1

Partnership response to the disturbances in August 2011

Executive Summary

1. The disturbances of August 2011 which involved rioting and looting in various

locations across the UK, required a wide variety of organisations to respond

effectively to deal with the level of resulting unrest. The primary operational

response was provided by the police, but a range of other organisations were

utilised in order to assist the police to prevent further unrest, deal with the potential

causes and any “ripple effect”. The main vehicles through which these organisations

were coordinated within local areas were Community Safety Partnerships1.

2. CSU used a semi-structured interview approach with a number of Community Safety

Managers (CSMs) at Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs), in areas both directly

affected and un-affected by the disturbances to collect information regarding their

prevention, response, and resilience activities, together with assessments of why

some areas were affected whilst others were not. More detail of the methodology,

and areas spoken to, is at Annex A.

3. Prevention and response activity focused on an immediate increase in police

presence and enhancement of shift patterns in all areas either directly or indirectly

affected, to deal with disorder and provide public reassurance. CSPs coordinated

and disseminated information in the form of: intelligence from communities; CCTV

information; social media feeds; and reassurance updates, using their established

communication links with CSP partners including businesses, the Voluntary and

Community Sector (VCS), and the public generally.

4. The key partners identified by CSMs were the Police, Fire and Rescue Services, Youth

Offending Services, Social Care, Probation and the Local Authority. The partnership

activity identified by the research included the following:

- Housing providers were important in the provision of accurate information and

assisting with possible sanctions to do with tenancy/social housing;

1 Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) were introduced under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and facilitate

the establishment of partnerships between Local Authorities, Police, Police Authorities, Fire and Rescue

Service, Probation, Health Authorities, the VCS, local residents and businesses. The partnerships work to

reduce crime and disorder by establishing the problems in their areas, consulting widely with the local

population to ensure accurate understanding of local issues, and developing strategies to tackle priority

problems.

2

- The Youth Services were a crucial link in provision of information about known

offenders in order to help quell further disorder and to help police with their

enquiries;

- The VCS played a pivotal role during the events by providing youth services to

divert, distract, inform and advise the younger population about how to respond,

and by providing access to outreach services;

- The VCS helped significantly in communication with the public by having access

to key groups and networks that are otherwise hard to reach;

- The use of voluntary community mediators and street pastors to help quell

frustration and anger within local communities was seen to be invaluable by

those areas that used them, with the particular benefit coming from the fact that

the individuals often lived in the areas and were familiar with not only the

people, but the local issues and tensions. They were also often respected

members of the community and could therefore operate at all levels within the

community;

- Community faith groups are generally engaged as a matter of course during

normal situations and so in the main, these networks were well established

which enabled communications and reassurance messages to be disseminated

through these groups quickly and efficiently;

- Businesses playing an important role in the disturbances by closing early, thereby

helping to reduce footfall and taking additional preventative measures to avoid

violence. Businesses were also key in communicating reassurance messages to

the public and providing intelligence to the police about potential areas of

unrest;

- Schools and Universities played a key role assisting the authorities with advice,

information about student involvement, contact details etc and were able to

provide key information to significant audiences at a time when it was most

needed; and,

- The CJS, who were under enormous pressure at the time to process all the

individuals through the system, in many areas across London particularly, sat for

24 hour court proceedings to manage the throughput.

5. Many CSMs in the areas spoken to unaffected by disorder, felt that this was due in

part to the strong preventative approaches in place, and the strong pre-existing

partnership arrangements. Their associated communication and management

3

procedures meant the multi-agency response was largely ‘business as usual’. The

responses indicate that the more established partnerships working together on a

daily basis to share information, resulted in a more efficient response, with more

clarity and ownership for tasks, and where needed, proactive action to manage and

deal with the wider community issues.

6. The unrest unfolded across England from the 8th August and, with the exception of

the disorder seen in Tottenham, appeared to involve individuals who were set on

violent disorder and looting, using the events in Tottenham as an excuse for criminal

behaviour. Most of the offenders were males aged between 17 and 30, with a small

minority having gang affiliation, and a number being previously known to

authorities.

7. The Riot Communities and Victims Panel are currently carrying out extensive

consultation with communities to look in depth at the causes of the disturbances.

