Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan...

Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan

Paul Staniland

Department of Political Science, MIT

MacMillan Center, Yale University

United States Institute of Peace

[email protected]

Greater Kashmir

“The public is the most powerful weapon and it is on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993

Greater Kashmir

“The public is the most powerful weapon and it is on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993

“the JKLF had an idea, but not a base” (interview, Kashmir, summer 2009)“by 1995, the JKLF as an armed group was no longer a force to seriously reckon with, although its agenda for a free, independent Kashmir still fired the hearts of many, if not most, Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)

“the most militarily well organized of all the jehadi organizations in Pakistan and Kashmir” (Rana 2004)

“not supported by a majority of Kashmiri Muslims” (Behera 2000)

The Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen

Who Cares? Effects of Insurgent Organization Victory and defeat in civil war

Rape and mass killing

Effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy

Success and failure in peace negotiations

Questions How do we conceptualize and measure

cohesion?


cohesion?

How do insurgent groups build themselves in the midst of rebellion against capable states?


cohesion?

How do insurgent groups build themselves in the midst of rebellion against capable states?

What explains consequent variation in insurgent cohesion across time and space?

Findings Social networks matter more than popular support

or ideological appeal Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin

cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts and minds

Findings Social networks matter more than popular support

or ideological appeal Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin

cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts and minds

When fighting capable states, external aid bolsters insurgent cohesion Resource-richness need not lead to loot-seeking and

indiscipline

Research Design Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily

capable, politically-resolved states

Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in: Kashmir, 1988-2008 Northern Ireland, 1962-2005 Sri Lanka, 1972-2009

Research Design Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily

capable, politically-resolved states

Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in: Kashmir, 1988-2008 Northern Ireland, 1962-2005 Sri Lanka, 1972-2009

Sub-national comparisons Variation within the same war and society

Cross-national comparisons

Research Methods 13 months of fieldwork in N. Ireland, India,

Indian-administered Kashmir, and Sri Lanka

Interviews 130+ current and former militants, politicians,

government officials, journalists, academics, analysts, aid workers

Written sources Internal documents and diaries Memoirs and oral histories Propaganda Journalism History and anthropology

Defining and Measuring Cohesion Cohesion: fighters and factions obey orders and

rarely launch splits or violent internal challenges

Focus on: Internal Unrest: splits, feuds, coups, defiance Internal Compliance: fighters and leaders respect orders,

peaceful leadership successions

Measurement: examine each group over time along a variety of indicators Frequency, Intensity, Issues, Autonomy

Existing Theories

Popular Support

Political Economy

State Policy

Explaining Insurgent Cohesion Two key variables:

1. Group’s social base

2. Access to external state and diaspora support

Explaining Insurgent Cohesion Two key variables:

1. Group’s social base

2. Access to external state and diaspora support

Distinct types of insurgent organization emerge: Cohesive State-Reliant Consensus-Contingent Factionalized

Social Bases Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et

al. 2001) of pre-existing networks



These are insurgent social bases



These are insurgent social bases

Variation in social bases: Embeddedness of insurgent leaders within local

communities Pre-existing social links between different leaders

Types of Insurgent Social Base Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social

relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and among leaders Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local

social ties

Types of Insurgent Social Base Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social

relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and among leaders Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local

social ties

Coalition Network: weak pre-existing social relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and/or among leaders

Social Bases and Organizations Bonding Network Social Integration

Pre-existing structures of collective action hold together organization at the top and from below Elite Cooperation Local Incorporation

Social Bases and Organizations Bonding Network Social Integration

Pre-existing structures of collective action hold together organization at the top and from below Elite Cooperation Local Incorporation

Coalition Network Social Division “Median voter” or mass appeal insufficient if lacking

embedded links to community and between leaders Elite Distrust Weak Local Incorporation

Effects of External Support In capable-state context, external aid crucial

Effects of External Support

Aid leads to military strength High organizational

capacity Resource

centralization Fighters and factions

join and remain

In capable-state context, external aid crucial

Effects of External Support

Aid leads to military strength High organizational

capacity Resource

centralization Fighters and factions

join and remain

Lack of aid leads to military weakness Low organizational

capacity Resource diffusion

Fighters and factions defect and dissent

In capable-state context, external aid crucial

Bonding Network

Coalition Network

High External Aid Cohesive (Durable)

Bonding Network

Coalition Network

Low External Aid

High External Aid Cohesive (Durable)

Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)

Bonding Network

Coalition Network

Low External Aid

High External Aid

High External Aid

Cohesive (Durable)

State-Reliant (Intermediate)


Bonding Network

Coalition Network

Low External Aid

High External Aid

Low External Aid

High External Aid

Cohesive (Durable)

State-Reliant (Intermediate)


Factionalized (Fragile)

Insurgency in Kashmir Territory divided between India

and Pakistan Central to India-Pakistan wars and

confrontations

Insurgency, 1988-Present ~70,000 dead

Militancy has spilled out into broader subcontinent

Major Areas of Insurgency

Insurgents Fighting India in Kashmir Comparative Cases:

6 indigenous Kashmiri organizations

3 Pakistani organizations

Research 2 trips to Kashmir Valley (May

‘08 and July ‘09) Multiple trips to New Delhi Interviews with all sides of

conflict Primary and secondary written

sources in English and Urdu

Two Empirical Puzzles

Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented, while far less politically popular Hizb the most cohesive Not a popularity contest

Two Empirical Puzzles

Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented, while far less politically popular Hizb the most cohesive Not a popularity contest

Pro-Pakistan groups varied in cohesion despite common sponsorship Not driven solely by Pakistani machinations

My Argument: Varying Social Bases Groups structurally able to mobilize different types

of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91



Groups built around coalition networks were unable to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different

popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation



Groups built around coalition networks were unable to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different

popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation

Groups built around bonding networks channeled command and material through robust, pre-existing social relationships Hizbul Mujahideen [Lashkar]

Cohesive

Hizbul Mujahideen (90-)*

Lashkar-e-Taiba (1987-)

State-reliant

JKLF (‘88-91)*

Ikhwan (‘91-’95)

MJF (‘89-’96)

Al-Umar (‘89-’94)

Harkat (‘80-’99)

Jaish (‘99-’01)

Consensus-Contingent

Hizbul Mujahideen (‘89)*

Factionalized

JKLF (‘91-’96)*

Ikhwan (‘95-98)

Jaish (‘02-)

Harkat (‘99-)

JKLF: Social Base Structure: no routinized access to sources of

collective action in Kashmir Valley Not linked to parties or religious authorities

Result: rapid, heterogeneous expansion Individuals and factions merge in and out of the

JKLF at will No pre-existing social control mechanisms

JKLF Fragmentation Pakistani support: 1988-1990

State-reliant group that attracts recruits and (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid

JKLF Fragmentation Pakistani support: 1988-1990

State-reliant group that attracts recruits and (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid

Loss of external support: 1991-1996 JKLF factionalized and internally-divided over

numerous issues Splits (up to 20), feuds, fratricide

High popular support insufficient to hold group together

“The JKLF had an idea, but not a base”Interview, Srinagar, July 2009

Hizbul Mujahideen: Social Base Non-violent Jamaat-e-Islami cadre party

Overlap (since 1940s) of: Traditional JI families Local party branches and schools Ijtimas, annual congregations, intermarriage across

villages and over time

Limited popular support “incapable of reaching out to vast numbers of

ordinary Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)

Forging Hizb Cohesion Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989


High command and Shura Council dominated by Jamaatis Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991


High command and Shura Council dominated by Jamaatis Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991

Local Jamaatis spread throughout Kashmir as fighters, recruiters, talent spotters Expands without fracturing

Implications and Extensions Insurgency not about the median voter: focus

instead on social networks and institutions



No simple relationship between material variables and organizational outcomes Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)



No simple relationship between material variables and organizational outcomes Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)

Next Steps: Expanding empirics Studying change/evolution

The State: Strategic Manipulator? Reasons for skepticism:

1. Bad intelligence 2. Disconnect between military and political aims 3. State internally disorganized

State more reactive than proactive

The State: Examples State does not drive fragmentation:

Tamil Jaffna 1980s Kashmir rural areas, early/mid-1990s PIRA and INLA splits from OIRA, late 60s/early

70s

State fails to fragment groups despite efforts: PIRA in mid-1970s Hizb until 2000 LTTE, 1972-2009 (Karuna split not exception)

External Support: Logics

Exogenous: external actors support groups for reasons largely unrelated to their prior cohesion

Endogenous: external actors support groups for reasons closely related to their prior cohesion

Find empirical support for exogenous logic: sponsors support groups with same war aims - even if fragmented or internally divided Early years marked by massive uncertainty - sponsors

hedge by supporting groups with similar goals

External Support: Examples “the role the Provisionals saw for themselves, defending

nationalists in the North and defending the British Army, was far more in keeping with what people, especially Irish America, understood.” Swan 2008, p. 223.

“like the Pakistan government, organizations such as the Jamaat [of Pakistan] are highly selective in which militants they support: basically those that share their Islamic ideology and have the same aspirations for Kashmir.” Malik 2002, p. 298.

Fine-Grained Measurement and PredictionsFrequency Intensity Autonomy Issues

Cohesive [I] Rare Low Low Political-Military

State-Reliant [II]

Intermediate Low Low Distribution

Consensus-Contingent [III]

Intermediate High High Political-Military

Factionalized [IV]

Common High High Many

Extending the Empirics: Capable state & ethnic minority rebellion Turkey (Kurdish areas) Iraq

(Kurdish/Shiite/Sunni) Russia (Chechnya) China (Tibet) Pakistan (NWFP/Sindh) India (Northeast/

Punjab)

Indonesia (Aceh/Dar-ul Islam/East Timor)

Anti-Soviet/German partisans

Algeria (1992-) Thailand Palestinian territories Burma

Other Resources? Do drugs, minerals, and other illicit flows have a

similar effect as state/diaspora aid? Research agenda:

In India, Pakistan, and SE Asia, will examine groups with access to mineral and drug resources

Two possibilities: Different nature of resource flows (not top-down) may

diffuse power and authority and lead to fragmentation, or Some groups may be able to harness these resources in a

similar manner to external aid Initial sense: heavily dependent on state power -

when strong, constrains group behavior

Types of Social BaseStrong Local Embeddedness

Weak Local Embeddedness

Strong Leadership

Ties

Bonding Network Foco-ist Network

(Coalition)

Weak Leadership

Ties

Parochial Network

(Coalition)

Anomic Network

(Coalition)

Where Do Social Bases Come From? Deeply historically-rooted

Products of complex, contingent processes of social mobilization and state response in previous decades or centuries

“Sticky” over time - facts on the ground by the time of a conflict, reproduced by family and social relationships and identities

Not endogenous to onset of conflict in question Can be traced back decades or more prior to war Often originally non-militant or even apolitical

Why These Scope Conditions? Civil wars vary dramatically

Insurgent vs. Conventional Secessionist vs. Center-seeking Ethnic vs. Ideological Strong state vs. Weak state Democracy vs. Authoritarian

I focus on one common context that poses a shared set of challenges to cohesion

Tight scope, but lays basis for cumulative research within and across types of wars

What is Cohesion? In this conceptualization, looks at both the

structural integrity of the group and the commitment of individual members

Not the same as success - can contribute, but is not a sufficient condition for victory

Focused on insurgent organizations - not the same as “ethnic group” or “opposition movement” cohesion

Overall Distribution of CasesCohesivePIRA (72-05)

LTTE (83-09)

Hizb (90-)

LeT (87-)

State-reliantIkhwan JKLF (‘88-90)

MJF Al Jehad

Al-Umar

EPRLF (87-90)

TELO

Jaish (99-01)

Harkat (80-99)

Consensus-ContingentEPRLF (81-87)

PIRA (1969-72)

Official IRA (1962-76)

LTTE (1972-83)

