Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 320–327

Exploring national culture’s consequences on international business lobbying

Andrew Barron *

ESC Rennes School of Business, 2, rue Robert d’Arbrissel CS 76522, 35065 Rennes Cedex France

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Available online 14 August 2010

Keywords:

Corporate political activity

Strategic management

Managerial preferences

National culture

A B S T R A C T

This conceptual paper explores the cultural dimensions of corporate political activity (CPA). Concerned

that prior research into firms’ political actions has been insensitive to culture and its impact on corporate

strategising, national culture is introduced as an explanatory factor behind managers’ political objectives

and the strategies they prefer to use in pursuit of those objectives. The paper adds to existing research by

unpacking and examining corporate political action at a deeper, more complex, human level.

Understanding that corporate political strategies are affected by culture enables politically-active

managers to anticipate, respond to and act on strategies pursued by competitor firms from other

countries.

� 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Journal of World Business

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1. Introduction

Recent economic and political developments, including forexample the 2009 G20 Summit in London, the Financial StabilityPlan unveiled by the Obama Administration in February 2009, andthe common agenda agreed by European Union (EU) leaders inDecember 2009 to regulate and supervise financial markets,suggest that, in the perennial debate regarding the role of the statein economic affairs, the pendulum is currently swinging towardsthe need for more rather than less government. Quite aside fromthese policy measures aimed at alleviating the ‘credit crunch’ andsoftening the impact of the resulting economic downturn, the factremains that, each year, the world’s advanced industrialisedeconomies formulate literally hundreds of political decisions thataffect businesses.

For many business practitioners, regulation is considered to bea threat. However, forty years ago, Epstein (1969) argued that firmsshould use governments as competitive tools for creating businessenvironments that favour their activities. In the intervening period,corporate political activity (CPA), defined by Getz (1997: 32) ‘asany deliberate action taken by firms to influence governmentalpolicy or process’, has become central to many firms’ overallbusiness strategies (Oberholzer-Gee, Cantrill & Wu, 2007).Historically, companies tended to focus their political actions ontheir domestic political settings. The growing importance ofinternational business and the rise of the multinational enterprise(MNE) have led to an internationalisation of corporate political

* Tel.: +33 2 99 54 62 82; fax: +33 2 99 33 08 24.

E-mail address: andrew.barron@esc-rennes.fr.

1090-9516/$ – see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.07.008

strategies. Firms are increasingly becoming politically active awayfrom their home markets (e.g. Hillman & Keim, 1995).

As argued by Blumentritt (2003), scholars interested in CPAhave not fully kept pace with the internationalisation of business-government relations. Although studies into the increasinglyinternational dimensions of firms’ political strategies abound (e.g.Boddewyn, 2007), most research published in the field examinesthe growing international character of firms’ political activitiesusing theories developed by American scholars to explain largelyAmerican phenomena. By drawing their inspiration from thesetheoretical traditions, scholars have neglected to consider theextent to which insights gleaned from other academic disciplinescan potentially shed new explanatory light on the politicalobjectives and practices of firms.

One such discipline is cross-cultural management. Culture,broadly understood here as the socially transmitted behaviourpatterns, norms, beliefs and values of a given community(Salacuse, 1998), is shared by members of a given society.Culture lies at the core of behaviour, differs between nations, butis stable within them (Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 1985). Scholarshave demonstrated that national culture impacts many differentindividual-level outcomes, including perceptions, beliefs andbehaviours (e.g. Leung, Rabi, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). Morespecifically, research has shown that national culture affectsmanagers’ strategic thoughts and actions. Indeed, Hofstede(1980) claimed that culture leads to cross-country differencesin patterns of managerial thinking, feeling and acting whilstother scholars (e.g. House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta,2004; Schneider, 1989) argued that managers socialised indifferent countries respond to strategic choices in different ways,and that these choices reflect underlying national culturalpReferences

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Despite the increasingly international nature of CPA, anddespite the growing importance of cross-cultural management as asegment of business and management research, little scholarlyattention has been invested in combining insights from these twocorpuses of literature to investigate whether and to what extentculture impacts on corporate political strategising. This paperseeks to fill this gap by unlocking managers’ mindsets andidentifying the impact of their national cultures on the politicalstrategies that they formulate. It begins by taking a critical readingof the mainstream CPA literature. In response to concernsidentified in the existing corpus of research, it sets forth atheoretical framework emphasising culturally-grounded manage-ment techniques and preferences as factors capable of determiningfirms’ corporate behaviours. This framework is subsequently usedto develop sets of testable, culturally-sensitive propositions. Thecontribution rounds off by discussing the implications of thetheoretical framework for researchers and practitioners andproposing avenues for future research.

2. Prior research

Emerging from a largely United States context, research intoCPA has drawn on numerous theories (including interest grouptheory, resource dependency theory, institutional theory, agencytheory, the behavioural theory of the firm, collective action theory,transaction cost theory, and public choice theory) to understandwhy firms become politically active and how they seek to influencepolicy decisions (for meta reviews of the mainstream CPAliterature, see Getz, 1997; Getz, 2001; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler,2004). Using these theoretical traditions to guide their enquiries,studies have found that the political objectives and practices offirms are determined by firm-specific characteristics (e.g. companysize, financial resources, past experience), industry-specificcharacteristics (e.g. number of firms in the sector, dependencyon governments) and institutional conditions (e.g. characteristicsof political systems). Since they have highlighted determinants offirms’ political actions that are relatively easy to observe andmeasure, studies into CPA in the United States context have servedas the basis for replication studies focusing on single countries (e.g.Chaudhri & Sampson, 2000; Grant, 2000; Sinha, 2005) and cross-national comparative studies (e.g. Bouwen, 2004; Campos &Gonzalez, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000).

Those scholars investigating CPA outside the USA have – likeother scholars of international business and management asdiscussed by Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) – not considered theextent to which their underlying theories were developed toexplain the political behaviour of firms in the U.S. context.Similarly they have not assessed whether it is appropriate to applysuch theories to other distinctive, national contexts. Scholarsexamining CPA from an interest-group theory perspective, forexample, assume that organised interests play a fundamental rolein policymaking processes (e.g. Dahl, 1961). Although thisassumption may be valid in the context of the United States(e.g. Masters & Keim, 1985), it does necessarily hold true in acountry like France, where interest group activity is much lessdeveloped (e.g. Safran, 2003). So, as argued by Coen (2007), beforethe wholesale replication of American studies of political actionbecomes the norm, scholars should consider the applicability oftheir underlying theories to the public policy processes andinstitutions of other regions.

The use of theories developed in the United States to investigateCPA in other countries raises another concern. Scholars havetended to focus on finding similarities that confirm the universalityof corporate behaviou observed in the United States. Again, this isan issue common to much research into international business(e.g. Boddewyn, 2008). There are reasons, of course, for expecting

greater similarity in firms’ political strategies. The pressures ofglobalisation, for example, are said to be leading to a convergenceof managerial thinking and practices around the world (e.g.Lammers, 1990). As firms become increasingly politically activeoutside their domestic political settings (e.g. Boddewyn, 2007),they might be expected to adopt more uniform strategicbehaviours when seeking to influence policy outcomes on theglobal stage. With specific reference to the European Unioncontext, for example, scholars have debated whether the processesof European integration have led to a convergence or ‘Europea-nisation’ (e.g. Heritier et al., 2001: 3) of practices and preferencesamongst economic, social, and political actors in the EU memberstates.

These arguments notwithstanding, the existing CPA literaturecan by and large be considered to be located within what Child(2000) referred to as a low-context research perspective. Thisperspective is insensitive towards nations and cultures asanalytically significant contexts. This can also be said of thosescholars who have examined CPA from an institutionalistperspective, the trajectory of existing literature that focuses mostsharply on cross-country differences in firms’ political behaviours.For example, Hillman (2003) and Hillman and Keim (1995) arguethat, in countries where government-business relations aredescribed as corporatist (e.g. Germany, Sweden), firms enter intolong-standing relationships with policymakers whilst in morepluralist systems (e.g. USA, UK) firms engage on a more ad hoc,issue-by-issue basis with political decision makers. What theseaccounts of CPA overlook, however, is the cultural origins ofcountries’ institutional arrangements and the extent to whichsocieties’ dominant attitudes and beliefs (i.e. cultures) result inelaborate systems of institutions (e.g. North, 2005; Redding, 2008).

3. Culture’s consequences on corporate political activity

In response to the clear absence of CPA research that adopts ahigh-context, culturally-sensitive (Child, 2000) perspective, thefollowing section presents a theoretical framework that helpsunderstand the effects of national culture on firms’ politicalobjectives and strategies. In accordance with existing research intoCPA, the framework assumes that managers enter the politicalarena in pursuit of specific objectives. When seeking to achievethose political objectives, it assumes – in accordance with thedecision-tree-based taxonomy of political action developed byHillman and Hitt (1999) – that managers face three specificstrategic choices: they must choose their general approach topolitical action, their level of participation in the policymakingprocess, and the specific tactics to use when seeking to influencepolicymakers. According to the model, the objectives andstrategies pursued by managers in the policymaking arena aredirectly driven by perceptions, preferences and expectationsconcerning rules and regulations, strategic planning horizons,negotiation, decision-making processes, and financial induce-ments. Drawing inspiration from the significant corpus of researchthat identifies and explains cross-national variations in manage-ment styles and practices using classification systems of nationalculture based on empirical research into national values (e.g.Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1994; Hofstede, 1980, 1991,2001; Laurent, 1983), the framework assumes that Hofstede’scultural dimensions have an indirect, moderating effect on themanagerial preferences and expectations that underpin corporatepolitical strategising. Fig. 1 provides a graphical representation ofthe key linkages between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and thedifferent aspects of corporate political action:

The different components of the framework are unpacked toelaborate propositions that more clearly elucidate how theobjectives and different aspects of corporate political activity are

Fig. 1. A cross-cultural framework of corporate political action. Masculinity v. Femininity - Gender role orientation (Hofstede’ new work relabelled this dimension. See

Hofstede, 2001).

A. Barron / Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 320–327322

affected by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The framework departsfrom the assumption that managers enter the political arena toachieve specific objectives. As argued by Shaffer (1995), theseobjectives can include seeking to pass new legislation that givestheir firms a competitive advantage, or seeking to block the passageof proposed legislation in an attempt to combat against unwantedregulatory intrusion. In the same way, Van Schendelen (2005)distinguished between managers who engage in ‘positive lobbying’(to pass regulations that support their business activities) and thosethat conduct ‘negative lobbying’ (to block regulations that impactadversely on their activities). For his part, Bonardi (1999, 2004)argued that managers can become politically active to enhance orpromote deregulation. Broadly speaking, therefore, the frameworksuggests that managers’ political objectives are influenced by thesignificance that they attach to rules and regulations: managers whoconsider regulation to be helpful will engage in positive lobbyingand seek to pass new legislation; those who consider it to be harmfulwill engage in negative lobbying and seek to block regulation orpromote deregulation.

Scholars in the field of cross-cultural and internationalmanagement have identified and explained cross-national differ-ences in attitudes towards rules and regulations in terms ofuncertainty avoidance, the dimension developed by Hofstede tomeasure the tolerance of countries’ citizens towards uncertaintyand ambiguity. Crucially, studies (including Calori, Lubatkin, Very,& Veiga, 1997; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Jeanquart-Barone &Peluchette, 1999; Meuleman, 2010; Moussetis, Rahma, & Nakos,2005; Perry, 2002) have shown that citizens of uncertainty-avoiding cultures (e.g., Japan, China) are more likely than theircounterparts from uncertainty-accepting cultures to introduceregulations (at the organisational level) and laws (at the societallevel) as mechanisms for overcoming unpredictable situations.

Assuming that managers’ overall political objectives (i.e. toblock or pass legislation, to promote deregulation) are influencedby their perceptions of rules and regulations, and assuming thatthese perceptions are themselves affected by culturally-groundedattitudes towards uncertainty and ambiguity, the frameworkproposes that:

Proposition 1. Managers socialised in uncertainty-avoiding cultures

will engage in CPA to create new regulations whilst managers socia-

lised in uncertainty-accepting cultures will engage in CPA to block the

passage of regulations or promote deregulation.

Based on this proposition, managers from France (a countryidentified by Hofstede as uncertainty-avoiding) will be more likelythan their counterparts from Britain and the USA (comparativelymore uncertainty-accepting countries) to engage in political actionto create new rules and regulations. Anecdotal evidence wouldappear to support this claim. For example, following the ‘creditcrunch’ of 2008/2009, the political representatives of French banksdemanded new regulations to restrict the activities of the City ofLondon (Barbier & Benoit, 2009) whilst their UK counterpartsopposed plans to create an EU body responsible for regulatinghedge funds and private equity firms. Fearful of losing marketshare and undermining the quality of wines available on theEuropean market, French winegrowers have lobbied aggressivelyagainst the demands of American wine exporters for the EU to liftregulations regarding coupage, the blending of red and white winesto create rose (Samuel, 2009).

When seeking to achieve their political objectives, theframework assumes, in accordance with the decision-tree-basedtaxonomy of political action developed by Hillman and Hitt(1999), that managers must first choose their general approachto political action. This involves deciding whether to engagetransactionally or relationally with policymakers. The transac-tion approach involves waiting for specific public policy issuesto develop before devising a strategy in response to that issue;the relational approach involves fostering enduring relation-ships with policymakers across numerous policy issues. Overtime these relationships will have in place the necessarycontacts and resources whenever policy issues arise. In thisway, CPA can be considered to involve strategic planningpreferences: managers choosing a transactional approach to CPAcan be seen to prefer short-term strategising whilst those optingfor the relational approach can be considered to prefer long-term strategising.

Cross-country differences in preferred strategic planninghorizons have been explained using the long-term versus short-term dimension developed by Hofstede and Bond (1988) tomeasure citizens’ willingness to forgo present for future benefitsand the importance they attach to attaining results immediately orover the long run. For example, in their analysis of strategicinvestment decisions, Carr and Harris (2004) found that managerssocialised in the long-term orientated cultures of Germany andJapan focused on long-term strategic success over a period of 15years whilst their counterparts socialised in short-term orientated

A. Barron / Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 320–327 323

cultures of the UK and the USA framed their strategic objectives in2- or 3-year terms.

Assuming that managers’ choices of general approach to CPA(transactional versus relational) are driven by their strategicplanning preferences, which are in turn influenced by culturally-conditioned attitudes towards time, the framework also proposesthat:

Proposition 2. Managers socialised in short-term orientated national

cultures will prefer to use a transactional approach to political action

whilst managers in long-term orientated national cultures will prefer

to use a relational approach to political action.

This proposition supposes that managers from Japan (a countrywhose citizens have a long-term time orientation) will prefer tofoster enduring relationships with policymakers. By contrast,managers from Germany (a country whose citizens have acomparatively shorter-term time orientation) will favour a moread hoc approach to political action. Evidence from the internationalautomotive industry would appear to support this prediction. Forexample, when engaging in political action in Brussels, Japanesecar manufacturers, such as Nissan and Toyota, have sought tocultivate and maintain long-standing, personalised networks withpolicymakers across the EU’s institutions (Hamada, 2006). Bycontrast, German manufacturers, such as Volkswagen and BMW,have favoured a more ad hoc approach to interest representation,especially in the field of environmental policy, where they havetended to enter the political arena only in reaction to threats posedby specific policy issues (Coen, 2004).

The framework assumes that, having decided upon theirgeneral approach to CPA, managers choose what Hillman andHitt (1999) refer to as they level of participation in the policy-making process. Specifically, managers can choose to pursuepolitical action individually or collectively. Whether managerschoose individual or collective political action is contingent ontheir negotiation preferences. Such preferences are important forCPA insofar as managers ultimately operate in a negotiatedenvironment. That is, their relations with external stakeholders,including policymakers, are open to negotiation and the exchangeof concessions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Rather than blindlyadhering to and complying with proposed legislation, managersbargain for special consideration from policymakers if they findconformity with legislation to be unpalatable or unworkable (e.g.Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Oliver, 1991). The framework in Fig. 1specifically suggests that managers can choose to negotiate suchconcessions with policymakers independently, or they can chooseto negotiate collaboratively by joining forces with managers fromother firms.

Scholars have identified and explained cross-country variationsin negotiation behaviour using Hofstede’s dimension of individu-alism versus collectivism, which measures cultural preferences foracting autonomously or within a group, and the extent to whichthe attainment of individual objectives or collective achievementstakes precedence. Specifically, studies (e.g. Cai, Wilson, & Drake,2006; Drake, 2001) have shown that managers socialised inindividualistic countries tend to view negotiation in competitiveterms, and negotiate alone for individual benefit. This is whatFisher and Ury (1981) have described as distributive bargainingtechniques. By contrast, managers socialised in more collectivistcultures generally view negotiation in collaborative terms, andnegotiate collaboratively for common benefits using integrativebargaining techniques.

Assuming that managers’ choices of participation level in thepolicymaking process (individual action versus collective action)are informed by their preferred negotiation behaviours, andassuming that such behaviours are shaped by culturally-informed

preferences for achieving individual or collective objectives, theframework proposes that:

Proposition 3. Managers socialised in individualistic cultures will

prefer individual political action whilst those rooted in collectivist

cultures will prefer collective political action.

