expectations and belonging in dire dawa drivers, dynamics and … · 2019. 11. 28. · tive...

february 2018submitted to the research and evidence facility

expectations and belonging in dire dawa drivers, dynamics and challenges of rural to urban mobility

Contents

Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases 3

Map of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda 4

Summary 5

1. Introduction 7

Project contexts and aims of research 7

Significance of the site of investigation 7

Methodology 8

Constraints and limitations 9

2. Research setting and context 10

Socio-cultural context 10

Political context 11

Economic context 12

Rural to urban migration in historical perspective 15

Impact on urban development 17

3. Migrant experiences 23

Drivers of migration 23

Role of social networks 35

Opportunities and challenges 37

Financial practices 40

Impact on site of origin 41

Onward migration 43

4. Conclusion 47

Bibliography 49

This report was written by Dereje Feyissa with contributions from Milkessa Midega and Ketema Wakjira. This report was edited by Kate McGuinness.

Cover image: Saido labour market in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia © Dereje Feyissa.

This report was produced with the financial support of the European Union and commissioned by the Research and Evidence Facility (REF), a research consortium led by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. The views expressed in this report are those of the researchers and do not indicate a position or opinion on the part of the Research and Evidence Facility, the Rift Valley Institute, the European Union or the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

The Rift Valley Institute works in eastern and central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.

Copyright © Rift Valley Institute 2018. This work is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

ExpEctations and bElonging in dirE dawa 3

glossary of acronyms, words and phrases

ANDM AmharaNationalDemocraticMovement

CSA CentralStatisticsAgency

DDIP DireDawaIndustrialPark

EPRDF EthiopianPeople’sRevolutionaryDemocraticFront

ESPDP EthiopianSomaliPeople’sDemocraticParty

FGD focusgroupdiscussion

IGLF Issa–GurguraLiberationFront

kebele (Amharic)thesmallestadministrativeunitofEthiopia; similartoaward

khat amildlynarcoticplant(catha edulis)nativetotheHorn ofAfrica

KII keyinformantinterview

OLF OromoLiberationFront

ONLF OgadenNationalLiberationFront

OPDO OromoPeople’sDemocraticOrganization

SEPDP SouthEthiopianPeople’sDemocraticMovement

sidet (Amharic)internationalmigration

TPLF TigrayanPeople’sLiberationFront

ye Dire lij (Amharic) sonsanddaughtersofDireDawa

rift vallEy institutE rEport 4

Map of Ethiopia, Kenya and uganda


summary

Asa secondary city, the competitiveadvantageofDireDawa, Ethiopia is location. ItistheclosestlargecitytotheportofDjibouti,makingitanimportanttransithubforinternationalmigrationviaDjiboutiandSomaliatotheGulfStatesandEurope.WhethermigrantsendupstayinginDireDawaormigratingonwarddependsontheirexperiencesinthecity’slabourmarketandtheirinitialexpectations.

Accordingtothe2007census,DireDawaisthesecondlargestcityinEthiopia.Withanurbanpopulationoflessthan20percent,Ethiopiasignificantlylagsbehindthesub-Sa-haranaverageof37percent.Urbanizationis,however,rapidlyincreasinginthecountry.Theurbanpopulationisprojectedtotriplefrom15.2millionin2012to42.3millionin2037,growingatarateof3.8percentayear.OneofthefactorsforthegrowthoftheurbanpopulationinDireDawaisruraltourbanmigration.Migrantsconstitutecloseto30percentofthecity’spopulation.Ofthesemigrants,45percentcometothecityfromruralareasand55percentmigratetothecityfromotherurbanareas.

Migrants come toDireDawa for various reasons. Formany, the city’s cosmopolitanimage and its reputation for socio-cultural integration across religious and ethnicboundariesisanattraction.Affectionatelycalledye dire lij(sons[anddaughters]ofDireDawa),residentsofthecityareconsideredtobewelcoming,progressive,laidbackandsociable.ThesequalitiescontrastwiththeperceptionofthosefromAddisAbaba,whoareregardedasmoreindividualisticandlesssociable.

Previouslyknownasarailwaytown,andfortheassociatedcontrabandtrade,DireDawais struggling to develop a post-contraband economydefined as a service and indus-trialhubforeasternEthiopia.MigrantscometoDireDawabecauseofeconomicpushfactors,includinglandshortagesanddegradationinruralareas,whichisparticularlythecaseformigrantsfromruralDireDawa,easternOromiaRegionalStateandSouthernNations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State. This is compounded by environ-mentaldrivers,especially the recurrentdrought in ruralDireDawaand theEastandWestHarargeZonesofOromiaRegional State,where the rain-fed farming system isstressedandcannolongerprovidesubsistencetothefarmingcommunity.

AsignificantdynamicimpactingmigrationinDireDawaisthecontestednatureofpolit-icalentitlementsinthecitybetweenitstwolargestethnicgroups,theOromoandtheSomali.Accordingtoapowersharingformulaworkedouttomaintainstabilityinthecityin2006,theOromoandtheSomalihave40percenteachofthepoliticalandadministra-tiveoffices.Theremaining20percentisgiventoothermembersoftherulingparty,theEthiopianPeople’sRevolutionaryDemocraticFront(EPRDF).BothOromosandSomalisdeeplyresentthispowersharingformulaandconsequentlyencouragemigrationfromtheir respectiveregions inordertochangethedemographiccompositionof thecity.Assuch,somemigrationtoDireDawa isperceived tobepoliticallydriven.Thethird


national census (2017–2018) is likely to fuel this politics of numbers, as it is directlyrelatedtopoliticalentitlementoverthecity.

Thisstudyfindsthataccesstobasicsocialservices,suchashealthandeducation,areanimportantpullfactor.ThereisnohighschoolinruralDireDawaandstudentswhocompletegradeeightandwishtocontinuetheireducationmustgotoDireDawatodoso,resultinginalargestudentmigrantpopulation.Accesstoeducationisalsoconstrainedbyculturalpractices,particularlyforgirls.Traditionalpractices,suchasearlyandforcedmarriage,arewidespreadinruralDireDawaandintheneighbouringOromiaandSomaliregions.DireDawaisconsideredtobeasafehavenforwomensubjectedtodomesticviolenceandgenderdiscrimination.

Friendship networks and peer pressure are strongly linked tomigration patterns tothecity,withmigrationoftenoccurringinachain.Inencouragingtheirfriendsorrela-tivesto jointhem,migrantstourbanDireDawatendtominimizethedifficultiesandhardships they faceand insteadexaggerate their accomplishments. TheproximityofurbanDireDawatoruralareasisenabledbyimprovedinfrastructure(roads)andtech-nology(mobilephones),whichhavemadetravelandinformationexchangemucheasier,therebyencouragingmigration.Theemergenceofethnic-basedneighbourhoods,whichprovidemigrantsaccesstoethnic-basedsocialnetworks,hasputastrainonthecity’scosmopolitanlegacy.

Despitehavinghigherexpectations,mostmigrantsendupworkingasday labourers,streetvendors,domesticworkers,commercialsexworkersandbeggars.Theyallstrugglewitheitherjoblessnessorexploitationinthelabourmarketplace.Therealsoappearstobeanethnicstratificationofmigrantlabour.MostofthedomesticandcommercialsexworkersaremigrantsfromruralDireDawaandeasternOromiaRegionalState,whereasmost day labourers in the construction sector aremigrants from the south. Somalisdonottendtoworkasdomesticworkersordaylabourersforculturalreasons.Thesetypesofjobsareviewednegatively,notleastbecausewagesarelow.Migrants,partic-ularlyfromthesouth,havedepressedwagesbecausetheyarewillingtobepaidlowerrates.Theyarealsopreferredforthequalityoftheirlabour.Thisethnicstratificationofmigrantlabourhasbroughtabouttensionsamongmigrants,andbetweenmigrantsandnativesofDireDawa.

Theimpactofrural–urbanmigrationonsitesoforiginispredominantlypositive,withmigrantsprovidingremittancestosupportfamily,particularlyforhealthandeducationcosts,andmoneytoinvestinlandandhousing.Apositiveimpactisalsoseeninshiftinggenderrelations,especiallyimprovedattitudestowardgirls’education.


1. Introduction

project context and aims of research

Thisprojectaimstobetterunderstandthedynamicsofruraltourbanmigrationandthewaysinwhichthisphenomenonimpactsthesocialandinfrastructuralfabricofthesecities. It isconductedwithintheframeworkof theResearchandEvidenceFacilityonMigrationintheHornofAfrica,supportedbytheEUTrustFund.ItiscarriedoutinthreesecondarycitiesinEastAfrica:DireDawa,Ethiopia;Gulu,Uganda;andEldoret,Kenya.Althoughsecondarycitieshavewitnessedtremendousgrowthinthepastfewdecades,playinganimportantrolebetweenruralandurbanareas,mostresearchonrural–urbanmigrationisconductedincapitalcities.Hence,astudyofmigrationtosecondarycitiesisparticularlyrelevantandtimely.Theresearchisorganizedaroundthreesetsofques-tions:

i. Towhatextentandhowdoesrural–urbanmigrationenhancepeople’slivelihoodsand resilience? Towhat extent do suchmovements lead to improved access toservices,higherincomes,betteremploymentandimprovedsecurity?Howeffectiveareurbanlinkagesinintroducingasafetynetforthosewholiveinruralareas?

ii. Whatistheimpactofpeople’smovementintosecondarycitiesoninfrastructureandservices,socialcohesion,andsecurity?Whatimpactdoesagrowingpopula-tionhaveonstrengtheningtheurbaneconomy,oronputtingpressureonservices,exacerbatingtensions,andcontributingtoinsecurity?

iii.Howdoesmigrationtosecondarycitiesaffectsubsequentmigration?Doesthefirstexperience ofmigration prepare people for furthermigration? Does populationpressurefromnewarrivalsencourageotherstoleaveorhelpestablishamarketforsmuggling?

Significance of the site of investigation

Withapopulationof233,224,DireDawacity isthesecond largestcity inEthiopia. Ithashugepotentialforgrowth.StrategicallylocatedbetweenEthiopiaandDjibouti,DireDawaisthecountry’seconomicarteryandoutlettothesea.Alargeruralareawithapopulationof108,610isalsoattachedtothecity.BoththeseurbanandruralareasareunderthejurisdictionoftheDireDawaAdministration.Accordingtothelatestcensus,in2007,thecombinedurbanandruralpopulationofDireDawais341,834,markingasignificantincreaseoverthelastseveraldecades: in1967,thepopulationofthisareawasonly50,733.

Withaviewtofosteringurbandevelopmentandindustrializationacrossthecountry,in2015theEthiopiangovernmentannouncedaplantoestablishten industrialparks


withinfiveyears (2015–2020), includingone inDireDawa.These industrialparksareintendedtoprovidethenecessaryservicesandfacilities for industriesasameanstoencouragemore foreign direct investment and domestic investment. Believed to bea gateway to achieving sustainable economic development through industrialization,these industrialparkswill facilitate thegrowthof secondarycitiesacross thenation,includingDireDawa.

Through successive five-year transformationplans, Ethiopia aspires to transform thestructuralbaseoftheeconomyfromagriculturetoserviceandindustry.Thisprocessinvolvesa shiftof labour fromrural areas tourbancentres,as is seen inDireDawa.Estimated to be only 17.3 per cent in 2012, Ethiopia’s urban to rural ratio is one ofthesmallest in theworld,wellbelowthesub-SaharanAfricaaverageof37percent.

According to projections made by the Central Statistics Agency (CSA),the urban population is projected to nearly triple from 15.2 millionin 2012 to 42.3 million in 2037, growing at 3.8 per cent per year.

Even if the levelofurbanization inEthiopia is lowbyAfricanstandards, theratesofurbanizationinEthiopiaareexceptional.DireDawacityhasoneofthefastestratesofurbanization,witha50percentgrowthratefrom1985to2015.

Dire Dawa is significant for better understanding howmigration to secondary citiesaffectssubsequentmigration;thatis,whetherthefirstexperienceofmigrationpreparesorinfluencespeopleforfurthermigration.ThisissueplaysoutindifferentwaysinDireDawa.Aboveall, itrelatestothegeographyofDireDawa,whichissituatedbetweenAddisAbabaandDjibouti,thecountry’scapitalandmajoraccesstothesea.Itisonlyabout300kmfromDjibouti,which isamajor transit route formigrationto theGulfStatesandEurope.Assuch,somemigrantscometoDireDawawith the intentionofonwardmigration.SomeofthesemigrantsthenrevisetheirplanandstayinDireDawapermanently,whileothers revise theirplanswhen thecity fails tomeet theirexpec-tations,withtheaimofmigratingontotheGulfStatesorEuropethroughDjiboutiorSomalia.Forothermigrants,particularlyfromsouthernEthiopia,DireDawaisameanstogenerateincometofundtheirpreferredonwardmigrationdestination,suchasSouthAfrica.

Methodology

ThefieldresearchtookplaceinAugustandSeptember2017.Theresearchteamconsistedofthreecoremembers:DrDerejeFeyissa(leadresearcher,staffofAddisAbabaUniver-sity); DrMilkessaMidega (research associate, staff of Dire DawaUniversity), andDrKetemaWaqjira(researchassociate,staffofAddisAbabaUniversity).Inaddition,fieldfacilitatorsassistedinidentifyingmigrantsandprovidingasecurityalertthroughoutthecourseofthefieldwork.

Theresearchusedavarietyofqualitativeresearchmethods, includingkey informantinterviews(KII); focusgroupdiscussions (FGDs), in-depth interviewsandanumberofparticipatorymappingexerciseswitheldersandexpertsingovernmentinstitutions.In


total,13KIIs,12FGDsand5in-depthinterviewswereconducted.TheFGDsconsistedof5to7participantseach,includingdaylabourers,migrants,residentsininformalsettle-ments, rural villagersand traditionalelders.KIIswereheldwithgovernmentofficialsinvariousdepartmentsandindividualsfromthebusiness,housing,developmentandbanking sectors. In-depth interviewswere conductedwithmigrants, rural residents,streetvendors,students, teachers,andhospitalityandserviceproviders. Inaddition,numerous informal conversationswere held to generate insight on issues related toruraltourbanmigrationandthecontestedstatusofDireDawacity.

Constraints and limitations

Thefieldworkwasconstrainedbythreefactors,includingtwospecificconflictsandtheemergenceofachallengingsituationwiththeprosecutor’soffice inDireDawa.First,on1September2017,thefederalpoliceinDireDawaattemptedtostopacarcarryingcontraband goods. They killed seven individuals andwounded several others in thelargelySomali-inhabitedareaontheroadtoDjibouti.Thedeadincludedwomen,whichincreasedtensioninthecityandresultedinclashesbetweenthepublicandpolice.Twopoliceofficerswerewoundedduringthisriotandseveralyouthsweredetained.Thesehighlevelsoftensiongreatlyconstrainedthesmoothoperationofthefieldwork.

Second, the continued territorial dispute between Oromia Regional State andSomali Regional State also had a direct impact on the security situation in DireDawa during fieldwork. The ruling political parties in Oromia Regional State, theOromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), and in Somali Regional State,the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), rotate leadership in theadministrationof thecity. InSeptember2017,at theheightof the territorial conflictbetween these twoparties, hundreds of peoplewere killed fromboth sides, partic-ularly in the East Hararge Zone bordering Dire Dawa, including the major khat

producingareaofAweday.Morethan50,000peoplewereinitiallydisplacedbecauseof this conflict.Among these, approximately 1,200Oromosweredisplaced from theAfdem,Sitti(formerlyShinile),AyshaandHursoareasofSomaliRegionalStateandarepresentlycampedinDireDawacity.Thisconflictcreatedanatmosphereofinsecurity,especiallyduringthelastweekoffieldwork. Inparticular,thesesecurity-relatedchal-lenges restricted the research team’smobility to only two rural areas of Dire Dawa(HarlaandMudiAnenovillages),selectedbecauseoftheirproximitytoDireDawa.

Third, attempts to probe the perception among some study respondents (includinggovernmentofficials)thatthereisalinkbetweenmigrantsandcrimewaspoliticized,inparticularbytheprosecutor’soffice.Theprosecutor’sofficeinitiallymisunderstoodtheintentiontolearnmoreaboutthisperception,especiallyasitappliestomigrantsfromsouthernEthiopia.Atissuewasaconcernthatsouthernmigrantsde factowerebeinglabelledascriminals.Allnecessaryeffortsweremadetoexplaintheobjectivesoftheresearch,whichtheprosecutoreventuallyaccepted,thusresolvingthisissue.


2. Research setting and context

socio-cultural context

Dire Dawa is known for its cosmopolitan character due to its high levelof cultural diversity. Unlike Addis Ababa and other major Ethiopian cities,bilingualism—and for some multilingualism—is part of everyday life.

TheAmharic,Oromiffa and Somali languages are spokenbymany residentsofDireDawa,allowingagreaterdegreeofsocialblendingthattypifiesDireDawaasameltingpot.Untilthe1974revolution,DireDawahadawell-establishedexpatriatecommunityof largely Italian,French, Indian,ArabandSudaneseorigin.Thiscosmopolitan legacyprovestoberesilient,eveninthecontextoftherisingethnicandreligiouscleavagesthathavebeenreinforcedbyEthiopia’spost-1991ethno-federalpoliticalorder.

Perhaps themostnotable change in the social landscapeofDireDawa is theethnicre-affiliationoftheGurgurafromOromotoSomaliethnicidentity.TheGurgurasharebothSomaliandOromoidentities,speakingtheOromolanguageandtracingtheirgene-alogytotheDir,aSomaliclanfamily.Thus,byorigintheGurguraareSomali,similartotheirneighbours, the Issa.Historically, however, theyhavebeenassimilated into theOromo,specificallytheNolleclanthatliveinareassurroundingDireDawa.Thisethnicshift,inducedbytheethno-politicsoffederalEthiopia,isdeeplyresentedbytheOromowhofeelbetrayed,whereastheSomalis,whopredominantlybelongtothe Issaclan,haveencouragedandwelcomedthisasawaytoaugmenttheirdemographicsizeandthusenhancetheirpoliticalownershipofDireDawa.ThecontestedethnicidentityoftheGurguraconstitutesoneofthemajorsocialfaultlinesincontemporaryDireDawa.

ThetotalpopulationoftheDireDawaAdministrationis341,834.RuralDireDawahasapopulationof108,610spreadover38ruralkebeles(smallestadministrativeunit)andismainlyinhabitedbyOromo(73.5percent)andSomali(26percent).ThepopulationofDireDawacity is233,224,which issubdivided intonineurbankebeles.Thecity iscomposedofmembersof the followingethnicgroups:Oromo(33percent),Amhara(29.5percent),Somali (23.5percent),Gurage(6.7percent),Tigrayan(1.8percent),Harari(1.6percent)andpeoplefromsouthernEthiopia,whohaveahistoryandcultureofmigration.

In termsof religion,DireDawa isaMuslimmajoritycity (70.9percent), followedbyOrthodoxChristians(25.6percent),Protestants(2.8percent),Catholics(0.4percent)andothers(0.3percent).InurbanDireDawa,Muslimsconstitute57.4percentofthepopulationandOrthodoxChristiansconstitute37.4percent,whileinruralDireDawa,thepopulationisalmostentirelyMuslimat99.5percent.

A comparison of census data from 1994 and 2007 shows significant changes in thedemography of some ethnic groups in Dire Dawa. For instance, while the popula-


tionofOromoandAmharadeclinedby1.9and7.6percent,respectively,theSomalipopulationroseby10.3percent.The increase intheSomalipopulation isattributedbothtomigrationtothecityandtotheethnicre-affiliationoftheGurguraasSomali.

IncontrasttothegrowthintheSomalipopulation,thedeclineoftheAmharapopula-tionisattributedtotheconflictandsecurityrisksfollowingthedemiseoftheDerg.

Political context

One of the major challenges of Ethiopia’s ethno-federal political order is contestedidentities and territorial disputes between the new regional states, with Dire Dawaoneofthemostpoliticallycontestedareas inpost-1991Ethiopia.Thiscontestationisevident,aboveall, inthehighturnoverof itsadministrativestructureandchanges inpoliticalownershipofthecity.From1991to1993,DireDawawasadministeredbytheOPDO–EPRDFaspartofOromia.ThiswascontestedbySomalipoliticalorganizations,particularlytheIssa–GurguraLiberationFront(IGLF).Politicalcompetitionandtensionbecamemoreacuteafter theestablishmentof SomaliRegional State in1993,whichclaimedDireDawaasitscapital.Whileclaimingthecityitself,whichwasthenadminis-teredbytheOPDO,theIGLFannexedmostoftheIssa-inhabitedareasformerlyincludedwithin theDireDawaAdministration into thenewSomali Regional State. This is thegenesisofthelong-standingterritorialdisputebetweenDireDawaandSomaliRegionalState.

InresponsetothepoliticalinstabilitycausedbythecompetitionbetweenOromoandSomalipoliticalorganizationsovercontrolofDireDawa,apower-sharingformulawasagreedbetweentheOPDOandESPDPundertheauspicesofthefederalgovernmentin2006.Thispower-sharingformulaisknownas40:40:20,accordingtowhichregionalpoliticalleadershipisequallydividedbetweentheOPDOandESPDP(40percenteach).Theremaining20percentisreservedforallotherethnicitiesrepresentedbythetwoEPRDFmemberparties,ANDMandSEPDM,ofAmharaandsouthernorigin,respectively.TheofficeofthemayorrotateseveryfiveyearsbetweentheOPDOandtheESPDP,with

BOX 1: Political parties in Ethiopia

Claimingtoredresspastethnicinequalitiesandensurejustice,theEthiopianPeople’sRevolutionaryDemocraticFront(EPRDF)cametopowerin1991,oustingtheDergmilitarydictatorshipthathadruledthecountryfrom1974to1991.TheEPRDFisacoalitionoffourethno-regionalparties:TheTigrayanPeople’sLiberationFront(TPLF;Tigray);theAmharaNationalDemocraticMovement(ANDM;Amha-ra);theOromoPeople’sDemocraticOrganization(OPDO;Oromia);andtheSouthEthiopianPeople’sDemocraticMovement(SEPDP;South).RegionalpartiesalliedwithEPRDFhaveruledtheremainingfiveregions:Somali,Afar,Gambella,HarariandBenishangul–Gumuz.TheEthiopianSomaliPeople’sDemocraticParty(ESPDP)istherulingpartyinSomaliRegionalState.


a single term inoffice. Thefirstelectionwasheld in2008. In addition to thepowersharing agreement,DireDawa is a two-tier systemof administration,which aims tobetterdecentralizethepoliticalandeconomicpowerofcityadministration.

Whileformallycomplyingwiththispower-sharingformula,boththeOPDOandESPDPdeeplyresent it,makingDireDawa’sconsociationdemocracyvery fragile.TheOPDOclaimsa largershare, ifnotexclusivepoliticalownership,basedondemographicandhistoricalarguments.TheESPDPadvancessimilarclaimsbasedonadministrativehistory(Somalishaveadministeredthecitysincetheimperialperiod),aswellasinreferencetotheSomalioriginoftheGurgura,whocouldtipthedemographyofDireDawaintheirfavour.Marredbypoliticalcompetitionsandethnictensions,DireDawaiscurrentlyfarfromarticulatingasharedvisionthatdrawsonitscosmopolitanlegacy.

Economic context

TheeconomicmainstayinruralDireDawaisagro-pastoralism.Livestockincludescattle,sheep,goatsandcamels,amongothers.ThemaincropsgrowninruralDireDawaaresorghum,maize,fruitand,inafewplaces,coffeeandkhat.Poorsoilforcropproduction,thevagariesofclimatechangeandlackofpoliticalwillfromthecity’sleadershiphaveseriouslyunderminedtheagriculturalsectorinruralDireDawa,makingitparticularlyvulnerabletorecurrentdrought.

TheeconomicmainstayofurbanDireDawaistradeanditsfunctionasalogisticshub.LocatedontheeasternedgeoftheRiftValley,DireDawaliesattheintersectionofroadsfromAddisAbaba,HararandDjibouti.TheDireDawaairportoffersflightstoandfromAddisAbaba andDjibouti.Additionally, the SelamBus Line ShareCompanyprovidesinter-citybusservicesbetweenDireDawaandAddisAbaba.MinibusesconnectthecitytoruralDireDawa,theneighbouringHarargeZonesinOromiaRegionalState,andSomaliRegionalState.DireDawaisalsohometoseveralbusinesscentres;notablyTaiwan(thelargest)andQefira.

Inthe1960s,DireDawa’seconomywasboomingasaresultofthethenrailway line,andtheemergenceofsmallandmediumscaleindustries.Fromthe1970stotheearly1990s,DireDawa’seconomywashighlydependentoncontrabandgoodscomingfromDjiboutiandSomalia.Althoughillicitandinformal,tradeincontrabandwasthelifelineofthetownuntilitsdemiseinthe1990sduetothedeclineoftherailwayandgovern-ment crackdown. Tighter border control and stricter lawenforcement by the EPRDFgovernmentfurtherunderminedthisvibranttrade.Aftercontrabandtradeslowlydriedup,businessactivitydwindledinthecityandDireDawalostitsformervitality.

DireDawaalsothrivesonthekhateconomy.MuchofEthiopia’sprimekhatgrows inthehillsaroundthecitiesofDireDawaandHarar,about150kmfromtheborderwithSomaliland. At Dire Dawa’s khatmarket in Chattera, trading continues late into thenight.ThekhattradeisrelatedtoDireDawa’seconomyinanumberofways.First,DireDawahasbeena favoured investmentdestination for rich khat growersand traders

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dire_Dawa_Airport


BOX 2: The broader political economy of khat

BetweenDireDawaandHarar,liesthesmalltownofAweday,nicknamedKhatcity.LocatedinEastHarargeZoneofOromiaRegionalState, it isthehubofEthiopia’skhattrade.IntheHornofAfrica,khatisaninstitutionwieldingenormouseconomicpower. InEthiopia, it isamajorearner:Somaliland, forexample,spendsapproxi-matelyUSD524millionperyear(about30percentofitsgrossdomesticproduct)onEthiopiankhat,althoughmanysuspectthetruefiguretobemuchhigher.*DjiboutiisalsoalucrativeexternalmarketforEthiopiankhat.

AnOromoresidentofDireDawa,whoisalsoaformergovernmentofficial,explainsthecomplexpoliticsofthekhattrade:

TheAwedayfarmersusedtobetherichestinthecountrybecauseofboomingkhatexporttoneighbouringcountries.SomeofthewealthyAwedayfarmersinvestedinDireDawa,especiallybuildinghouses.ThisishowtheAwedaySefer[aDireDawaneighbourhood]cametoexist.ThekhattradersfromAwedayestablishedanassociationforkhatexport.TheyevenopenedabranchofficefortheItalianKachamalibuscompany.ThelocalKachamalitransportbusinessusedtooperateuptoTigray,Djibouti,Somaliland.Thatwas1994–1995.

ManyOromosbecamerichandsomeofthemfromAwedayboughtlandandbuilthousesinDireDawa…Eventually,theOromokhatexportassociationwasdisplacedbyGunaTrading[amemberoftheTigrayanPeople’sLibera-tionFront–EthiopianPeople’sRevolutionaryDemocraticFront(TPLF–EPRDF)endowmentcompaniesknownasEFFORT].**ThepretextwasthattheysupportedtheOLF[OromoLiberationFront]economically.TheIssaalsobecameactiveinthekhattrade,suchasSojik,aDjiboutiantradingcompany.ShuraCompany,establishedbyShuraAdnan,anIsaqSomaliwomanfromJijiga,alsobecameveryprominentinthekhattrade.

OromokhatfarmerswerereducedtobeingsupplierstotheSomalikhatexporters.ShuraCompanywasaffiliatedwiththeformerfirstlady[AzebMesfin,wifeofPrimeMinisterMelesZenawi]andthatiswhyshebecameverywealthyandrecognizedasoneofthemostsuccessfulwomenentrepre-neursinEthiopia.Sheevenownedtwoaeroplanesforkhatexporttrade.SheusedtoexportkhatfromDireDawaInternationalAirport.CurrentlyShuraisdisplacedbyanOgadenbusinesswomenwithcloselinkswithAbdile,presi-dentofSomaliRegionalState,andthemilitarystationedintheregion.

*Forexample,in2014,accordingtotheMinistryofFinanceinSomaliland,khatsalesgenerated20percentofthegovernment’sUSD152millionbudget.

**EndowmentFundfortheRehabilitationofTigray,anumbrellacompanyforagroupofbusinessinvolvedinlarge-scaleindustrialactivitiesinEthiopia;e.g.bankingandinsurance,importandexport,mediaandcommunications,construction,agribusiness,andmining,etc.


fromAweday,evidentintheemergenceofaneighbourhoodknownasGendaAweday.Second,DireDawaisoneofthehighestconsumersofkhatinEthiopia,providingincomegeneratingopportunitiesformanykhattraders,includingmigrantstreetvendors.Third,DireDawa is amajor transit area for the international khat trade.Manyof the khattraders inDireDawaaremigrants fromEastHarargeZone inOromiaRegionalState,includingAweday.

TheDireDawaAdministrationisstrugglingtobuildapost-contrabandeconomy.1Signif-icantreductionincontrabandtradehaspositivelyaffectedtaxcollection.In2015,forinstance, theadministrationcollected close toETB500million (USD22.5million)2 intaxes,abigstepforacityonceknownforitsminimaltaxcollection.3ShortlyafterthecompletionofthenewelectricrailwaybetweenDireDawaandDjiboutiin2013,DireDawa’s entire business sector experienced a boom in industry, including small-scalemanufacturing,hotels,cafesandotherbusinessesalongtherailwayroute.Itisexpectedthat inadecadeor so,more than20,000employmentopportunitieswillbecreatedforDireDawans through small andmediumenterprises. The city administrationhasprovidedmorethanETB70million(USD3.2million)forindividualandassociationappli-cants.Morethan167,000m2oflandhasbeensetasidebytheadministrationforsmallandmediumenterprises. Sixmarket centres,more than800 shops and1,335 kioskshavealsobecomeoperationalinrecentyears.

HugepublicandprivateinvestmentshavebeenmadeintheserviceandmanufacturingsectorsinDireDawa.FromanindustrialzonebuiltatMelka—previouslyacontrabandsitewestofthecity—toinvestmentsinthehealthandhospitalitysectors,theeconomyofDireDawaisimproving.Currently,DireDawaboastssixfour-starhotels,withmoreplanned. Investment in the health sector (Art General Hospital and its associatedmedicalcollege)isattractingmedicalservicecustomersfromMogadishu,DjiboutiandtheSomaliregionsoutsideEthiopia.

Boostingtheconfidenceofthisawakeningcity,themanufacturingsectorispickingup.Onceacityofnomorethanfourfactories,DireDawa’sindustrialzoneatMelkaisnowhometomorethan18large-scaleprivatesectormanufacturingplantsandotherbusi-nessesengagedinfood,detergent,textileandsteelproduction,aswellasthreecementfactories. The construction sector has also been revitalizedwith new opportunities,

1 Unlessotherwisespecified,thedataintherestofthissectionofthereportisbasedonsecondarydatacollectedfromtheDireDawamayor’sofficeon23August2017.2 CurrencyratesareapproximateandreflectoandaratesasofSeptember2017,whenthisstudywascompleted.Indirectquotesfromrespondents,referencetobirrisretainedtobetterreflectspeechpatterns.Otherwise,theinternationalcurrencycode,ETB,isused.See:https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.3 Morerecently,theDireDawaAdministrationRevenuesandCustomsAuthorityestimatesthatitexpectstocollectETB927million(USD29million)intaxes.‘DDRCACollectsover487mBr’[USD15.2million],DireDawaAdministration,http://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:ddrca-collects-over-487m-br&catid=141&Itemid=435&lang=en.

http://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:ddrca-collects-over-487m-br&catid=141:general-news&lang=en&Itemid=603http://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:ddrca-collects-over-487m-br&catid=141:general-news&lang=en&Itemid=603http://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:ddrca-collects-over-487m-br&catid=141&Itemid=435&lang=enhttp://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:ddrca-collects-over-487m-br&catid=141&Itemid=435&lang=enhttp://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:ddrca-collects-over-487m-br&catid=141&Itemid=435&lang=en


includingaroughlyETB700million(USD32million)waterproject,theconstructionofDireDawaUniversityandtheDireDawadryport.

The expected economic game changer for the city is the Dire Dawa Industrial Park(DDIP).Locatedinthewestofthecity,DDIPisbeingdevelopedasanintegratedzonemodelledasaninternationalSpecialEconomicZone.Thefirstphaseofconstructionwascompletedattheendof2017.Enterprisesoperating inDDIPareexpectedtoemploy68,000people.TheplannedindustrialparkhasinitiatedanambitiousnewmasterplanforthefutureofDireDawa,informedbymodernisturbandevelopmentthinkingthathasneatlylaidoutresidential,serviceandindustrialareas.

Rural to urban mobility in historical perspective

MigrationtoDireDawacityhasoccurredatvarioustimesandinvariousphases.4Thefirstperiodislinkedtotherailwayduringtheearlytwentiethcentury,whennotonlyEthiopians fromother regions but also expatriates from various countries came andsettled inDireDawa toavail themselvesofneweconomicopportunities. Ethiopians,particularlyethnicSomalis,cametoDireDawaasrailwayconstructionworkers.Later,inthe1960s,DireDawaexperiencedaninitialphaseofindustrializationthatattractedlabourersfromvariouspartsofthecountry,inparticulartoworkinthecementandfoodprocessingfactories.Theriseofthecontrabandtradefromthe1970sthroughtothe1990salsoattractedanumberofmigrantstothecity,ashasthekhattrade.

Withthedeclineofthecontrabandtradeinthe1990s,DireDawalostsomeofitsappealformigrants.Someof its long-timeresidents,particularly theAmharas,also leftDireDawaatthistimebecauseofthenewethnicdispensationthatovernightdefinedthemasoutsiders:DireDawahascometoberegardedasacityofOromosandSomalis.Tobeexpected,thenumberofOromosandSomalisinthecityhasgrowninresponsetotheautochthonousclaimsadvancedbybothethnicgroupsoverDireDawa.TheeconomicrevivalofDireDawasincethemid-2000shasattractedmanymigrants,withthosefromsouthernEthiopiathemostvisibleadditiontothecity,manyofwhomaredaylabourersormobilestreetvendors.

Accordingtothe2007census,thenumberofmigrantsinDireDawaisashighas29.6percent(101,316)ofthetotalpopulationofDireDawa,with52.3percentofthistotalmigrantpopulationfemaleand47.8percentmale.Amongthesemigrants,45,842people

4 2007censusdataonplacesofbirthanddurationofresidenceshowsthatrural–urbanmigrationisthedrivingforceofurbanizationinEthiopia.Migrantshaveconstitutedalmosthalfoftheurbanpopulationforthepast20years,withthemajorityofthesemigrantscomingdirectlyfromruralareas.Urban–urbanmigrationhasalsoincreased.DireDawafollowsthispattern.


(45.2per cent) came to the city from rural areas5 and55,474people (54.7per cent)migratedtothecityfromotherurbanareas.AlthoughthereisnocleardocumentationonwheremigrantstoDireDawacomefrom,studyfindingssuggestthatthemajorityofrecentmigrantstoDireDawacomefromOromiaRegionalState,particularlyfromEastandWestHarargeZones.Basedonevidencefromthekeyinformantinterviews,focusgroupdiscussionsandin-depthinterviews,theoriginofmigrantsandthemainactivitiesinwhichtheyareengagedinDireDawaarecategorizedinTable1.

table 1: category of migrants in contemporary dire dawa city

category of migrants origin

Daylabourers SouthernNations,NationalitiesandPeoples’RegionalState(SNNPR);EastandWestHarargeZone;OromiaRegionalState

Domesticworkers EastandWestHarargeZones;AmharaRegionalState

Sexworkers EastandWestHarargeZones;AmharaRegionalState

Beggars EastandWestHarargeZones;AmharaRegionalStateandTigrayRegionalState

Civilservants OromiaRegionalState;SomaliRegionalState;AmharaRegionalStateandSNNPR

Investorsfromtheruralareas EastHarargeZone(Aweday)

Culturalandeducationalmigrants EastandWestHarargeZones

TransitmigrantstoDjibouti Alloverthecountry,particularlyOromiaRegionalStateandAmharaRegionalState

Seasonalmigrants RuralDireDawa;Djibouti

Traders Alloverthecountry,particularlyGurage

Environmentalrefugees(droughtaffected)

EastandWestHarargeZones;SomaliRegionalState

Source:Keyinformantinterviews,focusgroupdiscussionsandin-depthinterviews

5 Itisnotclear,however,whethermigrantsfromruralDireDawawereconsideredasmigrantsfromruralareasorifthecensusonlyrecognizedmigrantsfromruralareasoutsidetheDireDawaAdministration.AsthelastcensuswasconductedafterthestatusofDireDawahadbeendefinedastheDireDawaAdministration,withsurroundingruralareasincluded,itisunlikelythatmigrantsfromtheseruralareaswereincludedasmigrants.


