Existentialist Ethics: From Nietzsche toSartre and Beyond

Neil Thompson

Ethics are, of course, a fundamental part of professional practice. There aredifferent philosophical schools of thought relating to ethics and, although thereare often degrees of overlap, they are characterized more by difference thanharmony. Among these philosophical schools, one school that has receivedrelatively little attention in the professional literature (and a waning level ofinterest in the philosophical literature) is that of existentialism. This articleoutlines some of the main points of ethical theory in the works of FriedrichNietzsche, one of the founders of existentialist thought, and Jean-Paul Sartre,the best known of the existentialist thinkers, as well as other contributors toexistentialist thought. Possible developments in existentialist ethical theorysince the time of Sartre are also sketched out, and these are linked tocontemporary social work concerns.

Keywords Ethics; Existentialism; Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844�/1900); Perspec-tivism; Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905�/1980)

Introduction

In the psychoanalytically oriented 1960s there was a strong emphasis on ethicsin social work. This was parallel to the world of medicine and reflected in

large part the medical model of social work that was predominant at thattime. In situations where professional power is being exercised, ethical

safeguards are needed to make sure it is used responsibly within professionallydefined parameters, and so it is entirely appropriate that ethics should

feature as part of social work education. However, in the United Kingdom, asa result of the advent of radical social work with its emphasis on politics

rather than ethics, professionalism became de-emphasized. We entered a

ISSN 1749-6535 print/1749-6543 online/08/010010-14– 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/17496530801948705

Neil Thompson divides his time between his roles as an independent trainer and consultant withAvenue Consulting Ltd (www.avenueconsulting.co.uk) and part-time Professor of Social Work andWell-being at Liverpool Hope University. He has over thirty years’ experience in social work as apractitioner, manager, educator, consultant and author. He is committed to developing forms of socialwork that do justice to the complexities of both theory and practice. Correspondence to: NeilThompson, Avenue Consulting Ltd, PO Box 2060, Wrexham LL13 0ZG, UK. E-mail:neil@avenueconsulting.co.uk

ETHICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE VOLUME 2 NUMBER 1 (APRIL 2008)

period of ‘anti-professionalism’ (Lymbery 2004; Thompson 2005) based on a

political commitment to promoting radical social change. It is only relatively

recently that professionalism has been able to reassert itself*/a new form of

empowering professionalism that avoids the political naivety of traditional

forms based on unquestioned relations of dominance (Duyvendak et al. 2006;

Thompson 2007). Referring to the work of Jones (2000), McDonald (2006, p.

150) comments on the nature of the ‘new’ professionalism: ‘Social work must

become an engaged profession, participating as politically significant actors in

the social institutions shaping the contemporary environment. It cannot (and

must not) sit outside the arenas of power.’ She goes on to characterize the

new professionalism as ‘that which acknowledges professional expertise while

promoting active collaboration with other groups of service providers and with

service users’ (McDonald 2006, p. 151). The new professionalism is therefore

premised on partnership and empowerment rather than elitism and prescrip-

tion.With the resurgence of interest in professionalism, there now comes a

renewed emphasis on ethics. It is therefore important to ensure that this is a

politically informed ethics and not a return to the naivety of traditional ethics

largely disconnected from the wider political sphere (Clifton & Burke 2005).

Existentialism has followed a broadly similar path. The earlier versions of

existentialist thought were predominantly individualistic in their focus and took

very little account of wider social issues (Sartre 1948, 1958). Early existentialist

thought addressed ethical issues in a number of ways. However, Sartre promised

a volume of work on ethics, but largely abandoned this project in favor of a

political analysis. What resulted was a significant body of work on social and

political theory (Sartre 1963, 1976), with only fragments of an ethical theory

published posthumously under the title of Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1992).

However, as we shall see, there are clear strands of ethical theory that can be

drawn out of Sartre’s work, although these remain in need of further detailed

analysis and development if they are to be of value to social work.

This article is in four main parts. The first focuses on early existentialist

thought, with particular emphasis on the work of the German philosopher,

Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche is often portrayed as an ‘immoralist’ (i.e.,

someone who eschews morality), but this does not do justice to the quality

and breadth of ethical thinking to be found in his work. The second part relates

to later existentialist thought, with a particular, but not exclusive, emphasis on

the work of the French existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre. While Sartre’s work

clearly owes much to Nietzsche’s thinking, it also goes far beyond the basic

platform that his predecessor established. The third part explores, albeit briefly,

existentialist ethics beyond Nietzsche and Sartre. The final part is one in which I

bring aspects of existentialist ethical theory up to date in the context of

professional social work. These four parts combine to paint a picture of an

ethical approach that has the potential to offer a great deal of understanding if it

can be developed further.

EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 11

Ethical Thought in the Work of Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844�/1900) is probably one of the most influential thinkers

in the world of social theory. He was a significant influence on the development

of Freud’s work and therefore, indirectly at least, later psychoanalysts.

Poststructuralism and postmodernism also show signs of being heavily influenced

by strands of his thought (Bertens 1995). The absurdist work of writers such as

Camus (2006a, 2006b) and, of course, existentialism itself owe much to the

Nietzschean legacy (Guignon 1993). In addition, Nietzsche’s work has influenced

a number of people in the literary world*/for example, George Bernard Shaw. A

further significant influence is on the political world in the shape of laying the

foundation for fascism. However, although Hitler’s politics did owe much to the

work of Nietzsche, this was based on a (wilful) misreading of Nietzsche’s work,

exacerbated by misrepresentation of his ideas by his sister who was involved in

the posthumous publication of his work (Cate 2003). Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche

had strong antisemitic beliefs which were not shared by her brother, but she

allowed her beliefs to color the publication and propagation of his ideas after his

death. This provided a foundation from which others could build a politics of hate

notionally associated with Nietzsche’s thinking, but in reality fundamentally at

odds with his philosophy.

The basis of Nietzsche’s ethics is the rejection of metaphysics. He was

committed to what he described as ‘perspectivism’. By this he meant that

everything is seen from a particular perspective or point of view and that there is

no absolute underlying reality; no metaphysical dimension that guarantees a

‘Truth’. As Kee (1999, p. 45) puts it: ‘For Nietzsche there is no truth lying there to

be discovered: truth has to be created.’ The world, according to Nietzsche, is:

‘variously interpretable, it has no one meaning behind it, but countless

meanings*/this is ‘‘Perspectivism’’ and bangs the door in the face of anyone

who claims any sure ‘‘knowledge’’’ (Nietzsche, Collected Works, Vol XIX, p. 13,

cited in Heller 1988, p. 66; emphasis in original). This approach anticipates not

only existentialism, but also many other sociological and philosophical perspec-

tives that emphasize the significance of hermeneutics*/that is, the important

role of interpretation and meaning. It is also a helpful basis for partnership

working, laying the foundations for a multiperspectival approach.

In arguing that there was no absolute truth, he was therefore proposing that

there can be no absolute values. In his day, this was quite a radical departure in

philosophical thought and was given a mixed reception. What added to this mixed

reception of Nietzsche’s ideas was his announcement of ‘the death of God’

(Nietzsche 1974). Whereas another early existentialist thinker, Søren Kierke-

gaard, had argued that it is the task of each individual to find his or her way in

life without looking for divine instruction, he nonetheless was a firm believer in

God (albeit critical of institutionalized religion*/what he referred to as

‘Christendom’; see Kierkegaard 1996). Nietzsche, by contrast, took this a step

further by arguing that it is the responsibility of each individual to find a way

12 THOMPSON

forward because of the non-existence of God. Humanity, he argued, cannot rely

on predefined moral standards associated with a particular set of religious

tenets. Such an approach raises a challenge to the idea that the moral basis of

social work can be governed by a predefined ‘code of ethics’. We shall return to

this point below.The death of God meant that what we have to establish is what Nietzsche

referred to as ‘self-overcoming’. This is a concept closely linked to the idea of

self-knowledge, but going beyond that in terms of freeing ourselves from

misconceptions that we will have encountered in life and society. Cate (2003)

provides helpful commentary on this when he explains that:

It is misleading to speak of a theoretical freedom of the will if the individual whois supposedly exercising that freedom is in reality obeying all sorts of hiddenforces, impulses and motivations*/of an intellectual as much as geneticcharacter. The existential environment in which an individual finds himself[sic] is made of internal as well as external forces, which he must oppose andcombat if he is ever to achieve more than an illusory freedom of choice. Theidea, here exposed for the first time in embryonic form, was later to develop intothe Nietzschean concept of Selbstuberwindung (self-overcoming): the constantbattle every human being must wage against one’s hidden, inherited, uncon-sciously prejudiced ‘self’ in order to become that rarest of products*/a trulyfree-spirited individual. (Cate 2003, pp. 31�/2)

For Nietzsche, then, morality is not a matter of unquestioning adherence to a

predefined code of ethics or a prescriptive set of practices. Morality, in

Nietzschean terms, is a matter of becoming a ‘free spirit’ (‘Freigeist’, in

German). There is a parallel here with reflective practice which emphasizes that

practice needs to be creative and linked to the specifics of the situation rather

than based on simply following rules or procedures (Fook & Gardner 2007; White

et al. 2006)*/it needs to involve what Schon (1983) referred to as a ‘reflective

conversation with the situation’.Nietzsche’s approach anticipated later existentialist themes of radical free-

dom and authenticity (Sartre 1958). For Nietzsche, the idea of being a free spirit

was an essential feature of his thought and thus of his ethics. In the absence of a

God-given morality, it is our responsibility to develop our own values and live

according to them. This led him to develop his ideas about what he referred to as

‘beyond good and evil’ (Nietzsche 1966). He was using these terms in an

essentialist sense*/that is, he was urging us to go beyond fixed notions of what is

good and what is bad, and helping us to realize that it is not a simple matter of

attaching a positive or negative label to actions or, indeed, thoughts. The reality

is far more complex than this. Nietzsche therefore looked down on any attempts

to come up with a simple prescriptive morality. ‘Beyond good and evil’ can

therefore be understood to mean ‘beyond simplistic, essentialized notions of

absolute good and evil’. For Nietzsche, ethics was more a matter of noble versus

ignoble rather than good versus bad*/but this was not a nobility of birth, but

rather a nobility of mind, characterized by free-spiritedness (Cate 2003, p. 362).

EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 13

This idea of nobility was also closely associated with Nietzsche’s distinctionbetween ‘master’ morality and ‘slave’ morality (Nietzsche 1967). The latter, he

argued, is based on suspicion and mistrust; the humility of the lower orders in

society. It is fundamentally a negative morality. By contrast, he saw master

morality as being noble, positive and self-affirming:

For the fundamental difference between a truly noble morality and its opposite isthat it is a positive, confident, self-created, self-affirming system of valuesemanating from a feeling of abundant strength, whereas a ‘slave morality’ is aform of negative reaction against a reigning system of values, an expression of adeep-seated ressentiment [Nietzsche invariably used the French word, derivedfrom his study of the French Revolution] harboured by jealous human beingsconsumed by the repressed hatred and desire for revenge of the impotent. (Cate2003, pp. 501�/2)

It has to be recognized that Nietzsche’s approach is pre-sociological*/that is, he

shows no understanding of how a slave morality is part of an ideology inculcatedby systems of power and advantage. However, despite this, the distinction is an

insightful one. It paints a picture of the majority of people governed by a

prescriptive morality of ‘the herd’, accepted uncritically (slave morality) that

can breed jealousy and cynicism (ressentiment), while a minority of people have

the self-confidence to establish their own values and live in a spirit of ‘self-

overcoming’. Despite Nietzsche’s terminology of ‘master’ and ‘slave’, the

concept does not fit neatly with a class analysis, as members of the ruling class

will not necessarily be noble free spirits. Although there are undoubtedlyelements of elitism in Nietzsche’s thought, it is important not to oversimplify his

position here and see it simply as a matter of different moralities for different

classes. His understanding of the issues is far more nuanced than this and is

concerned with how individuals can rise above the unquestioning mores of the

‘herd’. This has implications for social work insofar as attempts to promote

empowerment can be seen to involve supporting individuals in breaking out of

established patterns of behavior that are self-defeating in some way*/for

example, in helping young offenders to find self-esteem in ways that do not

involve bowing to peer pressure to commit offences.In similar vein, a closely related notion in relation to morality introduced by