The framework predicts that managers from Great Britain (ahighly individualistic country) will tend to consider the policynegotiation process as a competitive exercise and have a culturaldisposition for individual political action. By contrast, managersfrom Germany (a more collectivist country) will view policynegotiations as a collaborative exercise and have a culturalpreference for collective political action. Such cross-culturaldifferences in preferred levels of participation in the politicalprocess are visible in the pharmaceutical industry. In theircomparative study of large firms as political actors, Grant,Martinelli, & Paterson (1989) found that British managerspreferred to lobby the EU institutions using their government-relations staff EU whilst German managers favoured co-ordinated,collective action through industry associations. Today, BASF andBayer play leading roles in the Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen

Industrie, which represents the political interests of over 260German pharmaceuticals companies of all sizes on the Europeanstage. By contrast, GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca prefer topetition the EU institutions alone rather than within theAssociation of the British Pharmaceuticals Industry (Greer, 2006).

Finally, the framework is built on the assumption that corporatepolitical strategising involves choosing tactics to influencedecisions taken by executive and legislative bodies and agencies(e.g., Lord, 2000). In this respect, Hillman and Hitt (1999) statedthat managers can choose between information strategies andconstituency-building strategies. Information strategies involveissuing position papers and technical briefs or making contribu-tions to public consultations in order to communicate their policypreferences and concerns directly to specific policymakers.Constituency-building strategies involve designing wider-reach-ing public relations campaigns that generate grassroots support fortheir concerns amongst voters, who in turn express their policyconcerns and preferences to political decision-makers.

In her review of existing CPA literature, Getz (1997) stated thatmanagers, when choosing their political strategies, will choosetactics that are aimed at those people whom they believe can helpresolve the specific issues they face. Accordingly, the frameworksupposes that direct information strategies targeted specifically atpolicymakers will be preferred by managers who consider that thepower to make political decisions resides solely with policy-makers. By contrast, the more indirect constituency-buildingstrategies aimed at wider publics will be favoured by managerswho consider decision-making power to be more widely spreadacross society.

The literature on cross-cultural and international managementteaches us that there exist cross-country differences regardingwho is involved in decision-making and who ultimately hasdecision-making power. These variations have been explainedusing power distance, the cultural dimension developed byHofstede to describe the extent to which citizens of a givencountry accept power hierarchy and inequality to be legitimate(e.g. Erez, 1994; Harris, Moran, & Moran, 2006; Sagie & Koslowsky,2000; Triandis, 1994). These studies have found that decision-making responsibility is widely spread in low power distancecountries and concentrated in the hands of a limited number ofindividuals in high power distance countries. Other studies (e.g.Eising, 2003; Kohler-Koch, 1997; Schmidt, 1999) suggest that highpower distance scores are associated with statist countries (e.g.France, Greece). In such countries, political decisions tend to be

A. Barron / Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 320–327324

made by ruling elites of likeminded politicians, civil servants andbusinessmen who attended the same prestigious educationestablishments, whilst lower power distance scores are associatedwith more corporatist (e.g. Austria, Germany) or pluralist countries(e.g. UK, USA) where, compared to statist countries, politicaldecisions tend to be made by policymakers in consultation withother social and economic actors, including firms, trade unions andrepresentatives of civil society.

Assuming that managers’ choices of information or constituen-cy-building strategies depend on their expectations regarding whohas the authority to influence political decisions, and assumingthat these expectations are themselves affected by culturally-conditioned attitudes towards power and hierarchy, the frame-work proposes that:

Proposition 4. Managers socialised in power-distance accepting na-

tional cultures will prefer to pursue information strategies whilst those

socialised in power-distance rejecting national cultures will prefer to

pursue constituency-building strategies.

The framework predicts that managers from France (a countrythat scores high on Hofstede’s power distance dimension) will preferto pursue information strategies and communicate their policyconcerns to policymakers directly. By contrast, managers fromBritain (a lower power distance country) will also use constituency-building strategies and shore up support for their political causesusing wider-targeted public-relations programmes. Evidence ofsuch cross-cultural preferences for information or constituency-building strategies is provided by Bruno Dupont, the managingdirector of the Brussels-based EURALIA lobbying consultancy. Heclaims that French business lobbyists are more likely than theirpeers from other countries to request direct meetings with EUpolicymakers (Lory, 2002). Similarly, research conducted by theParis Chamber of Commerce shows that British firms pursue a more‘bottom-up’ approach to lobbying, choosing to channel theirconcerns and preferences to policymakers through the media andother public relations mechanisms (Bonavita, 2005; CCIP, 2005).

