Evidence Case Digests

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Magdayao v. People G.R. No. 152881, 17 August 2004 Facts: On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to Ricky Olvis a check dates September 30, 1991, in the amount of P600,000.00, despite not having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National Bank, Dipolog Branch. Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount by retrieving the check and replacing it with two other checks. Magdayao, however, reneged on his promise. Despite repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao failed to make good the check’s value. As evidence for the prosecution, a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitted by the court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis. Issue: Was the photocopy of the subject check inadmissible in evidence for failure of the prosecution to produce the original dishonored check? Held: No. The law says that “the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.” It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. This rule requiring the production of the best evidence is to prevent fraud. If a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. In case the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party, the latter must be given reasonable notice, and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in court, only then may secondary evidence be presented. In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he hailed to do due to numerous unjustified postponements.

Transcript of Evidence Case Digests

Page 1: Evidence Case Digests

Magdayao v. PeopleG.R. No. 152881, 17 August 2004

Facts: On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to Ricky Olvis a check dates September 30, 1991, in the amount of P600,000.00, despite not having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National Bank, Dipolog Branch. Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount by retrieving the check and replacing it with two other checks. Magdayao, however, reneged on his promise. Despite repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao failed to make good the check’s value.As evidence for the prosecution, a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitted by the court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis.

Issue: Was the photocopy of the subject check inadmissible in evidence for failure of the prosecution to produce the original dishonored check?

Held: No. The law says that “the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.”

It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. This rule requiring the production of the best evidence is to prevent fraud. If a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. In case the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party, the latter must be given reasonable notice, and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in court, only then may secondary evidence be presented.

In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he hailed to do due to numerous unjustified postponements.

Doctrine: As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product

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order to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

Issue:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such?

Held:

Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.

The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.

Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.

[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which

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have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.”

[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. AUTOCORP GROUP AND PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZG.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008

FACTS:Petitioner Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994 from respondent Autocorp Group. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Seaoil issued 12 checks as payment therefor; however 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped. Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in the Regional Trial Court.

Seaoil claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia, in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated. The real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline.

Petitioner Seaoil in sum alleges that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, thus parol evidence is admissible.

ISSUE:Whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable in this case.

HELD:No. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.

The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera.