001 air philippines corp vs penswell incGR 172835 | Dec 13 2007 | J. Chico-Nazario

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.

Facts:Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.In its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of.Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion.Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before SC.ISSUE(S): W/N CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioner’s motion to subject respondent’s products to compulsory disclosure.HELD: NO

RATIO: No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.

The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution. SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:

(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s business;(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source.

Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized lubricants — namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound — are not consumer products.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013TOPIC:PONENTE: Abad, J.

AUTHOR:

FACTS:

Nature: This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.

1. On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

2. Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

3. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.2

4. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.

5. On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.HELD: DENIED. No. CA decision AFFIRMED.

- Trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

- For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records

RATIO:- Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she

wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

x x x x

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.

- The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:

SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature . She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the

patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.

003 Marcos vs Heirs of NavarroG.R. No. 198240, July 03, 2013TOPIC: Rule 130PONENTE: Villarama Jr., J.:

AUTHOR: Mr. ZNOTES:

FACTS:1. Spouses Navarro passed away and left behind several parcels of land. They were survived by their daughters, Luisa Navarro Marcos

(petitioner) and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son, Andres Navarro. The heirs of Andres are the respondents in this case.

2. Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the lot based on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. donated the lot to Andres, Jr.

3. The sisters requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit.4. The PNP handwriting expert, PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez, found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard

signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by the same person.5. The sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation.6. Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness.7. RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified Alvarez as a witness, ruling that her supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no

personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.

8. CA dismissed the sisters’ petition for certiorari.

ISSUE(S): Whether PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witnessHELD: No.

RATIO: Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.

Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.

The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification.

The RTC confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence. PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would not be hearsay. Under Section 49 of Rule 130, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion. Although the word “may” in Sec. 49 of Rule 130 signifies that the use of the opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on

the part of the courts, handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents.

RTC shouldn’t have disqualified Alvarez as a witness. She has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a witness under the Rules.

The analysis of the signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres, Sr. is crucial to the resolution of the case.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

004 PEOPLE v. CAÑETEG.R. No. 142930 March 28, 2003Topic: Examination of a Child WitnessPonente: Callejo, Sr., J.

NOTES/FF:Full text of this case contains the transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial which you might need to refer to if ever asked in the recitation.

FACTS:

1. In January 1996, after the separation of her parents, 12-year old Alma lived along with her father, who later on became blind and paralytic, in the house of her uncle Kakingcio Cañete and his family in Capoocan, Leyte.

2. On February 1, 1996, Alejandra, the common-law wife of Kakingcio, visited her daughter in Kananga, Leyte, leaving behind Kakingcio and their two young children and Paquito and Alma. At about 8:00 p.m., Alma was already asleep. Paquito was sleeping near her feet. The house was dark. Momentarily, Alma was awakened when she felt someone caressing her. It was Kakingcio. she could smell liquor from his breath. He poked an 8-inch long knife on her neck and whispered to her: “Ma, don’t tell your yaya because I will do something to you.” There and then, Kakingcio then inserted his private organ into Alma’s vagina and made a push and pull movement of his body. Alma felt pain in her private part and could do nothing but cry as Kakingcio ravished her. In the process, Alma lost consciousness.

3. On April 26, 1996, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, charging Kakingcio with rape. When arraigned, Kakingcio, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

4. When he testified, Kakingcio denied having sexually assaulted Alma. He interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that he was a farmer. He planted root crops such as banana. On February 1, 1996, he went to the house of Romulo Lukaba located at Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte, about three kilometers from his house, for the purpose of accompanying and helping Rolly Lukaba, the son of Romulo, gather coconuts in the coconut plantation of Romulo in the mountains. It took Kakingcio thirty minutes to reach the place. At about 9:00 in the evening, Kakingcio, Rolly and Romulo drank tuba. By 10:00 in the evening, Rolly and Kakingcio went to sleep. Romulo, however, left the two. The next day, Rolly and Kakingcio went back to the mountains and gathered coconuts.

