F-22 Raptor Strategy and Concept of Employment...F-22 Raptor Strategy and Concept of Employment...
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1 This Briefing is Classified: UNCLASSIFIED Headquarters Air Combat Command Effects-Based Operations Col Gary Crowder Chief, Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine Air Combat Command
Transcript of F-22 Raptor Strategy and Concept of Employment...F-22 Raptor Strategy and Concept of Employment...
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This Briefingis Classified:
UNCLASSIFIED
Headquarters Air Combat Command
Effects-BasedOperations
Col Gary CrowderChief, Strategy, Concepts
and DoctrineAir Combat Command
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Desert Storm
Over 150 target attacks planned in 24 Over 150 target attacks planned in 24 hourshours… more … more than in the than in the yearsyears 1942 and 1943 combined over central 1942 and 1943 combined over central
Europe in WWIIEurope in WWII
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How Was This Possible?
The maturation of airpower technologies merged with a theory of targeting for systemic effect rather than absolute
destruction
Advanced Technologies (Stealth + Precision ) +
New Planning Approach (Effects Based Planning )=
New Concept of Operations (Parallel War)
Defining Event Of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)Defining Event Of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
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1943 1970 1991
30 F-4 sorties
176 bombs (500#)
400 ft CEPOne Target
Vietnam
1999
All WX, One AC
Many Targets
1500 B-17 sorties9000 bombs (250#)
3300 ft CEPOne 60’ x 100’ target
WWII
Over five decades, advanced platforms and precision munitions revolutionized the effects of airpower by shortening the time and sorties
required to strike a target (or targets!).
Precision Redefines the Concept of Mass
1 B-2 sortie16 bombs
(2000#)20 ft CEP
16 Targets per PassAvailable Now
1 F-117 sortie2 bombs (2000#)
10 ft CEPTwo Targets per Sortie
Desert Storm
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The Leverage of Stealth:Non-Stealth vs Stealth Attack
41 Aircraft/ 8 Bombers1 Target—3 Aimpoints
Defense Suppression
Sweep/Escort
BombDroppers
Drones
F-4Gs
F-18s
EA-6Bs
A-6s
Tornados
F-18s
20 Aircraft/ 20 Bombers28 Targets—38 Aimpoints
BombDroppers
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Sequential vs Simultaneous Operations
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Parallel Warfare and Simultaneous Attack
SERIES WARFARE SERIES WARFARE --SEQUENTIAL ATTACKSEQUENTIAL ATTACK
Series attack of each target element in a Target System
PARALLEL WARFARE PARALLEL WARFARE --SEQUENTIAL ATTACKSEQUENTIAL ATTACK
Parallel attack of each target element in a Target System
PRALLEL WARFARE PRALLEL WARFARE --SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKSIMULTANEOUS ATTACKParallel attack of each
Target System
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Attrition vs Effects-based Operations
Priority Target1. Plant 12. Plant 23. Plant 34. Plant 45. Plant 56. Plant 67. Plant 78. Plant 89. Plant 910. Plant 1011. Plant 1112. Plant 12
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54 6
8 97
10 11 12
1
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Attrition vs Effects-based Operations
Priority Target1. Plant 32. Plant 83. Plant 94. Plant 105. Plant 16. Plant 47. Plant 28. Plant 69. Plant 510. Plant 1111. Plant 1212. Plant 7
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54 6
8 97
10 11 12
1
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Attrition vs Effects-based Operations
Priority Target1. Plant 32. Plant 83. Plant 94. Plant 105. Plant 16. Plant 47. Plant 28. Plant 69. Plant 510. Plant 1111. Plant 1212. Plant 7
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54 6
8 97
10 11 12
1 No Strike
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Attrition vs Effects-based Operations
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54 6
8 97
10 11 12
1Priority Target1. Plant 82. Plant 23. Plant 64. Plant 95. Plant 106. Plant 17. Plant 48. Plant 59. Plant 1110. Plant 1211. Plant 712. Plant 3 (No Strike)
No Strike
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Attrition vs Effects-based Operations
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54 6
8 97
10 11 12
1Priority Target
1. Plant 82. Pwr Line A3. Pwr Line B4. Plant 25. Plant 66. Plant 97. Plant 108. Plant 19. Plant 410. Plant 511. Plant 1112. Plant 1213. Plant 714. Plant 3 (No Strike)
No Strike
A
B
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Parallel Warfare and Simultaneous Attack
SERIES WARFARE SERIES WARFARE --SEQUENTIAL ATTACKSEQUENTIAL ATTACK
PARALLEL WARFARE PARALLEL WARFARE --SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKSIMULTANEOUS ATTACK
PARALLEL WARFARE PARALLEL WARFARE --SEQUENTIAL ATTACKSEQUENTIAL ATTACK
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Key to Effects-Based Planning Success:Keep Execution Tasks Tied to Political Objectives
PoliticalObjectives
MilitaryObjectives
CapabilitiesAvailable
DesiredEffects
Master AttackPlan
Air Tasking Order
Joint Concepts of Operations
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The Essence of Effects-Based Planning:A Systems of Systems Architecture
PoliticalObjectives
MilitaryObjectives
CapabilitiesAvailable
Master AttackPlan
Air Tasking Order
DesiredEffects
(Individual Targets)
OperationalCenters of
Gravity(Target Sets)
Tactical Centers of
Gravity
Strategic Centers of
Gravity(Target
Systems)
Joint Concepts of Operations
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The What & How Of Master Attack Plan Design
Render Army Ineffective
LeadershipNBC Electricity
Target Sets
LeadershipNBC Electricity
Desired EffectsDestroy
Damage Render Ineffective
ParalyzeIsolate
(de)
CONOPS ObjectivesIsolate & Incapacitate
Gain Air SuperiorityDestroy NBC Capability
Eliminate Offensive Capacity
(o)
Enemy System
Weapon SystemsF-117
TLAMSF/A-18
AH-64B-52
(ws)
LeadershipNBC
ElectricityAirfields
LeadershipNBC
ElectricityAirfields
Target SetsLeadership
TelecommunicationsNBC
ElectricityAirfields
MASTER TARGET LIST
(T)
... n
ATTACK SCHEME
Parallel Series
... n Master Attack Plan
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Effects Based Operations
Concepts:
• Rapid Aerospace Dominance• Coercive Campaigns• Cyber war and Perception
Modification• Rapid Halt • Network Centric Warfare• Shock & Awe • Dominant Maneuver
Capabilities:
• Global Coverage• Freedom of Access• Persistent Over-watch • Rapid Reaction• CONUS Reachback• Fewer Forces In
Harms Way
New Concepts & New Concepts & CapabilitiesCapabilities
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This Briefingis Classified:
UNCLASSIFIED
Headquarters Air Combat Command
Understanding and MitigatingCollateral Damage
Col Gary CrowderChief, Strategy, Concepts
and DoctrineAir Combat Command
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Collateral Damage
Collateral Damage: The damage expected to occur to non-military or approved targets in the course of prosecution of valid, approved military targets
Destruction of windows in a civilian structure located next to a military structure (e.g. barracks, Headquarters Bldg)
Unintended Damage: Damage that occurs as a consequence of weapons or weapons system malfunction, unforeseen second order effects, or as a consequence of other “targeting” errors
Fin failure on a guided munitionHidden ammo bunker underneath a structureIntelligence error
Collateral damage can be planned for and mitigated. The potential for unintended damage can be mitigated…but neither fully planned for or anticipated
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Collateral vs Unintended Damage
Risk Assessment
Military TargetBunker
Civilian StructureOffice Complex
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Mitigating Collateral Damage:The Role of Military Planning
The principal way for military forces to mitigate the potential for collateral damage is develop clear military objectives and tied military actions directly to those objectivesNumerous Steps in the Process
Objectives and GuidanceTarget DevelopmentWeaponeeringForce ApplicationExecution Planning and Force ExecutionCombat Assessment
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Myths About Collateral Damage
Collateral Damage can be avoided in conflictIntelligence is perfectWeapons always workAll damage is caused by friendly forcesHigh altitude operations decrease weapons accuracy and increase the potential for collateral damageCollateral damage can be equally mitigated in air and ground operations
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The Good News
We know IraqImproved planning and assessment tools
FAST CD, Imagery Data Bases, Electronic Target FoldersImproved munitions
Joint Direct Attack MunitionSensor Fuzed WeaponImproved TomahawkWind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
Improved aircrew trainingImproved Weapons Assessment and TrackingPost Conflict Preparations
