EVALUATIONOF THE

PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT-USAID­

DOMINICAN REPUBLICu.s. AGENC'f FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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~EWED AND OOWNGRADED by Lauren J. Gain,Dll'ector, OPS, January, 1975

April 1969

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTDEPART E

THE EVALUATION REPORT

of the

PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT

April 1969

lauren J. Goin

Peter Ellena

lawrence Tate

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1

The Threat to Internal Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3Recent History, the SituationToday, the Pre-Election Period,the Post Election Period

Observations, the Public Safety Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6History 1962-1966,the Five-Year Plan,Project Objectives and Achievements,U.S. Resource Inputs

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Current Capabilities and Limitations of the National PoliceAdministration and Management,Manpower Development, Riot Control,Daily law and order, Criminal Investigation,Communications, Transportation,Police Intelligence, the Department ofSpecial Operations

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . .Police Capabilities, the Public SafetyProject, Special Considerations,the Police Image, the U.S. Role,Police Strength Needs

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . .Project Scope and Effort,Coordination Project Resource Needsin the Short-Term and Long-Term,Steps that should be taken by theNational Police

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Individuals Consulted by Team •

Current Principal Political Parties ••••••.

Civil Disturbance Control Unit Organization Chart. •

Senior Officers Seminar. • • • • • . • • • • •

National Police Manpower Distribution as Reported

Summary of Santiago Pilot Project •

Summary of Highway Patrol

Communications Report. • . •

Records and Identification Chart •

Weapons Inventory of C.D.C..•••

National Police Vehicle Inventory. •

Military Assistance Program . . • •

Proposed Public Safety Goal Discription • . • • • •

Public Safety Procurement Funding Requirements

Briefing for the Director General of the National Police. •

Dominican Republic Chief of State and Cabinet Members •

Regional Population Figures •

National Police Budget Figures

National Police Pay Scale by Rank and Comparison withMilitary and Private Industry • • •

National Police Recruitment Standards

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Organizational Chart. •Proposed National Police

Present Police Regions .

Proposed Police Regions

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Annexes

INTRODUCTION

During his visit to Washington in September 1968, the Ambassador expressed hisinterest in the need for an in-depth evaluation of the Public Safety Effort in the Domini­can Republic. In his February 7 message (SD 366), the Ambassador stated that such anevaluation was not only advisable but that it would be helpful to him at that time.

Accordingly, AID/W, OPS arranged for a team composed of the following to con-duct the evaluation of the project:

Lauren J. Goin, Team Leader, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Public Safety;

Peter Ellena, Office of Public Safety, Operations Division, Latin America Branch;

Lawrence J. Tate, AID Latin American Bureau, Observer.

The Team arrived in Santo Domingo on March 23 and completed its work onApril 3.

Terms of reference for the study were set forth in State Message 036822 datedMarch 10 and commented on in SD 762 dated March 14. These are:

PURPOSE:

SCOPE:

1. Determine effectiveness of past and presently plannedPublic Safety Program.

2. Determine appropriateness of the program as an instru­ment for strengthening internal security and stabilityof Dominican Republic within context U.S. interests.

The study embraces:1. The nature of the current and anticipated threat to

internal security.2. The abilities of respective Civil Security elements to

fulfill assigned missions with particular emphasis inthe areas of administration, budget, personnel strengthsand management, deployment, operations, training sys­tems, communications, mobility, and maintenancecapabilities.

3. Examination of Public Safety Project objectives sinceinception of the activity.

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4. Measureme~tl of ~~gree to which objectives have beenachieved to date.

5. Assessment of the adequacy of project resources, i.e.,Technical Advisor, commodities, participating training.

PROCEDURES: 1. Consultation with appropriate members of the CountryTeam and USAID Staff.

2. Visitation to appropriate facilities and consultation withofficials of the National Police.

3. USAID/PS staff will assist by providing necessary dataand reports relevant to the purpose of the study.

TEAM REPORT: 1. Findings, conclusions and recommendations will be dis­cussed with the appropriate members of the USAID,Embassy, and the Ambassador prior to the Team'sdeparture.

2. A written report will be submitted subsequently forCountry Team comments.

3. The study team report is to be considered as an in-housemanagement tool and as such distribution will not bemade to or within the GODR.

In the Team's first meeting with Ambassador Crimmins the Ambassador expresseda concern regarding (a) the visibility of the U.S. assistance effort to the police as a pos­sible source of embarassment to the U.S. should the police use repressive measures,(b) the degree of accomplishment of Public Safety assistance, and (c) whether such ac­complishments was worth the cost to the U.S. He expressed a need to answer thesequestions in determining where the U.S. should go from here in working with theDominican police (if at all) at the least political and dollar cost to the U.S. It is againstthe backdrop of this guidance that the study was conducted.

In the process of conducting this study, the Team consulted, with the Ambassador,the USAID Director, and with other members of the u.S. Mission, and with pertinentofficials within the National Police establishment (See Annex A). Additionally theTeam visited and made on-site inspections of a number of relevant police facilities andoperations.

In submitting this report, the Team wishes to express its appreciation for thecooperation of all individuals consulted and for the guidance afforded b'y AmbassadorCrimmins and Mr. Devine, DCM.

THE THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY

U.S. INTEREST

Given the strategic location of the Dominican Republic and other relevant factorsprevalent in the Caribbean area, it becomes evident that it is in national security interestof the U.S. to take all necessary steps to forestall accession to power of a governmenthostile to the U.S.

In spite of the stormy past, the present government meets criteria commensuratewith U.S. political and security interest in the country. This condition is in no wayassuring when considered in terms of possible future events. On the contrary, the recordsugg~sts a strong likelihood of accelerating intensity in the bitter struggle for politicalpower as the country approaches elections in late May of 1970 and beyond.

On this point, the 1969 Country Assistance Strategy Paper (CASP) has this tosay:l

".... modest progress continues to be offset by rapid population rise, in­creasing volatility and radicalization of youth, emigration to the cities, severeunemployment, rising expectations and purposeful agitation feeding on frustra­tions. These conditions and trends warrant the conclusions that in theDOMREP. ... there will probably be a long-term movement to the left andthat this movement will probably take on an increasing anti-American cast.Thus, there is the possibility of a future explosion with serious implicationsfor our interest."

Relating to this analysis, and with specific reference to the subject under study in thisreport, the 1969 CASP submission proposes the following operational strategy:

".... use our influence with the Armed Forces and the police to have themconduct themselves professionally and correctly toward the citizenry and totry to prevent their over-reaction to terrorist and other provacative incidentsand the initiation of a spiral of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Urge Presi­dent Balaguer to avoid the temptation to authorize or acquiese in repressivemeasures in the security forces and to exercise control over excesses by thoseforces. Be prepared to take measures disassociating ourselves to the extentpossible from such excesses, (e.g., reduction in our technical and material

1See Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) Embassy Airgram A-54, February 24, 1969.

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assistance to the Armed Forces and the police in order to maintain and ex­pand their capabilities for meeting internal and possible external threat to theConstitutional Government. .... "

THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY INTEREST

The most recent Embassy assessment of the Dominican political/security situation(SDA-88) suggests that the period between March 1969 and the election 14 monthshence will be marked by increasing difficulties and uneasiness. It estimates that thereexists a 50-50 chance of a serious attempt to overthrow the government during thatperiod but suggests that tt1e Government has a better than even chance of completingits constitutional term. The assessment expresses an Embassy expectation of an in­creasing likelihood on the part of the Government to resort to the military with im­plications of repressive measures which, in turn, could affect the legitimacy of theelections. Concerning the stability of the government, the Embassy notes a risingconcentration of issues on the part of opposition parties and expresses concern lestone or more of these provide a commond ground around which the presently dividedopposition may rally. Notable among these issues are: continuismo (re-election),agitation emanating from the autonomous university, and a series of apparent politicalkillings. Coupled with and arising out of the latter two is the issue of "uncontrollableforces", Le., the occasional over-reaction by the sec~rity forces, including both themilitary and police, resulting in the raising of political temperatures and increasingopportunities for the left to legitimately accuse the government of harboring andutilizing forces of repression. A predictable by-product of repressive governmentmeasures is a coalescence of opposition elements, regardless of their ideologicalpersuasion.

Both the military and police forces have been attacked with increasing frequencyin the press for alleged repressive measures, with the police getting the majority of theattention.

For the past several months university student demonstrations and riots, at athree incident per week rate, have preoccupied the police riot control unit. Pre­planned gatherings of students and sympathizers, referred locally as "micromeetings"have to date not been characterized by violence. It can be expec!ed that urban dis­orders, possibly attended by violence will occur during the political campaigning tocome. The likelihood of, this happening will be considerably greater if the numerousleftist and PRD factions coalesce in their plans of action. "Micromeeting" tactics canresult in brush fire riots merely by violent action on the part of the demonstrators.This would present a serious problem to security forces.

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"\: r .' ~,r' .,-Recent activities on the p~rt of the MPD (the Marxist-Lenninist Communist Party),

are perhaps indicative of the threat under discussion.2 This party has been plottingsince 1968 to assume leadership over other extreme leftist and rightist groups inengineering the overthrow of the Government. The most recent attempts were thosescheduled to have occurred on February 26 and March 2. These are both regarded asserious efforts to promote a general armed uprising. However their failure to ma­terialize is attributed to the fact that the Government had advance intelligence enablingthem to take visible security measures, the inability of the CRC (Clandestine Revolu­tionary Commando) units within the Armed Forces to live up to MPD expectations,and, MPD's realization that other extremist parties were not prepared to join initiallyin the subversive undertaking. As the Team conducted its study, still another effort onthe part of the MPD to confront the government with violence was frustrated. Furtherdetails are not available at this writing.

As brought out earlier, the best evidence presently available points to an accel­eration and intensification of activities of this nature and a prediction of increasingseriousness if and when the opposition parties are able to unite on one or more ofthe issues, real or fabricated.

Thus it is within the contextual framework of this kind of political/securityenvironment that the team undertook to evaluate the present and proposed futureactivity of the Public Safety program in the Dominican Republic.

2Existing political parties are listed in Annex B.

5

OBSERVATIONS PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT

HISTORY OUTLINE

The day Dictator Trujillo was assassinated, May 30, 1961, several de facto admin­istrations were formed, however, an effective governmental vacuum existed for an ex­tended period. Leftist and extreme rightist agitation as a tactic to create chaos was aconstituant factor in the downfall of these governments. Violent riots and civil dis­orders were almost a daily occurence in Santo Domingo and other urban areas of thecountry during the early part of 1962.

The Government of the Dominican Republic, in a memorandum dated March 23,1962, requested special assistance in strengthening the capacity of the National Policeto maintain effective law and order and to modernize its organization, operations,and facilities.

In April of 1962, a preliminary survey was conducted by the USAID. This sur­vey confirmed the needs of assistance as requested by the GODR. As a result a USAIDPublic Safety program was established in May 1962 with one advisor assigned to theMission. With the moderate program some progress was made in response to the needfor immediate and effective internal security measures, though project momentum hadbeen impeded by changes in government. By September 1962, basic training in CivilDisturbance Control tactics had been provided to the civil security forces which pro­vided them with a measure of superiority over rioters and demonstrators. This estab­lished riot control force was known as the "Cascos Blancos" and in 1965 consisted ofapproximately 650 men stationed in Fortaleza Ozama. This force came under heavyattack during the fighting of April 26 to April 29, 1965 and was destroyed as aneffe'ctive civil disturbance fighting force.

New studies of the National Police capabilities made by USAID consultant in1965 confirmed the need for an accelerated program of training and commodity pro­curement to create a short-term posture of law, order, and security to meet immediateneeds. A Project Agreement was designed in 1966 to assist the National Police inreaching long-term objectives which included fourteen (14) sub-projects and an accel­erated training program was implemented with the arrival of five Public Safety trainingadvisors on TDY to initiate a crash training effort.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The 1961 objectives under Project Agreement P-l for Economical, Technical, andRelated Assistance Agreement, dated January 11, 1962 were as follows:

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-" ~jUUA. Surveys

1. Conduct, in cooperation with the representatives of the National Policeassigned to work with him, studies and surveys of existing and needed facilities, equip­ment, and operations of the National Police to be used as a basis for planning recom­mended improvements. Such plans when approved will be used as the basis for specificprojects under this cooperative agreement. Special emphasis will be placed on establish­ment of a National Police Training Facility, countrywide radio communications system,police record, and identification system, and a central scientific crime laboratory oper­ated by the National Police.

2. Working in concert with the host government, numerous surveys andstudies have been cowpleted which have been used as a basis for the specific sub­project. These surveys included but were not limited to a National Police trainingfacility, countrywide radio communications system, police record and identification,and a central scientific crime laboratory.

B. Work Plans

1. Develop, in cooperation with the National Police counterparts assignedto work with him a specific work plan for each project including:

a. Need and justificationb. Extent and scope of projectc. Participant training elementsd. A financial plane. Equipment, facilities, and training to be provided by the USAID

and the National Police.

2. Workplans for each sub-project have been completed and also presentlyserve as basic guidelines for program planning, evaluation, and reporting purposes.

C. Technical Assistance

1. Render direct technical assistance to the National Police and to serveas the direct representative of the AID Mission Director to the National Police. De­termine and request the assistance of other USAID technical advisors. The technical ad­visors would work with various divisions of the police as needed and necessary.

2. An early evaluation of the project was made and provided thejustification of the present PSD complement of 14 Public Safety advisors. Theseadvisors are working in various police divisions providing technical advise on a day­to=day basis.

D. The Five-Year Plan

The broad objective of the Public Safety program is to develop theNational Police into a modern, professional law enforcement organization capable of

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maintaining law and order and to constitute an effective firstline of defense againstsubversion. To accomplish this objective a Five-Year Plan detailing required self-helpefforts, funding and personnel was prepared by the USAID Public Safety Division tocommence in FY 1967 and end in FY 1971.

Project Agreement 70061, dated December 2, 1966, Project Agreement80112 articulates the fourteen (14) sub-projects of the Five-Year Plan as follows:

The funding requirements for the Five Year Plan are as follows:

PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT FINANCIAL SUMMARY

FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971

Technicians 75 308 488 488 424 424

(Direct Hire)

Contract 0 0 0 0 0 0Commodities 366 316 320 355 325 220

(20)Participants 14 33 0 60 46 46

TOTALS 455 657 808 903 795 690

Local Currency

($1.00 U.S.=$1.00

R.D. (Investment

Loans) 0 50 50 100 200 250

Accomplishments as measured against objectives and assessment of presentpolice strengths and weaknesses are presented separately in this report.

E. Civil Disturbance Control

1. Develop a corps of 800 men fully trained in this discipline duringFY 1967 for duty in the capitol and urban areas. The balance of the police forcewill receive basic civil disturbance control at the Police Academy.

2. U.S. Procurement

a. Provide Ml carbines to replace San Cristobal carbines.b. Provide .30 caliber telescope mounted rifle for counter-sniper

fire.c. Provide Garand rifles (M-l) for limited heavy weapons support.d. Provide 12 gauge shotguns.e. Provide standardized .38 revolvers.f. Provide other specialized riot control equipment such as pro­

tective shields, face masks, and communications equipment.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

A. Civil disturbance control training has been provided to 450 officers andmen of the CDC. However, through normal attrition, transfers, and like reasons thepresent strength of the CDC numbers 285 men. Training in the CDC is continuing.See annex 'c' for organizational chart.

B. Riot control training (12 hours) is provided to all students attending therecruit or in-service classes in the National Police Academy. Thus far 384 students havecompleted this training.

C. U.S. procurement as specified under this cooperative agreement has provided:

1. 157 - 30.06 Remington rifles2. 64 - .30 Caliber telescope mounted rifles3. 32 - .30 caliber Garand rifles4. 96 - 12 gauge shotguns5. 150 - 30 caliber carbines M-l6. 98 - standardized .38 revolvers7. Other specialized riot control equipment

a. 25 protective shieldsb. 349 Gas masksc. 2,466 gas grenadesd. 2,281 gas projectiles

D. Rural Training Teams

1. To provide minimal basic training to the members of the NationalPolice below the officer level in rural areas through the third quarter of FY 1967.

2. To meet the emergency situation in 1966, an accelerated trainingprogram for rural National Policemen was implemented, the instructors consisted of15 officers, they were given a three-week course of instruction in January 1966 whichcoincided with the arrival of a PSD Training Advisor who was assigned full-time towork directly with the instructional teams. Instructional material was formed and theinstructors were divided into five three-man teams. Five centrally located training siteswere selected and on March 14, 1966 the classes commenced. The courses coveredtwo weeks of intensive training in general police subjects and was designed to reachthe maximum number of National Police personnel in a short time. Training continueduntil the majority of police personnel in each area had attended the course. A totalof 2507 police personnel received the training.

3. Basic Training/National Police Academy

a. The National Police utilizing peso funds from the Credit Agreementdated June 30, 1966, will repair, refurbish, and construct the training academy at

Borinquen. The peso funds will be used for purchase of building materials and theNational Police construction battalion will provide the labor and equipment. Beginningin the third quarter of FY 1967 basic training will commence for a corps. of 5,000policemen. They will be trained in class units of 500 policemen each for a period 12weeks in ten consecutive quarters.

b. On July 16, 1968, the National Police Academy in Borinquenwas inaugurated by President Balaguer. The ceremonies were the culmination of almosttwo years of planning and construction at a cost of RD$150,000 which made possiblethis modern police facility with a capacity of 500 students. The first group of studentsbegan training prior to inauguration on March 5, 1968, the first class of recruits begantraining on July 22, 1968. The new academy has thus far graduated 400 policemenand 200 are currently attending recruit and in-service classes.

E. Leadership Education

1. A police cadet college and a High Command School for leadershipeducation will be established. Academic preparation will begin in the third quarter ofFY 1967 and classes will start in the third quarter of FY 1968.

2. In March of 1967 a high level police seminar of one week's durationwas established. This senior officers training program includes as students the top levelpolice administrators of the National Police. This course is conducted each quarter andfocuses on programming, administration, operations and supervision with a differentsubject matter chosen for the "work shop" portion of each class. The "work shop" wasdesigned to find solutions to the individual police problems of the attending studentsand foster closer cooperation among the various divisions of the National Police. Thusfar eight (8) seminars have been completed with 25 senior officers attending each class.Prior to the initiation of the Senior Officers Seminar Police administrators receivedvirtually no professional command training. See Annex D.

It is expected that the first class of 50 cadets will enroll in the PoliceCadet College by May 15, 1969. The building remodeled to temporarily serve as thePolice Cadet College is located in the National Police Academy at Borinquen. Theprogram of instruction, including lesson plans, has been completed and will provide athree-year course in a two-year period by utilizing the U.S. semester system on apermanent basis. The program of instruction will closely follow the curricula ofMichigan State University and the University of New Mexico.