Impact on urban development

CloselyassociatedwiththeeconomicrevivalofDireDawa,thecityhasoneofthefastestratesofurbanizationinEthiopia,witha50percentgrowthratefrom1985to2015.6ThisrapidurbanizationhascreatedatleastthreemajorimpactsonurbandevelopmentinDireDawa.

Informal settlements

Sinceitsinception,spontaneousurbandevelopmenthasbeenaprimaryattributeofDireDawa.Asaresult,mostofthecity’ssettlementsareconsideredtobeslums.Infact,onlytwo cityquarters—Kezira (includingGreekCamp)andNumberOne—arenot regardedasslums.TheremainderofDireDawalargelyconsistsof informalsettlements,mostofwhichhave insufficientsocial services, suchaseducation,healthandrecreation (parksandsports)facilities.

InDireDawacity,anestimated182,000peopleliveinsub-standardhousing,mostofwhomareOromomigrantsfromruralDireDawaandeasternOromiaRegionalState;atleasthalfofthesepeopleliveinsimplemud-housesorshacks.7Manyofthesehousingstructuresare locatedonhills andfloodplains, renderinga significantproportionoftheinhabitants—atleast15,000residentsliveinhigh-riskfloodingareas—vulnerabletonaturalhazardsanddisasters,suchaslandslidesandfloods.FloodsarecommonduringtherainyseasoninJunetoSeptember.InAugust2006,forexample,theDechatuRiver overflowed,floodingthecityandresultinginhundredsdead,thousandsdisplacedandextensivedamagetohomesandmarkets.8Thelocationofslumdwellingsinflood-proneareas,coupledwiththelackofasufficientflooddrainagesystem,poseshealthandsani-tationthreatstothecity.

Thereisabacklogofdemandforanestimated24,000houses,withdemandexpectedtogrowannuallybyanadditional2,900houses.Thehugegapbetweensupplyanddemandisleadingtoasubstantialincreaseininformalsettlements.Atpresent,informalsettle-mentsproliferatemainlyontheperipheriesalongtheDjiboutiRoad.Cognizantofthiscriticalproblem,thefederalgovernmentofEthiopiaandtheDireDawaAdministrationhaveprioritizedhousingdevelopment.In2010,theDireDawaAdministrationallocatedETB300million(USD13.5million)tobuildlowcostapartmentsfor3,500households.Thisnumber,however,hassincebeenreducedbymorethanhalf—toonly1,050house-holds.

6 Hailu,‘WhyEthiopiaNeedsFastGrowingSecondaryCities’.7 UN-Habitat,‘Ethiopia:DireDawaUrbanProfile’,Nairobi:UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgramme,2008,12,http://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2013/07/2740_alt.pdf.Unlessotherwisespecified,thedataintherestofthissectionofthereportisderivedfromthissource.8 ‘ScoreskilledinEthiopiaFloods’,BBCNews,7August2006,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5250386.stm.Floodingin2005alsocausedsimilarlevelsofcasualtiesanddamage.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dechatu_Riverhttp://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2013/07/2740_alt.pdfhttp://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2013/07/2740_alt.pdf


Moreover,theexecutivebodyofDireDawadiscussedthe issueof illegalsettlementsin2014andpassedaresolutionlegalizingallofthosebuiltbefore2011.Accordingtoa landuseexpert at theDireDawaAdministration, theexecutivebodyalsodecidedtoconsiderlegalizingthosebuiltbetween2011and2014becausesomanywerebuiltbutthisdecisionhasnotyetbeenformallyapproved.SettlementsinMermarsa,GendaMiskinaandKebele01ontheMelkaJebduRoad,wheretherailwayandtheindustrialparkarebeingbuilt,areallconsideredillegal.ThissituationismademorecomplexbythefactthatSomaliRegionalStatehasnotyetenforcedthenewleasepolicyagreedbytheDireDawaAdministration.

Unemployment

Seenasasignificantdriveroftheviolentprotestsin2015–2016,youthunemploymentisnowatoppriorityacrossallgovernmentlevels,includingintheDireDawaAdminis-tration.AccordingtotheDireDawaUrbanJobCreationandFoodSecurityAgency,theyouthunemployment rate is18.5percent,which isabove thenationalaverage (seeTable2).

Table 2: Youth unemployment rate over a five-year period (2011–2016), Dire dawa

fiscal year 2011–2012

2012–2013

2013–2014

2014–2015

2015–2016

2016–2017

unemployment rate (per cent)

National 17.5 16.5 17.4 16.8 16.9

DireDawa 22.7 22.3 22.8 18.1 23.9 18.5

Source:DireDawaAdministrationUrbanJobCreationandFoodSecurityAgency

TherelativelyhighrateofyouthunemploymentinDireDawaimpactsonurbandevel-opmentinDireDawaintermsofaccesstojobsandjobcreation.Forexample,thishasgivenrisetoambivalenceamongresidentsandbusinessownerswithrespecttogrowingratesofmigration.Ontheonehand,theyviewmigrantsthroughthecosmopolitanlensforwhichthecityisknown.MigrantlabourisalsosoughtafterbecausemanynativesofDireDawa,particularlytheSomalipopulation,arenotinterestedinworkingasdaylabourers.Ontheotherhand,thereisanemergingtensionbetweenmigrantsandthenativesofDireDawa,asarespondentfromtheDireDawaUrbanJobCreationandFoodSecurityAgencyindicates:

RuraltourbanmigrationhasaffectedresidentsofDireDawaintermsofaccesstojobsandemploymentinthecity. Despitesomeeffortsonthepartofthecitygovernmenttoplanandcreateurbanjobsyearafteryear,therapidrateofmigra-tionfromotherregionalstates,suchasthesouth[SNNPR]andOromia,tothecityhaschallengedthecity’splanforcreationofurbanjobs.Therateofunemploy-


menthasnotbeenreducedduetorapidrateofmigrationtothecity.MostoftheunemployednativesofDireDawacannotgetaccesstoworkinconstructionprojects—industry,railwayandwaterprojects.Thisisbecausethecompaniespreferdaylabourerswhocanworkforminimalrates.

ThosewhoacceptlowerwagesaremainlyfromDebub[south]andtosomeextentfromneighbouringzonesinOromia—EastHarargeandWestHararge.Asaresult,theunemployedyouthofDireDawacannotgetjobs.Hence,thetargetpopulationofDireDawa,forwhomthecityshouldfacilitateaccesstojobs,remainsachallenge.Wegiveprioritytoyouthofourown.Theyaloneareourburden.Thefederalgovernmentalsodoesnotconsidertherateofmigrationtoacitywhenitassesseswhetheraregionalgovernmenthasdeliveredonjobcreation.Inaddition,comparedtothemigrants,theunemployedyouthinDireDawahaveunfavourableattitudestowagelabour,andtheydonothaveasavingculture.

Theregulatorymechanismformanagingruraltourbanmigrationisalsonotwelldeveloped.Wearecognizantoftheconstitutionallyguaranteedfreedomofcitizens’rightstoresideanyplaceinthecountry,iftheysowish.Whateverregu-lationisthere,itisabouttherequirementofmigrantstoapplyandgetakebeleIDcard.AnyonewithakebeleIDcardisrecognizedasalegalresidentofthecityandentitledtoallrightsreservedforthenativepopulation,includingaccesstojobs.

TheactingheadofthesecuritydirectorateoftheSocialandLaborAffairsOfficeofthecityofDireDawaofferssomeconcreteexamplesoftheseincreasingtensionsbetweenmigrantsandthenativesofDireDawarelatedtocompetitioninthelabourmarketandthegrowingsenseofexclusiononthepartoftheformer:

NativesofDireDawaperceivethatthemigrationofpeoplefromotherregionshasreducednotonlytheirjobopportunitiesbutalsotheirnegotiatingpowervis-a-visemployers.ThistensionplayedoutinthedisagreementbetweenfarmersofGandasarKebeleandthecityadministration,whentheformerrefusedtoparticipateintheenvironmentalandwatersheddevelopmentactivitiesdesignedbythecity.Theyjustifiedtheirrefusalbasedontheirexclusionfromjobopportunities,whichisbeingincreasinglydominatedbymigrants,particularlybymigrantsfromthesouthsaying,‘Letthesemigrantsdotheconservationworkforyou!’Thereisagrowingawarenessamongprivatecompaniesthatthesecurityoftheirorganizationorbusinessdependsonthepositiverelationsthatitcreateswithlocalcommunities.

Therewasanotherincidentin2016betweenmigrantdaylabourersandresi-dentsofthecitywhilecompetingforjobsofferedbytheindustrialzoneinMelka[Kebele01].Theunemployedyouthofthecityputupafightwithmigrantsfromthesouth.Weintervenedandfacilitatedtherecruitmentofabout30nativeyouthtoworkalongsidethemigrants.TheDireDawaAdministration,incollabo-


rationwithprivatecompanies,havebeenworkingtoensuretherecruitmentoftheyouthofDireDawainthejobscreatedbycompaniesinordertoreducethetensionbetweenthemigrantsandthelocalcommunity.Althoughthereislackofcoherentregulationanddirectiveonhowtodealwiththetensionthatruraltourbanmigrationhasputontheemploymentopportunitiesinthecity,privateorganizationsareadvisedtofirstgettheapprovalfromthecitykebeleadmin-istrationaboutthebackgroundoftheapplicantsandwhotheyshouldemploy.ThosewhohavekebeleresidenceIDcardswouldbegivenpriority.

According to this samerespondent,anadditional complicating factor that feeds intothetensionsbetweenmigrantsandmembersofthelocalcommunityistheabsenceofaminimumwage.Thishascreatedafavourableconditionforemployers,whilesimulta-neouslymakingdaylabourersvulnerabletoexploitation.Asmigrantstendtotakelesspayment thanwhat is conventionally acceptable, thewage scale is getting lower forpeoplefromDireDawaandthesurroundingareas.Hegoesontoexplain:

Thegovernmenthasnotyetfixedminimumwageratesfordaylabour.Thefocusnowisoncreationofjobsratherthanondeterminingwhatamountofwagetheinvestorsorprivatecompaniesshouldpay.Lackofamechanismtoregulatelabourrelationshascreatedmanyproblems.First,thelackofaclearminimumwagescalehasattractedmigrantswhoarealwaysreadytoworkatanyrate,iftheyhavenootheralternative.Second,someprivateorganizationsdiscriminateagainstfemaledaylabourers,whoareofferedlowerwagesthantheirmalecoun-terparts.Third,thecommissionedprivateagencies(brokers)arealsopartoftheproblem.

Informal employment inmobile street vending is also seen to be one of themajorchallengesinurbanplanning,accordingtoastudyrespondentintheDireDawaAdmin-istration. It undermines the city’s ambition to become amodern city.Mobile streetvendingisassociatedwithmigrants,whosellitemsrangingfrombooksandsmallelec-tronic goods to roasted chickpeas and sunflower seeds. Traditional street vending ismore tolerated, however, as it is stationary and involves selling local goods, such asfruits,cosmeticsandkhat.Themajorityofmigrantsinvolvedinmobilestreetvendingareundereighteenyearsoldandtendtocomefromthesouth.Becausetheyareunderage,theycannotbeemployedasdaylabourers,sobecomemobilestreetvendorsinstead.Theycarrysmallshopmaterialsandmovefromonecornerofthecitytoanother,sellingtheirwares.

Security and social cohesion

Thegrowingcultureofmigration,especiallyonwardmigration(seebelow),inDireDawahaswidespreadsocialimpacts,astheviceheadoftheJustice,LegalandSecurityAffairsBureauoftheDireDawaAdministration,explains:

InternationalmigrationtoandfromDireDawahasaffectedthecommunityofthecity.MigrantsfromeasternEthiopiacometoDireDawa.TheystayinDire


Dawaanddecidewhichdirectiontotake.OnerouteisSudan–Libya–Europe.TheotherrouteisDjibouti–Hargeysa–Yemen–SaudiArabia(ifpossibletoEurope).ManyDireDawa-bornmigrantsdiedintheMediterraneanSea.Wemournforourdead.SomewerealsokilledbyISISfightersontheLibyancoasts.Theseallhavebroughtsocialcrisis.Sinceyouthsmaymigrateatanytimebydroppingoutofschool,parentshavebecomeuncertainabouttheirchildren.Familystability,societalstabilityisthreatened.Evenmiddle-incomepeopleselltheirpropertyandplanformigrationtoEurope.Weknowpeoplewhosoldtheirvehiclestogoabroad.Somealsoborrowmoneytomigrate.TheydonothavemoneytoworkinEthiopiabuttheydohavemoneytogotoSaudiorLibya.Aretheysuccessfulandreachtheirdestiny?Onlyonepercentmaysucceed.

