Evaluation of Navab Regeneration Project in Central Tehran, …...Moses did in New York: The...

Int. J. Environ. Res., 1(2): 114-127, Spring 2007ISSN: 1735-6865

*Corresponding author: [email protected]

Evaluation of Navab Regeneration Project in Central Tehran, Iran

Bahrainy, H.1* and Aminzadeh, B.2

1Faculty of Urban Planning, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran2Faculty of Environment, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

ABSTRACT: Urban design has been used in the cities throughout the world to achieve certaingoals and purposes. It has been common in developing countries, including Iran, to use urbanregeneration plans in the older sections of large cities to eliminate urban blight and decay, andeventually achieve modernization and in some cases to also overcome socio-economic and culturalproblems. Approaches have been used are modernist, technocratic, and elitist type of design/decision-making, which, as, the present case study show, results in complete failure. This studyintends to, following a discussion on theoretical basis of the issue, through a post-construction/post-occupancy evaluation of the Navab Regeneration Project in central Tehran, explore the reasonsbehind this failure and see how the problems involved in the product may be construed to the kindof design/decision-making process applied.

Key words: Urban design, urban regeneration, Tehran, Navab Project, evaluation

Received 14 May 2006; Revised 11 Aug 2006; Accepted 11 Oct 2006

INTRODUCTIONThe modernization movement in Iran began in

the 1870’s under Naser-ed-Din shah Qajar. Hehad been to Paris and loved it. Upon his return hehad the old walls of the city pulled down and anew set erected further out on the plain. Betweentwo walls a new “European” quarter was planned,complete with French-style parks. On the westernhalf was a huge square, an embassy row, and apromenade, Lalezar Street. But it was under RezaShah (1921-41) that the idea got the momentum.He attempted to modernize major cities by drivinga network of long straight roads through the heartof the urban fabric and articulating crossroads withlarge round-about where he set up statues ofhimself. Two intersecting main axes were cutthrough Tehran, and there were similar practicesin other Iranian cities such as: Shushtar, Hamedan,Mashhad, and Yazd. This process of modernizationintroduced new and unprecedented typologies ofurban and architectural works to the traditionalfabric of the cities, some of which later becamelandmarks. The result was a radical heterogeneityin major cities of Iran. Tehran as a promoter ofthe modern vision lies in the uneven heterogeneity

which represents the absurdity of modernization.

Construction of urban highways andboulevards intensified from 1950’s during theSecond Pahlavi as a symbolic sign ofmodernization. As we will see NavabRegeneration Project has utilized both those tools-reconstruction of old houses to medium and high-rise buildings, and construction of a new highway.These plus the urban redevelopment programsmake what Jacobs (1961) calls the Big Projectswhich have all been in decline throughout the worldsince 1970’s.

Historically, in the context of closed systems,the decision-making and implementation of thesekinds of large-scale projects are made at the topand is imposed on society as a goodwill gesture toimprove the quality of life of citizens, while in mostcases certain political goals are in agenda. Severaldifferent terms have been used for these kinds ofapproaches, such as: top-down, unitary, elitist,technocratic, autocratic, etc. Mazumdar (2000),for example, uses the term autocratic, anddescribes the concept of “autocratic control” in

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Iran during the history and particularly during thePahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) and points out howdecisions, actions and interventions by a personwith near-unlimited power transforms the city’smorphology. By control he means “forces thataffect, limit, push, pull and restrict the freedom ofaction of people with respect to their activitiesaffecting the city. Control can be achieved from,and be closely linked to, the political, administrative,social and religious structure of society”(Mazumdar, 2000).

Between the years of 1968 to 1978, the Cityof Tehran, already undergone unprecedentedgrowth and decay due to many factors, particularlydue to the eight-year war with Iraq and economicsanctions, got herself a new strong mayor,comparable to Haussmann under Napoleon III inParis, France. What Haussmann did was amassive surgery, whose grands travaus (publicworks) redrew the plan of Paris between 1850and 1870, providing a model for old citieseverywhere anxious to meet the needs of moderntraffic. These incisions were referred to, neutrally,as peercees or cuts, the word eventrement, onthe other hand, literally “disemboweling” or“eviscerating,” suggested a surgical metaphor inline with seeing the city as subject to pathologicaldisorders (Kostof, 1992). Haussmann’s rebuildingof Paris, writes Clark, “was spectacular in the mostoppressive sense of the word (Clark, 1986). “Oncethe city is imaged by capital solely as spectacle, itcan then be consumed passively, rather thanactively created by the populace at large throughpolitical participation (Low and Smith, 2006). Frey(1999), evaluating several cases of urbanregeneration in Europe calls this type ofintervention radical surgery which according tohim will eventually lead to failure. He insteadrecommends a rather more realistic approachcalled conservative surgery.

The mayor of Tehran, during the decade of1968-1978 was given the absolute authority andpower to do exactly what New York’s RobertMoses did in New York: The Haussmann of urbanexpressways suggested: “When you operate in onoverbuilt metropolis, you have to hack your waywith a meat axe” (Kostof, 1992). Kostof, in theCity Shaped, describes these kinds of projects asGrand Manner. Avenues are usually only a matterof a public front, behind which lay fragments of

older buildings dismembered by the inflexible, widestraight line of the cut.

During the last fifty years, Iran has hadnumerous experiences in various scales andsubjects of urban design, ranging from new towndesign, to urban renewal, and reconstruction ofthe-war-and-earthquake damaged areas, none ofwhich have been actually successful, andunfortunately no lessons has been learned fromthose failures. Contrary to the reconstruction ofthe war-and-earthquake-damaged areas, urbanregeneration is a planned demolition for thepurposes of reducing physical blight, socialdisorders, poverty eradication, and improving theoverall quality of life in cities. It, therefore, doesnot have the urgency of reconstructions due tonatural disasters, which means that the designsolutions in the case of urban regeneration couldbe more thoughtful, elaborate and with carefulanalysis of all variables, various courses of actions,possible impacts, and eventually with lessmistakes.

The Institute of Civil Engineers InfrastructurePolicy Group (1988) maintains that the objectiveof urban regeneration is to return the area as soonas possible to a self-supporting physical, social andeconomic base. The main characteristics ofsuccessful urban regeneration, according to thisInstitute, are defined as:• Strong motivation• Local participation and support• Flexibility in approach• Partnership between public and private

sector• Initial public sector investment

It should be emphasized that whileinvolvement and support of the local communityare essential to the success, and will prepare thecontext for strong motivations, support andpartnership, compulsory purchase procedures,which are commonly used in urban regenerationplans everywhere, are cumbersome and timeconsuming and will eventually make the completesuccess of the project far fetched. In developingcountries, however, the compulsory purchase order(CPO) is the core tool of urban regeneration plans.Legal discourse, practices and institutions ofCPOs’ are powerful factors in perpetuatingrelations of social authority, power, exclusion and

Bahrainy, H. and Aminzadeh, B.

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oppression. The exclusion of certain interests fromlegal processes in urban renewal is realizedthrough compulsory purchase which excludes thepoor, the socially and politically marginal (Imrieand Thomas, 1994).

Over the past 20 years or so, the moreprotracted conflicts over urban renewal schemeshave occurred where state authorities haveattempted to acquire land and property throughthe use of compulsory purchase orders (CPOs).While the use of CPOs has become less prominentover this period, a number of high-profileredevelopments, for example, London’s Docklandsscheme and Sheffield’s Lower Don Valley havebeen critically dependent upon them. Given theadversarial nature of CPOs, in which the stateseeks to acquire someone’s property without theirconsent, it is hardly surprising that the experiencesof them have been characterized by opposition,dissent and general hostility from those affectedby compulsory purchase. In these kinds of casesthe ideology of public interest completelyovershadows the ideology of private property (seeImrie and Thomas, 1994).

There is a sizable literature discussing the wayin which urban policy has promoted multi-sectoralpartnerships. It is now common place for manyindividuals and organizations, including business,community groups, the voluntary sector and otherpublic sector bodies, to cooperate with localauthorities in a wide range of activities. Thisprocess of collaboration, usually described as”local governance”, has become a major theme inurban studies (Davies, 2001). In developingcountries, however, the concept is still unknownand unpracticed, which is due to this fact that thecivil society is not playing its critical role in thedevelopment of self-supporting urbancommunities. Civil society is one in which citizenscollaborate with government to develop theircommunities with goal of eliminating poverty,improving living conditions, embracing humandignity, protecting the environment andstrengthening cultural and social cohesion. In facturban regeneration provides a golden opportunitytoward civil society, through participation,empowerment, and capacity building. Aside fromlegal and administrative issues, urban regenerationrequires special skills and knowledge in the partof planner/designer which provide him/her with

the competency to deal with the complex problemsof urban regeneration. This knowledge is far overwhat architects normally possess.

