EVALUERING OG KOMPLEKSITETdanskevalueringsselskab.dk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/...Space Shuttle...

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EVALUERING OG KOMPLEKSITET Michael Quinn Patton September 9, 2016 Kolding, Denmark

Transcript of EVALUERING OG KOMPLEKSITETdanskevalueringsselskab.dk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/...Space Shuttle...

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EVALUERING OG

KOMPLEKSITET

Michael Quinn Patton

September 9, 2016

Kolding, Denmark

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Photo by

Lynsey Gornick2

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In the

beginning…

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Māori

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AES Best Evaluation Policy and

Systems Award

2013 Award Winners: Nan

, Kate McKegg and Kataraina Pipi of Research Evaluation Consultancy Limited (a

member of the Kinnect Group), and Veronica Thompson from Sport New Zealand) for

Developmental Evaluation – He Oranga Poutama: what have we learned?

Recognizes work developing the best evaluation policy, integrated evaluation system,

evaluation program, framework and/ or implementation of evaluation policies, systems,

programs or frameworks. Also recognizes work undertaken in partnership with clients

or users who have championed the evaluation and can attest to increased arising from

the evaluation process or specific evaluation findings.

KateVeronica Nan Kataraina 5

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The Journey

TO MAORI

WITH MAORI

AS MAORI

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Core principles were developed

and adapted in various local

settings along with a system of

national coordination and support

to facilitate local effort.

HOP initiative set out to

develop a practical,

grounded understanding of

what as Māori looks like in

diverse activities.

He Oranga Poutama Developmental

Evaluation

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Complexity concepts & Evaluation

• Emergence: Self-organizing, Attractors

• Nonlinear: Small actions can have large

reactions. “The Butterfly Wings Metaphor

• Dynamical: Interactions within, between, and

among subsystems and parts within systems

can be volatile, changing

• Uncertainty: Getting to Maybe; unpredictable;

uncontrollable; unanticipated consequences

• Coevolution: Process uses; interdependence

• Adaptation: Developmental8

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Henry MintzbergStrategic

Leadership

Expert

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Evaluation of

strategy

Implementaion

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How emergent strategy works

Intended

Strategy Deliberate

Strategy

Realized

Strategy

Emergent

Strategy

Unrealized

Strategy

Source: Henry Mintzberg, Sumatra Ghoshal and James B. Quinn, The Strategy Process, Prentice Hall, 1998

http://www.ssireview.org/up_for_debate/article/strategic_philanthropy

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Traditional Accountability Focus

Unrealized Strategy= Failure

Intended

Strategy

Deliberate Strategy

Realized

Strategy

Emergent Strategy=Mission drift11

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How developmental outcomes evaluation works

Intended Outcomes Implemented

Outcomes

Realized Outcomes

EmergentOutcomes

Unrealized Outcomes

Source: Henry Mintzberg, Sumatra Ghoshal and James B. Quinn, The Strategy Process, Prentice Hall, 1998

http://www.ssireview.org/up_for_debate/article/strategic_philanthropy

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Inspired by Jeff Conklin, cognexus.org

Time

Complex development situations are

ones in which this…

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And this…

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Turns out to be this…

Time15

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…looks like this

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Emergence Example

Wilderness Leadership Program

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Emergence WildernessProgram Example

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TRUCKERS

TURTLES

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EMERGENCE

• Relationships

• Subgroups

• Critical incidences

• New intervention directions

• Emergent processes

• Emergent outcomes

• Emergent impacts

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Taking Emergence Seriously

• Beyond “unanticipated

consequences” to genuine

openness

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Complexity Concepts

• Nonlinearity: Small actions can

have large reactions. “The

Butterfly Wings Metaphor”

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Nonlinear Effects

• The Toronto SARS outbreak occurred in

two waves—March to April and April to

July 2003. In total, 44 people in Canada

died from SARS.

