Evidence Abby

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EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.

BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., and

MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCECO., LTD.,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 193986 | 2014-01-15

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-

G.R. CV No. 88361, which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), ofMakati City, Branch 138 in Civil Case No. 04-1005.

The facts follow:

On August 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo) shipped through MV Eastern Challenger V-

9-S, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (petitioner), 31 various steel sheets incoil weighing 271,828 kilograms from Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee

Calamba Steel Center Inc. (Calamba Steel).4 The cargo had a declared value ofUS$125,417.26

and was insured against all risk by Sumitomo with respondent Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.

(Mitsui). On or about September 6, 2003, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila. Upon unloading

from the vessel, nine coils were observed to be in bad condition as evidenced by the Turn Over

Survey of Bad Order Cargo No. 67327. The cargo was then turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc.

(ATI) for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba Steels withdrawal of the goods.

When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion, valued at

US$7,751.15, for being unfit for its intended purpose.5

Subsequently, on September 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28 steel sheets in coil, weighing

215,817 kilograms, was made by Sumitomo through petitioners MV Eastern Challenger V -10-S for

transport and delivery again to Calamba Steel.6 Insured by Sumitomo against all risk with Mitsui,7

the shipment had a declared value of US$121,362.59. This second shipment arrived at the port of

Manila on or about September 23, 2003. However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel,

11 coils were found damaged as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No.

67393. The possession of the said cargo was then transferred to ATI for stevedoring, storage and


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safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. When ATI delivered the goods, Calamba

Steel rejected the damaged portion thereof, valued at US$7,677.12, the same being unfit for its

intended purpose.8

Lastly, on September 29, 2003, Sumitomo again shipped 117 various steel sheets in coil weighing

930,718 kilograms through petitioners vessel, MV Eastern Venus V-17-S, again in favor of CalambaSteel.9 This third shipment had a declared value of US$476,416.90 and was also insured by

Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on or about October 11, 2003. Upon its

discharge, six coils were observed to be in bad condition. Thereafter, the possession of the cargo

was turned over to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by

Calamba Steel. The damaged portion of the goods being unfit for its intended purpose, Calamba

Steel rejected the damaged portion, valued at US$14,782.05, upon ATIs delivery of the third

shipment.10

Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through the latters settling agent, respondent

BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid the sums of US$7,677.12,US$14,782.05 and US$7,751.15 for the damage suffered by all three shipments or for the total

amount of US$30,210.32. Correlatively, on August 31, 2004, as insurer and subrogee of Calamba

Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner and ATI.11

As synthesized by the RTC in its decision, during the pre-trial conference of the case, the following

facts were established, viz:

1. The fact that there were shipments made on or about August 29, 2003, September 13, 2003 and

September 29, 2003 by Sumitomo to

Calamba Steel through petitioners vessels;

2. The declared value of the said shipments and the fact that the shipments were insured by

respondents;

3. The shipments arrived at the port of Manila on or about September 6, 2003, September 23, 2003

and October 11, 2003 respectively;

4. Respondents paid Calamba Steels total claim in the amount of US$30,210.32.12

Trial on the merits ensued.

On September 17, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision,13 the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Eastern

Shipping Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc., jointly and severally, ordering the latter to pay

plaintiffs the following:


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1. Actual damages amounting to US$30,210.32 plus 6% legal interest thereon commencing from the

filing of this complaint, until the same is fully paid;

2. Attorneys fees in a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed;

3. Costs of suit.

The defendants counterclaims and ATIs crossclaim are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

Aggrieved, petitioner and ATI appealed to the CA. On July 9, 2010, the CA in its assailed Decision

affirmed with modification the RTCs findings and ruling, holding, among others, that both petitioner

and ATI were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Pointing to the affidavit of Mario

Manuel, Cargo Surveyor, the CA found that during the unloading operations, the steel coils were

lifted from the vessel but were not carefully laid on the ground. Some were even dropped while stillseveral inches from the ground while other coils bumped or hit one another at the pier while being

arranged by the stevedores and forklift operators of ATI and [petitioner]. The CA added that such

finding coincides with the factual findings of the RTC that both petitioner and ATI were both negligent

in handling the goods. However, for failure of the RTC to state the justification for the award of

attorneys fees in the body of its decision, the CA accordingly deleted the same.15 Petitioner filed its

Motion for Reconsideration16 which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution17 dated October 6,

2010.

Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for review on certiorari before this

Court. However, ATIs petition, docketed as G.R. No. 192905, was denied by this Court in ourResolution18 dated October 6, 2010 for failure of ATI to show any reversible error in the assailed CA

decision and for failure of ATI to submit proper verification. Said resolution had become final and

executory on March 22, 2011.19

Nevertheless, this Court in its Resolution20 dated September 3, 2012, gave due course to this

petition and directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.

In its Memorandum,21 petitioner essentially avers that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the

RTC because thesurvey reports submitted by respondents themselves as their own evidence and

the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner clearly show that the cause of the damage was the

rough handling of the goods by ATI during the discharging operations. Petitioner attests that it hadno participation whatsoever in the discharging operations and that petitioner did not have a choice in

selecting the stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator mandated to conduct discharging

operations in the South Harbor. Thus, petitioner prays that it be absolved from any liability relative to

the damage incurred by the goods.