5. On February 4, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding Kakingcio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and imposing on him the penalty of death in view of the presence of the special qualifying circumstance of the minority of private complainant Alma and her relationship to Kakingcio and the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon and without any mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime.ISSUE:(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in participating directly and actively in the presentation and reception of the prosecution’s evidence thereby failing to uphold the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”(2) Whether or not minor private complainant Alma is a credible child witness [How should child witnesses be questioned in court?]HELD:(1) No.(2) Yes.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

As to the 1st issue

1. [Appellant’s contention] The appellant avers that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the appellant raped the private complainant in light of her testimony that when the appellant mounted her, he still had his short pants on.  When the prosecution tried to elicit from the offended party how appellant’s penis could have been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on and the appellant’s counsel objected to the question, the presiding judge himself took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded questions on the private complainant.  Worse, the presiding judge posed leading questions to the private complainant.  The presiding judge was biased and partial to the prosecution.  To buttress his contention, the appellant’s counsel cited a portion of the transcript of the stenographic notes, wherein the judge asks “So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser what else happened?” and “Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short pants?” The appellant further stresses that when Alma was raped it was nighttime and the place where she was molested was dark.  She could not have recognized and identified the appellant as her rapist.  Furthermore, Alma failed to report the rape immediately to the police authorities.

2. The Court does not agree with the appellant’s submission.  In People v. Ancheta, this Court emphasized that a presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules.  The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure.  After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal proceedings.  In People v. Zheng Bai Hui, this Court reiterated that:

In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense.  The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth.  Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome.  In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth.   A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness.  He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth.  He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.  It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

3. The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court.  Neither are the questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court.  It bears stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants before he mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to penetrate her sexual organ with his penis.  The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant could have inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his short pants.  Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased, the question of the public prosecutor “where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short pants” was not leading.  The trial court should have overruled the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the question.  However, the trial court was not precluded from asking questions to avoid further wrangling between the public prosecutor and the appellant’s counsel which may frightened or unnerved the private complainant, a minor and who was unused to judicial proceedings.  After all, the trial court was mandated to discover the truth.  As it turned out, the private complainant cried profusely as she testified impelling the trial court to order a continuance.  Even the counsel of the appellant agreed to a continuance.

As to the 2nd issue

4. Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice.  Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:

Sec. 19.  Mode of questioning. – The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

While it may be true that it was dark when the appellant ravished the private complainant in his house, it cannot, however, be gainsaid that the private complainant could have sufficiently identified the appellant as the culprit.  The appellant was the uncle of the private complainant.  She and her father Paquito had been living with the appellant and his family off and on for years before she and her father were brought back with appellant in January 1996 to Capoocan, Leyte, to live anew with the appellant and his family.  The private complainant was thus familiar not only with the physical build of the appellant but also with his voice and peculiar smell.  A person may be identified by these factors.  Once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is quite an easy task. In this case, the appellant poked a knife on her neck and whispered to the private complainant before she raped her: “Ma, ayaw pagsumat kan imo yaya kay may-ada ako ha imo bubuhaton” (Ma, don’t tell to your yaya because I will do something to you.” “Ma” was the nickname of Alma, the private complainant.  “Yaya” was Alejandra Cañete, the common-law wife of the appellant. Moreover, as testified to by the private complainant, the only persons left in the house in the evening of February 1, 1997 were the appellant and his two young children, Paquito, who was blind and an invalid, and the private complainant:

5. The credibility of the private complainant was not degraded by her and Alejandra Cañete’s reporting the sexual assault to the police authorities only on February 5, 1996.  The evidence shows that the private complainant was only twelve years old when she was raped by the appellant.  She and her father, who was completely blind and a paralytic, were living in the house of the appellant.  The latter threatened to kill her if she revealed what he did to her.  It was thus easy for the appellant to fulfill the threat if she divulged the violation of her honor. The private complainant could do nothing but cry.  When the appellant tried in the evening of February 3, 1996 to violate her again, she ran to a neighbor, Ka Caring, divulged to her that the appellant tried to rape her anew and sought her help.  In fact, the private complainant slept in the house of Ka Caring that evening and went back home only the next morning on February 4, 1996.  On February 5, 1996, the private complainant revealed to her Yaya Alejandra, the wife of the appellant, that the latter had raped her.  In People v. Bea, this Court held that it is not uncommon for a young girl at the tender age of sixteen years to be intimidated into silence and conceal the sexual assault on her by the appellant.

When cross-examined by the public prosecutor, the appellant unabashedly admitted that he did not know any improper or ill-motive on the part of the private complainant for charging him with rape, and on the part of his wife Alejandra Cañete for reporting the sexual assault on the private complainant by the appellant to the police authorities.

DISPOSITIVE: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 2523, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant KAKINGCIO CAÑETE is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to private complainant Alma Cañete the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.SEPARATE OPINION:

005 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM "BADONG"G.R. No. 145225             April 2, 2004TOPIC: RULE 130 Secs. 20 and 21PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.

AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:1. Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2,

1996 to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.

2. Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep.

3. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.4. Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to

fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to appellant’s home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.

5. A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.

6. Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.

7. In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint against appellant. The police in Bulan, however, advised them to first have Evelyn examined. Obliging, the two repaired on February 24, 1997 to the Municipal Health Office of Bulan, Sorsogon where Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo. The Medico-legal Report revealed that she is 7 months pregnant.

8. On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation Section of the Bulan Municipal Police Station before which they executed their sworn statements.

9. On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.

10. In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a girl, Joana Canchela, at Guruyan, Juban, Sorsogon.11. Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "because her mind is not normal," she having "mentioned

many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her."RTC of Sorsogon: accused Salvador Golimlim having been found guilty of the crime of RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as amended by RA 7659) beyond reasonable doubt is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the offended party Evelyn Canchela in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damage[s], and to pay the costs.In giving credence to Evelyn’s testimony and finding against appellant, the trial court made the following observations, quoted verbatim:

1) Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was consistent in her claim that her Papay Badong (accused Salvador Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and was the author of her pregnancy, and nobody else;2) She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped her only once;3) That the contradictory statements she made in open court relative to the details of how she was raped, although would seem derogatory to her credibility and reliability as a witness under normal conditions, were amply explained by the psychiatrist who examined her and supported by her findings;4) Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her (which is still subject to question considering that the victim could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact remains that she never pointed to anybody else as the author of her pregnancy, but her Papay Badong. Which only shows that the trauma that was created in her mind by the incident has remained printed in her memory despite her weak mental state. Furthermore, granting for the sake of argument that other men also laid on top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that her Papay Badong (the accused) had sexual intercourse with her.

ISSUE: Whether or not a mental retardate is disqualified to be a witnessHELD: NO. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.

RATIO:In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons cannot be witnesses:(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private complainant’s testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity," this Court held:

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.

To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of 46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.Doctor’s testimony:Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of her answers during the time of the testing.   She was not even hesitating when she told me she was raped once at home by her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me about how it was done on (sic) her. So, although she may be inappropriate but (sic) she was spontaneous, she was consistent.As to why witness cannot give a detailed answer: There are a lot of possible answers to that question;  one, is the court’s atmosphere itself. This may have brought a little anxiety on the part of the patient and this inhibits her from relating some of the details relative to the incident-in-question. When I conducted my interview with the patient, there were only two (2) of us in the room. I normally do not ask this question during the first session with the patient because these are emotionally leading questions, and I do not expect the patient to be very trusting. So, I usually ask this type of questions during the later part of my examination to make her relax during my evaluation. So in this way, she will be more cooperative with me. I don’t think that this kind of atmosphere within the courtroom with some people around, this could have inhibited the patient from answering questions.As noted in the above-quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions which do not inhibit her from answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court, upon examination by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the proceedings, on Dr. Belmonte’s suggestion,  how, as quoted below, she was raped and that it was appellant who did it.Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as her rapist.(Criminal case): In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 (the law in force when the crime was committed in 1996), the trial court did not specify under which mode the crime was committed. Under the said article, rape is committed thus:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua or death.

It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a retardate being different from those of a normal person, the degree of force needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile.

Still under the above-quoted provision of Art. 335 of the Rev ised Penal Code, when the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, however, although there is adequate evidence showing that appellant indeed used force and intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a deadly weapon.DISPOSOTIVE: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant, Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape, which this Court finds to have been committed under paragraph 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is hereby AFFIRMED.CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

006 Mercado v. VitrioloAC No. 5108, 26 May 2005PONENTE: Puno, J.

AUTHOR: Sarah C.NOTES:

FACTS:1. Parties:

1.1 Petitioner Rosa Mercado - Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards

1.2 Respondent Atty. Julito Vitriolo - Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).2. Rosa F. Mercado filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law as he

allegedly maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.

3. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon was the ex-counsel of Rosa in an annulment proceeding which was filed by Rosa’s husband. He died. SO, Atty. Vitriolo filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.

4. Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal case against Rosa for falsification of public documents.4.1 False entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children and an indication that she is married to Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real husband is Ruben Mercado.5. Petitioner Rosa: criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.6. Atty. Vitriolo: that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel.   According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case.  Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters.  The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.7. IBP:  respondent is guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for 1 year.

ISSUE(S):1. Whether or not Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between lawyer-client relationship when he filed the criminal

case.HELD: No.RATIO:

1. In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence.   Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary.

2. factors essential to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege:

2.1 (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected  (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.

3. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.  The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.   Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,  are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.

4. The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.   The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

5. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant’s allegations.   We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent.  All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.  She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent.  She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint.  The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.

6. Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.  Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication.  Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client.  It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

007 NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC NOTES/FF:

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONSG.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:1. Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008, granting the petition for  certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security (collectively the "respondent Committees").2. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded by the DOTC to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").3. Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the National Broadband Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.4. Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege:5. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. In petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.6. Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order, citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.7. Petitioner’s contention: first, the assailed Decision did not reverse the presumption against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v. Ermita; second, respondent Committees failed to overcome the presumption of executive privilege because it appears that they could legislate even without the communications elicited by the three (3) questions, and they admitted that they could dispense with petitioner’s testimony if certain NEDA documents would be given to them; third, the requirement of specificity applies only to the privilege for State, military and diplomatic secrets, not to the necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential communications privilege; fourth, there is no right to pry into the President’s thought processes or exploratory exchanges; fifth, petitioner is not covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the Court has the power and duty to annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, the requirement for a witness to be furnished advance copy of questions comports with due process and the constitutional mandate that the rights of witnesses be respected; and ninth, neither petitioner nor respondent has the final say on the matter of executive privilege, only the Court.8. On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, ( d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.9. Respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system;(MAIN ISSUE) (2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;HELD:(1) Yes; (2) Yes

RATIO:Issue (1):1. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, " that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."2. Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464: Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

3. Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.4. The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by the President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case. In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.5. Senate v. Ermita expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s subordinate officials: When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.6. Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given preference or priority , in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege.

Issue (2):1. Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilegeare not present. First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress. Such is unpersuasive. The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.2. Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are ‘operationally proximate’ to the President but who may have "no direct communications with her."3. It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In  re: Sealed Case precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential decision-making.4. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice. This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.5. Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President’s invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees’ specific and demonstrated need and the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.6. It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.7. Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.8. It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers relating to a negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party, et al. v. Thomas G. Aquino, et al. upheld the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations.

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations: The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential

characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature .

9. Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.10. With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent Committees’ case. There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied.11. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.12. This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.13. Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable.

Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

14. In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection.15. Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to information.16. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.

DISPOSITIVE:WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is herebyDENIED.

SEPARATE OPINION:

DOCTRINE:

008 In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses under the

AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)

subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012.(En Banc Resolution - FEB 14 2012)TOPIC:PONENTE: Per curiam

FACTS: Summary: The Impeachment Court trying CJ Corona’s impeachment case sought from the Supreme Court several documents (e.g. case rollos,

internal deliberations, privileged information, confidential discussions between the justices and court officials) purportedly relevant to the aforementioned trial. The SC denied such requests emphasizing that as an equal and independent branch of government, and citing the principle of comity, the documents sought were deemed part of the internal function of the Judiciary itself; hence, covered by

Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential or privileged information under well-defined rules. At the most basic level and subject to the principle of comity, Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to testify on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties, while testimony on matters external to their adjudicatory functions and duties may be compelled by compulsory processes.

During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE dated January 27, 2012 that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public offices.

The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the Court.

It was at about this time that the letters, now before us, were sent. The letters asked for the examination of records, and the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations, as above described, for purposes of Articles 3 and 7 of the Impeachment Complaint. (Requested documents from FASAP v. PAL, Navarro v. Ermita, League of Cities v. COMELEC).

In a MANIFESTATION in open court in the impeachment trial of February 7 and 8, 2012, the House Impeachment Panel requested the Impeachment Court for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the production of records of cases, and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees of the Supreme Court, to testify on these records and on the various cases mentioned above.

Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to our attention the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received, commanding her to appear at 10:00 in the morning of the 13th of February 2012 with the original and certified true copies of the documents listed above, and to likewise appear in the afternoon at 2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to produce the above listed documents and to testify.

In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court’s rules and policies.

ISSUE: Can the Impeachment Court validly obtain their requested documents from the Supreme Court?HELD: No.

RATIO: Independence of the Judiciary - important aspect of the principle of separation of powers – deemed written into the rules by established

practice and rendered imperative by the departments’ inter-dependence and need for cooperation among themselves – is the principle of comity or the practice of voluntarily observing inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutional duties for the harmonious working of government.

The two other branches, for their part, may also observe the principle of comity by voluntarily and temporarily refraining from continuing with the acts questioned before the courts. Where doubt exists, no hard and fast rule obtains on how due respect should be shown to each other; largely, it is a weighing of the public interests involved, as against guaranteed individual rights and the attendant larger public interests, and it is the latter consideration that ultimately prevails.

Access to court records: general rule – a policy of transparency. HOWEVER, this policy is not absolute: Notably, the rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of fees and compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This grant, however, is not as open nor as broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is subject to the limitations the laws and the Court’s own rules provide.

