factors related to the ABM debate in the US defene community.See bId., pp. 77-86.

5. nd.. P. 101.6. The greater-than-expected threat came into the defense lexicon in the mid-

1960's. It signified enemy capabilities that exceeded the high end of the range ofthreats projected by the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). In an age ofgrowing Soviet strategic capabilities, conservative force planning suggested the needto hedge against just such threats.

7. Richard Nixon, US Foreisn Poicy for the 1970 s: A New Straty for Poee.Washington: US Government Printing Office, February 18, 1970, p. 143.

8. For a further discussion of these points see J. 1. Coffey, "SALT Under theCarter Administraton," Nel, War COW Revirw, Winter 1979 HelmutSonnenteldt and William 0. Hyland, "Soviet Perspectives on Security," AdephiPao.r, No. 150, Spring 1979; Willam D. Jackson, "Policy Assessment at theCrossroads: the Soviets and SALT," 711 Bidth @ the Atomc Seknet April1979;, and Newhouse, p. 107.

9. Lawrence T. Cadwell, "Soviet Attitudes to SALT," AdWeph Pqper No. 75,February 1971, p. 2.

10. Ibd., p. 3. In the author's view it would be a mistake to overdraw the role ofthe "modeists." Soviet ledersh has long been interested in huther economicadvancement. However, It has shown no unwillingness to dMay economic eqnnauonwhen funds wee perceved as necessary to meet deftse meeds. Efforts by Sovietleadership to prpare their citizens for a new round of betigShtening to meetdelen needs in the wake of Grenada and missile dqoymes in Europe should be. IN e thi ht.

33i 'I

11. Pravda, March 15, 1954.12. Pinvda, December 22, 1952, cited in William D. Jackson, "The Soviets and

Strategic Arms: Toward an Evaluation of the Record," Political Science Quarterly,Summer 1979, p. 249.

13. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitations inSoviet Policy," International Security, Summer 1978, pp. 114-125.

14. For example see Pravda. April 8, 1978, p. 1.15. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, SALT. The First Strategic Arm Negotiation,

as reported in Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Srategic ArmsLimitations in Soviet Poicy," International Security, Summer 1978, pp. 113-125.

16. See The New York Time, March 5, 1979, p. AS.17. The Washington Post, March 5, 1979, p. AS.18. See US Congress, Senate, The SAL TiI 7reaty Hearings before the Committee

on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, lit Sess., Part 1, Washington: USGovernment Printing Office, p. 435.

19. Ibid., p. 539.20. Cohn S. Gray, "SALT I1: The Real Debate," Policy Review, Fall 1979, pp. 16

and 19.21 See TheNew York Times, February 3, 1981, p. Al.22. Richard Burt, "The Evolution of the US START Approach," NA TO Review,

September 1982, pp. 1-2. Also see President Ronald Reagan's speech at EurekaCollege on "East-West Relations," Vital Speeches of the Day, June 1, 1982, pp.482-485 and his November 18, 1962 speech before the National Press Club inWashington, "US Program for Peace and Arms Control," Current Policy No. 346,Washington: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, November 18,1961.23. Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of

Peace, Washington: US Government Printing Office, February 9, 1972, pp. 172.173.24. The SALTProcess, Washington: US Department of State, June 1978, p. 9.25, Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report:

FRhl Year 1979, Washington: Department of Defense, February 2,1978, p. 36.26. Ibid., pp. 3-57.27. See, for example, President Reagan, "US Program for Peace and Arms

Control," speech before the Natonal Press Club in Washington, on November 18,1981, Crrent Polky No. 346, p. 4; President Reagan's speech at Eureka College,Vial Speeches, p. 483; President Reagan's speech before the second UN GeneralAssembly Special Session on Disarmament, New York, June 17, 1962, "Agenda forPeace," CUrrent Policy No. 405, Washington: US Department of State, Bureau ofPublic Affairs, p. 3; and President Regan's address before the Los Angele WorldCouncil, March 31, 1983, "Reducing the Danger of Nuclear Weapons," CurentPolicy No. 473, p. 3. In September 1962, Richard Burt outlined the four keyobjectives of the arms control policy of the Reagan Administration-security,militarily significant reductions, equality, and verifiability. Concerning equality, bewre: "Equality is fundamental to balanced arms control, deterrence, and stabilityamd to a US-Soviet relatofhip based on mutual restraint and reciprocity." SeeBut, NA TO Rvew, p. 3.