Nietzsche, and one that has been widely misunderstood, is that of ‘man and

superman’ (or ‘man and overman’*/the German original, ‘ubermensch’, can be

translated as ‘superior being’). Nietzsche described humanity as ‘a rope between

animal and superman’ (Cate 2003, p. 404). This refers to his view that, whilepeople are able to rise above their animal basis and achieve more than animals

can, we have considerable untapped potential*/that we are capable of rising

above the pettiness and narrowness that hold us back. A ‘superman’, then, for

Nietzsche, was somebody who showed the potential to move away from forms of

practice that are based on prescriptions identified and reinforced by others,

towards a self-guided, more confident approach to the challenges of human

existence.

14 THOMPSON

These challenges Nietzsche saw as having a potential for developing great

strengths. He firmly believed in the importance of the ability to find joy in

tragedy, strength through adversity. As Kaufmann (2000, p. 11) puts it: ‘From

tragedy Nietzsche learns that one can affirm life as sublime, beautiful, and

joyous in spite of all suffering and cruelty.’ This is closely linked to three

important concepts that have significant relevance for social work practice*/

namely, resilience (Gilligan 2001), post-traumatic growth (Calhoun & Tedeschi

1999, 2001) and the related phenomenon of transformational grief (Schneider,

1994, 2000). It is worth considering each of these in turn:

. Resilience. This refers to the ability of individuals to ‘bounce back’ from

adverse events, growing stronger and learning from the experience. It is seen

as an important concept in working with children who have been abused,

deprived and/or traumatized (Cairns 2002). Being resilient is not simply a

matter of being robust (i.e., able to withstand high levels of pressure), but

rather of being able to draw out the positives of an otherwise painful and

negative situation. Nietzsche’s idea is that what does not kill us makes us

stronger (this common adage originates from his work), or at least has the

potential to make us stronger. The implication here is that social work can

help people maximize the positive potential of the painful situations they

encounter, rather than simply try to ‘get over’ them*/an approach that is

clearly consistent with crisis intervention as a social work practice modality.

This means that a simplistic approach to practice that neglects such key

concepts as ‘crisis’ and ‘resilience’ can be seen as unethical because it has the

effect of stifling human potential and limiting what people can achieve in

circumstances of adversity.

. Post-traumatic growth. This refers to the recognition that experiences of

trauma, while acutely painful and potentially very harmful, can also bring

about positive changes in a person’s life*/for example, in terms of greater

intimacy and closeness and/or spiritual awareness that can lead to a more

fulfilling life. A great deal of the work with children traumatized by abuse

referred to above involves helping them not only to heal the metaphorical

wound, but also to grow and develop as fully as possible*/for example,

through the use of life story work to help them develop more empowering

narratives (Rose & Philpot 2005). This is very much in line with Nietzsche’s

conception of suffering and its positive potential.

. Transformational grief. This refers to the potential for experiences of loss and

grief to lead to personal growth. It can also lead to greater strengths through

the development of social connections and a fuller sense of meaning and

understanding. As Schneider (2000, p. 7) comments: ‘Honoring the fullness of

your loss permits you to realize that you can’t make it on your own, and you

discover the delicate, essential threads of meaning and love, what I have

called ‘‘gossamer threads’’, that still weave themselves through your life.’

Given the relative neglect of grief issues in social work (Thompson &

EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 15

Thompson 2008a), this concept is an important one to keep in mind.Mishandling our dealings with someone who is grieving by blocking opportu-nities for growth can be equated with ‘kicking them while they are down’

*/something that clearly has ethical implications.

Nietzsche’s ideas can be seen to be relevant to social work not only in thesespecific ways, but also more broadly in terms of how hardships and difficulties,

while not welcome in themselves, can form the basis of positive developments.As an illustration of this, it is worth noting that many people have decided to

pursue a career in the helping professions as a result of the lessons they havelearned from dealing with adversity in their own lives (e.g., the highly committedresidential worker who was brought up in care). The writings of Nietzsche can be

seen to be extremely insightful and instructive (although some of his ideas arenot so appealing*/for example, his views on women which are largely, but not

exclusively, of a chauvinistic nature; Kaufmann 2000). Nietzsche clearly laid thefoundations for later developments in existentialist thought, and it is to these

that we now turn.