Many natives of Dire Dawa also associate the growing crime rates in the city withmigrants,particularlythosefromthesouth.AfemaleresidentofDireDawaremarks,‘We,peopleofDireDawa,startedlockingourhouseaftermigrantsstartedcominginnumbers,particularlythedaylabourers.’GovernmentofficialsintheDireDawaAdmin-istrationalsosharetheperceptionthatmigrantsarelinkedwithcrime,asthisofficialexplains:

MigrantsfromthesouthliveintheSabianandGoroareas.Therearecasesofrobberyintheseareas.Agroupoflabourersbrokeintohousesandstolegold,laptopsandmoney.Notonlythat.Therearemigrantswhousedrugs,suchashashishoralcohol,toperpetratecrimes.Previously,thepeopleofDireDawaknewonlykhat!PettycrimeismorecommoninSabian,DechatuandChattera,wheremostofthemigrantslive.

Relatedto increased levelsofcrime,migrationis furtherassociatedwithDireDawa’sgrowing population of street children and adults. Poverty, caused by environmentaldegradation,droughtand famine, is themainpush factor for children to liveon thestreet in urban Dire Dawa. This ismore visible in the upscale Kezira neighborhood.Themselvesvulnerabletotheviolationoftheirrights,streetchildrenareneverthelessassociatedwithgrowingcrimeinthecity,suchasstealing,robbing,shopliftingandtheftduringthenight.

InadditiontoincreasednumbersofstreetpeopleinDireDawa,thecityhasdevelopedacultureofbegging.Amongotherthings,thishasanadverseimpactonworkethicsanddrainsproductivelabourfromtheagriculturesector.Therearethreetypesofmigrantbeggars inDireDawa:FridaybeggarsfromruralDireDawa,whotraveltothecitytoreceivealms(sedeqa);seasonalbeggarsfromnorthernEthiopia;andfull-timebeggars.EveryFriday,peoplefromtheneighbouringruralareascometoDireDawatogenerateincomefromalms.Thebusinessdistrictswitness longqueues in frontofshopsoratmosquestocollectthemoneydonatedbythefaithfulandthewealthyasanactofreli-giousduty(theIslamicpreceptofgivingalmstothepoor).Similarly,somemigrantsfromthenorth,particularlyfromTigrayandAmhararegion,congregateinChristianchurches,especiallyonsaints’days,beggingformoney.Someofthesepart-timebeggarsreturn


totheirhomeareasandusethemoneytheyhavecollectedtosupplementtheirliveli-hoods.Others,bothMuslimandChristian,arefull-timebeggarsandmakealivingoutofit.

Some migrants, particularly from the Amhara region and East and West HarargeZones of Oromia, are also linked to the rise of commercial sex workers in the city.There are approximately 2,500 (1,500 permanent and 1,000 transient) commer-cial sexworkers inDireDawaoperating in hotels, bars andbreweries inDireDawa.

The Dechatu neighborhood, Dire Dawa’s red light district, is wheremany of thesecommercial sex workers conduct business. They are also blamed for the city’shigh HIV infection rate. The HIV prevalence rate in Dire Dawa among adults wasestimated at 4.3 per cent in 2007, which is among the highest in the country.

In2011,however,prevalenceamong15–49yearoldswasestimatedat4.0percent.

DireDawa’slocationalongtheAddisAbaba–Djibouticorridormakesthecityparticu-larlysusceptibletothespreadofothercommunicablediseases,aswell.


3. Migrant experiences

Drivers of migration

There are different push and pull factors that informmigrants’ decision to move to Dire Dawa city.

Push factors

• Conflicts;e.g.thecontinuedterritorialdisputebetweenOromiaRegionalStateandSomali Regional State and thepopulationof internally displacedpersons inDireDawa

• Landshortageanddegradationinruralareas

• Climatechangeandrecurrentdrought

• ViolenceagainstwomeninruralDireDawa

Pull factors

• DireDawa’simageasaprogressive(liberal)cosmopolitancity,withgreaterblendingacrossethnicandreligiousboundaries

• Economic revival, dailywage labour in the construction sector andexpectationsgeneratedbydevelopmentoftheDDIP

• Perceptions that Dire Dawa city is a safe haven for rural women subjected todomesticviolenceandforcedmarriage

• Educationalopportunities,inparticularaccesstohighschools

• Accesstohealthservices;e.g.theDilChoraReferralHospital

• Toaugmentpoliticalclaimsviademographicchanges(politicsofnumbers)

• DireDawaasatransitstopforinternationalmigration,viaDjiboutiandSomalia

• Ethnicallydeterminedjobopportunitiesforcivilservants

Dire Dawa’s cosmopolitan image

DireDawaisbrandedasthemostcosmopolitancityinEthiopia.Thecityfeaturesprom-inently in thecountry’sartistic landscape,withmanysongsby famoussingers—fromTilahunGesesetothelegendaryTediAfro—dedicatedtoitscosmopolitansocialfabricand robust socio-cultural integration across ethnic and religious boundaries. Affec-tionately calling themselves ‘ye Dire lij’ (the sons [anddaughters]ofDireDawa), the


populationofDireDawaisconsideredmoreopen,progressive,hospitableandrelaxedincontrasttoAddisAbaba,whichiswidelyviewedasmorehierarchical,individualizedandconservative.Reflectingtheculturaldiversityofthecity,manypeopleinDireDawaarebilingual,withsomespeakingmorethantwolanguages.TheDireDawaAdministra-tionhasinstitutionalizedthemulticulturallegacyofthecitybyadoptingamultilingualeducationalpolicy.UnlikeAddisAbaba,wheretheAmhariclanguageisthesolelanguageusedinschools,threelanguages—Amharic,OromiffaandSomali—aretaughtandusedinDireDawaschools.

TheimageofDireDawaasmigrant-friendlyisoftenconsideredasapullfactor.AsthismigrantfromHadiya,inthesouth,explains:

IusedtoadmireDireDawaasifitwereaforeignland,alandofopportunity.MyaunttoldmeaboutDireDawa,exaggeratingitsimage.…DireDawaatnightlookslikeaEuropeanorAmericancityforthoseofuswhocomefromruralareas.Thenightdeceivesyou!DespiteallthechallengesthatIhavefaced,IstillpreferDireDawatoAddisAbabaoranyothercityinEthiopia.UnlikeinAddisAbaba,youcanliveon100birr[USD4.5]perdayinDireDawa.Peoplehereareverysociableandhonestandwelcomemigrants.IoweDireDawabigtime.Itbroughtmeup,nomatterthedifficultiesattheworkplace.IhaveevenmanagedtogetakebeleIDcard.ThatmeansIamalegalresidentofDireDawa.FromwhatIheardfromfriendsandrelativeswhomigratedtoAddisAbaba,itisnotthateasyforamigranttohaveakebeleID.

For some, Dire Dawa’s image of being awelcoming cosmopolitan city is a factor inredefiningDireDawaasatransitplacetoapermanentdestination.ThismigrantfromWelayta,alsointhesouth,elaborates:

Youalwaysgetsomethingtoeatbecausethereisacultureofsharing.ItisnotlikeinAddis,wherepeopleeatbehindcloseddoors.Initially,IcametoDireDawa

box 3: contraband and cross-border trade

Smallandlarge-scaleofficialandunofficialcross-bordertradeispresentatTogo-chale,abordertownsituatedbetweenJijigaandSomaliland,andcurrentlyamajorsmugglingroute.Thistradeinvolveslivestock,khat,*somegrainsandcereals,cof-feeandsecondhandclothing.InformalorunofficialtradeinTogochaleisregulatedbygovernmentimport–exportlicenses,whichareissuedforfixedcommoditiestoindividualtraders.SomeoftheselicencesarecappedatUSD2,000amonthforpeoplewholiveinTogochaleandsurroundingareas.Thislegalinformalcross-bor-dertradebecomesillegal(contraband)whenitistransportedoutsideofTogochaleanddistributedtootherpartsofthecountry,includingDireDawa,fromJijiga.

*IntheEthiopiancontext,khatisnotconsideredtobeadrug.Henceitsdesignationascontrabandratherthanabannedsubstance.


withtheintentionofgoingtotheGulfStatesthroughDjibouti.WhenIheardthatthejourneytoDjiboutiandtheGulfStatesisnotonlyexpensivebutalsoveryrisky,IrevisedmyplananddecidedtostayinDireDawa.Afterall,Direisaniceplacetolive.Thepeoplearefriendlyandyoudonotspendmuchforclothing…Ifyoudonothaveenoughmoneytopayforyourrent,youcanevenliveonthestreet.Afterall,DireDawaisnotcoldatnight.

Economic drivers

The economic pull factors are largely related to Dire Dawa’s strategic location nearthe port ofDjibouti,making the city a logistics and trade hub. The new railway hasattracted migrants from all over the country because of opportunities for informalcross-border trade,or contraband trade,as thegovernment refers to it.Contrabandtrade consists of smuggling legal goods to avoid taxes; it does not include bannedgoods, such as drugs orweapons. Business areas in Dire Dawa, such as Taiwan andAshewa, are closely linked to informal cross-border trade. Awide range of goods—electronics,clothes,shoesandcosmetics—fromSomalia,SomalilandandDjiboutiaresoldinthesemarketsatfarlowerpricesthaninothercities,particularlyAddisAbaba. Despitethecontinuedgovernmentcrackdownoncontrabandtrade,manyresidentsofDireDawacity—migrantsandoriginalinhabitantsalike—stillmakealivingfromit.9

Theconstructionboominrecentyearsalsoattractsmigrants,particularlyfromSNNPR.Inadditiontothe large-scaleconstructionprojectsunderway inDireDawa,migrantsfindworkbuildinghotelsandprivatehouses.Forsomemigrants,DireDawaispreferredoverothercities(particularlyAddisAbaba),wherethedailywagelabourforceissatu-ratedandthecostoflivinghigher.AlthoughtheaveragedailywagefordaylabourintheconstructionsectorinDireDawa(ETB60to100perday;USD3to4.5)issimilartothatinAddisAbaba,thecostoflivinginDireDawaislower.Whencompleted,theDDIPisexpectedtodrawyetmoremigrantstothecitybecauseofthenumberofjobsonoffer.MigrantsareexpectedfromthesurroundingOromiaRegionalStateandvariousotherpartsofthecountry,includingsouthernEthiopia(HadiyaZoneandWelaytaZone).

LandlessnessisdescribedasamajoreconomicpushfactorformigrationtoDireDawa,especiallyamongrespondentsfromthesouth,asthismigrantexplains:

IcametoDireDawafromWelayta.Iamtheyoungestchildinourfamily.Weareafamilyofeight.Myfatherownsonlyhalfahectareoflandafterhedistributedittomyolderbrothers.Istillhavetwoolderbrotherswhoexpecttheirshareofthathalfhectare.ItwouldbeuselessformetowaituntilIcanmakeaclaimonmyshare,ifthisisatallpossible.Noriseducationthealternative.IlearntuptogradeeightandIwasnothopefulofabetterlifeifIcontinuedstudying.Manypeoplefrommyvillage,andevenfromSodo[thecapitalofWelaytaZone],could

9 Theshootoutbetweensmugglersandthesecurityforceson1September2017,alongwithsubsequentpublicprotests,indicatesthecontinuedresilienceandsignificanceofthistrade.


notgetajobaftercompletinghighschool.Someareevenunemployedwithacollegedegree.IthoughtofmigratingtoAddisAbabatoworkasadaylabourerbutpeoplewhoIknowwhomigratedtoAddisAbabaarenothappyaboutlifethere.Instead,IcametoDireDawawhenIheardthattherearealotofjobsfordaylabourers.

There appears to be an ethnic stratificationofmigrants’ labour,withmigrants fromsouthernEthiopiadominatingtheconstructionsectorasdaylabourers.Thesemigrantsareespeciallyattractivetoprospectiveemployersbecauseofthequalityoftheirlabourand their relative affordability.10More recently, there are also a growing number ofmigrantsfromtheEastandWestHarargeZonesofOromiaRegionalStateworkingasdaylabourers.