Christopher Alexander suggests seven rulesfor a successful urban regeneration project tocreate wholeness in the city, the first and the mostimportant of which is the piecemeal growth. Healso suggests a single, overriding rule whichgoverns all others: every increments ofconstruction must be made in such a way to healthe city. This statement has great implications forurban regeneration plans (Alexander, 1987).

But how are we going to know a project willheal the city and help toward its wholeness. Canwe actually predict the outcome of a project, withall positive and negative impacts, both within theproject itself and also in the surroundings? Thielmaintains that the essence of a true design processis the element of prediction: that is, for an activityto be called design, one should be reasonablyconfident that the proposal will in fact meet thepreviously established performance specifications.If there are no performance specifications, and ifthere is no evaluation of the performance of thebuilt project, there is then no evidence of design(Thiel, 1997).

The usual process of urban development/regeneration treats buildings as isolated objectssited in the landscape, not as part of the largerfabric of streets, squares, and viable open space.In this context decisions are usually made on thebasis of economic interests (profit taking), politicalinterests (gaining support of the lower incomegroups, and prestige) or engineering interests(solving traffic problems). In this all commonprocess, urban space is seldom even thought ofan exterior volume with properties of shape andscale and with connections to other spaces.Therefore, what emerges in most environmentalsettings is unshaped anti-space, which makes nopositive contribution to the surroundings or the users(Trancik, 1986). Automobile dependency (fast,transit access), modern and postmodernmovements attitudes toward space, ill-definedurban renewal policies and strategies, no definedrole for urban design and no respect for publicspace and the context are some of the maincharacteristics of this kind of urban design/regeneration.

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There are many these days who believe thatsustainable community development should becharacterized by “eco-innovation”, or innovativeeconomic development that respects the ecologyof the community and include dense, mixed-useneighborhoods, reduced material consumption,recycling, local retailers, walking, cycling andpublic transport, low car ownership, a mix ofpeople and cars and a link between jobs, andworkers’ residence (Carley, et al., 2001) Urbanregeneration provides a golden opportunity to turnthe existing trend of neighborhoods into moresustainable situation and to reestablish the publicrealm, fragmented by private interest and hostileforces, in a built form which liberates rather thanrepresses the life of the city (Gosling and Maitland,1984).

Navab Street, an old north-South Street inCentral Tehran, has had a vital role in linkingdifferent local districts and neighborhoods ofTehran in the last 70 years. Total project area was800 hectares and included some twentyneighborhoods, with a population of 259,828 in1996. The buildings were mostly 50 to 60 yearsold, representing the typical second Pahlavi’sarchitecture, built of masonry with 1 or 2 stories.The area was a cohesive social, physical, andcultural entity, consisting of several well-definedneighborhoods with strong family and socialrelations, sense of belonging and unity. As we willsee, this well-defined social, physical, andfunctional organization of the neighborhoods hasbeen destroyed by the Navab RegenerationProject. Included in the first comprehensive planof Tehran (1968) was a new and only main North-South motorway to provide fast and easy accessto and from central and northern parts of the city.The extension of the existing North-SouthChamran motorway further to the south, as astrategic plan to improve the transportationnetwork in the City of Tehran, has been part ofthe general planning activities of the Municipalityof Tehran for a long time. The plan would havesignificant role in solving part of the extensiveproblems of the transportation network in theGreater City of Tehran. In the 1992 RevisedComprehensive Plan of Tehran, the motorway wasreconfirmed as one of the four main highwayswhich complete the ring around the central coreof the city. The scale of the project, the magnitude

of demolition, and the financial resources neededto implement the project were so high that noauthority and/or organization dared to embark onthe project.

It was late in 1992 that the Municipality ofTehran finally adopted the plan and began itsimplementation. In addition to the motorway, thecity decided to develop the corridor into a newurban complex by providing high-densityresidential, commercial and office uses. Thereason behind this decision was twofold: a) toprovide space for relocated or demolishedactivities, and b) to provide the vast financialresources needed for the project (TehranMunicipality, 1992a). The total area of demolishedresidential units was 479,600 square meters andthe length of the strip 5,529 m. To save time,provide diversity and involve several design groupsin the project, the area was broken down into fivephases, each of which was contracted to aconsulting firm to prepare the detailed plan (Fig.1).

Actual implementation of the project startedin 1994 (Fig. 2), and expected to be completed infour years. The width of the constructed highwayis between 50-60 m, and a depth of 10-30 m isconsidered for buildings on both sides of thehighway (Fig. 3). The project introduced more than8500 new residential units to the area, most ofwhich were below 75 square meters. The buildings,with a high density of up to 19 stories provide some750,000 square meters of residential and 160,000square meters of commercial and office spaces(Tehran Municipality, 1992b & 1996). Thesenumbers show the extent of the intervention inthe existing fabric of the city and the impact it hashad, and will continue to have, on surroundings,the residents, and even the whole city.

The implementation of the project would haverequired substantial financial resources to coverthe costs of purchasing, demolition, andconstruction. This heavy financial burden was oneof the reasons why the project prolonged for somany years. The exact amount of the total costof the project is not known, but what is importantin this regard is that the city has decided to issuepublic bonds with comparatively high rates ofinterest in four phases to secure financial resourcesneeded. The project also benefited from privateinvestments by selling the units at a price below

Evaluation of Navab Regeneration Project

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the market value prior to their construction. Themain financial resources for the project were,therefore, the investment profit (75% net), themunicipality of Tehran, bonds, and the centralgovernment. The properties were bought fromowners, but on a compulsory basis, and with muchlower value than their market prices. Accordingto a report dated October 1996, (TehranMunicipality, 1997) there have been some 256unresolved legal cases of property ownership inthe area. Financial risks associated with overoptimism and false insights regarding the projectculminated in its abandoning for a period of twoyears. Financial pressures later forced the City toeliminate the uneconomic uses of cultural andeducational land uses together with the proposedpark system and green spaces initially foreseen inthe plan. As the project did not utilize effectiveimplementation instruments, so far only the firstand second phases have been built, and the thirdphase is now under construction. Insufficientgovernment funding and lack of private interest inthe project have resulted in its slow andproblematic implementation. To designers, theproject has been a typical large-scale architecturein the modernism movement. The approach usedhas been pragmatic and without a futuristic view;social and cultural issues, therefore, have not beentaken into consideration. Considering the extentof the intervention and size of the investment, thisproject is unprecedented in urban regenerationprojects of Iran (Fig. 4).

Fig. 1. Schematic plan Navab Highway and itsintersections with local streets

Fig. 2. A view of the demolition site in the Navab Project


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Fig. 3. Navab Project under construction

Fig. 4. A view of the built-up corridor of the Navab Project

MATERIALS & METHODSThe research method is a post-occupancy

evaluation. The purpose was to evaluate the end-product of the Navab Project, through a casestudy. To do this, the project’s performance wasevaluated against certain agreed upon criteria. Onthe basis of extensive review of almost all possibleurban design criteria, as well as the goals of theproject, certain criteria were chosen for evaluation.The criteria are as follow: Accessibility, placeidentity, vitality, security and urban facilities. Thesecriteria, mostly qualitative in nature, were thendivided into several sub-criteria, based on the area,

the city, and the social and cultural context. Sincescale plays a significant role in the performanceof any urban project, analysis was focused on twodifferent scales: city (macro), and district (micro).The method of gathering information is based ona direct observation which was carried out by twofaculty members and four graduate students ofenvironmental design to assess the actual qualityof the project and its performance while in use.The following is a brief description of the selectedcriteria:


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Accessibility: This criterion should answer thequestion of how easy it is to reach to other people,activities, and resources. The development ofvarious means of transportation places anemphasis on its functional aspects and constitutesthe root of functionalism as the planning ideology.People withdraw altogether from heavy street. Itcauses danger and accident, creates nuisance andair pollution, invades territories and privacy, willhave adverse impacts on the street life, home life,social interaction and crime (Appleyard, 1981).There are many who suggest that an appropriateurban design can transform the use of car fromobligatory into a selective state by maximizingusage of urban public transportation and providingmotives for walking and bicycling (Girardet, 1999;Deelstra, 2000).