Ethics in the Work of Jean-Paul Sartre

Sartre (1905�/1980) became the best known of the existentialists and arguably themost influential. For Sartre, the basis of ethics was a recognition of radicalfreedom*/the idea that, although we are surrounded by social and other

constraints, each of us nonetheless remains a free agent in the sense that wenot only can choose, we have to choose. We are responsible for ourselves insofar

as we have no fixed personality or ‘nature’ to fall back on as an explanation orjustification for our actions. Sartre therefore rejected essentialism and

determinism and, while he recognized the important influences of the socialcontext, he was wise enough to recognize that social pressures did not remove

the need to choose*/that is, did not alter the basis of radical freedom as thefoundation of human existence.

A recurring theme in Sartre’s work is the notion of bad faith: the idea that

many people do not live up to the challenge of radical freedom. They deny thisfreedom in a number of ways*/for example, by relying on the notion of fatalism,

social determinism and/or biological determinism. Bad faith is basically a lie tooneself. It is the denial that we are responsible for our actions and therefore

ultimately responsible for ourselves. Indeed, if we had no notion of freedom,there could be no notion of sin or transgression and therefore no conception of

ethics. If we were to accept a deterministic theory of human behavior, therewould be no scope for the study of ethics. There is a need, then, to ‘recognise

that clients are not simply passive recipients of services, but active agents whoplay a central role in determining the course of their lives. The ability to makechoices and the range of choices available are therefore key factors to take into

consideration’ (Thompson 2000, p. 119).

16 THOMPSON

The Sartrean conception of moral behavior is therefore premised on the notionof ‘authentic’ behaviour*/that is, behavior which steers clear of a reliance on

bad faith. To be authentic means to recognize radical freedom and live

accordingly, without attempting to rely on the self-deceptions of bad faith.

The existentialist use of the term ‘authentic’ should not be confused with the

everyday sense of the term, which has distinctly essentialist connotations*/for

example, in the notion of a person’s ‘authentic self’ being their true, underlying

essence. The existentialist conception of selfhood is markedly different from

this, based on the idea that the self is a process of becoming and not a relativelyfixed ‘personality’ (the idea of ‘becoming’ also features very strongly in

Nietzsche’s work; see Kee 1999). Nor should we regard the emphasis on freedom

and choice as a failure to recognize the significance of social constraints

(Bowring 2000).A further key aspect of Sartre’s ethics is the use of the Kantian notion that

ethical behavior is behavior that we would wish to become the rule for all

behavior*/that is, if I would not wish lying to be an acceptable rule of social

interaction, then ethically I should not lie (Kant 1964). This is an approach that

has some strength as it enables us to establish a criterion by which to form an

opinion as to whether a particular action or belief is ethically acceptable or not.

However, it could also be argued that it is too simplistic and does not take

account of the immense variability and complexity of moral matters. I wouldtherefore conclude that it is a useful moral precept, but it should not be seen as a

definitive statement of ethics, as that would be far too simplistic an approach to

this intricate area of thought and social practice (for a discussion of the debates

around these issues, see Hugman 2005, Chapter 2).

Sartre’s later works focused on wider social and political issues, and thisinvolved making use of a wide range of concepts drawn from sociology and social

theory. Two of these are particularly important. The first is that of ‘alienation’.

Sartre drew on Marxist understandings of alienation and was keen to emphasize

that social arrangements within a capitalist society have the effect of alienating

a large proportion of its citizens. As alienation can be construed as a harmful

process, this can be seen as unethical, albeit unethical at the level of social

organization, rather than that of individuals. It is a good example of how Sartre

linked ethics to politics and argued that the two should not be separated. Tounderstand what is morally acceptable is not a matter simply of understanding

individuals, but rather of also taking account of wider social and political

matters. This clearly has strong resonances with social work, where the

development of antidiscriminatory practice has shown the inadequacy of an

‘atomistic’ approach*/that is, one that focuses on individuals without reference

to wider sociopolitical factors (Mullaly 2002; Thompson 2003a).A further important concept is that of ‘seriality’. This refers to how people

can find themselves isolated (part of a series rather than part of a ‘fused group’,

a series being a collection of unconnected individuals*/a bus queue, for

example), separated from one another and, to a certain extent, from wider

society. This is another example of how the social order can have detrimental and

EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 17

therefore, in Sartre’s eyes, unethical consequences for its citizenry. The study ofethics in Sartrean existentialism therefore goes beyond individual rules ofbehavior and incorporates elements of the moral acceptability or otherwise

of social and political arrangements. It provides a more sociological analysis andthereby helps to address some of the weaknesses in Nietzsche’s approach, but

without losing any of its strengths.In this regard, existentialism provides a basis for challenging oppression.