Hizb (‘89)

FactionalizedINLA JKLF (‘91-96)

PLOT Jaish (01-)

EROS

Ikhwan (95-)

IPLO

RIRA

Harkat (99-)

Social Ties Over Ideology “we couldn’t disagree with a word the man [an OIRA

representative] said, all his arguments were totally right, totally justified. The Provisionals leadership was reactionary and Catholic, they went against what we believed in. But we just said: ‘Yeah, but what’s my da and ma going to say if I go home and tell them I’m going with the Reds?’ There was a real thing about the communist threat about that time. And family tradition counted for a lot.” Devenport and Sharrock 1997, p. 69.

“the success of the Officials in hanging on to the Lower Falls is more a tribute to his [Sullivan’s] personality than to the popularity of his political message.” Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 146.

Guns and Money Over Ideology Northern Ireland

Joe Cahill: “they wanted to know if we had guns for them. That was their main concern. . . they would not give up their allegiance to the Official IRA until they were certain they would get weapons.” Anderson 2002, p. 188.

PIRA recruit: “I never thought of joining the Stickies [the Official IRA]. I felt that Provies wanted to get the gear and that was good enough for me.” Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 153.

Kashmir “I agreed to send some of our boys to Pakistan for training [in

JKLF camps] in handling sophisticated weapons as it would have helped us in our plans.” Noorani in Thomas 1992, p. 263.

Ghulam Rasool Shah:”We took training from them [JKLF], but made it clear that we stand for merging Kashmir with Pakistan.” “Profile in Passion,” Newsline, Feb 2001, p. 34.

The Importance of External Aid “state support has had a profound impact on the

effectiveness of many rebel movements. . . . out of the 74 post-Cold War insurgencies surveyed, state support, we believe, played a major in initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or otherwise assisting 44 of them.” Byman et al 2001, p. xiv.

“Without the constant supply of weapons, the IRA would be lost and the whole republican structure would quickly break down.” Holland, p. 62.

“no militant group can operate for long [in Kashmir] without outside funding, training and arms.” Malik 2002, p. 298.

Lyall and Wilson III 2009, Johnston 2009, Salehyan 2009

Does External Aid Lead to Thuggery? “the IRA’s resources, however dubiously or criminally

attained, are overwhelmingly channeled back into mission-related activities. . . . group-oriented, nonpecuniary, and nonegoistic motivations have been key to both recruitment and retention.” O’Leary 2007, p. 207

“Our evidence of the rank-and-file terrorists does not support the view that they are mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable.” Moloney 2002, p. 174 quoting British Army in 1978

Hizb “became a sophisticated political movement, not just a bunch of gun-toting thugs” Joshi 1999, p. 86

Sri Lanka 5 major Tamil militant groups, 1972-2009:

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS)

Extreme variation on DV Argument:

LTTE: Cohesive (caste/regional networks + Indian, then diaspora support)

TELO: State-reliant on India EPRLF: intermediate case (elements of both consensus-

contingent and state-reliant at different points) PLOT and EROS: Factionalized

Jamaat-e-Islami

“the JI shows a uniform pattern: a committed, hard core following that amounts to only a small fraction of the population. Thus, as a political party the JI has consistently fared poorly in electoral contests in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kashmir, incapable of mustering more than a few percentage points of the popular vote. Nonetheless, all these JI branches have a long-standing reputation for committed cadres and organizational acumen”

- Bose 2007

Trajectories of MilitancyBonding Network Coalition Network

Significant External Support

Cohesive [I]Disciplined and controlled in both war and peace - “organizational weapon”

(Provisional IRA, LTTE, Lashkar-e-Taiba)

State-reliant [II]Insurgent proxy armies propped up from afar; rely on sponsor materiel for internal control

(TELO, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Ikhwan)

Minimal External Support

Consensus-contingent [III]Rely on norms and trust, but weak internal coercion and fighting power

(Official IRA, EPRLF)

Factionalized [IV]Deeply divided and fractious - split over numerous issues

(INLA, PLOTE, IPLO)

Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan...

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