In their decision-based model of CPA, Hillman and Hitt (1999)identified a third type of political tactic. Essentially, alongsideinformation and constituency-building strategies, managers canalso choose to use make financial contributions to policymakers orpolitical parties, or fund election campaigns—a tactic defined bythe authors as the financial incentive strategy. Such strategies, theyargue, are used by managers who regard financial inducements asmorally acceptable, and avoided by managers who them to beethically suspect.

Scholars of cross-cultural management have empiricallydemonstrated that managerial attitudes towards the legitimacyof financial inducements differ across countries. Such cross-national variations have been explained by Hofstede’s gender roleorientation dimension, which measures the assertiveness andcompetitiveness of a country’s citizens and their attachment tomaterial possessions and money. Although financial inducementsare used in many countries to influence political behaviour (e.g.OECD, 2008), studies have demonstrated that they are eschewedby managers socialised in feminine cultures but consideredacceptable by managers socialised in more masculine cultures(e.g. Husted, 1999; Vitell, Nwachukwu, & Barnes, 1993).

Assuming that managers’ decisions to use financial incentivestrategies are influenced by their perceptions regarding thelegitimacy of financial inducements, and assuming that suchperceptions are linked to culturally-grounded attitudes towardsmoney, the framework proposes that:

Proposition 5. Managers socialised in masculine cultures will be

more likely than those socialised in feminine cultures to pursue

financial incentive strategies.

This proposition suggests that managers for example fromVenezuela and Colombia (countries identified by Hofstede ashighly masculine) will seek to invest more financial resources inrepresenting their companies’ interests than their homologuesfrom for example the Netherlands and Norway (countries thatHofstede identified as being highly feminine). It is notoriouslydifficult to obtain reliable information on the financial con-tributions made by managers to politicians. As legislators,particularly in the European Union, are seeking to imposestricter controls on lobbying practices (e.g. Obradovic, 2009),managers may be unwilling to admit openly to using financialresources to buy influence. These methodological difficultiesnotwithstanding, research conducted by Transparency Interna-tional found that 28% of Venezuelan managers and 8% ofColombian managers surveyed admitted to paying kickbacks topublic officials, compared to only 2% of Norwegian and 1% ofDutch managers surveyed (Zinnbauer, Dobson, & Despota,2009).

In summary, the framework first suggests that managers’political objectives (i.e., to pass or to block legislation, to promotederegulation) are driven by their perceptions regarding rules andregulations, which in turn reflect culturally-grounded attitudestowards uncertainty and ambiguity (P1). Second, it suggests thatmanagers’ preferred choices of general approach to CPA (i.e.,relational versus transactional approaches) are affected by theirstrategic-planning preferences, which themselves are influencedby culturally-bound time orientations (P2). Third, the frameworkstates that managers’ preferred level of participation in thepolicymaking process (individual versus collective action) isinfluenced by negotiation behaviours, which are determined byculturally-conditioned attitudes towards achieving individual orcollective objectives (P3). Fourth, it suggests that managers’choices of tactics (specifically, information versus constituency-building strategies) are informed by their expectations regardingwho has the authority of influence political decisions, which inturn are influenced culturally-conditioned attitudes towardspower hierarchy and inequality (P4). Finally, the framework statesthat the use by managers of financial incentive strategies toinfluence policy decisions is affected by perceptions regarding thelegitimacy of financial inducements, which are informed byculturally-informed attitudes towards money (P5).

4. Theoretical implications

The theoretical framework and propositions developed haveimplications for scholars and practitioners of CPA alike. From aresearch perspective, this contribution adds generally to theliterature demonstrating that managers approach strategic choicesin different ways, reflecting preferences and expectations informedby the national cultures where they were socialised (e.g. Harris &Dibben, 1999; Harris & Ghauri, 2000; House et al., 2004; Schneider,1989:). Although much is already known about how nationalcultures affects how managers formulate communication strate-gies (e.g. Clausen, 2007; Zhu, 2006), design human resourcespractices (e.g. Carr & Pudelko, 2006; Lloyd & Hartel, 2004), conductquality management activities (e.g. Vecchi & Brennan, 2009; Yavas& Rezayat, 2003) and implement strategic marketing strategies(e.g. Lee & Trim, 2008), this contribution breaks new ground bydiscussing how culturally-grounded management styles andpreferences are applied to corporate political behaviour, anendeavour hitherto overlooked by scholars interested in theeffects of national culture on corporate strategising. The frame-work developed here suggests that managers do not stop beingAmerican, British, Chinese, etc. in their mentalities or behaviourswhen engaging in political rather than other managementactivities.