Place Identity: Many believe that in a global cityformation, the more distinctive, unique and speciala city is the more chances it has to succeed (Knight,1989; Kearns and Phil, 1993; Oktay, 2002). Thisemphasizes the issue of place identity. Identity isthe extent to which a person can recognize or recalla place as being distinct from the other places(Lynch, 1981). Relph (1976), in his pioneeringbook, Place and Placelessness relates it to a deephuman need, which exists for associations withsignificant places. Urban identity leads toappreciation of the role culture, history and heritagecan play especially in urban development andreconstruction schemes.The spatial structure, typeof the activities, and a set of building styles andfacade decorations are means of preserving thecultural continuity and shaping the physical identity.

Vitality: The statement “planning can induce cityvitality” (Jacobs, 1961) was one of the design

Table 1. Traffic volume in the old Navab streetand the new highway

No. of Vehicles per hour

Locations

Navab Street (1)

(1990)

Navab Highway(2) (2003)

Azadi St. to Dampezeshki St.

830 2350

Dampezeshki to Imam Khomeini

140 2580

Imam Khomeini to Ghazvin

330 2870

Ghazvin to Helale Ahmar 545 3020 Peak traffic hours 8-9 am 9-10 am Dominant direction North to South North to South

challenges in last decades. Jacobs argues that abustling street life is essential to a good city, andvital streets need a most intricate and close graineddensity of uses that mutually support each other.Gosling (1992) also relates lack of vitality toignoring the mixed-use pattern. Urban texturinggenerates vibrant activity, with maximum durationof coming and goings that bring a place to life. Toevaluate urban vitality, concepts of mixed use andfine grain texture have come to be recognized asimportant factors (Duany and Plater-Zyberk, 1991;Rowley, 1996). For further vitality of a street, itshould be permeable with buildings oriented tosidewalks, and adaptable urban spaces in whichpeople can halt and generate activities.

Security: The “defensible space” conceptconsiders creating an appropriate territory, a feelingof belonging and dedication to space, eye controlover the outside space and rehabilitation of physicalconditions as solutions for insecure spaces(Newman, 1972). Studies of crime situationpatterns and antisocial activities such as drugabuse, smuggling, and vandalism in the last twodecades have shown that they occur in a limitednumber of locations with specific features (hotspots). These studies show that an increase in thenumber of hot spots leads to an increase in thenumber of crimes (Sherman, 1995; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999). Hot spots are well known forcriminals in both local scale and the whole city.

Public Services: A balanced, integrateddevelopment of urban and local services such aseducational and cultural institutions, fire stations,health centers, parks, recreational and tourismfacilities, etc. will increase people’s overallsatisfaction of place. Where services and facilitiesare selected carefully and located in an organizingsystem and subsystem, they will provide safe andeasy accessibility as well as social interactions.

RESULTS & DISCUSSIONSAccessibility

As stated earlier, the main reason forembarking on the Navab Project was provision ofa major North-South access. Table 1 shows thetraffic flow before and after construction ofNavab Highway. These data suggest that there isa significant difference in the number of vehiclestraveling in the highway per hour, before

Source (1): Tehran Municipality (1992a)Source (2): Fieldwork Studies


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construction of the highway (Nov. 1990), and after(Oct. 2003). This shows the changing role of oldNavab Street as a local collector to a new urbantransit road. No estimate, however, is given in theproject for the expected number of trips in thenew highway. Many other factors influence theefficiency of the highway, such as the increase inthe number of accidents due to high number ofnodes, absence of taxi stations in local lanes whichforces people to use fast lanes to get on and off,and insufficient pedestrian passes, which causespassersby to cut through the highway to get to theother side.

Pedestrian access is provided by 12 over andunderpasses. The overpasses of 6.80 m height areunsuitable for children and the elderly. Thesidewalks along the highway do not easemovements due to factors including limited width(2 meters maximum), slopes and stairs, being cutby parking ramps, and closed views in placeslower than the highway level. Slopes and stairshave not allowed provision of bicycle andhandicapped access.

Many local streets which used to serve thearea are now turned into cul de sacs or been cutby the highway and its local lanes. Since themajority of streets cutting through Navab highwayare one way and some crossroads like theintersection of Mortazavi with Navab are notaccessible due to uneven height of the two streets;therefore, local trips have become longer and anoverburden is placed upon the local network.Although a special 7.80 m wide bus route has beenproposed in the initial plan of Navab, widening ofthe open space in front of the blocks later lead toits elimination. The high population density and lowcapacity of public transportation in the area havecaused difficulties for the residents of Navab andsurrounding areas.

Place IdentityThe sense of neighborhoodness is one of the

decisive factors in creating identity. The projecthas not benefited from an identifiable spatialstructure, as it lacks a physical or functional center.The architecture of Navab accentuates itsindividualism. It depicts an urge to be apart fromits context rather than a part of it, and thus it hasno relation with the districts around. In originalIranian architecture, arts, elements, shapes and

forms, are distinct features evolving through time,containing spiritual and symbolic meanings andexpressing historical and cultural values. Thearchitecture of Navab lacks almost all thementioned features. The façades are too simpleand uniform. Its important decorative feature is acombination of gray, red, and yellow that is incontrast with the colorless urban context.

The meaningful landmarks could also beregarded as influential elements of identity. Navabdue to the contrast between its physicalcharacteristics and its context is a prominentlandmark in the city. However, the legibility of thislandmark decreases considerably with the observerlocated inside. Although different phases aredesigned in different colors, the buildings conveyno information to the observer for they carry auniform spirit. Intersections, normally acting as anode, are now either destroyed or transformedinto concrete bridges.

VitalityA mixed-use pattern attracts group(s) of people

and provides a setting for social interactions. OldNavab has served as a center with a variety ofactivities, which can be traced in the number ofwholesalers and retailers, urban office buildings,local firms, banks, clinics, cultural spaces,restaurants and hotels, schools, industrial smallworkshops, stores, and other local and urbanfacilities. At present, the area is dominated byresidential buildings and shops.

The pattern of land division allows the possibilityto design various forms and functions, and couldthus be regarded as a means of creating vitality.Despite the huge blocks that constitute the Navablandscape, the local shops on the ground floordominate the space here and provide a fine grain.The orientation of building entrances could beimportant in creating vitality. All the main buildingentrances in Navab are oriented towards thehighway and open to the sidewalks. This may resultin lively pedestrian movement and a means ofincreasing vitality of place. In the back, however,the situation is quite different, there is no entranceto the buildings but a dead space between old andnew. Although, the existence of adaptable urbanspaces is a key factor in creating vitality, focusingon financial benefits of land uses, has led to limitedopen space in the site. Urban spaces in Navab


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Int.

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Tabl

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avab

Pro

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eval

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polit

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Com

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traffic volume

pedestrian access rel. with

surrounding main streets

focal points

main religious buildings of the

area.

Iranian architectural

features in pub. building

relation with context

meaningful landmarks

mixed use

adaptable urban spaces

recreational facilities

underpasses

back streets

enclosed areas

areas of poor light

demolished areas

office buildings

commercial centers

cultural facilities

functional centrality

north

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relation with surrounding

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relation with sur. walkways

quality of pedestrian passes

quality of over and underpasses

public transportation

sense of neighbor. relation bet. local mosque & other

act. relation with

context architectural

features

landmarks

mixed use

adaptable urban spaces

local shops

fine grain pattern

building oriented to sidewalks

back streets

cul de sucs created by the project

pedest. underpass

Lighting

park local shops

functional distance functional centrality

local

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Tabl

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avab

Pro

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atri

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Bahr

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.

123

Project do not allow activities, sittings and socialinteraction. Apart from Boostan, a small onehectare park on the intersection of a local streetand the highway, no other public park is availablein the area.

SecurityBased on the observations and analyses that

looked for people’s use of open spaces, it wasidentified that less antisocial behaviors take placein Boostan park which is mainly used by children.Areas with closed views including under bridges,the pedestrian underpasses in phase 1, in front ofinactive places such as vacant shops and officesare susceptible and easily occupied by the specialgroups such as drug addicts and dealers. Theresidences of the surrounding areas believe thatthe unsecured attitude of the Navab extends totheir areas, as cul de sacs are also becoming ahangout for offenders. As mentioned before, thenarrow alleys that separate Navab fromsurrounding areas set the conditions for specialgroups which attract offenders.

Lighting could also be regarded as a key factorfor security. In two completed phases, adequatelighting has been provided in the motorway, but

the poor lighting in the overpasses has createdundesirable and unsafe places in these areas. Theminimal lighting has caused pedestrians to usethem much less after the sunset. The areas withlow social interactions increase the likelihood ofattracting special groups; semi-dark routes areamong the preferred spaces for such groups. Poorlighting results in increasing the fear of crime, lessuse by pedestrians and more by offenders.

Public ServicesWith the estimated population of 350,000 by

the time of implementation and the demolishing ofall of the existing urban and local services in thearea, no school, hospital, playground or park(except for the small park in phase 1), culturalspaces or sport facilities will be available to theresidents. Even the shops are very limited in typeand do not provide the everyday needs of theresidents.

Commercial activities are placed along theedges in a far distance, therefore, they are notlocalized which leads to an inefficient circulation.Moreover, the poor maintenance of paths and lackof safety for pedestrians passing through thehighway increase the functional distance.

ACCESSIBILITY

o Increased accidents o The problem of highway crossing o Insufficient number of pedestrian passes o Unsuitable overpasses for children and elderly o Overcrowding o Increased North-South transit access o Inappropriate sidewalks o No handicap and biking access o Blocking local streets by the highway • Increased North-South transit access

PLACE IDENTITY

o Lack of identifiable spatial structure o Lack of spatial and physical identity of

mosques o Physical disintegration o Meaningless buildings and spaces o No historical and cultural continuity o Imposed uniformity of buildings o Strong contrast with surrounding • Colorful facades • Prominent metropolitan landmark

VITALITY

o Single-use (residential) dominancy o Unoccupied shops o Dead spaces between the old and new structures o Inadequate open/urban spaces o Lack of neighborhoodness o Least relation with the other side of the highway o Lack of adequate maintenances o Noise, vibration, and air pollution o Adverse impacts on street life due to heavy

traffic • Lively pedestrian movement in each sidewalk

SECURITY

o Too many indefensible spaces o Poor lighting in the overpasses o Dangers from traffic and crime

PUBLIC SERVICES

o Inadequate public services o Overcrowding o Uneven distribution of commercial uses o Poor maintenance

Table 4. Summary evaluation of Navab Project, based on five selected criteria

positive impact negative impact

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Those living in Navab use facilities outside theirown area and largely in the surroundingneighborhoods, which also suffer from lack ofsufficient local facilities. This has resulted in over-crowding and an overburden on neighborhoodfacilities.

Functional centrality could be regarded as akey factor in the arrangement of activities. Theabsence of a center, the linear form of the projecttogether with random placing of shops have madeaccess to urban and local services difficult.

Tables 2 and 3 show the impacts of the project,on the metropolitan and local levels. Constructingurban highways in old and congested urban fabricsresults in a blending of traffic, at different scales.The study shows that due to the weak relationshipwith surrounding and setting design priority tovehicles over pedestrians, Navab Highway hascaused a serious fragmentation in the previouslyintegrated fabric of this part of the city. Not onlydoes this physical discontinuity has led to a cut-off in the existing sidewalks and streets, but hasalso resulted in a dissociation of neighborhoodsand social interactions, between differentneighborhoods as well as in neighborhoodsthemselves.

A general comparison of the physical characterof the project with the existing fabric of the areaindicates that the project will ultimately developits own identity ــ an identity different to that of itsresidents. No congruence can be detected betweenthe architectural meanings, the pattern of buildingcomposition, size, proportions, colors, shapes,activities, and landmarks, and local cultural context.Although Navab lacks distinct buildings, landscapefeatures and elements that can, as landmarks,create identity and make its modular, standard, anduniform structure legible, the whole projectprovides a landmark in urban scale, which is mostlydue to its sharp contrast with the surrounding area.The single land useـــ residentialـــ , linear patternof activities, a design dictating people’s lifestyleand thus ignoring the flexibility and adaptability ofurban spaces has resulted in creation of passiveplaces.

Housing is mainly intended for low andmedium-income buyers, but displacement andgentrification has reduced social conditions, and

made the area to appear as less desirable comparedto surrounding older areas; thus the most deprivedoccupy the buildings. Although design solutionscan help, but without public control it is difficult toimprove the security of a place. Gentrification hasresulted in the loss of belonging to the place, andlack of market interest intensifies the problem. Theproject has had some positive effects on thesurrounding area as it has encouraged privatesector to begin reconstructing the area.

The result of the evaluation (Table 4) showsthat, in contrast to the claims made by the cityauthorities, and projects’ architects that the highquality of the project would make it as a model,and the principles developed here could beapplicable everywhere else, the project has failed,as it inflicted deep breakdown in the organicstructure of the social and physical fabric of thearea. The new mega structures that replaced thesmall, single, traditional houses and other structureshave created overwhelming inhuman walls on twosides of this machine tunnel. Interaction betweeneast and west neighborhoods has been severelydamaged. This has made the civil life in the areapractically cut.

The hasty decision made by the municipalitytogether with ill-defined strategies and deficienciesin the design process has led to a reduction in therole of local authorities, private partnership, andpublic participation. The result of such process isa weak and problematic physical restructuring,with slow speed implementation, high financial riskassociated with such massive investments,dissatisfied users, and physical and social adverseimpacts on the surrounding neighborhoods.

CONCLUSIONThis paper explained how and why the

planning and design of Navab Project hasessentially failed. The evaluation of Navab Projecthas revealed many significant points that offerimportant lessons for urban reconstructionactivities in Iran, as well as similar contexts ofother countries. Main reasons for the Project’sfailure can be summarized as follows:• Lack of urban design as a framework for

architectural activities• Lack of a systematic, explicit and open

decision-making process;

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• Lack of evaluation, particularly cost-benefitanalysis (economic as well as social andenvironmental) in developing and selectingalternatives;

• Lack of effectuation and monitoring tocorrect the mistakes.

• Lack of a feasibility study to justify theproject’s goals;

• Lack of legal justification for propertyownerships;

• Compulsory evacuation/relocation ofresidents/businesses in the early stages of

• redevelopment;• Lack of a defined authority for the project

management;• Lack of adequate and effective mechanism

for people’s participation in the process;• Interest groups have not been involved in the

design process.• The traditional structure of neighborhoods has

been destroyed.• Environmental issues and the dynamic nature

of city development in central city have notbeen taken into consideration.

• No attention has been made to the changesof land values on the strip edges.

• Accessibility, place identity, vitality, security,and public facilities are the main substantiveelements to be considered as essentialweaknesses of the project.

The evaluation and analysis of the Navabproject once again reconfirms that a government-controlled planning and design, which lacks theprocess of public/private collaboration often leadsto problems in the design/ decision-making processand the eventual failure of the product. As theproject was heavily dependent on the conventionaltheme of government does it all, it failed to respondto the desires, expectations, lifestyles, and tastesof the users, directly, and residents of the wholecity, indirectly. So wrong process could lead towrong product, or a wrong product is the result ofa wrong process.

It is quite disappointing that in a time when thedominant theoretical views in urban design, suchas sustainability, ecological design, new urbanism,collaborativism, and process-oriented design areemphasizing on the key issues mentioned above,

Navab Project is being designed and implementedwithout any slightest attention to these concerns.We may, therefore, conclude that a wrong processhas led to a wrong product. The authors hope thatthe lessons learned from this kind of failure canbe used to improve the design process for large-scale urban projects, and prevent future failures.

To prevent some of these problems in thefuture, more partnership between private andpublic interests need to be encouraged. Aparticipatory place making, supports and enhancesthe compatibility between built form and the needsof a community. This can be done by a conductiveorganization through which public and privateinvestments can be canalized, through whichstakeholders all can participate in thereconstruction process. The government, urbanplanners and architects should act as facilitatorsand catalysts in the planning and design processto create an apparatus for people-centeredplanning to promote the feeling of locality andfoster a more place-focused public reconstructionpolicy. It may be also concluded that in an activityas complex as urban design, particularly in atraditional context such as old textures of Iraniancities, application of a thorough process may infact serve a significant goal by itself in capacitybuilding, empowerment, education, and publicawareness.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTThis paper is based on the findings of a

research project carried out at the GraduateFaculty of Environment, with the financial supportof the Vice Chancellor for Research of theUniversity of Tehran.

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