Indeed, tackling oppression was a major feature of Sartre’s work, particularly inhis later writings (e.g., Sartre 1965). Although I am not arguing that the

development of social work values is premised on existentialist thought, thereis indeed a parallel here insofar as social work values in the United Kingdom andelsewhere have moved from a narrow individualistic conception associated with

a psychoanalytically influenced practice base in the 1960s and 1970s towardsemancipatory values premised on antidiscriminatory practice from the 1980s

onwards (Banks 2006; Thompson 2005).

Beyond Nietzsche and Sartre

The point was made earlier that Nietzsche’s work was also a strong influence onpostmodernist and postructuralist thought. To a large extent, such developments

(what McDonald (2006) refers to as ‘contemporary theory’) have occupied muchof the theoretical space previously the concern of existentialism, althoughwithout acknowledging the legacy it has gained from this philosophical tradition

in drawing on a number of existentialist concepts (Howells 1992a). A key featureof postmodernist thinking is the critique of metanarratives: the argument that

theoretical explanations should be small scale and specific and not part of a‘grand theory’ (Lyotard 1984). However, there is a double irony here. First,

postmodernism itself as a school of thought can be seen as a metanarrative, andso the critique is self-defeating (Sibeon 2004). This misguided emphasis on a

critique of metanarratives has therefore led, to a certain extent, to a theoreticalimpasse. Consequently, it is important to revisit existentialist thought, in part torehabilitate this canon and draw on its benefits and insights.

One particular aspect of this that is worth emphasizing is the work of Simonede Beauvoir (1972) in terms of gender equality. Nietzsche was to a large extent

misogynistic in his views (no doubt in large part influenced by the work ofSchopenhauer who was well known for his antipathy towards women and was a

significant influence on Nietzsche in his younger years). Sartre’s work, bycontrast, contains no such direct sexism, and does not directly address issues of

sexual equality. Writers such as Le Doeuff (1991) go so far as to argue that thisneglect of gender is an example of sexism in itself. However, Simone de Beauvoir

was a close companion of Sartre’s, personally and intellectually, and her ownwork on gender has established itself as a significant contribution to thedevelopment of feminist thinking. Her ideas have helped to broaden out Sartre’s

emphasis on oppression in relation to class and race. In particular, de Beauvoir’s

18 THOMPSON

concept of ‘alterity’ (or ‘otherness’) has proven very useful and is widely used infeminist scholarship. This refers to the way in which masculine perspectives areaccepted as the norm and issues relating to women’s perspectives are seen as

secondary or ‘other’. An example of this is the use of exclusive forms of language(‘he’ or ‘man’ to refer to people in general, including women; Cameron 1998;

Thompson 2003b).In some respects, this parallels the development of antidiscriminatory

practice in social work. The early emphasis of radical social work was onclass-based inequality and oppression (Bailey & Brake 1975; Corrigan & Leonard

1978). This was later broadened out to incorporate issues of gender equality andrace equality (see Thompson 2006). The work of Fanon in existentialism hasmade a significant contribution to our understanding of racism (Fanon 1963;

Gordon 1997), building on the work Sartre undertook in relation to antisemitism(Sartre 1965). Fanon’s work has strongly influenced the development of

postcolonial theory and has helped to establish the importance of challengingimperialist narratives that are both premised on, and supportive of, white

supremacist ideas (Sekyi-Otu 1996). However, what is yet to emerge is anydetailed treatment of issues relating to other areas of discrimination based on an

existentialist perspective*/for example, age, disability, sexual identity, religionand language (although de Beauvoir (1977) begins this process in relation to age

discrimination).

