Extracted Pages From... [Sarah Stroud, Christine Tappolet] Weakness of Wil(BookZZ.org)

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8

Choosing Rationally

and

Choosing Correctly

alph Wedgwood

Tw o

Views

of

Practical Reason

Suppose

t ha t you are faced

with several d i f ferent options

( that i s,

several way s

in which you might act in a given si tuation) . Which option should you

choose?

L et u s take an example t ha t B erna rd W ill iams mad e fam ou s (W ill iams 1980:

1 0 2 Suppose

t ha t you

w a n t

a gin and

tonic,

and you

believe

t ha t the

s tuff

in

f ront of you is gin. In fact, however , the s tuff is not gin but petrol . So if you

d r i nk

the s tuff (even mixed with tonic), it will b e d ecided ly unpleasant , to say

the least. Should you choose to d r i nk the s tuff o r

not?

It

seems to m e

t ha t

there are at least two w ays of inte rpre ting this qu estion .

If

we interp ret the question in one way, wh a t you should

choose

depends on

wha t the available option s are r e l l y l i k e not j u s t on wha t you b e l i e v e abou t

what these options are like). For example, it may depend on the actual causal

consequences o f those options, or on other external

facts t ha t

are quite

This

chap te r is an extensively revised restatement of the a rguments of an earlier paper

(Wedgwood 2002d), which

w as

based

on the

talk that

I

gave

at the

conference Weakness

of

W ill

and Varieties o f

Practical

Irrationality, Universite d e Mont rea l , M ay 2001. This restatement of

those a rguments was presented to audiences at Oxford and at the University of Ar izona in

February 2002. I am grateful to all those audiences and especially to my c o mmen t a t o r

in Mont rea l , Josee

B rune i ),

and also to Carla Bagnoli , Jo hn B room e, Alex Byrne, Philip Clark,

N ed Hall , Elizabeth Harman, Sally Haslanger, Richard Holton, Leonard

K atz,

Ka t h r i n

K oslicki,

J im Pryor,

Su san na Siegel, David Ve lleman,

and the

ed i tors

of

this volum e,

f or

helpful comm ents .



202

Ralph Wedgwood

indepe nden t of yo ur state of m ind. In this case, the option of drink ing the

stuff involves drink ing petrol , and so giving yourself a decidedly unpleasant

experience, while many of the othe r available options h ave no comparable

drawbacks.

So, w hen the question is inter pre ted in this way, you shouldn t

choose ' to drink the stuff. We could call this an external , or 'objective' ,

should .

I

shall express this external should

by

saying

that in

this case,

choosing to mix the

stuff

with tonic and dr ink it is an i n c o r r e c t choice for you to

make. As we might say, in choosing to mix the stuff with tonic and drink i t ,

you

have

got

things

w r o n g ;

your choice

was a

mis take

If we interpret the question in another way, however,

what

you should

choose ' depends only on y ou r o v e r a l l s t a t e o f m i n d (not on external facts

that

could vary while yo ur state of m ind remained unch ange d). Even though you

mistakenly believe

that

the stuff in f ron t of you is gin and no t petrol, it could

still be

that

there is an impeccable process of reasoning

that

leads from y ou r

current state

of

mind

to

you r choosing

to mix the

stuff with tonic

and

dr ink

it.

In that

case,

the

choice

to mix the stuff

with tonic

and

dr ink

it fits

perfectly

w ith yo ur c ur re nt overall state of m ind . So in this case, w hen the question is

interpreted

in

this way,

it

would

be

wron g

to say

that

you

shouldn t

choose '

to drink the

stuff.

We could call this an ' internal ' , or

'subjective' ,

'should ' .

1

I

shall express this internal

should by

saying that

in

this case, choo sing

to mix

th e stuff with tonic and dr ink it is a perfectly r a t io n a l choice for you to make .

The central topic of this chapter is the relationship between these tw o

kinds of should , the ' internal ' and the external should —or, in other

words, between choosing 'rationally' and choosing

'correctly ' .

It would be

odd if these two kind s of 'sho uld ' were completely indepe nden t of each o ther;

it

seems more likely that

the

truths involving

one of

these

tw o

kinds

of

I need not claim that the term 'should ' is simply a m b i g u o u s . It may be tha t 'should ' is

c o n t e x t

s e n s i t i v e . Perhaps, for example,

'should '

is always implicitly relativized to a contextually deter-

mined parameter

of

some sort . Then

we

could

sa y

tha t

th e

external,

or objective, 'should ' is

relative to the

parameter

of this

sort that

is

determined

b y

certain contexts, w hile

the

internal ,

or

subjective, 'should ' i s relative to the parameter of this sort tha t is determined by oth er contexts.

Unfortunately, I

can n o t

go

fur ther

into these semantic

issues

here.

That is, I am assuming that something l ike th e thesis t h a t

epistemologists—such

as

Fumer ton

(1995:

60 —9)—call

' internalism' holds of rat ional choice jus t as m u c h as of rat ional

or 'justified' belief. I shou ld emphasize that in using the term s ' internal ' and 'external' to indicate

this con trast between two ways of evaluating choices, I am following the usage that i s s tandard

am ong epistemologists. I am

n o t

following the usage that is mo st com mo n am ong meta-ethicist

So it should not be assumed that wh at I am here calling th e ' internal should ' has any relation

to

th e so-called 'interna l oug ht ' tha t has been discussed by Steph en Darw all (1995: 9 — 1 2 and

others.

1

2



Choosing

Rationally

and

Correctly

203

should are in

some

w ay e x p l a i n e d by

t ru th s involv ing

t he

o ther .

B ut in

which

direct ion does the o rde r of explanation go? A re the tru ths ab out which

choices

are

( internally

or

subjectively) r a t i o n a l

ultimately explained

by

m o r e

f u nd a m e n t a l

t ru ths abou t w hich choices a re (e xternally or objectively) c o r r e c t ?

O r

does

the

o rder

of

explanation

go in the

other

direction?

This issue marks

a

crucial disagreement between

tw o

views

of

p ract ical

reason. In effect, it is the

issue that underlies

the

d isagreement between what

G arre t t Cul li ty

and

Berys G aut hav e called

the

r e c o g n i t i o n a l

and the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t

views of

practical reason (Cull ity

and

Gau t 997k

1 — 6 .

3

As

I

shall un ders ta nd them, recognit ional views

of

practica l reason take

as

f u nd a m e n t a l

some pr incip le ab out w hen

a

choice

is

(externally

or

objectively)

c o r r e c t For

example, such re cogn it ional views m ight take

as

f u n d a m e n t a l

the

principle that

a

choice

i s

co r rec t

if and

only

if the

option chosen really

is in a

certain way a

g o o d t h i n g

to

do

— where w hether or not an option is a good thing

to do in this way may depend, at least in part , on external facts, such as the

ac tual causal conse quen ces o f the available options, a nd the like.

These re cogn it ional views rely on this fun da m en tal principle in giving an

acco u n t

of

w h a t

it is for a

choice

to

co u n t

as

( internally

or subjectively)

r a t i o n a l

Proponen ts

of

these views ca nn ot

say

t ha t

a

choice

is

r a t ional

jus t in

case the option chosen really is a good thin g to do. W he the r or not a choice is

rat ion al is , I am

assuming,

an i n te rna l

mat ter , de te rmined

by the

agent s

overal l s tate of m ind alone, where as whe ther or not an option is a good thing

to do is an

external mat ter , which

m ay

depend,

a t

least

in

par t ,

on

ex ternal

facts.

Ins tead , proponents

of

these recogn it ional views could

say

something

like this: a choice is r a t ional

jus t

in case th e agent

b e l i e v e s

t ha t th e option

chosen is (in the relevant way) a good thing to do. But this would not be a

very

plausible thin g

to

say:

if the

agent s

belief

t ha t

the

option chosen

is a

good

thing to do is a grossly i rrat io na l belief,

then

surely th e choice will b e equally

irrat ion al. So it

w ould

be

mo re plausible

to say

this:

a

choice

is

r a t ional

j u s t in

case it is

r a t i o n a l for the a g e n t to b e l i e v e

t ha t the option chosen is (in the r e levant

w a y a good th ing to do. A s m an y ep istem ologists agree, w he the r or not i t is

ratio na l for the age nt to hold a certa in belief is also an

i n te rna l

matter in the

relevan t sense, determ ined by the bel iever s overal l s tate of m ind, and not b y

facts

that could vary whi le that s ta te of m ind rema ined unch ang ed.

According

to

this conception

of

r a t ional

belief,

what makes

it

r a t ional

for

Chris t ine Korsgaard (1996k 35) calls these tw o views of pract ical reason realism and

co ns t r u c t i v ism respectively.



204

Ralph Wedgwood

one to hold a certain belief are in ternal facts abo ut one s experiences,

memories , intu i tions , backgroun d beliefs, and so

on.

4

The first

task

for any

version

of the

recognitional view,

then,

is to identify a

certain con cept th at represen ts the pro per ty o f being in the relevan t way a

good

th ing

to do .

Then

this view will give

an

a ccou n t

of

w h a t

it is for a

choice

to be

ra t ional

in

terms

of the

ra tionali ty

o f

holding certain

b e l i e f s

tha t involve

this concept. Fo r example, acco rding to the v ersion of the recog nitiona l view

under considera t ion, whenever

it is

ra tional

for one to

choose

a

certain

option, what makes it ra tional for one to choose this option is the

fact

tha t

it is ra t ional for one to hold a certa in belief invo lving this

concept—namely,

the

belief tha t

the

option

is in the

relevant

way a good

thing

to do .

Intuitively, if the fundamental principle applying to choices is tha t one

should (in the

external

or objective

sense

of should )

choose options that

really

are

good things

to do, then

this seems

to e x p l a i n

w y there

is

also

a

subsidiary

principle applying

to

choices,

to th e effect

tha t

one should (in the

internal

or

subjective sense

of

should ) choose options that

it is

ra t ional

for

one to believe to be good things to do. But what exactly is the na tu re of

the explanatory con nection between these two principles? I t m ay be that the

explanatory connection

is

this.

5

The

fact

tha t

an

option

is a

good thing

for one

to do is an

external

fact

about that option;

it is not

de termined

by facts

abou t

one s state

of

m ind alone.

So one

cannot

d i r e c t l y

comply with

the

r equ i rement

that one should choose options that real ly are good things to do. One can

only comply with this requirement

i n d i r e c t l y by

means

of

com plying with

an

internal requirement that one should

ad jus t

one s choices to some intern al

fact

abo ut one s m ental s tates. The best intern al requirem ent of this sort to

comply with, in order to achieve the external result of choosing options that

really are

good things

to do, is the

requirement that

one

should choose

options that

it is

ra tional

for one to

believe

to b e

good thin gs

to do. In

this way,

then, a recognitional view may not only give an account of the

feature

tha t

makes rational choices rational;

it may

also

help to e x p l a i n

w y

one

should

make choices that have that

feature,

r ath er t han choices that lack it.

4

So, if one has sufficiently

mislead ing evidence,

it

m igh t

be

ra t ional

for one to

believe

an

option to be a good thing to do, even

if

it is not in fact a good thing to do. In this

case,

according to

this accoun t o f

rational choice,

it is ra t ional to choose the opt ion, even tho ug h th e opt ion is not a

good thing to do. Convers ely, m isleading evidence m ight prev ent it from being rat ional to believe

an opt ion to be a good thing to do, even thoug h in fact it is a good thing to do. In this case, it is

irrational to

choose

th e

opt ion, even tho ug h

t he

option

is a

good thing

to do.

5

I have developed

this

approach to unders tanding th e relation between internal and external

uses of

should

in

o ther wo rk (Wedgwood 2 0 0 2 £ > .



Choosing Rationally and Correctly 205

A reco gnit ional view of this so rt can a lso give a n explanat ion o f why akrasia

is i r rat ional . Let us assume t h a t akrasia involves choo sing to do som ething

t h a t one believes not to be a good thing to do. Now , one s bel ief t ha t a cer tain

option is not a good thin g to do is either a ratio na l belief fo r one to ho ld or it is

not . If it is not a rational belief for one to ho ld , then one is being i r ra t ion al in

one s beliefs. If, on the oth er ha nd , i t is a ratio na l belief fo r one to hold, th n it

cannot s imul taneously

be

ra t ional

for one to

believe t ha t

the

option is

a

good

thing to do. So, one is choosing the opt ion even t h o u g h i t is not ratio na l for

one to believe the opt ion to be a good th ing to do;

h e nc e — a c c ord ing

to the

recognit ional view of r a t ional

cho ice—one s

choice is i r ra t ional . So akrasia

necessarily involves i rrat ional i ty, ei ther in one s

beliefs

or in one s cho ices.

W e m i g h t express the recognit ional view, metaphorical ly, by saying t h a t

rat ional pract ical reasoning

a ims

at choosing opt ions t h a t really are good

things to do . In this way, the recog nit ional view of rat ion al choice paral lels a

certain claim t h a t is o f t en made abou t b e l i e f A c c o r d i n g to th is claim about

belief, if one f o r m s and revises one s beliefs ra t ional ly, one s reas oning

a ims

at

believing

th e t r u t h an d n o t h i n g but the t r u t h ab o u t th e quest ion a t issue. In

this sense,

th e

recognit ional view holds t h a t rat ional choice

a ims a t

options

t h a t a re good things to do, j u s t as rat iona l bel ief a ims a t the t r u t h .

I

have only given a crude sketch of the recognit ional view of pract ical

reason here. The recognit ional view m i g h t be ref ined in man y ways. For

example, the recog nit ional view could be gen eral ized so t h a t i t app lies not j u s t

to

c h o i c e s (which

are

m e n t al events involving

the

f o r ma t i o n

of a new

in ten-

tion), but to all k inds

o f

i n t e n t i o n r e v i s i o n ( includ ing m e n t al events in wh ich one

reaff irms

or ab an d o n s an old in tent ion) . It could also be gen eral ized so

t h a t

it

even applies to one s

f iling

to revise one s inte nt ion s o n a certain occasion,

since

intui t ively failing to revise one s inten t ions can also sometimes be a

serious mistake.

In

o ther work (Wedgwood 2002a) I have suggested tha t th e s logan that

belief

aims at the

t r u t h is best interp reted as mak ing a claim a bou t belief tha t is ana logous to the c la im that th e

recogni t ional

v iew makes ab out choice.

Th e

fundamental pr incip le applying

to

belief

i s

t h a t

a

belief is co r rec t i f and only if the proposition believed is t rue. This fundamental pr incip le of

correct belief explains th e principles of rational belief. Roughly, th e f o rmat ion of a belief is

rat ion al if and on ly if , in f o rming tha t

belief,

th e believer w as fo l lowing th e appropriate rules and

procedures—namely , those ru les and p ro cedure s t h a t it is ra t ional for the believer to regard as

reliable way s o f r each ing the t r u t h .

Proponent s

of the

reco gnition al view need

not

maintain that

the

good

is the

const i tu t ive

aim of all desire or of all action as su ch . They c an agree w ith David Vellem an (1992:

1 1 7 — 2 2 ;

1996:

1 9 0 — 1

t h a t it is qu ite possible for on e to desire states o f

a f f a i r s ,

or to p e r fo rm actions, t h a t one



206 Ralph Wedgwood

This view might also be revised to give a more r e f ined account of when

exactly a choice is rational. According to the simple account that I am

currently considering, a choice is rational i f and only if it is rational for the

agent, at the time of choice, to believe the chosen option to be a good thing to

do. But suppose that one has to make a choice in an emergency, in which one

does not have enough time or information for it to be rational for one to hold

an outright belief about whether any of the available options is a good thing to

do.

In cases of this sort, one s choice can surely still be rational, even though it

is not rational for one to believe the chosen option to be a good thing to do.

This suggests

that

the account must be

r e f ined

so that it requires one to

a d j u s t

one s choice to the

ev idence

that one has in f a vour of beliefs about whether or

not the available options are good things to do, even if

that

evidence is not

good enough to make it rational for one to hold an outright belief to the

e f fec t

that

the

chosen option

is a

good thing

to do.

I shall return to the task of r e f in ing the recognitional view of practical

reason in the final section of this chapter. In most of this chapter, however, I

shall ignore

all

these refinements

to the

recognitional view.

To

s implify

the

discussion, I

shall

j us t focus on the

simple version, according

to

which

a

choice

is

correct

if and

only

if the

chosen option

is a

good thing

to do, and

a

choice

is

rational

i f and

only

if it is

rational

for the

agent

to

believe

the

chosen option to be a good thing to do. All the arguments that I shall make in

the

next f o u r sections could

be

adapted

to

apply

to the

more r e f ined versions

j u s t as much as to this simple version.

This simple version makes it particularly clear why it is appropriate to call

this a recognitional view of practical reason. According to this view, there are

simply truths about which of the available options are good things to do and

which are not; and the central or canonical method of practical reasoning is

j u s t to

attempt

to recognize or

to f orm rational e l i e f s about these truths,

and

then

believes not to be good in any way. Pro pon en ts of the rec ognitio nal view only insist tha t i f one

per fo rms

such act ions,

one is

akratic

a nd

therefore i r ra t ional.

8

Joh n Broom e has objected to me that in presenting the

issues

in this way, I am

conflat ing

tw o

separate qu estions:

th e

quest ion

of the

relative prio rity

o f the

in ternal

and the

external

shou ld ,

and the que stion of the relation between the terms should and good . But as I explain in the next

section,

there

i s a form al way of

using

th e

term

good

suc h tha t

to say

that

a

certain option

i s n o t

a

good thing

to d o in

this

w ay

j u s t

is to say

that

it is

some thing that

one (in the

external sense)

should not

choose .

There are also many m ore substant ive ways in which som ething c an be

good: for example, something can be good for me , or good for O xford Universi ty, or moral ly good.

T he

quest ion

of how

these substantive ways of being good

ar e

related

to

w ha t

on e (in the

external

sense) should cho ose is one tha t I shal l not be addressing here.



Choosing

Rationally and Correctly 207

to

mak e one s choice according ly. Som ething like this conception

of

ra t ional

practical reasoning

is

suggested

by

A ristotle s claim tha t practic al wisdom

involves bo th

the

practical i n t e ll ec t — that

is ,

sound reasoning abo ut act ion

based on a

t rue unders tand ing

of the

h u m a n

g ood — an d

choice

in

accordance

with w hat the practical intellect

asserts.

10

Proponents

of the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t view o f practical reason, on the o ther hand,

take as

fund am enta l certa in in ternal requirements tha t

a

choice m ust meet

in

order to be rational. They deny that these internal requirements o f ra t ional

choice are explained by any principle about when a choice is (externally)

correct ,

or w h en an option is (externally) a good thing to do . Thus, the

construct ivists deny that these internal requirements o f rationality are

explained by the good external results to which complying with these

requirements either will actually lead,

o r may

reasonably

be

expected

to

lead.

A cco rding to the constructiv ists , these intern al requirem ents either

require

no

explanation

at

all,

or

else

are

explained

in

some other way.

For this reason, according

to the

constructivists , there

is no

external

concept of an option s being

good

in some way such that it is a basic

requ irement of rationality that one must choose options that it is ra t ional

for one to believe to b e good in that way. (If this w ere a basic r equ i rement of

rat ionali ty, i t wo uld b e all but irresistible to co nclude th at the reason why one

shou ld choo se actions that it is ra t ional for one to b e l i e v e to be good in tha t way

is because

of a

more fundamental pr incip le that

one

should choose actions

that really a re good in tha t w ay.) Instead, co nstruc tivis ts typically propose that

the requirements o f practical rationality are e i ther purely p r o c e d u r a l require-

ments ,

or

e lse pure requirements

o f f o r m a l c o h e r e n c e

am ong one s choices

or

preferences.