26. For example, n Pavda, January 19, 1977; February 23, 1977; and April 26,Iva.

34

29. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, at present theBritish have 64 strategic nuclear missiles in place on 4 nuclear submarines. Inaddition, they have 48 Vulcan and 50 Buccaneer strike aircraft capable of deliveringnuclear weapons on targets in the Soviet Union. The French have about 18 land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 80 sea-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBMs) capable of striking the Soviet Union with plans to increase the sizeof their nuclear powered ballistic missile fleet by two additional submarines in the1930's, and, thus, add an additional 32 missiles to their stategic forces. The Frenchalso have 34 MIRAGE IVA strategic bombers. While estimates of Chinese strategicnuclear capabilities vary widely, it is reported that the Chinese have deployedapproximately 50 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and between 645IRBMs. Both these systems are capable of reaching targets in the Eastern USSR.They also may have begun to deploy a limited number of multistaged ICBMs (CSS-3s) with a range sufficient to strike targets in the European USSR (excludingMoscow), as well as a full range ICBM (the CSS-X-4) capable of striking targetsanywhere in the Soviet Union. In addition to their ballistic missiles, the Chinese haveabout 90 TU-16 medium bombers with a range of about 3000 km. They also havebegun to deploy a nuclear powered submarine with 12 missile tubes. The MiltayBalance 1983-1984, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983,pp. 8244. Also see Ronald T. Pretty, ed., Jane's Wepon Systems, London: Jane'sPublishing Co., Ltd., 1962, pp. 1-2.

30. See unilateral statements made at the close of SALT I in Smith, pp. 514-515.31. SALT Lexcon, Washington: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

1974, p. 16.32. Both SALT I and SALT II frequently relied on range as the qualifying

criterion for the inclusion of a weapon system under the agreements. For thepurpose of the SALT I agreement, ICBM launchers capable of launching ballisticmissiles with ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeasternborder of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the jcontinental USSR were considered strategic. SALT II further clarified the definitionof ICBMs by setting the range between these two points at 550 km. Range,although not spel-fically mentioned, also seemed to be an underlying qualifyingcriteria for "heavy bombers" in the SALT 11 agreement. The Soviet Bear and Bisonaircraft and the US B-52 and B-I type aircraft are all capable of what could beconsidered intercontinental ranges. However, aircraft such as the US FB-I I I and theSoviet Backfire bomber were not included in the SALT 11 agreement. Likewise, theProtocol to the SALT 1 Treaty set limits on SLCMs based on range. See Smith, p.S09 and SALT !1 Agrement, Washinlton: US Department of State, Bureau ofPublic Affairs, Selected Documents No. 12A, June 13, 1979, pp. 27-28.

33. See Smith, pp. 90-91.34 Abid., P. 93,35. Strobe Talbott, Edgn The Im.i* Story of SALT 1, New York: Harper

and Row Publishers, 1979, p. 33.36. bd.. p. 72.37. IbId., pp. 148and ISO38. For example, on Robert Kmedy, "Soviet Teater Nuclear Capabilities: Th

Euopmn Nuclear Balance in Transition" in ZfmWe of t wei t: W s.tiwl and-EAwoP SKUaity laWn RAepai 4d edited by Robert Kennedy and John M.Wdhtuin. Boulder: Westvisw Press, 1964.

35

- .4.

4 . .

39. Throw-weight has been defined as "... the maximum useful weight which hasbeen flight tested on the boost stages of the missile. The useful weight includesweight of the reentry vehicles, penetration aids, dispensing and release mechanisms,reentry shrouds, covers, buses and propulsion devices with their propellants (but notthe final boost stages) which are present at the end of the boost phase." See SALTLexicon, p. 18.40. Equivalent megatonnage (EMT) is a measure used to compare the destructive

potential of differing combinations of nuclear warhead yields against relatively softcountervalue targets. EMT is a computed function of yield (in megatons) whichcompensates to a degree for the fact that blast danage resulting from a nucleardetonation does not increase linearly with an increase in yield. Thus, if thedestruction of a soft target is desired, it may be more effective to use two weaponseach of small yield than a single weapon of a higher total yield even if its yield wasmuch higher than the total yield of the two small weapons. Hard target killcapability is a function of both the accuracy of the weapons system and the yield ofthe warhead. Accuracy, however, is the predominant factor.