The future permanent National Police Cadet College will be situatedon realty owned by the National Police at Borinquen. This land is located some 700meters to the east of the enlisted men's school and is separated by a wide valley wherecommon firearm ranges are now being constructed.

Forty-one students have thus far qualified to attend the first-class ofthe Police College and it is anticipated that the additional nine will be available prior tothe initiation of classroom instruction. This student capacity matches the estimated

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yearly attrition rate of the National Police Officer Corps. Candidates are required tohave their secondary baccalaureate. Funds have been obligated by the GODR for theconstruction of the permanent school, the current target date for completion is July1970.

F. Participant Training

1. To provide training grants for selected members of the National Policefor training in the U.S. and/or third countries.

2. Selected members of the National Police are regularly chosen asparticipants to the International Police Academy (lPA) in Washington and in past yearsto the Inter American Police Academy (lAPA) located in Panama.

One hundred and thirty-one Dominican police officers have beengraduated from these training institutions. Of this total, 106 (81%) are still active inlaw enforcement with a high percentage serving as instructors or in key positions.

G. Firearms Training

1. All policemen, officers, and enlisted men will be trained in the use ofthe following standard police weapons: .38 caliber revolvers, .30 caliber M-l carbine,12 gauge shotgun, as part of the Basic Training and leadership sub-projects.

a. The civil disturbance control force will receive additional trainingin the caliber .30 M-l Garand beginning in the third quarter of 1967.

b. After initial training, each man will fire all weapons periodicallyin regional firearms training programs which will be~n in the fourth quarter of FY 1967and continue through the life of the agreement.

2. The original Project Agreement was amended by ProAg 80112 adds"and jointly programmed local currency funds will be utilized for new range construc­tion in each of the police regions".

3. Accomplishments.

A program of intensive firearm instruction was implemented in Juneof 1967. To date 1,210 enlisted personnel and 439 officers have received firearmstraining. This course of instruction has now been incorporated into the recruit andin-service training classes at the National Police Academy. The current course of in­struction is of 97 hours duration and provides training in five different weapons(1) .38 caliber revolver, 34 hours, (2) .30 caliber rifle, 23 hours, (3) 30.06 caliber rifle,21 hours, (4) shotgun, 11 hours. ~he firearms training program will also be includedin the curricula of the Cadet Training program.

Fou,r National Police firearms ranges are programmed for the future,one for each police region. The first Pistol and Rifle range is near completion and is

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located in the National Police Academy in Borinquen. The second range will be locatedin the City of Santiago and it is anticipated that construction of that range will commencein July of 1969.

The pistol range in the National Police Academy has fifty (50) firingpoints, thirty-five (35) are covered at twenty-five yards and have a four feet minimumwidth from center to center. The additional fifteen firing points are at 50 yards. Thepistol range was designed to be utilized for all phases of training including competitionshooting. All fifty targets at twenty-five yards are the "turning" type operated bymechanical means from the firing line. The completion date for this range is March 7,1969.

The adjoining rifle range will be completed in June of 1969. Thisrange has twenty-five firing points at 200 yards maximum with a six-feet width fromcenter to center of target. The target carriers are of the conventional angle iron doublehung window design, with target butts and one 8' x 14' target house.

H. Police Administration

This sub-project involves administrative reforms and force level reductionsof the National Police. The initial objectives of this sub-project are:

I. Establish functioning National Police Planning Office, and a reorganiza­tion of the National Police, to include a new administrative structure with the NationalHeadquarters divided into three departments - Operations, Special Branch (Intelligence),Administration, and support. See Annex 'E'. Included in this reorganization will be areduction in the number of police regions from ten to four (see attachment 'F' & 'G')and a reduction in the force level from the actual strength of 8744 to 6100 over a five­year period which began in FY 1967.3

2. The National Police Planning office was established in 1968 and 7officers have been appointed to staff positions with a respected Colonel in command.The Planning Office is in full operation and beginning to assume its role as the catalyticagent for the reformation of the National Police structure. A two-week Planning Semi­nar has been conducted for the Planning Office staff members to expose and familiarizethe members to the functions and responsibilities of a planning office. Working inconcert with members of the USAID/PSD, the Planning Office has been instrumental inthe initiation of training programs, the implementation of the Traffic Division, initiationof a juvenile bureau and are currently working with the USAID/PSD in developing amodel precinct in the Capitol City of Santo Domingo, in compiling a "operationsmanual" and researching the possibility of organizing a statistical unit.

3The National Police reported their authorized strength as of January, 1966, at 9,698

(Annex H). Actual strength at that time was somewhat less because of losses during the

revolution.

The Special Branch has been developed into an "elite" effective policeorganization of approximately 183 men with strong counterinsurgency capability. Thisunit establishes police presence in rural communities and functions primarily as an in­telligence gathering force with limited combat capability which enables the police to keepabreast of potential insurgency threats.

Considerable progress has been made toward the reorganization of thePolice effort, primarily through the Planning Office and the Senior Officers Seminar.This concept now appears to be without opposition and it may be an opportune timeto submit the proposed legislative changes.

1. Rural/Municipal Police

1. Effective police control in rural areas and towns outside the capitolregion will be established by assumption of area patrolling by the National Police.

2. The police operations in the Santo Domingo region will be revisedto provide better control of patrol, traffic, investigations, and internal security.

3. Public Safety advisors will counsel and assist in the day-to-dayregional operations of the four regional directorates.

4. The pilot project in the City of Santiago was implemented in June1968 as a model and example for the future reorganization of the National Police.This new concept for the National Police utilizes the police manpower in performingpatrol activities in contrast to the old system of performing quasi-military duties inthe "estacamento." In the pilot project 40 specially selected and trained officers whoform the nucleus of the new patrol activity combine rural and urban patrol efforts byemploying foot patrols (two men) to provide police presence in residential and businessareas, supplemented by radio patrol units. The effectiveness of this activity has beenclearly illustrated by the significant decline of criminal acts in the areas covered. Thepatrols operate in the Santiago Province on eight-hour shifts, 24 hours a day, seven daysa week. See Annex "I".

Personnel are currently being trained in Santo Domingo in order tofurnish a capably trained force to implement this identical service through the modelprecinct under development in Santo Domingo by the National Police with PSD assis­tance. The implementation of this patrol activity in rural areas will measurably assistin filling the gap between the irregular activity of the Special Forces (DSO) and theurban police activities.

A Radio Patrol was established in Santo Domingo in February of 1963with the implementation of 10 vehicles. Special training was provided the membersselected to be radio patrolmen and the radio patrol concept was applied to the capitolcity. The radio patrol force currently numbers 15 units in Santo Domingo and fourunits in Santiago.

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J. Traffic Control

The objective is to assist the National Police in establishing a traffic controlprogram. This project involves a number of activities to improve the traffic situation, toimprove the public image through daily contact with the public which traffic controloffers.

An in-depth traffic survey was conducted in October of 1967 which pointedout the need for a complete reorganization of the Traffic Department of the NationalPolice. This reorganization plan was implemented in November of the same year. OnMay 6, 1968 and incidental to the reorganization of the Traffic Department, a HighwayPatrol unit was inaugurated to enforce traffic laws on the 164 Km. highway betweenthe Capitol city and Santiago (see Annex 1). The highway patrol consists of four sedans,painted a distinctive white and green with a rotating red beacon and equipped withcommunications.

There have been numerous in-depth studies conducted for the NationalPolice, primarily in point control, traffic lights, and in the traffic training field. Inaddition, PSD has trained a total of 320 National Policemen in traffic direction,point control, and operations, and 75 traffic officers in highway patrol operationsand accident investigation.

PSD has been instrumental in conducting three traffic educational cam­paigns in conjunction with the Traffic Department and the EI Comite Nacional de~eguridad de Transito and in stimulating interest in public relations activities.

K. Criminal Investigations

1. Reorganize all criminal investigative units into a central criminalinvestigative department at National and Regional headquarters as soon as the enablinglegislation and/or executive directives take effect.

2. Establish an Internal Affairs Bureau, reporting directly to the Chiefof the National Police to be established to investigate charges of graft, corruption anddisciplinary cases within the police force.

At present the National Police still operate with two separate investiga­tive organizations, the Homicide Bureau which includes homicide, rape, assults, ques­tioned documents, vehicle theft, narcotics, and juvenile crimes, and the Criminal In­vestigation Unit which is charged with the investigation of robbery, theft, fraud, vice(gambling), and contraband.

Several significant steps have been taken to integrate these investiga­tive units into an effective force (1) through advice two bureaus have been movedfrom the relatively ineffective Criminal Investigation Unit to the reasonably effectiveHomicide Unit, (2) integration of these forces have been accomplished in four interiorcities - Santiago, San Francisco de Marcris, Barahona, and La Roma, and (3) weekly in­vestigators meetings have been initiated to exchange information and foster a degree

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cooperation between the investigative units. These are positive steps toward the eventualintegration of the Homicide and Criminal Investigation units.

In addition, a daily roll call in-service type training program has beenimplemented in both investigative units, direction was provided for the modernizationof the antiquated filing system of the Criminal Investigation section to a more suitableserially numbered file.

Numerous training courses have been initiated since June 1967 providingtraining in investigations to 121 investigative personnel with an additional 31 completinga course in safe handling of explosives. There are currently 12 police personnel attendinga course in investigative techniques.

L. Communications

Beginning in the second quarter of FY 1967 radio communications will beexpanded to support rural policing operations and more effective maintenance capabilitieswill be dt;veloped nationally.

An in-depth survey of the communications system was conducted in Juneof 1968 and updated in March of 1969. The survey report prepared by the Public SafetyCommunications Advisor provides a review of the police communication capabilities,progress to date, and future development. (See Annex "K").

A separate communications system has been established for the newly in­augurated Highway Patrol. This system permits control over the vehicles at all timesthrough the installation of a 60 watt repeater that was repaired and installed at AltoBandera, and in addition a base station and four high-powered mobile units were alsoinstalled to complete the highway patrol communications system.

The first step toward the consolidation of the police communications at thePolice Palace has been implemented. The City Patrol Dispatcher and the base stationare to be relocated to the Palace. Previous dead areas will be eliminated due to thehigher altitude of the Palace. The Communications Control Center will combine allpolice communications at one central location. The room is being remodeled to facilitatethe equipment.

Current efforts are directed to the development of the City Mobile Tele­phone System. This system will group police officials together on a separate channel,which will considerably reduce the traffic workload of the patrol and administrativenetworks. Surplus desk telephones will be converted for use as control leads.

The Rural Patrol Network will be expanded as the pilot project is increasedand extended to other interior cities throughout the nation. FM 5b units will beutilized as mobile units as well as base stations in future expansion projects.

In-service type training programs are continuing to improve the repaircapabilities of the maintenance personnel.

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M. Motor Vehicle Maintenance

The National Police will improve the maintenance of their vehicles throughtraining and supervision of maintenance personnel and by recognizing and expandingmaintenance facilities in the capitol and rural areas, beginning in the first quarter ofFY 1967.

Great strides have been made in the field of motor vehicle maintenancesince the survey of April 1966. A great many recommendations have been implementedand efforts to improve this facility are continuing. Listed below are some of the ac­complishments in this field:

1. A vehicle record system has been implemented wherein each vehiclehas a separate folder listing such items as amount spent on spare parts, lubrication in­formation, and a complete history of the vehicle.

2. A maintenance record system has been devised wherein a record iskept of all National Police vehicles. Prior to instituting this system vehicle lubricationwas left to the drivers discretion. This information is now being noted including oilchange dates and mileage, lubrication, and tire rotation.

3. A spare parts accountability system was placed into effect to controland properly store spare parts. This included the installation of proper bins and aninventory system. The maintenance advisor reports that the accountability has im­proved to the point where 100% accountability is in the foreseeable future.

4. A reorganization of the tool stock and checkout system was com­pleted. Each man is presently issued a number and the corresponding tool check isplaced on the peg from which the tool was removed. Tools lost or missing are re­placed at the borrower's expense.

5. A spare parts reconditioning process was developed to determine therepair value of replaced parts. Parts found to be repairable are repaired, returned tothe parts stock and noted on the inventory card.

6. A vehicle inspection and entrance system has been devised to providea written order from the shop supervisor indicating the necessary repairs and assign­ment of a mechanic to repair the vehicle. When the repairs are completed, the super­visor inspects the work and signs the order if it meets with his approval.

7. A physical reorganization was made of the repair shop area separatingminor repairs, major repairs, and unrepairable vehicle, many of which were taking upbadly needed space. Removed from the shop area are the major repairs which are nowsituated in separate shops thus allowing the main shop more space.

8. A pre-employment driver's test was implemented due to the high rateof accidents involving police drivers. Persons now desiring to become a police drivermust take a driver's test and are examined to determine their knowledge of vehiclemaintenance. 75% of the applicants have been rejected which resulted in a 70% de­crease in the police accident rate.

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9. A machine shop has been organized to turn brake drums, reface valvesand perform other machine shop services which prior to this installation required theshop to sent to private repair facilities which proved to be costly and time consuming.

10. A driver's manual was printed which explains techniques of driving inaddition to simple maintenance ~equirements and how to cope with potential mechanicalproblems. There is a practical portion of this course that is provided on a continualbasis with ten men in attendance at anyone time.

N. Records and Identification

1. A modern records identification system will be established at nationaland regional levels and will include central identification and record files, a UniformCrime reporting system, and a standard "Identification and Records Manual".

2. The system will be continuously developed over the period of thesub-project agreement.

The primary objectives of this activity have largely been achieved, with thesole exception of the establishment of the regional identification centers in the admin­istrative zones, which have yet to be established.

A central fingerprint file for the country has been established, which in­cludes some 330,000 ten-finger fingerprint cards. Eighty thousand of these have beenclassified using the Henry System and of this number fifty thousand are criminal files.The balance are civil files representing applica Its for passports, foreign residents, andthe like;, The remainder of 250,000 cards are in this latter category. This file is serv­ing the police and the other government agencies effectively with an average of 20,000file searches per month, including 3,000 for the Armed Forces and 3,500 for applicantsfor passports. It is reported that about one positive identification per day is made ofa latent fingerprint recovered at a crime scene (see Annex L).

The advisor is in the process of establishing a single fingerprint (Battley)file and has trained three classifiers to date. About $1,600 is needed to make Zerox.copies of habitual criminal cards now in the files before the file can be established.After these copies are made, the file could be established and operative in two monthstime. To date funds have not been available from the GODR.

Forms have been developed for the Uniform Crime Reporting System andapproved by the Director General. He has provided a directive to the service relativeto their use, but with some isolated exceptions they have not been used to date. Thepolice commanders in the rural areas and cities must be convinced that these reportswill benefit their own ability to perform the police job.

The advisor has prepared an Identification and Records Manual which hasbeen printed and distributed to the police commanders throughout the country.

Additionally, additional files of aid to the police have been establishedas a result of technical assistance provided by the project. These include a "nick-name"

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file, and a gun permit file. The advisor has written, in conjunction with the staff ofthe Identification Section a fingerprint classification textbook, which is used in trainingclasses for classifiers.

One of the most significant accomplishments has been the establishmentof a statistics branch of the Identification Section. This branch prints quarterly andannual reports on crime incidence throughout the country.

O. Criminalistics Laboratory

1. A criminalistics laboratory at the National level will be developedutilizing the existing limited equipment, beginning in the second quarter of FY 1967.

2. Only technicians with a scientific education will be assigned to thelaboratory.

Project efforts have not been devoted to the achievement of the objectivestated above. There has been and continues to be a sound reason for this in the absenceof any trained laboratory technical competence.

Lt. Romero Navarro was given training for four months at the PoliceLaboratory in EI Salvador under Dr. Pedro Angel, an able laboratory scientist. Lt.Romero has had a high school education and has absorbed some knowledge regard­ing the application of scientific methods to the examination of physical evidence.But, he is not a competent laboratory technician and should not be expected to bewith the meager training and kind of educational background that he has had.

The present sophistication of the National Police and the nature of in­vestigative requirements dictates the need for a criminalistic facility that can supportthese investigations and provide sound information to the courts relative to the examina­tion of physical evidence. While the courts are not yet knowledgeable as to the valueof scientific investigation of physical evidence, it will be just a matter of time beforethey demand this kind of police service.

Long-range plans are needed to get a proper facility established. The basicrequisite is the well trained and competent laboratory technician. The acquisition of thenecessary laboratory equipment and materials can follow. The best course to follow inthis instance will be to train the technician first (in the U.S. for instance) and then forthe U.S. to consider providing technical assistance and perhaps other aid in getting thelaboratory established.

P. Training Aids and Communication Media Objectives

1. The existing police communications media plant will continue to beoperated, with drafting and art layout capabilities to be expanded beginning in thesecond quarter of FY 1967.

2. The National Police will perform such reproductional tasks within thelimitation of plant capabilities in relation to this project as the USAID may request.

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a. Fine progress has been made in developing this facility into acompletely adequate printing and reproduction plant. In addition to meeting policeneeds for these kinds of services, the facility regularly serves other branches of govern­ment including USAID and USIS on occasion. The plant consists of two photographicdark rooms, one of which is especially designed to serve the furnished offset camera.It has one Davidson and two Addressograph Multigraph offset presses plus two letterpress, the latter served by a small lineotype unit. In addition, there exists miscel­laneous mimeograph and ditto units. A small section is equipped to perform necessaryart work, layouts, and stripping leading to photographic and pre-sensitized plate mak­ing operations. Stiching, folding, and trimming equipment is also available.

b. USAID input consisted primarily of the heavy printing equipmentand the offset camera obtained from Haiti when that Mission closed out.

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CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONSOF THE NATIONAL POLICE

ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION

For the first time actual modernization measures are being undertaken, represent­ing greatly improved administrative and management abilities of the National Police. Theestablishment of the Planning Office on January 23, 1968 was the key step and innova­tions in police management and operations have followed. This concept plus the energyand "can-do" attitude of the Planning Office Chief, Colonel de los Santos provide anoutstanding opportunity for the effective utilization of U.S. technical assistance.

Change in management, organizational, and administrative concepts and proceduresare underway or contemplated by the Police. These are major in most respects andnaturally can be expected to take considerable time. Basically, a major change musttake place in attitudes of police leaders as to how police service should be provided thepublic. By training and by proving the wisdom of administrative changes the attitudinalchange will happen. But it should not be expected to happen in the short time spanof several years.

Weaknesses in management and administration continue to obstruct effectivepolice operations. These are found in supervision, use of material resources, and inpolice operations generally.

When measured against the National Police abiliti~s in January, 1966, dramaticchanges have been made for the better.

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT

In the immediate past revolution period a crash training program was used totrain over 2,500 of some 8,700 police officers. Only several hundred in the entireforce had received training prior to that time.

With this effort as a springboard, a full range of training programs exists todaywhich fully meets the needs of recruit training, junior officer training, senior officertraining, and for the most part for special skills development.

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_c ;.;~J 2T 2pt!Excellent school facilities have been developed at Borinquen and the new cadet

college has just started its first class in temporary quarters. The senior officer seminaris onc of the best examples of modern leadership development efforts any place in theworld.

Many of the training concepts have barely started and will be modified to ac­commodate policc needs as time passes. Borinquen needs facilities for the new cadetcollege and a continual improvement of teacher methods will be needed. Some addi­tional rcferesher training, such as roll call training, is needed and is being planned.

DAILY LAW AND ORDER

Whilc it is still too early to providc proof of a major upswing in the effective­ness of the police in pcrforming its basic task of daily law and order, there are signifi­cant indicators that this is so. For the first time the police are utilizing foot patrolsin Santo Domingo and in Santiago. A pilot plan for urban enforcement in Santiago hasshown a rcported 40% rcduction of crime incidence in its six months of operation.This is attributablc to foot patrols, supplemented by mobile patrol, which are deterentsto criminal activity. A foot patrol has just been initiated for some parts of the capitol,but statistics are not yet available as to its effectiveness.

Modernized patrol methods will allow the reduction of fixed police posts; in­crcase the police-public contact; and the measure of police service and will preventcriminality and thc disruption of order. The police are firmly on the way to achievingthis kind of patrol, but have yet a long way to go.

RIOT CONTROL

At the present timc thc strength of the Civil Distrubance Control Unit of 285is inadequate. It has an ability at this level to cope with localized relatively non-violentdisturbances (such as those currently caused by University students). But an urbanriot of only modcst proportions (e.g. - 3-5,000 people) would severely tax the force andshould thc riot occur on a weckend they would be unable to handle it.

The employment of CDC pcrsonnel is as follows:

70 used for fixcd post, such as guarding route of the President between hishomc and the Palace; guarding the lottery; and the interior guard at theCDC headquartcrs.

16 administrative personnel, backers, etc.199 available for riot control duty, except for 60 that

are sent to places in the interior where President Balaguer visits on weekendsto inauguratc bridges, and for other ceremonies. During these days, thenonly 139 men are available for riot control.

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The appropriateness of the tactics used by the CDC has varied somewhat rangingfrom effective control with a minimum use of force to the unnecessary use of force whenprovoked. Further, the CDC preference seems to be to fire tear gas projectiles from150-200 yards rather than to close with the rioters and disperse them.

The equipment used by the CDC leans heavily toward arms rather than batonsand tear gas. Currently the CDC is restricting the use of tear gas since their tear gassupply is running low. This is indeed true since 1,880 gas grenades (200 over 3 years old)and 1,185 (mostly outdated) remain in the inventory. Since January 1,1969,586 grenadesand 1,096 projectiles have been used. (See Annex M). There have been occasions else­where in Latin America where a full scale urban riot would require 500 grenades perday.

The Country Team estimates the capability of the security forces in the CASP(Annex 1, A-54, P 41) as follows:

"Provided they maintain their present support for Balaguer, the Dominicansecurity forces, with the police acting as the initial force against insurgencyand the military performing a back-stop role, have the capability, throughsheer force of arms and men, to overcome any threats reasonable to anticipateduring Balaguer's term of office. "

If we arc to assume that we would accept the early introduction of military forces tocope with civil disorder, then the Team would agree with the above statement. As men­tioned above, the Team assesses the CDC capability as limited due to its strength andmanner of employment. The prospect of over-reaction is enhanced by the inclusion ofunnecessary firearms in the riot control squad.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

The police organization provides for two investigative elements, the HomicideDivision and the Criminal Investigation Division. Each of these divisions has a juris­diction over specific offenses yet jealousy exists between them. The competency ofinvestigators in each division varies greatly from very good to hopeless.

Training in modern methods of investigation and interrogation have been pro­vided in some cases and more training is underway. On the bright side, most of theinvestigators of the Homicide Division are graduates of the International Police Academyin Washington.

Public Safety Advisor Raugi urged that investigators of the two divisions gettogether weekly to discuss active cases. Some five or six weekly meetings took placeand were successful. However, the advisor was not able to stick close to this activityand the meetings stopped.

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The criminalistics facility is noticeably useless as such, though the single tech­nician may have an adequate capability for some simple tests. As of now, there is no"criminalistics" capability as such. The laboratory technician, however, is now sub­mitting reports to the prosecutor regarding firearms identification, questioned docu­ment examination, narcotics and poisons "presence or absence" and the results of the"paraffin test" to determine if a person has fired a hand weapon.

In all investigations the police continue to rely on confessions to "elear thecase" and to not bother to obtain proof through other sources as to the culpabilityof a suspect. With this limitation in concept, the interrogation methods in the Homi­cide Division are generally good.

POLICE COMMUNICATIONS

The countrywide police network is a VHF-FM net with 42 stations, utilizing amountain relay point at Alta Bandeira. The equipment used is Motorola 25 watt basestations and provides an effective and reliable network to meet police administrativeand operational needs. The Police Department of Special Operations has a non-com­patible countrywide network using the same equipment, while the Army, Air Force,and Navy maintain their own systems.

The reorganization plan for the police which will lead eventually to four regionsrather than the present ten, requires Regional Operational communications. This willbe provided through the use of OPS/FM-5 five watt transceivers.

Maintenance of the police radios continues to present a problem because (a) oncepolice personnel are trained they find more lucrative employment outside of the serviceand, (b) funds for spare parts are not regularly provided. The introduction of the FM-5radio into the police network will require additional training, but should not presenta difficult problem.

The establishment of the Communications Control Center at the Police Palacelater this year should provide a tremendous increase in the ability of police leaders tomanage police operations and a point for assuring compatibility with DSO and militarynetworks.

The Team believes that if a regularized fund plan can be developed for pro­curing radio spare parts and replacement units U.S. assistance in this activity could endat the end of FY 1970.

TRANSPORTATION

The vehieles in the police inventory number 385 of 20 makes, ranging in agefrom 2 to 11 years old (Annex H). About 100 of these are assigned to the interior

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and 51 are deadlined awaiting repair. The down time for repairs may be a matter ofmonths if the vehicle has been in an accident and must be assessed by an insurancecompany and/or spare parts are not available.

As the result of a survey conducted by an OPS specialist in 19664 the motorvehicle repair shop facilities were reorganized and an advisor was assigned to implementsurvey recommendations. Today, the police technical abilities are adequate in this area,but there are leaks in repair machinery and general management.

Personal vehicles (such as motorbikes and scooters, as well as automobiles) wereobserved in the garage compound. Training of mechanics is continuous since they, too,seek outside employment once they have been trained. Funds for spare parts are notprovided regularly. Thus, the guarantee that the maximum number of vehicles is avail­able for police use continues to be impossible in the face of these factors.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Established early in 1966 the purpose of this group was to patrol rural areas in9-man teams in order to stimulate sources of information among the campesinos and tocombat small groups of armed insurgents when located. The DSO numbers 183 welltrained men as of today and its mission has changed to the extent that their purposeis not to engage in combat. Should such a requirement arise, military forces would becalled upon.

From reports given to the Team, the DSO is an effective organization and isconsidered to be an "elite" group within the police.

The Secret Service, an arm of the National Police, was not examined in detailby the Team. However, Embassy officers report a fair degree of sophistication in itsoperation and adequate dissemination of information to other police elements foraction. Reports on its activities are sent regularly to the Director General as arereports from the DSO.

TRAFFIC

Considerable studies have been made in traffic management and enforcement.Aside from the National Police Traffic Division there are other elements concernedwith traffic safety and engineering. These are

1. Secretariat of Public Works.Direccion Nacional de Transito Terreste (Land Transit Directorate)National Traffic Engineers-National Police do not have such a section for

.this purpose.Duties: Traffic engineering for Santo Domingo and the republic. Driverlicense testing, issuance and control.

4 H. Caplan "Automotive Repair and Management Survey" 1966 (UNCL).

2. Civic group.Comite Nacional de Seguridad de Transito (National Traffic Safety Com­mittee) National Safety Council type for traffic only.Function:Coordinate Nat. Pol, Land Transit Directorate and other civic group (Lions,Rotary etc) in traffic matters.

3. Internal Revenue (Rentas Internas)Duties:Vehicle registration-statistics-include traffic accident information.

The development of a Highway Patrol which involves the use of four patrol cars,covering 164 km between Santo Domingo and Santiago was a major step forward intraffic enforcement and accident preventions. The Patrol is to be extended to otherhigh traffic volume highways under current plans.

The joint efforts of the police and other groups in the community. have led tovarious public information programs on traffic safety and a growing awareness on thepart of the police of the public relations value of good traffic enforcement.

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CONCLUSIONS

POLICE CAPABILITIES TO COPE WITH THE THREAT. In the next 14 monthsthe police will be hard pressed to deal with urban riots of a moderate size and with anyform of urban terrorism. Rural insurgency is unlikely, and would probably be discoveredat an early enough stage and coped with, either by the police or military -forces.

The police are just beginning to take significant steps toward the building of aneffective and responsive institution. But the fruits of these efforts cannot be realizedwithin the next year or so.

To prepare themselves for the expected turmoil leading up to elections, thereare things the police can do, mostly without U.S. material assistance. Recommendationsin this regard are given below.

After the elections and for the several years following, much depends, of course,on the nature of the next government. Concern for internal stability during this periodwas expressed by the Country Team on page 9 of the CASP:

"No matter who is elected, he will be faced with the need to act to acceler­ate the process of modernization or else he -- and we - could well confrontan explosive situation in the FY 1971-73 period. We question seriouslywhether the present pace of social and economic advance will be sufficientto contain the rising pressures. These come not only from the urban areas,where youth, frustrated intellectuals and professionals, labor and the unem­ployed are becoming increasingly radicalized and restive under politicalagitation by "revolutionary" left groups, but also from the country-sidewhere reaction against a highly distorted system of land tenure and general

conditions of life is becoming more frequent, though still scattered, despitethe continuing passivity and conservatism of most campesinos. The seculareconomic and social inequities and inefficiencies of Dominican society can­not be corrected except over many years, and the Balaguer government, inpart because of our efforts, has certainly made progress in the past thirty­two months. But that progress is by no means fast enough and deepenough for the longer haul,! and a better planned and better executed attack,inspired with a sense of urgency, has to be made on those inequities anddistortions. "

It is obvious that special attention will have to continue to be given to the develop­ment of the police in order that they can provide the necessary stability through dailylaw and order and thus prevent the maturation of latent threats to society.

THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM. Initial assistance to the National Police wasprovided in May, 1962 with the arrival of an advisor and continued at the level of twoadvisors until early 1966. The objectives were limited and the modest assistance providedwas effective in spite of frequent changes of government, including a coup, and the 1965revolution. Since the effectiveness of the police as an institution of government waslost due to the revolution, the base point in measuring progress must be January, 1966.

In the intervening 39 months, dramatic strides have been taken in organization,planning, management, and police operations generally. These gains are attributed toU.S. technical and material assistance and the training given at all levels of the policeorganization, both in the U.S. and in-country.

Nevertheless, in the judgment of the Team, some changes in the thrust anddimensions of the Public Safety effort are in order. A continued close working rela­tionship between the U.S. advisors and the National Police will be needed especiallyin the pre-election months. Recommendations in this regard are given below.

At the present time there are 14 advisors assigned to the project. Two of thesewill leave in June as a result of the "balance of payments" exercise (BALPA). Adjust­ments in terms of numbers of advisors and their duties will have to be made and thejob titles of one or two advisors changed to reflect more accurately their new duties.The Chief Advisor is eligible for home leave in October 1969. Considering the pre­dicted activities leading up to and immediately following the election he should beextended through June 1970.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Police Image. The proper role of the policeman is defined as a servant ofthe public. As such he protects the individual and his property. He prevents anti-legalbehavior and, using humane methods, maintains order within the law. Unfortunately,this role definition is not understood by the people and is just beginning to be graspedby the police themselves. The changing of attitudes will be needed on the part of thepolice as a whole, and this is in the process. The people will have to understand thepolice role in their society, and their own as well, and the need to lend their supportand cooperation to the policeman in the performance of his duties. Agreed, this issomewhat utopian and probably unreachable entirely - but the movement of changemust be in this direction. The police image will brighten as these changes take place.

Meanwhile, there will be instances of reversion to the older, more primitiveand, indeed, traditional ways of policing - and soldiering - on the part of the DominicanSecurity Forces. Recently at a graduation ceremony, 1st. Lt. Arilio Descartes de Jesus

27

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Perez stated on the occasion of the graduation of the third course given in basic instruc-tion for the National Police Radio Patrol:

"The Headquarters of the NP, conscious of their historic responsibility;-­does not curtail its effort in giving their men vast knowledge, so that theycan be 'Agents of development '; .... we insist in extracting the best,within our possibilities, because of that we are exempt to shelter in ourranks men capable of reacting negatively because people call them indians,same as they would call a mechanic, grease monkey, or a lawyer, a shyster,disrespectfully. "

"The men react according to the influence of their environment, that is,according to our judgement, the answer to why some of our police agentsreact as a Dominican and not as policemen." (underscoring added)

The Country Team in its CASP covered the character of Dominican society onpage 4 as follows:

"In the face of dangers facing the government and despite some advances,Dominican political, economic, social, and military institutions still con­tinue to be characterized by a dangerous primitiveness, fragility, andvulnerability to extremism."

As the "first line of defense" against elements of subversion and disorder, thepolice naturally are the targets of political "outs" of all ideological persuasions. Thismust be expected. Every effort must be taken by the police to ensure its operationalintegrity and capability without resorting to unnecessary force or other acts whichmay lend credence to what otherwise are false charges in the press.

The U.S. Role: The primary interest of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic isderived directly from U.S. national security interests.S Because of the strategic locationof the Dominican Republic, and for other reasons, the U.S. must prevent the accessionto power of a government hostile to the U.S. In the Team's view it is vital that theU.S. take all necessary steps to strengthen the National Police to meet predicted dis­order during the pre- and post-election period. The police have been set on the properroad and we should do our best to keep them from wandering into unproductive by­paths, or, indeed, returning to the repressive tactics characteristics of the Trijillo era.Through continued technical assitance the U.S. can and should exert a professionaland moderating influence on National Police administration and operations.

What are the alternatives? If we terminate the police assistance effort thepolice would revert to methods used during the 1965 revolution in problem solving.

SCountry Team's CASP, A-54, p. 1.

28

These would be direct, violent, and often times bloody, and it would not result in aninstitution devoted to public service and the support of society under the rule of law.A possible advantage would be that the U.S.may not be blamed for this kind of polic­ing. Since the police use U.S. equipment and are known to have received U.S. trainingthe absence of a police assistance program may very well not guarantee that the U.S.would not be blamed for police excesses. If we were to drastically reduce our advisorypresence we would correspondingly reduce our moderating and professional input. TheU.S. would still be blamed in the leftist press as long as one advisor were present in theDominican Republic. If we were to continue our technical assistance, but proceed witha "quasi-covert" method of operation we would be practically ineffective since advisorsmust work with the police where they work - and that is in full view of the public forthe most part.

Finally, if we were forced with a deteriorating police capability (which theTeam believes would happen if there were a significant reduction in U.S. advisoreffectiveness) we would soon be faced with a military assumption of the police role.This would undoubtedly result in harsh measures and the attendant U.S. vulnerabilityto leftist attack because of our military assistance, which is more "visible" than ourPublic Safety program.

Taking a positive, active approach to the question of what should the U.S.role, is the only way of dealing with it, recognizing all the while that there is a basicand "persistent fact of the essential primitivism of the Dominican society, politicsand institutions, which vitiates, distorts, and frustrates our inputs".6 The risks to theU.S. Se~urity interests in doing otherwise and in choosing one of several alternativesmentioned above, would be considerable. The role that th~ police must play in adeveloping society provides the underpinnings for social, economic, and politicalprogress. The stresses placed on society as society changes are represented by the de­mands of the people for their share of the fruits of sophisticated society and the needof the people to express dissent within the law and without fear of reprisal. Theseare matters of concern to the police administrator in the proper provision of policeservice. At the same time he must deal firmly, quickly, and without hesitation withelements of disorder, subversion, and criminality. This balance is the modern policingconcept being inculcated into National Police leaders through U.S. advisory assistance.Without this aid the more traditional concepts -- "or the Dominican way" -- wouldprevail.

Since January 1966 the U.S. has spent (including the FY 1969 request of$795,000) $2.823 million in grant funds and about $150,000 in loan funding.? The

6Supra, p.2., Pt. B.

7During the same period the U.S. provided about $8.07 million for the MAP program,

which supports elements of the military forces having a force strength of 6,283. See Annex 0 for

details.

Ambassador raises the question as to whether achievements to date have been worth thecost. As seen elsewhere in the report, the Team identifies great strides forward in policeadministration, planning, training, communications, and other areas of police endeavor.In short, an institution is in the building stage. The Team believes that the degree towhich this institution has been built to date in terms of our own security and politicalinterest has been procured at a very reasonable cost. It is confident that these changeswould not have occurred without V.S. help as much as it is convinced that V.S. helpin some degree will continue to be needed during the remainder of the institutionbuilding stage. The institution may well be completed in four to six years given thepresent growth rate and providing there are no hinderances to this growth.

In sum, the V.S. has paid, and is paying this year, a modest insurance premiumto ensure that internal security problems are dealt with effectively by the police andthreats to internal security are prevented from reaching the stage when they must beredressed by military force, which is much more costly in the real, human, and politicalsense.

Police Strength Needs. The initial plan for a force strength reduction was setforth in the FY 1967 Project Agreement (No. 80112) based on the premise that 6,100was an adequate strength, provided that the force mobility was increased. The author­ized strength at that time was 8,774. Today the authorized strength is 8,759 with8,518 actually employed (not including 130 civilian employees). The picture is some­what different in terms of officers available for police duty. For example, 650 menare on the payroll because pension funds are not available or are physically incapableof working, and 375 are in full-time training programs. Thus there are about 7,400police available for duty and some 400 of these are assigned to fixed post guard duty.Since 1966 when the plan was developed there has been a population growth <;>f 3.6%annually (the largest in Latin America8) and the coming year will place a full policingburden on every available man.

The National Police state that they have not enough personnel as it is and pos­sible indications of this were noted by the Team in the understrength CDC unit andthe use of ten two-man foot patrols for a city of over 100,000 population in theSantiago pilot plan.

Some economy of manpower will probably be realized as more modern patrolingmethods are used as well as the abolishment of fixed post guard duty for police, butthis is some months and possibly years in the future.

The team believes that the plan was soundly conceived and that a reduction inthe force strength of the National Police should be one of the goals of our assistance

8 "Economic Needs and Prospects in Latin America" USIB NIE 80/90-69. March 1969

(S Controlled Dissem)

30

effort. Because of the changing internal security requirements brought about becauseof problems of population growth, a worsening education system, urban migration,growing unemployment and others, the original figure of 6,100 may need to be modified.During the later phases of the revolutionary period in 1965 an estimate by U.S. observerswas made that 5,500 police would be sufficient, providing each was able to perform histasks effectively.

Faced with the expected tensions in the re-election period is believed wise tosuspend our efforts for the time being in getting the police to reduce their forcestrength. This represents not a change in objective on our part, but a modification ofstrategy to accommodate the current and expected needs for police services. In effect,then, this proposal is a stretch-out of our timing for the accomplishment of our objec­tive regarding the reduction of police force strength.

SECRET

SECRET

'~\.C:ri~ Q~~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

General

1. The U.S., through the USAID Public Safety program, should take a positiveand active posture in its assistance to the National Police.

The' need for this aid will be especially critical in the next 14 months. TheTeam considers that the U.S. strategy as proposed by the Country Team in its CASP(p. 26) is generally appropriate.

'in the security fields, use our multiple contacts to encourage thearmed forces and police to support and obey the new, constitutionalgovernment, a course especially important if the new government isreform-oriented and therefore subject to suspicion and hostility fromthe armed forces and sectors of the civilian right. Try to convinceall sectors of the security forces of the threat to stability and theirown interests represented by unattended, legitimate aspirations ofthe people. Continue our program to improve the capabilities ofthe security forces to meet realistic threats and to bring about, ata politically feasible pace, rationalization, reduction and professional­ization of the military and the police. Continue to try to inculcateattitudes respectful of constitutional guarantees and human rightsand responsive to civilian constitutional direction and control.

"With specific reference to the National Police, reduce, throughattrition and refusal to renew enlistment options, the personnelcomplement from the authorized 8,500 man force to 6,100 by1971. 9 Expand urban and rural police patrol seroice to providean overall police presence, now lacking or deficient throughoutthe Republic. Provide technical advisers, on a descending scaleover the period, to continue the development of the police train-ing program. Supply commodities and spare parts which arebeyond the financial capability of the GODR to provide. Usethis material as leverage to induce rationalization. Provide par­ticipant training at the International Police Academy, in order toassist in meeting the increasing demand for trained instructorsin the expanding training program."

9 See previous pages for Team comment on this point.

The dimension of the instruments for implementation of this strategy may have to bealtered in either the plus or minus directions depending on who is elected President andthe resultant feasibility of objectives presently contemplated for the Public Safety projectduring this period.

2. The Ambassador may wish to establish a security assistance committee,comprised of the DCM, the Chief Public Safety Advisor, the MAAG Chief,'I .. T _. t- (Alternatively he may wish to charge the Internal Security Sub-Com-mittee of the Country Team with the task below.)

Coordination of security forces, plans and activities and an awareness ofthese, as well as military and police attitudes, could well be vitally important. A reg­ularized coordinating mechanism on the U.S. side would be valuable in allowing theU.S. to provide advice with a "common voice" in the security area. For example, re­portedly there is a mutual animosity which exists between General Perez y Perez,Secretary of the Armed Forces, and General Braulio Alvarez, Director General of thePolice. Joint efforts on the U.S. side might be able to circumvent the impact of thisfactor on the coordination of police and military efforts in maintaining internalsecurity.

As to the coordination point specifically, special effort should be made,perhaps through joint police/military exercises, to rejuvenate the joint OperationsCenter.

The Public Safety Pr~ject

3. Both the general and specific objectives of the project should be redefinedand oriented toward requirements for assistance in both the, short and long-term.

.The fourteen point program outlined in the FY 1967 Project Agreement,and based on a PSD staff five-year plan, does not now reflect accurately the scopeand thrust of the project as it should be. Suggested project goals are provided inAnnex P.

4. Project emphasis should be on the maximum utilization of advisor capa­bilities to influence police leadership toward modern and humane police administrationand operations.

The Chief Advisor and members of his staff have established excellent rap­port with their counterparts and, given the Dominican scene, should be able to exert asignificant professional and moderating influence. The Team considers this U.S. resourceas the best tool the U.S. has in countering possible police excesses that may otherwisearise as the internal· situation becomes more tense in the coming months.

\.\. ; ~.

'SECRET·,.:' ~ w:rn

: -" ". ~ f: ~~; t~.;.. ~ ~C"; ~"".-

Through this advisory assistance the PSD staff should concentrate onmeasures that will enhance the police image and to prepare the police for coping withurban disturbances in the capitol.

5. Project resources should be adjusted to coincide with redefinition of thegoals of the project.

Technicians. By June of 1969 the project will be authorized 12 advisorsas follows:

Title

Chief AdvisorDeputy Chief AdvisorPSA (Training)PSA (Training)PSA (Education)PSA (Rural Training)PSA (Minicipal)PSA (Municipal)PSA (Records and Identification)PSA (Logistics/Motor Maintenance)PSA (Communications)PSA (Investigations)

Incumbent

Anthony A. RuizJames E. HenryDavid De la TorreJoseph F. FernandezKnute F. K. ThropeJoseph F. McManusDonald M. AllenErnest ChioccaCarlton A. RoodJohn A. ManokRobert L. YatesRichard P. Raugi

Firearms training and traffic advisory functions are now provided by advisors whosepositions will be cancelled in June and thcir duties will be absorbed by the remainingstaff.

The Team recommends that the following positions be considered fortermination at the conclusion of the incumbent's tour:

PSA (Municipal)PSA (Municipal)

Ernest Chiocca (HLE 9/20)Donald M. Allen (HLE 6/69)

The Communications and Records and Identifications advisor '8 positions should beconsidered for termination after elections, or at the end of FY 1970.

A review of the entire staffing for the project should be made in the thirdquarter of CY 1970 and adjustments in numbers and types of advisors needed for thelonger-term made at that time.

Participants. Every effort should be made to send qualified police officersto the International Police Academy in Washington. This is one of the best resourcesfor long-term gain that the U.S. has and it is presently not being utilized.

34

Funding restrictions on the Dominican side and the probable need duringthe next ~4 months for all police officers to be on the job may present obstacles to thiseffort on our part. However, we must consider the longer-term needs of the force andprepare now the police to meet them insofar as we can.

Commodities. The FY 1969 and FY 1970 commodity plans total $354,500and $325,000 respectively. Of these amounts costs for motor vehicles represent 50% inFY 69 and 36.9% in FY 70 (Annex Q). It is proposed that leverage be used in the 'pro­vision of motor vehicles to require the GODR to provide a guaranteed regular monthlyallotment for spare parts and for necessary POL.

The down time for vehicles needing repair of several months in many casesis very excessive and must be resolved by Poliee administrative action.

STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY THE POLICE IN THE NEXT YEARI O

In the judgement of the Team there arc some things that the National Policecould do to better prepare themselves to carry out their tasks effectively. For the mostpart these actions are within the current capabilities of police leadership, and if thesesteps are acceptable to them, U.S. advisory assistance can be provided to help them intheir execution.

The Evaluation Team is impressed with the improvemc'nts in police administrationand operations that have been and are taking place. The National Police is much betterprepared to perform its role in the increasingly sophisticated Dominican society than itwas in carly 1966. In the next year it is expected that heavier burdens will fall on policeshoulders. With the charge given it to protect life and property and to maintain publicorder with the use of minimum force the police will have to cope with an array of prob­lems of disorder in the pre-election period, especially in the capitol.

To meet these problems effectively and humanely, the Team proposes the follow­ing actions for consideration by the National Poliee leadership:

Riot Control. The force strength of the CDC should be increased to a minimumof five hundred men. The entire force should be given refresher training, emphasizingthe need to use the minimum force in the control of urban disturbances, and in crowdcontrol. The presence of arms in the front line of riot control formations is believed

lOWith the permission of the Ambassador and accompanied by the DCM, Mr. Frank Devine,

the Team gave a verbal report to Brig. General Graulio Alvarez and his deputy Colonel Bisono Jackson

on April 3. The information presented is given under this heading and the Director General was

promised a translated copy of this part of the report. At Annex R is a report of significant informa­

tion obtained during the briefing.

to be dangerous and may lead to the use of gunfire as a result of provocation or may re­sult of a weapon being stolen by a rioter. Weapons of the proper kind have their placein riot control formations, but they should be in reserve to protect the life of the police­man when necessary. Tear gas should be used liberally and in accordance with traininggiven the unit. It is much better to expend a few tear gas grenades at the proper timethan to wait and have to resort to harsher measures should the situation get out ofhand.

Riot Control Contingency Plan. Should the internal security situation worsensomewhat, it may be that the "micromeetings" experienced to date will take on a moreviolent character. If this happens, it can be expected that relatively small groups ofrioters may create a riot in separate parts of· the capitol at the same time. This wouldoverreach police abilities very quickly.

It is proposed that a contingency plan be developed wherein mobil patrols often men each, fully equipped with tear gas and other riot control equipment, can patrolpotential trouble areas. Their purpose would be to identify the incipient riot at itsearliest stages and arrest the key agitators.

Coordination. Security for the nation rests in the hands of all of its securityforces, with the police being the first line of defense against elements of disorder andviolence. In order for the police to do their job effectively in the overall context ofthe maintenance of internal security it much work elosely with the military forces andthe country's intelligence services. This naturally requires the maximum amount ofcoordination of plans for operations and of the operations themselves.

Experience has been obtained in planning for an ideal mechanism of coordinationduring the establishment of the. Joint Operations Center. A major step will be takentoward coordination with the establishment of the Communication Center in the PolicePalace. The Senior Police Seminars are outstanding media for developing understandingof the roles and missions of the military and police forces and creating a base for thedevelopment of joint operational plans.

It is proposed that special exercises be undertaken jointly with the military forcesregarding the nature of threats to internal security that can be expected to occur in thenext year and the means to deal with them properly.

A proposed subject of the Senior Officer Seminar is that of the proper role ofthe police and military during the pre-election period. The preservation of the constitu··tional process and the rights of the people to express dissent within the confines of laware vital elements in the Dominican political system. The security forces naturally arethe protector of these rights and must take such steps from a leadership point of view toassure that their respective forces perform their tasks effectively and with a minimumamount of force.

mJ~[~SS~HE~SECRET

Public Relations. The police have been and can expect to be the targets ofelements of society which wish to attack the government. Most of the motivationfor thcse attacks may be political and many of them will probably be undeserved.In order to create an image of the police in the eyes of all Dominicans that is theproper one, positive action on the part of the police should be considered.

Positive action programs for information about the police activities and ac­complishments should be undertaken by the Director General's Press RelationsOfficer. All news media and television should be used to the maximum to presentpositive information to counter negative information that will be presented in thesemedia.

The Internal Affairs Division. Many of the attacks on the police that can beexpected will be on the basis of improper police behavior in the performance of hisduties. The post positive manner in preventing improper behavior in the first placeand to apply disciplinary measures where it does occur is through the use of an internalorganization within the National Police, whose sole function is to monitor police per­formance and behavior.

The present procedure of appointing an investigative commission to investigatespecific incidents of alleged police misbehavior deals with the problem after it has oc­curred. An internal organization, which might be called the Internal Affairs Division, isthe means of preventing them from occurring in the first place. True, effective trainingthe cornerstone for all good police work, but it is not enough. Management requires thatthere be various means for the administrators to assure that the job is being done correctly.

In using such a Division, the police must use it properly and punish those who areshown to have acted contrary to proper police service. _The lise of a Division of this kindcould be widdy publicized, giving a clear example that every effort is being made to pre­vent misconduct and to deal with it when it does. This is the appropriate organizationaland management method for administrating the force, rather than the use of civilian re­view boards whieh have been suggested from time to time in various countries.

Police Investigations. The Team proposes that the two investigative divisions ofthe National Police be joined into a common Police Investigations Division. This movewill provide a better means for the supervision of investigation activities of the force andwill assure the maximum internal coordination of investigation activities.

Mobile Patrol. Urban automotive patrols are one of the significant measures thatthe police use to provide rapid police service and to prevent criminacity. It is corres­pondingly less effective unless it is constantly mobilc. It is proposed that every effort bemade to obtain the necessary funds for gasoline and oil in order that mobile patrols canpatrol constantly, rather than for only a part of the time as is often the case now.

Manpower. The Team believes that the effective use of police manpower islimited somewhat by the employment of trained police officers on fixed guard posts.Approximately 400 are so employed at banks, and other institutions.

It is proposed that private establishments now using police and military personnelfor fixed guard duty hire their own guards, with training provided by the police as a serv­ice. Government buildings requiring guards should be guarded by military personnel. 11

One of the problems faced by the police is the loss of skilled manpower to higherpaying jobs outside the service. Particular examples of this are in the fields of commun­ications and automotive maintenance. It is proposed that the National Police considera plan whereby these personnel would be employed in shifts, timed so that they couldaccept outside employment to supplement their incomes.

Transportation. Adequate transportation has been and continues to be a criticalmanagement and operational problem for the police. Drastic action appears to be neededto resolve these problems which obstruct the maximum effectiveness of the police. Thefirst major problem concerns the repair of vehicles. Considerable improvement has beenrealized in the police abilities in this regard,~but there are still many vehicles deadlined(51) and the time to get a vehicle repaired and back on the road is too long in mostinstances.

It is proposed that administrative steps be taken to:

a) See that insurance adjusters examine vehicles that have been in an accidentinspect the vehicle within a week after it reaches the police garage,

b) A regular allotment of funds is guaranteed for the procurement of spareparts, and

c) A more rapid system for disposing of non-repairable vehicles be developedin order to rid the garage area of junk vehicles.

Total transportation needs of the police under the proposed reorganization planamounts to about 500 vehicles of various types. The U.S. is contributing heavily tothis goal at the present time, but the Dominican Government must establish a vehicleretirement program as a means for estimating and justifying requests for new vehicleprocurement each year in the police budget.

11 From conversation the team had with Colonel Jocelyn, MAAG Chief, and his staff, it

is probable that he would propose that police be used for this purpose. The team would demur

on the basis of the amount of training given a policeman versus that given a soldier relative to

that required for fIxed post duty. This subject is one that should be examined in the Internal

Security Subcommitte in order that a joint proposal can be made to the security force commands.

For example, the following lists gives the year of manufacture of vehicles nowin the police inventory.

Year of Manufacture Number of Vehicles

1958 1

1959 3

1960 2

1961 0

1962 56

1963 46

1964 45

1965 53

1966 92

1967 60

Total 358

According to our estimates all vehicles made before 1966, or 206 (58%) shouldbe considered for retirement on the basis of it being uneconomical to repair them.This percentage is too high and the high number of older vehicles places a heavy strainof vehicle maintenance facilities and on the budget for repair costs.

ANNEX A

INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED BY TEAM

Ambassador John H. CrimminsMr. Frank J. Devine, Deputy Chief of MissionMr. John P. Robinson, Director, USAIDMr. Robert S. Tancer, Acting Deputy Director, USAID

Mr. James E. Flannery, Political OfficerMr. Frank Estancano, Political Officer

Mr. James C. Haahr, Political OfficerCol. Henry V. Joslin, Chief MAAG, USMCLt. Col. Donald F. Barris, Army AttacheGeneral Braulio Alvarez Sanchez, Chief, National PoliceCol. Eligio Antonio Bisono Jackson, Deputy Chief of Police

Col. Antonio de Los Santos Almarante, Director, National Police Planning Office

Col. Gaspar Morato Pimentel, Officer-in-Charge, Radio Patrol Facilities

Sr. Julio Octavio Aybar, Police Photographer

Col. Juan Bautista del Villar, Lt. Col., Commandant-Homicide Division

(includes Identification Bureau)

Sgt. Ramon Isaias Hernandes Jorge, Administrative Assistant to Commandant, National

Identification Bureau

Lt. Col. Juan Bautista del Villar, Commandant - Homicide Division

(includes Crime Laboratory)

Lt. Luis Felipe Romero Navarro, Commandant - National Criminalistics Laboratory

Lt. Jose Ramon Gomez Quesada

Lt. Miner Danilo Mendez Perez

Capt. Armando Garcia Fernandez

Col. Robinson Brea Garo, Police Commander - Santiago de Los Caballeros

Lt. Col. Euligio Benito Moncion Leonardo, Director of National Police Enlisted Men's

Academy

Lt. Col. Sergio Tulio Cabrera Martinez, Director of Junior Officers Training

Lt. Col. Jose Felix Hermida Gonzales, Commander of Civil Disturbance Control Unit

Col. Rafael Morel Tineo, Acting Commander Civil Disturbance Control Unit

Lt. Dorian Antonio Feliz Viera, Training and Field Officer CDC.

'1 ~ 'I" "", n ...

nret'TRSSfFti:DMajor Antonio de Lima Merino, Commander Criminal Investigation Division,

National Police

Major Carlos Peguero Cruz, Commander National Police, Communications Division

Capt. Victor Manuel Reyes Paulino, Assistant-in-Charge of Department of Special Operations

Capt. Ramon.Aquilino Martinez Polanco, Officer-in-Charge, Police Motor Maintenance Facility

MAAG PERSONNEL

Lt. Col. Hector Carranza, USA

Major Charles L. Herring, USA

Commander James McLoughlin, USN

Lt. Col. Donald P. Palmer, USAF

41

ANNEX B

PRINCIPAL DOMINICAN POLITICAL PARTIES - (April 1969)

PR - REFORMIST PARTY

President Balaguer is also President of this party. It is generally middle of the roadbordering on conservative, with middle class leadership and widespread campesino support.Francisco Augusto Lora, the Vice President of the party is also Vice President of the Republic.

PRD - DOMINICAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

Existed as a loosely organized anti-Trujillo exile group prior to its organization as apolitical party in 1961. The dominant figure in the party is Juan Bosch, currently living inSpain. The Secretary General of the party is Francisco Pena Gomez. The party appeals tolower and lower middle class elements as well as to students and liberals, and emphasizes rapidsocial and economic change. There are signs of increasing polarization within the party betweenradical leftist elements and moderates. The Bosch thesis of "popular dictatorship" and thequestion of participating in the 1970 election are especially controversial matters within theparty.

PRSC - REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY

The PRSC supported Bosch in the 1966 elections. It is to the left of center and favorsmore rapid social and economic change. Party President is Caonabo Javier Castillo.

PQD - DEMOCRATIC QUISQUEYAN PARTY

Leader of the party is retired General Wessin y Wessin, who returned to the DominicanRepublic in January 1969 after three years of enforced absence in the United States. The partywas formed in 1967, and is regarded as nationalistic, rightist and vehemently anti-communist.

MRIJ4 - 14th of JUNE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

This self-declared Leninist organization began as a nationalistic, anti-Trujillo movement.It took its name from an unsuccessful invasion mounted on June 14, 1959. Principal leadersare Juan B. Mejia, Fidelio Despradel and Rafael Taveras. It has received financial aid from Castro.

42

SECRET··

MPD - DOMINICAN POPULAR MOVEMENT

Self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist party, originally founded in Cuba in 1956 by a smallgroup of Communist exiles headed by Maximo Lopez Molina. Its membership, concentrated inSanto Domingo, was estimated in 1967 at 250; it may have declined since then as a result offactionalism. In February and March 1969 it sought to spark a coup to overthrow the Balaguergovernment, and it appears to be responsible for a number of recent terrorist actions.

PCD - DOMINICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Organized in the mid-1940s, it operated in exile or underground until after the Trujilloassassination. Membership estimated at 200, with strength concentrated among urban profes­sionals, intellectuals and university students. Although it is basically Moscow-oriented, the PCDhas shown signs of seeking to improve its relations with Cuban Communists.

PCRD - (PACOREDO) COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A splinter group from the PDC, numbering about 50 members. It appeals to youth andstudents and advocates a militant, quasi-anarchical line. It is considered pro-Chinese Communist.

ANNEX C

CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL UNIT

VEHICLES:

1. 10 Chevrolet Personnel Carriers. Procured by PSD in 1964 and 1966.2. 2 Kaiser Jeeps. PSD procured in 1967.3. 1 Two ton truck personnel carrier mark Beford. Not PSD procured.

COMMUNICATIONS:

1. Radio Base Station. PSD procured.2. 10 Motorola Portables, Handi-Talkies. PSD procured.3. 2 Motracs, installed in two of the above personnel carriers. PSD procured.

All communication equipment procured in 1965 and 1966.

. . ~

':44 '.'.,'..'

SECRET

CIVil DISTURBANCE CONTROL UNITFORCE

COMMANDER

ASSISTANTFOR. CDR.

I

ANNEX C

I

FOR. HDQ.PLATOON

TRAININGLIAISON

PUBLIC RELATIONS

ISUPPORTSECTION

OBSERVATIONSECTION

TACTICALSUPPORTPLATOON

TACTICALSUPPORTSQUAD

CDCCOMPANY

I

ICO. HDQ.SECTION

IOPERATIONS

SERGEANT

I1-CLERK3-GEN.DUTY2-DRIVERS

IPATROL

PLATOON

IPATROLSQUAD

ISQUAD

SERGEANT

I

ITACTICALSUPPORT

TEAM

ITACTICALSUPPORT

TEAM

SQUADCORPORAL

II

SEARCHTEAM

SEARCHTEAM

COMPANY PATROL PLATOON

1 OFFICER

PLATOONLEADER

1 OFFICER25 ENLISTED MEN

ANNEX C

~ ....

mn~"

. ;::0' 0-m-I.

1 EMr-----_

1 EM

SQUAD LEADER1 ST SQUAD

1 EM

SQUAD LEADER2 NO SQUAD

ANNEX C

COMPANY SUPPORT PLATOON

•.'r"',.,"....~,~.., .... " ~ ."

1 OFFICER25 ENLISTED MEN

1 OFFICER

PLATOONLEADER

1 EM

DRIVER II 8 EM 8 EM I 8EM

SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORTSQUAD SQUAD SQUAD

ANNEX D

NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTION OF SENtOROFFICERS SEMINAR

1.- By agreement of the NP Headquarters and A.I.D., the Education and TrainingDivision and the Direction of the Seminar for Senior Officers of NP, have resolved to hold theFirst Seminar of the four corresponding to the year 1969 in the third week of April.

2.- The program of instruction for this Seminar is based principally on studies andpractical application of techniques and experience in the everyday work of each Senior Officerparticipating.

3.- To achieve this object, you are responsible for preparing a work of study basedupon the jurisdiction of your command or service region, which you will have to present fromthe platform at the Seminar. This work does not have size limit, but you should clearly exposeall the suggested matter listed below.

4.- Your work should as a minimum embrace the following points:

1) Geographic characteristic:

a) Extension of your j~risdiction in Km2

b) Mountainsc) Riversd) Rural roads, and highway-bridge of concrete, of steel and of woode) Municipals, Districts and Sectionsf) Access roads to the mountains

2) Important Economic Aspects:

a) Principal Industriesb) National and Foreign Banksc) Principal, cropsd) Cattle - cows, pigs, goatse) Irrigation canalsf) Important commercial establishments in your jurisdictiong) Agricultural acreage under exploitationh) Mines and mine productsi) Forestry

3) Aspects of prim,ary education and illiteracy:

a) Public schools in your jurisdiction, (universities, secondary schools, elementaryschools, intermediate schools and rural schools)

b) College and special schoolsc) Statistics of enrollment pertaining to these educational establishmentsd) Statistics pertaining to number of illiterates in your jurisdictione) Number of inhabitants living in your jurisdictionf) Statistics pertaining to number of individuals living in citiesg) Statistics pertaining to number of individuals living in rural areas

4) Police organization under your jurisdiction, including personnel education and training:

a) Organization Chart under your jurisdictionb) Number of companies, Detachments and Posts, including the number of men in each

onec) Number of officers who have taken courses in the exterior, in the National Police

schools, university professionals, graduates on other coursesd) How many have not taken any coursef) Statistics pertaining to primary, secondary, or commercial education of all men

under your command

5) Public Relations:

a) Which programs or practices of Public Relations are developed in your Departmentor jurisdiction

b) With the pressc) With the radiod) With the educative and cultural institutions, social assistance program, with the

public officials and institutions of the Statee) With persons representing your jurisdictionf) With the church andg) With the citizens in general

6) The condition of delinquency in your jurisdiction, and the police problems considered byyou the biggest or most important:

a) Statistics of arrests made in your jurisdiction, detailing the infractions most frequentand places where they occur;

b) Juvenile Delinquency, including your opinion about the causes that originate them;

c) If there are tendencies to increase or decrease the index of delinquency, congruentto the police proceeding;

d) Indicate which are the biggest or most important police problems that affect yourjurisdiction, in accordance with verified facts, and in relation to your professionalexperience;

e) In the operational: problems with the citizens, with authorities of other depen­dences, with transportation, with incorrect proceeding of subordinates with the~diciary; .

f) In the administrative: transfers, delays in supply of equipment and expendablematerial; lack of discipline among subordinates, lack of proper lodging, and

g) Which solutions you recommend.

49

1ll~\n fi~'SECRETn\i\:\\\:l;·-~j! il~ \Lt ' .t-" ..

5.- The preceding points are explanatory but not limiting, you may expose any addi-tional study or problem that you consider in the interest of improving police efficiency.

6.- Those officers who are not Commanders or Inspectors, but are executing adminis..trative functions, can choose any jurisdiction of the country and place themselves 'imaginarilyas Commander if you are a Colonel or Lt. Colonel; as Inspector if you are a Major.

7.- Sources of references for yqu to do the job of presentation could be the municipalgovernment and Statistics publications, educational institutions, Offices of Public Works, andof Agriculture, of the Government, National Geography, maps and advice from your personnel.

8.- You should have your work ready for presentation in the second week of the monthof April of this year. If any information of additional advice are needed we are in the bestdisposition and desire to offer it to you.

DR. M. ANTONIO DE LOS SANTOS A.Colonel

Planning Office DirectorSeminar Director, NP

RAFAEL MOREL TINEOColonel

Education & Training Division, NPSeminar Deputy - Director

ANNEX E

PROPOSED ORGAN IZATIONAl CHARTNATIONAL POLICE DOMIN ICAN REPUBLIC

DIRECTOR GENERAL NATIONAL POLICESUB·DIRECTOR

INTERNAL AFFAIRSLEGAL ADVISORSECRETARIAT

ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR GENERALADMINISTRATION AND TECHNICAL SERVICE

~ PERSONNEL

~ EDUCATION AND TRAINING

~ FINANCE

~ LOGISTICS AND SUPPLIES

~ COMMUNICATIONS

I-- TRANSPORTATION

""- RECORDS AND LABORATORY

ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR GENERALPOLICE OPERATIONS

- CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

- PATROL

- TRAFFIC

- CIVIL DISTURBANCE

- REGIONAL OPERATIONS

PLANNING OFFICEPUBLIC RELATIONS

ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR GENERALSPECIAL OPERATIONS

~ OPERATIONS

~ PLANNING

~ ADMINISTRATION

l-- RESEARCH

'-- TRAINING

I I I IREGIONAL DIRECTOR

BARAHONA

REGIONAL DIRECTOR

SANTIAGO

REGIONAL DIRECTOR

SANTO DOMINGO

REGIONAL DIRECTOR

SAN PEDRO DE MACORIS

Base 56769 1-68

PRESENT POLICE REGIONS ANNEX F

REPUBLICIntcrnati{;na1 bGundary

PROPOSED POLICE REGIONS ANNEX G

SECRET

.. -

ANNEX H

POLICE DISTRIBUTION

Republica Dominica

Headquarters Santo Domingo

Officials

330

Enlisted

3,016

Regions

Urban 142-25581. Distrito Feder.

Rural 29-386

2. Barahona

3. San Juan

4. Monte Cristy

5. Santiago

6. San Fsco De Macoris

7. La Vega

8. San Cristobal

9. San Pedro De Macoris

10. La Romana

Region total

Headquarters total

Total Actual Strength

Authorized Strength

54

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171 2,944

17 322

15 311

17 262

37 707

25 370

22 398

13 294

15 260

10 152

342 6,010

330 3,016

672 9,026

9,698

I January 1966

ANNEX I

SUMMARY OF,SANTIAGO PILOT PROJECT

A pilot project for the reformation of the National Police (NP) was implemented during16-29 June, 1968, as a first step in the re-str.ucturing suited to modern, professional policingmissions. The pilot effort is operating in the city of Santiago, combining urban and rural patrolefforts. Forty carefully selected officers and enlisted men, who form the nucleus for the newpatrol activity, began an 8-week motorized patrol training course on 5 August 1968. The AIDtrained instructors selected from various NP divisions were assisted by Public Safety Advisors.An RD$4,000 initial expenditure by GODR was required for the purchase of training materials,·new uniforms, shoes and operating costs for the 1st month. RD$I,140 used for POL andvehicular spares is being spent montWy.

The patrols are scheduled to operate throughout the Santiago Province on 8-hour shifts,24 hours a day, seven days a week. The assigned personnel have regular days off to be enjoyedin family environs.

Five police activity reporting forms that provide essential information are heing completedby policemen in the field. They include a unified crime report form, which has provided the NPstatistical section with data that shows a 40% decrease in crimes of all categories. The study wasmade of the three month period prior to the start of the program as compared with a three monthperiod after its implementation. This form also saves victims and witnesses of crimes many hoursformerly spent in traveling to the police facility.

On 5 September a group of 52 foot patrolmen were selected as an adjunct to the urbanmotorized patrol. They received 80 hours of classroom instruction and began their officialduties on 30 September 1968, together with members of the motorized patrol. The footpatrolmen each work 8 hour tours between 6 AM and 12 Midnight.

On 21 December 1968, 28 officers and enlisted men who were selected to complementthe expansion of the Pilot Project, successfully completed 8 weeks of training and were graduated.They returned to their respective units until such time that necessary equipment is available,whereupon they will be transferred to Santiago.

On 31 July 1968, in conjunction with the Santiago Pilot Proje~t, four rural police postswere selected for the installation of first aid stations. This joint PuhlicSafety-Human ResourcesProject is one in which National Police facilities and personnel will be us~d in a social actioneffort with training being a National Police responsibility and equipment heing supplied hyHuman Resources Division. Five police enlisted personnel, to be assigned to' these stations, weretrained by a National Police civilian contract doctor in Santiago to give injections, first aid, andpractice midwifery with duties similar to those performed by U.S. Army medical corpsmen. TheHuman Resources Division cannot comply with their commitment until the Health Loan issigned by GODR, thereby releasing RD$40,000 alloted for this program.

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U)SEC'R~t~j

ANNEX J

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HIGHWAY PATROL

One of the phases of USAID Public Safety Program includes the reorganization of theTraffic Division of the National Police into a modern, efficient, and subdivided operating unit.One of these subdivisions was the establishing of a Highway Patrol to cover the three mainhighways and adjacent secondary roads. The Northern Highway extending from the Capital ofthe Republic, Santo Domingo, to the second largest and most important city, Santiago de losCaballeros, was designated with highest priority due to the excessive accident frequency andheavy traffic.

Traffic accident fatalities on the highways of the Dominican Republic accounted for 70%of all fatalities, although these fatal traffic accidents only accounted for 30% of all the trafficaccidents in the Republic for 1966. Further study revealed that nearly every fatal accident onthe highways was a "Multiple type traffic fatality". The "Publico", the common carrier, usedby the public to travel over the country is, generally, a compact, five passenger type vehicle.Traffic laws prohibit the overloading of these carriers, hut due to the lack of enforcement, thesedrivers will load from six to nine passengers in and outside of these vehicles. It was a commonsight to see a Publico loaded with eight passengers inside the vehicle and two more passengerscrouched in the trunk. The trunk lid being open created another hazard for the driver in thathis rear view was blocked out completely. Other prime hazards adding to this dangerous highwaytravel were:

1. Publico drivers without any driver training.2. Using Publico vehicles on the highways without proper vehicle inspections.3. Absolute disregard of highway warning and traffic regulatory signals.4. Complete lack of accident investigations or traffic enforcement on any of the highways.

These hazardous highway conditions, plus the high accident frequency on the highwaysdemanded of the Public Safety Program a high priority recommendation for the establishmentof an efficient modern type highway patrol operation in the Republic. Accordingly, in October,1967, personnel were selected using the following recommended criteria:

1. Three years service in the traffic division.2. Possession of a valid driver's license.3. Have the grade of at least a sergeant.4. Pass an eye and driver's reaction test on the Porto-O-Clinic Testing equipment.5. Pass a rigid character examination.6. Satisfactorily complete a six month basic traffic, defensive driving, accident investiga­

tion course.

\\~\\\~r~~~'S'l:~~'\The criteria recommended for selecti~~\Q.fi:rarikiri~fofficers was the same as listed above

plus the requirement that they be graduate~fficers of the International Police Academy,Washington, D.C. These officers also served as instructors in subjects that they became pro­ficient in while attending the academy.

This traffic course was divided into three phases to cover the six month training: as thetheory on the subject was given and completed, practical field problems were given on the sub­ject matter, upon completion of the field problems a review was then given to them in the classroom to cover any details in which the participants were still confused. These participants weregiven a complete basic traffic training schedule plus practical field training in all aspects of trafficpoint control, traffic flow problems, traffic control operations, traffic surveys, traffic analysis,defensive driving training, obstacle driving training, and finally traffic accident investigations usingthe international traffic accident report forms. It was interesting to note that several of theparticipants had never driven a vehicle in their police career. The driver training given to them inthis course proved that it was easier to train a driver without any experience then it was to traina driver that supposedly knew how to drive a vehicle. This driver training included proper patroltechniques, the Stopping and Approaching of a suspicious vehicle on the highway, using theirradio communications equipment to apprehend speeding violators instead of pursuing them athigh rates of speed jeopardizing their lives, their vehicle and other motorists on the highway. ByadYising a patrol unit ahead to stop and make the apprehension. The men were also instructedto advise the radio central each and every time that they stopped a vehicle on the highway givingdescription of the vehicle being stopped, license number, number of occupants, and locationwhere the vehicle is being stopped plus the direction of travel. All of this information wouldserve as another protective measure in case of any type of assault against the patrol officers.

This highway patrol unit consists of four 1967 Rambler four door sedans, green and whitecolor, equipped with three-way radio transmitter receiver with a potential strength of 60 watts,red rotating beacons mounted on top of each unit, sirens, National Police Traffic Division High-

. way Patrol Decals mounted on each front door, traffic flares, first aid kits, blankets, fire ex­tinguishers and each patrol unit containing the necessary accident investigation equipment. The154 Km. Highway between the capitol and Santiago was divided into three sectors, each patrolunit would have about 50 Km. to patrol in their respective sectors. The fourth unit serves as arelief unit in case of a breakdown of one of the patrol units and also is available while the patrolunits are being maintained and serviced here in the capitol. This fourth unit also serves astransportation for relieving the shifts mounted in these units. These units remain and are servicedout in their sectors 24 hours a day and the assigned personnel relieve one another out on thehighway. There are two sergeants assigned to each unit with a ranking officer as the field super­visor riding in one of the three units on each one of the eight hour, shifts.' This provided anotherinovation, in that all of the highway patrolmen are working eight hour shifts, six days with oneday off per week, instead of the ten or twelve hour shifts seven days a week that are normallybeing worked in all other assignment.

There is a company commander with the rank of cap~ain that is in charge of all personnelin the field plus another captain that is in charge of administration, operations, statistics andanalysis at the office of the highway patrol that is located at th~ National Police Palace reportingdirectly to the commander of the Traffic Division.

57

The six months that these police officers were together for their training provided thewherewithal so that these officers could be molded into a team. This team concept togetherwith the discipline required of each, gave birth to an "Esprit de Corps" among all the members.The division of into shifts provided a natural competitive atmosphere in which one shift wascompeting against the other two shifts of the group, in trying to provide a higher caliber ofservice and appearance to the motorists on the highway. Their appearance included a changefrom the usual complete grey uniform to a white shirt, grey tie and trousers, a white crashhelmet trimmed in green to blend with the. new colored green and white patrol car. Anotherdistinction was the adoption of a police-badge type decal placed on the front doors of the patrolcars and the same miniature decal for their. shoulder-patch and for their crash-helmets. An in­crease in their pay envelopes, to help defray their daily expenses while on patrol on the highwaywas another incentive that the commanding General was able to procure from his limited budgetto enhance their serving on this new highway patrol. The unification of these different facetsof this program brought out the end result which was being sought, raising the integrity andmorale of these men to the point that they were proud to be part of this highway patrol opera­tion and that the public would look up to and respect them, not for the "Brute Force" as inyears gone-by, but these highway patrolmen would be given due recognition for the demon­stration of a highly technic~l and modern training program which accounted for each and everypolice function that they would perform in the future.

Fifteen days prior to the inauguration of the Highway Patrol a Public Relations Programwas kicked off by the Commanding General of the National Police announcing the inaugurationdate of the Highway Patrol, this event was covered by all news media and served as a vehicleto begin an educational campaign for all motorists and pedestrians using the highway. Fullcooperation was received from all local television and radio stations, newspapers, all that wasnecessary was for the traffic division to provide the idea or subject and each station of newspaperwould prepare the necessary pictures, plates, placards or television shots to produce the educa­tional materials used. The inauguration was attended by the Secretariat of Interior and Police,the Archbishop of Santo Domingo who offered the Catholic Blessing of the highway patrolmenand fleet, representatives from the different branches of the armed forces in Santo Domingo,Chief of the Public Safety Division. The Commanding General of the National Police and theChief of the Traffic Division made the inauguration speeches. After the inauguration held onMay 6, 1968, at the National Police Palace the educational campaign was continued by usinghandouts and courtesy tickets as part. of the Public Relations Program. The acceptance by boththe public and newS media has grown to such an extent that even private industry such as oil andgas companies, insurance companies and private businesses have volunteered their financial supportiR the printing of driver's manuals, a new traffic law, and other training materials that are beingused in furthering the training of all of the traffic police officers assigned to the traffic division,and motorists in general.

The statistics recorded for the first month of patrol operation on the highway indicatedthe following data:

I. 118 traffic accidents investigated2. Two (2) traffic fatalities3. 18,690 krn. were patroled by all three (3) highway patrols shifts for an average 24

hour day with each unit patroling over 200 km. for each eight (8) hour shift.

58

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4. 1958 Courtesy Tickets were issued for an average 8 hour shift issuing about 78tickets.

5. Courtesy Selective Enforcement was initially applied to the violation of overloadingof Publicos and of the total Courtesy Tickets issued 20% were issued for this soleviolation.

It is felt that the tragic waste of human lives and personal injuries plus the tremendousproperty loss in vehicles had drastically been reduced by the creation, training, and placing intoservice of this Highway Patrol in the Dominican Republic.

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SECRET

ANNEX K

17 June 1968Santo DomingoUSAID/PSD

I. INTRODUCTION

This report, prepared by the Public Safety Communications Advisor, has the purpose andscope of providing a review of the police communications capabilities, the system as it will even­tually be, and the progress to date. The report is being made in response to a request by theOPS, AID/W.

II. PRESENT SYSTEM ARRANGEMENT

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The Police communications system is now considered to be the best in the country.Although other radio systems, both government and private, use the same type of equipment,such as repeater location, ·they fall short of the police capability. The system operates in the"high band" frequency range between 150 mc. and 170 mc. using FM narrow band modulation.

All the equipment is high quality commercial type manufactured by Motorola. There arethirty-seven tabletop base stations with twenty-five watts output, nine floor-mounted sixty wattstations, one hundred and five transistorized "motorac" mobile units, and various assortedportables, megaphones, etc.

The networks comprising the police radio communication system consists of the followingnetworks:

1. Nationwide Administration Network2. Rural Patrol Network3. Santo Domingo Patrol Network4. Highway Patrol Network-(see Figure G)5. Civil Disturbance Control Network-(see Figure H)6. Command and Staff Network

B. EXISTING NETWORK OPERATION

The present arrangement of each network is described as follows: (See attachments Dthrough H.)

The network consists of a repeater located at Alto Bandera through which mobilesand base stations throughout the country operate. Communications between all of the largertowns and cities is provided. A phone patch is available to Santo Domingo telephones.

There are forty-four base stations operating on this network. In addition, there are fortymobiles, located generally in Santo Domingo.

2. Rural Patrol Network (see Figure F)

This network is a simplex channel which is used by the patrol vehicles throughoutthe country with the exception of the capitol city. They communicate directly to their respect­ive local stations and to one another. There is a station at Alto Bandera that operates on thischannel, thereby providing a voice relay to all parts of the country. There are forty-five mobileunits and forty-six base stations that use this network.

3. Santo Domingo Patrol Network (see Figure D)

Presently Santo Domingo has a separate duplex network for the city patrol vehiclesthat is distinct from the rest, of the country. Vehicles on this channel communicate with a radiooperator at the radio patrol building. The mobiles generally have 25 watt Motrac units. Thebase station is a new 120 watt transistorized floor-mounted model, remotely controlled. Themobile units are not able to transmit and receive simultaneously even though two frequenciesare utilized.

4. Highway Patrol Network (see Figure G)

The Highway Patrol is a new department, newly organized to combat the dangeroustraffic situation on the country's highways. The first phase of the patrol will begin on the DuarteHighway between Santo Domingo and Santiago. Santiago is the second largest city located 100miles to the northwest of the capitol. Along this route the communications network has beenestablished. It operates through a repeater presently located at Alto Bandera which will permitcontinuous supervision over the movements of each vehicle. We were able to establish the con­trol console adjacent to the patrol commander's office at the Police Palace. The commanderwill use his patrol personriel as dispatchers rather than operators from the communicationsdepartment.

The mobile units are 80 watt two-frequency Motracs. The second frequency permitsdirect contact with the larger towns located along the highway. For this purpose the nationwideadministration network is utilized. There are presently four mobile units and one 60 watt basestation installed. The repeater iE a 60 watt tube ty'pe model.

61

5; Civil Disturbance Control Network (see Figure H)

The network is in the process of being completed. Previously the Civil DisturbanceControl forces, known as C.D.C., had no communications. There was only a 25 watt station onthe administrative network. A 60 watt base station was substituted which we equipped with areceiver preamplifier. The resultant sensitivity is .25 microvolts for a readable signal. This isnecessary because of the low power output of the portable units that comprise the rest of thenetwork. Initial operational checks show that the network will perform better than our expec­tations. The portables are the 5 watt all transistorized model manufactured by Motorola. Thereare ten portables as well as one 25 watt mobile.

6. Command and Staff Network

This network was discontinued late in 1966. At that time several of the units usedby the previous president could not be accounted for.

C. EXISTING STATION CAPABILITIES

1. Police Communications Center

The communications center is located on the top floor of the radio patrol building.(See Figure A) From there control is maintained over all networks with the exception of thehighway patrol and the C.D.C. The equipment consists of three remote control units, each con­nected to a base station located in an adjoining room. The· base stations consist of a small 120watt compa-station for rural patrol vehicles, a 120 watt floor-mount station for city patrol, anda 60 watt tube-type unit to control the Administration network. There is no standby unit.(See Figure F for layout diagram.)

2. National Police Palace

Located at the palace in what used to be the communications room are two 60 wattbase stations an,d the telephone switchboard. The switchboard has no direct connection withthe radio operators located in another part of the city. One base station operates on the ruralpartol channel. The other is the remotely controlled highway patrol station.

3. Alto Bandera Repeater Site

The Alto Bandera location permits operation through a repeater to at least 80% of thecountry. Located there is a transistorized 375 watt repeater, a tube-type 300 watt repeater, anda tube-type 60 watt repeater. All three are for operation on the administration network. In ad­dition, a second tube-type 60 watt repeater is used for the highway patrol. A locally controlled60 watt base station operates on the rural patrol network.

62,' H:'~sEC'R'ET L:~ ~"~::

SECRET- ..

4. Country-wide Base Stations

In most cases the stations are 25 watt Motorola table-top models. Together witheach station is a monitor receiver which permits simultaneous monitoring of the Administrationand Rural Patrol channels. In five poor signal areas 60 watt floor-mount stations are used. (Seemap - Figure 1).

5. Miscellaneous Base Stations

The CDC forces have their base station located at their headquarters in the south­western part of the capitol city. The base has two frequencies. The primary frequency is forcommunication with the portables. The second operates on the country patrol frequency. Thisfeature enables communications with other base stations in the event of telephone failure andwith certain vehicles as well. (See Figure H.)

At the Police Academy located at Borinquen, 20 miles from the city, there is a lackof telephone service. To meet this challenge the radio shop is now constructing a radio link toprovide telephone service to that location. The system will be simultaneous duplex affordingthe effect of a normal telephone line. The radio equipment will in turn be connected to astandard telephone instrument at the Academy. (See Figure E.)

D. RADIO MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

The Radio Maintenance Shop is well located at the radio patrol location. The vehiclerepair shop as well as the print shop and otheEs are close by. There are 19 technicians workingunder the shop foreman who is a First Lieutenant. Additionally there are four men at AltoBandera, as well as one in Santiago. The parts stockroom is located some distance away at theCommunications Commander's office.

III. RECOMMENDED SYSTEM OPERATION

A. GENERAL OBJECTIVES

The primary objective is to reorganize the National Police radio networks into an efficientcommunications system. The NP is to be restructured into functional Department and Divisions.The frequencies will be assigned in a manner that will enable direct contact between those ofsimilar duties.

A secondary objective is to repair all inoperable equipment and in turn utilize to themaximum the radio equipment belonging to the police.

Also, the number of r~dio units will gradually be increased as urban and rural patrolprograms are developed in the coming. years.

63

SECREJ~... .;. ~ .' :;., ,~-:-...::

B. PROPOSED CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS

The following steps actually constitute the program undertaken to develop the NationalPolice communications capability.

Since the program was initiated some programs have already been completed, others areunderway.

Step 1. Creation of a Highway Patrol Network (Figure G.)

When it was recently decided that a highway patrol was needed, it was evident that aseparate communications network would have to be established for their use. A system would·be needed that would permit control over the vehicles at all times anywhere in the country.Obviously a repeater system would have to be used. For the initial phase of the program a 60watt repeater was repaired and installed at Alto Bandera. A base station and four high-poweredmobile units were installed ready for service.

, As the patrol grows and eventually operates throughout the entire country, it will bebeyond the capability of the present repeater. Sixty watts is not sufficient for mobile coveragefrom Alto Bandera. Presently under consideration are two methods of providing coverage. Thefirst and easiest method is to make use of the 300 watt standby repeater and use a 12 db gainantenna. The second method is to use two other mountain top sites with a 60 watt repeaterat each. There is no signal overlap. Therefore they both could operate on the same frequency.In any case the permanent arrangement should be installed by December 1968.

Step 2. Provide a District Network for Use by the C.D.C. (Figure H.)

The equipment needed has been gathered together and repaired. The base station isnow installed and working, as well as six out 'of the ten portables. The remaining four will berepaired as soon as possible.

Step 3. Development of a Telephone Link by Radio to the Police Academy at Borinquen(Figure E.)

The system was designed for use with two 25 watt tabletop base stations. Deadlinedunits were repaired and placed in operation. The system is nearing completion. It should be inoperation within a month.

Step 4. Santo Domingo Patrol Frequency Change

In the near future, city patrol vehicles will be changed to the frequency used by patrolvehicles throughout the rest of the country. The present network is a duplex arrangement. Thisduplex frequency is needed for use in Step 5. Therefore Step 4 and 5 have to be done con­currently.

This system when implemented will provide mobile telephone service capable of simul­taneous transmit and receive. It will be the easiest method of reducing the workload of the 375watt repeater at Alto Bandera. The ranking NP Officers' radios can be put on the telephonechannel which will operate only in Santo Domingo. The results will be (1) less traffic throughAlto Bandera, (2) all the Officers eliminated from the patrol channels, (3) the Officers will beunified for the first time on the same channel.

The present 120 watt Santo Domingo Patrol Network base station will be convertedto a repeater operation and a phone patch will be connected. An operator at the NP Palacecan operate it in conjunction with the telephone switchboard.

One watt protables that were previously deadlined can be made to perform satisfactorilyas mobile units on the telephone channel. There are ten of these that can be substituted for tenMotracs, which can be released for patrol use. The portables will be trunk-mounted with a sur­plus telephone modified to operate as a control head. Two antennas per vehicle will be neededfor simultaneous operation. The Motracs as well as the portables can be easily modified forthis type of operation. This step should be completed within six weeks of the arrival of partslisted in pending PIO/Cs.

Step 6. Relocation of the Parts Stockroom

Local funds are needed for this project. For this reason there will possibly be somedelay. The project is needed but not vital.

Step 7. Relocation of the Communications Control Center to the NP Palace

A new Communications Control Center is needed to combine all the police communi­cations at one location. With the exception of CDC forces, the pO,lice will have normal opera­tional control of all systems from the Police Palace. However, the capability of control of theCDC will be incorporated in the system, so that all networks may be controlled from onelocality. Space for the telephone exchange control unit will be included in the Console. Thepurpose will be to establish a focal point through which all police communications will pass.The location will be close to the offices of the administrative and executive personnel.

The room will be remodeled by the GODR (See Figure B). The Console will beUSAID-procured in FY 69. In the interim before the Console arrives, the existing controlstations will be moved in and operated on desks as at present.

Step 8. Remodeling of the Alto de La Bandera Building

The building at the Alto de La Bandera mountaintop radio relay .location is in needof minor repairs, paint and sealing material to eliminate moisture from condensation. Negotia­tions are presently being finalized by an Investment Agreement with the GODR to providePL-480 funds for this project (as well as the Control Center) together with improvements toprovide better living conditions. An inside bathroom and a kitchen with the necessary hot and

.........

cold running water and sewer systems will be added. Included, is the installation of a 10 kilowattemergency power generator that has already been provided by USAID.

The cost to the GODR will be $5,000. for the labor and materials as opposed to$37,000. for a new building as recommended by the Communications Commander.

Step 9. Retrieval of Police Radio Equipment

The equipment was loaned to the Dominican Military during the Revolution and stilloperates on police frequencies. This step is a very difficult one and may well be impossible toaccomplish.

Step 10. Increase of Quantity of Radio Equipment

In the period 1968-1971, two hundred more radios will be required. The FM-5 andFM-1 units are preferred as being adequate and economical. These units are to be used in ruralpatrol vehicles which will operate in and about small towns and villages throughout the interior.The five watts of power will be enough to provide communications, yet interference fromneighboring operations on the same frequency will be minimal. The units will operate on therural patrol channel (160.0 mc). This is necessary to provide flexibility of assignment ofvehicles.

OPINION

The present Commander of the Communications Department, Major Carlos Pequero, haspresented himself to the Police as being a communications expert. Yet his qualifications forthe position he holds consist of a period of time as a radio operator in the Navy.

In the opinion of this technician he has very limited technical and administrative ability,coupled with a marked tendency towards empire building.

C. RECOMMENDED EQUIPMENT NEEDS AND COST

Upon arrival of commodities procured under pending PIO/Cs, the communications systemwill become fully operational. The Police have agreed to furnish all radio spare parts and supplies.Accordingly, they were informed that no more orders for parts will be made by AID. The Com­munications Commander recently accused AID of causing the majority of his problems becausespare parts were not arriving fast enough or in sufficient quantity.

In the future PIO/Cx for Communications will be limited to radio equipment and a con­trol console. At present it appears that the radios will consist of about 150 each FM-5 unitsand 50 FM-1 units to total 200 altogether. Presently the first 12 are on order. The balancewill be ordered in quantities from time to time throughout the next three fiscal years. Thecost of the FM-5 units, including accessories, 10% parts and transportation will total about$55,000. The FM-1 units will cost about $12,000, to total between $65,000 and $70,000. Thebest guess for the price of the control console "is about $5,000.

66

IV. ORGANIZATION

The Mission has undertaken the task of surveying the entire Dominican National Policewith the purpose of reorganizing it into a civilian rather than a military organization. Naturallythe Communications Department will be greatly affected.

A. PRESENT SITUATION

Presently the department is divided into two sections. The first and largest section iscomprised of radio operators. There are about 275 men whose sole duty is to operate forty­seven base stations.

The maintenance section is comprised of twenty-six persons. Their technical abilityis quite limited. Some do not know how to use a volt-meter or how to solder. The section isslowly growing larger in spite of advisory efforts. Periodically another man is requested by theCommander of the department. The Commander has a complicated organizational chart (seeFigure R) and has made everyone a specialist. Permission is required to work on something outof a man's speciality.

B. RECOMMENDED CHANGES

The following changes recommended by the Communications Advisor will improve theefficiency of the operation and maintenance of the Police communications system.

The recommendations consist of the following:

First change the department to maintenance organization only. The operators will be used asoffice personnel ill" the country detachments and be under the supervision of the respective de­tachment commander.

Second, reduce the technical personnel to fifteen men.

Third, assign the men on a geographic rather than specialty basis.

AMENDMENT TO SURVEY OF NATIONAL POLICE

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

April 1968

The purpose of this Amendment is to update the survey in order to reflect the situationas of January 1969. This also serves to indicate the progress during the year 1968. Changes,although not spectacular, continue to occur in the National Police Communications Department.The goals as listed in the beginning are close to being obtainable. Many methods were used onthe part of the advisor to effect achievement of these goals.

'i'"/-

Present System Arrangement

A. General DescriptionB. Existing Networks

Proposed Changes - Systems

Recommended Changes - Personnel

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1. Nationwide Administrative Network - No change.2. Rural Patrol - No change.3. Santo Domingo Patrol -4. Highway Patrol - No change.5. CDC - Completed.6. City Telephone -

Observations

Reassign frequenciesRepair inoperable equipmentIncrease Units (FM-5)

PRESENT SITUATION - JANUARY 1969

SYSTEMS

1. Nationwide Administrative Network

The network is operating without significant modifications of the original installation.Since this is a repeater operation covering the entire nation, the channel carries a high level oftraffic. The network operates very well despite this condition. There are no foreseeable changesor additional stations.

2. Rural Patrol Network

It is in this network that the anticipated expansion will occur. As the pilot project isexpanded and is followed by more rural patrols, radio equipment will be provided by USAID.The l\1ission is awaiting delivery of the first 20% of the FM-5B units. They are to be utilizedas base stations as well as mobile units. Presently, Motorola "motrac" radios are being utilizedin some of the larger towns.

3. Santo Domingo Patrol Network

The network is ready to undergo a complete change. The patrol is to be dispatchedfrom the Police Palace. In addition, the frequency is being changed to the same channel utilizedby the Rural Patrol. Compatibility will be achieved by operating on the same frequency as theRural Patrol network. The two networks combined can be considered as "the Patrol Network".The change to the simplex channel is necessary to enable the supervisory personnel to monitorand communicate directly with their respective patrol vehicles. The recommended changes willshortly be accomplished thereby concluding this portion of the communications program.

4. Highway Patrol

The Highway Patrol auxiliary of the National Police is awaiting delivery of four newvehicles to augment the four presently in operation. These are six 80 watt motrac radios at theradio shop ready to be installed. In the future, as several of the Rural Patrol vehicles are re­equipped with the FM-5 units, the existing motor units will be removed, recrystalized, and util­ized for the Highway Patrol. The repeater, located at Alto Bandera is rated at 60 watts. Thecommunications Commander, Major Pequeno, is still against utilizing an existing 300 watt re­peater. The repeater is the standby for the Nationwide Administrative Network. This changehas been recommended by the advisor several times. The Commander wants a brand-new re­peater instead. This matter is in the hands of the police. From the standpoint of the Mission,the Highway Patrol project is fairly well firmed up. The gradual increase of mobile units willbe substance of future change. A special antenna for the repeater has been ordered. It has thecapability of increasing the effective power by 16 times. The antenna can be installed in one day.

5. Civil Disturbance Control Network

The network consists of twelve portable radios and three mobile units operating withtheir distinct base station. There are no immediate plans for expanding this network.

6. City Mobile Telephone System

The mobile telephone system is ready to be newly established to groups of police officialstogether on a separate channel. In this way the workload and interference of the Patrol Networkand the Administrative Network should be reduced. The system is not an end in itself, but amethod whereby officials are eliminated from the patrol and administrative networks. The radiois a symbol of prestige, therefore performance is secondary to appearance. Surplus desk tele­phones are to be converted for use as control leads. In this way the present shortage of Motorolamicrophones and speakers will be minimized. After the initial reaction, the system should bereceived with enthusiasm. There are about 35 units that will eventually operate on this channel.At present, 15 radios or about 40% are utilizing the channel. It is anticipated that the systemwill be completed by the first part of the coming summer.

CONTROL CENTER

1. Change of Control Stations to Palace

The first step toward consolidating all of the communications at the Police Palace hasbeen accomplished. The City Patrol despatcher and the base station are to be relocated to thePalace, according to agreement. They will be moved to the telephone switchboard. Dead areaspreviously encountered by the patrol vehicles will be stimulated due to the higher and more ad­vantageous location of the Police Palace. The move should be made within the next few weeks.

2. Telephone Switchboard

At the present time there are 9 incoming lines to the police switchboard. They are usedfor incoming and outgoing business calls, There is only one si!:1gle telephone for all of SantoDomingo to call for police assistance. The number is very difficult to remember.

The local telephone company is studying a proposal by the Mission to provide a specialnumber for emergency calls by the public. Two possibilities are "80" and "444". If they arewilling to provide this service, there will be a very positive effect regarding public opinion andeffectiveness of the police. This will be especially true if this can be obtained on a nationwidebasis. In any case the telephone system at the Police Palace will be divided into three groups.The first group will consist of emergency switchboard with a capacity of 10 rotating lines, Thesecond group will consist of the existing system utilizing equipment connected to eight lines forbusiness calls. There is a capacity of 14 lines eventually.

The third group consists of direct outside lines to the offices. At present these accountfor one-half of the telephones in the building.

STATIONS AND MOBILES TO BE INSTALLED IN FY 1969

Santiago - MobileSantiago - MobileSantiago - MobileSantiago - MobileSantiago - MobileSantiago - MobileSantiago - MobileTamboril - BaseLicayal Medio - BaseVilla Bisomi - BaseVilla Gonzalez - BaseLa Cumbre - BaseManzanillo - BaseSosua - BasePuerto Plata - MobilePuerto Plata - MobilePuerto Plata - MobilePuerto Plata - Mobile

70

§P/'tr1'CSEC~ET:;

San Francisco De M - MobileSan Francisco De M - MobileSan Francisco De M - MobileSan Francisco De M - MobileNugua - MobileNugua - MobileSanchez - MobileSamana - MobileLa Vega - MobileLa Vega - MobileBonao - MobileMonte Cristi - MobileMonte Cristi - MobileDolabon - MobileVolverde - MobileSan Jose de los Matan - Mobile

SpareSpare

STATIONS AND MOBILES TO BE INSTALLED IN FY 1970

Duverge - Base

Duverge - Base

Jimani - Mobile

Constanza - Base

Constanza - Mobile

Joina Mosa - Base

Villa Mella - Base

Punta Couceda - Base

Borenguen - Base

Borenguen - Base

Boyaguana - Base

Boyaguana - Base

La Descubierta - Base

La Descubierta - Base

Los Metas - Base

Los Metas - Base

Jaina - Base

Jaina - Base

Pederuales - Mobile

Euriguilla - Mobile

Elias Pina - Mobile

San Pedro De M. - Mobile

San Pdero De M. - Mobile

San Pedro De M. - Mobile

San Pedro - Mobile

San Pedro - Mobile

Halo Mayor - Mobile

Halo Mayor - Mobile

Higuey - Mobile

Higuey - Mobile

Spare

Spare

Spare

Spare

Spare

San Juan - Mobile

San Juan - Mobile

San Juan - Mobile

San Juan - Mobile

Naiba - Mobile

Naiba - Mobile

Borahona - Mobile

Borahona - Mobile

Azua - Mobile

Azua - Mobile

San Jose de Dcon - Mobile

Bani - Mobile

Bani - Mobile

San Cristobal - Mobile

San Cristobal - Mobile

San Cristobal - Mobile

Villa Altagrecia - Mobile

Villa Altagrecia - Mobile

Monte Plata - Mobile

Sabona Grande - Mobile

La Victoria - Mobile

Miches - Mobile

Sabona de la Mar - Mobile

El Sayho - Mobile

El Sayho - Mobile

El Sayho - Mobile

La Romana - Mobile

La· Romana - Mobile

La Romana - Mobile

La Romana - Mobile

SECRET

PRESENT COMMUNlCAT\ONS CENTERPH)'S\C~L L~"OUl

ANNEX Kfigure A

~'

t;:;::~~ ..,

PARTS ROOM

COMMANDERSOFFICE

COUNTRY PATROLAND

C\TY PATROL

BASE STATIONS

REMOTE

~

NATIONWIDE ADMINISTRATION

R~D'O p~lROL BLDG.

PROPOSED CO.MMUNICATIONS CENTERPHYSICAL LAYOUT

ANNEX KFigure B

~ ~.:;~,' ~;:/

§~f~~r"~~~ (;~~~:~~"'l:~.;~ cv

1;...":; ::'Jl~''''-:~''/.~':''.::2i

c.::n.-::,:",~-:.c':.rl~·!

U I.~f.~:-;.:-~.:.r:.::'"U;:,,;,;.a

t:~;;~'~;l~

Equipment Room

TelephoneDialingEquipment

NATIONAL POLICE PALACE

BASE STATION AND REPEATER DIAGRAMProposed Arrangement

ANNEX KFigure C

TX TX TX155.0 155.75 160.0

RX RX RX160.1 160.3 160.0

Repeater 375 W Repeater 300 W Base 60 W

NATIONWIDE HIGHWAY RURALADMINISTRATION PATROL PATROL

ALTO BANDERA

TX160.0160.4

RX160.0160.4

TX160.1160.0

RX155.0160.0

Base 25 Wor60W

Base 25 W

STANDBY

TYPICALRURAL BASE

TX160.4160.0

RX160.4160.0

Base 60 W

CIVilDISTURBANCE

CONTROL

TXTX 160.1

154.9 160.2160.3RX

RX 155.0151.1 155.88

155.75

Base 25 W Base 60W

ACADEMYTELEPHONE STANDBY

PHONEPATCH

STANDBY

TX160.2

RX155.88

CITY MOBILETELEPHONE OPERATOR

TXTX155.0

155.75 160.0

RX RX160.1 160.0160.3

Repeater 60 W Base 60 W

Repeater 120 W

TX160.0

RX160.0

CITYPATROL

Base 120 W

TX160.3

RX155.75

TX160.1

RX155.0

Base 60 W Base 60 W

NATIONWIDE HIGHWAYADMINISTRATION PATROL

c': :., '.,"~',: ';' :"1

of"':;;" ".~ .'•..

',j 'l,

CONTROL CENTER

BASE SlAIION AND REPEAlER DIAGRAMANNEX KFigure 0

TX TX TX TX TX TX160.1 160.3 160.0 160.2 154.9 160.4

PHONEPATCH

RX RX RX RX RX RX155.0 155.75 160.0 155.88 151.1 160.4

Base 60 W Base 60 W Base 120 W Repeater 120 W Base 25 W Base 60 W

NATIONWIDE HIGHWAY CITY CITY MOBILE ACADEMY RIOTAD MIN 1STRAT ION PATROL PATROL TELEPHONE OPERATOR TELEPHONE CONTROL

SANTO DOMINGO

TX TX TXTX

TX155.0155.0 155.75 160.0 155.75 160.0

RX RX RX RX RX160.1 160.3 160.0 160.1 160.0

160.3

Repeater 375 W Repeater 60 W Base 60W Repeater 60 W Base 60 W

NATIONWIDE HIGHWAY RURALADM IN1STRATION PATROL PATROL STANDBY

ALTO BANDERA

TX160.1160.0

RX155.0160.0

Base 25 Wor60W

TYPICALRURAL BASE

.< •. ':.4...,)

,:':;Vi:.;~

'~j:;§-;~";1 ' .• ;:~ .. ' '"

r1:<

PRESENT SANTO DOMINGO ANNEX KFigure E

FREQUENCY ARRANGEMENT

~~.:,:"". __~....,.,.":,,, Tl

"':,.:'~'=':~J"~;;:";"':,:

i~~~~~(~Patrol160.0

(~Official

160.1-155.0

(~Official

~160.0(

Military160.1-155.0

t~Military

160.1-155.0 ~(

Official160.1-155.0

(~Patrol

, 55.0 - 160.2

(~Patrol

155.0~160.2

(~Sub-Chief

160.0

(~Official

160.1-155.~(

~ Patrol~ 155.88-160.2

Official160.0

~PRESIDENT160.1 - 155.0

RADIO PATROL

~Official

160,1-155.0

(~Patrol

155.88-160.2

r~CHIEF

160.1-155.0

(~Official

155.0-160.2

~Official I

160.0 '

(~Patrol'160.0

(~Official

160.0

(~Patrol

155.0-160.2

PROPOSED SANTO DOMINGOFREQUENCY ARRANGEMENT

ACADEMY151.1 - 154.9

ANNEX KFigure F

(~Telephone

155.88-160.2

l~Telephone

155.88-160.2

\~Telephone

155.88-160.2

C""""\(o--o~

Telephone155.88-160.2

POLICE PALACE

Patrol160.0

~Patrol160.0

OFFICIALS VEHICLES PATROL VEHICLES

\~Telephone

155.88-160.2

\~Telephone

155.88-160.2

\O~PRESIDENT160.1-155.0

~Patrol160.0

{~Patrol160.0

ADMINISTRATION AND RURAL PATROLNETWORKS

ANNEX KFigure G

SANTO DOMINGO

PRESIDENT

~O.1-155.0

~F160.1-155.0

~Patrol~~160.0

Patrol160.0

F1160.1 155.0F2160.0

ANNEX KFigure H .

BASE

F1 160.1 155.0F2160.0

•HIGHWAY PATROL NETWORK

/'

CIVil DISTURBANCE CONTROLCOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

ANNEX I(Figure I

160.45 WATT

,

" "-~ ~

160.4 160.4

5 WATT 5 WATT

F1 160.4F2 160.0

CAMPAMENTO DUARTE

MAP OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ANNEX KFigure J

o

~~POOR SIGNAL A\~

*"* SANTIAGO

*-

~::~\**~~~( *

~~~RA*~*

*:

CARIBBEANSEA

"*

ATLANTICOCEAN

~-N-

~

**:

LEGEND'* 25 WATT STATION

o 60 WATT STATION

o 100 WATT OR MORE

ANNEX KFigure K

PRESENT COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENTORGANIZATION DIAGRAM

STAFF6MEN

COMMANDERSTOCKROOM

CLERK

SHOPSUPERVISOR

TECHNICIANS(2)

SPECIALOPERATIONS

TECHNICIANEAST

REGION

TECHNICIANSOUTHREGION

TECHNICIANNORTHREGION

TECHNICIANPORTABLES

MEGAPHONES

TECHNICIANTELEPHONE

REPAIR

275 INDIVIDUALRADIO OPERATORS

~...:.:;,.,~:""'::,..II.J.':'.::J:

~ oi,'::;,:":'j -~:'£.l

~i :...:....,.~.:.:.:.L: ..,l..£'.:~~.:::"'~'"",;.;"::.::.;':)

TECHNICIANALTO

BANDERA

TECHNICIAN

INSTALLATION

TECHNICIAN

MOTRAe

TECHNICIAN

STATION

TECHNICIAN

TELEVISION

TECHNICIANGENERATOR

PLANT

ASSISTANTS(4)

ASSISTANTS(2)

ASSISTANTS(2)

ASSISTANTS(2)

ASSISTANTS(2)

ASSISTANTS(3)

PROPOSED COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENTORGANIZATION DIAGRAM

COMMANDER

ANNEX KFigure L

TECHNICALSUPERVISOR

TECHNICIANS(2)

SPECIALSERVICE

STAFF1 WOMAN

TECHNICIAN

ALTOBANDERA

OPERATORS(2)

ALTOBANDERA

TECHNICIANS(3)

SANTODOMINGO

TECHNICIAN

NORTHREGION

STOCKCLERK

TECHNICIAN

SOUTHREGION

TECHNICIAN

EASTREGION

ANNEX L

RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION-NATIONAL POLICE

ACTION REPORTS

teJ.:X;::::-.;/,.:;.:\:~':;:':::::':;':\.,:::_'::l!

li"~~~'l'~u Z':ll."1:.-'(

~:~~.~~~;

"'- n.~·

1I:,;"":'~y-''':'~: "; '.. ::.: ,n

?~ ..;:.

--->".,'V'~.'"., m

n'

(.~:.'~

GUN PERMITS1,300

ARMED SERVICES2,000

NUMBER OF FILESEARCHESMONTHLY

NATIONAL POLICE15,000

PASSPORTS - GOVERN­MENT EMPLOYMENT

CLEARANCES3,000

STATISTICAL SECTIONREVIEWS

ALL RECORDS

................ -\\\

\

rIIII ­I II IIIII1/ /II //

FILES300,000

PASSPORTS

INDEX

FOREIGNERS

GUN PERMITS

GOVERNMENTEMPLOYMENT

NATIONAL POLICE PALACECRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

COMPLAINTSFINGE RPRI NTS

DETACHMENTSNATIONAL DISTRICT

INDEX

PRINTS

CRIMINAL50,000

FILED NOTCLASSIFIED

250,000(CIVI L)

NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION BUREAU

FINGERPRINTSCLASSIFIED

80,000

-1\\, \

" \" \" \,\

REGIONALHEADQUARTERS

ARREST RECORDSFINGER PRINT CARDS

r;:;-':"~T_"::.:;:;;.f:!l.·~"

~~~::"-:':::;J. .::.:..~.~{j

~ ~~::~:~:::~~

§~~:C:,:,·,r:')1~~:::~f:J1t:;::~',:~.",::Lt:':,,..:.!.~

',~i:::-o.-~'"'":'"':.':;'''''·'~1t; r.

~::-:;:,:':.','-;';\,":~'':':';:.f~

MONTHLY TOTAL = 19,300

ANNEX M

WEAPONS ON HAND AT CAMPAMENTO DUARTE (CDC)

AS OF MARCH 27,1969

88 Savage 12 gao Shotguns8 Winchester 12 gao Shotguns

157 Remington 30.06 Rifles64 Remington 30.06 Rifles with Scopes

150 30 Cal. Carbines32 Garand 30 Cal. Rifle M-254 37 Cal. Teargas Projectile Launcher

349 Gas Masks225 Gas Mask Holders

4440 12 gao Shotgun Shells1880 CN Teargas Grenades (200 outdated)1185 CN Teargas Projectiles (85 not outdated)

AMOUNT OF TEARGAS GRENADES AND PROJECTILES USED

SINCE JAN. 1, 1969

586 Teargas Grenades1096 Teargas Projectiles

85

SECRET

ANNEX N

VEHICLES PRESENTLY IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

Make Model Year Quantity A.I.D. procured

Willys Jeep 1967 24 yesWillys Jeep 1966 38 yesWillys Jeep 1964 3 noWillys Jeep 1963 25 noWillys Jeep 1962 2 noRambler Sedan 1967 20 yesRambler Sedan 1965 1 noRambler Sedan 1964 6 noFord Falcon 1964 3 noFord Falcon 1963 9 noFord Falcon 1962 8 noFord Fairlane 1966 10 noFord Fairlane 1965 1 noFord Custom 1964 2 noFord Custom 1963 3 noFord Custom 1962 11 noChevrolet Sedan 1964 3 noChevrolet Sedan 1962 4 noHarley/Davidson M/C 1965 9 noHarley/Davidson M/C 1962 4 noHarley/Davidson M/C 1960 2 noHarley/Davidson M/C 1959 3 noHarley/Davidson M/C 1958 1 no

'Tt~r~ npr'SECR'E,J: t:1~J

... .~ ';. l' .:~

'\ ..-~:~ -'~~'~:~"._:,

VEHICLES IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

WHICH ARE NOT OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURE

Make Year Type Number

Mercedes-Benz 1963 Bus 2Bedford 1962 Stake Truck 4Hillman 1962 Truck 2Commer 1963 Bus 1Commer 1962 Truck 1Bedford 1962 Truck 4Toyota 1964 Jeep 11Toyota 1963 Auto 1Datsun 1966 Auto 6Singer 1966 Auto 12Opel 1965 Auto 9Honda 1967 Motorcycle 6Honda 1965 Motorcycle 11Lambreta 1965 Motorcycle 18Lambreta 1962 Motorcycle- 1

3-wheeledSuzuki 1967 Motorcycle 1Kawasaki 1966 Motorcycle 1Yamaha 1964 Motorcycle 6Cazenave 1966 Motorcycle 1Tule 1967 Motorcycle 1

OTHER EQUIPMENT IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

Make Year Type Number A.I.D. procured

Chevrolet 1966 Panel truck 7 yesChevrolet 1964 Panel Truck 4 noChevrolet 1962 Panel Truck 5 noChevrolet 1962 . Pick-up Truck 8 noChevrolet 1967 Bus 2 yesWillys 1967 Station Wagon 6 yesWillys 1966 Station Wagon 17 yesFord 1965 Pick-up Truck 3 no

87

(~ ..... ~ ruI'r ,

~..,1 r1

SECRET 'I. ::~ :<~

.:.,~

Make Year Type Number A.I.D. procured

Ford 1964 Pick-up Truck 3 noFord 1962 Pick-up Truck 4 noFord 1965 Stake Truck 1 noFord 1964 Stake Truck 1 noFord 1963 Tow Truck 1 noFord 1963 Stake Truck 1 noFord 1962 Dump Truck 1 noDodge 1963 Bus 3 no

88

PARTS EXPENDITURE REPORT-NATIONAL POLICE REPAIR SHOPDOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ANNEX N

.. J.:J

~f~l

e----

13,651

I--

I~-

f-- 10,434 I' -

At..

8.9911~ ~

"'. "

\.400.t

- -

I

~.772~

\~ ~-- 6,616

~............ 6.101 6,861

l1li"'" - ~

~ '~970 ~~, ..... ,

4,789 5,463

~A4,676

~-

4,2~ -- j....... ..........

'\ 2.16)"~3r~

4,589 .................~ 3,953 .,,........ 3,441I-- 3,261 -

\-~ 11'-- -

1,180

o

2,000

1,000

11,000

10,000

14,000

13,000

12,000

MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB

1967 1968 1969

~ECREr~ 'd

,,',.....

ANNEX 0

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Team has neither the competence nor the responsibility to evaluate the military as­sistance program. However, since the military forces share with the police the responsibility formaintaining internal security it is considered important to set forth certain facts as provided byMAAG Mission and to note comments of the Country Team regarding the MAP and Dominicanmilitary forces.

The force strength of the Dominican military forces is Army, 10,834; Navy, 3,406; AirForce, 3,798 for a total of 18,038 men and officers. The military assistance program supportsthe first and second Infantry Brigades, having a strength of 4,336 men, whose mission is to re­inforce the National Police in maintaining internal security in urban and rural areas. It alsosupports support elements of the Army consisting of the Engineer Battalion of 332 men, en­gaged in civic action; a Transportation Company of 525 men, and a Signal Maintenance Companyof 52 men.

The Navy MAP supports ten of the Dominican Navy's fleet of twenty ships of all typesand concentrates mostly in developing an offshore patrol capability in the Navy. About 300Dominican Navy personnel are assigned to MAP supported craft.

The Air Force element of the MAAG supports all of the Dominican Air Force aircraftexcept for Vampire Jets (12) and Alouette helicopters (2). Some 740 Air Force personnel areemployed in the MAP supported squadrons.

The U.S. input for the military assistance program for the past four years (excludingadvisor salaries) has been:

000 DOD Projected

FY 1966 Army 1,433.4 1971Navy 585.4 Grants 867Air Force 790.5 Other 917

Total 1,808.4 1,784

FY 1967 Army 1,089.0 1972Navy 647.2 Grants 868Air Force 870.6 Other 917

Total 1,606.8 1,785

FY 1968 ArmyNavyAir Force

FY 1969 ArmyNavyAir Force

Total

Total

631.5319.1

1,359.5

2,310.1

1,473.2278.0592.9

2,344.1

GrantOther

1973881917

1,785

The total numbers of MAAG advisors of all types now authorized to the Mission is 31.The Country Team commented in the CASP on the capabilities of the Army and its

relationship to the police as follows.

"The MAAP supported First Brigade of the Army, consisting of three Infantry battalions, hasan adequate capability of providing backup support to the rural and urban police in maintainingsecurity in any part of the country. Support, planned and approved, for the Second Brigadeof the Army, which controls the northwestern section of the country, will further reduce themovement times for the back-up support in that region. It is expected that early in 1969 oneMAP-supported battalion from the First Brigade will move to the north west and provide a morereadily available reaction force in the country's second largest urban area and principal agricul­tural districts. A new battalion will be trained and equipped in the First Brigade in order tomaintain its present effectiveness close to Santo Domingo. Planned and approved support fortwo additional infantry battalions and part of the Second Brigade headquarters should furtherincrease internal defense capabilities. The remaining units of the Second Brigade, the ThirdBrigade and the Fourth Brigade (until its expected deactivation) remain scattered throughoutthe country performing patrol and police functions and are incapable of overall rapid assemblyor movement. However, full-time training and joint plans and operations with the police arerequired if the First Brigade is to realize the full capability afforded by MAP-provided materialand training. Although police and military officials profess to accept, in principle, the conceptthat both groups have mutually-supporting internal security roles, which require the closestcoordination of their planning, training, and operations, there is still lacking a firm and continuinginterest in bringing about effective cooperation and coordination between the two organizations.The Joint Operations Center has not been fully accepted."

ANNEX P

PROPOSED PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT GOAL DESCRIPTION

The Public Safety Project will provide technical and material assistance and training inorder to assist the building of the Dominican police institution capable of providing essentialpolice services to the public, ensure daily law and order, prevent disruption by subversion .and criminality and protect the lives and property of the people. Toward this general goal theproject will have as its objectives:

The improvement and modernization of -

I. Police Organization and Administration by means of:A. Reorganization of rural police provinces who form regional zones,B. Working through the Planning Office to develop realistic budgetary practices,C. Working through the Planning Office and Traffic Division to expand the

Highway Patrol to the north and east and to continue police participation in civilian trafficcouncils,

D. The development of a vigorous police/community relations program in orderto gain popular support for police activities and improve the image of the police.

ll. Manpower Development by means of various kinds of training programs:A. Complete the development of the recruit school at Borinquen to train recruits

each year,B. Establish a training program for junior officers now in the service to train

200 officers each year.C. Complete the establishment of a two-year cadet college at Borinquen to train

50 cad~ts each year.D. Establish regular refresher training programs in the police disciplines and .fire-

arms marksmanship in each of the four regional zones.E. Continue advisory aid in the conduct of joint service senior officer management

seminars at the rate of at least four each year.F. Continue to provide advisory aid in special skills training programs, i.e., motor

vehicle maintenance, communication equipment maintenance, driver education, radio operators,etc.

G. Establish an adequate visual aids development capability at the new BourinquenSchool.

H. Provide training opportunities for selected officers at the International PoliceAcademy at about the rate of 25 per year for the next four years.

Ill. Develop a minimum acceptable level of Civil Disturbance Control capability forpolice assigned to the capitol and principal urban centers by:

A. Increasing the strength of the CDC unit to 500 (from 285) as a minimum byOctober 1969.

B. Retraining of the existing personnel by October 1969 emphasizing humaneriot control methods.

C. Providing refresher training to regular duty police in Santiago, La Romana,and other urban centers by October 1969.

D. Assuming that gas munition stocks are sufficient for all urban centers.IV. Upgrading the capability of criminal investigators to perform their tasks properly

and effectively by:A. Urging the joining of the two separate investigation divisions.B. Providing aid in intensive investigator refresher training.

V. Assuring the provision of a reliable communications to meet administrative and op­erational needs by:

A. Completing the FM-5 installations as the new zones are established throughoutthe country.

B. Continuing aid in technician training programs.C. The establishment of a Communications Center in the capitol.

VI. Broadening the now-accepted concept of police records and identification proceduresthrough the country by:

A. Continuing technical assistance to develop zone records centers.VII. Assuring a minimum acceptable capability for transportation of all kinds for the

force by:A. Working through the Planning Office to develop a police vehicle retirement

and procurement program.B. Continuing training for about 15 vehicle mechanics per year.C. Working through the Planning Office to develop a system ensuring the regular

supply of funds for POL.VIII. Sustaining the capability of the Department of Special Operations by:

A. Providing continuing technical assistance.B. Providing modest material inputs representing those items that the GODR is

unable to buy with its own funds.

r ."

ANNEX QPUBLIC SAFETY PROCUREMENT FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

COST IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARSSUB-PROJECT GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF COMMODITIES FY 1969 FY 1970 TOTAL

1. Civil Disturbance Riot Control Equipment, Special supplies, weapons,Control replacement of tear gas 5. 5. 10.

2. Basic Training, Training Aids, Classroom equipment 2.5 3. 5.5Borinquen

3. Leadership Education, Training Aids, Office and Classroom equipment 5. 10. 15.Cadets, Junior &Senior Officers ,~

'.4. Firearms Training Weapons (carbines, rifles, revolvers, shotguns), 95. 95. 190. V'):

mconsolidated training ammo. requirements, n',reloading equipment, supplies, spares ~.

m:-I

5. Police Administration Office equipment: file cabinets, typewriters, 2. 1. 3.drafting and visual presentation equipment

6. Rural/Municipal Policing File cabinets, typewriters, training aids 2. 2. 4.

7. Traffic Control Patrol cars, wreckers, ambulances, motorcycles (54) (25) (79)(consolidated with MVM budget), special tech- 8. 4. 12.nical equipment including radios/lights, sirens,cameras, and film

8. Investigations File cabinets, typewriters, investigative aid 1.5 1. 2.5equipment

9. Communications Radios, spares, tools and test equipment, a 43. 60. 103.console

ANNEX R

BRIEFING FOR THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

The Team provided comments on police capabilities and performance and proposedcourses of action as set forth in pp 20 through 39 of this report. General Braulio respondedto practically each of the recommendations. Information he provided in this manner is sum­marized below:

Riot Control

a) increase of strength to 500: now plans to increase CDC force strength with 50men next class to graduate at Boringnen.

b) retraining, omit carrying arms: no comment on retraining per se, but madestrong point of his belief that arms are necessary to "give a show of force".He says he is co"nvinced that this is reason major riots haven't occurred todate. Willing to try using baton and gas only, but not enthusiastic about it.

RIOT CONTROL CONTINGENCY PLAN: Sees no problem in developing plan.

COORDINATION: Now doing various things to assure coordination of police and militaryservices:

a) Chiefs of services meet every Friday and discuss current and mutual problems­then go to see the President.

b) the Senior Officer Seminar is helpful.c) the Joint Operations Center, referred to as a "unified command" by Braulio,

is an established entity (note: information obtained by the Team is that thisis not case, but little would be needed to get it in working order).

d) the Communications Center will be helpful in coordination.

PUBLIC RELATIONS: mentioned fact that NP now has television and radio programs.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION: agreed with Teams comments on need-pointed out that anumber of the police brought into the force during the Trujillo era are usually the oneswho are troublemakers. Otherwise seemed favorably disposed to the recommendation.

POLICE INVESTIGATIONS: (inadvertently omitted in the briefing)

MOBILE PATROL: agreed patrol must be mobile, but pointed out a lack of funds.

95

Dr "r~~c;,R,H, "';'W"'~~ ;1 ry; '~ ';..'\ ~; .~"; [ll}~ jrr~ ~ ~

MANPOWER: has been aware of problem (as_jsJhe:~armyJiegardingits personnel used for fixedposts). Has been meeting with bank officials weekly for past five weeks during which heproposed banks employ own guards.' He got an agreement, but was instructed by thePresident to back down. He states he has less than 400 men on fixed posts today.

TRANSPORTATION: ~grees vehicle retirement/new procurement plan makes sense, but inquiredas to how many vehicles would be procured by the U.S. He mentioned he needed toknow this in order to prepare a proper budget request. The Team stated that he shouldplan for all vehicles to be procured by the GODR since the U.S. cannot do so indefinite­ly-he seemed to understand this. He mentioned that the police would not have to paycustoms duties on new procurement.

ANNEX S

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CHIEF OF STATE AND CABINET MEMBERS

President .Vice-President .Sec. of St. for Agriculture .Sec. of St. for Armed Forces .Sec. of St. for Education, Fine arts, Public Worship . . . . . .Sec. of State for Finance . . . . . . . . .Sec. of State for Foreign Relations .Sec. of State for Industry and Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sec. of State for Interior & Police . . . . . . . . . .Sec. of State for Labor .Sec. of State for Public Health & Social Welfare .Sec. of State for Public Works & Communications .Sec. of State Without Portfolio .Sec. of State Without Portfolio .Sec. of State Without Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sec. of State Without Portfolio .Sec. of State Without Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dir. Gen. of Dominican Institute of Social Security . . . . . . . .

BALAGUER, JoaquinLORA, Francisco AugustoALVAREZ Bogaert, FernandoPEREZ Y PEREZ, Enrique*DUVERGE, Mejia, Luis A.MARTINEZ, Francisco**AMIAMA Tio, FernandoBREA Pena, Jose A.**MENDEZ Lara, Jose Joaquin*DIAZ, PolibioFERNANDEZ Mena, Mario**LULO Gitte, MichelMIOLAN Reynoso, Angel**ESTRELLA Sadhala, OscarAMIAMA Tio, LuisCHAVES, Antonio Grullon, Dr.RODRIGUEZ, Jose RamonSMESTER, Federico Maximo

Cabinet originally installed on July 1, 1966. This list reflects changes made through January 15,1969.

* Military members of the Cabinet** PRD dissidents

Other members of the Cabinet are either members of the PRD or loyal to President Balaguer.

97

REGIONAL POPULATION FIGURESANNEX T

---------- -._---_._--------------

ANNEX U

NATIONAL POLICE BUDGET FIGURES

(Amounts shown are year-end summaries)

Table of Budgetary Classifications CY 1967!

01 Personal Services 12,450,708.170101 Salaries 12,445,776.170107 Representation Expenses 3,600.000108 Technical Services 1,332.000109 Others-Miscellaneous

·02 Non-Personal Services 86,871.57operating costs

0201 Communication Services0202 Utilities 17,491.810203 Publicity, Printing and Binding0204 Travel Allowances 30,242.400205 Freight & Storage 2,917.950206 ~ental 16,311.410207 Insurance0208 Building Maintenance 19,902.0003 .Expendables and Consumables 448,274.500301 Rations ~7,381.510303 Uniforms and Textile Products 130,943.220304 Paper and Cardboard Products, 6,500.00

Printed Matter0305 Rubber and Leather Products 35,950.000306 Chemical Products, Fuel 197,499.77

. '& Lubricants03Q7 Non-Metalic.Construction

Materials0308 Metalic Construction Materials0309 Cleaning Equipment & Misc. 416.60

10,000.001,000.00.

NATIONAL POLICE BUDGET FIGURES (Cont)

(amounts shown are year-end summaries)

Table of Budgetary Classifications CY 1967 CY 1968 CY 1969

0310 Repuestos (Spares) 56,275.0004 Purchase & Repair of Machinery 48,731.97 63,326.24 18,000.00

and Equipment0402 Appliances, Utility and

Communications Equipment0403 Vehicles 330.00 425.00 2,000.000404 Office Equipment 5,015.99 6,000.000407 Heavy Tools

(.·'';':.''"..j~·.l':'''~\:~

0408 Spares - All Types 39,491.97 45,830.75::;~:i~~·:~-::~?~~

~~~0409 Misc. Furnishings & Equipment 8,910.00 12,054.50 10,000.00 ~:E~~-~--~

0412 Repair of Appliances r"C"V)'-

1-1 0413 Repair of Vehicles ~:-m,

,1""" #:~ 0 0414 Repair of Office Equipment!O

~~0 (-;l:J .

07 Fixed Obligations 399,681.74 456;251.76 456,000.00 rm:'-~

(I t: 0701 Pensions 399,681.74 456,251.76 456,000.00 ~~.-'. .-

[~£1 11 Special Accounts 78,690.00 41,965.001 Intelligence Service 31,200.00 41,965.002 School Funds3 Materials for Homicide Division4 National Police Public Relations 4,375.005 Officers Club Fund 5,100.006 Unknown Special Accounts 3,200.00-7 Unknown Special Accounts 34,815.00

TOTALS RD $13,520,907.95 $13,676,206.78 $13,696,885.00

CY 1969 NATIONAL POLICE BUDGET

Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity ActivityCurrent Expenses #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 TOTAL +

01 Personal Services 3,727,800 2,258,880 2,180,580 3,565,790 862,410 12,595,41002 Non-Personal

Services 46,000 1,800 1,200 66,000 115,00003 *Materials & Supplies 324,775 16,000 22,000 31,500 118,000 512,27507 Pensions 456,200 456,200

Capital Investments

04 Purchase & Repair ofMachinery & Equipment 18,000 18,000

06 Construction 50,000 50,000

TOTALS 4,622,775 2,276,680 2,203,780 3,663,240 980,410 13,746,885

~- •.•'- ..... _,4. ::'

* (POL - tires and spares included)

March 26, 1969

Activity # 1 General Staff and Administrative HeadquartersActivity # 2 Traffic, Highway, and Radio Patrol ServicesActivity # 3 Secret Service, Department of Special Operations, Criminal

investigations, and Penitentary DetailActivity # 4 Operation Services at Company, Detachment, and PostsActivity # 5 Training, Health, and Social Action

C' r~·'~

\~\~\\\1$EC RETi,~.J, \!:\. -••

ANNEX V

NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH DETAILED BY GRADE OR RANK AND SALARY

GeneralColonelL1. ColonelMajorCaptain1st L1.2nd L1.Sgt. Major1st Sgt.Sgt. A & CSergeantCorporalPFCPrivate

1123348

113178283154

80114625892994

4,990

$675.00 per mo.390.00370.00330.00290.00235.00215.00155.00145.00135.00125.00115.00

95.0090.00

$110.00

100.00100.00

Special Allowances:Sub-Chief (Colonel)Professional Personnel

(doctors, lawyers)Regional CommandantsTechnicians

(chauffeurs, communi­cations personnel, bandmembers, highway patrol-men, etc.) Varies $5.00 to $50.00

I Private Industry Pay Scale: Minimum wage in the Dominican Republic is 25c per hour.The usual wage paid throughout industry both state and private is as follows:

Unskilled laborSemi-skilled laborSkilled labor

$2.50 per day4.00 per day8.00 per day

It is understood that these wages are subject to graduation depending upon the type of industry andthe location of the plant. In general, somewhat higher wages are paid in the capital city than in theinterior of the Republic.

102

';;~~~~n~SIHn}

Recruitment Standards: Applicants must be citizens of the Dominican Republic; have an8th Grade education; be of sound physical and mental health; of good moral character; have nocriminal record or pending civil suits; neither they nor their families have been involved in the at­tempted overthrow of the Dominican government; be in possession of a good conduct certificatesigned by the District Attorney of their judicial district; meet minimum physical requirements of135Ibs., 5'5"; must be at least 18 and no more than 30 years of age.

Selection Procedures: After successfully completing a written examination (minimumpassing score of 70 unless waived), final selection of candidates is made by a panel of NationalPolice officers assigned to the Police Academy.

The average number of years police experience is nine as calculated by the National PolicePersonnel Office.

Force deployment by district:

Administration Number Total

Federal District 2,086 2,006 5,418San Juan Region 19 2 199San Pedro de Macoris 13 2 215La Vega 33 3 413Monte Christy 21 1 161Barahona 19 1 196La Romana 12 1 125San Francisco de Macoris 29 3 199Santiago 82 6 608

103

ANNEX V

1300700

CE PAY SCALEI

PAY SCALE

600500400300200100oI I I---.----_.-------~-----,

~---.------• _____ a

~--- ---------~-- -------.--~--- ----------.-----_.-----~--- ---___ II

NATIONAL POllI

~__ I 1--... NATIONAL ARMY

-------------

2ND. LIEUTENANT

LT. COLONEL

CAPTAIN

FI RST LIEUTENANT

MAJOR

BRIGADIER GENERAL

SUB-CHIEF (COLONEL)

COLONEL

SERGEANT MAJOR

FIRST SERGEANT

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

SERGEANT A & C

SERGEANT

CORPORAL

PRIVATE

DOMINICAN I"NDUSTRY PAY SCALE1300700600500400300200100

I I I ...I-F

o

MAI\IAGERIAL

SUPERVISORY

SKI LLED LABOR

SEMI-SKI LLED LABOR

. UN-SKI LLED LABOR

CANE-PICKER

ANNEX W

REQUIREMENT FOR ENLISTING IN THE NATIONAL POLICE

The enlistment as a recruit in the National Police shall be voluntary but the enlisteeswill be required to serve for a four-year period. The enlistees shall take a constitutional oathand swear loyalty to the Republic, promising to support the legally constituted government, obeyand acquire obedience to the constitution and laws of the country. No person shall join theNational Police as a recruit if he does not meet the following conditions.

a. Be a Dominican citizen in full possession of his political and civil rights.b. Have reached the age of 21 to 30 years.c. Be at least 5'6" in height and weigh 140 lbs.d. Have at least passed the Second Course of Intermediate Education (8th grade)

verified by the Certificate of Sufficiency. This should be attached to the applicationfor enlistment.

e. Be in good health, be of robust constitution with good conformation, according toa medical examination to be conducted by National Police physicians.

f. Be of good habits and furnish a certificate of non-criminality issued by the Districtof the applicant's residence.

g. Not have been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor nor have been dismissed fromany other public service for bad conduct.

h. Have no pending public action.1. Renounce all political militancy.j. Pass the qualifying examination given to the National Police recruit candidate with

a minimum score of 70.

Said examination shall comprise the following subjects: Spanish Language, Mathematics, Socialand Natural Sciences at the 8th grade level.

~-.-/- - - -

~-~~

UNITED STATU OF AMEIleA

·11111'