CSMs highlighted the lack of positive activities for young people as a major

contributory factor, making young people more vulnerable to gang membership and

anti-social behaviour

Results

The response to the disturbances

The Immediate Response

8. The Police and their community safety partners were quick to respond as the unrest

unfolded by instigating emergency planning procedures. Local Resilience Plans were

utilised in a high number of cases, but the interviews suggest that partnership

arrangements were so strong (described as ‘business as usual’) in most areas

affected that formal review of the local resilience plan was not required, as effective

communication directed timely activity.

9. Police forces formed Gold Command Groups at the outset of the disorder and in

most cases the Chief Executive of the local authority, or another senior member of

the CSP or local authority, were active members. Silver Command Groups were also

formed in a number of areas and again, CSP staff formed integral members of those

groups. Daily meetings took place within areas directly affected by the disturbances,

facilitating a more effective response to the unrest than if partners were working

alone. In many cases, the VCS were also included in meetings in order to harness

their skills and resources, particularly those working with young people and young

offenders e.g. Outreach groups. All CSPs directly affected expressed high levels of

satisfaction with the way partners worked together in order to manage the

immediate crisis, and in the clarity of responsibility which drove clarity of

4

communication. The benefits realised by including a wide range of partners,

particularly the VCS, in Gold/Silver groups was emphasised as being key to a

successful, holistic approach to prevention of further disturbance.

The Operational Response

10. The operational response in those areas directly affected was an immediate increase

in police numbers and visibility, achieved through: using Police Community Support

Officers; Special Constabulary; cancellation of all leave; increasing shift patterns; and

mutual aid. Public order policing tactics were used in all cases where direct disorder

was experienced. ”Softer” approaches were used in areas not directly affected but at

high risk including obtaining warrants to search known offenders and using Penalty

Notices for Disorder (PNDs) to deal with low level anti-social behaviour. Dispersal

tactics were used by all areas to stop the build up of large groups of people. In most

cases it appeared to be informal, however the use of current and newly acquired

dispersal orders were reported by Harrow, Solihull, Leicester and Gloucester CSP.

These powers contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the policing response

within the areas affected.

The wider ‘social’ response

11. CSPs were an extremely important communications link between authorities and

communities. They were the main vehicle for receiving information and intelligence

from the community and sending out emails and internet updates to give the current

state of play from responsible authorities. They also managed the delivery of

numerous community meetings to reassure residents and businesses and to offer

advice and support in the aftermath of the disturbances.

12. Police officers and other partners were involved in community meetings, and in

areas that were directly affected have maintained advice centres for people to

continue to use. Due to their extensive links with the community and other relevant

departments, CSPs coordinated not only community, faith and race groups, but also

housing and social care, and voluntary and community organisations working directly

within local areas. These were seen by residents and businesses to be extremely

helpful in providing support for the application of grants, business continuity

support, advice for homelessness and for general trusted advice about what was

going on in their communities.

5

13. Haringey CSP immediately began to coordinate activity which included the

establishment of a dedicated 'Tottenham Business Advice Service' for residents and

businesses affected by the riots to receive advice on housing, insurance, legal and

business continuity. Partners including CSP partners and VCS partners and affected

businesses provided 1:1 support. Officers are continuing to support businesses to

claim for damages from the Council's Tottenham Fund, the Mayor of London's High

Street Fund and the Government's High Street Support Fund. The Council has

offered up to 3 months hardship relief exemption from business rates for businesses

within the affected area. The community and council have developed an 'I Love

Tottenham' campaign to promote the High Road and are seeking funding activities to

encourage shoppers and visitors such as markets, mini festivals, outdoor

performances, public art etc. A Health and Welfare Recovery Group continues to

oversee the work ensuring the borough stays in touch with those affected by the

riots and continues to signpost them to support, including psychological support,

housing and business support. The Haringey Community Panel of community

members has been set up to engage the community, and the borough has received a

visit from the National Riots Victims and Communities Panel set up to look into the

riots (including motivations and causation, how public services engaged, and

community resilience).

14. A number of businesses closed early across the country during the peak of the unrest

after advice from the CSP that disorder could be imminent. The business advice

provided to local communities was coordinated by CSPs and included advice on

business continuity, insurance claims, funding/grants available and information and

advice on where to go in the event of disorder etc. The police and CSP partners were

also visiting businesses in the days and weeks after the events in a number of areas

to give them advice on how to secure their buildings, and continued business

support to help them get back on their feet as soon as possible.

15. A number of CSPs reported working with the VCS in the form of street pastors and

community mediators, to be an extremely effective way to gather intelligence, quell

rumour and deal with smaller scale tensions that might arise within their local

communities. Oldham, Swindon and Sutton all reported effective use of the

voluntary sector in this way, suggesting that by having contacts residing within

different areas of the community who can be called upon to provide their local

knowledge at times of unrest if required, the community enjoys more reassurance,

feels more represented, and is more likely to provide intelligence and information

than to official authorities.

6

16. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, Blackberry Network etc) was used extensively by

both sides of those involved in the disturbances. In the first instance, it was used by

potential rioters, to encourage and in some cases actively incite other people to join

them in the disorder. All CSPs reported having good social media monitoring

activities in place at the time, which allowed them to monitor the activity and

tensions in their areas. Most CSPs also have their own Facebook and Twitter pages

with increasing numbers of followers, and this allowed them to correct

misinformation and offer additional reassurances. 26 (83%) of CSPs contacted who

were directly affected, reported taking part in social media preventative activity

(40% of all CSPs taking part).

17. Although social media was used by offenders to facilitate the disturbances

throughout the country, rather than attempting to shut off access to social media

during any future outbreak, it was claimed that maintaining normal activity not only

gives authorities a possible advance notice of outbreak, but also allows law

enforcement to track and monitor key nominals and use the evidence during

prosecution in court.

What prevention activity took place?

18. Once the initial disturbances had begun during the evening of August 8th across

London, many CSPs not yet affected began to put preventative activities in place to

attempt to minimise the likelihood of disorder in their areas. All the CSPs spoken to

had instated critical incident procedures almost immediately. The resulting actions

clearly varied according to whether or not the areas were subsequently affected. In

most cases CSPs were integral in coordinating the resulting actions to ensure they

could be implemented through their extensive use of community groups and

contacts.

19. Pre-existing partnership arrangements in most CSPs that we spoke to facilitated

effective information sharing. The sharing of intelligence across all partners was a

key element of an effective prevention and response strategy and this looked to be

‘business as usual’ in the vast majority of CSPs. The sharing of details of key youths

already known to the authorities to be actively involved in gang or delinquent youth

group related anti-social behaviour and disorder enabled proactive engagement with

those individuals and their families by the police and CSP partners to discourage

them from becoming involved. This sharing of information also took place with

probation where a number of CSPs reported partnership activity around preventing

offenders just recently released from prison from becoming involved. This included

the provision of advice relating to sanctions that could apply e.g. Acceptable

Behaviour Contracts (ABCs), Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) or Criminal Anti-

7

Social Behaviour Orders (CrASBOs) if young offenders recently released from prison

were to re-offend in this way.

20. CSPs within all areas contacted had had direct involvement in the coordination of

responsive and preventative activities which included:

- Organising for street cleaning to be carried out early in the morning to allow

normal business to resume the next day;

- Contacting utility companies which had road works happening at that time in the

area, to ensure all street furniture or items that could be used as potential

missiles were removed;

- Rubbish removals operatives were also brought in (prior to their next scheduled

round) to ensure all rubbish was removed from domestic and business properties

to minimise the risk of arson; and

- Acting as the main contact and dissemination point of all communications to and

from authorities, including updates and briefing from police and authorities

which were disseminated out by the CSP to their networks of contacts including

the VCS and within the community.

21. Some prevention activities were reported by CSMs to have worked particularly well

in partnership, including:

- A coordinated joined up approach to CCTV with operatives providing information

to police for prevention and prosecution processes;

- The ability to share information and updates, together with messages of

reassurance to a significant number of people in quick time using CSP partner

contacts;

- Coordinated deployment of resources to avoid duplication and provide clarity;

and

- Co-location of council officials at police stations for the duration of the unrest to

manage the various agencies required.

22. For those CSPs that subsequently experienced disorder, CCTV evidence has been

critical in not only identifying the offenders, but also in prosecution approaches.

CSPs often took the lead role in coordinating control room facilities for all relevant

authorities taking an active part i.e. Police, FRS, with CCTV playing a critical role in

command and control processes. Some CSPs located officials within police stations

to enhance partnership working, and some created control room facilities within

8

their offices, where co-location existed, or where the relevant facilities were easier

to access.

23. For those CSPs that did not subsequently suffer disorder, CCTV helped significantly in

identifying groups that were congregating and allowed proactive intervention to

take place to dispel or disperse potentially problematic groups.