41. Cold launch is the technique of ejecting a missile from a silo before fullignition of the main engine. This technique leaves the missile silo essentiallyundamaged and available for reload. How much time it would take to actuallyreload a silo would depend on th locaton of the space missile and other factorsrelated to the silo preparation and the physical loading of the missile. Estimatesvary. Some contend that the Soviet Union would be ready to fire a second missilewithin 6 hours.42. See Soviet Military Power 1983. Washington; US Government Printing

Office, March 1983, p. 14; and Caspar Weinberger, A wnua Repot to the COwnrFiscal Year 1984, Wbshington: US Government Printing Office, February 1, 1983,p. 333.

43. The bomber balance has been a seriously disputed issue. The SALT IIagreement only included B-52, B-I, Bear, and Bison type aircraft in the counts of USand Soviet strategic bomber forces. Today, according to US Department of Defenseestimates, the Soviet Union has about 145 long-range Bear and Bison aircraft. TheBear has an unrefueled combat radius of 8300 km. The Bison's range is slightly less.The United States has about 241 operational B-52s which have a combat radius ofabout 8000 kn. Thus, the United States has approximately 100 more operationalstrategic bombers than does the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union also hasdqoyed over 200 Backfire bombers to perform conventional, maritime, andnuclear strike missions. The Backfire has a combat radius of 5500 km. If deployedto Arctic staging bases or refueled in flight, the Backfire can attack targets anywherein the United States. The United States deploys 36 FB-I I I medium-range bomberswhich would rely on inflight refueling and forward basing for intercontinentalattack. If Backfires and FB-Il ls are added to the counts of strategic forces, theUSSR would have about 50 more operational strategic bombers than does theUnited States. See Soviet Military Power, pp. 14, 13, and 25; Weinberger, AnnualReport, p. 333; and SALT ll Agrement, Washington; US Department of State,Burean of Public Affairs, June 18, 1979, pp. 28-29.46. i SmIth, pp. 504-507 ad SALT iiAmnsen. p. 32.47. Wihae! Oule, "US Arms Rudctam PhD Contains More imbie Cuts Than

Amomaced," T7% W=Mangt Pwit. April 13, 1963, p. Al.

36

.7 . - - - __________________

• r , #€ • . ,

48. Security and Arms Control, P. 25; and Michael Getler, "Soviets AdVancRevised Proposal on Arms Limits," T7W Weihingion Ptst, July 13, 1963, Al.49. Both President Carter, with the signing of Presidential Directive 41 (PD-41)

and President Reagan, with National Security Decision Directive 26 (NSDD-26),have taken steps to improve America's Civil Defense posture. The three elements ofthe current US Civil Defense program now being administered by the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) are population protection, industrialprotection. and blast sheltefin. See S. Norris, "President leagan's Civil DefenseProgram," Thm Dtfemsi Monitor, Vol. XI, 1962. For a thorough analysis of Sovietand American civil defense efforts me John M. Weinstein, "The StrategicImplications of Civil Defense, " in 77m DtfuWr of the Wet.

So. Direct up and down link betwee the national command authorities (NCA) inWashington and missile sites and bomber bae are not likely to be very vulnerableto well-orchestrated attacks Ucept those resulting from ndcear bursts designedspecifIly to impede such c muiaon. However, the multitude of otheCommniais which rely on relay stations and ground networks are likely to bevery vulnerable to such attacks.

S1. See Weinstein "The Strategic Implication of CiNi Defense."52. For a wide-ranging ezaminatlon of Soviet vailnerabilities one John M.

Wnstein, "All Features Orate and SONl: Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities and theFuture of Deterrence," in The DWfeae of the Wow.

53. Talbott, p. 157.54. Article V of the ABM Treaty specifically prohibited the development and

testing as well as deployment of sea, air, spc, or mobile lanid-batsed ADM systemsand components. It also prohibited both parties from developing and testing AIMlaunchers capable of baunching more than one ADM interceptor missile or capableof rapid reload. Article VI of the treaty was designed to constrain the advance ofassociated radar, missile, and launcher technologies which might be converted fromnon-ABM use to use as part of an antiballistic missile system. It could be argued thatArticle II of the "interim agreement" on strategic offensive forces also limited tosome degree the rate of technological advance by prohibiting the conversion ofICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964 into land-based launhr for heavyICBMs of types deployed after that time. However, Article U was more a reflectionof American concern over the vulnerabilities to US Minuteman ICBM missileforces which were developing as a result of the Soviet degloyment of its heavythrow-wielit SS-9 missmiles, thanit was areflection ofa speciflc attempt to control