Interestingly, there arehardly any Somali day labourers inDireDawa. This is due tosocio-culturalreasons.ThisSomalirespondentresidentinDireDawaclarifies:

YoudonotfindasingleSomaliattheSaidolabourmarket[wheredaylabourersarehired].ThisisbecauseofthenatureofSomalisociallife.Onedoesnotneedtoworktomakealiving.Itisenoughifamemberofthefamilymakesagoodlivingeitherasatrader,politicianorcivilservant.Thereisasystemofredistribu-tion.Whatonecangetfromfriendsandrelativesisalotmorethantheearningsfromdaylabour.Afterall,daylabourisverydemandingandyetyougetlittle.Onaverageonegetsasadaylaboureraround1,500birr[USD68]permonth.And1,500birrisnothingforaSomali.Itisnotevenenoughforthreedays.Youneedmoneyforfood,forkhat,etc.

Therearevarioussourcesofmoney.Thereiscontrabandtrade.Althoughitismuchmorereducednowthanbefore,Somalisstillmakemoneyfromcontra-bandtrade.Haveyouheardwhathappenedyesterday[1September2017]?Duringtheskirmishbetweenthesecurityforcesandthecontrabandtraders,theentireSomalineighbourhoodintheKelaareawentouttoshowsolidaritywiththecontrabandtraders.Thisisbecauseofthetrickle-downeffectofcontrabandtradeformanySomalis.Thereisalsomoneycomingfrompoliticians.Whatevertheyget,theyeatitwithrelatives,friendsandclanmembers.Moneyalsocomesfromthediaspora.TherearemanySomalidiasporawhoremitmoneytofriendsandrelatives.

Anothereconomicpullfactoristhestrongrural–urbanlinkbetweenDireDawacityandthesurroundingruralareas.DireDawaiscloselyconnectedtotheruralareasofHarargeZoneinOromiaRegionalStateintermsoffood,khatandlivestockproduction.Thereare

10 Inparticular,southernmigrantsappearmorephysicallyfitthanlabourersfromotherregions.Oftenstrugglingwithstrongerpushfactorsathome(particularlyseverelandshortages),southernmigrantstendtotakelowerwagesthanaverage.Moreover,theyaremoreexperiencedinwagelabour,basedontheirbackgroundworkingincommercialfarmsorasmigrantdaylabourersintheAwashvalleysincethe1960s.


threelivestockmarketsinthecityofDireDawa.11MostcattlefoundinthesemarketsaresuppliedfromtheEastandWestHarargeZones(Bedeno,Dawe,Weter,Chelenko,Kulubi,LangieandAlemayaworedas[district;thirdleveladministrativeunit]),theShinileZoneofSomaliRegionalStateandthevariouspeasantassociationsoftheDireDawaAdministrativeCouncil.

Investmentopportunities are yet another economicpull factor formigration toDireDawa, in particular for somewealthier Somalis from Somali Regional State, notablythosefromneighbouringShinileZone.DireDawaistheclosesturbancentretotheIssaSomali,whereasJijigaisbothfurtherawayanddominatedbytheOgadenSomalis.AsaSomali respondent,anative residentofDireDawa,notes, ‘When IssabecomerichtheycometoDireDawa.Theybuylandandbuildhouses.’TheemergingupscaleSomalineighbourhood,Mermarsa,atthecontestedborderbetweentheDireDawaAdminis-trationandtheShinileZoneofSomaliRegionalState, isacaseinpoint.Asthissamerespondentexplains:

MostoftheresidentsatMermarsaareIssa,fromShinileZoneandDireDawa.ButtherearealsosomeDjiboutians.DjiboutianscometoDireDawaforasummerretreat.Butnowsomeofthemhavestartedinvestinginhouses,ashouserentinghasbecomeveryexpensive.Insteadofpayingforrenttheyprefertobuildtheirownsummerhouses.TheyalsogeneratemoneybyrentingthemwhentheygobacktoDjibouti.TheygetlandnotasDjiboutiansbutasSomalisfromSomaliRegionalState.TheyclaimEthiopiannationalidentityandnooneaskswhetherthisistrueornot.Probablysomeofthemalsobribethelocalofficials.Afterall,DjiboutiansdonotneedavisatocometoEthiopia.TheyareallowedbytheEthi-opiangovernmenttocrosstheborderastheywish.…ItisthesamewithpeoplecomingfromSomaliland.YouseealsocarsinDireDawawithSomalilandnumberplates.

Jobopportunitiesinthecity’scivilservicealsoserveasaneconomicpullfactor.DireDawahasattractedtwokindsofcivilservantmigrants:AmharicspeakersandcivilservantsfromtheOromiaandSomaliregions.TheDireDawaAdministrationisachartercity,12 withAmharicastheofficiallanguageofgovernment,whichhasdrawnAmharicspeakers(mainlyfromtheAmhararegion)toDireDawa’scivilservicesector.ThedesignationoftheOromiaandtheSomalisaspower-sharingpartnersoftheDireDawaAdministrationhasalsoattractedOromiffa-andSomali-speakingcivilservantstothecity.

11 Thefirstisforcattle,locatedatSabian.Thesecond,locatedabout4kmfromthecitycentreontheDjiboutiRoad,isforgoats.Thethirdmarket,alsoforcattle,isfound10kmfromthecitycentreontheDireDawa–HararRoad.12 Achartercityisoneinwhichthesystemofgovernmentisdefinedbythecity’sowncharterdocumentratherthanbystate,provincial,regionalornationallaws.Suchacitycanadoptorchangeitsorganizingcharterbydecisionoftheadministration,accordingtotheproceduresestablishedinthecitycharter.


Table 3: Dire Dawa Administration Civil Service Employees by Ethnicity (2004–2014)

Ethinic group

Employee percentage by fiscal year Average

2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Amhara 60.5 59.7 61.2 57.6 42.7 42.5 44.0 45.4 45.0 46.8 50.5

Oromo 30.7 27.2 25.8 28.8 36.3 35.5 36.1 38.1 37.5 37.7 33.4

Somali 0.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 4.8 5.6 4.6 4.8 3.8

Gurage 2.8 4.1 4.1 4.6 4.4 4.7 4.3 4.7 3.5 4.5 4.2

Tigrayan 2.6 2.9 2.6 3.0 0.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.4 2.8

Others 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.3 13.1 9.3 7.4 2.8 5.9 2.7 5.3

Employee 3409 4460 4528 5438 5487 6250 6324 6384 7248 7448 5701

Source:DireDawaAdministrationCivilServiceBureau,(2004–2014)

AsTable3indicates,witha50percentshare(onaverage,overaten-yearperiod),theAmharaarestilldisproportionatelyrepresentedinthecivilservice.Since2008,however,slightchangesintherepresentationofethnicgroupsinDireDawa’spublicinstitutionshavebeenseen,whichmightbetheinfluenceofthe40:40:20power-sharingarrange-ment.By2012, forexample,Amharaspeakersemployedascivil servantsdeclinedto45.4percent,whilethenumberofOromoandSomaliroseto38.1percentand5.6percent,respectively.

MostoftheleadershipoftheDireDawaAdministrationaremigrantswhocomefromeitherOromiaRegionalStateorSomaliRegionalState.ThisisdeeplyresentedbynativesofDireDawa,acrosstheethnicdivide,basedonconcernsthatDireDawawillbecomeacityofmigrants.AGurguraSomalirespondentelaboratesthis:

NearlyallDireDawaadministratorscomefromoutside,whethertheIssafromShinileZoneortheOromofromEastorWestHarargeZone.DireDawaneedstobegovernedbyitsownsons[anddaughters].MigrantsdonotunderstandDireDawa’ssocialfabricandinsteadimposeanexternalagendaonthecity,suchasthepoliticalcompetitionbetweentheOromoandtheSomalielites.

Similarnativistdiscoursesareevident indiscussionswithnativeOromoandAmhararesidentsofthecity.


Political drivers

One consistent theme raised by both Oromo and Somali respondents is politicallymotivatedmigrationtoDireDawabymembersofthesetwoethnicgroupsundertheauspicesoftheirrespectivepoliticalparties.Atstakeisthepoliticsofnumbers,orinflu-encingdemographicchangeinDireDawa.TheOromopoliticaleliteadvancesalargelydemographicargument forpoliticalownershipof thecity,a reference to their largerpercentage(47percent)oftheDireDawaAdministrationpopulation.Somalisrejectthe2007censusresults,especiallyaftertheGurgura’srecentethnicre-affiliationasSomali.AccordingtoOromoperspectives,SomalieliteshaveactivelyencouragedSomalimigra-tiontothecityinordertoalteritsdemographicstructuretobackuptheirownershipclaimoverDireDawa.Inparticular,theyrefertonewSomalineighbourhoods,suchasSebategnaandMermarsa.ThisOromoresidentofDireDawaexplainsatlength:

TheIssatookalltheirlandsoutsideofDireDawacityandplaceditwithinSomaliRegionalState.YettheyclaimequalpowerovertheremainingpartofDireDawa,whichisbasicallyOromoandsomeGurgura.Thishasdangerousimplications.ShinileZoneis9kmnorthoftheDireDawaAdministrationbuttheyclaimedalltheareasuptoandincludingDireDawaUniversity.Theytookthelandandredis-tributedittoSomalis.

DireDawahasimplementedanewleasepolicy—recognizingallillegalsettle-mentsbefore2011aslegalandoutlawinganyillegalsettlementsincethen.However,SomaliRegionalStatehasnotacceptedthenewleasepolicy.ThishasmadeiteasierforSomalisinDireDawatoacquirelandfromtheSomaliregionadjacenttotheDireDawaAdministration[inShinileZone].TheybuildnewhousesonbothsidesoftheborderandyettheygetservicesfromtheDireDawaAdministration.SomaliRegionalStatehasplannedtosettle30,000householdsadjacenttoDireDawabutitdoesnothavethecapacitytoprovideservices.Thisisthenewpoliticalgame,whichisplayedbytheIssapoliticalclass.

Thenewneighbourhood,calledSebategna,islikeBoleMedhanealem,theburgeoningSomalineighbourhoodinAddisAbaba.ThisisaneighbourhoodestablishedbymigrantIssaandithasbecomeanIssaneighbourhoodinDireDawa.Previously,theIssahadonlyoneneighbourhoodinDireDawacity,AfeteIssa.OgadenbusinesspeoplearealsobehindthisSomaliexpansioninDireDawa.OgadenSomalisaretreatedlikeanegg[treatedcarefully]bythefederalgovern-mentbecauseoftheONLF[OgadenNationalLiberationFront]insurgency.TheOgadenbusinessclassalreadytookoverbusinessinJijigafromthehighlanders.TheywanttodothesameinDireDawa.

LandinDireDawahasbecomeveryexpensivesince2012,whenillegalsettlementintensifiedafterthenewleasepolicy.Now250squaremetresofland[withatitledeed]issoldforonemillionbirr[USD45,000];withouttitledeed,400,000birr[USD18,000].MostpeoplewhoarebuyinglandinDireDawaareIssaSomalis.TheyalsogetlandfromShinileZoneillegally[becauseSomaliRegionalStatehas


notyetacceptedthenewleasepolicy],someofwhichistechnicallywithinDireDawaAdministration.

ASomalicounternarrativewouldpresentthegrowingnumberofSomalisinDireDawaasacomebacknotanexpansion,whilecharacterizingtheOromoaslatecomers,albeitwithapreferentialaccesstolandandhousingthankstothepoliticalleveragetheyhaveintheDireDawaAdministration.ThisSomaliresidentofDireDawaelaboratesindetail:

DireDawaisarailwaytown.ThisisimportantbecausehistoryofDireDawaisdirectlyrelatedtothecontestedissueofpoliticalownershipofDireDawa.NotethattherailwaywasbuiltonthebacksofSomalicamels.ThelabourerswerealsoSomalis.IfthehistoryofDireDawaisrelatedtotherailway,andgiventhefactthattherailwaywasbuiltbytheSomalis,assuchDireDawabelongstotheSomalis.DireDawausedtobecalledIssaandGurguraAwraja.ThisisaclearrecognitionofSomaliclaimsoverDireDawa.EventheDergrecognizedtheSomaliownershipofDireDawa.