On the other hand, respondents counter, among others, that as found by both the RTC and the CA,

the goods suffered damage while still in the possession of petitioner as evidenced by various Turn


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Over Surveys of Bad Order Cargoes which were unqualifiedly executed by petitioners own surveyor,

Rodrigo Victoria, together with the representative of ATI. Respondents assert that petitioner would

not have executed such documents if the goods, as it claims, did not suffer any damage prior to their

turn-over to ATI. Lastly, respondents aver that petitioner, being a common carrier is required by law

to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it carries.22

Simply put, the core issue in this case is whether the CA committed any reversible error in finding

that petitioner is solidarily liable with ATI on account of the damage incurred by the goods.

The Court resolves the issue in the negative.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this

Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts. This is clearly stated in

Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from ajudgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial

Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition

for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set

forth.

Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue.

Questions of fact cannot be entertained.23

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or

jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of theprobative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question

of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the

query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the

existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other

and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.24

In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI should be liable

for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly impose upon this Court the task

of reviewing, examining and evaluating or weighing all over again the probative value of the

evidence presented25 something which is not, as a rule, within the functions of this Court andwithin the office of a petition for review on certiorari.

While it is true that the aforementioned rule admits of certain exceptions,26 this Court finds that none

are applicable in this case. This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the

RTC which were duly affirmed by the CA. Unanimous with the CA, this Court gives credence and

accords respect to the factual findings of the RTC a special commercial court27 which has


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expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter28 of maritime and admiralty

highlighting the solidary liability of both petitioner and ATI. The RTC judiciously found:

x x x The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC, for brevity) No. 67393 and Request

for Bad Order Survey No. 57692 show that prior to the turn over of the first shipment to the custody

of ATI, eleven (11) of the twenty-eight (28) coils were already found in bad order condition. Eight (8)of the said eleven coils were already partly dented/crumpled and the remaining three (3) were

found partly dented, scratches on inner hole, crumple (sic). On the other hand, the TOSBOC No.

67457 and Request for Bad Order Survey No. 57777 also show that prior to the turn over of the

second shipment to the custody of ATI, a total of six (6) coils thereof were already partly dented on

one side, crumpled/cover detach (sic). These documents were issued by ATI. The said TOSBOCs

were jointly executed by ATI, vessels representative and surveyor while the Requests for Bad Order

Survey were jointly executed by ATI, consignees representative and the Shed Supervisor. The

aforementioned documents were corroborated by the Damage Report dated 23 September 2003

and Turn Over Survey No. 15765 for the first shipment, Damage Report dated 13 October 2003 and

Turn Over Survey No. 15772 for the second shipment and, two Damage Reports dated 6 September2003 and Turn Over Survey No. 15753 for the third shipment.

It was shown to this Court that a Request for Bad Order Survey is a document which is requested by

an interested party that incorporates therein the details of the damage, if any, suffered by a shipped

commodity. Also, a TOSBOC, usually issued by the arrastre contractor (ATI in this case), is a form of

certification that states therein the bad order condition of a particular cargo, as found prior to its turn

over to the custody or possession of the said arrastre contractor.

The said Damage Reports, Turn Over Survey Reports and Requests for Bad Order Survey led the

Court to conclude that before the subject shipments were turned over to ATI, the said cargo werealready in bad order condition due to damage sustained during the sea voyage. Nevertheless, this

Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was also negligence on the part of the employees

of ATI and [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.] in the discharging of the cargo as observed by plaintiffs

witness, Mario Manuel, and [Eastern Shipping

Lines, Inc.s] witness, Rodrigo Victoria.

In ascertaining the cause of the damage to the subject shipments, Mario Manuel stated that

the coils were roughly handled during theirdischarging from the vessel to the pier of (sic) ASIAN

TERMINALS, INC. and even during the loading operations of these coils from the pier to the trucks

that will transport the coils to the consignees warehouse. During the aforesaid operations, theemployees and forklift operators of EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.

were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Specifically, during unloading, the steel

coils were lifted from the vessel and not carefully laid on the ground, sometimes were even dropped

while still several inches from the ground. The tine (forklift blade) or the portion that carries the coils

used for the forklift is improper because it is pointed and sharp and the centering of the tine to the

coils were negligently done such that the pointed and sharp tine touched and caused scratches,

tears and dents to the coils. Some of the coils were also dragged by the forklift instead of being


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carefully lifted from one place to another. Some coils bump/hit one another at the pier while being

arranged by the stevedores/forklift operators of ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. and EASTERN

SHIPPING LINES.29(Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, it is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain

under the custody of the carrier.30 As hereinbefore found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA basedon the evidence presented, the goods were damaged even before they were turned over to ATI.

Such damage was even compounded by the negligent acts of petitioner and ATI which both

mishandled the goods during the discharging operations. Thus, it bears stressing unto petitioner that

common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to

observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to

certain exceptions enumerated under Article 173431 of the Civil Code, common carriers are

responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of

the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,

and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively,

by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.32 Owing to thishigh degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have

been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is,

unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to

avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they

observed such high level of diligence.33 In this case, petitioner failed to hurdle such burden.

In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the ruling of

the RTC as to warrant the modification, much less the reversal of its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 88361 is hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 113779-80 | 1995-02-23

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For

even if the commission of the crime can be established, without proof of identity of the criminal

beyond reasonable doubt there can be no conviction. In the case at bench, the identification of the

petitioner cannot rest on an assured conscience. We rule that petitioner is entitled to a mandatory

acquittal.

Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged before the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 1 with Robbery 2 (Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal

Code) and Carnapping 3 (republic Act No. 6539).

Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. The other three (3) are still at-large.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried.

We come to the facts.

Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public school teacher of Kaligayahan Elementary School,

Novaliches. Her work requires her to leave her maid, JOVINA MADARAOG TORRES, alone in her

house at Block 45, Lot 28, Lagro Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. Her husband is in Australia

while her children go to school.

The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the morning of July 19, 1988. Somebody knocked at the

gate of the Torres residence pretending to buy ice. As the maid Madaraog handed the ice to the

buyer, one of the robbers jumped over the fence, poked a gun at her, covered her mouth, and

opened the gate of their house. 4 The ice buyer and his companions barged in. Numbering four (4),

they pushed her inside Torres' house and demanded the keys to the car and the safety vault. 5 Shetold them she did not know where the keys were hidden. 6 They tied up her hands and dragged her

to thesecond floor of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left downstairs as their lookout. 7

On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom door with her

back on the vault. They also gagged her mouth and ransacked Torres' room. One of the accused

stumbled upon a box containing keys. They used the keys to open drawers and in the process found


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the car key. Petitioner was then summoned upstairs and given the car key. He tried it on the car and

succeeded in starting its engine.

In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to loot the vault and other valuable items in the house.

They then tied Madaraog's hands and feet to the bed's headboard and escaped using Torres' car.

Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her ties with her fingers, hopped to the stairs and cried for

help. 8 Her neighbor Semia Quintal responded and untied her. They also sought the help of

Angelina Garcia, another neighbor. It was Garcia who informed Torres that her house was

burglarized.

Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the

National Bureau of Investigation(NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the

physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by the

artist was a person with a large mole between his eyebrows. 9 On August 30, 1988, petitioner was

arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraogand the other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench.

SEMIA QUINTAL 10 averred that she saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men whiling away

their time in front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes were committed. Quintal is a

neighboring maid.

MARY BARBIETO 11 likewise declared that she saw petitioner allegedly with several companions

standing by at Torres' house that morning of July 19, 1988. She is a teacher and lives within the

block where the crimes were committed.

Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient

identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of the Torres family since

1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough and rushing cake orders from 7:00

o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop Bakeshop in Antipolo

Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.

He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. On August 30, 1988 at about 8:00

o'clock in the evening, he was in their house watching a basketball game on T.V. and went out to

buy a cigarette. On his way back, a person accosted him and asked his name. After he identified

himself, 13 a gun was poked at his right side, a shot was fired upward, and five (5) men swooped onhim without any warrant of arrest. He asked them if he could wear t-shirt as he was naked from waist

up. They refused. They turned out to be NBI agents of one of whom a certain Atty. Harwin who lived

in Lagro, Novaliches. He was shoved into the car and brought to the NBI headquarters. 14 He was

surprised when an NBI agent, whose identity was unknown to him, pointed to him as one of the

suspects in the robbery in the presence of Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses.

Petitioner's sister ANGELI TUASON, 15 part-owner of TipTop Bakeshop corroborated his story. She


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testified that on July 17, 1988 she asked her sister Mary Ann to remind petitioner to work early on

July 19, 1988 since Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays are busy days as she caters to schools.

The trial court in a Joint Decision convicted petitioner of the crimes charged and sentenced him as

follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"In Q-88-396 (carnapping) or an indeterminate term of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)

MONTHS as minimum and TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum; and in Q-88-397 (robbery) for a

term of ONE (1) YEAR, SEVEN (7) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as minimum and TWO (2)

YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS as maximum.

On the civil aspect, the court hereby orders Alvin Tuason y Ochoa as follows:

1. In Q-88-396 (carnapping) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the carnappedToyota Corona Sedan, Model 1980 with Plate No. NPZ 159 or to pay its value of P180,000.00 which

the court finds to be the reasonable value of said car; and.

2. In Q-88-397 (robbery) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the stolen items

mentioned in the information filed in said case and hereinabove stated or pay the corresponding

values thereof or a total of P280,550.00 which the court finds to be the reasonable values.

The civil liability is joint and solidary with the co-conspirators of accused Alvin Tuason.

In case of appeal, the bail bonds are fixed at TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS(P280,000.00) fro criminal case No. Q-88-396 and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

(P100,000.00) for criminal case No. Q-88-397.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED." 16

Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On December 16, 1993, the Eleventh Division

of the appellate court gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of petitioner and affirmed in

toto the assailed Decisions. 17 On February 4, 1994, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration wasdenied for lack of merit. 18

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred:

A.

[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL

COURTS ARE GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING


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THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE ARE BASED ON CERTAIN

REFUTABLE REASONS EXPRESSLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.

B.

[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER THE CONCEPT AND

ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE."

C.

[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER THE CONCEPT AND

ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "NEGATIVE EVIDENCE."

D.

[F]OR IGNORING OR DISREGARDING THE GLARING AND FATAL INFIRMITIES OF THE

TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, SPECIALLY AS IDENTIFICATION, AS WELL AS

TO THE PALPABLE IMPROBABILITY OF HEREIN PETITIONER HAVING BEEN A SUPPOSED

PARTICIPANT IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED, THE ERROR BEING TANTAMOUNT TO GROSSMISAPPREHENSION OF THE RECORD.

E.

[I]N AFFIRMING THE CLEARLY REVERSIBLE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

We reverse.

Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the

mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. 19 The trial court and respondent

appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from hervantage position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated

in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner

made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of

petitioner.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog

actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto

testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before they happened. There is,

however, a serious doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the

NBI headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between hiseyebrows. 20 While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole between his

eyebrows. 21 On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer made a drawing of petitioner

showing a dominant mole between his eyes. 22 As it turned out, petitioner has no mole but only a

scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference between a

mole and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a new connective tissue that replaces tissue

injured. 23 On the other hand, a mole is a small often pigmented spot or protuberance on the skin.

24 If indeed Madaraog and Quintal had a good look at petitioner during the robbery, they could not


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have erroneously described petitioner. Worthy to note, petitioner was not wearing any mask in the

occasion. Madaraog's attempt to explain her erroneous description does not at all convince, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: We come now to the third person 'iyong namang isa ay mga 28 o 29 ang edad, mga 5'2" o 5'3"ang taas, payat, medyo kulot ang buhok at maiksi at mayroong malaking bilog na nunal sa pagitan

ng kilay sa noo. Mahaba at malantik ang pilikmata,' who is that?

Interpreter:

Witness referring to Exhibit "J-3."

Q: Madam witness where is that round mole that appears in the two eyebrows of the person?

A: It is probably the cartographer that made a mistake.

Q: I am referring to you now Exhibit "J". I call your attention to that black rounded figure at the middleof the bridge of the nose between the two eyebrows, what was that represent?

A: A mole, sir." 25

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Among the four drawings prepared by the cartographer section of the NBI, you will agree with

me Madam Witness that it is only on Exhibit "J" when that rounded mole appear?

A: No sir, it is the third one." 26

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: You did not call the attention of the NBI that the third one whom you identified as Exhibit "J-3" did

not bear that rounded mole as mentioned by you, did you?

A: I did not remember.

Q: Why did you not remember having called the attention of the NBI to that deficiency in the

drawing?

A: I was not able to call the attention of the NBI (sic) because there were four of us who made the

description." 27

Secondly, the trial court and the respondent appellate court unduly minimized the importance of this

glaring discrepancy in the identification of the petitioner. The trial court resorted to wild guesswork. It

ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

"[T]he court has observed that Alvin has a prominent scar in between his two (2) eyebrows. It is not


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within the realm of improbability that Alvin covered up that scar with a black coloring to make it

appear that he has a 'nunal' which was therefore the one described by Jovina and, which reinforces

her testimony that she had a good eye view of Alvin from the start of the robbery to its conclusion."

28

This is a grave error. The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction that isirrational because it is not derived from an established fact. The records do not show any fact from

which the trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner covered up his scar with black

coloring to make it appear as a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of guilt

beyond reasonable doubt. This palpable error was perpetrated by respondent appellate court when it

relied on the theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because the trial court had a

better opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This is a

misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of the trial

court was not based on the demeanor of any witness which it had a better opportunity to observe.

Rather, it was a mere surmise, an illogical one at that. By no means can it be categorized as a fact

properly established by evidence.

And thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has serious lapses in her testimony that diluted her

credibility, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: I am showing to you Exhibit "M" and please point to this Honorable Court that portion where the

accused (Alvin Tuason) allegedly asked from you the price of that plastic pack of ice.

A: I did not state it in my statement.

Q: Why did you say a moment ago that you place it there (Sinumpaang Salaysay)?

A: But that is the truth, sir.

Q: I am not asking you the truth or falsehood . . . I am only asking you why you said a moment ago

that the portion of your testimony now is incorporated in Exhibit "M."

A: [B]ecause they asked the price of the ice." 29

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: After reading Exhibit "M", did you or did you not call the attention of the investigator that some ofyour narrations were not incorporated therein?

A: No, I did not because he did not ask me.

Q: [Y]ou did not come forward to volunteer that some portions of your narration were not

incorporated therein?

A: [T]he investigator knew it.


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Q: You mean to tell the Honorable Court that after reading Exhibit "M", the NBI investigator knew

that there were some lapses or omissions in your statement?"

A: It's up to the investigator." 30

Barbieto is a school teacher and the kind of excuses she proffered does not enhance her credibility.

Moreover, she and Quintal merely testified they saw petitioner within the vicinity where the crimeswere committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot lead to the conclusion that petitioner truly

committed the crimes at bench. Petitioner, we note, lives in the same vicinity as the victim. To use

his words, he lives some six (6) posts from the house of Torres. His presence in the said vicinity is

thus not unnatural.

The doubtful identification of petitioner was not at all cured by the process followed by the NBI

agents when petitioner was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses in their

headquarters. Madaraog's identification of petitioner from a line-up at the NBI was not spontaneous

and independent. An NBI agent improperly suggested to them petitioner's person. Petitioner thus

testified:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Mr. Witness (Alvin Tuason) do you know of any reason why these two witnesses in the persons

of Jovina Madaraog Torres and Mary Barbieto would be testifying in the manner that they did against

you?

A: At the NBI, I saw them with the NBI agent. After the agent pointed at me, later on they also

pointed at me." 31

On cross-examination, he declared:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Do you know the reason why they testified and pointed to you as one of the robbers of July 19,

1988?

A: Because when I was at the NBI, the NBI agent pointed at me.

Q: Did you see them at the NBI when they pointed at you?

A: They were outside a room where there was a glass window.

Q: So you can see those persons outside the room?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When they pointed you and identified you were there other persons with you when you were lined

up during that time?