• 2014: Mexico City sees spike in H1N1

swine flu cases, 68 people dead

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Damiano Soup Kitchen, Duluth, Minnesota

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Space Shuttle Disasters

• Challenger disaster

January 28, 1986• Columbia disaster

February 1, 2003

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Nonlinearity

• Vicious circle: From working to homeless

• Virtuous circle: Youth homeless center

staff story

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SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER

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resultSearch Booksresultoe9S6SgfGeneral RPP1PP1ACfU3U1E

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Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region

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The worldwide proliferation in recent years of so–called complex emergencies. These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official and private agencies.

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A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid changes that are difficult to predict. Thus complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and scale of response. The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more.

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Although some evaluations of international assistance for complex emergencies have been carried out, experience from the planning and execution of large–scale aid for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction has not been extensively documented and assessed. Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

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This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi–donor, joint evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committee was composed of representatives from 19 OECD–member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) secretariat of the OECD; 9 multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGO organizations.

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Co-evolution, co-creation

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Bumblebees and the flowers they pollinate have coevolved so

that both have become dependent on each other for survival.

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Joint Evaluation in

Complex Ecologies

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Five Paris Declaration Principles

1. Country ownership

2. Alignment

3. Harmonization

4. Mutual accountability

5. Managing for results

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Responsibility:

Process UseThe impacts of being involved in the

evaluation process for those countries,

donors, and participants involved.

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High Degree of Process Use

Process use refers to and is indicated by individual changes in thinking and behavior, and program or organizational changes in procedures and culture, that occur among those involved in evaluation as a result of the learning that occurs during the evaluation process. Evidence of process use is represented by the following kind of statement after an evaluation: "The impact on our program came not just from the findings but from going through the thinking process that the evaluation required." 43

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RELATIONSHIPS

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Meta-Evaluation

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“A Leader's Framework for Decision

Making” by David J. Snowden and

Mary E. Boone, Harvard Business

Review,

November, 2007:

Wise executives tailor their approach to fit

the complexity of the circumstances

they face.

46

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Wise evaluators tailor their approach

to fit the complexity of the

circumstances they face

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Conditions that challenge traditional

model-testing evaluation

• High innovation

• Development

• High uncertainty

• Dynamic

• Emergent

• Systems Change

Adaptive

Management

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Evidence-based Practice

Evaluation grew up in the “projects”

testing models under a theory of

change that pilot testing would lead to

proven models that could be

disseminated and taken to scale:

The search for best practices

and evidenced-based practices

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Fundamental Issue:

How the World Is Changed

Top-down dissemination of

“proven models”

versus

Bottoms-up adaptive

management

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Models vs. Principles

Identifying proven principles for

adaptive management

(bottoms-up approach)

versus

Identifying and disseminating

proven models

(top down approach)51

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EvalPartners

The international movement

to strengthen national

evaluation capacities

52

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Complexity Theory

as a

Theory of Change

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EVALUATION CONTRASTS

Traditional linear evaluations…

1. Testing models

Complexity-based Evaluation…

1. Tracking and understanding adaptations

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Traditional

Evaluation…

2. Render

definitive

judgments of

success or

failure:

Does the

program work?

Complexity-based

Evaluation…

2. Rendering nuanced,

disaggregated

feedback &

generating learnings

for adaptation &

development:

What works for whom

in what ways under

what conditions?55

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Traditional Complexity-basedEvaluation… Evaluation…

3. INDEPENDENCE:

Evaluator external, independent, objective

3. RELATIONSHIP-FOCUSED, COLLABORATIVE

Evaluator a facilitator and learning coach bringing evaluative thinking to the table, co-evolution,

co-ceation

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Traditional Complexity-based

Evaluation… Evaluation…

4. CERTAINTY:

Predetermined

outcomes

Fix the design

upfront

Predetermind

indicators

Fixed

questions

4. FLEXIBILITY

Emergent

outcomes

Flexible design

Emergent

indicators

Dynamic

questions

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Traditional Complexity-based

Evaluation… Evaluation…

5. Linear cause-

effect thinking

and logic

models

5. Systems and

complexity thinking

with attention to

dynamics,

permeable

boundaries,

interdependencies,

and emergent

interconnections58

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Complex Dynamic Systems

• Interrelationships

• Open boundaries

• Diverse perspectives

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Understanding the

Elephant

from

a Complex Dynamic

Systems Perspective

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Global Systems Change

Evaluation

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EvalPartners

The international movement

to strengthen national

evaluation capacities

62

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“We can not solve our problems

with the same level of thinking

that created them.”