24. Redbridge Safer Communities Partnership coordinated resources for the Emergency

Control Centre (ECC) and maximised the use of CCTV by locating an official with a

police officer in the ECC for the duration of the period to monitor social media

activity and feed intelligence to the CCTV room which had been set up in an

adjoining conference room with 10 terminals. This allowed cross referencing of

intelligence and better deployment of resources to affected areas. The facility is still

up and running and being used by youth workers, probation officers etc to further

identify known offenders.

What was the level and extent of damage?

25. The extent of damage as a result of the unrest showed significant variation within

CSPs that were directly affected from minimal damage with minor criminal damage

and anti-social behaviour (e.g. Leicester), to those that suffered extensive damage to

businesses, domestic premises, petrol stations and police stations and experienced

rioting, looting, arson and firearms incidents (e.g. Tottenham and Croydon). Where

damage was extensive, CSPs reported that targets tended to be retail shopping areas

including town centres, religious buildings and police stations.

26. Some CSPs not directly affected reported having residents who had been involved in

the disorder in neighbouring areas, and some reported suffering from anti-social

behaviour and violent disorder including arson, robbery, looting and throwing

missiles. Generally these incidents were minor and were dealt with quickly by the

officers involved.

Why were some areas affected, while others were not?

27. Many of the areas that were hit badly appeared to be shopping centres or town

centres, and many of the CSMs spoken to suggest that the disturbances tended to

affect those areas that had high rewards, in terms of looting possibilities, and that

had good transport links which facilitated movement of large numbers of people.

This appears to be borne out when looking at the demographics of the individuals

involved who were more likely to come from deprived areas within the locality, than

richer areas.

9

28. The data also suggested that where localities contain areas of both deprivation and

wealth, located side by side within close proximity, residents from more deprived

areas tended to be the main offenders of rioting and looting in neighbouring richer

areas. The data suggested that in the main, offenders did not travel far from their

residential homes to perpetrate disorder, and so in areas where wealth and

deprivation exist side by side, the temptation to cause disturbance and exploit the

opportunity to loot, for some, could have been too hard to resist.

29. A number of CSPs which are located on the borders of areas where violence and

rioting took place suffered no problems at all despite their proximity to trouble.

Others reported suffering quite seriously from the disturbances being carried out

nearby and had to deal with arson, looting, burglary and general anti-social

behaviour, on a smaller scale, which was dealt with effectively and was seen to quell

any potential larger disturbances. CSPs that unexpectedly did not suffer from

disturbance suggested that this was due mostly to the proactive police presence and

preventative work carried out by CSPs which included correcting misinformation

using social media and internet channels, and engaging community contacts to

spread messages of reassurance. Police officers used dispersal methods to minimise

large groups congregating and in partnership with the local authority and CSP

conducted target hardening to protect potential targets and maintain peace. Formal

dispersal orders were generally not mentioned explicitly but reference was often

made to the utilisation of dispersal as a means to quell potential violence.

What was the response of areas previously affected by riots?

30. Bradford and Oldham CSP were both unaffected by the current period of unrest, but

have had experience of extensive rioting in 2001 in May (Oldham) and July

(Bradford). Following the 2001 riots, both areas have adopted extensive partnership

working arrangements across the responsible authorities and within the voluntary

and community sectors which were reported to have contributed significantly to the

lack of disorder experienced during recent months.

10

31. At the time of the recent unrest nationally, Oldham was experiencing a significant

increase from community tension due to the collapse of a murder trial in which both

victim and offender were linked to rival organised crime groups. In addition, because

of its proximity to Manchester, social media monitoring gave a strong indication that

the violence that had erupted in Manchester would similarly affect Oldham. On the

night of potential disturbance in Oldham, the policing presence was increased,

volunteers in the form of community mediators and street pastors were engaging

with the community, and youth prevention teams were utilised on the streets to

attempt to quiet any unrest. Oldham is part of the Tackling Knives Action Plan

(TKAP) and so already has a strong infrastructure in place to tackle youth related

violence and disturbance and believe that this strongly contributed to the lack of

trouble in Oldham.

Who took part in the unrest?

32. The data available at the time suggested that those taking part were mostly male

and generally aged between 17 and 30. Those involved represented a broad mixture

of ethnic groups and offenders generally did not stray far from their residential

homes. Some CSPs reported involvement of individuals who were gang affiliated but

this was seen to be in the minority. A high number of individuals involved were from

deprived areas and were unemployed, and a small number were aged under 16.

What drove the unrest?

33. The Riot Communities and Victims Panel chaired by Darra Singh and supported by

DCLG, are currently carrying out extensive consultation with communities to look in

depth at:

- the motivation for the riots;

- why the riots happened in some areas and not in others;

- how key public services engaged with communities before, during and after the

riots;

- the motivations of local people to come together to take civic action to resist the

riots or to clean up their area after the riots had taken place;

- how communities can be made more socially and economically resilient in the

future, and

- what they think could have been done differently to prevent or manage the riots.

11

34. The Panel are due to deliver early findings by November 2011, and present their final

report in March 2012.

The CSM view

35. In the absence of the Panel’s findings, CSMs were asked their opinion of why the

riots occurred, either in their areas or in other areas affected.

36. The general consensus was that it was a small minority of individuals, who became

involved in copy cat, opportunistic rioting and looting, using the incidents in London

that sparked off the first riot, namely the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan by police

officers in Tottenham on the 6th August, as an excuse to riot and loot in their areas.

It was suggested that the deployment of police officers as mutual aid to London may

have suggested, incorrectly, that the remaining police were not able to provide

sufficient resilience, and some individuals chose to take advantage of that and

attempt civil unrest. Available data suggests that although there was an element of

organised criminality/gang member involvement, this was in the minority, with the

majority of people unknown previously to the authorities.

37. The vast majority of CSMs spoken to from areas that encountered disorder reported

no previous indications at all. A few experienced minor incidents prior to the events

(Croydon, Camden, Merton, Manchester, Leeds, Harrow) which led them to put

strong preventative measures into place but in the main, the unrest came

‘completely out of the blue’.

38. A large number of CSPs involved speculated that disillusionment amongst younger

people with their role in society, could also have contributed to the outbreak.

Community Safety Partnerships felt that a number of factors currently affecting

young people may have triggered frustration and led to violent outbreaks including:

- a lack of employment opportunities and future prospects;

- poor educational attainment and few training possibilities;

- high levels of alcohol and drug abuse;

- an increase in public sector cuts which has significantly affected the provision of

youth services;

- a lack of (distraction) activities during the evening and weekend for young

people;

- a lack of respect for others from both adults and young people;

- an increase in student fees and a decrease in financial support available; and

- a high incidence of dysfunctional families with poor role models and unstable

housing arrangements.

12

39. However, most also suggested that the above factors alone were not sufficient to

cause the outbreaks of disorder; they felt that the media coverage of the riots

beginning on the 8th Augusts fuelled people across the country to take part, and that

if the coverage had been less ‘frenzied’, the outbreaks could have been better

contained.

40. The lack of positive activities for young people was cited as the single most

important issue for youth by almost all CSMs spoken to. Concerns regarding young

people being vulnerable to gang membership and anti-social behaviour were raised

as a result of a lack of positive youth activities. Many CSPs work hard with partners

to increase access to positive activities which in turn take young people off the

streets and encourage them to focus on constructive activity rather than destructive;

it was clear that the majority of CSPs felt that the government funding cuts has

resulted in a decrease in youth activities locally and highlighted the potential link

between a lack of activities for the youth and an increase in involvement in anti-

social behaviour and/or disturbance. Furthermore, some of the CSPs that were not

affected have in place very strong partnership arrangements relating to youth

activities and have asserted that it is due to the strong commitment and priority

attached to such services, that disturbance was avoided.

41. North East Lincolnshire did not suffer from disorder during the recent disturbances

which they put in part, down to their ‘Positive Activities’ programme, which is

Coordinated by North East Lincolnshire CSP. It involves partnership activity between

Sport Lincs, Humberside Police, North East Lincolnshire Council’s Sports

Development, Positive Futures, Young Peoples Support Service and Grimsby Town

Football in the community. The multi-agency partnership has been established in

order to reduce Anti-social behaviour and youth crime by engaging young people in

positive activities which can then be used as a tool to develop good social skills, as

well as giving young people something to do and somewhere to go. The programme

uses sport as a stimulant to encourage young people to make their own positive

influential decisions and to enrich their lifestyles with future educational and

employment opportunities through the means of regular physical activity.

Do areas have problems with Youth Gangs?

42. Of the 31 areas spoken to which were directly affected by the disorder, 19 (61%)

reported having historical or emerging problems with gangs or delinquent youth

13

groups2. A further 8 CSMs (24%) from areas not affected by the recent disorder, had

similar problems3. All 27 (42% of all areas spoken to) have strategies to deal with

their gang problems, which involve a range of different interventions from support,

distraction through to enforcement.

43. Westminster has seen an escalation of serious youth violence and gang related

activity in the past 2 years and has a strong partnership approach to addressing

serious youth violence. This strong joined-up response of agencies was reported to

have played a significant role in minimising the impact of the recent street

disturbances. Key activities that form part of the strategy include: a dedicated gang

worker, parenting workers and support, cross border gang mediation, conflict

resolution in schools, joint operations by MPS and Locality Young People Workers

and monitoring of gang members through gang multi-agency partnership meetings.

Over the summer, the council developed the 'Your Choice' gang diversion

programme designed to offer young people a choice, to either desist from gangs,

with support from the council, VCS and partners who will provide support through a

package of interventions, otherwise all enforcement options will be explored in

order to put a stop to their gang involvement. The programme aims to identify the

identity of gang members and make more effective use of shared intelligence

through a partnership Gang Information Desk.

44. Southwark have developed a Violent Crime Strategy which includes home visits to

families of gang members, help with moving house (for gang members who want to

leave via “SERVE”, the first scheme in the country), working with schools, risk

management and call-ins. This has resulted in a large reduction in the amount of

serious violent crime in Southwark.

2 Includes Croydon, Westminster, Enfield, Southwark, Islington, Redbridge, Lewisham, Hackney, Sutton,

Hammersmith & Fulham, Birmingham, Manchester, Wolverhampton, Liverpool, Sandwell, Bristol, Gloucester,

Leeds, Oxford.

3 Includes Sheffield, Luton, Oldham, Trafford, St. Helens, Harrow, South Ribble, Hounslow.

14

45. Islington has developed an Integrated Youth Services, consisting of universal play

and youth services, detached work, gangs prevention and youth offending. All staff

within the integrated services link with police, Safer Neighbourhood Teams and

community leaders within local partnerships to ensure that work with gangs is joined

up. Since 2007, Islington Council, police and other partners have developed a series

of services and initiatives to address gangs and serious youth violence. The Bronze

Group was established in 2008 and is a multi agency operational meeting which aims

to prevent and reduce young people's involvement in gang activity, group offending

and violent crime in Islington by identifying and prioritising those at most risk either

as a victim or perpetrator, facilitating information sharing, coordinating action plans

and planning and risk assessing young people's return to the community from prison.

The Early Intervention and Protection Team (EIP) is based in Islington Targeted Youth

Support-Youth Offending Service and is linked to secondary schools and delivers

workshops and provides specialist support to young people, especially women who

are at risk from gangs or from sexual exploitation.

What is the extent of provision of activity for young people?

46. Those CSPs which were affected, and those that were not are carrying out a wide

variety of initiatives and activities to attempt to engage their younger population

and work together to solve some of the problems facing young people. Some of the

larger areas have instigated Youth Parliaments and Youth Question Time sessions, to

allow a greater understanding of the priorities of young people and how some of the

problems encountered can be resolved.

47. Following the recent events, the Gloucester Youth Peace Project was launched for

young people in order to distract them from gang membership and involves events

such as the Youth Showcase Event to showcase the activities still current in and

around the city for young people aged 5 - 20 years. The Youth Peace Project will

follow a programme that values education rather than acting as a drop-in and aims

to harness the skills and motivation of young people in a more constructive way.

15

48. Harlow CSP has responded to calls for suitable activities and premises for young

people by working in partnership with the Youth Council to provide Café Youth and a

state-of-the-art skate park which have both given young people safe and appropriate

places to congregate and have acted as a deterrent to anti-social behaviour and

crime. In addition, the Harlow Citizenship Scheme for young people has included

environmental projects and inter-generational work to improve understanding and

relationships between young people and the older community, and the Kickz Project

provides a range of activities for young people including football coaching by

professionals from Tottenham Hotspur FC.

49. Community Safety Managers also referred to programmes that were centrally

funded pointing to the significant benefits realised within the community. For

instance, Ipswich received funding, until recently, for their Anti-social Behaviour

Family Intervention Programme and Parenting Skills programme, which was

delivering excellent results with those families that were causing the most problems,

until the funding was stopped. A number of CSMs suggested that current

arrangements mean that the funding available goes straight to the county councils

which tends to mean that some of the less visible community work loses out on

funding. This is having a significant effect on the amount and level of provision that

can be offered within the community.

Was Community Cohesion a factor?

50. In most of the areas contacted, CSMs reported relatively high levels of community

cohesion with small pockets within areas where cohesion was lower, but the vast

majority experienced good community relations with high levels of cohesion.

51. Communities voiced their satisfaction with the police response to the disorder and

the prompt action by the CJS in all areas surveyed, and in some cases were helping

the authorities by providing names and addresses of individuals involved in the

disorder.

52. All areas spoken to reported that the disturbances had triggered high numbers of

members of the public, not involved in the disturbances, to send information and

intelligence to coordinating authorities about where the unrest was breaking out,

areas of congregating youths etc which greatly increased the ability of the police,

through partnership with other appropriate authorities, to quell potential outbreaks

and to take out the key nominals that were inciting the violence. The small numbers

involved in the outbreaks across the country, also support the assertion that in

general, members of the public did not want to get involved, or be involved in the

16

disturbances, and were doing everything they could to proactively limited the

amount of damage caused by, in some cases, using themselves as shields, to protect

religious buildings, or by contributing intelligence about locality of unrest and

identity of offenders to enable key arrests to take place.

53. Information from DCLG suggests that over 72,000 followers subscribe to a Twitter

page set up post the riots (#RiotCleanUp) which has further mobilised communities

to take part in community activities and post riot enquiries that have been set up.

Compared to the total number arrested over the period for the disturbances

(approximately 5000), this number shows the relative level of activism existing in

communities.

54. In the majority of areas that were hit by significant disturbance, communities

assembled themselves using social media and community word of mouth, to carry

out ‘Community Clean Ups’ which were attended by many residents who all showed

great civic pride in their areas, and high levels of satisfaction and confidence in the

police response to the period of disturbance.

55. Reports from CMSs suggested that as a result of working together and engaging

during the period of unrest, many areas are finding that a better dialogue now exists

between the community and the police, which has also helped to bring communities

together in a positive way. Community activism was high directly after the disorder

with communities mobilising themselves to help practically with clean ups and also

to show support in a number of different ways.

56. The community of Peckham created a Peace Wall which was instigated by local

people and supported by various community groups. Post-it notes were handed out

by community group members and people were encouraged to write messages of

cohesion. Following this a series of community events were also run arranged by

local groups but supported and promoted by the CSP. These included arts activities,

Run the Rye - a charity run and music events (supported by the Ministry of Sound).

57. A large number of areas saw communities working together to create ‘I Love .. ‘

campaigns in the immediate aftermath of the disorder. Manchester and Tottenham

were other examples of communities harnessing the energy post-riot and using it in

a constructive way to increase the community pride in a locality. Partnerships

supported and promoted the ‘I love.. ‘ campaigns but they were generally created by

communities, for communities.

17

ANNEX A

Methodology

The Community Safety Unit were asked to identify the types of activities CSPs which

were directly and indirectly affected by the riots, were carrying out in response to

the disturbances, in order to highlight effective practice and innovative partnership

working, which could inform other partnerships across the country.

CSPs that were directly affected by the riots (according to information received from

DCLG from daily Situation Reports from Local Authorities during the period in

question), and those that unexpectedly were not affected (chosen from previous

knowledge of these areas and using the National Protective Services Assessment

Tool (NPSAT) Public Order Domain to assess which police forces were deemed to be

high risk according to the indicators), were contacted by telephone or email in order

to gather information regarding the CSP response to the period of unrest. The

results from that work are detailed below.

A total of 98 Community Safety Managers (CSMs) were contacted by telephone or

email over the course of three weeks. 64 of those (65%) provided data and of this

number, 48% (n=31) were CSPs that were directly affected by the riots, and 52%

(n=33) were those CSPs that were unexpectedly not affected. Details of the CSPs

contacted can be found at Appendix A. The data which was gathered from each CSP

included information relating to their preventative, response or resilience activity in

relation to the disturbances, the extent of their partnership working, perceptions

regarding why the unrest occurred and who took part, and information relating to

youth problems in their locality. The details of questions used for this work can be

found at Appendix B.