There are two main versions o f cons truct ivism that are defended by

contemporary philosophers . O ne version is d e c i s io n th e o r e t ic cons truct ivism,

according to which one s preferences are ra t ional if and only if they satisfy

certain

condit ions o f coherence o r consistency. Typically, the idea is tha t

9

I

describe this

as the

central

o r canonica l

method

o f

prac t ical reasoning b ecause str ict ly

speaking, acco rding to this view as I for m ula ted i t, i t may also be rat ional to take certain s h o r t c u t s in

one s

pract ical reasoning.

So long as it is

rationally permissible

for one to believe that th e

chosen

opt ion

is a

g ood t h in g

to do, and one s

choice

is

suitably sensitive

to whatever

considerat ions

make

it th e

case

that it is

rationally permissible

for one to

believe th is , then one s choice

may be

ra t ional even

i f one has not

ac tual ly formed

any

belief

a t all

a b o u t whether

or not the option in

quest ion is a good thing to do.

See A ristot le s defini t ion of practical wisdom phroms i s ) in N i c omachean

Eth ic s

6. 5, 1140 5

(repeated

at

1140

b

22);

and

compare

also 6. 2,

1139*24,

and 6. 9,

1142

b

34.



208

Ralph Wedgwood

these preferences

must satisfy

the ax ioms ( trans i t iv i ty , monotonic i ty , inde-

pendence , and so on)

that

a re necessary t o m ake i t possible to represent those

preferences

by

means

of a

u t i l i ty

func t ion

(Joyce 1999: 84— 9).

For an

agent

whose preferences

a re

coherent

in

th i s way ,

i t is

r a t iona l

to

choose

a n

option

i f

a nd only if no a l ternat ive opt ion i s p referred .

1 1

The o ther main version of construct ivism is ant ian construct ivism,

according to which the fund a me nta l pr inc iple of ra t iona l choice requi res

that

in making choices, one should follow a p rocedure

that meets

cer ta in

fo rmal

condi t ions of consistency a nd universa l izabi l i ty . Specifical ly , a ccording

to K a nt (1788, Ak. v.

30— 1),

to be rat ional, one

must

a lways ma ke one s choice

thro ug h fol lowin g some maxim or general rule, which i t

must

also be

consistent

for one at the

same t ime

to

will

to be a

universa l

l aw.

12

In these constructivist theories,

then,

these internal requirements

of

rat ional choice

a re

fundamenta l . Const ruct iv is t s have made many c la ims

about these requirements: some construct ivists have compared them to the

require men ts of logical consistency am ong our beliefs;

13

and some const ruct -

ivists have claimed

that

these requirements of rat ional choice are a priori .

14

B ut

they

a ll

deny

that the

external not ions

of a

choice s being correct

or of an

option s being a good th ing to do play a ny role in the explanat ion of the

requi rements of ra t ional choice . T he external not ions a re e i ther denied to

have

a ny

necessary connect ion

to the

no t ions

of

r a t iona l prac t ica l reasoning

or of

reasons

for

act ion,

or

else they

a re

simply e f i n e

in

terms

of

w h a t

it is

I tenta t ively suggest tha t th e b road ly p rocedura l account of r a t iona l p r a c t i ca l r ea son ing

sketched by

Be rna rd Will iams (1980:

1 0 4 — 5

is also a

version

of construct ivism.

W illiams seems

to

th ink

t h a t

i t is j u s t

in tu i t ively clear tha t cer ta in procedures

of

deliberation

a re

r a t iona l .

H e

certainly does

not try to

explain

w hy

these procedures

a re

r a t iona l

by

appea l ing

to the

good

externa l resul ts tha t com ply ing wi th these proced ures may be expected to have.

This in terpreta t ion o f K an t — w hi c h is basica lly due to Korsgaard (1989)— is controv ersia l ,

and

rejected

by some phi losophers ,

such

a s W ood (1999), who regard themselves a s

Kant ians .

But

for

p resent purposes ,

i t

does

not

ma t te r whether th i s i n te rp re t a t ion

of K an t i s

cor rect .

All

t h a t

mat ters

here

is

t h a t

th e

v i ew tha t

I am

call ing

Kan t i an construct ivism is

w o r th y

of

ser ious

examinat ion .

13

For

example, Richard

Jeffrey

ta lks

of the

pr inciples

of

r a t iona l

choice as the

logic

of

decision (Jeffrey 1983);

and

Korsgaard c la ims tha t ,

j u s t a s

if

I am

going

to

t h ink

I

mus t th ink

in accordance w i th th e pr inciple of

non-cont rad i c t ion ,

so too, in essentially th e s ame way ,

if

I a m

going

to will at all I m u s t do so

u n i v e r s a l l y . . .

The r equ i r ement of universali ty is in th is way

const i tut ive of will ing (Korsgaard 1996fc

235).

14

K an t repeatedly

insists

t h a t th e f undam enta l p r inc ip le o f

p rac t ica l

r ea son mus t be a p r ior i

(Kan t

1785,

Ak. iv. 388—90, 4 0 6 — 1 2 ,

425— 7). Some decis ion- theoret ic

construct ivists,

s u c h

a s

Gauthier (1985) and Dreier (1997),

also

seem to suggest tha t the fund am enta l requiremen ts of

ra t iona l preference are a pr ior i .




ra t ional

to

choose .

F or

example, a ccord ing

to

some

of

these

ph i losophers, for

an option to be a good th ing for one to do j u s t is for it to be a n option t ha t it

w o u l d

be

ra t ional

for one to

choose,

if one

we re ideally well info rm ed abou t

th e

relevant

facts.

1 5

Acco rd in g to this definit ion, a ll t ru ths about which choices

are

corre ct , and a bo ut which options are good things to do, are

cons t ruc ted

out of the internal requirements of rat ional choice.

Paraphras ing

C hris t ine Korsgaard

1 9 9 6 f c : 3 6 — 7 ) , we can

express

the differ-

ence between constructivism and the recognit ional view as follows. C o n -

structivists

believe

t ha t

there

are

tru ths abou t what

is a

good th ing

for one to

do b e c u s e there are ra t ional procedures for mak ing cho ices— whereas

according to the

recog nit ional view, there

are

ra t ional proced ures

for

m ak ing

choices b e c u s e

there

are

t ru ths abo u t what

is a

good th ing

for one to do,

wh ich

it is

ra t ional

for one to

expect those procedures

to

t rack .

For the

construct iv -

ists,

these rat iona l p ro c ed u re s— o r m o r e gen erally,

the

in ternal requirements

of ra t ional c h o ic e— a re f und am ental . Eve rything else

t ha t

has any necessary

connection to reasons for action

m u s t

be explained on the

basis

of these

in ternal requirements

of

ra t ionali ty. This

is wh y

both

the

Kan t ian cons t ruc t -

ivists,

such as K orsgaard 1 9 9 6 f c ) , and the decision- theoretic construc tivists ,

such as David G auth ier (1986) , seek to con stru ct the wh ole of ethics on the

basis o f

thei r account

o f

these in ternal requirem ents

o f

rat iona l choice.

In

this chapter

I

shall con sider some

of the

ob jec t ions

t ha t

the

construct iv -

ists

have directed against

th e

recogn it ional view. Ironically,

as I

shall argue,

these ob jectio ns apply j us t as

m u c h

to constructivism a s to c ertain versions o f

the recognit ional view.

hen

I shall argue

t ha t

there is a version of the

recognit ional view

t ha t

is

i m m u n e

to con structivist ob jectio ns. This, i t

seems to m e, provides considerable supp ort for this version of the recogni-

tiona l view.

F o r m a l and Substant ive Vers ions of the Recogni t ional

View

As I explained in the pre viou s section, the simple v ersion of the re co gnitio na l

view t ha t

I am focu sing on here f irst identifies a certain concept

t ha t

15

Com pare Chr is tine

Korsgaard (1986a:

122):

w h a t

makes

the

object

of

you r ra t iona l

choice

good is tha t it is the object of a ra t ional choice . Here Korsgaard is b roadly speaking followin

Kant, w ho appears to believe tha t an option is a good th ing to do (not merely good in relation t o



210

Ralph Wedgwood

represents

the

proper ty

of

being

an

option that

is in a

certain

way a

'good

thing

to

do',

and then

claims tha t

a

choice

is

rational

if and

only

if it is

rationa l

for the

agent

to

hold

a

certain

fcehe/involving

his

concept—namely, the belief

tha t th e chosen option is in this way a 'good thing to do' .

But

wh ich

way of

being

a

good thing

to do is the

relevant

way'? A s

Judi th

Thomson (2001: 17—19)

and

others have pointed ou t, there

are

m a n y

different

ways

in which something can be good: it may be good for me, or good for

Oxford U niversity, or m orally good, and so on. Perhaps there can also be mor e

than

one

concept that represents

the

very same property (such

as the

concepts 'good

for Cicero' and

'good

for Tully ,

perhaps).

If so, then

even

after the

recognitional view

has

identified

the

relevant

way of

being good,

it

must

still identify

the

relevant c o n c e p t that represents

the

proper ty

of

being

in

this

way a good th ing to do . So exactly

wh ich

out of all the concepts that can be

expressed by the term

'a

good thin g to do', is the one th at the recognitiona l

view

is

employing here?

According to David Velleman (1996: 176—7) , there are two main types of

concept that proponents of the recognitional view can employ here. They

could

employ

a

concept th at gives

a

purely 'formal' specification

of the

'object

of

practical

reasoning'; or

they cou ld employ

a

concept th at gives

a 'sub stan-

tive' specification of the 'object of practical reasoning'.

As Vellema n explains,

a

conce pt gives

a

' formal ' specification o f ' t h e object

of

an enterprise' if it is simply th e concept of the

object

of tha t enterprise. For

example,

the

concept 'winning' gives

a formal specification o f ' t h e object of a

competitive game , since the concept ' winning j u s t is the concept of

succeeding in

competition

(Velleman 19 96: 17 6). Similarly, Velleman sug-

gests,

one

concept that could

be

ex pressed

by the

term

'a

good thing

to

do

is

simply

th e

concept

of the 'object ' of

practical reasoning .

Velleman believes tha t practical reaso ning literally has an 'object ' or aim . I

shall

not

assume this here. Instead,

I

shall suppose that

a

purely

'formal'

concept

of a

'good thing

to

do

is a

concept such tha t

it is a

conceptual t ru th

that

an

option

is a

'good thing

to do in

this sense

if and

only

if it is an

option that

it is

c o r r e c t

to

choose—in

precisely

th e

same sense

of the

term

'correct ' that

I

exp lained

in the

previous section.

O ne

such concept, which

can be expressed by describing an option as a 'good thing to do' , is as I have

argued

elsewhere (Wedgwood

2001o) a

concept

th e

content

of

which

is

determined

by the

special 'conceptual role tha t

it

plays

in

rational practical

some end, but good s i m p l ic i t e r j u s t in

case

it is an o ption that no well-informed agent c an

reject

wi t h o u t violating the fundamental internal requirem ent of ra tionality.



Choosing Rationally

and

Correctly

211

reasoning.

Specifically,

if a ra t ional agent makes judgements us ing th is

concept , about which

of the

available op tions

fall

under th is concept

and

which do not , then she will choose one of the op tions tha t she jud ge s to fall

un de r the co ncept , and not one of the opt ions that she judg es not to

fall

u n d e r it. I have argued that if the c o n t e n t o f a c onc ep t is de termined by its

having a

conc eptual role

o f

this kin d,

then i t

fo l lows that

an

op t ion

falls

u n d e r

th e c onc ep t if and on ly if it is c o r r e c t to choose it.

T o

j udg e tha t

an

op t ion

is a

good th ing

to do , in

this fo rm al sense, then,

is

not to m a k e a specific v a l u e - ju d g e m e n t , such as t ha t th e op t ion is m o r a l ly good,

or good /or

the a g e n t ,

or good

a s a m e a n s to a c e r ta i n e n d .

It is s imply to j udge tha t it is

an op t ion that it is c o r rec t to c hoose . This judg em en t could a lso b e exp ressed

in

many o ther w ays .

For

example, this judgement could also

be

exp ressed

by

saying tha t the opt ion i s cho icew orthy or

O K .

The judgement tha t an

opt ion

is in

this formal sense

no t a

good th ing

to do

c ou ld

be

expressed

by

saying tha t

the

opt ion

is

som ething that

one had bet ter

not

do, or

tha t there

is a conclusive

r eas on

for one not to do, or simply tha t one should

not

do.

16

O ne

version

of the

recogni t ional v iew, t h e n , w o u l d

use the

t e rm

a

good

thing to do to express this pu rely fo rm al conc ept. I shall cal l this the f o r m a l

version

of the recognit ional view. T he formal vers ion of the recogni t ional

view is

d is t inct f rom

the

constructivis t view, because whether

or not

some-

th ing c ounts as a

good

th ing to do , in this formal sense, is typically

determined

not by

interna l

facts

a b o u t

the

agen t s o verall state

o f

m i n d ,

bu t

at least in p a r t by ex ternal facts w hich co uld vary whi le the agent s overall

s tate of m ind rem ained un cha ng ed.

Alternat ively , the recogn i t ional v iew might use the term a good th ing to

do

to

express

a

m o r e

s u b s t a n t i v e

c onc ep t

of an

op tion s being good

in

some

specific w a y . I shall call views of this sort substantive versions of the

recogn i t ional v iew.

Fo r

example,

one

su ch sub stantive version

of the

recogni-

t ional v iew wou ld use the t e rm

a

good th ing to d o to m e a n o p t i m a l for th e a g e n t s

h a p p i n e s s .

This version

of the

recogni t ional v iew would

in

effect

be

w h a t

Derek Parf i t (1984:

1-2)

has called the Self-interest Theory o f

Rat ional i ty .

Ac c or d ing to

th is theory ,

a

choice

is

c o r r e c t

if and

only

if the

chosen opt ion

maximizes the agent s hap piness ( that is , there is no alternative to the chosen

op tion that wil l m ake a greater co ntr ibu tion to the agent s happ iness) ; and a

16

To say

t h a t X is a g o o d thing

t o

do

(in this form al

sense) does

not

imp ly t ha t

o ne

s h o u l d

d o

X O ne

m i g h t

be in a

Bur idan s ass

case, in

w h i c h b o th

X and Y are

good things

to do, but it is

impossible to do

bo t h .

In this case, i t is not

t rue t ha t

one

s h o u l d

do X or

t h a t

one

s h o u l d

d o Y

Still,

they

are

both good things

to do .



212 Ralph Wedgwood

choice is rational if and only if it is rational for the agent to be l ieve that th e

chosen option maximizes her happiness.

Another substantive version of the recognitional view would use the term

a

good thing to do to mean o p t im a l fo r s t i s f y i n g

the

to tal i ty

o f the

agen t s

p r e s e n t

desires.

This would in effect be what Parf i t (1984: 9 2— 4 ) has called the the Instrumen-

tal version of the Present-aim Theory . According to this theory, a choice is

correct if and only if the chosen option optimally satisfies the totality of the

agent s present desires; and a choice is rational if and only if it is rational fo r

the

agent

to

believe that

the

chosen option optimally satisfies

the

totality

of

his

present

desires.

17

A

Problem

for Substantive

Versions

of the

Recognit ional

View

Let us start by considering

substantive

versions of the recognitional view. For

example, consider

th e

egoist ic

version

of the

recognitional view

(P arfit s

Self-

interest Theory ). This view interprets

the

notion

of a good

thing

to

do

as

opt imal f or the agen t s o w n happ iness (where the term happiness expresses a

substantive

concept of some

sort—not

simply the purely f o rmal concept of

a life

of the

sort that

it is

correct

to

choose). According

to

this view,

if one

makes

a

choice, one s choice

is

correct

if and

only

if the

chosen option

maximizes one s happiness;

and

one s choice

is

rational

if and

only

if it is

rational

for one to

believe that

the

chosen option maximizes one s happiness.

A s I

shall argue here, this egoistic version

of the

recognitional view faces

a

problem that Christine Korsgaard (1996fc : 9— 21) has called the normative

question .

According to this egoistic view, it is irrational—indeed ak ra ti c — f o r

one to choose any option if one rationally believes

that that

option will not

maximize one s own happiness. But we can imagine an agent (let us call her

Alice)

who knows that a certain option will not maximize her happiness, but

is still uncertain about whether or not to choose that option—perhaps

because

the

option

has

some other

fea ture

that

she is

tempted

to

regard

as

highly important. Al ice need not doubt that the

fact

that the option will not

maximize her happiness is

s o m e

reason for her not to choose it. But she may

17

This instrumentalist version of the recognitional view m u s t be distinguished from the

decision-theoretic version of

constructivism, since according

to

this

instrumentalist view, the

internal requirements of rational

choice

are

explained

by a

mo re

fundamental principle t ha t

defines when

a

choice

counts as (externally) correct.



Choosing


still be unce r t a in whe ther to t reat this fact as an o v e r r i d i n g o r d e c i s i v e r eason, as

the

egoist ic view requires

her to do. She

might express

he r

perplexity

b y

asking, Why shou ld I a lways choose opt ions that maximize m y o w n happi-

ness?

W h y

s h o u l d n t

I

somet imes choose op t ions tha t w on t m aximize

m y

happiness instead?

In asking this

no rm at ive ques t ion ,

Alice seems to be seeking some

compell ing f u r t h e r

r e a s o n

not to

choose

any

opt ion that does

no t

maximize

her happiness. T ha t i s , she is loo king for some con siderat ion th at cou ld

rat ional ly p e r s u a d e her not to choose any op t ion tha t she believes not to

maximize

her

happiness—even

i f she did not yet

have

the

disposition

to

avoid

choosing any op t ions tha t she rationally believes not to maximize he r

happiness. But according to the egoist ic version of the recognit ional view,

there a re no such f u r t h e r r easons. T he on ly way in wh ich any considera t ions

can ra t iona l ly persuade

one not to

choose

an y

op t ion , according

to

this

egoistic

v iew, is by mak ing i t i rrat io nal for one to bel ieve that the opt ion

maximizes one s o wn happiness. So accord ing to this egoistic view, i f som eo ne

lacked the disposition not to choose any op t ion tha t i t was not r a t iona l f o r her

to

believe

to

maximize

h e r

happiness, there would

b e no

op t ions tha t

she

could b e r a t iona l ly persuaded not to choo se; such an agent would b e b e y o n d

the p o w e r o f r a t iona l persuasion a l together .

So ,

it seems, the egoistic ve rsion o f the recognit ional view must accept that

if any agents lack the disposit ion to com ply w ith this a lleged rat io nal re quire -

m nt—th r equ i rement t ha t

o n e

shou ld

n o t

choose

an y

op t ion tha t

i t is no t

rat ion al for one to bel ieve to maxim ize one s ow n happ iness—there i s no way

of

r a t iona l ly persuad ing

th m

to do so. In that sense, the egoistic view

must

regard th is ra t iona l requi rement as

b a s i c

If one is not a lready disposed to

c o n f o r m t o th is requi rem ent , there i s no w ay of ra t iona l ly persuad ing one to

do so, since ra t ional p ersuasion precisely consists in e xploi ting a pe rson s

disposition to comply wi th th is requi rement .

There do seem to be some basic ra t iona l requi rements of th i s sor t . For

exam ple, i f som eo ne is not alread y disposed to accept instance s of the

basic

laws of logic, there will be no way of rat ional ly persu ading him to do so, since

a l l a rgum ents tha t

o n e

m ight employ

in

o rder ra t iona l ly

to

persuade

h im

will

themselves involve instances of those very laws of logic. So why sho u ldn t t he

egoistic r equi rement a l so be a basic ra ti ona l r equ i reme nt o f this

sort?

Ho w eve r, i t does not seem plausible that this egoistic req uirem en t is a

basic

r e q u i r e m e n t o f this sort . I f you violate a r a t ion a l r e q u i r e m e n t — t h a t is, if yo u

m a k e

an

i r ra t ion al choice

o r

f o r m

an

i r ra t iona l

b e l ie f— this

reflects

a

co gni t ive



214

Ralph Wedgwood

defect

i n y o u (This is a f u n d a m e n t a l d i f ference be tween the in te rna l not ion of a

ra t ional choice and the externa l no t ion of a cor r ec t choice . There need be no

defect

in you at all if you make an incor rec t choice , by choosing an opt ion

tha t

is not in

fact

a

good th ing

to do; i t ma y be

sheer

bad

luck tha t

the

s tuf f

was

pet rol

and no t

gin,

s o

tha t y our choice

to mix the s tuff

with tonic

and

d r ink

i t

was in fact an

incor rec t choice .) Since ir ra t iona l i ty

is

always

a

d e f ec t

in

you ,

then, so long as you are being

sufficiently

sane and intelligent, you will ten d to

avoid

such

defects .

At the very least , if it is a b a s i c r equ i r emen t of r a t ional i ty

tha t one should not f o rm a se t of beliefs o r choices that has a ce r ta in f ea tu re ,

then if you r e c o g n i z e

t ha t

a

ce r ta in

set of beliefs or

choices

h as

tha t f ea tu re ,

you

will not rema in unc er ta in about whethe r or not to form tha t se t of beliefs and

choices,

unless you are being less than pe rfe ct ly sane and intell igent . For

example, suppose that

it is a

basic pr inciple

of

r a t ional i ty tha t

it is

i r r a t iona l

to

believe any p roposi t ion tha t is logica l ly se l f -cont radic tory.

Then

if you

recognize tha t

a

cer tain proposit ion

is

logically self-contradictory,

y ou

will

no t r em a in unce r t a in abou t whe the r o r not to believe tha t prop osit ion, unless

you are being less tha n per fec t ly sane and intell igent .

Intuit ively, however,

it

seems quite possible that Alice

is

be ing per fec t ly

sane and intelligent, even if she recognizes that it is not r a t ional for her to

believe tha t the opt ion in question will maximize he r happiness, but still

r emains unce r t a in abou t whe the r

to

choose tha t opt ion. A l ice s unc er ta in ty

abou t whe the r or not to choose this opt ion har dly seems in the same ca tegory

as a failure to be

convinced

by

instances

of the

e lementary laws

of

logic.

Inde ed , her perplexity seems em ine ntly intelligible. So it seems implausible to

claim tha t

it is a

basic r equ i r emen t

o f

r a t ional i ty tha t

one

should never choose

any

opt ion that i t is not ra t ion al for one to believe to m aximize one s own

happiness. But as we have seen, the egoistic version of the recognit ional view

entails tha t it is a basic r equ i r ement . So this seems to be a ser ious problem for

the

egoistic version

of the

recognit ional view.

The

same problem also arises

for

o ther substant ive versions

of the

reco gni t ional view . For exam ple , accord ing to the ins trum enta l is t ver s ion of

the

recognit ional view,

a

choice

is

r a t ional

if and

only

if it is

r a t ional

for one

to believe that the chosen option optimally satisfies the totali ty of one s

present desires. S o, a cco rd ing to this view, it is i r ra t iona l (indeed akra t ic) for

one to choose an opt ion if one ra t iona lly believes that the opt ion does not

optimally satisfy the totali ty of one s prese nt desires. But we can ima gine a n

agent (call

him

George)

w ho

star ts

to

regard

the

m a j o r i t y

of his

desires with

suspicion;

perha ps he becom es at t ra cte d to the ideal of de tach ing himself



Choosing


f rom a ll self-centred desires. Geo rge cou ld be convinced that a cer tain option

will not

optimally satisfy

the

totality

of his

present desires,

bu t

s t i l l wonder

w hether or not to choose tha t opt ion. He m ight ask himsel f , W hy should I

always choose options that optimally

satisfy

the total i ty o f m y p resent desires?

W hy sho uldn t I som etimes choose opt ions tha t do n t o pt im al ly

satisfy

those

desires instead?

In

asking this question, George appears

to be

seeking

a

compell ing f u r t h e r

r e s o n not to

choose

any

option that does

no t

optimally satisfy

the

totality

o f

his present desires. T ha t is, he is seeking som e considera t ion that could

ra t ional ly

persuade him not to choose any such o p t i o n—e ve n if he is not

yet disposed to r e jec t a ll op t ions tha t i t is not r a t iona l f o r him to

regard as optim ally satisfying the total i ty o f his desires. B ut a ccord ing to the

ins t rum enta l is t v iew, there a re no such f u r t he r reasons. The only consider-

at ions t ha t

can

ra t ional ly persuade

one not to

choose

any

opt ion

a re

cons iderat ions

that make i t i r rat ional for one to believe that the option wil l

opt imal ly satisfy th e total i ty o f o ne s desires. So , unless George is a l ready

disposed

not to choose any op t ion that i t is no t r a t iona l for him to r egard as

opt imal ly

satisfying

the tota lity of his desires,

th n

there are sim ply no option s

tha t

he

could

be

ra t ional ly persuaded

not to

choose.

Thus, the i n s trum enta l is t m u st c laim that it is sim ply a

b s i c

r eq u i rem en t o f

ra t ional i ty

tha t one sho uld n ot choose any opt ion that i t i s not ra t ional for

one to r egard as optimally satisfying one s total set of desires. But it seems

do ub t f u l w h e th e r

the

ins t rumenta l is t requirement rea l ly

can be a

basic

r eq u i r emen t o f ra t io nali ty. George cou ld surely be per fect ly sane and intelli-

gent, even if he recognizes that it is not r a t iona l for him to r egard a cer tain

opt ion

as

optim ally

satisfying his

to ta l

set of

desires,

but

s t i l l remains uncer-

ta in about whether to choose tha t opt ion.

In

general, this problem will arise

fo r

ll substantive versions

of the

recogni t ional v iew. Whatever substant ive concept o f a good th ing to do

the rec o gnitio nal view takes as its ce ntr al co ncep t, it will have to tak e the

requ irem ent tha t one should not choose any opt ion that i t i s not ra t ional for

one to believe to be, in this substantive sense, a g ood th ing to

do

as a

basic

r eq u i r emen t o f r a t ional i ty . Bu t i t seems do ub t f u l whether there can be any

basic r eq u i r emen t o f r a t iona l i ty o f this sort . Fo r every such requirement , it

seems that agents could be per fect ly sane and intelligent, even if they

recognize t ha t it is not r a t iona l fo r

th m

to believe a cer tain option to be

(in this substantive sense) a good th ing to do , and yet still

feel

uncer ta in

about whether

to

choose

the

op t ion . None

o f

these al leged requ irem ents



216

Ralph Wedgwood

resemb les the

clear examples

of basic requirements—such as the

r equi rement

that

one

should

not

believe logical contradictions.

For

every substantive

concept

of a

good thing

to do , one

could always ask, without revealing

any

insanity

o r

lack

of

intelligence, B ut

why

should

I

always choose option s

that

are

good things

to do in

tha t

way? W hy

sh ouldn t

I

sometimes choose

options that aren t in tha t way good things to do at all? So the substantive

versions of the recognition al view all seem to face a serious problem .

A n

A nalogou s Problem

for

Cons t ruc t iv is t

Views

As I

shall argue,

a

closely analogous problem also arises

for

con struct ivis t

views of

practical reason.

A s I

ment ioned

in the first

section, there

are two

main varieties of constructivism that have many p ropo nen ts today: decision-

theoretic constructivism and Kant ian construct ivism.

According to decision-theoretic constructivism, rational choices are

choices

tha t

cohere in a

certain

way

with each other

and

with one s

preferences

and beliefs.

Specifically, one s preferences should

be

t rans i t ive, monoton ic ,

independent , and so on; and it is ra t ional to choose an option only if no

alternative option

is

preferred. A cco rd ing

to

this view, one s choices should

(in the

in ternal

use of

tha t

term) satisfy

these conditions

of

coherence.

But

now it seems that we can

raise

the norm ative question again. W h y shou ld our

choices satisfy

these conditions

of

coherence?

W hy

does

it ma t t e r

whether

or

not our choices a re coherent in this

way?

According to

Ka ntian constructivism , rational choices

are

choices that

are

made by means

of a . p r o c ed u r e

tha t

satisfies

certain

formal

condi t ions o f

cons i s tency

and universal i ty .

Specifically,

one must

mak e one s choice

by

fol lowin g

a

general

rule

or

maxim , wh ich

i t

must also

at the

same time

be

consistent

for one to

will

to b e a

universal law. Acc ord ing

to

this view,

on e should (in the

in ternal

sense

of

tha t term) always m ake one s choices

by

fol lowing

a

unive rsalizable

maxim

of

th is kin d.

But the

normative

quest ion arises

here too.

W h y shou ld we

always

make

our

choices

by

fol lowing such universal izable m axims?

W hy

does

it ma t te r

whether

or not we

make

our

choices

in

this

way?

According to the cons tructiv ists, the

fact

that one always

should

make

choices

tha t

meet

these inter nal conditio ns

of

coherence

or

universalizability

is not explained by the go od external results t o w hich su ch ch oices either will

actually

lead,

or may

rationally

b e

expected

to

lead.

But

this seems

to

imply

that it matters s imply i n

i t s e l f

purely fo r i t s o w n sake whether or not one s




choices meet these in terna l condi t ions

o f

coherence ,

o r

w hether they

a re

m ade by fo l low ing a sui tably universa l izable

m a x im .

18

On the face of i t , how ever, this is a rather surpris in g idea. W hy on ear th

should such a th ing m at ter p ure ly for i t s ow n sake? Perhaps choices t h a t d o

no t

meet these in terna l condi t ions

o f

cohe rence

o r

universal izabil i ty

a re

aesthetical ly unattract ive

in

some way: they fo rm

a

less pr ett y

m e n t a l

pa t te rn

t h a n choices t h a t do meet these condit ions. B u t this hardly seems a suffi-

ciently weighty c ons idera t ion

to

explain

w hy ( in the

i n t e rna l

use of the term

one s hou l d n e v e r m ake choices

t h a t

do no t satisfy these internal condit ions. I t

w o u l d

defy

belief

to

claim t h a t

it

mat te rs pure ly

for i ts ow n

s ake whe the r

o r

n o t one s choices meet these in terna l condi t ions in the re levant way, b u t

absolutely

no

explanation

can be

given

of why it

mat te rs .

So

cons t ruc t iv is ts

must sure ly offer some fu r th er explanation of why i t m a t t e r s — t h a t i s , of w hy

one s choices should

meet

these in terna l condi t ions

o f

cohe rence

o r

un ive r -

salizability.

19

Many cons t ruc t iv is ts t ry to offer such an explanation by arguing

t ha t

it is

cons t i tu t ive of having the capacity fo r choices a t al l

t h a t

on e s choices must

tend

to

satisfy these in terna l condi t ions

o f

coherence .

For

example, some

o f

the d ecis ion- theoretic constru ctivis ts , such as David Lewis (1974), argue

t h a t

w e

w o u l d

no t

even

be

in te rpre table

as

having preferences

at all

unless

our

choices tended, by and large, to satisfy these condit ions of coherence .

2

Bu t is this claim, t h a t i t is con sti tut ive of having p referen ces at a l l t h a t one s

choices

m u s t

tend, by and large, to satisfy these condi t ions of in terna l

coherence , rea l ly enough all by itself to explain why it is

a l w a y s i r r a t io n a l

to

make choices

t h a t

do no t

satisfy

these condi t ions

( tha t

is ,

t h a t

one s hou ld

never make choices

t ha t

do not satisfy these condit ions)?

21

Even if it is

impossible to have preferences at all unless your choices tend, by nd

l a r g e

to

This p o i n t is m o r e or less explicit in

Kan t ,

w ho c laims (K ant 1785, Ak . iv. 3 9 6 — 4 0 0 t h a t th e

g o o d will

—i.e. th e wil l that complies with th e f undam enta l p r incip le of ra t ional choice, rejecting

all

non-universal izable maxims precisely b e c a u s e they

are not

universalizable

in the

relevant

way—is valuable purely

in

itself,

not

mere ly because

of its

a c tua l

or

expected results.

Decis ion- theoret ic

constructivis ts often

appeal to the so-called

m o n e y

p u m p

a r g u m e n t .

For som e cri ticism of the m o n e y

p u m p

a r g u m e n t , s ee B r o o m e 1999:74—5 a nd Maher 1993:

3 6— 8 .

Alternatively, this argument could be based on the idea that unless one conforms to these

condit ions o f cohe rence , on e will not c o u n t a s a unified agent wi th a gen uine wil l, a s opposed t o a

bundle

of

d isparate desires

a nd

needs;

s ee

G auth ier 1985.

21

I need no t c la im tha t s uch cons t i tu t ive claims are s imply irrelevant to explaining why we

shou ld comply wi th

th e basic

r equ i rement s

o f

rat ionali ty. Indeed,

I

suggested tha t s uch const i -

tut ive claims prov ide part o f the explanation i n some of my earl ier w ork (Wedg woo d 1999, §4). A ll

t h a t I am c laiming here is tha t these const i tu t ive c laims are not sufficient all by themselves to

8

2



218

Ralph Wedgwood

sa t is fy

these condi t ions , how can this explain w hy your choices should l w y s

sa t is fy

these condi t io ns ? Perhaps

i t

does

not

m a t t e r

a t a l l i f you s o m e t i m e s

m a k e

choices that do not

s a t i s fy

these condi t ions .

A n y w a y , i t s eems doub t fu l whe the r the claim

that

a d isposi t ion no t to

ma ke s uch in terna l ly inc oheren t choices i s cons t i tu t ive of having pre ferences

a t a l l can be the b s i c

explana t ion

o f why i t i s

i r r a t i ona l

t o

ma ke such choices .

If

this cla im were the basic explana t ion of why i t i s i r ra t iona l to make such

in ternal ly incoherent choices ,

then i t

would

in effect be a

ba sic principle

o f

r a t iona l i t y

that

i t is i r ra t iona l for any one to go aga ins t those d i spos i t ions

that

a re

cons t i tu t ive

o f

hav ing pre ferences

a t

all.

But i t i s

dou b t f u l whe the r the re

can be any s uch bas ic principle o f ra t i ona l i t y .

As I a rgued in the previous s ec t ion, i f you ma ke an i r ra t ion a l choice , th i s

choice

reflects

a cogni t ive

defect

in you Since i r ra t i ona l i ty is a lways a

defect

in

y o u ,

then

so long as you are be ing suff ic ient ly sane and intel l igent , you wil l

tend to avoid such

defects.

At the very least , i f i t is a b s ic pr inciple of

r a t iona l i t y

that

i t is i r r a t i ona l f or a n y o n e to f o rm a set of beliefs or choices

that h a s a

ce r ta in f e a tu re ,

then i f you

recognize

that a

cer t a in

se t of

beliefs

or

choices h a s

that

f e a t u r e , y ou will no t r ema in uncer t a in abou t whe the r o r no t

to form

that

se t of beliefs a nd choices, unless y ou a re being less tha n perf ect ly

sane

a nd

intel l igent .

But i t

seems intui t ively qui te possible

that a

per fec t ly

sane

a nd

in tel l igent agent might recognize

that

a

cer t a in choice would

involve going against

a

d i spos i t ion

that i s

cons t i t u t ive

o f


at all, a nd s t i l l remain uncer ta in about whether o r no t to m a k e that choice.

Such

a

person

might a sk

hersel f ,

I

recognize

that a

disposi t ion

not to

m a k e

choices

o f

th i s k ind

i s

cons t i tu t ive

o f


a t

all,

bu t why

shou l dn t

I

somet imes res i s t

that

d isposi t ion,

a nd

m ake

a

choice

of

thi s k ind

a n y w a y ? So i t seems do ub t f ul wh ether the in terna l condi t ions of ra t io na l

choice can be explained in this way.

The sam e problem a lso seems to ar ise for the Ka nt ia ns explana t ion of why

we should never make

a ny

choices except

by

fo l lowing the i r supreme

principle of pract ical reason (see Kant 1785, Ak. iv. 4 4 6 — 7 , a nd K o r sga a rd

9 9 f c :

9 2 — 1 00 ) .

Th is Ka n t i an exp lana t ion

i s

based ul t ima te ly

on the

p ropos-

i t ion

that

the will is free

Then

t he K an t i a ns a rgue

that

i t is cons t i tu t ive of

hav ing

free

will a t a l l

that

one

must

have the c apac i ty t o fol low a l aw

that

one

gives to oneself . Final ly, they argue

that

the only possible law of this kind is

provide

s uch

an explana t ion. In the case of the bas ic r equi rement tha t one should not bel ieve

logical c on t r ad ic t ions , for exam ple, i t also seems

c ruc ia l

t h a t i t is r a t i o n a l for one to believe tha t

one

m u s t

conform to th is

r equ i r emen t

i f one is to

r each

the

t r u t h a b o u t

the

ques t ion

a t i ssue.




their suprem e principle

o f

p ract ical

r e a s on—t he law

that

one

ought always

to

m ake one s choices by follow ing a general maxim that one ca n con sistently at

the same time will to be a universal law.

N ow ,

the

Ka nt ians canno t argue that

it is

consti tut ive

o f

having

free

will

tha t

one

actually makes

a ll

one s choices

by fo l lowing

t h i s fundamenta l

principle;

then

i t would be impossible to violate this principle of rational-

i ty—in which case

it

would surely

not be a

gen uine p rinciple

of

ra t iona l i ty

a t

all.

So ,

instead,

the

K antian s typically argue only tha t

it is

consti tut ive

of

free

will that one has the capacity to follow this law. But then the normative

question arises

yet

again.

A

pe rfectly sane

and

in tel l igent person might

ask

himself:

I

recognize that having

th e

capacity

to

fol low this

law is

consti tut ive

of having

free

will

a t all but why

should

I

a lways make

m y

choices

by

exercising

this capacity?

W hy

s h ou ld n t

I

somet imes mak e choices w i tho ut

exercising

my capac ity to f ollow this law? So i t seems most do ubtfu l whether

this approa ch can give a satisfactory explanation of why we shou ld follow the

Kant ians supreme principle

o f

practical reason.

In

general , i t seems do ub tfu l w heth er the c onstruc tivists can explain w hy

we should com ply with the in tern al requ irem ents of rat ion al choice, in a way

that deals adequately with

the norm ative quest ion .

Indeed,

i t

seems that

const ruct iv is t

views

are

j u s t

a s

vu lnerable

to

th is problem

as the

substantive

versions of the

recogn i t ional v iew.