When Court Records are considered Confidential - In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records “create a hierarchy of rights that protect certain confidential relationships over and above the public’s evidentiary need” or “right to every man’s evidence.” Accordingly, certain information contained in the records of cases before the Supreme Court are considered confidential and are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate, the need arises from the dictates of the integrity of the Court’s decision-making function which may be affected by the disclosure of information.

Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it. Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC10 declares that the results of the raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties and their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters, administrative cases and criminal cases involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict confidentiality and where the raffle results are not disclosed even to the parties themselves Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions taken in each case in the Court’s agenda, which are noted by the Chief Justice or the Division Chairman, are also to be treated with strict confidentiality.

Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication (Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC). Why? The rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to “freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding

unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s comments. The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of individuals is an important element of the government’s decision-making process and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”

This privilege is not limited to the Judiciary. Even the other equal branches of government enjoy the same privileges (i.e. executive privilege and legislative privilege).

Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks only of the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is understood that the rule extends to documents and other communications which are part of or are related to the deliberative process. The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are component

parts of the process for formulating governmental decisions and policies. Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other court officials and employees when asked to act on these documents and other communications.

Defining confidential information - Confidential information generally refers to information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, such as notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussion, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.

Even after the decision, resolution, or order is made public, such information that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or order shall remain confidential. [emphases ours]. To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the document is both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.

o A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative process privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it relates. In other words, communications are considered predecisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.

o A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process. The key question in determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid discussion within the agency. If the disclosure of the information would expose the government’s decision-making process in a way that discourages candid discussion among the decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability to perform their functions), the information is deemed privileged.

Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved.

The Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information they acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication, such as information on how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the justices used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure of confidential information that could subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.

Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to any compulsory process in relation to the performance of their adjudicatory functions.

o To summarize these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and are not subject to disclosure:o (1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of

the Court’s session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;

o (2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before the Court;o (3) Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature, in particular, documents and other communications

which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.

o (4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of office.

o (5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the court to the general public.

o (6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.

o (7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the consent of the Court.

Witnesses need not be summoned to testify on matters of public record. These are the records that a government unit is required by law to keep or which it is compelled to keep in the discharge of duties imposed by law. A record is a public record within the purview of a statute providing that books and records required by law to be kept by a clerk may be received in evidence in any court if it is a record which a public officer is required to keep and if it is filled in such a manner that it is subject to public inspection.32 Under the Rules of Court, the rule on public records is embodied in Section 44, Rule 130.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION y SORIANO,

[G.R. No. 131636. March 5, 2003]TOPIC: RULE 130 SECTION 20-25

1. Artemio was charged before the RTC Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate complaints committed against his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.

2. Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.

3. Sometime in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.

4. Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro.

5. Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion.

6. Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father.

7. RTC: convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.8. Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a

witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Besides, Elven’s testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he was cruel to him.

9. Artemio points to the following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996 ; (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.

10. Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia.

11. Also, According to him, Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemio’s deceased mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another man.

ISSUE: WON the son of artemio is competent to testifyHELD: yesRATIO: FILIAL PRIVILEGE- waived

As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on “filial privilege.” This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges . As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only “to tell the truth.”

Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven. The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy.

As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.

We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED w

010 FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., v. CA and MELECIA T.

AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)

SY, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing SyGR No. 127745, 22 April 2003TOPIC: Dead Man’s StatutePONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J..

FACTS:

1. February 7, 1990: Petitioner Sanson, in his capacity as creditor, filed before the RTC of Iloilo City a petition, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on January 10, 1990. He claims that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.

2. Petitioners Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.

3. By Order of February 12, 1991: Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate.

4. During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute.

5. TESTIMONIES OF THE PETITIONERS:-Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued by him before his death; before the deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceased’s) son Jerry who told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after the death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored due to the closure of his account.-Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased issued five checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.-Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased, two to Angeles and the other to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died or sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was closed, hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter dated February 6, 1990 addressed to the deceased’s heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled.The administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank. She objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute - specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade because she is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.6. RTC: Dead Man’s Statute not applicable – ruled in favor of petitioners

7. CA: reversed RTC’s decisionISSUE(S):

1. WHETHER THE CA ERRED FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIMS OF CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR.?

2. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLAIMANT FELICITO G. SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY [ON] THE CLAIM OF CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN AND VICE VERSA.

HELD: YESRATIO:

ISSUE 1

1. Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness or—subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present—the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.

2. Jade’s testimony on the genuineness of the deceased’s signature on the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas is clear.3. The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he is prima facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value,

following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:

Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. – Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.

4. As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie . The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere

witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties . Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.

ISSUE 2

1. Petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute; besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

2. The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of " parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)

3. But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction

4. In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks- documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):