A: In the second line I was in the line-up.


14/59

Q: When was the first time they pointed you as one of the suspects?

A: In the Office of the Chief Unit there, to the third floor of the NBI building." 32

This damaging testimony of the petitioner was not rebutted by the prosecution. The NBI agent

present during the identification of petitioner was not presented to belie petitioner's testimony.

Consequently, the identification of the petitioner in the NBI headquarters is seriously flawed.According to writer Wall, the mode of identification other than an identification parade is a show-up,

the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification. Together with its

aggravated forms, it constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever

used by the police. 33

The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving. Again,

the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be

literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving

evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a

witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack ofopportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission

would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony

in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination. 34 Clearly,

petitioner's testimony in court on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI

headquarters is not self-serving.

Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing dough at TipTop

Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. With the usual traffic

jam, it takes him two (2) hours to commute from Lagro to Tondo. It was thus physically impossible

for him to be at the locus criminis. He said he learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3)days thereafter. He did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1) month after

the crimes were perpetrated.

Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony established that her brother had an eye examination on July

17, 1988 35 and she reminded him to work early on July 19, 1988 which he did.

Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be considered in the

light of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused. 36 In

People vs. Omega, 37 we held:

"Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and difficult to

disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of

concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the

defense of alibi assumes importance."

The case at bench reminds us of the warning that judges seem disposed more readily to credit the

veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the


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accused, whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or other testimony. 38 They are

unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her

experience that her powers of perception becomes distorted and her identification is frequently most

untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives, not necessarily stimulated originally by the

accused personally - the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support, consciously or

unconsciously, an identification already made by another. 39

IN VIEW THEREOF, the Decision of December 16, 1993 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and

petitioner Alvin Tuason is ACQUITTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


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CAMELO CABATANIA, Petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and

CAMELO REGODOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 124814 | 2004-10-21

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing

the March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn

affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No.

88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent

Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P

500 per month.

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia

Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was

born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted

that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros

Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was

while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod

City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner

promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their

sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City.

Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But

petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her.

On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she

gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter

and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home.

During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the

afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's wife, hence

she was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New

Year's Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos


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City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up

and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City

and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her

about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the

following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner's

house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife was in need of

one, she was re-hired. However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and

inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by

her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see

each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia's

counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner

refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they hadsex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He

vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in

Singcang, Bacolod City.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite

its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was

alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on

the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-

minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the

plaintiff in support of the claim to "be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual

intercourse with the plaintiff's mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child.

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on

the personal appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-

minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos."[2]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:

The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not

prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a

witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not

required that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is

perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and


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disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is

therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse with appellant occurred

on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to

appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").

In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial

court and there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find

no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's findings.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[3]

Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL

CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF

RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED

BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[4]

Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a

general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the

trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and

conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is

manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) whenthe judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the

findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes

beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant

and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial

court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on

which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant

facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a different

conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the

absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is convinced

that this case falls within one of the exceptions.[5]

The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent

was based on the testimony of the child's mother and "the personal appearance of the

child."

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish

paternity and filiation.[6] An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome


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situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be

issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.[7]

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and

on the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxx xxx xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation

of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth

purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when

there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.

The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child onthe information of a third person.[8]

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a

public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on

the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity.[9]

Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se

inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as

circumstantial evidence to prove the same.[10]

Aside from Florencia's self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her inSingcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary

recognition.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia's testimony. Both the trial court and the

appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for

recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not

affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencia's husband is living and


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there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child

born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against

its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11] The presumption of

legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad

principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is

grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely

subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence

to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set aside. Private

respondent's petition for recognition and support is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.


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THERESITA, JUAN,

ASUNCION, PATROCINIA,

RICARDO, and GLORIA, all

surnamed DIMAGUILA,

Petitioners,

vs.

JOSE and SONIA A.

MONTEIRO,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 201011 | 2014-01-27

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 15,

2011 Decision 1 and the March 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV

No. 92707, which affirmed the August 23, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,

Santa Cruz, Laguna (RTC), in Civil Case No. SC-3108.

The Facts

On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro), along with

Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before

the RTC, against the petitioners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria

Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus, Enrique, Nina,

Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners

and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna,

with an area of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro

anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila

(Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership

to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio

Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano

Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to

Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano


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and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either

Perfecto or Vitaliano.

During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated, namely: (a) Motion to

Dismiss for lack of legal capacity to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of cause of action; (b)

Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial thereof, which was denied; ( c) Motion forProduction and Inspection of Documents; (d) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting the

same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer Pre-trial; (f) Notice of Consignation by the petitioners in

the exercise of their alleged right of redemption of the share being claimed by the Spouses Monteiro

in light of the deed of sale they produced and claimed to have been executed by the heirs of Pedro

in their favor; (g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff, which was denied; (h) Motion

for Reconsideration thereof, which was also denied; (i) Motion for Clarification and/or Extended

Resolution; and U) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a pending Petition for Certiorari before

the CA assailing several of the RTC orders. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the

CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.

On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for

Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint. 4 The RTC granted their motion. The amended

complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession

of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants, specifically,

the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were

retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original

answer that the subject propety had already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano,

through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, thebrothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion and Vitaliano of

the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them as well as their heirs

and successors-in-interest.

Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro,

who had divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1 /3

shares measuring 81.13 square meterseach; that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-

half immediately adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano;

that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat

Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearingin an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the

share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answer5 to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was

inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their

original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they

argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two


23/59

and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-owenrship, contrary to their

original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that the Bilihan did not specify the metes and

bounds of the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even assuming that such

had been specified, they averred that the sale of a definite portion of a property owned in common

was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.

During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who

testified that Perfecto was his grandfather

and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had two properties, one of which was the subject

property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was

survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over

the subject propety to Sonia.

Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she was

interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of the

southern portion of the Bahay na Sato, and that he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partitionexecuted by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the property to

prove that the property had already been partitioned between the two brothers.

Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro

to survey the property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject property,

subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.

Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true

copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.

Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR), testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land,

including cadastral maps from the region.

One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their

first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the prope1iy had already

been partitioned into n0rthern and southern portions between the two brothers, as the original

answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy of it. She claimed that the mistake was

only pointed out to her by their new counsel after their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She

further testified that there was no intention to partition the "bahay na bato" which stood on thesubject property, in order to preserve its historical and sentimental value.

Ruling of the RTC

In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the

Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-half of the

property, to wit:


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WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to peacefuly vacate and

turnover possession of 1/3 of the southern portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration No.

1453, specifically described as "A" of Lot 877 in the sketch plan marked as Exhibit "I", within 60 daysfrom the finality of this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;

b. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P500 per month

in the form of rent for the use of the property from July 1993 until the property is vacated;

c. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, attorney's fees of P30,000 and

litigation expense of P20,000.

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into two share

and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the

property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed

and honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw7 and a

corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the subject property had long been registered as

Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano,

and Lot 877 (southern-half), claimed by Perfecto.

The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the Dimaguilas themselves in their

original answer. It gave no credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an error oftheir former counsel and that she was unaware of the contents of their original answer. It noted that

the Dimaguilas had strongly maintained their theory of partition from 1992 when the complaint was

first filed, and only changed their defense in 2001 when Spouses Monteiro filed their amended

complaint. It keenly observed that it was precisely their admission which propelled Spouses Monteiro

to amend their complaint from one of partition to recovery of possession. Thus, the RTC concluded

that there was indeed a partition of the subject property into southern-half and northern-half portions

between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the Dimaguilas were estopped from denying the same.

As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1 /3 share of Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro,

the RTC found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to thecontrary. It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale were not the Dimaguilas, who were the

heirs of Vitaliano, but the heirs of Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs of

Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro's siblings), had signified their conformity to the pa1iition and to the

sale of Pedro's 1 /3 portion.

Ruling of the CA


25/59

In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence

thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, 8 the cadastral map and the municipal

assessor's records. 9 It noted, more importantly, that the Dimaguilas themselves corroborated the

claim of partition in their original answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped fromdenying their admission of partition after the respondent spouses had relied on their judicial

admission.

The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was raised before the RTC, but not

addressed, that the Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary

stamp tax, in accordance with Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Citing

Gabucan v. Manta 10 and Del Rosario v. Hamoy, 11 the CA, however, ruled that if a document

which did not bear the required documentary stamp was presented in evidence, the court should

require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp. The CA noted that the RTC had failed to direct

Spouses Monteiro to affix the stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be more vigilant onsimilar situations in the future. Nonetheless, it held that the petitioners did not possess the necessary

personality to assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro because it pe1iained

to the southern-half of the property to which they had no claim.

The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals as compensatory damages since

Spouses Monteiro were wrongfully deprived of possession of the 113 portion of the southern-half of

the subject property. It also upheld the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses by the RTC,

considering that Spouses Monteiro were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their

rights and interest.

In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration

for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL

PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX DECLARATION NO. 1453.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE

SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO THE RESPONDENTS.

III


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THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C, THE

BILIHAN NG LAHA T NAMING KARAPATAN.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE

ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN HALF OFTHE PROPERTY.

V

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR

RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE

PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO GRANT THE

COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED THEREIN. 12

The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the pa1iition of the subject prope1iy into

northern and southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and it was not their intention

to partition the property because to do so would damage the house thereon. Even assuming an

admission was made, the petitioners aver that such was made only by some, but not all, of the co-

owners; and that pa1iition can only be made by all co-owners, and allowing the admission istantamount to effecting paiiition by only some co-owners. Spouses Monteiro themselves, in their

original complaint, made an admission that they were co-owners of the property and asse1ied that

there was no partition. The evidence a/iunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the cadastral map

and the list of claimants, were timely objected to during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the

best evidence rule.

The petitioners reiterate that the Bi/ihan should not have been admitted into evidence because it

lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC, providing that no document

shall be admitted in evidence until the requisite stamps have been afiixed thereto. They argue that

the ruling of petitioners' lack of personality to assail the deed of sale is different from the issue of thedeed of sale's admissibility as evidence. They conclude that considering that no documentary stamp

was ever affixed on the deed of sale, such should never have been admitted into evidence and

consequently, should not have been relied upon by the lower courts to prove the sale of 113 of the

southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is inadmissible as evidence, the respondent

spouses have no basis for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property.

Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in awarding to Spouses Monteiro the possession of the


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brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact in their

original answer, to wit:

(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed a deed

of EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed property dividing the same into two (2) equal

parts as indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:

xxx

(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by all the parties in this case from the

beginning or as soon as they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO DIMAGUILA became the

sole and exclusive owner of the southern half of the aforedescribed property and VITALIANO

DIMAGUILA became the sole owner of the northern half of the same property; the house that was

built thereon and still existing up to this time was likewise equally divided between the two (2)

DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial partition

of half equal shares;

xxx

2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA in the above described property has already

been long segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well known by all the parties in this

case; 17

xxx

(Emphases in the Original)

Section 4 18 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a partly in the

course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by

showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was

the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not

provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:

Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?

A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving us a copy ...19

This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of

evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.2 Furthermore,

the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after

their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. In

their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a partition into


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northern-half and souther-nhalf portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was precisely this

admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot

now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.

Article 1431 21 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered

conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the personrelying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so

amended their original complaint for paiiition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the

subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that

there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually

be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent

spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the

petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants

presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the

best evidence rule.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the

original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer

or is recorded in a public office. 22 Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a

document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be

proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. 23 Section 24 of Rule 132provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by 7'1 a copy attested by the officer

having the legal custody or the record.24

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area

covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III

of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga

Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed

land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies

of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in

official records are an exception to the rule. 25 The rule provides that entries in official records made

in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the

performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's

attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The


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the sale of the southern-half portion between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro. They are not

real parties-in-interest who stand to be benefited or injured by the sale of the 1/3 portion of the

southern-half over which they have absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the courts below, only

fellow coowners have the personality to assail the sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's siblings,

Esperanza and Leandro. They have, however, expressly aquiesced to the sale and waived their right

to the property in the afiidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro. 36 As such, the petitioners have noright to their counterclaims of demolition of improvements and payment of damages.

With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim over the subject 1/3 portion of the

southern-half of the property through the Bilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding possession,

rentals, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to them.

The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be reckoned from January 2, 2001, the

date the Spouses Monteiro filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of the subject portion.

Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall also be imposed on the total amount of rent due from

finality of this Decision until fully paid.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and the March 5, 2012

Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CAG .R. CV No. 92707 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,

in that:

a. The award of rent at the rate of P500.00 per month shall be reckoned from January 2, 2001 until

the property is vacated; and

b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality

of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.


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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMIL MARCOS Y

ISIDRO, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 91646 | 1992-08-21

D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, J.:

Appellant Romil Marcos y Isidro was charged with the crime of Violation of Section 4, Article II of

Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an

information filed by the Office of the City Fiscal ofZamboanga City with the Regional Trial Court of

Zamboanga

City. The information alleged:

"That on or about June 7, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI six (6) sticks of marijuana

cigarettes, knowing same to be a prohibited drug." (Rollo, p. 7)

When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty.

After trial on the merits. the appellant was found by the court guilty as charged and was sentenced to

suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua at the San Ramon Penal Colony and to pay the costs.

The trial court gave credence to the buy-bust operation conducted by the prosecution witnesses, all

of them Narcom agents, wherein the appellant sold six (6) sticks of marijuana to Sgt. Amado Ani, a

member of the operation, who acted as the poseur-buyer. The other target of the operation, a

certain

Ballena eluded arrest and escaped.

The trial court summarized the buy-bust operation leading to the arrest of the appellant as follows:

" . . . The arrest of the accused was carefully planned. After receiving the information from the

civilian informant named 'Bobby' that the accused and another person was selling marijuana atTalon-Talon more particularly at Lucy's Store. the Narcom Agents conducted a surveillance in said

place riding on two motorcycles a day before the raid. They saw the accused selling marijuana. The

following day, again, the Narcom Agents held a conference and each of them was briefed by

their team leader. One of them who was Sgt. Amado Ani was to act as poseur buyer while others,

namely: Sgt. Jesus Belarga, Sgt. Bernardo Lego and Sgt. Julieto Vega as arresting officers. The

following day, June 7, 1989, at about 11:00 a.m., said team consisting of Narcom Agents proceeded


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to the place. Three were left at a vulcanizing shop, namely, Sgts. Belarga, Lego, and Vega; while

Sgt. Amado Ani, the poseur buyer, proceeded to the Lucy's Store. There he met the accused Romil

Marcos who asked said poseur buyer how much he was buying and the latter answered him P10.00

worth. The accused entered the store, gave the P10.00 marked money given by Sgt. Ani to his

companion Ballena and the latter gave the accused Romil Marcos the six sticks of marijuana

cigarettes which were wrapped. Sgt. Ani examined the same and upon verifying that it wasmarijuana, he proceeded to the street and made the pre-arranged signal by wiping his face with a

handkerchief. The three Narcom Agents rushed to the place where Sgt. Amado Ani was. However,

after Sgt. Ani gave the signal, he returned to where the accused Romil Marcos and alias Ballena

were, introduced himself as Narcom Agent and grabbed the accused Romil Marcos but the latter

was able to escape. While escaping, the Narcom Agents saw him throw a stick of marijuana

cigarette which Sgt. Belarga retrieved. Later, they apprehended Romil Marcos and brought him to

their office at Upper Calarian, this City. He was turned over to the chief investigator Sgt. Mihasun

together with the six sticks of marijuana cigarettes that were sold by the said accused Romil Marcos

to the poseur buyer, Sgt. Ani. The six sticks were examined by the PCCI and found the same to be

positive of marijuana." (Rollo. p. 24)

The trial court rejected the appellant's defense that he was not the object of the buy-bust operation

and that he was arrested when he refused to testify against Ballena who was actually the target of

the buy-bust operation. He testified as follows:

" . . . That on June 7, 1989, past 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at Lucy's Store waiting for a

jeep going to Sta. Catalina to find out en he was going to work at the Peninsula Construction

Company because he was temporarily laid off. That while he was at the Lucy's Store, a motorcycle

stopped in the store. Immediately, the people on board said motorcycle chased a certain Ballena

who is his neighbor. That Ballena's complete name is Romeo Ballena who is known as Mimi or Mi.Then he heard a shot when they were chasing Ballena but does not know who fired the same. The

people on board the motorcycle were not able to catch up with Ballena, so they returned to the store.