The

Formal

Vers ion

of the

Recognit ional View

So

far as I can

see, there

is

only

one

approach

to

pra ctical reason th at avoids

this

p rob lem— namel y , the

version

o f the

recog nit ional view that

is

based

on a

pur y

f o r m l concept

of a

good th ing

for one to do .

22

A s I

explained above,

it

is

a

conceptual truth, buil t into

the

n a tu re

o f

th is fo rm al concept

o f a good

th ing

to

do , t ha t

an

option

is a

good th ing

to

do

in

th is sense

if and

only

if it is

an optio n tha t it is cor rec t to choose. A cco rding to the

formal

version of the

recog nit ional view,

a

choice

is

ra t ional

if and

only

if it is

ra t ional

for the

agent

to believe tha t the optio n cho sen is, in this pu rely fo rm al sense, a good thin g

to do.

Suppose that someone raises

the

normative question with respect

to

this

no t ion of w h a t is a good th ing to

do : W hy

should I a lways choose options

22

One phi losopher

w h o m

i t

m ay

be

correct

to

interpret

a s

accepting

this formal

version of

th e

recogni t ional

view

is Law rence

(1995).



220

Ralph Wedgwood

that are good things to do ? W hy sho uldn ' t I sometimes choose options that

are not

good things

to do?'

Whe n

th e

question

is

unders tood

in

this way,

it is

equivalent

to the

question 'Why shou ldn ' t

I

sometimes choose options th at

it

is

not

correct

for me to choose?' But as I

explained

in the first

section,

to say

that it is not correct ' to choose an o ption is ju st to say that one shouldn t

choose

it. So

asking this q uestion

is

also equ ivalent

to

asking: 'Why shou ldn ' t

I

sometimes choose options th at I sho uld n' t choose?' But that question will

ha rdly perplex any sane and intelligent person If you s hou ldn' t choose i t, you

sho uld n' t choose i t . That is an u tterly tr ivial truth—not a tru th that requires

any

fur the r explanation.

So it may

well

be a

basic requirem ent

of

rationali ty

that one sho uld n ot choose an y option tha t it is not ration al for one to believe

to be, in this form al sense, a good thing to do.

A s I

suggested

in the

second section, this for m al concep t

of a 'good

thing

to

do' may, more specifically,

be a

concept

the

very content

of

which

is

given

b y

its

special

'conceptual role in

p ractical reasoning.

If so, then it is by

def in i t ion

a concept such tha t if one is rational, a nd

judges

that a certain option is in this

sense

not a

good thing

to do,

then

one

cannot need

any

fur ther reasons

to

persuade one not to choose that option. A ny rational thinker w ho masters

this concep t will treat the ju dg em en t that an option is not in this sense a good

thing to do as simply settling the practical question of whe ther to choose the

option. In effect, it would be buil t into the very natu re of this concept that it is

a basic requirem ent of rationali ty that o ne shou ld not choose options that

one rationally believes not to be good things to do.

The objection that this view must

face

is not tha t it imposes substa ntive

requirements that

it

cannot adequately explain,

bu t

rather that

it is

empty

or

tr ivial—an object ion that

has

been pressed

forcefully by

Vellem an (1996:

174—8).

H

W h e n th e term is used in this form al sense, to say that an option is a

'good thing to do ' is just to say that it is correct to choose it. So the

f undamen ta l principle

of the

recognitional view—that

it is

correct

to

choose

2 3

For Velleman (1996: 190), this 'emptiness

charge'

is

ju s t

one stage in his a rgum e n t for a

conception of practical

reason that

seeks

'to avoid

t he

twin

pitfalls

of

internalism

and

external-

ism'. Specifically,

Velleman attacks

the recognitional

view

of

practical reason because

it

appears

to

provide one way of defending 'externalism'—by

wh i ch

h e

means

th e

view that there

are

some

reasons fo r action that are entirely independ ent of the agent's contingent desires. Even if the

recognitional view wou ld provide

one way of

defending 'externalism', however,

we

should

not

assume

w i t h o u t fur ther

discussion

t ha t th e reco gnitio nal view is o m m i tt e d to

'externalism'.

(Perhaps

it is not

rat ional

to

believe that

an

action

is a

good thing

to do

unless that action

satisfies

one of one's contingent desires.) At all events, I shall

focus

purely on Velleman's

objection to the

recognitiona l view,

and

ignore

t he

o the r aspects

o f his

a rgum ents here .



Choosing


an

option

if and

only

if the

option

is a

good thing

to d o — a m o u n ts to

no th ing

more than the trivial claim th at it is cor rec t to choose an option if and only if

it is

cor rec t

to

choose

it . So how can

this principle explain anything

at all?

2 4

Proponents

o f the

recog nit ional view could reply

as

follow s. This specifica-

t ion

of the

fun da m en ta l pr incip le , using th is form al concept

of a 'good

thing

to

do' ,

is

indeed trivial .

B ut

perhaps

the

proper ty

of

being

in

this form al sense

a

good thing

to do can be

also specified

in

o the r w a y s — n o t

jus t b y

means

of

this

pure ly fo rm al concept. For example, perhap s this prope rty is identical to the

proper ty

of

being

a

mo rally permissible option that ,

out of all

such moral ly

permissible options, best

satisfies

the agent's total set of desires. Then the

f u n d am en t a l

principle could also

be

specified

in a

non- t r iv ia l way—as

the

principle that a choice is cor rec t if and only if the option chosen is a moral ly

permissible

option that, out of all such morally permissible options, best

satisfies the

agent's desires.

However, the formal version of the recognit ional view itself te l ls us

nothing about which such non- t r iv ia l specifications are true. I t j u s t tells

us to form

ra t ional

beliefs,

involving this purely formal concept, about

w hich of the available options are good things to d o and w hich are

not,

and

then to

choose accordingly .

But all

tha t

it

tells

us

about wha t

it is for an

option to be a good th ing to do is simply tha t it is an op tion th at it w ould be

correct to

choose. Velleman

(1996: 175—6)

objects that this

'would

b e . . . lik e

asking

[the agen t] to hunt for som ething described only as the quarry , or to

play a game with an eye to something described only as

w i n n i n g '.

According to

this objec t ion ,

the

formal vers ion

of the

recognit ional view

is

too

empty

to

tell

us how to set

about making ra t ional choices about w hat

to

do. T rue , it tells us to

form

ra t ional

beliefs

abo ut wh ich of the available options

are

good things to do and w hich are not . B ut acco rding to this complaint , this

view

tells us so little ab ou t wh at it is for an option to be a good thin g to do tha t

i t can no t tel l us how to set abo ut form ing such rat ion al

beliefs.

In fact, it is not

obvious tha t this objec t ion

is

correct .

It is

t rue tha t

the

formal version of the recognitional view does not by itself give us any non-

trivial

specification

of w h a t it is for an option to be a good thing to do

(a l though,

as I

have argued,

it is

quite compatible with

the

existence

of

t rue non- t r iv ia l specifications of this sort) . Nonetheless, this view may tell

24

A s

Velleman claims (Velleman

1996: 176—8),

there

cannot be any

'objec t

of

pract ic

reasoning' unless there is some

subs t n t i ve

specificat ion of what achieving this object consists in.

A s

he p u t s i t: 'A game w h o s e objec t w as spe cifiable only as

winning

wouldn't have an

ob jec t—

that is, wouldn' t have any objec t in par t i cu la r ' (176).




belief can be

suff icient

to

mot ivate choice

in

this

w ay

un less that be l ie f

w as

i tself o r ig ina l ly p roduced , a t leas t in p a r t , by s ome o f one s des i res . So,

as suming these

tw o

t h e se s abou t mo t iva t ion ,

beliefs

a b o u t w h a t

is a

good

th ing to do

m u s t

a lso be bas ed, in som e w ay, on som e of one s desires . (This

is not to say

tha t these

beliefs

can be

based

on

any

o f

one s des i res ;

i t may be

only cer ta in

s p e c i a l

des i res that

can

p lay this role

as

p a r t

of the

u l t i m a t e

ra t iona l

basis

for

these beliefs.) M oreove r , s ince one s pract ical reaso ning

must

u l t imate ly b e based on o rd in ary empi ri cal i n fo rm at io n abo u t the

available

op t ions

and

wha t the i r non-normat ive p roper t i e s would

be , the

same

m u s t

be t ru e o f these

beliefs.

Final ly, the general principles of rat ional

belief

apply

to

these

beliefs a s

m u c h

a s to any

o ther s :

one

s h o u l d

try to

keep

these

beliefs

cons i s t en t , un i f i ed

b y

re la t ions

o f

exp lana to ry coherence ,

and

so on.

R o ug h l y ,

t h e n ,

the ep i s temology of these beliefs is as follows . A be l ie f abou t

a p a r t i cu la r op t ion A to the effect t h a t A i s , in the

f o rmal

sense, a good

th ing t o d o ,

m u s t

b e based on (1) o rd ina ry empi ri ca l

beliefs

a b o u t

A

to the

effect

t h a t

A has

s u ch -an d - s u ch n o n -n o rm a t i v e p ro p e rt ie s ,

and (2)

s ome

a t

l eas t rough general pr incip le to the effect that , at leas t typical ly and for the

mos t par t , op tions tha t have those no n-norm at ive p roper t ie s

a re

good th ings

to

do .

2

Th is rou gh general pr incip le

m u s t

in turn be based on a search for

w h a t J o h n

Rawls

(1972: 4 6 — 5 3 ) has

called

reflective e qu i l i b r ium .

This

is a

process tha t s tar t s ou t by t rea t ing one s d i spos i t ion to have a cer ta in sor t o f

desire

for cer ta in op t ions as w eak , p r ima facie ev idence that those op t ions are

in

the

fo rm al sense good th ings

t o do ;

th i s process

th n

a ims

to

f o r m ,

on the

basis

o f th i s ev idence, a max imal ly coheren t se t of rough general pr incip les

about which op t ions are ( in th i s sense) good th ings to

do.

27

This

is

on ly

a

rough ske tch

of

th i s ep i s t emolog ica l accoun t . Much more

w ou ld have to be said to m ake i t p laus ib le that th i s i s an adeq u ate ac co u nt of

the

ep i s temology

of the

re levant

beliefs. M y

main po in t he re

i s

s imply

to

a rg ue

2

Su ppo s e t ha t

one of

t hese r o u g h general pr inciples

is the

p r inc ip le tha t

(a t

least typically

and for the

m os t par t )

no

op t ion tha t

has

p r o pe r t y

P i s a

good th ing

t o do . W hy

c an t s o m eo n e

raise the

no rmat ive ques t ion aga in ,

W hy

s h o u l d

I (at

least

for the

mos t par t ) avo id choos ing

opt ions t ha t have proper ty P T B u t

this

pr inciple is not an i n t e r n a l r equ i r em en t of r a t i o n a l i t y It is an

external

fact a bo u t wh ich op t io ns are good things to do. So even if it is

j u s t

a basic p r inc ip le tha t

cann o t be any f u r t h e r explained, the re i s no reason to expec t tha t i t m u s t b e convinc ing to all

agents who are suff icient ly sane and in te l l igent .

W e

s h o u ld pe r haps

also

r equ i r e t ha t

i t

m u s t

be

r a t iona l

for one to

expec t tha t

a p rocess o f

fur ther ref ining this

r ou gh genera l pr inc ip le ,

a nd f u r t h e r

em pir ical inves t igat ion

o f A and the

o t h e r available opt ion s , w ou ld no t finally defeat the conclus ion t h a t A i s a good th ing to do.

2 7



224

alph

Wedgwood

tha t it is far f rom obvious tha t no such accoun t can be developed. Once such

an a c c ou n t is developed, the f o rma l ver s ion of the recogni t ional view wil l

clearly be able to give an i n f o r m a t i v e a c c ou n t o f how ra t ional pract ical

reasoning proceeds: one f i r s t follows the rules and procedures tha t a re

specified in this epistemology to a r r ive a t r a t ional beliefs a b ou t wh a t is and

w hat is not a goo d thin g to d o; and

th n

one chooses accordingly , by choosing

an

opt ion tha t

o ne

rationally believes

to be a

good th ing

t o do .

I n s t r u m e n t a l

Reasoning

an d

Ch oos ing

in

Unc e r t a in ty

The formal version of the recogni t ional view appears, then, to have the

resources to deal both wi th Vel leman s emptiness ob jec t ion and wi th the

d e m a n d

fo r

explanat ion that

is

expressed

by

Ko rsgaard s

n o r m a t iv e

ques t ion .

But can i t

really give

a

satisfactory a c c ou n t

o f

pract ical rat ional i ty?

In

this

final

section

I

shall sk etch

a

refined version

o f

this recogni t ional view.

I

shall

try to make it plausible that this

ref ined

reco gni t iona l view gives an adeq uate

acc o un t of two crucial aspects of rat ion al pract ical reaso ning: the im po rtance

of

i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n i n g

and the

c ond i t i ons

fo r

ra t ional choice

in

u n c e r t a i n t y .

A great deal

o f

practical reason ing

is

i n s trum en ta l .

O ne

s tar ts

by

consider-

ing an end

tha t

o ne

in tends

to

achieve,

a nd

th n choo ses wh ich m e a n s

to use in

o rder to achieve that e nd. Indeed, such instru m en tal reaso ning is involved in

a lmost

a ll

cases w hen pract ical reason ing leads

to

act ion. (The on ly exception

is

the

special case where

the

opt ion tha t

o ne

j u d g es

to be a

good th ing

to do

and th n cho oses is w hat A rt h u r D anto (1965) has called a basic a c t io n — t h a t

is,

som ething tha t o ne can j u s t do , wi thout having to choose any f u r t h e r

m ea n s

in

o r d e r

to do

it.)

But how can the

recogn i tional view accou nt

for the

crucial

role

o f

such ins t rum en ta l

reasoning?

To account for ins t rumenta l reasoning, the recogni t ional v iew has to be

ref ined,

in two

ways. First ,

the

fundamenta l pr inc iple

m u st be

ref ined

so

t ha t

it applies no t on ly to choices but also to i n t e n t i o n s . (A choice is a consc ious

m enta l event involving the f o r m a t io n o f an in tent ion , w hi le an in tent ion is an

enduring mental s tate that typical ly lasts unt i l

it

ei ther leads

to

act ion

or is

abando ned.) Secondly , th i s funda m en ta l princ iple

m u st b e

refined

so

that ,

fo r

an in tent ion to be correc t , it i s not eno ugh tha t one s in tended course of

ac t ion sho uld

be a

good th ing

to do; it m u st

also

be a

course

o f

act ion th at

on

w i l l a c t u a l l y c a r r y ou t if o ne i n tends to do so. The und er ly ing idea here is t ha t an

in tent ion tha t

o ne

simply will

no t

execute

is

pointless,

and to

that extent

a



228

Ralph Wedgwood

B ut suppose that one does know for cer ta in that exac t ly o ne of these propos

itions

is tru e. M oreove r, suppose that one is also rationally certain that these

uncer ta in proposi t ions are all beyond one s co ntro l ; noth ing that one can do

can determ ine wh ich on e of these proposit ions is tru e. Finally, suppose that

each of these relevant uncertain proposit ions has a certain probabil i ty given

one s evidence. Then, we can say t ha t an option s expected shor t fa l l

f rom optim ality is the sum of the degrees to which the o ption falls shor t of

optimali ty according

to

each

o f

these relevant un cer tain proposit ions,

weighted b y the p robab il i ty of that proposit ion s being true . I propose that

it is ra t ional to choose an option if and only if that option has minimal expec ted

s h o r t f l l from optimali ty . (In effect, th is proposal about how to make choices in

unce r t a i n ty is directly modelled on expec ted u ti l it y theory except that it uses an

objective evaluative

n o t ion — shor t fa l l

f rom opt imali ty — instead of the

mo re famil iar not ion

o f a

u t i l i ty func t ion .

3 2

)

This

proposal—that

on e should always choose an op t ion wi th minimal

expected sho rtfa l l f rom opt imali ty—is a plausible gener alization of the simple

version of the rec ogn ition al view that I con sidered above. This propo sal en tails

that

if

there

are any

options such that

it is

ra t ional

for you to

have

the

ou trigh t belief that those options

are

optimal, then

it is

ra t ional

to

choose

any

of

those options. If it is ra t ional for you to have the ou trig ht belief that a

certain option is optimal, then, g iven you r evidence, the proba bil i ty that that

option

is

optimal

is 1; so the

expected shortfal l f rom optimali ty

of

such

an

option will always be 0. On the oth er ha nd , this propo sal seems a plausible

extension of the simple v ersion of the rec ogn ition al view to cases in w hich it is

not

ra t ional

to

have

an y

outright belief about which

of the

available options

will

be, one m ay

still

be

u ncer ta in whether

it is

better

for one to

perform

the first

o ption, with

a ll

of its causa l effects, or to pe r fo rm the second option, with all of its cau sal effects. This is why we

need to

focus

on uncer ta in ty abou t normative or eva lua t i ve p roposi t ions of this sor t .

I have here followed so-called causal decision t heory

(Joyce

1999:

115—18)

in relying on the

u n c o n d i t i o n l

probability of the re levant un certain proposi t ions , ra ther than on their proba bility

conditional on

one s per fo rming

th e

option

in

question . (This

is why I

have also

had to

follow

th e

causal

decision theorists

in

assuming that

the

re levant unc ertain proposi t ions

are all

beyond

one s cont rol .) If the

no t ion

of an

opt ion s shortfal l f rom

optimality

accord ing

to a

cer tain

relevant

uncer ta in proposi t ion is

identified

wi th the

difference

between i ts utility and the utility

of the opt ion that is opt imal according to that prop osi t ion , then this a c c o u n t of ra t ional choice

will actually c o i n c i d e wi th the causal version of expected uti l i ty theor y. It wou ld be a wor thwhi le

pro jec t

to

investigate w hat

the

consequenc es wou ld

be of

revising th is a ccoun t

by

relying

on

c o n d i t i o n l

probabilities (instead of unconditional probabil i t ies), and on o ther definitions of

shortfal l

f rom optimality

as well. B ut

un fo r tuna te ly

I c an n o t

carry

ou t

this

investigation here.

32



Choosing


are

opt ima l . In such cases, you can no t choose a n opt ion such tha t i t is rat iona l

for you to have an outr ig ht bel ief in the propo si t ion th at th at o pt ion is

optimal, since ex h y p o t h e s i it is not r a t ional for you to have any such ou t r igh t

belief.

So it seems plausible tha t the best thing to d o in this case is to cho ose an

opt ion w i th minim al e x p e c t e d degree

o f

shor t fa l l f rom opt imali ty.

I f you

c anno t

aim at what you firmly believe to be optimal, you can at least aim to min im i ze

your e x p e c t t i o n o f f lling s h o r t of o pt imali ty. In this way, then, th e r ecogni t ional

view may be able to give an a dequ ate a cco un t of how i t is rat iona l to m ake

choices

i f one is uncer t a in abou t w hich of the available options are good

things

to do and

wh ich

a re

not

M any mo re r e f inement s may be necessary before the f orm al vers ion of the

recog nit ional view c an give a ful ly

satisfactory

a c c o u n t of rat ional choice. B ut

in this section I hope to have made it p lausible tha t the view has the r esources

to provide such a

satisfactory

account. Given that this view also seems to have

a

p lausible answer both

to

Kor sgaard s

n o r ma t i ve ques t ion and to Velle-

m a n s empt iness

ob jec t ion ,

i t seems to m e tha t th is view is a un iqu ely

promising approach to unders tanding prac t ical reason.

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