64

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From International to Global

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Are we ready for….

Evaluators without borders

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First, some context and

perspective

You can't see the Earth as a globe unless you get at least twenty thousand miles away from it.

Only 24 humans ever went that far into outer space -- the three-person crews of the nine Apollo missions that traveled to the moon between 1968 and 1972.

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THE BLUE MARBLE SHOT

But only the 3 in the last

Apollo mission saw a full

Earth and took the first

complete photo of Earth

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December 7, 1972

The first photograph taken of the

whole round Earth

The only one ever snapped by a

human being.

The Blue Marble Shot

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Taking a Blue Marble

Perspective

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Compare images

National boundaries: the result of war,

colonialism, enslavement, exploitation, genocide,

oppression, greed, politics, religious

persecution….73

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Global problems transcend

national and agency boundaries

• Climate change

• Economic turbulence

• Refugees

• Virulent infectious diseases

• Dying oceans

• Global cyber-terrorism

• International drug cartels

• Human trafficking

• Weapons trafficking

• Poverty and inequality

• Multi-national corporate collusion74

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Global problems….

• The definitions of the problems are

disputed

• The “facts” are a matter of intense debate

• Politics and special interests dominate:

-- national interests

-- multi-national corporate interests

-- agency agendas

-- competition for resources

• The stakes are huge 75

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“We can not solve our problems

with the same level of thinking

that created them.”

76

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Where will we get and

how will we train…

• Blue Marble Evaluators

• Global Systems Evaluators

• World Systems Thinkers as

Evaluators

• Evaluators without borders,

boundaries and blinders77

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Blue Marble Evaluation

Anthem 2016

Michael Quinn Patton

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We are the world

We are the world

We are the children

We are the ones who make a brighter

day

So let's start giving

There is a choice we're making

Were saving our own lives

It's true we'll make a better day, just

you and me

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHs

v9NJn2j0

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Blue Marble

Evaluation Anthem

There comes a time

When we heed a certain call

When evaluation must evolve.

The Blue Marble calls us

To do what must be done

The future of our planet must be won.

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We can’t go on

Pretending day by day

That our designs, as now done,

Are adequate.

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We must now become

World Savvy rigorously

And the truth be told

Through global data we unfold.

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Chorus -- Everyone

We are the world’s evaluators

We are the ones who take a global view– eval-uat-ing.

There’s a need we’re serving,

To use a systems lens

Evaluating complex changes globally.

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There are projects failing

To take a whole world view

To see

Inter-connected-ness

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We must now become

World Savvy rigorously

And the truth be told

Through global data we unfold.

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So right here, and right now

As political dynamics unfold,

And the winds of change blow,

as far as we can see,

The global currents swirl

Tumultuously

And we track the rippling results

And we track the rippling results

WE, EVALUATORS, document the changing

world….

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We have to create innovative and adaptive

evaluation approaches for a complex, dynamic

world.

We have to share successes and failures.

As we look ahead, to global initiatives, and beyond

to future evaluation challenges,

Global Systems Change Evaluations and Blue

Marble Evaluators are on the global agenda.

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Chorus -- Everyone

We are the world’s evaluators

We are the ones who take a

global view– eval-uat-ing.

There’s a need we’re serving,

To use a systems lens

Evaluating complex changes

globally.

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89

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ReferencesDevelopmental Evaluation: Applying Complexity

Concepts to Enhance Innovation and Use.

Guilford Press, 2011.

Utilization-Focused Evaluation, 4th ed.,

Michael Quinn Patton, Sage, 2008.

Essentials of Utilization-Focused Evaluation,

Michael Quinn Patton, Sage, 2012

90

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91

Website sample chapter:

http://www.guilford.com/excer

pts/patton.pdf

website for the book:

http://www.guilford.com/cgi-

bin/cartscript.cgi?page=pr/patt

on.htm&dir=research/res_eval

&cart_id=824067.29797