35. hr-loperDertram, "Thes Future of Arms Control: Part UI-Arms Controland Technological Changs: Elements of a New Approach." AdebAib Pqeaw No.146, Sumumar 1978, P. 2.56. Smithi, p. 99. John Newhouse aiad that perhapsno Probia ad focued

moare analysis and interval debate in Washbogta than had the Vrate n ofverification. SiMilauy Strobe Talbott contendedoht verificaion was the "inglbigmes conmmr oif the Congress" In its dellberatiom an the SALT H3 Tre anmNews P. 14 and Talbott, p.9.

57. ACDA Dhmaor Osorge M. Selpome, "St4anat belbe the Committee anftorsigReoos of the us Set., 3*1t,197," ia SAf N wte Tatiuea,0~ ala Ify M A, Wainlsm US Departimnt of SUN% Dwae of PublicAfaRs, July 9-11I, 97,p. 24.

58. One of die may concerns during the SALT If negotiations was the so-calleSS-20/SS-16 conversion problem. The Soviet Union had tested a mobile ICBMlabeled by the West as the SS-16. It then deployed the SS-20, an intermediate-rangeballistic missile-essentially, the SS-16 minus its third propulsion stae. Thus, anumber of strategic force analysts were concerned that the Soviet Union might beable to store the third state of this missile and, in a crisis, quickly convert its SS-205to ICDMs.

59. One solution to this problem was that at a specified time the United Stateswould uncover ail its map shelters so that Soviet satellites could verify the numbersof missiles the United States actually was shuffling between sites. The Soviet Unionnever indicated whether such an arrangement would be satisfactory. Had the UnitedStates, however, adopted a deep trench mobile basing mode for its missiles, theproblem might haved been more complex.

60. For a further discussion of some of the problems of verification, see L.AsAspin, "The Verification of the SALT 11 Agreement," Scientific Auerican,February 1979, pp. 3&-45; Robert Perry, the Faces of Veriflcatlon. Strategic ArmsaCont rolfor the 1980's. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, August 1977; AmronH. Katz, Verikcation and SALT. Thse State of the Art and the Art of the State,Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1979; Paul H. Nitze, James E. Dougherty,and Francis X. Kane, Th Fateful Endr and Shades of SALT," New York: Crane,Russak and Company, 1979; Seymour Weiss, "SALT Verification" in John F.Lehmani and Seymour Weiss, eds., Beyond the SAL TIIAsure, New York: PraegerPublishers, 1961, pp. 6741; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,Strategic Dbiarnient, Verfiartion and National Scurty, New York: Craew,Russak and Company, Inc., 1977.

49. For a detailed discussion of the SCC, see Colonel E. Asa Bates, Jr., USAF(Ret.), "The SALT Standing Consultative Commission: An American Analyses,"M~eklniu, Volume 4, 1975, pp. 132-145.

62. Talbott. Eadgaai, p. 143.63. ANi., pp. 114-117.64. John F. Lehman, Jr., "Verificatio Concerns," in Beyond the SALT II

Faivue, p. 25.65. See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "SALT Loophole," T7e Wahington

PNt, February 23.1963, p. A17.66. Evans and Novak, "A Smoking Oun in Siberia?"67. For example, in Dusko Doder, "Soviet Lade Calls for Economic Reform,"-

The Washington Pot, August 16,1983, P. A12.66. Dusko Doder, "Soviets Seem Near Arms Escalation," The Washington Nt

December $,.1962 p. Al.69. Evans and Novak, "A Smoking Oun in Siberia?"70. Mc~aorge Bundy. "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has

Cangsed?"- in Theftset of Strategic Deuremew: Pat I, AdO lhPowuu% No. 160,Leadon: The Interntional Instit for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1960.71. Details of the "build-down" proposal remain sketchy at this writing However

in general the proposal calls for a minimumn reduction in strategic forme of 5 percentper year.- Thuas, for sach mew system added older syatm would have to be retired.The American proposal appears to be dsulpas to retr the more vulnerble systemsvichiy. Thues, for each new ICBM with MIRY, such a the MX. two elder systemwit MIRY would hav to be retired. However, for each three new SLIWs added,a*l two older systew would hav to be -eabed

38

IATE

MED