ProblemshavestartedtocomesincetheEthio–Somaliwarof1977–1978.AllSomaliswerederogatorilycalled‘shiritamSomali’[skirtedSomali;aninsultbasedontheemasculationofSomalimen,inreferencetothetraditionalgarbtheywear].Wewearshiritnotbecausewecannotaffordtobuytrousersbutratherbecauseitisourtradition.ManyEthiopianSomalisleftfromalloverthecountry,includingDireDawa,andwenttoSomalia.Atthesametime,manypeoplefromotherpartsofEthiopiacametoDireDawainsearchofjobsandcontrabandtrade.Otherscameasdaylabourersanddomesticworkers.Also,manypeoplecametoDireDawaduringthe1978drought.TheEthiopia–SomaliwarhurttheEthiopianSomalisthemost.

TheSomalishavesoughttoregaintheirstatusinDireDawasince1991,aftertheregimechange.ButtherewastheproblemoftheOLF,whichfoughttheSomalisinErer,Melka,etc.ManySomalisweredisplacedbytheOLFandcametoDireDawa.TheOromoshavebecomeprominentsince1998,whentheygotpower.ManyOromos,fromplacessuchasAweday,cametoDireDawa.TheevidenceforthatistheestablishmentofanewOromoneighbourhoodinDireDawa,GendaAweday.ItwasaloteasierforOromomigrantstoacquirelandinDireDawathanthenativeSomalis.TheillegalsettlersaretheOromo.TheyhavefilledallthehillsofDireDawa.

AndyettheyremovedSomalisettlementsnearDireDawaUniversity.NotethatthelanduponwhichDireDawaUniversitywasbuiltwaspartofShinileZone.ThisisbecauseESPDPisaveryweakparty.ESPDP’smainjobistocombatONLF;nothingmore,nothingless.Otherwisetheydonotexerciserealpower,neitherinDireDawanorinSomaliRegionalState.TheyareworthsellingEPRDF’snews-papersandpamphlets.AfteralltheyareaffiliatedwithEPRDFwithoutbeingmembers.ThisisbecausetheyarenottreatedasequaltotheOPDO.


Thepoliticaldrivers for inwardmigration toDireDawaare complex.At theheartofthecontestationsurrounding thepower-sharing formulabetweentheOPDOandtheESPDPisthequestionofGurguraidentity:AretheyOromos,Somalisorboth?AGurguraresidentinDireDawashedslightontheconflictednatureofGurguraidentityandthepoliticalclaimsmadeinreferencetoownershipofDireDawa:

AllSomalisbelongtotwobroadclanconfederations:DirandDarod.GurgurabelongtotheDirSomali.IssaisalsoDirSomali.TherelationshipbetweenGurguraandOromostartswiththeNolleOromo.TheNolleOromowerefightingwiththeAllaOromo.TheAllawereverypowerful.TheNollemadealliancewiththeGurgurabecausetheGurgurawereknownaswarriors.TheNolleadoptedtheGurgura.GurguramenmarriedNollewomenandallofthedescendantsclaimedtheirmother’sdescentbecausethatwaswheretheywereliving.ThatishowasectionoftheGurgurabecameOromoandwhymanyGurguranowspeakOromiffa.Otherwise,theyareallSomalisbyorigin.

ManyoftheeasternkebelesinruralDireDawaareGurgura,thoughtheyspeakOromiffa.Buttothewest,uptoErer,theGurguraspeakSomali.NowadaysyoufindthreetypesofGurgura:thosewhospeakOromiffa;thosewhospeakSomaliandthosewhoarebilingual.Accordingtothelawoftheland,thepeoplewholiveintheimmediatesurroundingsofacitydeterminetheownershipofthatcity.TheOromosaretheminorityinruralDireDawaandyettheyclaimedequalpower,sharingitwiththeSomalis.MostofthepeoplewholiveinthesurroundingareasofDireDawacityaretheGurguraandtheIssa.IneasternruralDireDawa,thereisonlyoneOromokebeleandeventhatisnotpureOromobutmixedwithGurgura.InwesternruralDireDawatherearefivetosixOromokebeles.Thatisall.

Theso-calledpower-sharingformulaisnotgenuine.Inrealterms,itisnot40:40:20but60:40becausethe20percentbelongstotheEPRDFandtheOPDOisamemberoftheEPRDFrulingparty.Itshouldhavebeen50percenteach.ThereasonwhytheESPDPisweakisbecauseofthepower-sharingformula.ItcaneasilybeoutvotedbytheOPDO.

IdonotunderstandwhentheOromosaytheGurguraturnedthemdown[cuttheiraffiliationtore-affiliatewithSomalis].TheissueofwhoGurguraarecanonlybedecidedbytheGurgura.Nooneshouldimposeanidentityonthem.AndtheGurgurahaveclearlyidentifiedasSomali.ThisisnotthefirsttimethattheGurgurahaveclaimedSomaliidentity.TheydidthatduringtheEthio–Somaliwar.TheproblemisalsothewaythecensusisconductedinEthiopia.Inthe1994census,theenumeratorsjustidentifiedtheGurguraasOromobecausetheyspeakOromiffa.Ofthe600studentsandteachers[whotookthecensus],only20wereSomalis.TherestwereOromos.

ThereseemstobeaninstrumentalistthrustunderlyingthecontestednatureofGurguraethnicidentity,asthesameGurguraintervieweefurthernotes:


ThereisalsoproblemwiththeOromo—thequeueontheOromosideislongerthantheSomaliside.WenotonlycompetewiththeOromosofDireDawabutalsowithOromosfromalloverOromia,whocometoDireDawainsearchofjobsorasgovernmentofficials.Theyaretoomany.Incontrast,thequeueontheSomalisideisshorter.TheGurgurabelongtotheSomaliethnicgroupandtheirinterestisbestservedasSomali.WhattheGurguracouldnotgetasSomali,theywouldnotgetasGurgura.

Inruralareas,however,theGurguradonotdrawsuchasharpethnicboundarybetweenthemselvesandtheOromo.Infact,theyemphasizetheirdualidentitywiththeSomaliandtheOromo.ThisisapositionthatcomesoutclearlyduringafocusgroupdiscussionwiththeGurgurainMudiAnenovillage.

TheOromoresponserecognizestheSomaliethnicoriginoftheGurgurabutemphasizestheir thoroughassimilation intoOromocultureandwayof life.Duringa focusgroupdiscussionwiththeAbaGadaCouncilinLagaHare,respondentssuggestthattheGurgurahavetochoosebetweenbeingOromoorSomali.Shouldtheypreferthelatter,thenasthisrespondentasserts,‘TheycangobacktotheSomalisbutwithoutourlanguageandourland.TheGurguraarelikeagourdwithoutahanger.Theycannothangonawallwithoutbeingsupported.’AttheheartofOromofrustrationsistheethnicre-affiliationoftheGurguraswithSomalis,whichhasgiventheSomalisjustificationtoclaimcontrolofDireDawaandencouragemigrationtothecityinordertochangeitsdemography.

Political drivers for inwardmigration toDireDawaalso operate amongother ethnicgroups.Althoughitwasdifficulttocorroborate,someresidentsofDireDawa,aswellasgovernmentofficials,believethatmigrantsfromthesouthareactivelysupportedbytheSNNPRgovernment,particularlytheSouthernEthiopiaDevelopmentAssociation,asthefollowingexplanationbyanativeofDireDawaindicates:

PeoplefromalloverthecountrycometoDireDawa.ButthewaymigrantsfromthesouthcometoDireDawaisabitstrange.Theycomeinnumbersandadayaftertheirarrivalyouseethemasstreetvendersordaylabourers.Howisthispossibleunlesstheyaresupportedbytheirregionalgovernment?TheSouthernEthiopiaDevelopmentAssociationgivesthemseedcapital.Migrantsfromthesouthalsodonotstaylonginoneplace.Theyaremobile.Maybetheyalsoworkasintelligenceforthefederalgovernment,whichdoesnotlikethefactthatDireDawabelongstotheOromoandtheSomalis.

Environmental drivers

RuralDireDawaandthesurroundingEastandWestHarargeZonesofOromiaRegionalState and the Shinile Zoneof Somali Regional State aredroughtprone.Despite this,


theeconomiesoftheruralkebelesdependonagriculture.13 Inadditiontothedebili-tatingeffectsofclimatechange,theagriculturesectorintheDireDawaAdministrationisseverelyconstrainedbyothercriticalfactorsthatdriveruralresidentstomigratetothecity insearchofworkasday labourersor tobecomebeggarsandstreetpeople.Thesefactorsinclude:

• Land scarcity: The average size of rain-fed farmland to household is 0.25 hect-ares,while thatof irrigated farmland tohousehold is0.1hectares.This isbelowthenationalaverageof0.5hectares.Whenfarmlandisdividedbythenumberofhouseholds,thereisacutelandlessness.

• Shortage of water for irrigation: Approximately 70 per cent of farmers practicerain-fedagriculture.Norainmeansatotalfailureofassetsfortheserain-dependentfarmers,ashappenedtomanyfarmersin2015–2016,followingElNiño.

• Poor soil characterand infertility: Soil in ruralDireDawa ispredominately sand,with 99.3 per cent requiring treatment for acidity and other related problems,leavingonly0.7percentsuitableforagriculturewithoutintensivetreatment.14Thetopographyofthefarmlandsisalsoachallenge,withmostsituatedonhillsides,notflatareas,renderingcropsmoresusceptibletoflooding,whichoftenleadstosignif-icantassetlossesforfarmers.

• Severefoodinsecurity:NearlyallruralDireDawahouseholdsareintheproductivesafetynetprogram.

Largelydriventoleavebecauseofdrought,mostruralmigrantstoDireDawacityliveinslumareasandillegalsettlements,suchasGandaMiskina.Amongthosedrought-af-fectedfarmerswhoremaininruralareas,immobilityandentrapmentcanpreventtheirmigration.Forexample,somefarmersmightprefertorelocatetoDireDawaasdailywagelabourersbutfeelconstrainedbylackoflanguagecompetence.Thisruralmigrantto Dire Dawa city encapsulates the dynamics inwhich drought-affected farmers arecaught:

IcamefromLegaAdovillage.IcametoDireDawathreeyearsago.TheproblemoflandlessnessisaveryseriousprobleminLegaAdo.Mineisafamilyoftenpeopleandweonlyhave0.3hectaresofland.Itisthesameforourneighbours.Besides,inrecentyearsourareahasbeenhitbydrought.Manypeople,espe-ciallyyoungpeople,wouldliketocometoDireDawatoworkasdaylabourers.Buttheproblemislanguage.Employersprefertoemploypeoplewhospeak

13 InruralDireDawakebeles,thereareapproximately22,000households,withanaveragehouseholdsizeofseven.Thismeansthatapproximately154,000peopledependdirectlyonagriculture.Source:DireDawaAdministration,Agriculture,Water,MinesandEnergyBureau,August2017.Unlessotherwisespecified,thedataintherestofthissectionofthereportisderivedfromthissource.14 ThisisaccordingtothesoilfertilitymappingexercisecurrentlyunderwayfortheDireDawaAdministrationandconductedbytheAgriculture,Water,MinesandEnergyBureau,August2017.


Amharicsothattheycandirectlycommunicatewiththem.Wealsodonotunder-standhowthesystemworks.

Educational and cultural drivers

Variousharmfultraditionalpractices,mostofwhichconstituteviolenceagainstwomen,areimportantdriversofruraltourbanmigrationinEthiopia.15Femalegenitalmutila-tionandearlymarriagearewidelypracticedinruralDireDawaandintheneighbouringOromiaandSomaliregions.ThishaspushedmanywomenandgirlstoleavetheirhomesandmigratetoDireDawa.Oftentimes,parentsinruralareascompelunderagegirlstomarry.Insomecases,thesegirlsdivorceandescapetoDireDawa,wheremanyofthemworkasdomesticlabourers.

Accesstohighereducationisanotherdriverofruraltourbanmigration.Thereareonlythreejuniorhighschools(abovegradesix)servingthe38kebeles inruralDireDawa.Theseschoolsareveryfarfromsomevillages,whichmeansstudentscanonlycontinuetheir education if they go to Dire Dawa city. The problem ismore acute for female

15 ViolenceagainstwomeninruralDireDawaissorampantthattheDireDawaAdministrationestablishedtheWomen’sRehabilitationCenterin2012,whichisthefirstsuchcentreinEthiopiathatisentirelyfundedandmanagedwithgovernmentresources.IttreatswomenwhomigratetoDireDawafromruralareasandfemaletransitmigrantswhohavebeenvictimsofabductions,earlymarriages,bigamyandotherviolations.UNWomen,‘SheltersforWomenandGirlswhoareSurvivorsofViolenceinEthiopia’,NewYork:UNWomen,2016,http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/shelters-for-survivors-of-violence-ethiopia.pdf.

box 3: a success story: famia abadir

FamiaisfromHarla,avillage10kmfromDireDawacity.In2001,thedirewarningbyareligiousleaderinHarlathatgirlswhodidn’tmarrythatyearwouldnotbeabletomarryforthenextsevenyears,setoffaspateofchildmarriagesthatre-sultedinmorethan80girlsmarryinganddroppingoutofDujumaPrimarySchool.Famia,fifteenyearsoldatthetime,wasoneofthem.Famiamissedanentireyearofschoolaftershewasabductedandrapedinwhatturnedouttobefailedat-temptstomarryheragainstherwillandtheconsentofherparents.

TheeventsinDujumain2001ledtoafocusedawarenessraisingcampaignandcommunitymobilizationinruralDireDawatoendthepracticeofearlymarriageandsimultaneouslyhighlighttheimportanceofgirls’education.Asaresult,Famialeftherhusbandandconvincedherparentstosendhertothegirls’hostelinDireDawatocontinuehereducation.

FamiaattendedjuniorhighschoolatJaloBalinaandthenmovedtoSabiansecond-aryschoolinDireDawacity.ShewastransferredtoDireDawaPreparatorySchool,whereshecompletedgradeselevenandtwelve.ShethenjoinedMekelleUniver-sityandearnedaBAdegree.Aftergraduating,Famiawasemployedinofficeworkforthreeyears.Shecontinuedtopursuepost-graduatestudyatBahirDarUniversi-ty.Fromthere,shegotascholarshiptoNorway,whereshecurrentlyresides.


students,whoareculturallyconstrainedfrompursuingtheireducation.Thoseparentswhosupporttheirdaughters’educationareoftenhesitanttosendthemtoDireDawaforfearofviolence.Moreover,studentsfromruralareasattendingsecondaryschoolinDireDawameanadditional costs forparents; namely accommodationand subsis-tence.Toalleviatethesechallengesandbetterenablegirlsfromruralareastogoontosecondaryeducation,theDireDawaAdministration(inpartnershipwithUNICEF)builtanall-girlhostel in2007inDireDawacity.Accordingtothedirectorofthehostel,todate,1,025femalestudentshavebeenhostedthere,allfromruralDireDawa.Ofthese,389havesuccessfullycompletedtheirhighschooleducationandareemployedbythegovernmentorintheprivatesector;othershavegoneontopursuehighereducation.

role of social networks

TheroleofsocialnetworksinruraltourbanmigrationplaysoutinDireDawainvariousways. First, it explains the issue of immobility.Mostmigrants from rural areas havefriends,relativesor,attheveryleast,acquaintancesinDireDawawhoserveascontactpersons.ForpeoplefromMudiAnanovillage—7kmnorth-eastofDireDawa—lackofsocialnetworksinDireDawaiscitedasareasonforimmobility,despitethedesiretomigratebecauseofrecurrentdrought.Asthisruralvillageresidentsays:

Ourvillagehasbeenhitbyrecurrentdrought.Weusedtobeagro-pastoralists,combiningsorghumandmaizecultivationwithcattleandcamel.WeusedtosellmilkinDireDawacity.Butnow,cropshavefailedandwenolongerrearcattle.Onlygoatsandcamels.Weareleftwithonlygoatsandcamelsthankstotheircapacitytosurviveevenextremedrought.WeseepeoplegoingtoDireDawa,wheretheyworkduringdrought.Butyoucannotsimplygotherewithoutrelativeswhosupportyoutogetajoboruntilyoustartworking.Asaresult,wedependonreliefdistributedbythegovernment.Ourchildrenarealsonoteducated.Thereisonlyoneprimaryschool(gradesonetofour)inMudiAnano.Wecomplainedthatifthechildrenpasstogradefive,theyhavetogotoDireDawa.Andwecannotaffordtopayfortheircostoflivingthere.Thosewhohaverelativesinthecitycouldcontinuetheireducation.Sofar,onlyeightstudentsfromMudiAnanowhohaverelativesinDireDawaarepursuingtheireducationabovegradefive.

Second,peerpressureisconsideredtobeamajorpullfactorforruraltourbanmobility.Both male and female migrants often exaggerate what they have in Dire Dawa (orelsewhere), generating a higher expectation for future migrants. They also do notcommunicatetheproblemstheyface inthecity.Forexample,awomanfromaruralareawhomigratedtoDireDawawouldnormallygobacktohervillageayearlatertoimpressher friends,wearingbetter clothesand shoes. The remainingwomenwouldthenbe tempted tomigrate to the city. The fact thatDireDawa is anopen society,wherenewarrivalsarewell integrated intothecity,seemstohavemoreofan influ-enceonwomenandchildren’sdesiretomigrate.TheheadoftheWomen’s,Youthand


Children’sAffairsBureauinDireDawadescribestheroleofpeerpressureinrelationtogrowingruraltourbanmigrationinthefollowingway:

OneofthemajorfactorsinmigrationsofwomenandchildrentoDireDawaisyeguadegna gefet [peerpressure].Previousmigrantswhomadesomemoneyinthecityandsomewhatchangedtheirlivesgobacktotheirhomes[inruralareas]wearingbetterclothsandshoes,andoveractinthecommunitytoattractmoregirlsandchildrentomigration.Theyusuallytelltheirpeersbackhome‘itisasifgoldrainsinDireDawatown’.Then,notonlywomenandchildrenfrompoorbackgroundsbutalsofromwelltodofamiliesdecidetomigratetoDireDawa.

TheissueofpeerpressureasapullfactorclearlycomesoutinFDGswithmigrants.Withanemphasisontheroleofpeerpressure,onemigrantfromsouthernEthiopiarecountshisstory:

IamfromHadiya.ManyofmyfriendsmigratedtoSouthAfrica,AddisAbaba,ShahemeneandHawasa.Iwasverymuchimpressedbyhowmuchtheirlifehaschanged.Mostofthemalsosendremittancestosupporttheirfamilies.GotoanyvillageinHadiyaandyouseethedifference.Migrantfamiliesarewaybetteroffthananyotherfamily.DoyouknowwhyDebubGlobalbankhasbecomeveryprofitable?Itisbecausemanymigrantsfromthesouthsendremittances,partic-ularlyfromSouthAfrica.Iwasincontactwithmymigrantfriendsthankstoviber,telegramandimmo.Thesedaysitdoesnotcostmuchtomakeinternationalcallsthroughsocialmedia.Allofmymigrantfriendsusedtosendmenicephotos—posingwithfashionableclothesandshoes.Theyalsoencouragedmetocometowheretheyareatanycost.Afterall,inthesouthfamiliesarealsomorewillingtopayfortheirchildrentomigratethangivingthemsomemoneytostartbusinessinthehomeland.ButnowIsaymyfriendsverymuchexaggeratedhowmuchtheyhavechanged.Itiskindofshowingoff.Someofthemevensentmephotosleaningonacar.Ithoughttheyhavebecomesorichthattheycouldaffordtobuyacar.Idonotblamethem.IamdoingthesamewithfriendswhoIleftbehind.

Third,ethnic(socialandcultural)networksalsoplayanimportantroleinruraltourbanmigration.ThehardeningoftheethnicandreligiousboundariesinthecontextoftheidentitypoliticsoffederalEthiopiahasunderminedDireDawa’scosmopolitanlegacy,evident intheemergenceofethnic-basedneighbourhoods.LamentingtheerosionofDireDawa’scosmopolitanlegacy,anOromonativeofthecityrecollectsduringaninter-view:

DireDawa’scosmopolitanismhasrootsintheFrenchbuiltKeziraneighbourhoodwhenitwasestablishedasarailwaytownin1902.TheKeziraneighbourhoodwasveryinternational,wheretheFrench,theArabs,theTurks,etc.lived.ThentheAmistegnaneighbourhoodevolved,whereEthiopiansofdiverseethnicoriginslivedtogether,graduallycreatingtheDireDawawayoflife.TheOromos,Somalis,Hararis,Amharas,Gurages,etc.wereintermingled.ItwasapitytoseeOromosandAmharasfightingin1992.ExceptfortheAmharasinAmistegna,therestleft


DireDawabecauseoftheethnicconflict.Itwasironic,however,becausefouroftheso-calledOromoinstigatorsoftheconflictturnedouttobenon-Oromos.TheywereallfromAmstegnaandtheyidentifiedwiththeOromo.TherewasonlyoneOromoonthewantedlist.Mostnon-OromosfromAmstegnaevenjoinedtheOLF.Currently,however,theAmistegnaneighbourhoodhaslostitscosmopol-itancharacterandpeoplearedividedethnicallyandreligiously.

DireDawa’snewethnicneighbourhoodsinclude:AfetteIssa,Mermarsa,Borenandcitycentrearea(Somali);GendaAweday,GendaMiskinaandGaraDimma(Oromo);AddisKetema(Amhara);andGendaGurage(Gurage).Theseethnicneighbourhoodsserveasinformationpoolsandsocialsupportnetworksfornewmigrants,furtherreconfiguringthesociallandscapeofDireDawacitybasedonethnicidentity.Theintensecompeti-tionandrivalrybetweentheOromoandSomalipoliticalelitesonissuesrelatedtothepoliticalownershipofDireDawaislikelytofurtheraccentuateethnicfaultlines,withadirectimpactonthepatternofmigrationtothecity,includinganewspinonwhoisanativeandwhoisamigrant.

BecausethereiscontestationbetweenOromoandSomaliethnicgroupsovercontrolofthecity,thetwocompetingculturalinstitutionsoftheOromoandtheSomali,theAbaGadaandUgaz,respectively,havebeenrecognizedandpromotedbythecitygovern-ment as a conflict management strategy. For example, an Oromo council of elders[Gadaa]wasestablished‘inanattempttogiveacoherentvoicetothedifferentOromogroupswithinDireDawaandtherebycounterbalancetheIssa’.16Theseculturalaffilia-tionsattractbothSomaliandOromofromsurroundingruralareastothecityofDireDawa.Assuch,thepoliticalstructureputsahigherpremiumonethnicidentity,whichmigrantsmobilizeaspartoftheir localizingstrategies,particularlyOromoandSomalimigrantstothecity,whilemigrantsfromotherethnicgroups increasinglyfindthem-selvesindisadvantagedpositions.

Opportunities and challenges

Although the khat industry offersmanymigrants livelihood opportunities, they alsofacechallengeswhentheyengageinthisbusiness.Forexample,thecontinuedviolentconflictbetweentheOromiaandSomaliregionalstatescouldfurtherunderminetheOromo standing in the international khat trade, andwith that,DireDawa’s share ofthislucrativetrade.On18September2017,around50Somalis,someofthemtradersfromSomaliland,werekilledinAwedaywheretheywereactivelyengagedintheinter-national khat trade. In response, Oromos were killed in Hargeysa, Somaliland andmassivelydisplacedfromJijigaandothertownsandvillagesinSomaliRegionalState.This isanindicationofwidergeopoliticalrepercussionsrelatedtotheOromo–Somaliconflict,withanimpactonEthiopia’skhatexporttoSomalia.InanefforttodiversifyitsdependenceonEthiopiaforkhat,forexample,Somalilandhasbegunimportingmirra—

16 Kefale,‘EthnicDecentralization’,596.


theKenyanversionofkhat—potentiallycostingEthiopiamillionsofdollars.ThewaningofAwedayintheinternationalkhattradewillhavesignificanteconomicrepercussionsfortheeconomyofDireDawa,andthereforethelivelihoodsofmanymigrantswhoareconnectedonewayoranothertothekhattrade.

Thecontentious issueofwhocontrolsDireDawacity,which is sensitiveto thecity’sdemographic structure, also poses challenges—for natives and migrants alike. ThisnativeDireDawaSomalirespondent,forexample,isconcernedaboutthesocio-politicalimplicationsoftheconstructionsectorbeingdominatedbynon-Somalis:

Thiswillcreateseriousproblems.IfSomalisdonotworkintheindustrialpark,inconstructionandinotherformsofwagelabour,theywillbeeconomicallypoorer.Butresponsibilitylayswiththeparty,whichclaimstorepresenttheSomalis—theESPDP[EthiopianSomaliPeople’sDemocraticParty].Theyarebusywithotherthingsthanthinkingabouttheirownpeople.ThisisthetimetocreateawarenessamongtheSomalisregardingparticipationinthedaylabourmarket.Butsadly,thisisnotwhatishappening.…IfearthatDireDawawillbeacityofmigrantsifESPDPdoesnotdoitshomework,includingawarenessraisingamong

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