Upon returning to the store, one of them pointed at him and said that he was a companion of Ballena

at the same time handcuffing him. At that time there were many people at the Lucy's Store

numbering about thirty; that there were three CAFGUs who arrived in the place and one of them

asked the people who were riding earlier in the motorcycle what were those shots for. One of them

in the motorcycle answered that they must not interfere as they are Narcom Agents, and the CAFGU

did not interfere. After that they placed him between the motorcycle driver and the other person and

took him with them to Calarian; that the persons who took him were the same people who chased

Ballena; that while on their way to Calarian, one of the two persons who chased Ballena in amotorcycle told him that he must act as witness against Ballena. However, said accused told them

that he would not like to testify because he does not know what was that about. They said that they

are going to place him in jail because he does not want to be a witness against Ballena." (RTC

Decision, p. 6, Rollo, p. 21)

In his appeal the appellant assigns the alleged errors of the trial court as follows:


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The record reveals that when the prosecuting Fiscal offered the prosecution's documentary evidence

among those offered was Exhibit "E" which was described as "the wrapper containing the six (6)

sticks handrolled cigarette which were sold by the accused Romil Marcos to the poseur-buyer Sgt.

Ani, and as part of the testimony of the Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Belarga and

also Sgt. Mihasun" Marcos alleges that nowhere in the offer of documentary evidence is there amention as regards the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-

bust operation. Under these circumstances, the appellant argues that the appellant should be

acquitted for failure of the prosecution to offer the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to

Sgt. Ani.

This argument is not well taken.

We rule that Exhibit "E" does not refer to the wrapper alone but also refers to the six (6) marijuana

sticks sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation. It is to be noted that Exhibit "E"

was offered as evidence in relation to the testimonies of Sgt. Belarga, Forensic Chemist AthenaAnderson and Sgt. Mihasun. The record is clear to the effect that in their testimonies, Sgt. Belarga,

Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Mihasun referred to Exhibit "E" as the six (6) sticks of

marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation conducted by the Narcom

agents led by Sgt. Belarga at Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City on June 7, 1989.

The second and third assignment errors raise the issue on credibility of witnesses. In this regard the

appellant points out alleged circumstances of the prosecution witnesses which "render their

testimonies lacking in probative weight or value." The appellant focuses on the alleged inconsistent

statements of the Narcom agents as regards how long they have known their informant named

"Bobby" to the point that the appellant suggests that there was no informant and that the surveillanceon June 6, 1989 and the buy-bust operation conducted on June 7, 1989 never took place at all.

Whether or not the prosecution witnesses, particularly the Narcom agents have known their

informant Bobby for one year is not a material point in the crime of illegal sale of marijuana drug

under Section 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. This crime requires merely the consummation of

the selling transaction. (People v. Dekingco, 189 SCRA 512 [1990]; and People v. Catan, G.R. No.

92928, January 21, 1992) In case of a "buy-bust operation", the crucial point is that the poseur-buyer

received the marijuana from the appellant and the same was presented as evidence in court. Proof

of the transaction is sufficient. (People v. Catan, supra; and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136

[1990])

In the case at bar, the transaction was established by the evidence on record. Prosecution witness

Sgt. Ani who acted as poseur-buyer positively identified the appellant as the one who sold him six

(6) sticks of marijuana for the amount of P10.00. He testified as follows:

"Q. On June 7, 1989, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, who were those who proceeded to Bandariba,

Talon-Talon, this City?


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A. We were together with Sgt. Belarga, Sgt. Lago and Sgt. Vega.

Q. And from your headquarters to Talon-Talon, this City, how did you go?

A. We went there to Bandariba by using the motorcycle.

Q. What particular place at Bandariba, Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City, did your group go?A. We stopped first at a little vulcanizing area near the road.

Q. What did you do there in that area of vulcanizing?

A. Our team leader, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Vega left at the vulcanizing area.

Q. How about you?

A. I proceeded to the vicinity where the Lucy store is located.

Q. How far is this vulcanizing to Lucy store where you proceeded?

A. About 30 to 40 meters.

Q. You were able to proceed to the Lucy store?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What happened when you were at the Lucy Store?

A. In front of the store I was met by Romil Marcos and he asked me what I want.

Q. In what dialect did Romil Marcos ask to what you like for?

A. In Tagalog dialect.

Q. What did you say to this question of Romil Marcos?

A. I said 'mayroon ba tayong stock?'

COURT:

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. 'If you have marijuana stock.'

FISCAL AVECILLA:

Q. Did Romil answer you when you asked that question?

A. Yes, he answered.

Q. What did he say to you?

A. He asked me. 'How much?

Q. What did you do when he asked 'How much?'

A. I handed the P10.00.


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Evidence Abby

Documents

Transcript of Evidence Abby