The Implications of Existentialist Ethics for Social Work Practice

A full and detailed analysis of the implications of existentialist ethics for

professional practice would require a book-length treatment. My aim here istherefore the more modest one of raising awareness of some key issues that

merit further exploration and development. I thus present a small number ofissues to consider in terms of how existentialist ethics have implications for

social work practice. These are presented by way of illustration and are notintended as a comprehensive overview. For further discussion of the linksbetween existentialism and social work, see Thompson (1992, 2000).

Perhaps the most important point to note from the discussions above is thatethics needs to be fluid and not absolutist. This is not a form of relativism in the

sense of ‘anything goes’, but rather what Sartre referred to as ‘relatio-nism’*/that is, the notion that everything is undertaken from a particular

standpoint (compare this with Nietzsche’s notion of ‘perspectivism’). In otherwords, what we must seek is an ethics of uncertainty, not the false, arrogant and

misleading certainty of essentialist moral prescription, but rather a free-spirited,authentic approach to recognizing the values underpinning our work and acting in

accordance with them. An ethics of uncertainty would involve an approach thatis fluid and tailored to the circumstances in question, rather than one based on anumber of fixed precepts. Here existentialism coincides with critically reflective

practice, with its emphasis on engaging critically with practice situations and

EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 19

creatively drawing on knowledge in ways that are consistent with valuesand ethical principles*/but which do not expect our professional knowledgeand value base to provide predefined answers (Thompson & Thompson 2008b).

The second important implication is that ethics needs to address macro-levelas well as micro-level issues. Ethics needs to be seen as part of social theory, not

as separate from it. Ethics and politics should therefore be seen as two sides ofthe same coin, rather than separate domains. As Hugman (2005, p. 30)

comments: ‘[E]thics is both individual and social. It is not possible to separatethese aspects; indeed, it is more helpful to think of ethics in terms of the

interaction between individual morality and social norms.’ Once we enter thesocial domain, we are also, of course, entering the political domain, for wherethere are people, there are power relations (Lukes 2005; Thompson 2007).

A third implication is that we should aim for an ethics of empowerment. IfNietzsche’s notion of self-overcoming is to be given credence, and if Sartre’s

emphasis on freedom and authenticity is to be valued for the insights theseconcepts bring, then the notion of empowerment needs to be at the forefront of

our ethical thinking. Social work is not a matter of doing things to people or‘looking after’ people in a patronizing way (Nietzsche was quite harsh in his

criticism of the notion of compassionate people who try to help withoutunderstanding the nature of human suffering and the ability to develop positively

from such suffering; see the discussion above of resilience, post-traumaticgrowth and transformational grief).

Conclusion

Existentialist thinking on ethics is wide ranging and complex. An article such asthis cannot possibly do justice to all the issues involved and makes no attempt to

do so. More realistically, what I have attempted to do here is to present some ofthe key issues as a stimulus to further thought, debate, analysis and study.

Existentialism is an underrated source of theoretical and practical insights (VanDeurzen & Arnold-Baker 2005), and it is to be hoped that the discussions here willhave helped to give readers some insight into how existentialist concepts have

the potential to be used effectively to develop our understanding.Based on Sartre’s later works, with their sociopolitical emphasis, it is a clear

implication of existentialist ethics is that self-overcoming and authenticity needto be understood in the context of cultural and structural factors (Rubinstein

2001; Thompson 2003a). Ethics needs to be seen as linked to politics and not asan alternative to it: political liberty must be premised on ontological free-

dom*/that is, changes at a broader level cannot occur if we deny the significanceof human agency at a personal and collective level (Thompson 1992).

It should be clear that, from an existentialist perspective, ethics needs to beconceptualized as a set of broad guidelines that need to be tailored to the actualcircumstances of the practice encounter (in line with the precepts of reflective

practice) and not on prescriptions divorced from the specifics of the situation

20 THOMPSON

(here existentialism is consistent with Foucault’s approach to ethics; seeRabinow 2000). Ethics can then be part of a project of authenticity and self-overcoming and thus of empowerment. An overgeneralized ethics of essentialist

prescription, by contrast, can be seen to be demeaning, disempowering andtherefore ultimately oppressive.

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