18

APPENDIX A

List of CSPs contacted for this work:

CSPs that were directly affected by the period of unrest: (* - contributed data for this work)

Safer Croydon Partnership *

Greenwich CSP

Haringey Safer Communities Partnership *

Wandsworth CSP

Westminster CSP *

Enfield CSP *

Safer Southwark Partnership *

Safer Ealing Partnership

Camden CSP *

Waltham Forest CSP

Islington CSP *

Safer Bromley Partnership

Redbridge Safer Communities Partnership *

Safer Merton Partnership *

Lambeth CSP

Lewisham CSP *

Hackney CSP *

Tower Hamlets CSP

Barking & Dagenham CSP

Newham CSP

Kensington & Chelsea CSP

Hillingdon CSP

Safer Sutton *

Brent CSP

Barnet CSP

Richmond CSP *

Bexley CSP

Hammersmith & Fulham CSP *

Birmingham CSP *

Salford CSP *

Manchester CSP *

Leicester CSP *

Wolverhampton CSP *

Liverpool CSP *

19

South Nottinghamshire CSP *

Sandwell CSP *

Wirral CSP *

Bristol CSP *

Milton Keynes CSP

Kirklees CSP

Sefton CSP

Gloucester CSP *

Leeds CSP *

Reading CSP

Oxford CSP *

South Gloucestershire CSP *

Wiltshire CSP

Southampton CSP *

Lewes CSP

Coventry CSP *

Medway CSP *

CSPs unexpectedly NOT affected by the riots:

Newcastle CSP *

Cardiff CSP

Sheffield CSP *

Luton CSP *

Bolton CSP *

Bury CSP *

Oldham CSP *

Rochdale CSP

Safer Stockport Partnership *

Tameside CSP

Trafford CSP *

Wigan & Leigh CSP

St Helens CSP *

Knowsley CSP *

City of London CSP *

Safer Harrow Partnership *

Havering CSP *

Safer Kingston Partnership *

Dudley CSP

Walsall CSP

20

Solihull CSP *

Bradford CSP *

Calderdale CSP

Wakefield CSP *

Swindon CSP *

Burnley CSP *

Blackburn with Darwen CSP *

Blackpool CSP *

Fylde CSP *

Lancaster CSP

Wyre CSP

South Ribble CSP

Chorley CSP *

West Lancashire CSP

Preston CSP *

Ribble Valley CSP *

Pendle CSP

Rossendale CSP

Hounslow CSP *

Portsmouth CSP

Harlow CSP *

Spelthorne CSP *

Warwick CSP *

Rhonnda Cynon Taff CSP *

Swale CSP *

Ipswich CPS *

Slough CSP *

21

APPENDIX B

Questions asked of CSPs directly affected by the disturbances:

1. Are you the correct person to speak to about the CSPs response to the recent

disturbances? If not, who should I speak to?

2. Can you briefly explain whether your area was affected, and if so, to what extent?

Where were the key disturbances?

3. Why do you think those areas were targeted rather than other areas within your LA?

4. In your opinion, why do you think the disorder happened?

5. Who do you think took part? (males, females, age groups?)

6. What are the key issues for young people in your LA?

7. To what extent is there a sense of community / community cohesion in your local

area?

8. Does your LA/CSP have a problem with youth gangs? And if so, does the LA/CSP do

any proactive work with youth gangs? (we are not referring to Organised Crime

Groups/Gangs here, just youth gangs)

9. If so, are you willing to be contacted in a week or so's time for a more in-depth

conversation about the CSP work with gangs?

10. What role did the CSP play during the period? Did you use your Local Resilience

Plan?

11. Did you see any indications of raised tensions in the local area before the disturbances took place?

12. Did you work with any partners/partnerships during the period? 13. Did you work with the voluntary sector at all during the period

14. Did anything work particularly well when working in partnership compared to working alone?

15. If so, would it be something you are willing to provide more details about for others

to learn from?

16. Have you made any changes to your resilience plan/partnership structures or doing anything differently as a result of what happened,?

Questions asked of CSPs unexpectedly NOT affected by the disturbances included the

question “Although your LA/CSP did not suffer disorder directly, what if anything, did you do

22

in your local area in response to the riots elsewhere e.g. preventative/reassurance work,

police intelligence, increased police visibility?” in addition to the above.