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This contribution also has significant implications for scholarsinterested in corporate political activity. Whilst existing CPAresearch tends to focus attention on the firm-level, industry-leveland institutional-level antecedents of corporate political action,the emphasis of this contribution is placed on individual managers.Focusing on individual-level antecedents allows the strategicbehaviour of firms to be unpacked and examined at a deeper, morecomplex, human level. This makes sense to the extent that firms’political strategies are ultimately formulated by managers,including government affairs staff, public affairs staff, andpolitically active Chief Executive Officers.

Placing the emphasis on how managerial preferences andbehaviours are influenced by national culture suggests that existingexplanations of CPA may provide only a partial picture of why firmsbecome politically active and why they choose certain politicalstrategies over others. For example, mainstream CPA researchsuggests that firms’ choices of general approach to CPA arecontingent on their dependency on government contrasts (e.g.Hillman & Hitt, 1999), whether they operate in a corporatist orpluralist system (e.g. Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Keim, 1995), orwhether they offer a highly diversified range of products andservices (Hillman, 2003). The theoretical framework developed herebuilds on these existing explanations by suggesting that whetherfirms pursue a transactional or relational approach may depend ontheir managers’ cultural-grounded preferences for short- or long-term orientated strategic planning. Crucially, those socialised incomparatively long-term orientated national cultures will prefer toengage relationally and those from more short-term nationalcultures will prefer to engage transactionally with policymakers.

Firms’ choices of participation level in the policymaking processhave been explained by their dependency on governments (e.g.Ozer & Lee, 2009), the number of firms in their industry (e.g.Masters & Keim, 1985), their financial resources (e.g. Coen, 1997,1999; Cook & Fox, 2000; Hillman & Hitt, 1999), and the specificityof the threats that they face (e.g. Blau & Harris, 1992; Kaufman,Englander, & Marcus, 1993; Shaffer, 1992). The propositionsdeveloped here suggest whether firms’ choose to engage alone orcollaboratively in CPA depends on their managers’ culturally-influenced perceptions as to whether negotiations are eithercollaborative or competitive exercises.

The suggestion that firms’ choice of tactics (information,constituency-building or financial inducement strategies) isdependent on managers’ culturally-conditioned preferences alsobuilds on existing CPA research. For example, prior research statesthat managers pursue information strategies because they sharecommon positions with voters on salient policy issues (e.g. Keim &Zeithaml, 1986), because they wish to convey factual informationto key decision makers when the latter do not understand policyissues (e.g. Getz, 1993), or because government officials depend onlobbyists for information and expertise (e.g. Mahoney, 2007). Theframework developed in this contribution adds to these explana-tions by suggesting that managers choose such strategies becausethey have culturally-grounded expectations that political deci-sions are taken by an elite of policymakers.

Prior research argues that managers engage in constituencybuilding because they wish to create credibility with individualpolicymakers (e.g. Coen, 1997, 1999), because their firm and votersdisagree on salient policy issues (e.g. Keim & Zeithaml, 1986),because policymakers and firms disagree over issues (e.g. Getz,1993), and because policymakers consider an issue to be of lowpriority. The framework developed here enriches this existingresearch by suggesting that managers choose constituency-building strategies because they expect the power to influencepolitical decisions to be equally distributed across society.

The proposition that managers choose to use financialinducement strategies because they have an cultural attachment

to material possessions and money adds to existing CPA research,which suggests that the propensity of managers to use financialinducement strategies depends on the salience of policy issues (e.g.Keim & Zeithaml, 1986) or the dependency of their firms ongovernments as customers (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

5. Managerial relevance

From a practitioner’s perspective, the paper sensitises man-agers to cultural factors that can influence the strategic politicalpreferences of their international competitors on the politicalstage. Based on the arguments developed here, knowing that firms’political strategies can be influenced by managerial culturalpreferences can contribute to managers’ efforts to anticipate,respond to, and act on the strategies pursued by rival firms. Forexample, having background, cultural knowledge about rival firms’political representatives can potentially improve firms’ politicalmonitoring and issue management activities. Knowing that theirrivals socialised in uncertainty-avoiding cultures are likely topropose new legislation as a solution for economic problemsenables firms’ political representatives socialised in uncertainty-accepting cultures to identify in a timely manner potential threatsto their own political objectives. Information about the culturalbackground of firms’ political representatives also facilitates thesearch for potential partners in the political arena. Indeed, knowingthat managers socialised in collectivist cultures will be more openthan managers from individualistic cultures to influencing policydecisions collaboratively will enable firms’ political representa-tives to more efficiently select appropriate collaborators forpolitical action.

The propositions developed in this contribution also havepotential implications for policymakers, especially at a time whenthe financial crisis has prompted large government interventions –not only in national but also increasingly in supranationalpolicymaking arenas – to restore confidence in financial systemsand contain the fall-out of the crisis on the real economy (e.g.Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2010). For example, ifpolicymakers seeking to introduce legislation to ease the effects ofthe crisis know that politically-active managers socialised inuncertainty-avoiding cultures are likely to engage in politicalaction to block new regulation, they will be better placed toanticipate and plan for possible sources of resistance to theirplanned measures. Their ability to foresee and respond toopposition to their planned legislation may also be improved ifthey are aware that managers socialised in power-distancerejecting cultures are likely to engage in constituency-buildingto shore up widespread support for their policy concerns.

6. Concluding remarks

The objective of this paper has been to propose a theoreticalframework as a helpful starting point for investigating the effectsof national culture on firms’ political actions. The framework doesnot claim to provide definitive conclusions about the impact ofnational culture on corporate political activity. Indeed, from anempirical perspective, surveys of politically active managerssocialised in a wide range of culturally diverse countries need tobe conducted to test the validity of the propositions suggested bythe framework. Such empirical studies should hold constantfactors such as firm size, industry membership and financialresources, to rule these out as rival explanations for any variationsin CPA observed. They should also focus on managers’ politicalactivities in a common political arena (e.g. the World TradeOrganisation, the European Union) to rule out differences inpolitical systems as an explanation for any observed differences inpolitical behaviour.

A. Barron / Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 320–327326

Future empirical work should also seek to identify the moderat-ing factors that determine in which contexts or situations nationalculture is the most important factor explaining CPA. This isimportant, for example, since American managers (socialised inindividualistic cultures) have been shown to engage in collectivepolitical action (e.g. Getz, 1993; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997) andChinese managers (socialised in collectivist cultures) have beenshown to engage in individual political action (e.g. Kennedy, 2008).Determining when national culture has more influence over CPAthan other variables could be achieved by conducting in-depth casestudies of policy negotiations involving firms and testing the culturalframework of CPA sketched out above against other the competingtheories addressed in reviews of the mainstream CPA literature.

From a theoretical perspective, future research could build onthe framework presented in Fig. 1 by addressing the criticismslevied at the use of cultural classification systems in general, and atHofstede’s cultural dimensions in particular. As discussed exten-sively elsewhere (e.g. Holden, 2002), the use of such typologies hasbeen criticised for reducing the complexities of national culture tosimplistic and overly generalised conceptualisations. In responseto this criticism, the model could be enhanced by incorporatingtheoretical insights from other cultural categorisation studies, thusproviding a more sophisticated analysis of the effects of culture onpolitical action. For example, since CPA involves influencingbusiness environments the dimension of internal versus externalcontrol, as developed by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner(1997), could be used to uncover managerial perceptions regardingthe value of CPA. Specifically, scholars could investigate whethermanagers socialised in internalistic cultures (whose membersbelieve they can control and manage the environments in whichthey operate) attach more importance to CPA than managerssocialised in externalistic cultures (whose members believe peoplecannot shape their destinies but must simply adapt to externalcircumstances). Although incorporating a wider range of culturaldimensions could potentially provide richer explanations of theeffects of culture on managers’ political objectives and strategies,care should nonetheless be taken to avoid the pitfalls of somecross-cultural research, as discussed by Taras, Rowney, and Steel(2009) and Taras, Kirkman, and Steel (2010), unworkably bulky byincluding additional cultural dimensions.

Since the use of cultural dimensions has also been criticised formagnifying national stereotypes and overlooking the culturalheterogeneity that can exist within countries (e.g. Kirkman, Lowe,& Gibson, 2006; McSweeney, 2002; Shenkar, 2001; Taras et al.,2009), the model could also be adapted so that it pays greaterattention to the inherently multi-level character of culture. Giventhe amount of business lobbying undertaken by industry-specifictrade associations, one potentially interesting avenue of research,based on research conducted into industry cultures (e.g. Chatman &Jehn, 1994; Phillips, 1994), could involve developing a frameworkto ascertain whether and to what extent managers socialised in thesame industry-specific cultural milieus within and across givencountries respond to strategic political choices in the same way.

These further improvements notwithstanding, it is nonethelesshoped that this paper has served its original purpose, namely tosensitise CPA scholars to the importance of national culture forunderstanding cross-national variations in corporate politicalstrategising and open up interesting and valuable avenues forfuture research.

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